Month: August 2012

State Sponsored Nuclear Proliferation: Why States Share Nuclear Weapons Technology

by spopescu, posted in Research Notes

Professor Greg Koblentz of the GMU Biodefense Program has a new piece in Global Studies Review:

State-sponsored nuclear proliferation, defined as a government’s intentional assistance to another state to acquire the means of producing nuclear weapons, including the transfer of weapons-grade fissile material, the technology to produce weapons-grade fissile material, or warhead design information, has had a crucial influence on the spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear warhead design supplied to Libya by the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan was initially obtained from China which was itself the recipient of extensive nuclear assistance from the Soviet Union. Iraq, Libya, and Syria might have become members of the nuclear club thanks to sensitive nuclear assistance from other states if outside intervention had not stopped their programs. The current nuclear crises with Iran and North Korea were triggered by the transfer of uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan. Iran is now offering to engage in ostensibly peaceful nuclear cooperation with countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela.

Link to the full piece is here.

National Strategy for Biosurveillance: Anything New?

by spopescu, posted in Policy Review

Reviewed by Siddha Hover (GMU Biodefense PhD program)

The Obama administration published the National Strategy for Biosurveillance on July 31st of this year. The Strategy seeks to lay the foundation for the forthcoming biosurveillance strategic implementation plan, set to be published before the end of 2012.  The self-expressed goal of the Biosurveillance Strategy is to provide “a well-integrated national biosurveillance enterprise that saves lives by providing essential information for better decisionmaking at all levels”. Although official recognition of the need for effective biosurveillance is important, the strategy has two key flaws; a general lack of originality and an over-broadening of that which constitutes biosurveillance.

Before the flaws of the Biosurveillance Strategy can be examined, however, a cursory overview of its content is necessary. The Strategy employs rhetorical mechanisms of  “guiding principles”, “core functions” and “enablers” to present an introduction to US biosurveillance goals.  Emphasizing the use of “existing, multipurpose capabilities” the strategy presents four key national goals – discerning the environment, identifying essential information, alerting decision makers, and forecasting. These goals are enabled by the aptly titled “enablers”, which include the integration of capabilities, capacity building, encouraging innovation, and strengthening interactions across multiple sectors.

These concepts are indeed relevant. Cross-sector information sharing is indeed crucial to effective biosurveillance, as is innovation in detection technologies. However, these and similar suggestions have already been made reiteratively over the last decade, by almost all relevant stakeholders, in relation both to biological threats specifically and terrorism writ-large. Gregory Koblentz, in his book Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security, published in 2009, calls explicitly for innovative “detection, protection, and treatment technologies”.  The 9/11 Commission Report, published in 2004, has entire sections dedicated to the need for increased cross-sector information sharing. The choice to pursue status-quo principles, core functions, and enablers of the Strategy is not a negative reflection on the content itself, and there is merit in the argument that these suggestions remain pertinent. However,  the lack of originality in the Strategy is nonetheless disheartening and concerning. Disheartening because the superficial treatment of the need for improvements in our national biosurveillance could be interpreted as official ambivalence. Concerning because the most virulent diseases, whether manufactured by terrorists or reassorted in pigs, are often characterized by a devastating aptitude for change.

The second flaw within the Strategy is the broadening of the concept of biosurveillance.  Biosurveillance is defined as “the process of gathering, integrating, interpreting, and communicating essential information related to all-hazard threats or disease activity affecting human, animal, or plant health…”, where all-hazard is associated with all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks.  This Strategy takes this definition of biosurveillance and broadens it to include “emerging infectious diseases, pandemics, agricultural threats, and food-borne illnesses”. By positing itself as a continuation of both the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, the National Biosurveillance Strategy effectively securitizes all wide-scale health concerns.  This broadening is problematic for a number of reasons, the foremost being a dilution of that which constitutes a “threat” almost to the point of meaningless. Processing the vast amount of information  on intentional threats alone is already extremely challenging for the national security apparatus. The mandate to monitor all incidents of disease unnecessarily adds to this vast burden while expending limited security resources, leaving us less able to address immanent biological threats and exigencies.

The detrimental impact of this broadening is further visible when analyzing the Strategy’s policy suggestions. For instance, the aforementioned goal to “indentify and integrate essential information” encompasses within it the suggested development of a “discrete set of key questions to speed incident detection and awareness”. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks (Amerithrax) illustrate the difficulty in developing such a discreet set of questions. Despite occurring in the weeks following 9/11, and despite the staggered timing of the attacks, two of the latter Amerithrax victims still died due to misdiagnosis. Bacillus anthracis, like many of the other select agents, presents very similarly to pneumonia, making its initial diagnosis difficult. Thus, just as it remains difficult to synthesize a single set of questions to exclusively detect the symptoms of one, relatively uncommon disease, any set of questions which is expected to detect all potential effects from CBRN, emerging infectious diseases, pandemics, and food-bourne illnesses would be meaningless.

All criticisms aside, it should be kept in mind that the Biosurveillance Strategy is the first of its kind.  The lack of originality could be interpreted as a summation of past precedent. The broadening of the scope of biosurveillance  could be interpreted as recognition of the need for effective pandemic preparedness. As a first draft, then, while it definitely needs work, it’s very existence is a step in the right direction.

Book Review / The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History

by spopescu, posted in Reviews

The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Harvard University Press 2012)
Raymond Zilinskas and Milton Leitenberg
Hardcover. 960 pages. $55.00

Reviewed by Justin Ludgate (GMU Biodefense MS Program)

In researching one of the most closely guarded secrets of the Soviet Union, Raymond Zilinskas and Milton Leitenberg’s work on the history of the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program (BW) program is ambitious to say the least. The authors describe the current view of the Soviet Union’s BW program as being an incomplete picture cobbled together from precious few, often flawed, primary sources due to the compartmentalization and secrecy that veiled the program. Zilinskas and Leitenberg bring new research and analysis to the table and provide the most comprehensive examination to date of the Soviet BW program. The book itself is vast and covers everything about the program from research on weaponizing Francisella tularensis to Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin’s failures to end offensive BW research.

Overall, the tone of the book suggests future concerns regarding Russia’s failure to abide by international agreements, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, due to the ongoing concern of closed Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) biological research facilities. Though not without criticism, the authors do note that U.S. efforts to prevent BW related proliferation of materials, technology, or personnel were largely successful thanks to programs such as the U.S. Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the Department of State’s International Science and Technology Center.

The book’s first goal is to describe the Soviet BW program as thoroughly as possible, as it was the largest of its kind in the world. The first chapter covers the program’s history between 1918 and 1972, or the “first generation” of the Soviet BW program. The Soviet BW program was initially influenced by the parallel needs of combating endemic diseases and preventing a recurrence of the high level of disease-related deaths suffered by the armed forces during World War I and the subsequent civil war. Prior to World War II, the military concentrated its efforts on weaponizing agents such as Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, and various types of Rickettsiae. All of these pathogens were endemic to the Soviet Union and defensive research efforts such as vaccine development often paralleled offensive research, creating a complicated dual-use relationship. The Soviet Union later exploited this dual-use relationship to establish cover stories for institutions dedicated to offensive BW research during the program’s second generation which ran from 1972 until 1992.

The authors credit the massive growth of the “modern” Soviet BW program experienced after 1970 to the machinations of a scientist named Yury A. Ovchinnikov, who convinced the MOD that biotechnology research could provide the Soviet Union with a potent weapon. At that time, scientists were dependent on the patronage of the Soviet government, as there were no private institutions capable of funding scientific projects. The MOD and the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) in particular were highly sought after patrons due to their deep pockets. However, the funding came with strings attached. Scientists interested in studying bacteria, viruses, and genetics were often obliged to conduct military research, whether they were aware of it or not. While Ovchinnikov was successful in securing funding from the MOD, the bargain ensured the continued militarization of biology in the Soviet Union for years to come.

By 1972, the 15th Directorate of the MOD was tasked with overseeing a network of BW research institutes, located in Kirov, Zagorsk, and Sverdlovsk. In 1973, a new network of offensive and defensive BW research institutes, named Biopreparat, was established. Officially reporting to a civilian authority, many aspects of offensive research were undertaken by military scientists and senior officials within the new organization held military rank. The book provides a host of details about the history, research, and current workings of former Biopreparat institutes such as Vector, the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology, and the Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental-Industrial Base. This includes the dire economic situation these institutes found themselves in following the cessation of funds flowing from the Soviet state apparatus after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The second goal of the book is to ascertain whether the drastic loss of funding to BW institutes within Biopreparat and the MOD, following the end of the Soviet Union, caused a “brain drain” of former BW scientists to other nations or the proliferation and sale of BW-related material. The authors argue that U.S. threat reduction programs were largely successful in preventing the proliferation of BW research, materials, and personnel. However, a closed system of institutes with historic ties to the Soviet BW program still exists today. Worse, the authors argue that a regression has taken place in Putin’s Russia. The Russian government now refuses to admit that there ever was an offensive BW program and has reverted to the Soviet-era story that the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk was caused by contaminated meat and not an accident at a military BW site.

In writing this book, the authors faced a daunting task. Compartmentalization within the Soviet BW program ensured that even high-level sources, such as Ken Alibek, Vladimir Pasechnik, and Igor Domaradsky, did not necessarily possess the full picture of the Soviet BW program. The authors interviewed various other scientists involved in Biopreparat, but their identities are largely kept anonymous due to a decree from the Russian government that criminalizes any discussion of former Soviet state secrets. The lack of sources within the MOD leads to significant gaps in the book regarding Soviet BW munitions, doctrine, and strategy.

Overall, the book is a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet BW program, including its origin, evolution, motivation, and accomplishments and failures. The Soviet Union’s BW program is a great topic for anyone studying biodefense as it offers both scientific and political insights.  The writing style is easy to follow, although readers with little scientific background may have to refer to the glossary during some of the more technical sections of the book. The acronyms and changing names of certain institutes involved in the BW program can be confusing, but that is to be expected given the sheer size and scope of the Soviet BW program. In synthesizing new and previously available sources, this book provides the most objective assessment of the Soviet Union’s BW program, as well as the implications of this program on the future of international security. That being said, the authors are careful to point out the limitations of their research and gaps in their knowledge of various aspects of the Soviet BW program, indicating that much remains to be learned about the largest and most advanced BW program in history.