Pandora Report 3.31.2023

Happy Friday! This edition is packed with new publications, upcoming events, opportunities, and resources. Some highlights include a piece on rad and nuke threats from a Biodefense PhD alumna, an exciting new podcast from CSIS a current Biodefense MS student helped launch, a very helpful piece from the Washington Post outlining Russia’s disinformation, and an upcoming book talk covering “Lessons from the Covid War: A Report by the Covid Crisis Group” hosted by the Schar School.

“ASPR Releases Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise Multiyear Budget Assessment”

This week, “…the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) released the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise (PHEMCE) Multiyear Budget (MYB) for fiscal years 2022-2026. The report assesses budget needs to support medical countermeasure priorities which would allow the U.S. Government to prepare for the next public health threat. The multiyear budget projects an estimated overall funding need of $64 billion over the five-year period.”

‘“HHS’ recent responses to COVID-19, mpox, and Ebola, demonstrate the importance of a strong domestic medical countermeasure enterprise,” said Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Dawn O’Connell. “As the first PHEMCE multiyear budget released since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, it will serve as a useful tool for Congress to gauge ASPR’s funding levels to provide the country protection against whatever comes next.”’

“The PHEMCE is an interagency body that reviews the current threat landscape and makes recommendations to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on available or future medical countermeasures. This MYB was built over a period of time in which there were continuing resolutions, omnibus spending bills, and a near-simultaneously released President’s budget—this MYB is indicative of the assessed need and does not substitute for requested levels in the President’s Budget.”

“The multiyear budget also provides Congress and external stakeholders with funding information related to investments made in specified threats. The report highlights key priorities — from supporting innovative approaches to MCM development, to fostering clear, scientifically supported regulatory pathways for MCMs, to ensuring our national security.”

“The report, which picks up in 2022 – where the last MYB left off, estimates a gap of $35.3 billion between the flat fiscal year 2022 level and projected five-year total.  ASPR looks forward to working with Congress to overcome challenges and ensure America is prepared for whatever threat is around the corner.”

Read more here and download the full multiyear budget here.

ICYMI: “HERA Signs Agreement with ECDC and with EMA to Strengthen Cooperation on Health Emergency Preparedness and Response”

Earlier this month, the European Commission’s “Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), as well as HERA and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) have agreed to strengthen cooperation and to coordinate their work in support of health emergency preparedness and response in the area of medical countermeasures…The agreed working arrangements will help ensure that there are no unnecessary overlaps and that resources are used more efficiently.”

These arrangements aim to improve collaboration in areas like intelligence gathering and assessment, assessment of major cross-border health threats, and contribution to reinforcing the global health emergency preparedness and response architecture.

Learn more and read the agreements here.

“Civil Defense for Radiological Threats”

This CBNW article, written by Biodefense PhD alumna Dr. Mary Sproull, explores improvements made since 9/11 in American preparedness for radiological and nuclear threats and highlights key areas of mass casualty planning that require further improvement.

She writes in her conclusion, “As primary response for any emergency is initially a local response, development of a base of local radiation experts nationwide is an important step for civil defense.  Integration and establishment of working relationships between these local radiation SME and the first responders and medical professionals they will be supporting prior to future emergencies is also key to ensure a level of trust for effective mitigation of radiation dread.  The ROSS program is an important aspect of emergency preparedness which should receive more visibility, financial support, and resources to increase access for training opportunities at the local level.  Further, increased funding to support training of first responders and medical personal themselves on the relative health risks of radiation exposure is needed. “

“The Nonproliferation Compliance Cheminformatics Tool Completes a Second Test”

This project note from the Stemson Center provides an update on the Nonproliferation Compliance Cheminformativs Tool. The note explains, “The NCCT is a proof of concept of a practical tool to aid frontline officers – border security, customs, law enforcement, defense, chemical industry – to quickly check available chemical identifying information (name, registry number, molecular structure) against national or international control lists of chemical warfare agents or precursors. Frontline officers typically have just seconds to determine whether a given substance is a concern or not – a task that can be complex and time-consuming even for trained chemists. Developed jointly by the Stimson Center, Prof. Stefano Costanzi’s research group at American University, and Dr. Koblentz of George Mason University, and funded by Global Affairs Canada, the proof of concept consists of a database of chemical structures implemented and run through a commercial, desktop-based cheminformatics software (ChemAxon’s Instant JChem).”

“The Future of Chemical Disarmament in an Eroding Global Order”

“On February 7-8, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Future of Chemical Disarmament in an Eroding Global Order.” This workshop brought together over 100 participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities from nine countries and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The workshop aimed to examine: (1) the transformation of OPCW from an organization whose current primary mission is to verify and monitor the destruction of declared chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles to one that is focused on preventing their re-emergence and (2) the fate of multilateral arms control regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and multilateralism in an eroding global order.”

The workshop summary, which includes discussion of key takeaways and highlights from each panel, as well as the annotated bibliography for this workshop (both of which Biodefense PhD student Danyale Kellogg helped prepare) are available on CGSR’s website.

“A Short History of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense”

COL Paul Kassebaum and Dr. James Dillman chronicle and discuss the history of MRICD in this piece for CBNW, writing in part “Since 1917, U.S. Army scientists have developed medical solutions for chemical threats. That legacy is carried on today by the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (MRICD) at Aberdeen Proving Ground-South in Edgewood, Maryland. MRICD traces its origins to components of the Army Medical Department responsible for defense against chemical weapons during World War I. In October 1922, the Medical Research Division was organized at Edgewood Arsenal to study the pharmacological actions of chemical threat agents, to develop treatments for exposed casualties, and to provide the information generated to Army Medical Corps personnel. During this period, Edgewood Arsenal became the center for chemical defense research, development, and testing operations.”

“There’s a ‘ChatGPT’ for biology. What could go wrong?”

Sean Ekins, Filippa Lentzos, Max Brackmann, and Cédric Invernizzi tackle the security issues posed by models like ProtGPT2 and ProGen in this piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, explaining “In recent months ChatGPT and other AI chatbots with uncanny abilities to respond to prompts with fluid, human-like writing have unleashed torrents of angst flowing from different quarters of society; the chatbots could help students cheat, encroach on jobs, or mass produce disinformation. Outside of the spotlight shining on the chatbots, researchers in the life sciences have also been rolling out similar artificial intelligence-driven technology, but to much less fanfare. That’s concerning, because new algorithms for protein design, while potentially advancing the ability to fight disease, may also create significant opportunities for misuse.”

“As biotech production processes are evolving to make it easier for creators to make the synthetic DNA and other products they’ve designed, new AI models like ProtGPT2 and ProGen will allow researchers to conceive of a far greater range of molecules and proteins than ever. Nature took millions of years to design proteins. AI can generate meaningful protein sequences in seconds. While there are good reasons to develop AI technology for biological design, there are also risks to such efforts that scientists in the field don’t appear to have weighed. AI could be used to design new bioweapons or toxins that can’t be detected. As these systems develop alongside new easier, cheaper, and faster production capabilities, scientists should talk to and learn from peers who focus on biosecurity risks.”

“The Biorisk Management Casebook: Insights into Contemporary Practices”

New from Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation: “Stanford University’s Bio Policy & Leadership in Society Initiative (Bio.Polis), in collaboration with the Program on Science, Technology & Society at the Harvard Kennedy School and with support from the Global Biological Policy and Programs team at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI | bio), is pleased to announce the launch of The Biorisk Management Casebook: Insights into Contemporary Practices. The Casebook and the accompanying Biorisk Management Case Study Collection gathers and analyzes how biorisk management is practiced in diverse life science organizations across the research lifecycle.”

“As life science research matures globally, it is also vital to mature the management of biosafety and biosecurity risks that can accompany discovery and innovation. In this context generalized frameworks for biorisk management have been developed alongside guidance documents. However, the breadth of risks and the diversity of organizations supporting research pose challenges to the continued development, adaptation, and implementation of these frameworks. In addition, organizations lack access to concrete examples of how frameworks are or have been implemented in practice, hindering their ability to learn from one another. “

“How Russia Turned America’s Helping Hand to Ukraine Into a Vast Lie”

This piece by the Washington Post Editorial Board discusses Russia’s ongoing disinformation efforts, building on previous reporting on social media policing in authoritarian regimes. The authors write, “Disinformation is not just “fake news” or propaganda but an insidious contamination of the world’s conversations. And it is exploding.”

They continue on to explain the origin of the United States’ bio collaborations with Ukraine and Georgia, writing “The agreement with Ukraine grew out of the 1992 Nunn-Lugar legislation, sponsored by Mr. Lugar and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) to clean up the Cold War legacy of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union, an effort that became known as Cooperative Threat Reduction. In the 1990s, thousands of nuclear warheads and missiles were liquidated, followed by vast stocks of chemical weapons. Later, the Nunn-Lugar program expanded into reducing biological threats in Russian laboratories, as well as other former Soviet republics. Among other efforts, a public health reference laboratory — named the Lugar Center — was opened in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 2011. Pathogens stored in a Soviet-era research institute in the center of Tbilisi were moved to a purpose-built, secure facility.”

They explain the periodic attacks these programs have faced from Russia, describing the “firehose of falsehoods” aimed at them. At the end of this very detailed retelling of these long-standing efforts, they conclude “Open societies are vulnerable because they are open. The asymmetries in favor of malign use of information are sizable. Democracies must find a way to adapt. The dark actors morph constantly, so the response needs to be systematic and resilient.”

“In a world that connects billions of people at a flash, the truth may have only a fighting chance against organized lying. As an old saying has it: “A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes.”’

What We’re Watching and Listening To 🍿🎧

The CommonHealth 

Check out this new podcast from the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security: “On The CommonHealth, hosts J. Stephen Morrison, Katherine Bliss, and Andrew Schwartz delve deeply into the  puzzle that connects pandemic preparedness and response, HIV/AIDS, routine immunization, and primary care, areas of huge import to human and national security. The CommonHealth replaces under a single podcast the Coronavirus Crisis Update, Pandemic Planet and AIDS Existential Moment.”

Current episodes include interviews with Sherly Gay Stolberg and Dr. Raquel Bono covering different topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Biodefense MS student Sophie Hirshfield, a current CSIS intern, also helped create this podcast!

SIPRI Launches Video Series on Biosecurity Risks and Emerging Technology

From the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: “SIPRI is pleased to launch a new video series that explores biosecurity risks linked to emerging technologies and considers how these risks can be addressed. The series features international experts from the research fields of genetics, bioethics, international affairs and microbiology.”

“The interviews were conducted during an expert workshop in Stockholm in January 2023 on risk at the intersection of biological science and technological developments. The workshop and this video series are part of SIPRI’s work to develop a toolkit for biorisk assessment, targeting academics and researchers in the life sciences. This work, undertaken with support from the British Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, examines dual-use technologies that have implications for the proliferation, development and use of biological weapons. The series gives a voice to key stakeholders in the field, working towards a mutual understanding of the challenges affecting the convergence of biotechnology and emerging technologies.”

The Kremlin’s Bioweapons Lies

This YouTube short from the US Department of State’s Share America channel offers a succinct overview of Russia’s false BW claims and the threats this poses to legitimate, peaceful scientific collaboration globally.

Lessons From the COVID War: An Investigative Report

Beyond the Pandemic: Addressing Attacks on Researchers and Health Professionals

From the National Academies: “Last fall, the Committee on Human Rights (CHR) held a webcast series, Silencing Scientists and Health Workers during the Pandemic, which examined threats and attacks against science and health professionals connected to their work to combat the spread of COVID-19, as well as related implications for internationally-protected human rights.”

“On April 11 (3:00-4:15 pm ET), the CHR will host a webcast to mark the launch of the webcast series’ Proceedings-in Brief.  This event will gather experts to explore practical steps that scientists, researchers, and health professionals are taking to protect themselves and their colleagues from targeting—including violence, harassment, and other attacks.”

Learn more and register here.

Nobel Prize Summit-Truth, Trust and Hope

Taking place May 24-26 this year in DC and virtually, this Nobel Prize Summit asks “How can we build trust in truth, facts and scientific evidence so that we can create a hopeful future for all?”

“Misinformation is eroding our trust in science and runs the risk of becoming one of the greatest threats to our society today.”

“Join us at this years’ Nobel Prize Summit which brings together laureates, leading experts and you in a conversation on how we can combat misinformation, restore trust in science and create a hopeful future.”

Learn more and register here.

Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community

“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”

This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Call for Papers: “Training Programmes To Counter Current And Emerging Biological And Chemical Proliferation Risks: Themes, Practices, And Lessons Learnt”

From the Journal of Strategic Trade Control: “The purpose of this call for papers is to facilitate inter-disciplinary exchange regarding the implementation of training to counter emerging chemical and biological proliferation challenges. In particular, the call welcomes contributions in the form of JOSTC articles on the processes, mechanisms, and tools for creating awareness of the following topics:

– Cross-border movement (e.g. transport, shipment) of chemical and biological materials and equipment.
– Cross-border movement of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
– Trade in sensitive and dual-use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and equipment.
– Strategic trade control regimes of relevance to disarmament and non-proliferation.
– Information security, data sharing, and cybersecurity challenges to CBRN non-proliferation.
– Due diligence and risk management initiatives to safeguard global supply chains against misuse and diversion.

Information about this call is available on the JoSTC webpage and the full description of the call can be accessed here. The deadline for paper submission is 2 October 2023.”

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: “This well-known Irish-born American cook is thought to have infected as many as 122 people with typhoid fever and was the first person in the US identified as an asymptomatic carrier of the bacteria that cause the disease-Salmonella typhi. What was her legal name?”

Shout out to Georgios P. for correctly answering last week’s trivia. Our question was: “Before the infamous sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, Aum Shinrikyo attempted to use biological weapons. In July 1993, what agent did the cult attempt to spread from a cooling tower on the roof of their headquarters?” The answer is B. anthracis.

Pandora Report 3.24.2023

Happy Spring! Lest our readers in the northern hemisphere enjoy the added sunshine too much, this edition of the Pandora Report focuses heavily on a new report that suggests China CDC failed to disclose information connecting raccoon dogs to the initial outbreak of COVID-19 at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, potentially covering up critical evidence in understanding the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. We also tackle the signing of the COVID-19 Origins Act of 2023 into law, the continued discussion about biosecurity oversight, the Biden administration’s release of biotechnology and biomanufacturing goal documents, and the 28th anniversary of the Tokyo subway sarin attacks.

US Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Goals and Priorities Released

This week, in response to President Biden’s September Executive Order, the administration announced the release of three new documents: Harnessing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Research and Development (R&D) to Further Societal Goals; U.S. Department of Defense Biomanufacturing Strategy; and Developing a National Measure of the Economic Contributions of the Bioeconomy. According to the White House, the first is a report from the Office of Science and Technology Policy that outlines “a vision for what is possible with the power of biotechnology and biomanufacturing, and R&D needs to achieve this ambitious vision.”

In addition to these documents, “Other deliverables from the Executive Order are in development, including: a plan to expand training and education opportunities for the biotechnology and biomanufacturing workforce, a report on data needs for the bioeconomy, a national strategy for expanding domestic biomanufacturing capacity, actions to improve biotechnology regulation clarity and efficiency, and a plan for strengthening and innovating biosafety and biosecurity for the bioeconomy.”

COVID-19 Origins…More Politics, Some New Evidence

Raccoon Dogs Linked to Outbreak at Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market

This week, a researchers, including the Schar School’s Dr. Saskia Popescu, released a report on Zenodo titled “Genetic evidence of susceptible wildlife in SARS-CoV-2 positive samples at the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market, Wuhan: Analysis and interpretation of data released by the Chinese Center for Disease Control”. Nature discusses key findings of the report, writing “Particularly notable was the raccoon-dog mitochondrial DNA found in six samples from two stalls. These small fox-like animals are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, and can spread the infection to other raccoon dogs without showing clear signs of sickness. Raccoon dogs and masked palm civets have also been found with infections of viruses that are almost identical to the one that causes severe acute respiratory syndrome, which is related to SARS-CoV-2 and caused an outbreak in people in 2003. And work in palm-civet cells indicates that the creatures could possibly become infected with SARS-CoV-2.”

“The researchers were looking for evidence of mammals, which could have been intermediate hosts of the virus. They identified near-complete mitochondrial-DNA sequences — each some 16,000 base pairs long — for five species, including raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonoides), Malayan porcupine (Hystrix brachyura), Amur hedgehog (Erinaceus amurensis), masked palm civet (Paguma larvata) and hoary bamboo rat (Rhizomys pruinosus)…”

Furthermore, in their forward, the authors discuss their discovery of data posted publicly on the GISAID database corresponding to sequences from environmental samples collected at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan. Though metadata suggests this data was posted in June 2022, it was not made publicly available until recently. According to the report, “We downloaded the public data to search for genetic sequences from non-human animals, which the CCDC did not identify in their February 2022 preprint. The preprint also posited that all SARS-CoV-2-positive samples in the market were the result of human infections, claiming that the market was a site of amplification of an already widespread epidemic. We and others therefore had urgently requested release of the data. The potential for analysis of samples for animal DNA had also been recommended in the mission report of the World Health Organization (WHO)-convened global study of origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part, released March 2021.”

The researchers later explain “Once the data were identified on GISAID, it became possible to test the veracity of these claims. We found information that was critical to understanding the nature of the origins of the human infections at the Huanan market, as this was the early epicenter of SARS-CoV-2 spread and was likely where spillover occurred and sustained human-to-human transmission was established.”

They continue “Our analysis of these data found that genetic evidence of multiple animal species was present in locations of the market where SARS-CoV-2 positive environmental samples had been collected. This includes raccoon dogs, which are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2
infection and shed sufficient virus to transmit to other species. However, this also included other mammalian species that require consideration as possible intermediate hosts of SARS CoV-2. Although live mammals had previously been observed at Huanan market in late 2019, their exact locations were not conclusively known, and some of the animal species we identify in the report below were not included in the list of live or dead animals tested at the Huanan market, as reported in the 2021 WHO-China joint report on the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results show that they were present. In some cases, the amount of animal genetic material was greater than the amount of human genetic material, consistent with the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in these samples being due to animal infections.”

They then detail their attempts to inform an author of the Gao et al. preprint about the data and later accusations that they had violated GISAID’s terms of use. They then notified the WHO of their preliminary findings, at which point SAGO convened a meeting with some of these researchers and scientists from China CDC. SAGO explained in their statement that “The presentations from China CDC and invited international researchers indicated that there were newly available data from the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. This included metagenomic data of environmental samples from various stalls and wastewater collection sites collected as early as January 2020. Analyses of these data suggest that apart from SARS-CoV-2 sequences, some samples also contained human DNA, as well as mitochondrial DNA of several animal species, including some that are known to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. This included DNA from wild raccoon dogs, Malaysian porcupine, and bamboo rats among others, in SARS-CoV-2 positive environmental samples.”

Importantly, the statement explains “The findings suggest that animals were present at the market shortly before the market had been cleared on 1 January 2020, as part of the public health measures by Chinese authorities. These results provide potential leads to identifying intermediate hosts of SARS-CoV-2 and potential sources of human infections in the market.”

While GISAID allegedly made the data unavailable to the researchers because it is the basis for an update to an existing Liu et al. 2022 preprint that is in the process of being re-submitted for publication by China CDC, this presents a troubling twist in the COVID-19 origin saga. This information sat in GISAID hidden for the better part of a year, and was made unavailable when scientists outside China CDC sought to analyze it, even though they contacted the initial authors and requested to collaborate.

Among the abundant discussion this has brought has been outrage directed at the PRC for failing disclose this data. The WHO itself expressed concern, with Director-General Tedros saying “These data do not provide a definitive answer to the question of how the pandemic began, but every piece of data is important in moving us closer to that answer…And every piece of data relating to studying the origins of COVID-19 needs to be shared with the international community immediately.”

When asked in an interview why these data were not made available sooner, Maria Van Kerkhove (technical lead of the WHO’s COVID-19 response), said “That is the question. Why weren’t these data shared and analyzed with Chinese scientists? We have been calling for any and all data to be made available. Clearly there is more data that is out there. What is not clear is what else is out there,” adding another layer of concern in this ongoing search for the pandemic’s origin.

COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023 Signed by President Biden

Of course, concerns about lack of transparency regarding the COVID-19 pandemic are nothing new in the Beltway, as was further demonstrated this week. This Monday, President Biden signed a bill into law directing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to declassify certain information about COVID-19’s origin. President Biden said in a statement “We need to get to the bottom of COVID-19’s origins to help ensure we can better prevent future pandemics.  My Administration will continue to review all classified information relating to COVID–19’s origins, including potential links to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  In implementing this legislation, my Administration will declassify and share as much of that information as possible, consistent with my constitutional authority to protect against the disclosure of information that would harm national security.”

The bill indicates the information must be released within 90 days of being signed into law, and it covers information like names, symptoms, and roles of any researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology who became ill in the fall of 2019. The House passed the bill in a 419-0 vote following the Senate’s unanimous vote, in a rare showing of overwhelming bipartisanship. Rep. Jim Himes of Connecticut told The Washington Post the declassified information made available to the public will not be the raw transcripts from intercepted calls, but finished intelligence reports.

Biosecurity Discussion Continues

This entire saga has all brought renewed public debate over the safety of high-containment laboratories. Sam Weiss Evans and David Gillum write in STAT News, “The Covid pandemic exacerbated fear and panic regarding the potential for a future bioterrorism agent. As the lab leak theory continues to cause debate, politicians want to be able to tell their constituents that they are solving the problem by adding more oversight to biological research. But if all they are doing is adding more burden, bureaucracy, and box-checking, is it really making anyone more secure?”

“…governance systems are increasingly not up to the task of managing biosecurity risks. States, industry, and academia have been too focused on the technical frontiers in biotechnology, heralding cheaper, more efficient, and more sophisticated tools to conduct biological research, but not putting the same degree of curiosity or funding into how we might direct these advances in ways that protect the vulnerable and prevent catastrophe. Scientific advances such as CRISPR, gene drives, synthetic viruses, and increased pathogen capabilities, are rapidly proceeding while innovation in our collective ability to govern their security concerns is not.”

While the debate over the lab leak hypothesis has been politically charged from the start, there are broader biosecurity concerns that do deserve increased attention, as highlighted by the Global BioLabs project in its latest report-Global BioLabs Report 2023. Newsweek covered this report this week, writing in part ‘”We urgently need coordinated international action to address increasing bio-risks,” Gregory Koblentz, an author of the report with the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, said in a statement.”

Science summarizes much of the concern in their discussion of the report, writing “Concerns about an increasing number of BSL-4 and BSL-3 labs aren’t new, but they have grown since the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic began in 2019. One hypothesis is that the virus came from a lab. And many countries, particularly those building their first BSL-4 labs, lack strong policies and methods to monitor such labs, the report says. Only Canada has legislation overseeing all experiments, even those with no government funding, that are considered “dual use” because the results could potentially be used to cause harm.”

28th Anniversary of Tokyo Subway Attacks

The 28th anniversary of the Tokyo sarin attacks passed this week, marking nearly three decades since the horror unleashed by Aum Shinrikyo in March 1995. The cult staged five coordinated attacks on three lines of the Teito Rapid Transit Authority at rush hour near the Diet headquarters, killing 13, seriously injuring 50, and harming over 5,000 others. Some of those severely injured did later die as well. NHK, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, notes “Japan’s Public Security Intelligence Agency notes that successor groups of the cult are still active. It says a group known as Aleph is actively recruiting young people by concealing its name.”

“Infectious Disease as a Security Threat: A Mental Framework for Future Emergency Preparedness”

Biodefense PhD Student Ryan Houser recently published this article in the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: “The emergence of COVID-19 pandemic has had significant impacts on human lives as well as economic and social stability. The United States has a complicated history with biosecurity. The September 11th terror attacks uncovered various weaknesses in the national biosecurity infrastructure that have persisted into the current pandemic. This study explores the implications of framing the infectious disease biothreat as a security threat to improve our capabilities while protecting against the potential accelerated threat of bioterrorism in the post-COVID-19 era. To counter the increasing biothreats, the United States must invest in revamping the biodefense infrastructure to increase our resilience to various biothreats.”

“The BWC Ninth Review Conference: An Overview of Outcomes, Outlooks, and National Implementation”

Read this new report from VERTIC here: “2022 saw an important milestone for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), as it marked fifty years since its opening for signature. Since then, every five years, approximately, States Parties have convened for a Review Conference of the Convention. The Ninth Review Conference was held in the final quarter of 2022, amidst an international security landscape with a new set of challenges and priorities.”

“Upon the BWC’s entry into force in 1975, the UK’s then-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs noted that States Parties to the Convention “have both renounced this entire class of weapons and undertaken to prevent their future development, by appropriate national measures”.1 His statement highlights the essential nature of national measures to achieve the Convention’s ultimate goal of banning biological weapons. Following the conclusion of the Review Conference it is timely to take stock of the progress, challenges, and ways forward for national implementation of the BWC; a topic that VERTIC have been working on for over twenty years.2 This Brief will do so in two parts: Part I provides a consideration of the outcomes and outlook of the Ninth Review Conference; Part II examines the coverage of national implementation at the Conference and, ultimately, provides a series of recommendations for strengthening national implementation during the next review cycle of the Convention.”

“OK, But Where Will the Next Pandemic Come From?”

Angela Kane and Jaime Yassif discuss the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Joint Assessment Mechanism in this opinion piece for The Hill. They write “While the politics surrounding an outbreak cannot be ignored, the international community needs to get better at conducting evidence-based assessments of pandemic origins, in order to minimize and deflect the most polarizing voices in favor of objective scientific analysis. Nearly 7 million deaths from COVID-19 worldwide prove the stakes are high.”

“To address this need, the Nuclear Threat Initiative is working with international partners to establish a new Joint Assessment Mechanism (JAM) which would fill a significant gap in the international community’s ability to discern the source of high-consequence biological events of unknown origin. Its mandate would be to establish the facts — specifically, whether the event emerged naturally or was accidentally or deliberately released from an academic, commercial or government laboratory.”

“Avian Flu in Cambodia”

Rick A. Bright discusses the H5N1 outbreak in Cambodia and what it tells us about the importance of global surveillance and collaboration for Think Global Health, writing “As human and bird interactions increase, however, the likelihood of zoonotic transmission grows. The first confirmed bird-to-human transmission of these viruses occurred in Hong Kong in 1997, though seroprevalence studies in the same region suggest a substantial number of mild or asymptomatic infections among people who work closely with poultry. In Cambodia, where highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses have been detected in wild birds since 2003, fifty-eight cases of human infection and thirty-eight deaths have been documented, a fatality rate of 66 percent. The February cases are the first since 2014.”

“It used to take months to identify the pathogen, conduct genomic analytics, perform contact tracing, and alert the world of a potential outbreak of concern — but enhanced global surveillance capabilities, new genomic sequencing technologies, and real-time data sharing in publicly accessible databases have changed all that. This time, scientists at the Institute Pasteur Cambodia (IPC) and Cambodia’s National Institute of Public Health were able to share their findings globally within twenty-four hours of collecting the first clinical specimen. They quickly tempered concerns by confirming that virus collected from one of the patients, an eleven-year-old girl, was from a group of influenza viruses endemic in birds in the region and thus likely to have been transmitted without a human intermediary.”

“The Polarized Pandemic”

David P. Fidler breaks down the history of politicized health crises and how COVID-19 is likely to be remembered for Think Global Health, writing “The turmoil caused by COVID-19’s emergence and global spread triggered a tsunami of analyses on what went wrong and how the United States and other countries should transform policies on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. This series on U.S. foreign policy and global health participates in this effort at diagnosis and prescription. Synthesizing such commentary proves difficult, if not foolhardy, and the question of how the COVID-19 pandemic will be described in the future cannot be definitively answered today. Some themes, however, suggest that COVID-19 will be remembered as the polarized pandemic that cast a divisive shadow on U.S. public health, domestic politics, and foreign policy.”

“The Real Horrors of ‘The Last of Us’ May Already Be Here”

Erik English merges the post-apocalyptic fantasy world with real life in this piece for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the deeper story the video game and new HBO drama tells, writing “The show, based on the beloved video game from 2013, is split into two levels. In the foreground, it is a fairly conservative story of survivalism and kinship. In the background, it is telling a different story about the failure of institutions during crises, the breaking of the social contract amid a turn towards authoritarianism, and the tradeoffs between utilitarianism and individual justice.”

“U.S. Companies Must Stop Enabling Mass DNA Collection in Tibet”

Columnist Josh Rogin discusses an alarming trend in data collection for The Washington Post, writing “There is overwhelming evidence that Chinese authorities are using mass forced DNA collection in many parts of China — but Tibet is an especially cruel case. Human rights groups report that police are taking blood samples from men, women and children , with no legitimate justification , in all seven prefectures in the Tibetan autonomous region, often showing up at kindergartens. There’s zero indication Tibetans can refuse.”

“Drug Discovery Efforts at George Mason University”

Andalibi et al. discuss research at GMU in this article in SLAS Discovery, writing in their abstract: “With over 39,000 students, and research expenditures in excess of $200 million, George Mason University (GMU) is the largest R1 (Carnegie Classification of very high research activity) university in Virginia. Mason scientists have been involved in the discovery and development of novel diagnostics and therapeutics in areas as diverse as infectious diseases and cancer. Below are highlights of the efforts being led by Mason researchers in the drug discovery arena.”

“To enable targeted cellular delivery, and non-biomedical applications, Veneziano and colleagues have developed a synthesis strategy that enables the design of self-assembling DNA nanoparticles (DNA origami) with prescribed shape and size in the 10 to 100 nm range. The nanoparticles can be loaded with molecules of interest such as drugs, proteins and peptides, and are a promising new addition to the drug delivery platforms currently in use. The investigators also recently used the DNA origami nanoparticles to fine tune the spatial presentation of immunogens to study the impact on B cell activation. These studies are an important step towards the rational design of vaccines for a variety of infectious agents.”

“To elucidate the parameters for optimizing the delivery efficiency of lipid nanoparticles (LNPs), Buschmann, Paige and colleagues have devised methods for predicting and experimentally validating the pKa of LNPs based on the structure of the ionizable lipids used to formulate the LNPs. These studies may pave the way for the development of new LNP delivery vehicles that have reduced systemic distribution and improved endosomal release of their cargo post administration.”

“To better understand protein-protein interactions and identify potential drug targets that disrupt such interactions, Luchini and colleagues have developed a methodology that identifies contact points between proteins using small molecule dyes. The dye molecules noncovalently bind to the accessible surfaces of a protein complex with very high affinity, but are excluded from contact regions. When the complex is denatured and digested with trypsin, the exposed regions covered by the dye do not get cleaved by the enzyme, whereas the contact points are digested. The resulting fragments can then be identified using mass spectrometry. The data generated can serve as the basis for designing small molecules and peptides that can disrupt the formation of protein complexes involved in disease processes. For example, using peptides based on the interleukin 1 receptor accessory protein (IL-1RAcP), Luchini, Liotta, Paige and colleagues disrupted the formation of IL-1/IL-R/IL-1RAcP complex and demonstrated that the inhibition of complex formation reduced the inflammatory response to IL-1B.”

“Working on the discovery of novel antimicrobial agents, Bishop, van Hoek and colleagues have discovered a number of antimicrobial peptides from reptiles and other species. DRGN-1, is a synthetic peptide based on a histone H1-derived peptide that they had identified from Komodo Dragon plasma. DRGN-1 was shown to disrupt bacterial biofilms and promote wound healing in an animal model. The peptide, along with others, is being developed and tested in preclinical studies. Other research by van Hoek and colleagues focuses on in silico antimicrobial peptide discovery, screening of small molecules for antibacterial properties, as well as assessment of diffusible signal factors (DFS) as future therapeutics.”

“The above examples provide insight into the cutting-edge studies undertaken by GMU scientists to develop novel methodologies and platform technologies important to drug discovery.”

Women at the OPCW

From the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: “In this one-hour panel discussion, we will speak to four women leaders at OPCW on the importance of embedding gender equity and diversity in the culture of an organisation.”

“Starting with opening remarks by the OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, an International Gender Champion, to set the stage on how important it is to have people of diverse backgrounds in roles at all levels, including leadership, in furthering the mandate of OPCW. We will join our panelists to discuss their personal leadership journeys, learning experience, and advice on how to promote diversity and inclusion in a leadership role. There will be time for questions and answers at the event of the event.”

Learn more and register here. This event will take place on March 27 at 10 am EST.

Navigating Infodemics and Building Trust During Public Health Emergencies

“The National Academies will convene a virtual public workshop, April 10-11, to examine the history of public health infodemics, the impact of infodemics on trust in the public health enterprise, and tools and practices to address infodemics. This workshop builds upon a previous National Academies workshop on Building Trust in Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Science, and will go beyond what is known about risk and crisis communications to generate actionable, targeted insights that federal state, tribal, local, and territorial agencies and officials can take to prevent and respond to infodemics.”

Learn more and register here.

ICYMI- Webinar: Global Biolabs 2023 Report on Laboratories Handling the World’s Most Dangerous Pathogens

Watch the recording for this event here.

“On March 17, 2023, the Global Biolabs Initiative launched its latest report, Global BioLabs 2023, and released updates to its interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs.

With the global expansion of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, where the world’s most dangerous pathogens are studied, gaps in biosecurity and biosafety governance are widening. Since its inception in 2021, the Global Biolabs Initiative has tracked the proliferation of the highest containment labs, identified several key trends in their construction and operation, developed biorisk management scorecards to measure how well countries are governing biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research, and mapped the global biorisk management architecture.

The pace of BSL4/BSL3+ labs expansion is outpacing current biosafety and biosecurity regulations, and coordinated international action is needed to address increasing biorisks. In this webinar, Dr Filippa Lentzos, King’s College London, and Dr Gregory Koblentz, George Mason University, present the Global BioLabs 2023 report, describe key trends, and discuss recommendations for strengthening global biorisk management. The event also featured a demonstration of the interactive map.

In 2022, the Global Biolabs initiative partnered with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to relaunch the interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, which can be viewed here: https://thebulletin.org/global-biolabs/

Read the report and find more information about the Global Biolabs Initiative here: https://www.globalbiolabs.org/

ICYMI- Cyberbiosecurity: The New Frontier of Counterproliferation

“On December 6, 2022, CRDF Global hosted a webinar titled “Cyberbiosecurity: The New Frontier of Counterproliferation.” The two-hour panel session featured cyberbiosecurity experts Randall Murch and Dr. Gemma Bowsher. Murch is a research lead for cyberbiosecurity at the Virginia Technical Institute and has been credited for the creation of the term “cyberbiosecurity.” Dr. Bowsher is a research associate and co-lead for Health Intelligence and Biosecurity at the Conflict and Health Research Group at King’s College London. Biorisk management expert Dr. Lora Grainger and Nathan Gwira, CRDF Global’s cybersecurity technical specialist, acted as moderators. Biosecurity Deputy Program Manager Urszula Velez was the logistics support leader for the event.”

Learn more and watch this event’s recording here.

Apply for the 2023 Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship

“The global norm against biological weapons cannot be maintained without youth voices  being  included  in the multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Youth perspectives are key to create innovative solutions and generate long-term engagement. There are particular benefits to including the perspectives of young people from developing countries, where most of the world’s youth is concentrated.”

“Organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva in partnership with key international actors empowering youth in science diplomacy and global biosecurity, the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship provides a unique learning and networking experience into multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva.”

“Launched in 2019 as a Biosecurity Diplomacy Workshop, the Youth for Biosecurity Initiative is for the first time in 2023 providing the opportunity for 15 young scientists from the Global South to join an online interactive training programme prior to a field visit during the meeting of the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention in Geneva.”

Learn more and apply here by March 29.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: “Before the infamous sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, Aum Shinrikyo attempted to use biological weapons. In July 1993, what agent did the cult attempt to spread from a cooling tower on the roof of their headquarters?”

Last week, our question was: “The Ides of March may have already passed, but this week’s question is still focused on classical antiquity: In about 129 BC, Manius Aquillius, a senator and consul, is thought to have ended an ongoing war in the Roman province of Asia by doing what to rebellious cities?” Florus describes in Epitome of Roman History how the notoriously brutal Aquillius poisoned the water supplies of several rebellious cities throughout Asia, including Pergamum. He wasn’t the only one to suffer, though! Adrienne Mayor, author of Greek FirePoison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs, details in The Poison King: The Life and Legend of Mithridates how Aquillius was subjected to “a diabolical last meal for a glutton for gold”–execution by molten gold.

If you recall, a couple weeks ago we asked a trivia question about the murder of Georgi Markov, who reportedly was poisoned by a man who used a modified umbrella to push a pellet containing ricin into his leg. The Guardian recently covered a new Danish documentary on the life of Markov and the events that led to his death that can be accessed here.

Pandora Report 3.17.2023

Happy Spring Break! This week offers a mixed bag including coverage of the new Global BioLabs Report, many updates on and discussion of US pandemic policy, updates on the potential poisonings in Iran, and more. There are several new publications as well, with topics spanning South Korea’s COVID-19 response, the BWC Working Group, Russian disinformation, and more. As always, we have listed several upcoming events, professional opportunities, and a new trivia question.

2019 Biodefense Grad Receives Award from Institute for Defense Analyses

The Schar School recently featured Janet Marroquin Pineda (Biodefense MS ’19, Current Biodefense PhD Student) for her recognition by the Institute for Defense Analyses: “Marroquin Pineda, a 2019 graduate of the Schar School of Policy and Government’s Master of Biodefense program and current Schar School biodefense doctoral student, was recently awarded the 2022 David S. C. Chu Award for Excellence in Research at IDA. The award is presented annually to a research associate who has made outstanding analytic contributions in support of IDA’s mission to answer the most challenging U.S. security and science policy questions with objective analysis.”

Bonus-the Schar School piece was written by Biodefense MS Student Sophie Hirshfield!

Boom in Labs Handling Dangerous Pathogens Not Matched by Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulation

“The number of labs handling dangerous pathogens has risen to more than 100 around the world but has not been accompanied by sufficient oversight, raising biosafety and biosecurity concerns, a new report by King’s College London warns.”

“The Global BioLabs Report 2023 found the number of BSL4 labs in operation, under construction or planned has grown by 10 in two years, from 59 across 23 countries in 2021 to 69 across 27 countries. Three quarters of these are in urbanised areas exacerbating the impact of any accidental releases of pathogens.”

‘“We’re seeing rapid expansion of max containment labs in Asia but many of these countries score poorly on biorisk management,” report author Dr Filippa Lentzos said. “We found biosafety governance to be stronger than biosecurity, while the weakest component is management of dual-use research of concern.”’

“The report also highlights the rise in use of a new type of high-containment lab, known as ‘BSL3+’ or ‘BSL3-enhanced’ of which there are 57 around the world – mainly in Europe and most in urban centres. These labs adopt additional precautions when carrying out especially risky research, but there are few guidelines for what constitutes a BSL3+ lab and no evidence that the measures being taken in these facilities are adequate for the research they carry out.”

‘“We urgently need coordinated international action to address increasing biorisks,” says project-co lead Dr Gregory Koblentz of the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.”

“To address these risks, the report calls for:

  • Labs conducting high-consequence work with pathogens to adopt the international standard for biorisk management (ISO 35001).
  • Countries to incorporate current international biorisk management standards into their national legislation and guidance.
  • The World Health Organisation (WHO) to develop criteria and guidance for BSL3+ labs as well as guidance on field biosafety, and to establish collaborating centres for biorisk management for every region.
  • Countries to better leverage existing international biorisk management organisations to strengthen global biorisk management.”

“Dr Lentzos said: “There has been a global boom in construction of labs handling dangerous pathogens, but this has not been accompanied by sufficient biosafety and biosecurity oversight. Our new report documents for the first time the current picture around the world and sets out clear recommendations to help address current shortcomings that need to be implemented at the local, national and international level.”’

“The Global Biolabs project based at King’s College London began in 2021 and partners with George Mason University and The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Its new report scores the 27 countries with BSL4 labs on their biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research legislation and general implementation effectiveness. It shows the rapid increase in the number of BSL4 labs and says most of the increase is in Asia including India, Kazakhstan, and Singapore. It also identified trends around the size of the facilities and the level of personal protective equipment used in such labs.”

“For the first time the report also looked at ‘BSL3 enhanced’ and ‘BSL3+’ labs which it found are mainly used by public health institutions and universities, and tend to have a stronger focus on animal health research compared to BSL4 facilities.”

“The report also assessed biorisk management and governance at the international level and found that overall, biosafety governance was found to be much stronger than biosecurity. It highlighted how there are several informal multinational groups that emphasise biorisk management in their missions but lack authority and/or resources to mandate meaningful changes.”

“It also said that those international organisations that do have more resources, members and official mandates that could cover biorisk management place the issue lower down on their list of priorities and there are challenges achieving co-ordinated action and agreement.”

US COVID-19 Updates

House Backs COVID Origins Information Declassification

Last Friday, the US House of Representatives voted unanimously to require the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, to declassify information regarding the origin of COVID-19 in a 419 to 0 vote. The bill previously passed the Senate on March 1 with unanimous consent, so it is now awaiting signature by President Biden. This comes in the shadow of much controversy surrounding the Department of Energy’s updated assessment on the likelihood of a lab origin of SARS-CoV-2.

Biden Administration Requests $20 Billion in Mandatory Funding to Improve Public Health

President Biden’s budget request, released this Thursday, includes $20 billion in mandatory funding (available over five years) for “…the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of Health, and the Food and Drug Administration to support preparedness for pandemics and other biological threats.” Notably, as the end of the emergency declarations approaches, the administration did not request supplemental funding for COVID-19. GovExec explains further that, “For the CDC specifically, the budget proposal includes funding to support the agency’s restructuring, which it started in April 2022, based on issues identified during the pandemic as well as funding to improve public health data, which is something the director has told Congress the CDC desperately needs.”

End of Emergency Declarations Approaching

The COVID-19 Emergency Declaration that was enacted in March of 2020 is set to expire on May 11, 2023, marking a major shift in the federal government’s involvement and support for the ongoing COVID-19 response. In a recent brief for NACCHO Voice, Callahan and Ridley explained that “According to the CDC, as of February 2023, there are still over 200,000 new reported cases of COVID-19, nearly 2,500 COVID-19 related deaths a week, over 3,500 new hospital admissions daily because of COVID-19, and only 16 percent of the US population has received the updated booster dose. Although the Emergency Declaration is ending, COVID-19 is still very much present in our communities and still poses a threat to our health and well-being.”

Klotz and Sandbrink discussed what the end of this declaration will look like in a recent piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, writing in part “President Joe Biden’s administration announced that come May 11, COVID-19 will no longer be a public health emergency necessitating special governmental powers. Republicans in the House passed a bill to end the emergency immediately. And Biden himself famously declared the pandemic over at an auto show in September. Of course, no matter how many federal officials make pronouncements, the COVID-19 pandemic won’t be over any time soon. Trevor Bedford, a computational virologist at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle, told David Wallace-Wells of The New York Times that each year about 50 percent of Americans will get COVID-19 and 100,000 will die. The article was appropriately titled “Endemic Covid-19 Looks Pretty Brutal.” It will be, and society should be prepared to limit the carnage with better medicines, better vaccines, and better air filtration systems.”

Their piece covers a number of ways the US can help mitigate the severity of this situation, including reducing the number of hospitalizations and limiting the impact on the economy, through measures like embracing nasal vaccines, working to improve air quality, and navigating implementing effective but politically divisive measures like masking in public settings. They write in their conclusion, “Some strategies, like better medicines, will allow us to survive COVID. Others, like better vaccines and better air, could help quash outbreaks. Only time will tell if we will be able to ever rid ourselves of omicron and its subvariants. Others infectious disease threats could be looming, as well. H5N1 bird flu recently swept through a mink farm in Spain, raising concerns that the virus could mutate so it transmits more easily among mammals, including humans. That would be a potentially catastrophic development. The virus kills 50 percent of the people it infects. Far from being important only for taming COVID-19, new vaccines, therapies, and technologies may one day, unfortunately, be needed to thwart H5N1, too.”

Preparing for the Next Pandemic

Finally, if it isn’t clear by now, the start of the next pandemic is a question of when it will happen, not if it will happen. Dr. Tom Inglesby touched on some of the issues we might face when that does happen in a recent opinion piece for the New York Times. In it he explains: “Late last year, I participated in an exercise meant to play out what might happen if the world was presented with a new disease spreading quickly, with no warning…The exercise revolved around a number of simulated emergency meetings of the World Health Organization advisory board, called in response to a very serious new pandemic — a risk that the W.H.O. refers to as “Disease X.”’

“Among the exercise participants were highly experienced current and past health ministers and senior public health officials from nine countries. The urgent events required them to make hard policy decisions quickly, with little information. Each decision had huge consequences for society and for the course of the pandemic. This was how it was in the early days of Covid. It’s also how it will be in other pandemics.”

“Some of the smartest and most experienced international public health leaders had differing, sometimes opposing views on many fundamental questions about the response. Should they shut down travel in the earliest days? Should they close schools in the first affected countries? If a future pandemic has a much higher case fatality rate than Covid or if it severely affected children, should countries take different, stronger, faster measures to contain it? Top experts don’t yet agree.”

Furthermore, another key issue to successfully preparing for the next pandemic is not just recognizing how politicized public health is in the United States, but the negative impact this has had on the public health workforce. In a recent piece for Michigan Advance, Anna Gustafson writes about the difficult situation Governor Gretchen Whitmer and former Chief Medical Executive of Michigan’s Department of Health and Human Services, Dr. Joneigh Khaldun, faced. Gustafson writes ‘“I think in the very beginning I made a general assumption that if people were presented with the right information, and saw how this was impacting our society, we would come together and buckle down to prevent the spread of the virus,” Khaldun, who has since left her position with the state, told the Advance this week. “What I did not anticipate is just how political the pandemic response would become, and how that would hinder our response.”’

This points to a number of much deeper, systemic problems that simple public health funding will not be able to address, let alone in time for the next public health crisis.

“Navalny” Wins Oscar

“Navalny,” a documentary focused on former Russian presidential candidate Alexey Navalny, won the Oscar award for best documentary this Sunday at the Academy Awards. CNN explains, “The riveting real-life thriller follows Navalny’s political rise, his survival of an assassination attempt against him by poisoning and his subsequent imprisonment. Directed by Daniel Roher and presented by CNN Films and HBO Max, “Navalny” documents a methodical investigation by CNN Chief International Correspondent, Clarissa Ward, and journalist group, Bellingcat, to unmask Navalny’s would-be killers.”

Updates on Poisonings in Iran

Michele Catanzaro outlines what is known so far about this situation in Nature News, explaining “Iran’s government has arrested more than 100 people that it says are responsible for an unknown sickness that has affected potentially thousands of the country’s schoolgirls. Many are attributing the sickness to poisoning. As videos continue to emerge online of distressed young people being taken to clinics and hospitals, Nature spoke to toxicologists, chemical-weapons researchers, epidemiologists, political scientists and others to explore possible explanations.”

This piece addresses a number of facets, including the potential for the uptick in reported symptoms to be the result of the psychological stress fear of being poisoned can cause. Furthermore, on the topic of how these events should be investigated, Catanzaro writes “Researchers, human-rights groups and some governments say that an independent investigation is needed. Such an investigation would need the government to provide “access to health data, that are often extremely securitized in Iran”, says Behrouzan.”

This piece addresses a number of facets, including the potential for the uptick in reported symptoms to be the result of the psychological stress fear of being poisoned can cause. Furthermore, on the topic of how these events should be investigated, Catanzaro writes “Researchers, human-rights groups and some governments say that an independent investigation is needed. Such an investigation would need the government to provide “access to health data, that are often extremely securitized in Iran”, says Behrouzan.”

“A thorough investigation would include interviews with victims, toxicological tests, analyses of clinical histories, an epidemiological study and environmental sampling, according to researchers Nature has interviewed.”

““I would like to see an open discussion, with the clinicians that saw the girls speaking freely,” says Ward. “You have to bring the community with you. Community involvement for something sensitive is crucial for people to believe in the findings,” adds Hay, who carried out a process of this kind to understand mass sickness in Kosovo around the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia into separate countries2 in 1991.”

“Iran has enough trained experts and equipment to carry out toxicological investigations, says Hay. This capacity was built during and after Iran’s war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, during which Iraq used chemical weapons.”

Man Arrested in November Claims He Sought to Release a Virus at Schiphol

Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport has had a rough go the last year, but this culminated in November when a 55-year-old man was arrested at Schiphol Plaza after claiming he wanted to release a virus at Schiphol airport. The man was arrested as the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) responded when he entered the airport carrying a suitcase he claimed contained a jar with a virus inside, according to recent reporting from NL Times.

“A few weeks before the incident, the man had sent an email claiming he wanted to release a virus at the airport, the Marechaussee said. The Marechaussee briefed airport security about the man, so he was immediately recognized when he entered Schiphol Plaza at the end of November 2022. Marechaussee officers stopped and searched the man. He told them he had a virus in his suitcase.”

Ultimately, RIVM determined the jar he had contained no hazardous materials, and the officers involved were not in danger. The man’s motivation is still unclear at this time.

“How South Korea Avoided a National Lockdown”

In a recent piece for the Telegraph, Nicola Smith discusses South Korea’s approach to responding to COVID-19, highlighting the country’s ability to rapidly roll-out testing in the early days of the pandemic. She writes, “Testing was the key to Korea’s success, said Dr Jee Young-mee, head of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA), in an exclusive interview with the Telegraph last week. Mass testing, quickly deployed, allowed South Korea to save lives, avoid a nationwide lockdown and keep its economy motoring.”

‘“We thought quick action starts from testing. We need to know the confirmed cases very quickly then we can isolate and treat. With that we can contain the virus,” she told the Telegraph in the KDCA’s state-of-the-art headquarters – a sprawling campus of polished buildings an hour from Seoul that’s been the vanguard of the country’s pandemic response.”

Dr. HyunJung Kim, an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD program, focused his dissertation on this topic and has published portions of his research, including his recent Globalization and Health article-“Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea.”

In this article, Kim explains “Emergency-use-authorization (EUA) is the representative biodefense policy that allows the use of unlicensed medical countermeasures or off-label use of approved medical countermeasures in response to public health emergencies. This article aims to determine why the EUA policies of the United States and South Korea produced drastically different outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how these outcomes were determined by the originations and evolutionary paths of the two policies…Historical institutionalism (HI) explains institutional changes—that is, how the institution is born and how it evolves—based on the concept of path dependency. However, the HI analytical narratives remain at the meso level of analysis in the context of structure and agency. This article discusses domestic and policy-level factors related to the origination of the biodefense institutions in the United States and South Korea using policy-learning concepts with the Event-related Policy Change Model.”

He finds that, “The evolution and outcomes of the two EUAs are different because both policies were born out of different needs. The United States EUA is primarily oriented toward protecting homeland security against CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) threats, whereas the South Korea EUA is specifically designed for disease prevention against infectious disease outbreak.”

“Biodefense: Actions Needed to Address Long-Standing Challenges”

This new Snapshot from the Government Accountability Office discusses several ways the federal government can strengthen its preparedness for a biological incident. GAO’s recommendations focus on addressing challenges in the National Biodefense Strategy, strengthening biodefense preparedness activities, addressing biodefence technology issues and challenges in biosurveillance efforts DHS faces.

“Improving U.S. Biosafety and Biosecurity: Revisiting Recommendations from the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel and the Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Regulations”

This article from Haines and Gronvall was recently published in Applied Biosafety. Their absrtact reads in part “In response to a series of biosafety incidents in 2014, the White House directed two high-level expert committees to analyze biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories and make recommendations for work with select agents and toxins. Overall, they recommended 33 actions to address areas related to national biosafety, including promoting a culture of responsibility, oversight, outreach and education, applied biosafety research, incident reporting, material accountability, inspection processes, regulations and guidelines, and determining the necessary number of high-containment laboratories in the United States”

“Further work is needed to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories handling regulated pathogens (biological select agents and toxins [BSAT]). These carefully considered recommendations should now be enacted, including determining if there is sufficient high-containment laboratory space for response to a future pandemic, developing a sustained applied biosafety research program to improve our understanding of how high-containment research should be performed, bioethics training to educate the regulated community on the consequences of unsafe practices in BSAT research, and the creation of a no-fault incident reporting system for biological incidents, which may inform and improve biosafety training.”

“The BWC Working Group: Setting the Scene for the Organizational Meeting”

The BioWeapons Prevention Project recently published this report discussing the taskings and organization of the Working Group established at the Ninth BWC Review Conference last year. The piece explains in part, “The Ninth five-yearly Review Conference for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC/BTWC) held at the end of 2022 agreed on the establishment of a ‘Working Group on the strengthening of the Convention’. Although the Review Conference was unable to agree many details of how the Working Group might operate, the creation of the Group is seen by many practitioners as an advance on earlier arrangements for activities between Review Conferences.”

“What’s Next? The Ninth Biological Review Conference and Beyond”

Zhang et al.’s latest piece for UNIDIR discusses the recent BWC RevCon and what the Final Document lays out for the next five years. They write in part, “Biosecurity and biological disarmament cannot remain siloed and insulated from wider trends in the scientific and technological community. As biotechnology continues to advance, converge and spread around the world, interaction with stakeholders working on relevant technologies internationally will become ever more important for both biosecurity and biological disarmament. The Working Group provides an important opportunity to advance the BWC and re-shape relations with external stakeholders. States should seize this chance in setting up the Working Group.”

“Nuclear Security During Armed Conflict: Lessons From Ukraine”

Check out this new publication by Vitaly Fedchenko for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: “The attacks on nuclear installations in Ukraine by the Russian military in 2022 were unprecedented. Nuclear security aims at prevention, detection and response to malicious or unauthorized acts by non-state actors, not the armed forces of a state. However, an international armed conflict creates new circumstances in which a national nuclear security regime must operate.”

“In March 2022 the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) highlighted ‘seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security’ in extraordinary circumstances. There are three further areas in which the international nuclear security framework can be strengthened and prepared for extraordinary events, including armed conflict. First, there is a need to further clarify and plan the actions of competent authorities. Second, the IAEA may be able to assist member states in developing guidance for specific scenarios during extraordinary events. Third, there should be further integration of nuclear security with nuclear safety and emergency preparedness and response.”

“The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons”

New from the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, this piece explains the history of Russia’s involvement in CTR-backed disarmament efforts and its ongoing disinformation campaigns. The piece explains that “Moscow continues to push false information about biological weapons, without providing any credible evidence. Over a thousand members of the scientific community have signed a letter  penned by Russian experts  openly disputing the Kremlin’s claim, saying the work of peaceful biological research laboratories in Ukraine does “not imply any development of biological weapons or even the use of particularly dangerous pathogens in the laboratories. The list of destroyed strains published by RIA Novosti and other Russian media outlets contains not a single particularly dangerous strain.”’

“The United States’ peaceful cooperation and assistance activities comply with and help fulfill our obligations under the BWC. These cooperation and assistance activities have been transparent and designed to help countries detect, prepare for, and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Russia seeks instead to cast peaceful research to prevent disease in Ukraine and around the world — and the U.S. cooperation and assistance to support it — as nefarious biological weapons programs. The Kremlin’s biological weapons disinformation campaign aims to deflect, distract, and misdirect. Russia has a history of accusing others of doing what it is doing itself, and its recent biological weapons claims related to Ukraine are no different. The United States assesses that Russia continues to maintain an offensive biological weapons program in violation of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.”

LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION FIFTH REVIEW CONFERENCE

Online Panel Discussions | 20 and 30 March 2023 | 13.00-14.30h CET

WHAT: The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is pleased to invite you to two online panel discussions on Lessons Learned for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Fifth Review Conference. They are part of a series of events the Institute is holding in preparation for the Fifth CWC Review Conference. The events will contribute to enhancing understandings of CWC Review Conferences and identifying lessons to be learned from past experiences. 

The set of speaker for each of the events will be announced shortly. The updated agenda can be found at: https://www.unidir.org/events/lessons-learned-chemical-weapons-convention-fifth-review-conference. Speakers for these events include former Review Conference office holders, national representatives, and experts. 

The panels will be moderated by James Revill and will include a question-and-answer session with the audience.

WHEN & WHERE: 20 and 30 March 2023 | 13.00-14.30h CET | Online

PARTICIPANTS: UNIDIR encourages the participation of representatives and experts specialized or interested in issues pertaining to the CWC.

RSVP: The link to the webinars will be shared with registered participants. Please register here: https://CWCLessonsLearned.eventbrite.com. For any questions, please contact: sarah.erickson@un.org

Online Event: Discussion with Amb. van der Kwast About What to Expect at the 5th CWC Review Conference

“The Fifth Five-Year Review Conference (RC-5) for the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention will be held in the Hague from May 15-19, 2023.”

“At the conference, member states and the broader chemical weapons disarmament community will gather to assess past achievements, treaty implementation, and compliance, and discuss plans to strengthen the CWC in the years ahead.”

“You are invited to join a virtual discussion with Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast, the chair-designate for the Review Conference, who will share his hopes and expectations for the conference’s outcomes.”

“Paul Walker, the Chair of the CWC Coalition, will moderate. Amb. van der Kwast’s remarks will be followed by a Q&A session.”

“This discussion will be on the record.”

“This special event will be open to all members of the CWC Coalition, and other interested members of the public, journalists, and diplomats.”

This webinar will take place on March 21 at 11 am EST. Register here.

Book Talk with Dr. Katherine Paris on “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse”

“Dr. Katherine Paris, an alumnus of the Mason Biodefense PhD program, recently released her new book “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse.” Join the NextGen Global Health Security Network for a conversation with Dr. Paris to learn about her research!” This event will take place on Wednesday, March 22, from 7-8 PM. Register for the Zoom here: https://cglink.me/2d7/r2064992

Intelligence Studies Consortium

“On March 24, 2023, the Intelligence Studies Consortium is convening its third symposium, entitled New Perspectives in Intelligence Studies. This year, George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting. The symposium will be from 8 AM to 4 PM in Rooms 125-126 Van Metre Hall, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA. The closest Metro is Virginia Square/GMU on the Orange and Silver lines.

The symposium will feature student presentations in four panels:

  • Russia and China
  • Violent Non-State Actors
  • Emerging Technologies
  • Transnational Challenges

There will be an 8:30 AM keynote address from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Shannon Corless, and a lunchtime conversation with General Michael V. Hayden.

We encourage students to attend in person. We have also provided a livestream option for those not in the Washington DC area.”

Learn more and register here.

Apply for the 2023 Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship

“The global norm against biological weapons cannot be maintained without youth voices  being  included  in the multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Youth perspectives are key to create innovative solutions and generate long-term engagement. There are particular benefits to including the perspectives of young people from developing countries, where most of the world’s youth is concentrated.”

“Organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva in partnership with key international actors empowering youth in science diplomacy and global biosecurity, the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship provides a unique learning and networking experience into multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva.”

“Launched in 2019 as a Biosecurity Diplomacy Workshop, the Youth for Biosecurity Initiative is for the first time in 2023 providing the opportunity for 15 young scientists from the Global South to join an online interactive training programme prior to a field visit during the meeting of the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention in Geneva.”

Learn more and apply here by March 29.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). The Ides of March may have already passed, but this week’s question is still focused on classical antiquity: In about 129 BC, Manius Aquillius, a senator and consul, is thought to have ended an ongoing war in the Roman province of Asia by doing what to rebellious cities?

Shout out to Sophie H. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to last week’s question, ” In 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident, was poisoned with what agent?” is ricin.

Pandora Report 3.10.2023

This week we tackle the addition of three subsidiaries of BGI Group (formerly the Beijing Genomics Institute) to the US Entity List, the ongoing discussion regarding DOE’s recent COVID-19 origins assessment, congressional hearings on the same subject, and updates on the suspected poisonings of school girls in Iran. This issue also has several new publications and upcoming events, including one discussing the outcome of Germany’s intervention in a suspected IS-inspired plot using ricin and an upcoming book talk with Dr. Katherine Paris, an alumna of the Biodefense PhD program.

US Department of Commerce Adds Three BGI Subsidiaries to Entity List

Effective March 2, 2023, the US Department of Commerce officially added three subsidiaries of BGI Group, formerly the Beijing Genomics Institute, to the Entity List. The Entity List is published by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and requires foreign persons, entities, and governments to meet US licensing requirements for export and transfer of certain items. Placement on the list does not prohibit companies and persons in the US from purchasing from or doing business with these entities. About 600 Chinese entities are on the list, including many known to have aided the PLA in creating artificial islands throughout the South China Sea. The Biden administration has added over 110 Chinese entities to the list, in large part because of the PRC’s military-civil fusion policies and the two-way transfers they have facilitated between companies, research institutions, universities, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The BIS announcement read in part: “The ERC [End-User Review Committee] determined to add BGI Research; BGI Tech Solutions (Hongkong) Co., Ltd.; and Forensic Genomics International, to the Entity List, under the destination of China, pursuant to § 744.11 of the EAR. The addition of these entities is based upon information that indicates their collection and analysis of genetic data poses a significant risk of contributing to monitoring and surveillance by the government of China, which has been utilized in the repression of ethnic minorities in China. Information also indicates that the actions of these entities concerning the collection and analysis of genetic data present a significant risk of diversion to China’s military programs. These entities are added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR.”

BGI released a statement in response to the announcement, saying “We believe the BIS’s decision may have been impacted by misinformation and we are willing and able to clarify. BGI Group’s work strictly abides by local, regional, and global moral and ethical standards, and adheres to all required laws and regulations. BGI Group does not condone and would never be involved in any human-rights abuses. None of BGI Group is state-owned or state-controlled, and all of BGI Group’s services and research are provided for civilian and scientific purposes.”

As we discussed early last year, BGI is known to have used its NIFTY test, a prenatal test used globally, to collect data in collaboration with the PLA. Furthermore, early in the pandemic, as the US struggled to build testing capacity and states could not run their own tests in their state labs, BGI Group targeted US state governments with cheap tests that promised to rapidly increase their capacity. The company also worked with the PLA on projects aiming to make ethnic Han Chinese people less susceptible to altitude sickness, though BGI Group claims this work was purely academic in nature. The all adds to growing concerns that foreign entities are using seemingly harmless products, such as at-home DNA tests like 23andMe or AncestryDNA, can be exploited by adversaries.

COVID-19 Origins…Familiar Arguments, Renewed Vitriol

Predictably, discussion of last week’s announcement that the Department of Energy assesses with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 very likely originated in a laboratory has continued with much fervor this week. This section covers some recent publications discussing this as well as the recent congressional hearing focused on the matter.

Updates on Discussion of DOE and FBI’s Assessments

As we discussed last week, there has been a lot of online discussion of the updated intelligence assessment from DOE that inadequately explains what the Department actually found and what it means. Cheryl Rofer explains in her recent Scientific American piece that 90 day intelligence estimates are not the end-all and be-all, especially in a situation like this. She writes that “An intelligence assessment isn’t a scientific conclusion. They are different beasts. The summary itself observes that different agencies weigh intelligence reporting and scientific publications differently. The important factor for intelligence assessments is the veracity of sources, whereas scientific conclusions depend on data and the coherence of the argument the data support. However, data from a scientist who has proved unreliable in the past will weigh less heavily in scientific conclusions, and intelligence analysts will regard fanciful stories from an otherwise reliable informant skeptically. The scientific data are available to the public, unlike the reporting that underlies the intelligence assessments.”

Rofer also explains how the intelligence divisions of national laboratories work, writing “Cutting-edge science is the expertise of the Department of Energy, however, which runs 17 national laboratories, several studying SARS-CoV-2 and its origins. Intelligence professionals in the national laboratories work with scientists to develop assessments. Because they are embedded in the laboratories, they can develop working relationships to explore puzzles of science and intelligence. Because I was responsible for a similar environmental cleanup site at Los Alamos National Laboratory, a question that I was involved in during the 1990s was whether the Soviets had done hydrodynamic tests at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, scattering metallic plutonium chunks. Members of the intelligence division came to me and other chemists, and our physicist colleagues, to learn how and why such tests would have been performed, and what clues they would leave behind for analysts to spot. Eventually, we found that indeed tests were run in this way. A joint program with Russia and Kazakhstan recovered 100 kilograms of plutonium that might have gone to scavengers, as a result of this detective work.”

Furthermore, as Drs. Angela Rasmussen and Saskia Popescu (assistant professor in the Schar School Biodefense Program) explain in their piece for the Washington Post, “No new evidence is available for public scrutiny. It is impossible to evaluate the Energy Department’s claims. Yet they have been repeated in many quarters as if they were proof of a lab origin — a belief that fuels demands to curtail work on dangerous infectious agents…This circus makes the United States and the world less prepared, not more, to defend itself against emerging pathogens that could lead to pandemics, including the alarming influenza strain H5N1 spreading globally in animals or the deadly Marburg virus outbreakin Equatorial Guinea.”

In their piece, Rasmussen and Popescu highlight the critical oversight of the risk that cities where people and animals live in close contact pose. They write “Only in a city with a large, mobile, interactive population of people and animals could the virus establish sustained onward transmission from person to person. This pandemic could have just as easily begun in Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou — where SARS-CoV-1 emerged in 2002, also as a direct result of the sale of live animals at “wet markets.”

Promised Congressional Hearings Kick-Off with House Oversight Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Hearing

Rasmussen and Popescu summarize much of the problems and concerns with the congressional hearing in their piece mentioned previously, writing “Deepening partisanship on covid-19 hinders progress at home and abroad. None of the witnesses called so far by the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic for its first hearing this week has technical expertise on SARS-CoV-2 origins science. Few have experience within the covid-19 response effort. All have promoted pro-lab leak opinions without providing any evidence to support their claims. It is easier to place blame than to address systemic issues that led to more than a million covid deaths in the United States.”

The majority’s witnesses included Dr. Jamie Metzl, a historian of Southeast Asia whose career has largely centered on humanitarian policy; Nicholas Wade, a former science editor at the New York Times who drew criticism for his 2014 book that asked, in reference to economic issues in many African countries, whether “variations in their nature, such as their time preference, work ethic and propensity to violence, have some bearing on the economic decisions they make.”; and Dr. Robert Redfield, a physician who was the CDC director during the Trump administration and has ample clinical research experience, largely focused on HIV/AIDS. The minority witness was Dr. Paul Auwaerter, an infectious disease physician whose researcher includes work on Lyme Disease and EBV.

As Jon Cohen explains in Science Insider-“Some scientists and legislators might have hoped this morning’s U.S. congressional hearing on the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic would move beyond partisan politics and seriously investigate what has become a deeply divisive debate. But members of the House of Representatives’ Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic mostly hammered home long-standing Republican or Democratic talking points, shedding no new light on the central question: Did SARS-CoV-2 naturally jump from animals to humans or did the virus somehow leak from a laboratory in Wuhan, China?”

Of course, much of the witness statements and questions focused on the EcoHealth Alliance and its role in projects with the Wuhan Institute of Virology. In response to several of the statements, the EcoHealth Alliance issues these corrections to assertions made at the hearing. Of particular interest is the status of the DEFUSE proposal that was submitted to DARPA, a frequent talking point in online lab-leak discussions. Of this, the Alliance writes plainly “…the proposal was not funded and the work was never done, therefore it cannot have played a role in the origin of COVID-19.”

Bloomberg also published a piece discussing how this drawn out, unproductive discourse obscures the rise globally of high-security biolabs, which features the work of Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz and Dr. Filippa Lentzos of King’s College London. Of the politicization this has brought, Dr. Koblentz was quoted saying “Nobody wants lab accidents…Unfortunately this issue has become politicized and polarized. That’s because the people with the loudest voices have had the microphone.

Iran Poisonings

According to NBC, at least 2,000 people in Iran have reported symptoms since concerns about deliberate poisonings of schoolgirls in the country first emerged, though some members of parliament estimate that number could be as high as 5,000. This comes as videos circulate of young girls coughing profusely as they are escorted out of school, with others showing girls slumped over and struggling to breathe in hospitals. So far, 30 schools in at least 10 provinces have reported cases of girls mysteriously falling ill. This has led to mounting protests in Tehran, which is particularly troubling in light of recent protests over the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini, a young Kurdish woman, in police custody after she was arrested by the Islamic religious police for allegedly violating modesty standards.

President Ebrahim Raisi spoke out this week about the issue, ordering investigations and telling the cabinet that these incidents are “an inhumane crime” aimed “at intimidating the students, our dear children, and their parents,” according to state media. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene, also said that, if these allegations are confirmed, that they constitute a “great and unforgivable crime” and that “the culprits must face the toughest of punishments.”

“Can a 1975 Bioweapons Ban Handle Today’s Biothreats?”

In this piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Matt Field writes “Rapid advances in biotechnology and the lack of an enforcement mechanism are challenging the Biological Weapons Convention. Amid swirling allegations that countries are violating the treaty, are slow-moving attempts to update it enough to prevent biological doom?” In it, he discusses challenges in adapting the treaty to current issues, quoting Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz, writing “It is worrisome that states parties can’t agree on relatively simple propositions that would ensure that the Article 1 prohibition on developing biological weapons includes biological agents produced or modified via emerging technologies such as genome editing,” Koblentz, the George Mason University biosecurity expert, said.”

“Model Law for National Implementation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Related Requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540”

New from VERTIC: “This Model Law was developed to assist countries in drafting legislation to implement the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the biological weapons-related provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.”

“It can be used to identify all the relevant measures that should be included in national legislation to give effect to the BWC and related provisions of UNSCR 1540. It can further be used during the legislative drafting process. As there is no “one size fits all” approach for the drafting of national implementing legislation, each state should determine the type of implementing measures it requires in accordance with its constitutional processes, legal tradition, existing legal framework, activities in the field of bioscience and other national circumstances. The Model Law is therefore intended to provide a useful basis to draft BWC implementing legislation and can be used to draft new legislation, or amend existing laws and/or regulations.”

“Ricin’s Round Two: Germany Prevents Another Islamic State-Motivated Bioterrorism Attack”

Herbet Maack’s piece in the Terrorism Monitor discusses the outcomes of Germany’s January intervention in a suspected IS-inspired attack. Maack writes in his conclusion, “The disrupted plot of Monir J. and Jalal L. shows the continued threat from loosely IS-connected and IS-inspired individuals. It also underscores the continued interest of Islamist-motivated perpetrators in bioterrorism and their desire to inflict significant losses of life. For Germany, the disrupted plot was already the second one involving ricin. While US-German counterterrorism intelligence cooperation seems to be functioning well, the potentially catastrophic consequences for any failure should cause Berlin to consider strengthening its own domestic counter-terrorism intelligence gathering capabilities.”

“Diverse Voices in International Security: NTI’s Gabby Essix on Promoting Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the Biosecurity Field”

This interview with Grabby Essix, a Bio Program Officer at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, discusses DEI efforts in the biosecurity field: “NTI is committed to highlighting and supporting diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in the peace and security field. During February, Black History Month, NTI Deputy Vice President for Communications Rachel Staley Grant sat down with NTI | bio Program Officer Gabrielle (Gabby) Essix to discuss DEI efforts in the biosecurity field. Essix supports NTI’s efforts to increase global action on biological and health security through the Global Biosecurity Dialogue and the Global Health Security Index and she leads NTI’s annual Next Generation for Biosecurity Competition. Since 2017, this competition has fostered professional development for rising global leaders in the field of biosecurity and biosafety, and it promotes DEI within the global health security community.”

“Toxic Inheritance: Assessing North Korea’s Chemical Weapons Capability”

This essay from Royal United Services Institute discusses ongoing work using open source research and remote sensing technologies to assess the DPRK’s CW capabilities and production capacity. This essay provides a review of historical documents related to the program and identifies 33 sites of interest in the country, with the promise of creating a map of more sites at a later date with alleged links to CW production.

“Verification of Exposure to Chemical Warfare Agents Through Analysis of Persistent Biomarkers in Plants”

De Bruin-Hoegée et al. discuss the possibility of using plant biomarkers in forensic reconstructions of chemical warfare attacks in their article in Analytical Methods. Abstract: “The continuing threats of military conflicts and terrorism may involve the misuse of chemical weapons. The present study aims to use environmental samples to find evidence of the release of such agents at an incident scene. A novel approach was developed for identifying protein adducts in plants. Basil (Ocimum basilicum), bay laurel leaf (Laurus nobilis) and stinging nettle (Urtica dioica) were exposed to 2.5 to 150 mg m−3 sulfur mustard, 2.5 to 250 mg m−3 sarin, and 0.5 to 25 g m−3 chlorine gas. The vapors of the selected chemicals were generated under controlled conditions in a dedicated set-up. After sample preparation and digestion, the samples were analyzed by liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) and liquid chromatography high resolution tandem mass spectrometry (LC-HRMS/MS), respectively. In the case of chlorine exposure, it was found that 3-chloro- and 3,5-dichlorotyrosine adducts were formed. As a result of sarin exposure, the o-isopropyl methylphosphonic acid adduct to tyrosine could be analyzed, and after sulfur mustard exposure the N1- and N3-HETE-histidine adducts were identified. The lowest vapor exposure levels for which these plant adducts could be detected, were 2.5 mg m−3 for sarin, 50 mg m−3 for chlorine and 12.5 mg m−3 for sulfur mustard. Additionally, protein adducts following a liquid exposure of only 2 nmol Novichock A-234, 0.4 nmol sarin and 0.2 nmol sulfur mustard could still be observed. For both vapor and liquid exposure, the amount of adduct formed increased with the level of exposure. In all cases synthetic reference standards were used for unambiguous identification. The window of opportunity for investigation of agent exposure through the analysis of plant material was found to be remarkably long. Even three months after the actual exposure, the biomarkers could still be detected in the living plants, as well as in dried leaves. An important benefit of the current method is that a relatively simple and generic sample work-up procedure can be applied for all agents studied. In conclusion, the presented work clearly demonstrates the possibility of analyzing chemical warfare agent biomarkers in plants, which is useful for forensic reconstructions, including the investigation into alleged use in conflict areas.”

“Twenty Years Ago in Iraq, Ignoring the Expert Weapons Inspectors Proved To Be a Fatal Mistake”

In this essay for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Robert E. Kelley discusses the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and faulty claims about Iraqi WMD programs that drove the decision to invade. He writes in part, “I was in Iraq in those final months before the 2003 invasion as Deputy for Analysis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Action Team tasked with the nuclear side of the weapons inspections, while the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) worked in parallel, looking for biological and chemical weapons, as well as illicit missile programmes. We studied a few outstanding questions regarding the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme that had been discovered and dismantled in the early 1990s; we looked for new evidence and investigated leads and suspicions passed on to us by national governments; we inspected many sites and interviewed Iraqi scientists and officials in person; and we analysed the data. By early 2003 we knew at a very high level of confidence that there was no nuclear weapons effort of any kind in Iraq, and we were regularly passing this information back to the UN Security Council. We were not wrong.”

“ChatGPT: Opportunities and Challenges for the Nuclear Agenda”

In this work published by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Yanliang Pan discusses the potential for misuse of ChatGPT in academia, politics, and cybersecurity, focusing on the nuclear agenda. He writes in part, “However, just as AI instruments can be used to advance the nuclear agenda, they also present risks that cannot be ignored. For instance, ChatGPT’s potential to enhance the capabilities of malign cyber actors represents a serious danger to nuclear security. With the digitalization of instrumentation and control systems, nuclear facilities are increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats, including malware and phishing attacks that ChatGPT is most proficient in assisting.  Testing shows, for example, that the AI model has no qualms about writing fake emails to nuclear facility employees asking for access credentials – in different languages and styles of writing as requested…Indeed, it has no way of knowing whether the email is fake at all as it lacks the ability to check the user’s credentials. Upon the user’s request, the AI model will also identify common vulnerabilities in specific systems of a nuclear facility and list the malware that has been used in the past to target those systems…”

“Now AI Can Be Used to Design New Proteins”

In this piece for TheScientist, Dr. Kamal Nahas explains advancements in AI, writing “Artificial intelligence algorithms have had a meteoric impact on protein structure, such as when DeepMind’s AlphaFold2 predicted the structures of 200 million proteins. Now, David Baker and his team of biochemists at the University of Washington have taken protein-folding AI a step further. In a Nature publication from February 22, they outlined how they used AI to design tailor-made, functional proteins that they could synthesize and produce in live cells, creating new opportunities for protein engineering. Ali Madani, founder and CEO of Profluent, a company that uses other AI technology to design proteins, says this study “went the distance” in protein design and remarks that we’re now witnessing “the burgeoning of a new field.”

“Trust In US Federal, State, And Local Public Health Agencies During COVID-19: Responses And Policy Implications”

From Health Affairs: “Public health agencies’ ability to protect health in the wake of COVID-19 largely depends on public trust. In February 2022 we conducted a first-of-its-kind nationally representative survey of 4,208 US adults to learn the public’s reported reasons for trust in federal, state, and local public health agencies. Among respondents who expressed a “great deal” of trust, that trust was not related primarily to agencies’ ability to control the spread of COVID-19 but, rather, to beliefs that those agencies made clear, science-based recommendations and provided protective resources. Scientific expertise was a more commonly reported reason for “a great deal” of trust at the federal level, whereas perceptions of hard work, compassionate policy, and direct services were emphasized more at the state and local levels. Although trust in public health agencies was not especially high, few respondents indicated that they had no trust. Lower trust was related primarily to respondents’ beliefs that health recommendations were politically influenced and inconsistent. The least trusting respondents also endorsed concerns about private-sector influence and excessive restrictions and had low trust in government overall. Our findings suggest the need to support a robust federal, state, and local public health communications infrastructure; ensure agencies’ authority to make science-based recommendations; and develop strategies for engaging different segments of the public.”

Global BioLabs 2023 Launch- “High Consequence Bio Labs: Growing Risks and Lagging Governance”

“The Global Biolabs Initiative is proud to announce the launch of its new report, Global BioLabs 2023, and an updated interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs. With the global expansion of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, gaps in biosecurity and biosafety governance are widening. Since its inception in 2021, the Global Biolabs Initiative has tracked the proliferation of the highest containment labs, identified several key trends in their construction and operation, developed biorisk management scorecards to measure how well countries are governing biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research, and mapped the global biorisk management architecture. The pace of BSL4/BSL3+ labs expansion is outpacing current biosafety and biosecurity regulations, and coordinated international action is needed to address increasing biorisks.”

“Dr Filippa Lentzos, King’s College London, and Dr Gregory Koblentz, George Mason University, will present the Global BioLabs 2023 report, describe key trends, and discuss recommendations for strengthening global biorisk management. The event will also feature a demonstration of the interactive map: globalbiolabs.org.”

This event will take place March 16, 2023, 1 pm GMT. Register for the Zoom webinar here and access Global Biolabs tools and resources at globalbiolabs.org.

Credit: The BulletinGlobal Biolabs

Penetrate, Exploit, Disrupt, Destroy – with Dr. Craig J. Wiener

From the Alperovitch Institute: “Join us on Wednesday, March 15th at 5pm at the SAIS Hopkins Kenney Auditorium. Dr. Craig J. Wiener is recognized as an expert in major foreign adversary espionage, sabotage and strategic capabilities that pose threats to the U.S. Government (USG) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dr. Wiener’s previous position was as the Senior Technical Analyst for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence where he fulfilled a role as DOE’s lead all source cyber threat analyst, the Department’s representative to the National Security Council for Cyber Operations, a key member of National Intelligence Council Special Analytic Groups, and a government briefer and/or advisor for Defense Science Board studies on Cyber as a Strategic Capability, Homeland Defense, Strategic Surprise and the future of US Military Superiority among other topics. Additionally, Dr. Wiener initiated and led studies for special nuclear weapons related threat and vulnerability analyses and advanced technical security threats to USG equities by foreign adversaries and engaged in the development, planning and operationalization of counter-adversary strategies across multiple domains of operations. Dr. Wiener joined the MITRE Corporation as a Technical Fellow in early-2020, where he supports key U.S. Government (USG) national security initiatives. He was recently appointed by the Secretary of Energy to the Electricity Advisory Committee to advise DOE on current and future electric grid reliability, resilience, security, sector interdependence, and policy issues.”

Dr. Wiener is an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD Program! Learn more and register for this event here.

Online Event: Discussion with Amb. van der Kwast About What to Expect at the 5th CWC Review Conference

“The Fifth Five-Year Review Conference (RC-5) for the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention will be held in the Hague from May 15-19, 2023.”

“At the conference, member states and the broader chemical weapons disarmament community will gather to assess past achievements, treaty implementation, and compliance, and discuss plans to strengthen the CWC in the years ahead.”

“You are invited to join a virtual discussion with Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast, the chair-designate for the Review Conference, who will share his hopes and expectations for the conference’s outcomes.”

“Paul Walker, the Chair of the CWC Coalition, will moderate. Amb. van der Kwast’s remarks will be followed by a Q&A session.”

“This discussion will be on the record.”

“This special event will be open to all members of the CWC Coalition, and other interested members of the public, journalists, and diplomats.”

This webinar will take place on March 21 at 11 am EST. Register here.

Book Talk with Dr. Katherine Paris on “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse”

“Dr. Katherine Paris, an alumnus of the Mason Biodefense PhD program, recently released her new book “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse.” Join the NextGen Global Health Security Network for a conversation with Dr. Paris to learn about her research!” This event will take place on Wednesday, March 22, from 7-8 PM. Register for the Zoom here: https://cglink.me/2d7/r2064992

Intelligence Studies Consortium

“On March 24, 2023, the Intelligence Studies Consortium is convening its third symposium, entitled New Perspectives in Intelligence Studies. This year, George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting. The symposium will be from 8 AM to 4 PM in Rooms 125-126 Van Metre Hall, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA. The closest Metro is Virginia Square/GMU on the Orange and Silver lines.

The symposium will feature student presentations in four panels:

  • Russia and China
  • Violent Non-State Actors
  • Emerging Technologies
  • Transnational Challenges

There will be an 8:30 AM keynote address from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Shannon Corless, and a lunchtime conversation with General Michael V. Hayden.

We encourage students to attend in person. We have also provided a livestream option for those not in the Washington DC area.”

Learn more and register here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: In 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident, was poisoned with what agent?

Shout out to Scott H. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to last week’s question, “This chemical agent features in Roald Dahl’s famous short story, The Landlady, in which the main character is given a tea that tastes of bitter almonds. What is the name of this agent?” is potassium cyanide.

Pandora Report 3.3.2023

Happy end to yet another very eventful week! Today we are covering the Department of Energy’s updated assessment on the start of the pandemic, the subsequent discourse, the IC’s assessment on Havana syndrome, the newly-signed NSM 19, and Iran’s investigation into alleged poisonings of schoolgirls.

Spy Agencies Gone Wild RE: COVID-19 Origins? Not Quite…

This week, the Department of Energy (DOE) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provided assessments and statements indicating that they believe the initial spread of SARS-CoV-2 was the result of a lab leak in Wuhan. The initial firestorm was kicked off by a Wall Street Journal article with a less-than-helpful headline regarding DOE’s delivery of an assessment to the White House. In the following days, the FBI director provided statements indicating his agencies reached the same conclusion. Subsequent discussion has been rife with poor understandings of the Intelligence Community (IC) and intelligence itself, in addition to flawed claims about what these assessments actually mean. This section aims to break down what all has happened in this area this week and highlight the intrinsically interdisciplinary nature of intelligence and national security more broadly.

What Actually Happened This Week

As previously mentioned, the Wall Street Journal published an article on Sunday entitled “Lab Leak Most Likely Origin of COVID-19 Pandemic, Energy Department Now Says” to much uproar from all matter of folks. The assessment referenced by the article stemmed from analysis conducted by Z-Division at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which led DOE to conclude “as part of a new government-wide intelligence assessment that a lab accident was most likely the triggering event for the world’s worst pandemic in a century.”

As the Washington Post explains, “…other intelligence agencies involved in the classified update — completed in the past few weeks and kept under wraps — were divided on the question of covid-19’s origins, with most still maintaining that a natural, evolutionary “spillover” from animals was the most likely explanation. Even the Energy Department’s analysis was carefully hedged, as the officials expressed only “low confidence” in their conclusion, according to U.S. officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe a classified report.”

“U.S. officials confirmed that an updated assessment of covid-19’s origins was completed this year, and said the document was based on fresh data as well as new analysis by experts from eight intelligence agencies and the National Intelligence Council.” Furthermore, the IC remains firm in its view that SARS-CoV-2 was absolutely not developed as a biological weapon.

Of course, this news sparked a lot of conversation from lab leak and natural origin proponents alike. As NPR notes:

…at the end of the day, the origin of the pandemic is also a scientific question. Virologists who study pandemic origins are much less divided than the U.S. intelligence community. They say there is “very convincing” data and “overwhelming evidence” pointing to an animal origin.

In particular, scientists published two extensive, peer-reviewed papers in Science in July 2022, offering the strongest evidence to date that the COVID-19 pandemic originated in animals at a market in Wuhan, China. Specifically, they conclude that the coronavirus most likely jumped from a caged wild animal into people at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, where a huge COVID-19 outbreak began in December 2019.

Virologist Angela Rasmussen, who contributed to one of the Science papers, says the DOE’s “low confident” conclusion doesn’t “negate the affirmative evidence for zoonotic [or animal] origin nor do they add any new information in support of lab origin.”

“Many other [news] outlets are presenting this as new conclusive proof that the lab origin hypothesis is equally as plausible as the zoonotic origin hypothesis,” Rasmussen wrote in an email to NPR, “and that is a misrepresentation of the evidence for either.”

The FBI also re-iterated its moderate confidence assessment that the virus originated in a lab, with FBI Director Christopher Wray highlighting this in an interview with Fox News. To summarize, the FBI maintained its moderate confidence assessment that the COVID-19 pandemic began with a lab accident, DOE changed its view to that above, and the CIA and another agency remain undecided as they did in the 2021 unclassified assessment. The others continue to favor a natural origin. So where does that leave us?

The Breakdown

As this discussion has been fraught with confusion about the IC, we will cover some brief basics about the IC’s structure and work. First, the IC is broad and diverse. It is composed of 18 organizations, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the 17 constituent organizations that report to ODNI. ODNI and the Central Intelligence Agency are independent organizations. Nine others are Department of Defense elements (including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National-Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the DoD service intelligence elements). Seven other organizations are elements of other departments and agencies. These include the “Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and US Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis.”

Naturally, each of these agencies has its strong suits and purposes, though there is intentional overlap. The intelligence failures in the lead up to the events of September 11, 2001, significantly changed the IC, bringing the abolition of the Director of Central Intelligence, the establishment of ODNI and the Director of National Intelligence position, creation of new agencies and restructurings of existing ones, and an overall effort to improve coordination, collaboration, and communication in the community. The main failure in the case of 9/11 was in not “connecting the dots”, so there have been strong efforts to make agencies share information in a timely, useful manner. Of course, this has not made the IC immune to failures, but it has been a positive step in improving coordination and creating appropriate overlap that can help provide more comprehensive intelligence to decision makers.

Furthermore, far from simply being “spy stuff”, intelligence draws on broad expertise and knowledge sources in a cycle of evaluation and feedback. In fact, it is estimated that about 80% of intelligence relies on open information, including news and academic sources. Information gaps and limitations may require further collection, but the bulk of information is often times openly available. Furthermore, the community is simply not full of a bunch of spies. For example, in 2003, it was estimated that just 10% of the CIA’s workforce were clandestine officers-the ones that recruit sources and go on covert missions like you might see in the movies. The rest are all kinds of analysts, mission management and admin folks, and even all kinds of scientists, physicians, public health experts, and so on. Agencies oftentimes have entire directorates dedicated to S&T work, and there are entire sub-organizations dedicated to specific S&T-related topics, including the National Center for Medical Intelligence.

There is also confusion about how analysts conduct their work. The 2011 IC Consumers Guide referenced by many news outlets and scholars discussing these assessments and their confidence levels explains how analysts conduct their work. It reads in part “Intelligence analysts are generally assigned to a particular geographic or functional specialty area. Analysts obtain information from all sources pertinent to their area of responsibility through information collection, processing, and forwarding systems. Analysts may tap into these systems to obtain answers to specific questions or to generate information they may need.”

“Analysts receive incoming information, evaluate it, test it against other information and against their personal knowledge and expertise, produce an assessment of the current status of a particular area under analysis, and then forecast future trends or outcomes. The analyst also develops requirements for the collection of new information…Analysts rarely work alone; they operate within a system that includes peer review and oversight by more senior analysts.

With this information in mind, it is clear that statements that paint the IC as a hive mind that produces assessments on political whims without oversight, methodologies, or internal review processes are unhelpful and untrue. Though it is not publicly known who specifically wrote these assessments, it is reasonable to believe they were made in good faith and in accordance with the above information. In addition to personal knowledge and expertise, importantly, IC analysts do have access to classified information-a fact seemingly overlooked by many in the last week.

One of the main points of confusion in public discussion of this has centered on why the Department of Energy is making an assessment on the origins of a virus. It is true that the Department of Energy, as the name implies, oversees national energy policy and manages nuclear power and weapons, but that is not its only tasking. In fact, the idea that eventually led to the Human Genome Project was conceived in the Department’s Office of Science. DOE has an intelligence element (as referenced above) and also oversees the National Laboratories, a broad system that aims to address critical scientific challenges “from combating climate change to discovering the origins of our universe”. Three of these laboratories (Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia) are National Nuclear Security Administration labs, meaning they do work related to nuclear weapons in addition to other kinds of research-including global security research. The labs do work in conjunction with other organizations and, in some cases, support the IC. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, for example, has its Laboratory Intelligence Program, which has been at the heart of this frenzy and provides “critical science and technology support to the intelligence community’s foundational intelligence missions in strategic intelligence and anticipatory intelligence, as well as mission objectives in counterproliferation, cyber intelligence and counterterrorism.” The point is-DOE is not just a bunch of physicists working on the nuclear weapons stockpile. The Department is as large and diverse as its taskings, including those requiring expertise in the life and social sciences.

Much attention has also been paid to the confidence levels of the assessments. WSJ noted later in its piece that the assessment was made with low confidence, a term used by analysts when “…information used in the analysis is scant, questionable, fragmented, or that solid analytical conclusions cannot be inferred from the information, or that the IC has significant concerns or problems with the information sources.” Unfortunately, this information is not particularly helpful for the general public as the assessment itself is classified, so it is not known what information led to the assessment and why specifically it was rated low confidence. Analytical confidence can be influenced by several factors, including analyst expertise (which is likely limited given the nature of this specific assessment), time constraints, source reliability and corroboration, and more.

As ODNI identified in its unclassified October 2021 Intelligence Community Assessment on COVID-19 Origins, at the time, four elements and the National Intelligence Council also assessed with low confidence that initial SARS-CoV-2 infection was likely caused by natural exposure to an infected animal. One agency (the FBI) was noted to assess that the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most likely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident. This assessment was made with moderate confidence, which “…generally indicates that the information being used in the analysis may be interpreted in various ways, or that the IC has alternative viewpoints on the significance or meaning of the information, or that the information is credible and plausible but it is not sufficiently corroborated to warrant a higher level of confidence.” At that time, three other IC elements remained unable to coalesce around either explanation. Again, however, these assessments are classified, so there is no way of knowing why they were judged this way in the open source.

Others have taken aim at a low confidence assessment finding a lab origin “very likely”, arguing that these terms are mutually exclusive. Analytic confidence is separate from the estimative language employed by the IC. Estimative language (“very likely”, “almost certainly”, “unlikely”, etc.) expresses an assessment or judgement. Assessments are oftentimes based on incomplete information, which is why analysts use estimative language to express the likelihood or probability of something given what information is available. Because information gaps are inherent to this work, these products include declarations of underlying assumptions and judgements analysts made in their processes. Confidence levels “reflect the scope and quality of the information supporting its judgements.” In fact, to avoid confusion, the ODNI indicates that a confidence level and degree of likelihood should not be included in the same sentence. Again, as these assessments are classified, we do not know what assumptions were made nor what sources were used. However, it is possible and okay to judge that something is very likely with low confidence, particularly when dealing with something as complex as the origin of this virus.

The Bottom Line

Flashy news headlines aside, what have we really learned from these reports? Well…not much. It was well-established in late 2021 that the IC is unclear on the origins of SARS-CoV-2, and the events of this week have not settled that debate. As the NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications, John Kirby, told the press this week, “There is not a consensus right now in the U.S. government about exactly how covid started…That work is still ongoing, but the president believes it’s really important that we continue that work and that we find out as best we can how it started so that we can better prevent a future pandemic.”

Furthermore, it is important to address the question of to what extent we can know this and what it would change at this point. China is clearly not going to cooperate on any kind of investigation into COVID-19’s origin. That has been clear since the early days of the pandemic and is part of a pattern of behavior on the part of the CCP. Irrespective of where this virus actually came from, it is clear that China did cover up its initial spread in the population, censoring netizens and healthcare professionals until it was impossible to conceal further. While an in-depth investigation into the start of this pandemic has always been needed, hyper focusing on this runs the risk of diverting attention from other critical issues we have much more information readily available on. China did cover up the initial spread of this virus and has been disingenuous in its reporting and handling of it ever since. The United States failed to adequately respond to this pandemic for a variety of reasons, a fact that does not depend on how the virus initially spread. It is vital to balance desires to find the truth of COVID-19’s origins, something that is indisputably important, with using the information that is available and can reasonably be acquired to address these problems before the next pandemic. This information could inform debates on laboratory safety and oversight, though, as Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz demonstrated in his interview with the New York Times this week, there is a wealth of information available already driving these discussions.

Finally, this all demonstrates the intrinsically inter/multidisciplinary and cross-sectoral nature of these problems. False dichotomies pitting national defense against public health, particularly in terms of funding, are not helpful, particularly as it is increasingly clear that public health threats are critical national security threats. As the IC learned in the early years of this century, siloing information is incredibly dangerous-a lesson we cannot afford to have to re-learn at the intersection of public health and national security. While respect for expertise and experience is an absolute necessity, understanding the need to collaborate, work across lanes, and recognize what unique capabilities others can offer is equally vital. These threats are not going anywhere, so learning to understand how different disciplines approach these problems and how best to work together is of the utmost importance.

New ICA-Havana Syndrome Very Likely Not Caused by Foreign Adversary

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines released a statement this week regarding the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the mysterious “Havana syndrome”, indicating the IC finds it very unlikely a foreign adversary is responsible for the phenomenon. The Washington Post writes “The new intelligence assessment caps a years-long effort by the CIA and several other U.S. intelligence agencies to explain why career diplomats, intelligence officers and others serving in U.S. missions around the world experienced what they described as strange and painful acoustic sensations. The effects of this mysterious trauma shortened careers, racked up large medical bills and in some cases caused severe physical and emotional suffering.”

The DNI Statement reads in part “Today we are sharing key judgments and investigative efforts from our Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Anomalous Health Incidents (AHIs). This assessment builds on the Intelligence Community’s (IC) interim findings released last year, which described the IC’s judgment that U.S. adversaries, including Russia, were not engaged in a global campaign resulting in AHIs, but indicated that we continued to investigate whether a foreign actor was involved in a subset of cases. Since then, we continue to surge resources and expertise across the government to explore all possible explanations.”

“Based on the latest IC-wide effort, which has resulted in an ICA that will be issued today, I can share with you that most IC agencies have now concluded that it is “very unlikely” a foreign adversary is responsible for the reported AHIs. IC agencies have varying confidence levels because we still have gaps given the challenges collecting on foreign adversaries — as we do on many issues involving them.”

President Biden Signs National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security

This week, President Biden signed National Security Memorandum (NSM) 19 to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security. According to the White House, “This comprehensive new strategy advances several of President Biden’s most enduring national security priorities: protecting our nation and the international community from the existential threats posed by WMD terrorism and preventing non-state actors from using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.”

Among its central aims is that of keeping radioactive materials used in industry out of terrorists’ hands, notes the New York Times. The same article explains that “Details of the new memorandum are classified. Previous versions of the policy focused on securing fissile material commonly used in nuclear weapons such as the ones the United States used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The effort focuses on specific radioisotopes that terrorists could potentially use in so-called dirty bombs — improvised weapons that use explosives to blast radiological materials into the surrounding area, potentially sickening or killing people and causing environmental harm.”

President Biden’s Homeland Security Advisor, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, explained the impact of NSM 19 on the medical field at an event at the Nuclear Threat Initiative: “In her remarks, the homeland security adviser said that medical devices for treating blood with X-rays — a process that makes transfusions safer — have traditionally used cesium-137 as the radioactive source to produce those rays, but that alternatives that use less dangerous materials now exist…The Department of Veterans Affairs, which manages the largest public health care network in the country, recently removed all cesium-based blood irradiators from its hospitals, she said, and transitioned in October to machines that produce X-rays though different processes.”

This comes just over a month after a small quantity of cesium-137 went missing in Western Australia, prompting a large search for the tiny cylinder that lasted six days.

Iran Investigating Reports of Schoolgirl Poisonings

Iran announced this week it is investigating reports that several schoolgirls were poisoned as revenge for the role of young women in recent protests in the country. The Guardian explains “Iran’s deputy education minister, Younes Panahi, told reporters yesterday: “After the poisoning of several students in [the city of] Qom … it was found that some people wanted all schools, especially girls’ schools, to be closed.” He added: “It has been revealed that the chemical compounds used to poison students are not war chemicals … the poisoned students do not need aggressive treatment and a large percentage of the chemical agents used are treatable.”

Dan Kaszeta, author of multiple well-known works on chemical weapons, discussing Iran’s investigation

“Report: A Summary on Ending Biological Threats-Event Summary”

From the Council on Strategic Risks: “This report summarizes discussions held during a workshop hosted by the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) on September 26, 2022, focused on ending extreme risks from biological threats. For several years, CSR has convened diverse experts who agree that it is more feasible than ever to halt the spread of infectious disease threats from all sources before they cause significant damage. After several years of virtual discussions during the heights of the COVID-19 pandemic, this in-person, invitation-only event brought together experts from government, academia, industry, and non-profit organizations to discuss how to use technological advances, policy, and other tools to gauge progress, identify open questions and ongoing challenges, and think strategically about what steps must be done next.”

“Conversations and panels held during “The Summit on Ending Biological Threats” were held under the Chatham House Rule. This report does not represent consensus among participants, nor does it assign specific perspectives to any individual participant. Though many topics were covered throughout the Summit, conversation centered around a few core subject areas: pathogen early warning, public-private collaboration, interagency efforts and collaboration, and strategic communications. This summary report will discuss these central topics and provide a general overview of discussions.”

“A Bipartisan Approach to Pandemic Security? It’s Within Reach”

Beth Cameron, Gary Edson, and J. Stephen Morrison recently published this opinion piece with STAT News in which they discuss the findings of the “Democracy and Pandemic Security” roundtable convened by their respective organizations. They write in part “Covid-19 laid bare persistent inequities across America. Polarization, a comorbidity that made the pandemic worse, continues to impede a unified and effective response to public health threats, and not just those caused by viruses. When the next threat emerges — and it will — it is uncertain if most Americans will adhere to public health measures.”

“That is why our organizations — the Brown University School of Public Health Pandemic Center, the Covid Collaborative, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies Global Health Policy Center — recently convened a diverse group of leaders to discuss how to better protect Americans from pandemic threats while at the same time reinforcing American values of freedom and democracy. The group included former governors and mayors; officials from red, blue, and purple states and from the Biden, Trump, Obama, and Bush administrations; as well as experts in incident management and pandemic inequity.”

“Prevention of Zoonotic Spillover”

From the WHO: “The devastating impact of COVID-19 on human health globally has prompted extensive discussions on how to better prepare for and safeguard against the next pandemic. Zoonotic spillover of pathogens from animals to humans is recognized as the predominant cause of emerging infectious diseases and as the primary cause of recent pandemics.”

“This spillover risk is increased by a range of factors (called drivers) that impact the nature, frequency and intensity of contact between humans and wild animals. Many of these drivers are related to human impact, for instance, deforestation and changes in land use and agricultural practices. While it is clear that the triad of prevention-preparedness-response (P-P-R) is highly relevant, there is much discussion on which of these three strategic activities in the field of emerging infectious disease should be prioritized and how to optimally target resources. For this, it is important to understand the scope of the respective activity and the consequences of prioritization. “

Read this position paper here.

“WHO Warns of Worsening Health Situation in Ukraine”

This Devex Inside Development piece discusses the WHO’s data on health care in Ukraine since Russia invaded the country last year. It reads in part “About 44% of people in liberated areas are seeking health care for chronic conditions, such as kidney and heart disease. One in 3 people can no longer afford to buy medicines. An estimated 10 million people may have a mental health condition. All this is happening against a backdrop of continued attacks on health care in the country. Since the war started, WHO has recorded more than 800 attacks on health care, a huge majority of which damaged or destroyed facilities, including hospitals and pharmacies.”

Third International Summit on Human Genome Editing

The Royal Society will host this hybrid summit March 6-8, 8:30- 6 pm GMT. “Building on previous events held in Washington, DC (2015) and Hong Kong (2018), the London meeting will continue the global dialogue on somatic and germline human genome editing. Major themes for discussion include developments in clinical trials and genome editing tools such as CRISPR/Cas9, as well as social, ethical and accessibility considerations these scientific developments entail.”

“The three-day Summit is being organised by the Royal Society, the UK Academy of Medical Sciences, the US National Academies of Sciences and Medicine and The World Academy of Sciences. Find out more about the Summit’s Organising Committee, chaired by Professor Robin Lovell-Badge FMedSci FRS.”

Register here.

Report LaunchPreparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the CWC: A Guide to the Issues

“The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is pleased to invite you to the in-person launch of a new report on Preparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Issues. This is the first in a series of events the Institute is hosting in preparation for the Fifth CWC Review Conference, which is scheduled to take place from 15 to 19 May 2023.” One version will be hosted in The Hague on Monday, March 6 from 12:30-14:30 CET and another in Brussels on Tuesday, March 7 from 12:30-14:30 CET. Both will also be broadcast via Zoom.

Penetrate, Exploit, Disrupt, Destroy – with Dr. Craig J. Wiener

From the Alperovitch Institute: “Join us on Wednesday, March 15th at 5pm at the SAIS Hopkins Kenney Auditorium. Dr. Craig J. Wiener is recognized as an expert in major foreign adversary espionage, sabotage and strategic capabilities that pose threats to the U.S. Government (USG) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dr. Wiener’s previous position was as the Senior Technical Analyst for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence where he fulfilled a role as DOE’s lead all source cyber threat analyst, the Department’s representative to the National Security Council for Cyber Operations, a key member of National Intelligence Council Special Analytic Groups, and a government briefer and/or advisor for Defense Science Board studies on Cyber as a Strategic Capability, Homeland Defense, Strategic Surprise and the future of US Military Superiority among other topics. Additionally, Dr. Wiener initiated and led studies for special nuclear weapons related threat and vulnerability analyses and advanced technical security threats to USG equities by foreign adversaries and engaged in the development, planning and operationalization of counter-adversary strategies across multiple domains of operations. Dr. Wiener joined the MITRE Corporation as a Technical Fellow in early-2020, where he supports key U.S. Government (USG) national security initiatives. He was recently appointed by the Secretary of Energy to the Electricity Advisory Committee to advise DOE on current and future electric grid reliability, resilience, security, sector interdependence, and policy issues.”

Dr. Wiener is an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD Program! Learn more and register for this event here.

Intelligence Studies Consortium

“On March 24, 2023, the Intelligence Studies Consortium is convening its third symposium, entitled New Perspectives in Intelligence Studies. This year, George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting. The symposium will be from 8 AM to 4 PM in Rooms 125-126 Van Metre Hall, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA. The closest Metro is Virginia Square/GMU on the Orange and Silver lines.

The symposium will feature student presentations in four panels:

  • Russia and China
  • Violent Non-State Actors
  • Emerging Technologies
  • Transnational Challenges

There will be an 8:30 AM keynote address from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Shannon Corless, and a lunchtime conversation with General Michael V. Hayden.

We encourage students to attend in person. We have also provided a livestream option for those not in the Washington DC area.”

Learn more and register here.

Charity Entrepreneurship 2023 Charity Ideas

Charity Entrepreneurship currently has a call open to support the launch of a nonprofit in Biosecurity and Large-Scale Global Health. Possible organizations includes: “An organization that addresses antimicrobial resistance by advocating for better (pull) funding mechanisms to drive the development and responsible use of new antimicrobials,” and “An advocacy organization that promotes academic guidelines to restrict potentially harmful “dual-use” research.” Learn more and apply for these grants here.

Sustainable Diagnostic Containment Laboratories – Request for Expressions of Interest

“This Expression of Interest (RFEI) is seeking bold ideas that will reinvent the diagnostic laboratory, making it fit-for-purpose in resource-limited contexts globally. These innovative solutions are expected to reimagine the physical laboratory in order to reduce ongoing operational and maintenance costs and allow sustainable presence of safe and secure handling of high-consequence pathogenic materials, whilst maintaining and/or optimizing core functions of a diagnostic laboratory in low- and middle- income countries.”

“This RFEI represents Phase I of a dual-phase approach to development of a Grand Challenge for Sustainable Diagnostic Laboratories. The pool of Expressions of Interest received will be used to inform the scope of a full Grand Challenge program in Phase II, under which Grand Challenges Canada will award funding. Submission of an Expression of Interest does not constitute an application for funding; however, Expressions of Interest will receive feedback from an external review process designed to improve the quality of full proposals submitted for an open call for funding applications in Phase II. Most promising Expressions of Interest may also be shortlisted for direct invitations to submit full proposals for funding in Phase II.”

Learn more and register here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). This week, we are throwing it back to middle school English class: This chemical agent features in Roald Dahl’s famous short story, The Landlady, in which the main character is given a tea that tastes of bitter almonds. What is the name of this agent?

The correct answer to last week’s question, “What is the first multilateral disarmament treaty that banned an entire category of WMD?” is the Biological Weapons Convention.

Pandora Report: 2.24.2023

This week we have several exciting announcements, a leadership change at Africa CDC, and more to cover. We also have plenty new publications, including multiple from our own students and faculty. This edition rounds out with new upcoming events, an AMR resource from the CDC, and, as always, a trivia question so you can show off what you know.

Biodefense Alumna, Faculty Member Named to PLOS Global Public Health Editorial Board

Biodefense faculty (and alum) Dr. Saskia Popescu is now a member of the  PLOS Global Public Health Editorial Board.  PLOS Global Public Health is an open access global forum for public health research that reaches across disciplines and regional boundaries to address the biggest health challenges and inequities facing our society today. ­­PLOS Global Public Health addresses deeply entrenched global inequities in public health and makes impactful research visible and accessible to health professionals, policy-makers, and local communities without barriers. The journal amplifies the voices of underrepresented and historically excluded communities and prioritize equity, diversity, and inclusion at all levels – editors, editorial boards, peer reviewers and authors – to broaden the range and diversity of perspectives at the forefront of public health and advance the health of all humankind. 

Dr. Jean Kaseya Becomes Head of Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention

Dr. Jean Kaseya, a Congolese physician with more than twenty years of experience working in public health both in the DRC government and in international institutions, has become the first Director General of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. Kaseya’s candidacy was approved by the African Union this past weekend, and he joins the agency amid a transition designed to allow it to operate with more authority and flexibility. Whereas his predecessors were directors of the Africa CDC (which functioned as a technical institute), Kaseya is director general of Africa CDC that functions now as a public health agency, which will grant him more powers and less expectations of dealing with African Union bureaucratic issues.

Kaseya has indicated one of his main priorities is healing the relationship between Africa CDC and the WHO. Health Policy Watch noted “Today, after the confirmation, my first call was with Dr [Mashidiso] Moeti, Regional Director, WHO/AFRO region to reiterate my commitment to work closely with WHO to address health issues in Africa,” he stated, putting aside the rift that opened between the Africa CDC and WHO last summer over the degree of autonomy that Africa CDC should have in declaring regional public health emergencies.”

While Africa CDC grew its prominence through its COVID-19 response, Kaseya now must manage maintaining that level of prominence as the AU shifts to managing other challenges. The same Health Policy Watch article continues with “But COVID-19 is no longer the priority that it used to be, Guzman noted.  Instead, many countries are now preoccupied with a burgeoning fiscal and debt crisis, as well as multiple other competing priorities.  These include accelerating the African Continental Free Trade Area, the main agenda item at the 36th AU Assembly, as well as confronting the growing effects of climate change and the war in Ukraine on food security, and beyond. “

South Sudan Assents to Accession to Biological Weapons Convention

On February 15, the United States notified the BWC Implementation Support Unit that South Sudan deposited its instrument of accession to the Biological Weapons Convention in Washington DC. This makes South Sudan the 185th State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention. South Sudan joins the majority of other countries as a State Party, including Namibia, which acceded to the BWC less than a year ago on February 25, 2022. Learn more about the Convention and the ISU’s work here.

“How the James Webb Space Telescope Can Inform Health Security”

Biodefense PhD student Ryan Houser recently published this article in Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness. He writes in part, “In a moment when life on Earth has felt increasingly tragic and troubling based on what has become the background noise of the continued impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, dangerous climate change impacts, and other international affairs challenges, NASA and its partners released images of the early universe from a historical space telescope. The launch of the James Webb Space Telescope in December, 2021 was the result of decades of innovation and challenges, but the images just beginning to be released are awe-inspiring. Not since the release of ‘Earthrise’ from the Apollo 8 mission has images from space highlighted how Earth is both grand and delicate. Against the vastness of the universe, the fragile nature of the Earth is overshadowed by the endless possibilities that exist within the galaxies around us. The images from the Webb telescope are an inspiration for scientific progress and for the next generation of scientists who will lead us into the future. The story of the James Webb Space Telescope and its creators serves as an important and informative lesson for the future of global health security which is still reeling from the continued threat of COVID-19 and the newly emerging Monkeypox threat. The necessary advancements in global health security will be a formulation of great failures such as the overall COVID-19 response, the result of never-ending commitment to progress from practitioners and policy makers, an effort of global collaboration, and one of increasing complexity that requires a diversity of thought to find innovative solutions; all themes which line the story of the James Webb Telescope and serve as an analogy for the mission towards the next great frontier in global health security, one free of global catastrophic biological risks.”

“Biology Is Dangerously Outpacing Policy”

Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program, and Dr. Rocco Casagrande recently published this opinion piece in The New York Times. In it they discuss concerns about dual-use research and the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity’s recent recommendation to majorly overhaul government oversight such research. They explain the core problem this recommendation aims to address, writing “Historically, the United States has taken a reactive and haphazard approach to preventing lab accidents and the misuse of high-risk science. A patchwork of regulations, guidance and policies exists based on the specific pathogen being researched, the type of research being conducted and the source of funding. But some research doesn’t fall under any agency, leaving an oversight vacuum.”

They continue, explaining “This fragmented system has not kept pace with the evolving risk landscape. There are now more powerful tools for genetic engineering, and these tools are easier to use and more widely available than ever before. There are also more researchers interested in conducting research with engineered pathogens for scientific and medical purposes. According to the Global Biolabs Initiative, of which Dr. Koblentz is a co-director, there are more than 100 high and maximum containment labs around the world conducting high-risk research, with more planned. The United States has more such labs than any other country. Failure to update bio-risk-management policies is too great a concern.”

They later offer a proposal to create a government agency specifically tasked with managing this oversight: “The United States also needs to establish an independent government agency that has the authority and resources to regulate this research. This agency would serve a similar purpose as the National Transportation Safety Board or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and be dedicated to understanding the cause of accidents and mitigating risk anywhere in the United States. This would provide a central place for scientists to receive guidance about their work or to raise concerns. Such an agency could develop and promote policies so that all institutions doing this work would be held to the same standards.”

“Some researchers argue that these recommendations are too far-reaching and will inhibit science. But many of these measures would align the regulatory environment of the United States with those of its peers, such as Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany. Fears that more oversight will have a chilling effect on research are belied by the robust research programs found in each of these countries. Still, the implementation of these recommendations will require a careful balancing act: fostering innovation in the life sciences while minimizing the safety and security risks.”

“Blind Spots in Biodefense”

In this editorial for Science, Ann Linder and Dale Jamieson discuss the Biden administration’s National Biodefense Strategy and critical areas it fails to address. They write in part “In October, the Biden administration released its National Biodefense Strategy (NBS-22), the first update since the COVID-19 pandemic began. Although the document notes that one of the lessons of the pandemic is that threats originating anywhere are threats everywhere, it frames threats as largely external to the United States. NBS-22 focuses primarily on bioterrorism and laboratory accidents, neglecting threats posed by routine practices of animal use and production inside the United States. NBS-22 references zoonotic disease but assures readers that no new legal authorities or institutional innovations are needed. Although the US is not alone in failing to confront these risks, its failure to comprehensively address them echoes across the globe.”

“More zoonotic diseases originated in the United States than in any other country during the second half of the 20th century. In 2022, the US processed more than 10 billion livestock, the largest number ever recorded and an increase of 204 million over 2021. Risks occur across the supply chain, from facilities where animals are born to homes where they are consumed. The ongoing H5N1 avian influenza outbreak has left 58 million animals dead in backyard chicken coops and industrial farms. It has infected animals in one of the dozens of live poultry markets in New York City (elsewhere called “wet markets”). Of the many agencies that govern food animal production, the US Department of Agriculture is the most important, but even it has no authority to regulate on-farm animal production.”

“Interventions to Reduce Risk for Pathogen Spillover and Early Disease Spread to Prevent Outbreaks, Epidemics, and Pandemics”

This online report by Vora et al. was recently published in Emerging Infectious Diseases. Abstract: “The pathogens that cause most emerging infectious diseases in humans originate in animals, particularly wildlife, and then spill over into humans. The accelerating frequency with which humans and domestic animals encounter wildlife because of activities such as land-use change, animal husbandry, and markets and trade in live wildlife has created growing opportunities for pathogen spillover. The risk of pathogen spillover and early disease spread among domestic animals and humans, however, can be reduced by stopping the clearing and degradation of tropical and subtropical forests, improving health and economic security of communities living in emerging infectious disease hotspots, enhancing biosecurity in animal husbandry, shutting down or strictly regulating wildlife markets and trade, and expanding pathogen surveillance. We summarize expert opinions on how to implement these goals to prevent outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics.”

“Hundreds of Incidents of Lost Nuclear and Radioactive Material Logged in Latest CNS Trafficking Database”

From the Nuclear Threat Initiative: “The latest edition of the Global Incidents and Trafficking Database, produced by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) exclusively for NTI, documents 352 incidents of nuclear and radiological material outside of regulatory control between 2020-2021. The Global Incidents and Trafficking Database is the only publicly available account of incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. It aims to give researchers and policymakers a comprehensive picture of the amount and types of incidents that occur, from which they can develop data-driven policy solutions. CNS has logged more than 1,500 global incidents since the database was launched in 2013, emphasizing that the security of nuclear and radioactive materials remains a persistent global safety and security concern.”

“The latest dataset, available as a downloadable spreadsheet, is published with an accompanying analytical report and interactive map to illustrate where incidents have taken place. Delays and disruptions in national reporting due to the COVID-19 pandemic led to the publication of a two-year aggregate report of 2020 and 2021 incidents. The dataset illustrates several alarming trends, including more incidents occurring because of failure of individuals to abide by appropriate procedures and attempts by right-wing extremist groups to acquire nuclear and other radioactive materials. Furthermore, the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the United States, even before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, has stymied progress on nuclear and other radioactive materials security issues on the international stage and the threat of radiological crime and terrorism remains high, particularly in unstable regions.”

“Disinformation in the Kremlin’s Toolkit of Influence: Training Guidance for Scoping the Threat to the Norms and Institutions of Weapons of Mass Destruction Nonproliferation”

The Center for the Study of Democracy recently published this report: “Russia’s hybrid warfare operations utilize a combination of tactics and tools. Disinformation – the deliberate spread of inaccurate, incomplete, or fabricated information – remains one of the core instruments through which the Krem­lin seeks to assert its political authority domestically and exercise influence abroad. During the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Russia has stepped up its disinformation campaigns focusing in particular on technically specific and malign narratives around chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons – collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This training guidance focuses on hybrid threats that involve the use of materials associated with the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. It seeks to illustrate 1) how the use of WMD materials fits within the Kremlin’s toolbox of influence and 2) how disinformation activities regarding WMD-enabled attacks can impact the existing WMD nonproliferation norms and institutions. The guidance contains indicative scenarios which are intended to facilitate consideration of the possible manifestations of disinformation activities and the types of approaches and strategies that can be implemented to counter foreign malign activities in the media sector.”

What We’re Listening To 🎧

This Podcast Will Kill You, Special Episode: David Quammen & Breathless

Latest episode of TPWKY: “What do you get when you combine a love of reading with an interest in biology/public health/medical history and a background in podcasting? The TPWKY book club, of course! This season’s miniseries of bonus episodes features interviews with authors of popular science books, covering topics ranging from why sweat matters to the history of food safety, from the menstrual cycle to the persistence of race science and so much more. So dust off that library card, crack open that e-reader, fire up those earbuds, do whatever it takes to get yourself ready for the nerdiest book club yet.”

“We’re starting off this book club strong with a discussion of Breathless: The Scientific Race to Defeat a Deadly Virus, the latest book by award-winning science writer David Quammen (@DavidQuammen). Breathless recounts the fascinating – and sometimes frightening – story of how scientists sought to uncover the secrets of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID. In this interview, Quammen, whose 2012 book Spillover explores the increasing pathogen exchange occurring among humans, wildlife, and domestic animals, shares with us how he decided to write Breathless and why this story of discovery needs to be told. Our conversation takes us into musings over why we saw this pandemic coming yet could not keep it from happening, the controversy over the origins of SARS-CoV-2, and the question of whether future pandemics are preventable or inevitable. Through this discussion, we find that the global response to future pandemics depends just as much on locating the gaps in our knowledge about this virus as it does on applying what we have learned so far. Tune in for all this and more.”

Osterholm Update: COVID-19 Episode 125-Masks, Memories, & Middle Ground

“In “Masks, Memories, & Middle Ground,” Dr. Osterholm and Chris Dall discuss the state of the pandemic in the US and around the world, the newly released CIDRAP Coronavirus Vaccine R&D Roadmap, and the rise of vaccine misinformation and disinformation.” Find this episode on CIDRAP’s website.

Personal Protective Equipment and Personal Protective Technology Product Standardization for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain

“The National Academies will convene a public workshop, March 1-2, to examine standards gaps related to personal protective equipment (PPE) and personal protective technology (PPT). The event will explore innovative approaches and technologies needed to update and streamline the U.S. standardization system for PPE and PPT in support of supply chain resiliency. Policymakers, manufacturers, users, and relevant technical contributors will discuss ways to improve the effectiveness, safety, supply stability, and accessibility of PPE and PPT in health care settings and increase usage by critical infrastructure workers and the general public.” Learn more and register here.

The Biden Administration’s New Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism 

From the Nuclear Threat Initiative: “Join us as White House Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and other senior U.S. officials discuss the Biden administration’s new strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction terrorism and advance nuclear and radiological security.” This event will be held on March 2 at 11 am EST. Register here.

Report Launch Preparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the CWC: A Guide to the Issues

“The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is pleased to invite you to the in-person launch of a new report on Preparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Issues. This is the first in a series of events the Institute is hosting in preparation for the Fifth CWC Review Conference, which is scheduled to take place from 15 to 19 May 2023.” One version will be hosted in The Hague on Monday, March 6 from 12:30-14:30 CET and another in Brussels on Tuesday, March 7 from 12:30-14:30 CET. Both will also be broadcast via Zoom.

CDC Launches Antimicrobial Resistance Investment Map

From CDC: “Antimicrobial resistance (AR), when germs do not respond to the drugs designed to kill them, threatens to return us to the time when simple infections were often fatal. CDC is committed to protecting people and the future of the healthcare, veterinary, and agriculture industries from the threat of antimicrobial resistance.

The AR Investment Map showcases CDC’s critical activities in the U.S. and abroad to combat antimicrobial resistance with investments in laboratory and epidemiological expertise and public health innovation. CDC supports most of these activities through its AR Solutions Initiative, while also leveraging investments from successful programs across the agency for maximum efficiency.

The map also includes projects related to combating antimicrobial resistance that are funded by supplemental appropriations provided to CDC to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the American Rescue Plan Act or the CARES Act. These activities are also highlighted in a fact sheet.

Go To CDC’s Antimicrobial Resistance Website

Sustainable Diagnostic Containment Laboratories – Request for Expressions of Interest

“This Expression of Interest (RFEI) is seeking bold ideas that will reinvent the diagnostic laboratory, making it fit-for-purpose in resource-limited contexts globally. These innovative solutions are expected to reimagine the physical laboratory in order to reduce ongoing operational and maintenance costs and allow sustainable presence of safe and secure handling of high-consequence pathogenic materials, whilst maintaining and/or optimizing core functions of a diagnostic laboratory in low- and middle- income countries.”

“This RFEI represents Phase I of a dual-phase approach to development of a Grand Challenge for Sustainable Diagnostic Laboratories. The pool of Expressions of Interest received will be used to inform the scope of a full Grand Challenge program in Phase II, under which Grand Challenges Canada will award funding. Submission of an Expression of Interest does not constitute an application for funding; however, Expressions of Interest will receive feedback from an external review process designed to improve the quality of full proposals submitted for an open call for funding applications in Phase II. Most promising Expressions of Interest may also be shortlisted for direct invitations to submit full proposals for funding in Phase II.”

Learn more and register here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). For this week, our question is: What is the first multilateral disarmament treaty that banned an entire category of WMD?

The correct answer to last week’s question, “This viral disease is primarily spread by Aedes aegypti mosquitoes and was first detected in humans through a serological survey conducted in Uganda in 1952. What is its name?,” is Zika.

Pandora Report: 2.17.2023

Happy Friday! This week we are tackling reporting on the WHO’s investigation into COVID-19’s origin, estimates that counter China’s official COVID-19 death count, new insight into the death of Pablo Neruda, and more. New publications listed in this issue include Rolf Ekéus’ book discussing his time leading UNSCOM and a recent CBWNet working paper authored by Ralf Trapp. New professional opportunities are also included in this week’s announcement section alongside our weekly trivia question.

Biodefense Alumnus Named 2023 Emerging Leader in Biosecurity Fellow

Matthew Ferreira (Biodefense MS ’22) was recently selected as a 2023 Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative (ELBI) fellow by the Center for Health Security at Johns Hopkins University. Ferreira joins a class of 31 fellows selected from a pool of more than 227 applicants. He told the Schar School, “I am so excited to be accepted into the ELBI Fellowship program…I am looking forward to meeting and connecting with the others in the Fellowship class as well as alumni of the program. Many of the professionals and scholars that I have had the pleasure to work with have participated in ELBI, so I’m honored to have the chance to meet and learn from this cohort of diverse and talented people in the coming year.”

Read more about Ferreira and his time in the Biodefense Graduate Program here.

Confusion Over Nature WHO COVID-19 Investigation Reporting

This week, Nature published a news article indicating the WHO had abandoned the planned second phase of its investigation into the origin of COVID-19. In it, Smriti Mallapaty began by writing “The World Health Organization (WHO) has quietly shelved the second phase of its much-anticipated scientific investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, citing ongoing challenges over attempts to conduct crucial studies in China, Nature has learned. Researchers say they are disappointed that the investigation isn’t going ahead, because understanding how the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 first infected people is important for preventing future outbreaks. But without access to China, there is little that the WHO can do to advance the studies, says Angela Rasmussen, a virologist at the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon, Canada. “Their hands are really tied.”

Naturally, this caused quite the ruckus. However, the WHO was quick to pushback and clarify that it has no plans to abandon this investigation. Dr. Maria Van Kerkhove released a statement denying the claims. In Nature‘s reporting, Van Kerkhove is quoted saying “There is no phase two,” to the investigation and that “the plan has changed,” as “The politics across the world of this really hampered progress on understanding the origins.” However, on Wednesday, she clarified-“I think we need to be perfectly clear that WHO has not abandoned studying the origins of Covid 19. We have not, and we will not.” As Health Policy Watch explains, she elaborated with “In a sense, phase two became the Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of novel pathogens (SAGO),” she clarified. SAGO held its first meeting in November 2021 and was established as a permanent advisory group to work on drawing up a framework to understand the origins of not just COVID-19 but any future outbreaks. “So the creation of SAGO was in effect, our best effort to move this work forward.”

On issues with the PRC’s cooperation (or lack thereof), she added “Studies that were recommended from the March 2021-WHO report, from the June 2022-SAGO report and studies that we’ve been recommending at the animal human interface and markets, on farms need to be conducted in China. We need cooperation from our colleagues there to advance our understanding…”

The WHO is not the only one investigating COVID-19’s origin either, with House Republicans launching their investigation into whether the pandemic began with an accident at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. AP reports “The Republican chairmen of the House Oversight Committee and the Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic are seeking information, including from Dr. Anthony Fauci, concerning the idea that the coronavirus leaked accidentally from a Chinese lab.”

China-From CRISPR to COVID

China’s Post-Zero-COVID Wave

As China rolled back its Zero-COVID policies in early December, estimates and concerns about the deadly wave of infections the country faced abounded. This was particularly true as the new year travel season approached, as millions were set to travel from urban centers to their hometowns in rural areas across the country. Soon, reports of overflowing crematoriums and funeral parlors, sold out coffin makers, and sweeping infections coincided with continuously relaxing COVID-19 control policies. However, as of February 9, China has reported just 83,150 COVID-19 deaths, and leaders just declared a “decisive victory” against the virus. Of course, this is a number particularly difficult to believe in a country that has struggled so much with acquiring and delivering effective vaccines, relying instead on harsh lockdown and testing requirements.

As the New York Times explains, “The question of how many people died has enormous political relevance for the ruling Communist Party. Early in the pandemic, China’s harsh lockdowns largely kept the coronavirus at bay. Xi Jinping, the top leader, has portrayed that earlier success as evidence of China’s superiority over the West, a claim that would be hard to maintain with a high death toll.”

“The differences between China’s figures and researchers’ estimates are dramatic. The official numbers would give China the lowest death rate per capita of any major country over the entirety of the pandemic. But at the estimated levels of mortality, China would already have surpassed official rates of death in many Asian countries that never clamped down as long or as aggressively.”

So what gives? As we have discussed in the posts linked above, China is using much more narrow definitions of COVID-19 deaths, counting only those who died from respiratory failure and excluding those who died of liver, kidney, and even cardiac failure. Worse, the government quit counting COVID-19 deaths that occurred outside of hospitals which, coupled with the sudden absence of required testing and reporting, certainly had a major contribution to these suspicious numbers.

This piece from the New York Times discusses the numbers below and how experts at different institutions calculated them, including factors like China’s less effective vaccines, elderly populations, and more.

Source: The New York Times

The He Jiankui Saga Continues

Biodefense Graduate Program Associate Professor Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley recently hosted an event along with her colleagues, titled “Looking Back into the Future: CRISPR and Social Values-BioGovernance Common’s Open Discussion with Chinese Academics.” Among other things, they highlight in their event summary that “We’ve exposed that there is little substance behind the ambitious Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) gene therapy that Dr. Jiankui He, the scientist behind the illegal heritable human genome editing, has been boasting about to global patients. We were concerned that he might endanger another vulnerable population if his new venture remains unchecked,” and “Our event nudged Chinese media to publicly challenge Dr. He for the first time on his DMD research. As a result Dr. He has announced that he will prioritise research rather than social media promotion.”

Nature also covered the event, highlighting He’s refusal to discuss his past work and potential challenges this will create in understanding other important ethical issues. The article explains “On Saturday, He spoke at a virtual and in-person bioethics event that was promoted as “the first time that Dr. He has agreed to interact with Chinese bioethicists and other CRISPR scientists in a public event”. But during the talk, He did not discuss his past work and refused to answer questions from the audience, responding instead that questions should be sent to him by email.”

It continues later with “Some researchers worry that interest in He Jiankui is diverting attention away from more important ethical issues around heritable genome editing. “This event puts the spotlight on He Jiankui — Will he apologize? Is he displaying remorse?,” says Marcy Darnovsky, a public interest advocate on the social implications of human biotechnology at the Center for Genetics and Society in Oakland, California. Instead, she thinks researchers should focus on discussing whether there is a medical justification for heritable genome editing.”

He, who was recently released from prison and is now working in Beijing, garnered sharp criticism in 2018 when he announced that a woman had given birth after He implanted into her uterus two embryos he had used CRISPR-Cas9 to edit the CCR5 gene to make them resistant to HIV infection. It was later revealed that a second woman carried a third child whose genome He edited.

Was Pablo Neruda Murdered by a Physician Acting on Behalf of General Pinochet?

In late September 1973, the famed Chilean poet Pablo Neruda died in a clinic in Santiago, having checked out of a hospital earlier that day. The Nobel laureate was hospitalized with prostate cancer earlier that month, just as the coup d’état led by US-backed Augusto Pinochet ousted Chile’s socialist president, Salvador Allende. Neruda, a member of Chile’s Communist Party and close advisor to President Allende, checked out of the hospital after he claimed a physician injected him with an unknown substance. He reportedly died that evening of heart failure. In the decades since, his family and many members of the public have insisted he was murdered on the orders of Pinochet. This was spurred by reports from Manuel Araya, Neruda’s driver, that he witnessed Neruda tell his wife he believed the physician was ordered by Pinochet to kill him and the belief that Neruda was flying to Mexico to counter Pinochet in exile.

In 2013, a Chilean court ordered the launch of an investigation into Neruda’s death in light of these allegations and concerns. Neruda’s body was exhumed that same year, allowing scientists to test samples to better understand the poet’s death. This Wednesday, following a ten-year investigation by scientists in Chile, Canada, and Denmark, Chilean Judge Paola Plaza received the findings of an international report on the matter. The report indicates Pablo Neruda may have been killed by botulinum toxin-producing bacteria. The New York Times reports “The scientists found in Mr. Neruda’s body a potentially toxic type of bacteria that would not naturally occur there, and confirmed that it was in his system when he died, according to a two-page summary of the report shared with The New York Times. But they could not distinguish whether it was a toxic strain, and they could not conclude whether he was injected with the bacteria or if, instead, it came from contaminated food.”

The same article continues, “Yet the scientists conceded that other circumstantial evidence supported the theory of murder, including that in 1981, the military dictatorship poisoned political prisoners with bacteria possibly similar to the strain found in Mr. Neruda. (However, that method of poisoning stemmed from a chemical-weapons program the dictatorship began in 1976, three years after Mr. Neruda’s death.)”

While definitive answers remain out of reach in this case, Neruda’s is not the only contested death from this period. As the same article also explains “Yet Wednesday’s report and Ms. Plaza’s eventual conclusion may never sway some of the Chilean public. Karen Donoso, a Chilean historian, compared the uncertainty over Mr. Neruda’s death to some people’s lasting questions over the death of the leftist President Salvador Allende, who shot himself rather than fall into the hands of the military as it overthrew his government.”

“World’s Largest Collection of Viruses: Inside the Massive Biodefense Lab in Houston Area”

Houston’s ABC13 recently got an insider’s look at Galveston National Laboratory, located at the University of Texas Medical Branch. Their reporting offers an overview of the work that goes on at the facility, including in the BSL-4 area. As the station explains, “The Galveston National Laboratory is one of 14 U.S. facilities with BSL4 labs built by the National Institutes of Health in the years following the 2001 Anthrax attacks as a network of biodefense laboratories to “study viruses of pandemic potential and to develop medical countermeasures…The team is proud that in its 15 years, there has never been a “major laboratory incident resulting in the transmission of a disease” at the facility. This may be why most of us know little to nothing about their work.”

You can learn about the other 13 BSL-4 labs in the US and more around the world at globalbiolabs.org.

“Chemical and Microbiological Forensics in Investigations of Alleged Uses of Chemical and Biological Weapons – A Preliminary Analysis”

New from CBWNet: “In the latest CBWNet working paper, Ralf Trapp discusses the mechanisms for investigating the use of chemical and biological weapons and the development of scientific capacity for such investigations. The author highlights the importance of investigations in determining if a chemical or biological weapon was used, the type of agent used, and the origin of the weapon. The OPCW and the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism have set up systems with designated laboratories to investigate such allegations. However, there are still significant scientific challenges to be addressed, including validation of methods, agreed acceptance criteria, and distinguishing between natural and deliberate events. The paper emphasizes the need for continued investment and attention from governments to make progress in this field.”

“A Notorious Syria Conspiracy Theory is Definitively Debunked”

Brian Whitaker tackles the OPCW IIT’s newest report on the Assad regime’s use of CW in Douma and its debunking of disinformation surrounding the attack in this piece for New Lines Magazine. He writes in part, “The essence of the disinformation campaign was a refusal by its purveyors to accept that the Bashar al-Assad regime was conducting chemical warfare in Syria. Instead, they claimed all such attacks were “staged” by rebels to frame the regime and trigger a Western intervention. There was never any evidence for this, but it became the deniers’ standard response to reports of chemical attacks. The main reason the Douma attack in particular became a cause celebre for the deniers is it was one of only two chemical attacks (out of a total of over 300) that did in fact result in punitive airstrikes by Western powers. In addition, for the deniers, the emergence of two dissenters from within the OPCW and a series of leaked documents kept the issue alive longer than might otherwise have been expected. Meanwhile, Russia’s attempts to shield its Syrian ally led to political divisions in the OPCW, which threatened to undermine the global prohibition against chemical weapons.”

Iraq Disarmed: The Story Behind the Story of the Fall of Saddam

Rolf Ekéus, Chair of the UN Special Commission on Iraq from 1991-97, recently published his book covering his tenure and the organization’s struggles in disarming Iraq of its WMDs-Iraq Disarmed:

“The quest to disarm Iraq took place between two wars—one justified and right, the other a dreadful mistake, a violation of international law that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths.”  With these unvarnished words, Rolf Ekéus begins his political-thrilleresque story of the disarmament of Iraq—and the machinations that ultimately led to the fall of Saddam Hussein and the rise of ISIS.”

“After Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and the war that followed, the UN Security Council ruled that Iraq must rid itself of all weapons of mass destruction. The difficult, politically sensitive, and dangerous task of accomplishing this rested with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), led by Ekéus, one of Sweden’s most seasoned diplomats. This was a radical experiment in UN governance—essentially conveying to one individual the power to conduct a disarmament program, with oversight only by the Security Council.”

“What followed were a succession of tense conversations with the Iraqi leadership, often-dangerous inspections, complex destruction processes, negotiations with Security Council representatives, and diplomatic maneuvering by world leaders. The recounting of these events lies at the heart of Ekéus’s personal narrative of disarmament history in the making, a narrative that adds substantially to the evidence that UNSCOM’s mission was successful and the 2003 war clearly illegal.”

“Crafted not in the interests of a political agenda, but rather for the sake of historical accuracy, Iraq Disarmed serves today as a sobering cautionary tale.”

“Private-Sector Research Could Pose a Pandemic Risk. Here’s What To Do About It”

Dr. Gerald Epstein, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University, recently published this piece in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. In it he discusses biosecurity issues in the private sector, using the 2018 synthesis of horsepox in a Canadian academic lab and Larry Wayne Harris’ attempt to order freeze-dried Y. pestis as touch points. He writes in his conclusion, “With the growth of the bioeconomy and increasing amounts of privately funded life sciences research, restricting biosecurity policy only to government-funded institutions creates an ever-growing gap. Even though research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens constitutes an extremely small fraction of the overall life science and biotechnology enterprise—and the fraction of that work done with private funding even smaller—the potential global consequences of such work make it increasingly important to develop governance approaches that go beyond attaching strings to US government dollars. Closing this gap within the United States is not sufficient, given the global extent of the life science enterprise and the global consequences of any lab-caused pandemic—but it is a necessary start.”

Strategic Trade Review, Winter/Spring 2023

The 10th issue of the Strategic Trade Review covers a number of timely topics. Dr. Andrea Viski, Schar School Adjunct Professor and editor for the Review, writes in here introduction “The role of the Strategic Trade Review is to empower readers from all stakeholder communities with the powerful tool of rigorous and consummate scholarship from some of the top experts in the world on this and other questions. From discovering the ways that North Korean nuclear researchers acquire sensitive technology through international collaborations to how companies implement R&D compliance, this 10th issue of STR holds a mirror to today’s most important trade and security concerns.”

“MCMi Program Update”

“This newly released annual report provides an update on the US Food and Drug Administration’s work to support medical countermeasure-related public health preparedness and response efforts:

FDA plays a critical role in protecting the United States from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and emerging infectious disease threats. FDA ensures that medical countermeasures (MCMs)—including drugs, vaccines and diagnostic tests—to counter these threats are safe, effective, and secure. FDA works closely with interagency partners through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE, or Enterprise) to build and sustain the MCM programs necessary to effectively respond to public health emergencies. FDA also works closely with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to facilitate the development and availability of MCMs to support the unique needs of American military personnel. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (PAHPRA), requires FDA to issue an annual report detailing its medical countermeasure activities. This report responds to that requirement for the latest fiscal year available.”

Personal Protective Equipment and Personal Protective Technology Product Standardization for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain

“The National Academies will convene a public workshop, March 1-2, to examine standards gaps related to personal protective equipment (PPE) and personal protective technology (PPT). The event will explore innovative approaches and technologies needed to update and streamline the U.S. standardization system for PPE and PPT in support of supply chain resiliency. Policymakers, manufacturers, users, and relevant technical contributors will discuss ways to improve the effectiveness, safety, supply stability, and accessibility of PPE and PPT in health care settings and increase usage by critical infrastructure workers and the general public.” Learn more and register here.

Novel Applications of Science and Technology to Address Emerging Chemical and Biological Threats

For the first time since 2019, this Gordon Research Conference is back, this time in sunny Ventura, CA. “The Chemical and Biological Defense GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.” The conference will be held March 19-24, 2023. Learn more and apply here by February 19.

Call for Applications: Fellowship for Ending Bioweapons (2023 – 2024)

From the Council on Strategic Risks: “In a time of rising geopolitical tensions and the continued emergence of biological events, the devastation that biological threats can cause is clearer than ever. Whether biological threats arise naturally, by accident, or through a deliberate effort to weaponize infectious diseases, they pose grave risks to international security and stability, and significantly impact the welfare and health of people around the globe. The urgency for mitigating this area of catastrophic risks is further driven home by Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and concerns that its leaders might consider using weapons of mass destruction in conflict, which includes biological weapons, and continued misinformation and disinformation related to biological weapons threats.”

“The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) is continuing to develop and cultivate creative solutions to help address biological threats, including a particular focus on reducing risks of the deliberate weaponization of infectious diseases. As part of this work, CSR is announcing a call for applications for the 2023–2024 class of our Fellowship for Ending Bioweapons. Applications are due by 5pm Eastern Daylight Savings Time on March 24, 2023. Four to six Fellows will be selected.” Learn more and apply here.

IFBA Launches New Professional Certification in Cyberbiosecurity

From the International Federation of Biosafety Associations: “The IFBA is pleased to announce the launch of their new Professional Certification in Cyberbiosecurity which identifies individuals with demonstrated competencies in the mitigation of cybersecurity risks within biological laboratories. This includes Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) risks in order to protect sensitive biological research, data, databases, and laboratory facilities and equipment against illicit or unauthorized access, theft, tampering, or other forms of misuse.” Read more here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). For this week, our question is: This viral disease is primarily spread by Aedes aegypti mosquitoes and was first detected in humans through a serological survey conducted in Uganda in 1952. What is its name?

Shout out to Scott H. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to “This disease, named for a Brazilian physician, is caused by the Trypanosoma cruzi parasite, and is commonly spread by kissing bugs. What is it?” is Chagas disease.

Pandora Report: 2.10.2023

Happy (almost) Valentine’s Day! This week we’re covering Russia’s spats with the WHO and continued disinformation efforts, a Biodefense PhD Student’s recent research award, and more. This edition includes plenty of new publications, including several reports from the US and UK governments and the UN on topics ranging from most important health threats to the UN’s assessment of integrating the One Health approach in combatting superbugs. Of course, this one also has this year’s Pandora Report Valentine’s Day cards so you can spread all the love this year.

Biodefense PhD Student, MS Alumna Wins IDA Research Excellence Award

Janet Marroquin Pineda, an Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Scholar who is currently earning her PhD in Biodefense, recently received IDA’s Award for Research Excellence. IDA said of Marroquin Pineda, “Marroquin Pineda serves as a subject matter expert, provides her team with analytical guidance, and transitions from individual contributor to project lead as needed. She has exhibited skillful leadership, masterful diplomacy and expert ability to uphold quality and objectivity standards on multiple projects. She routinely develops unique methods and creative approaches to complete projects. In addition, her work is consistently well-received by sponsors. Further, Marroquin Pineda has become a thought leader within SFRD’s chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear portfolio. Her technical skills, analytic leadership and extensive sponsor network across the biotechnology community have been key to growing and maintaining this strategically important portfolio for IDA.” Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz said, “We are very proud of Janet and glad that IDA has recognized how exceptional she is.”

Congratulations to Janet! We are all so proud of you!

Russia Clashing with US, WHO, the Truth…

If you thought we were past Russia making ridiculous claims about supposed American BW facilities in Ukraine, it seems the Russians still just can’t help themselves. On January 30, Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, NBC chief at the Russian Ministry of Defence, claimed once again in a briefing that the United States developed biological weapons in facilities in Ukraine, including enhanced versions of SARS-CoV-2. Yahoo! News explains that “In his remarks, Kirillov claimed to have obtained 20,000 documents that show evidence of “illegal military and biological activities” on the part of the United States in Ukraine. He described the documents as “reference and analytical materials” but provided no other details.”

However, Kirillov went further than he has previously, this time referencing the EcoHealth Alliance in his claims that the US has done work “enhancing the pathogenic characteristics of COVID-19.” The same article explains this further with “The reference to EcoHealth Alliance, also disseminated uncritically by Russian state media, seemed calculated to appeal to Western outlets that have trafficked in conspiracy theories about both the coronavirus and the war in Ukraine. Kirillov said that organization played a “key role” in biological warfare, an assertion that goes well beyond what mainstream critics of EcoHealth Alliance have maintained.” This round of claims also include ones that the US has infected Ukrainian servicemembers, prisoners, and addicts with HIV using these weapons. Of course, this is part of a broader disinformation firehose created by the Russians, as EUvsDisinfo has covered extensively.

This wasn’t the only update in Russia’s saga of international embarrasment this week, as the Russian delegation to the WHO Executive Board called the organization’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine “politicized”. This was after the publication of a report this week discussing the WHO’s emergency response in Ukraine, which has been quite extensive given Russia’s repeated targeting of healthcare facilities in the country and other ongoing problems. Russia attempted to pressure the WHO into revising the report, taking particular issue with the agency’s use of the word “invasion” in reference to what the Russian Federation continues to describe as a “special military operation” in Ukraine. In response, WHO Director-General Tedros said, “I used the same word in a speech last year…I couldn’t find any other word that would represent it because it’s the truth. What could I say?” He later continued, saying “The report is truthful and was written in good faith, and it’s my report and I take full responsibility…We didn’t try to politicize anything. … There was no pressure.”

On a related note, the American Hospital Association recently released an analyst note discussing the Russian hacktivist group, KillNet, and its efforts targeting the US health and public health sector. As the note explains, the group uses DDoS attacks often and has “…previously targeted, or threatened to target, organizations in the healthcare and public health (HPH) sector. For example, Killmilk, a senior member of the KillNet group, has threatened the U.S. Congress with the sale of the health and personal data of the American people because of the Ukraine policy of the U.S. Congress. In December 2022, the pro-Russian hacktivist group claimed the compromise of a U.S.-based healthcare organization that supports members of the U.S. military and claimed to possess a large amount of user data from that organization.”

Scientists and Others Establish Protect Our Future Group

A team of scientists and other professionals have created Protect Our Future, a group that aims to create “…a future free of lab-generated pandemics, a future where reckless research on pathogens is ended, and a future where public trust in science is restored.” Science writes, “Protect Our Future co-founder Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, cites the 1977 influenza pandemic, which killed more than 700,000 people, as an example of what the group hopes to prevent; some researchers believe it was sparked by a leak of influenza from a lab in the Soviet Union. And Ebright and his new group also think virology experiments at a lab in Wuhan, China, could have sparked the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite a lack of direct evidence for that scenario, Ebright has regularly tweeted that officials at the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), which helped fund that work, potentially share blame for the deaths of millions in the current pandemic.”

The group hopes to reduce the number of laboratories undertaking research they deem problematic, and it is primarily interested in educating the public to influence the discussion of this topic among policymakers. Naturally, this is in contrast to those who argue that objectives like this and those in similar proposed legislation would inhibit or prevent beneficial research. However, others have also criticized the new group’s approach, which Science also explains: “But Stanford University microbiologist David Relman, who was part of the Cambridge Working Group, objects to the new organization’s “heavy top-down approach” and the lack of involvement from scientists who do research on dangerous human pathogens. He says guidelines crafted with input from scientists are more likely to change behavior without impeding research than rigid, punitive laws. Relman co-chairs a similar effort, the Pathogens Project, launched in September 2022 by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists to consider how to conduct responsible research with high-risk microbes. The Pathogens Project, he says, has a more “bottom-up” approach that incorporates the views of scientists working in the field.”

Spread the Love with Pandora Report Valentine’s Day Cards

Share the love with friends and family in style this year using our Valentine’s Day cards!

“Expanding the Australia Group’s Chemical Weapons Precursors Control List with a Family-Based Approach”

Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz recently co-authored this article with Costanzi and Cupitt in Pure and Applied Chemistry: “The Australia Group (AG) is a forum of like-minded states seeking to harmonize export controls to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The AG Chemical Weapons Precursors list features dual-use chemicals that can be used as precursors for the synthesis of chemical weapons, all individually enumerated. This is in contrast with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedules, which, alongside entries describing discrete chemicals, also include entries that describe families of chemicals. By using families of chemicals, the CWC achieves the objective of covering with a single entry a wide array of related chemicals of concern, including chemicals that have not yet been made. There are practical reasons why the AG Chemical Weapons Precursors list is exclusively based on the enumeration of individual chemicals. A cheminformatics tool of which we have developed a prototype, the Nonproliferation Compliance Cheminformatics Tool (NCCT), has the potential to enable export control officers to handle control lists that contain families of chemicals. Thus, it opens the way to expand the AG Chemical Weapons Precursors list to a family-based approach for some of its entries. Such a change would result in a closer alignment of the chemical space covered by the AG Chemical Weapons Precursors list with that covered by the CWC Schedules, thus closing loopholes that could be exploited by proliferators.”

“Preparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Issues”

“The Fifth CWC Review Conference is expected to take place in the second quarter of 2023. This event presents an important opportunity for CWC States Parties to take stock of the past and chart the future of this important disarmament agreement.”

“Progress with the CWC will however require careful preparation both in terms of the development of substantive inputs and ideas, but also raising awareness and understanding of the CWC and the Review Conference process. To support the CWC delegates, this report includes factual material on the historical experiences related to preparations, proposals, procedures, and participation in past Review Conferences.”

“It also includes a brief, balanced analysis of salient issues that are likely to be addressed at the Fifth Review Conference. Furthermore, it makes recommendation for preparing for the Review Conference.”

“The NIH-Led Research Response to COVID-19”

Science recently published this piece from Collins et al. discussing the NIH’s work to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic: “Though the COVID-19 pandemic, which has claimed the lives of at least 6.5 million individuals worldwide, is not yet over, it is not too soon to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the research response and some of the lessons that can be learned. Much important research has investigated key public health and clinical issues such as masking, indoor air ventilation, and prone ventilation. But, arguably, no research has been more innovative and impactful than that of the biomedical community around vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics. Drawing on our experience leading US-driven elements of this global biomedical research effort, we review here major cross-sector initiatives led by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and its partners. We outline key milestones…and crucial lessons learned, with the goal of informing and guiding the research community’s response to future pandemics…”

“American Democracy and Pandemic Security: Strengthening the U.S. Pandemic Response in a Free Society”

Check out this new report from the CSIS Global Health Policy Center , Brown University Pandemic Center , and COVID Collaborative discussing the findings from the first meeting of the Democracy and Pandemic Security roundtable. They write in part, “Going forward, a bipartisan approach is needed to protect public health and work to preserve individual freedom, drawing on the lived experiences of states and localities that did better at reducing deaths and hospitalizations while navigating impacts on education, the economy, and society. Such an effort will be mindful of the politics that have divided Americans during the Covid-19 response and will engage leaders and institutions reflecting the strength and pluralism of the United States to learn from the past and build a better future. A new, pragmatic consensus is needed that bridges deep divides and is fueled by candor, self-criticism, humility, a determined optimism, and civility. Mistakes stretch across every acre, as do quiet successes. Finding new solutions is the challenge. This report provides a description of the first convening and major findings of the Democracy and Pandemic Security roundtable.”

“Public Health Preparedness: HHS Should Plan for Medical Countermeasures Development and Manufacturing Risks”

This recent study from the Government Accountability Office reports on its ongoing monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic and HHS’ use of Centers for Innovation in Advanced Development and Manufacturing (CIADM) funds. However, HHS is ending the CIADM to transition to the National Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing Partnership (BioMaP). GAO explains that, “BioMaP is early in its development, and it is unclear how BioMaP will address some of the challenges faced by the CIADM program, as in the following examples.

  • BioMaP is expected to use a different contracting structure intended to provide more incentives for industry partners to participate. However, this different structure requires additional expertise to manage effectively. Moreover, HHS told GAO that its contracting staff had previously faced resource challenges using this different contracting structure for other programs during the COVID-19 pandemic. HHS officials said in April 2022 that the agency has half the contracting staff needed to manage its contracting portfolio. This creates the risk that the agency may not have enough resources and expertise to manage this different structure effectively.
  • HHS does not have a sustainable source of funding for the new program model, and it has not yet developed detailed plans or budgets. HHS officials said that, without sustained funding for BioMaP or a similar program, the agency would be unprepared to respond to the next pandemic.”

As a result, GAO “…is recommending that HHS incorporate into the development of its new program model an approach to systematically assess, and respond to, known challenges and risks associated with advanced development and manufacturing of medical countermeasures.”

“UKHSA Advisory Board: Preparedness for Infectious Disease Threats”

This report from the UK Health Security Agency’s Advisory Board aims to outline “…current infectious diseases threats, through the dominant routes of transmission and highlight the preparedness work within the organisation.” The report finds in part, “The UK has strong public health infrastructure in place, including robust surveillance systems, laboratories, and emergency response plans. Key components of this are outlined below, including developments to strengthen and improve. UKHSA will need to review the funding models available for each of these areas and agree the priorities for funding for future financial years. UKHSA has also enhanced its preparedness through the Centre for Pandemic Preparedness (CPP) and delivery and engagement with the G7 100-day mission for diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.”

“100 Days Mission: First Implementation Report”

“The independent International Pandemic Preparedness Secretariat (IPPS) has released a new report highlighting progress in the 100 Days Mission, an international effort to ensure that safe, effective vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics are available within 100 days of the onset of future pandemic threats. Victor J. Dzau, President of the National Academy of Medicine (NAM), is a member of the IPPS steering group and co-chair of the IPPS Science and Technology Expert Group, which provides technical input and assurance to the 100 Days Mission. “It is my privilege to serve as co-chair of this expert group, which will provide critical advice and evaluation of progress toward the 100 Days Mission,” Dzau shared.”

“Bracing for Superbugs: Strengthening Environmental Action in the One Health Response to Antimicrobial Resistance”

New from the UN Environment Programme: “The report Bracing for Superbugs: Strengthening environmental action in the One Health response to antimicrobial resistance provides evidence that the environment plays a key role in the development, transmission and spread of AMR.  Prevention is at the core of the action and environment is a key part of the solution.”

“The report aims to demystify and unpack the different, while interconnected, aspects of the environmental dimensions of AMR, offering a comprehensive overview of scientific findings on the subject. It provides actionable evidence of the importance of the environment in the development, transmission and spread of AMR, and it shows that environmental dimensions of AMR are multifaceted and the response rests on collaboration between sectors. A concerted systems approach such as “One Health,” which recognizes that the health of people, animals, plants and the environment are closely linked and interdependent, is the approach needed to tackle it.”

“This report analyzes the three economic sectors and their value chains that are key drivers of AMR development and spread in the environment: pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, agriculture and food, and healthcare, together with pollutants from poor sanitation, sewage and waste effluent in municipal systems. The report synthesizes current knowledge gaps, and it shows that while several actions are ongoing, more needs to be done and offers solutions to prevent and respond to AMR.”

“A One Health response to AMR will not only help reduce the risk and burden of AMR on societies but will also help address the triple planetary crisis.”

“Tracking the Bird Flu, Experts See a Familiar Threat–and a Virus Whose Course is Hard to Predict”

Helen Branswell discusses H5N1 in this piece for STAT News, writing about the history of this virus and Dr. Keiji Fukuda’s, a physician and epidemiologist who specializes in influenza, and others’ experience with it. She discusses the complex concerns surrounding its recent spread in a Spanish mink farm and potential changes in its epidemiology and ecology, writing “It is not clear how the virus entered the farm. But it seems possible, perhaps even probable, that at some point H5N1 spread from mink to mink. “Our findings also indicate that an onward transmission of the virus to other minks may have taken place in the affected farm,” the scientists who reported the event wrote in the journal Eurosurveillance. “This is suggested by the increasing number of infected animals identified after the confirmation of the disease and the progression of the infection from the initially affected area to the entire holding…The mere idea of mink-to-mink transmission gives flu researchers pause. If a virus can transmit from one mammal to another, what’s to stop it from transmitting between other mammalian species — like ours?”

Her piece concludes with a haunting quotation from Fukuda-“Fukuda concurred. “What has become clear to me over time is that the big challenge is not the viruses. That’s not what gives me a pit in my stomach,” he said. “The real challenge is whether people, whether governments, whether policymakers have the ability to actually address the challenge in the way that needs to be done. And I don’t see so much which encourages me, to be blunt. That’s what gives me a pit in my stomach.”

“Laying the Groundwork for the Bioeconomy”

Sarah Carter’s recent piece for the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) discusses the federal government’s role in the bioeconomy and the findings of an FAS workshop on this topic. She writes in part: “The December 7, 2022 workshop focused on government-based financial and economic tools and how they can best support the bioeconomy. Speakers provided context by describing the ways that the U.S. government is already planning to support regional biomanufacturing infrastructure through the National Science Foundation’s Regional Innovation Engine program and through the Department of Commerce’s Build Back Better Regional Challenge. Workshop participants also generated a range of specific ideas, including investment in networks of biomanufacturing infrastructure, direct government investment (e.g. tax incentives, subsidies, procurement, and improved grant opportunities) as well as development of resources and education to support small companies. Diverse workforce development was also identified as a critical factor, with an emphasis on programs and partnerships for technical programs and community colleges rather than Ph.D.-level education. The discussions revealed two overarching themes:

  • There is a need for investments in a wide diversity of scale-up facilities and infrastructure for bio-based products.
  • Investments will need to be sustained over time. Because biomanufacturing is rapidly advancing, ongoing funding will be needed to ensure that the facilities that are built and workforce development programs that are established now will be able to change and adapt in the future.”

“First Regional Workshop to Operationalize the Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences: Mitigating Biorisks and Governing Dual-Use Research (the Framework) in the WHO African Region”

This event summary from the WHO discusses a January workshop co-hosted by the WHO Science Division in collaboration with the WHO Regional Office for Africa and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention to operationalize the framework in the WHO African region. “The objectives of the two-day technical workshop were to present the framework and other related existing regional initiatives; to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and experience of countries on the challenges and needs in mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research; to strengthen collaboration among multiple and multidisciplinary stakeholders within the WHO African region; to test specific elements of the framework, including the six-step approach and the checklist for the national governments, and identify the needs for additional toolkits or regional guidance; and to recommend concrete actions for the roll-out of a national implementation of the framework.” A detailed report of this workshop will be published at a later date.

“What’s a Spillover? A Spillback? Here are Definitions for the Vocab of a Pandemic”

Max Barnhart’s recent piece for NPR covers commonly used terms like spillover, spillback, outbreak, epidemic, and more to help in understanding upcoming pieces in the “Goats and Soda: Stories of Life in a Changing World” series.

What We’re Listening To 🎧

“Special Online Briefing with Ambassador Joseph Manso, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons”

Amb. Joseph Manso’s briefing on the OPCW IIT report regarding the Assad regime’s use of CW in Douma in early 2018 is available here in both written and MP3 format. This briefing provides an overview of the IIT report’s findings and implications beyond these specific findings.

Publication Launch Event-Strategic Trade Review: 10th Issue

Join the Strategic Trade Research Institute on February 15, at 9 am EST for this launch event moderated by Dr. Andrea Viski, a Schar School adjunct professor who teaches courses on strategic trade controls. Featured authors will engage in a virtual interactive panel discussion discussing the new edition. Learn more and register here.

The 13th Annual Dupont Summit on Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy

“The purpose of the Dupont Summit is to promote interdisciplinary conversation about pressing issues related to the politics and policy of science, technology and the environment. The conference mirrors the interest of the PSO and its partners in promoting conversation about current policy concerns. The conference brings together academics, government, business and social leaders from a variety of backgrounds.” The hybrid conference will meet on Friday, February 17. Learn more and register here.

Personal Protective Equipment and Personal Protective Technology Product Standardization for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain

“The National Academies will convene a public workshop, March 1-2, to examine standards gaps related to personal protective equipment (PPE) and personal protective technology (PPT). The event will explore innovative approaches and technologies needed to update and streamline the U.S. standardization system for PPE and PPT in support of supply chain resiliency. Policymakers, manufacturers, users, and relevant technical contributors will discuss ways to improve the effectiveness, safety, supply stability, and accessibility of PPE and PPT in health care settings and increase usage by critical infrastructure workers and the general public.” Learn more and register here.

Novel Applications of Science and Technology to Address Emerging Chemical and Biological Threats

For the first time since 2019, this Gordon Research Conference is back, this time in sunny Ventura, CA. “The Chemical and Biological Defense GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.” The conference will be held March 19-24, 2023. Learn more and apply here by February 19.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). For this week, our question is: This disease, named for a Brazilian physician, is caused by the Trypanosoma cruzi parasite, and is commonly spread by kissing bugs. What is it?

“The live insect depicted here, in this dorsal view, was a species of Triatoma, or kissing bug, able to transmit the protozoan pathogen, Trypanosoma cruzi, which causes the incurable illness known as Chagas disease.” | Credit: CDC PHIL

Shout out to Georgios P. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to “In February 1964, Albert Nickel, an animal caretaker at Fort Detrick, contracted and died from a disease after he was bitten by an infected rodent. What is the name of the disease and what is its causative agent?” is Bolivian hemorrhagic fever caused by Machupo virus.

Pandora Report: 2.3.2023

Happy Friday! This week we are covering President Biden’s announcement that the national and public health emergency declarations for COVID-19 will terminate on May 11, recommendations to expand federal oversight of biosecurity and risky research, and the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team’s third report on the 2018 Douma chemical attack. We also have a number of new publications and a podcast episode featuring Dr. Glenn Cross, an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD Program, discussing Rhodesia’s CBW program during its counterinsurgency in the 1970s.

Biden Administration to End COVID-19 Emergency Declarations in May

In September of last year, President Biden declared in an interview on “60 Minutes” that “The pandemic is over,” drawing swift backlash for seemingly endorsing the sentiment that the pandemic is over because Americans want to behave like it is. He continued, saying “We still have a problem with COVID. We’re still doing a lot of work on it…but the pandemic is over. If you notice, no one’s wearing masks. Everybody seems to be in pretty good shape. And so I think it’s changing.” We wrote then, “Everybody” is definitely not “in pretty good shape.” With developments announced this week, this has potential to become even more true later this year with the end of pandemic protections.

President Biden notified Congress this week that he plans to end the national emergency and public health emergency declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic on May 11, a move that will shift the federal response to one designed at managing an endemic threat and end several protections and benefits. It comes as many have pushed for a “return to normal” and House Republicans threaten to end the national emergencies themselves. The end of these emergencies will likely mean that many Americans will have to pay for COVID-19 testing, vaccinations, and treatments out of pocket that were previously free to them. Zeke Miller explains this further in AP News, writing in part “It comes as lawmakers have already ended elements of the emergencies that kept millions of Americans insured during the pandemic. Combined with the drawdown of most federal COVID-19 relief money, it would also shift the development of vaccines and treatments away from the direct management of the federal government.”

Congress has refused to authorize additional funding for COVID-19 vaccines, prompting the federal government to begin preparations to move this care to the commercial market last year. Pfizer and Moderna have indicated that their prices for COVID-19 vaccines will likely be between $82 and $130 per dose. This amount is between three and four times what the federal government has paid for them through bulk purchasing programs, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation. The same Kaiser analysis found that, “If payers end up paying those prices for one dose per adult, the analysis estimates that the total cost of purchasing booster shots commercially would run between $6.2 billion and $29.7 billion a year, depending on price and how many people nationally get the vaccine or booster.”

The federal government spent over $30 billion on these vaccines to “…encourage their development, guarantee a market, and ensure that the public can access them at no charge.” Insurers may be able to negotiate discounted prices, but as Kaiser also points out, “…they will have limited leverage because they will generally be required to cover all recommended vaccines and boosters.” While those with public or private insurance may not personally bear this cost, this could drive up insurance premiums. Worse, those who are uninsured will lose their guaranteed access to these vaccines and, given the prices announced per dose by Pfizer and Moderna, paying out-of-pocket will likely be out of reach for many.

And the number of uninsured also has potential to rise with the end of expanded Medicare coverage in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. AP explains, “Medicaid enrollment ballooned during the pandemic, in part because the federal government prohibited states from removing people from the program during the public health emergency once they had enrolled. The program offers health care coverage to roughly 90 million children and adults — or 1 out of every 4 Americans. Late last year, Congress told states they could start removing ineligible people in April. Millions of people are expected to lose their coverage, either because they now make too much money to qualify for Medicare or they’ve moved. Many are expected to be eligible for low-cost insurance plans through the Affordable Care Act’s private marketplace or their employer.”

Worse yet “Food help for unemployed adults, under the age of 50 and without children, will also change after the public health emergency is lifted in May. During the emergency declaration, a rule that required those individuals to work or participate in job training for 20 hours per week to remain eligible for SNAP benefits was suspended. That rule will be in place again starting in June. SNAP aid for more low-income college students will also draw down in June.” Important to note here is that it is estimated as many as 4 million Americans are out of work because they are dealing with long COVID. The unemployment rate stayed roughly the same in January 2023 as job growth continued, but this does not address discrepancies between stagnated wages and rising costs of living. Ultimately, the end of all these expanded benefits and protections now will only harm especially vulnerable populations, more than likely threatening their overall health.

Finally, the Office of Budget and Management indicated this week that “…an abrupt end to the emergency declarations would create wide-ranging chaos and uncertainty throughout the health care system — for states, for hospitals and doctors’ offices, and, most importantly, for tens of millions of Americans. During the PHE, the Medicaid program has operated under special rules to provide extra funding to states to ensure that tens of millions of vulnerable Americans kept their Medicaid coverage during a global pandemic. In December, Congress enacted an orderly wind-down of these rules to ensure that patients did not lose access to care unpredictably and that state budgets don’t face a radical cliff. If the PHE were suddenly terminated, it would sow confusion and chaos into this critical wind-down. Due to this uncertainty, tens of millions of Americans could be at risk of abruptly losing their health insurance, and states could be at risk of losing billions of dollars in funding.” If the last three years have taught us anything, it is that giving about 100 days notice for these kinds of changes is hardly helpful for those who will be the most impacted.

Of course, the end of the national emergencies does not mean the pandemic is actually over. Three years after its inaugural meeting, the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee released the report from its fourteenth meeting regarding COVID-19. While the committee and WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus acknowledged the pandemic is likely at a transition point, the “WHO Director-General concurs with the advice offered by the Committee regarding the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and determines that the event continues to constitute a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).”

Importantly, “The WHO Secretariat expressed concern about the continued virus evolution in the context of unchecked circulation of SARS-CoV-2 and the substantial decrease in Member States’ reporting of data related to COVID-19 morbidity, mortality, hospitalization and sequencing, and reiterated the importance of timely data sharing to guide the ongoing pandemic response…WHO is urging countries: to remain vigilant and continue reporting surveillance and genomic sequencing data; to recommend appropriately targeted risk-based public health and social measures (PHSM) where necessary; to vaccinate populations most at risk to minimize severe disease and deaths; and to conduct regular risk communication, answering population concerns and engaging communities to improve the understanding and implementation of countermeasures.”

Ultimately, apathy towards this ongoing emergency is driving the end of protections and needed benefits for those that need them most. The pandemic is not over, despite politicians’ interest in that being the case. No amount of political rhetoric will ever substitute making needed investments in adequately managing and preventing these kinds of public health emergencies–a lesson the United States seems destined to “re-learn” yet again.

This illustration, created at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), reveals ultrastructural morphology exhibited by coronaviruses. Note the spikes that adorn the outer surface of the virus, which impart the look of a corona surrounding the virion, when viewed electron microscopically. A novel coronavirus, named Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was identified as the cause of an outbreak of respiratory illness first detected in Wuhan, China in 2019. The illness caused by this virus has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).| Credit: CDC PHIL

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity Recommends Changes in Biosecurity Oversight

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity endorsed a set of draft recommendations this past week that found, among other things, that current definitions of potential pandemic pathogens (PPP) and enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPP) are too narrow and over-focused on pathogens that “…are both likely “highly” transmissible and likely “highly” virulent”. Their recommendations would expand oversight to cover work considered less risky and end blanket exclusions for “research activities associated with surveillance and vaccine development or production,” among several other measures aimed at enhancing safety and transparency. The White House will decide whether or not to adopt these recommendations.

Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Biodefense Graduate Program Director, discussed these recommendations with The New York Times, saying ““If the government implements the spirit of what they’ve written, this would be a major overhaul of dual-use research oversight in the United States,”. The article also explains his argument that the White house should go beyond these recommendations and create an independent agency to perform this oversight and streamline a system he says is too fragmented.

OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Releases Third Report on Douma Attack

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons released its third report from its Investigation and Identification Team investigating a chemical weapons attack that occurred on April 7, 2018, in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic. The report indicates that “Based on the holistic assessment of the large volume and wide range of evidence gathered and analysed, and on the convergence of the outcomes of such corroborated multiple analyses, the IIT concluded that, on the evening of 7 April 2018, at least one helicopter of the Syrian “Tiger Forces” Elite Unit dropped two yellow cylinders containing toxic chlorine gas on two apartment buildings in a civilian-inhabited area in Douma, killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more.”

Syria’s Foreign Ministry commented on the report: “The [Syrian Foreign Ministry] statement said that the report lacks scientific and objective evidence, and no sane person or specialist can reach such misleading conclusions,” Syria’s state-run SANA news agency summarized the foreign ministry as saying….”Those who prepared this report neglected the objective observations raised by State parties, experts, academics and former OPCW inspectors, known for their expertise and knowledge.”

However, as polygraph.info explains, “That is false…The OPCW reviewed over 19,000 files, obtained and assessed 66 witness statements, and considered data related to 70 samples. It also followed up on “lines of inquiry” suggested by Syria and other state parties…Adhering to “best practices,” the OPCW reached its conclusions after collecting, scrutinizing and corroborating all the available information gathered throughout the course of its nearly two-year investigation.”

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued a joint statement with UK Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs James Cleverly, French Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs Catherine Colonna, and German Federal Foreign Minister Annalen Baerbock discussing the OPCW report:

Today, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) released a report that found the Assad regime responsible for the deadly chemical weapons attack on Douma on April 7, 2018. The report refutes the Russian claim that it was an opposition attack.

The report concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, around 19:30 local time on April 7, 2018 at least one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Tiger Forces, dropped two yellow cylinders which hit two residential buildings in a central area of the city releasing chlorine killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more.

This report marks the ninth instance of chemical weapons use independently attributed to the Assad regime by UN and OPCW mechanisms.

Our governments condemn in the strongest terms the Syrian regime’s repeated use of these horrific weapons and remain steadfast in our demands that the Assad regime immediately comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and relevant UN Security Council resolutions.  Syria must fully declare and destroy its chemical weapons program and allow the deployment of OPCW staff to its country to verify it has done so.

The report also points out that the IIT received credible information, corroborated through multiple sources, that Russian forces were co-located at Dumayr airbase alongside the Tiger Forces. The IIT also obtained information that, at the time of the attack, the airspace over Douma was exclusively controlled by the Syrian Arab Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces.

We call on the Russian Federation to stop shielding Syria from accountability for its use of chemical weapons. No amount of disinformation from the Kremlin can hide its hand in abetting the Assad regime. In the aftermath of Syria’s chemical attack on April 7, 2018, Russian military police helped the Syrian regime obstruct OPCW access to the site of the attack and attempted to sanitize the site.  Russian and Syrian troops also staged photographs later disseminated online in an attempt to support its fabricated narratives of this incident.

We commend the independent, unbiased, and expert work of the OPCW staff, condemn the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances.  We also reaffirm our commitment to hold accountable the perpetrators of all chemical weapons attacks in Syria and beyond.

Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Biodefense Graduate Program Director, said of the OPCW report: “This report documents the fifth chemical attack that can be directly attributed to the Syrian air force. The chlorine attack on Douma fits a pattern of chemical weapon use by the Assad regime and was an integral part of the brutal counterinsurgency operation the Assad regime was conducting at the time. The report is based on a thorough, multidisciplinary investigation that refutes Syrian and Russian allegations that this attack was somehow staged by the rebels.   The report breaks new ground by naming the Syrian military officer responsible for conducting this attack: Brigadier General Souheil Al-Hassan, commander of the notorious Tiger Forces, which has been responsible for a series of chemical attacks and other atrocities during the Syrian civil war.”

“Pandemic Origins: Technologies, Challenges, and Policy Options to Support Investigations”

This report from the Government Accountability Office discusses the findings of the office’s technology assessment, Pandemic Origins: Technologies and Challenges for Biological Investigations and covers “(1) key technologies available for pandemic origin investigations, (2) strengths and limitations of these tools and how researchers use them to investigate pandemic origins, and (3) cross-cutting challenges researchers face in trying to determine a pandemic’s origin.” GAO identified several challenges that can inhibit determination of a pandemic’s origin, including challenges in acquiring data and the lack of a sufficient and skilled workforce. According to the report, “GAO identified five policy options that may help address the cross-cutting challenges, including proactively establishing multilateral agreements for accessing and sharing samples and genetic sequence data, taking steps to grow an interdisciplinary workforce, and developing a national strategy targeted to pandemic origin investigations. These policy options represent possible actions that policymakers—who may include Congress, federal agencies, state and local governments, academia, industry, and international organizations—could consider taking.”

Disease X: The 100 Days Mission to End Pandemics

This new book was published this week by Kate Kelland, Chief Scientific Writer at the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). “Distilling insights from health security experts, examining epidemics and pandemics of the past and present, and analysing what governments, societies and their people got right and wrong in the response to COVID-19 and other devastating disease outbreaks, Kelland explores why and how viruses—tiny as they are—can wreak enormous havoc on our way of life. But she also tells a story of hope, giving readers a glimpse of a future where the threat of pandemics has been neutralised by a prepared and collaborative world.”

Governing Pandemics Snapshot Inaugural Issue

The first issue of Governing Pandemics Snapshot is available now from the Geneva Graduate Institute’s Global Health Centre. “Welcome to the inaugural issue of the Governing Pandemics Snapshot, a publication aiming to provide a concise, periodic overview on the state of efforts to strengthen global pandemic preparedness and response (PPR). This first issue looks back at 2022 and forward to 2023, examining three topics that will recur with each issue: negotiations towards a Pandemic Treaty (or instrument), amendment of the International Health Regulations; and Financing of PPR. Each issue will also cover a rotating special topic, and we begin here with Pathogen- and Benefit-Sharing (PBS). More frequent updates are available on our timeline at GoverningPandemics.org.”

“Addressing Misconceptions About Biological and Chemical Weapons and Related Legal Frameworks”

This new report from VERTIC is available now here. “The main purpose of this resource is to disprove misconceptions about biological and chemical weapons and related international instruments. It addresses misconceptions about biological and chemical weapons and related legal frameworks that VERTIC staff have identified through interactions with states over 20 years’ work on these treaties, and from other sources such as the media. Each misconception is broken down into an explanation of the misconception and its implications, and how to address it. The misconceptions are then disproved through factual and legal discussions, supported by expert commentary.”

“New Bio-Defense Strategy to Eschew ‘One Bug, One Drug’ Programs”

This piece in National Defense covers discussion of the upcoming Bio-Defense Posture Review with USAF Col. James Harwell, deputy director for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense at the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Requirements Office. The article reads in part, “Gone are the days where we take long periods of time to identify an emerging threat and build a specific countermeasure to that threat. Science is moving at a pace that allows for new threats to rapidly emerge and to undermine our ability to achieve our National Defense Strategy,” Harwell said.”

“The Doomsday Clock is Ticking on Biosecurity”

In this piece for Defense One, Suzet McKinney, Asha George, and David Relman discuss the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Science and Security Board’s setting of the Doomsday Clock’s time to 90 second to midnight. They acknowledge that it was mostly moved because of the war in Ukraine, but they also write that “The impact of this war on the global order has implications far beyond the nuclear realm and the battlefield more generally. The war thwarts international cooperation exactly when we need cooperation most—to address pressing 21st-century threats such as climate change, mis- and disinformation, and a problem we and others know quite well: the proliferation of biological threats.”  

“Managing the Risks of Biotechnology Innovation”

In this workshop policy paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, Dr. Gigi Kwik Gronvall discusses the risks posed by biotechnological progress and summarizes a November CFR workshop titled “Managing the
Risks of Biotechnology Innovation.” She identifies several gaps in global governance of these risks, including misinformation and disinformation’s influence on the progress and governance of biotechnology, writing in part “Well-funded groups have undermined the development of various biotechnologies, as seen in “golden rice,” which was developed in the 1990s to combat vitamin A deficiency. However, this intervention has not been deployed due to unjustified safety concerns, and millions of children have died from vitamin A deficiency. Misinformation about GMOs, vaccines, and therapies is common, and has intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, Russia has recently presented the presence of public health laboratories in Ukraine as cause for suspicion of misuse of biotechnologies. Sometimes institutions, newspapers, or research groups will organize to counter specific threads of misinformation and disinformation, but it is a significant, often uncompensated, obligation for those involved.”

“The Next Generation of Coronavirus Vaccines: A Graphical Guide”

“Vaccines against the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 have been given to billions of people to protect them from COVID-19, and have saved more than 20 million lives. But viral variants can evade some of the immunity provided by the original vaccines. As a result, vaccine developers around the world are working on dozens of ‘next-generation’ COVID-19 vaccines: not just updates of the first versions, but ones that use new technologies and platforms.” Check out this graphical guide from Nature that covers the next generation of COVID-19 vaccines.

“Could a Chatbot Teach You How to Build a Dirty Bomb?”

In this piece for Outrider, Matt Korda discusses concerns brought about by chatbots like ChatGPT and OpenAI. He writes in part, “But despite being programmed to align with human values, could ChatGPT be tricked into doing harm? To answer this question, many researchers (myself included) picked up ChatGPT’s proverbial gauntlet and went to work searching for creative ways to circumvent the AI model’s safety guardrails. The results of this collective experiment were often funny and—worryingly—occasionally successful.”

What We’re Listening To 🎧

Poisons and Pestilence “14 Bonus Episode: Dirty War with Glenn Cross”

In this latest episode, Dr. Brett Edwards discusses Rhodesia’s development of a CBW program and its use during the country’s counterinsurgency in the 1970s with Dr. Glenn Cross, an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD program and author of Dirty War, a book discussing this program in-depth that is a must read.

This Podcast Will Kill You “Episode 111 RSV: What’s syncytial anyway?”

“We’re kicking off our sixth season in the same way we ended our fifth: with another headline-making respiratory virus. But as our listeners know, not all respiratory viruses are the same, and it’s often those differences among them that play the biggest role in their spread or the symptoms they cause. This episode, we’re exploring the virus that everyone has been talking about lately. No, not that one. Or that one. The other one. Yes, we’re talking about respiratory syncytial virus, or RSV. For many people, the recent surge in RSV infections that dominated headlines this winter may have been the first time they had heard of this viral infection or realized how deadly it could be. But for others, RSV has long inspired fear and dread. In this episode, we Erins explain why this virus deserves such notoriety, how long we’ve recognized the dangers of infection, and what hope the future may hold for novel RSV treatments or vaccines. If at any point you’ve wondered what all the fuss is about this virus or how to pronounce syncytial, then this is the episode for you!”

Prosperity and Human Security: Japan and Asia’s 21st Century Governance Challenges

Join Harvard’s Program on US-Japan Relations for this symposium that includes panels on “Development and Governance Challenges in Public Health” and “Development, Climate Change, and Climate Migration”. The former will feature Dr. Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, discussing “China, Covid-19, and global health governance”. This event will take place on February 6 at 12 pm EST. Learn more and register here.

Jonathan Tucker CBW Symposium

“The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies cordially invites you to the 11th annual Jonathan Tucker Symposium on chemical and biological weapons issues on February 9th and 10th, 2023.” BW topics include “Revisiting the Siege of Caffa & Catapulting Cadavers” and “Governance of Dual-Use Biological Research,” the latter of which will be moderated by Dr. Gregory Koblentz. CW topics include “Lessons learned from the U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Program” and “The 2023 CWC Review Conference”. Learn more and register for the virtual events here.

Publication Launch Event-Strategic Trade Review: 10th Issue

Join the Strategic Trade Research Institute on February 15, at 9 am EST for this launch event moderated by Dr. Andrea Viski, a Schar School adjunct professor who teaches courses on strategic trade controls. Featured authors will engage in a virtual interactive panel discussion discussing the new edition. Learn more and register here.

Personal Protective Equipment and Personal Protective Technology Product Standardization for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain

“The National Academies will convene a public workshop, March 1-2, to examine standards gaps related to personal protective equipment (PPE) and personal protective technology (PPT). The event will explore innovative approaches and technologies needed to update and streamline the U.S. standardization system for PPE and PPT in support of supply chain resiliency. Policymakers, manufacturers, users, and relevant technical contributors will discuss ways to improve the effectiveness, safety, supply stability, and accessibility of PPE and PPT in health care settings and increase usage by critical infrastructure workers and the general public.” Learn more and register here.

Novel Applications of Science and Technology to Address Emerging Chemical and Biological Threats

For the first time since 2019, this Gordon Research Conference is back, this time in sunny Ventura, CA. “The Chemical and Biological Defense GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.” The conference will be held March 19-24, 2023. Learn more and apply here by February 19.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). For this week, our question is: In February 1964, Albert Nickel, an animal caretaker at Fort Detrick, contracted and died from a disease after he was bitten by an infected rodent. What is the name of the disease and what is its causative agent?

Shout out to Pappas G. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to “On April 22, 1915, the German Army infamously unleashed more than 160 tons of chlorine gas on French trenches near which Belgian city?” is Ypres. Check out the National World War I Museum and Memorial’s page on this event.

Pandora Report: 1.27.2023

The year of the rabbit is off to one heck of a start. This week we cover COVID-19’s spread in China as the Party increasingly cracks down on Zero-COVID protesters, growing concern amount H5N1 in mammals, new insight into the history of the plague, and more. Several new publications are listed, including a fresh book from Ed Regis about the history of the Pacific Ocean Biological Survey Program and multiple works on misinformation’s impact on COVID-19 responses. As always, we round out with events and announcements, including multiple great upcoming professional opportunities. Happy Friday!

COVID-19 Multiplying Like Rabbits in China

China’s CDC claimed this week that cases of critically ill COVID-19 patients are down 72% from a peak earlier this month in the country, with daily deaths of hospitalized COVID-19 patients down 79% as well. This comes as Wu Zunyou, Chief Epidemiologist at China CDC, claims that 80% of the country’s 1.4 billion people have already been infected. This seems like an effort to indicate that a rebound is unlikely in the coming months amid concerns that the new year travel season will cause further spread and deaths. Just last week, China claimed to have 60,000 COVID-19 deaths in the month since it rolled back its notorious Zero-COVID policies, a number far below the one million some models estimated the country will suffer this winter.

However, CNBC notes, “…some experts said that figure probably vastly undercounts the full impact, as it excludes those who die at home, and because many doctors have said they are discouraged from citing Covid as a cause of death.” This understanding better aligns with reports of over-crowded funeral homes and crematoriums, and reports of coffin makers and funeral decoration companies repeatedly selling out of their products amid the spread. Because of these discrepancies, many are doubtful of the government’s official statistics.

At the same time, reports of Zero-COVID protesters being arrested or intimidated are mounting. Four women in Beijing are known to have been arrested in connection with these protests, seemingly in retaliation for their role in what has been described as “the boldest challenge to the Communist Party’s rule in decades and an embarrassing affront to its leader, Xi Jinping.” The New York Times explains the Party’s need to do this, writing “The party seems determined to warn off anyone who may have been emboldened by the remarkable outburst of public discontent, which was followed just days later by Beijing’s abrupt decision to abandon Covid restrictions. Since then, domestic challenges have mounted: Youth unemployment is high, the economy is slowing, and Covid infections and deaths have accelerated.”

The same piece continues, “The party is also working to discredit the protesters by casting them as tools of malevolent foreign powers. Beijing has long dismissed dissent at home — from calls for women’s rights to pro-democracy activism to ethnic unrest — as the result of Western-backed subversion. The protests against “zero Covid” were no exception: One Chinese diplomat suggested that some of the demonstrators had been “bought by external forces.”

Chunyun, the Lunar New Year travel period in China, typically lasts from mid-January through late-February, meaning opportunities for spread in rural parts of the country are far from over, despite China CDC’s apparent claims to the contrary. The continued supply of highly suspect statistics and crackdowns on Zero-COVID protesters presents a troubling situation and indicates that the Party has done anything but change its ways.

Thinking of Offering a Nice Egg in This Trying Time? Mink Again

US egg prices skyrocketed in price by more than 137% between December 2021 and December 2022, leaving many in constant sticker shock at the grocery store as this once reliably cheap staple becomes increasingly expensive. Much of this is attributed to outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1), which has been spreading in US flocks since January 2022, resulting in cullings of over 57 million birds across industrial and backyard flocks. However, over the past year, this virus has also demonstrated its ability to spread from birds to mammals, with infections found in several species in the US so far, including raccoons, foxes, seals, grizzly bears, and, most recently, minks. Naturally, this had led to increased concern about potential spread into other mammal populations.

“Transmission electron microscopic image of two Influenza A (H5N1) virions, a type of bird flu virus Note the glycoprotein spikes along the surface of the virion and as a stippled appearance of the viral envelope encasing each virion.” Credit: CDC PHIL

Nature covered this story this week, writing “Until this particular outbreak, all mammalian infections could be attributed to direct contact with virus-contaminated material, says Hualan Chen, a virologist at the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute in China. For example, animals that ingest wild-bird droppings, or that prey on infected animals, can develop the disease. But its spread between mammals “implies that this H5N1 virus may pose a higher risk to public health”, Chen says.”

A new article in Eurosurveillance discusses the alarming spread of HPAI A(H5N1) at an American mink farm in Galicia, Spain in October 2022. In it, Agüero et al. explain that the farm experienced an acute increase in its mortality rate (.77% versus an expected range of .2-.3%), prompting the facility’s clinical veterinarian to collect samples from affected animals. These animals tested positive for H5N1, and “Post-mortem examination revealed haemorrhagic pneumonia or red hepatisation of the lungs as the most notable lesions”

The authors further explain the set-up of the farm, which housed 51,986 minks, writing “The minks were housed in wire netting cages placed in rows and situated in a series of over 30 partially open barns, which provided overhead protection but not total shelter of their sides. The minks were fed with raw fish and poultry by-products, cereals and blood meal. Poultry farms and avian slaughterhouses supplying the poultry by-products were located in Galicia. Up to 10 January 2023, H5N1 poultry outbreaks have not been reported from this region.”

The outbreak soon peaked, with a weekly mortality rate of 4.3% documented between October 17 and 23. Culling measures were ordered quickly, and all minks from infected pens were culled by November 17, along with destruction of all carcasses, fomites, and waste. Of the farm’s 12 workers, 11 were in contact with infected and culled animals, though none of them tested positive and they all completed quarantine without any problems. However, as the authors note in their abstract, “The identified viruses belong to clade 2.3.4.4b, which is responsible of the ongoing epizootic in Europe. An uncommon mutation (T271A) in the PB2 gene with potential public health implications was found. Our investigations indicate onward mink transmission of the virus may have occurred in the affected farm.”

While the mink farm seems to have been thorough in its efforts to stop this outbreak, there are concerns that this new variant may be circulating in wild bird populations. Nature writes, “But Puryear thinks that because the new variant contains genetic material from gull flu, it’s likely that at least some of its genetic changes arose in gulls before entering the mink farm. This means that a strain containing those mutations is probably still circulating in the bird population. But for human populations, the outlook is still good: if the new strain did start to infect people, health authorities could probably produce a vaccine quickly, and the antiviral drug Tamiflu (oseltamivir) can reduce the severity of the disease.”

The Nature news piece concludes with, “The potential risk to wild animals is greater. Bird flu has consistently caused high levels of sickness and death among wild birds and mammals over the past year, and how the new variant will affect that trend remains to be seen. “We just simply don’t know,” says Puryear.”

Shake Ups and Mess Ups at the Department of Health and Human Services

CDC Takes Major Steps in Revamp

CDC Director Dr. Rochelle Walensky announced a number of high-level changes to her agency this week, including the creation of the Office of Health Equity and the Office of Public Health Data, Surveillance, and Technology. These are steps taken in light of last year’s internal review that found, among other things, that the agency struggled with appropriately and rapidly sharing scientific findings, communications in general, and that it needed to strengthen relationships with federal, state, and local partners. Furthermore, most of the organizations under CDC will now report directly to the Office of the Director, moving away from what has been described as a “Community of Practice structure”.

MedPage Today explained this leadership re-structuring, writing “Today, additional details about that leadership structure became clear. There will be a centralized leadership team of experts housed within the director’s office, which will include the director of the CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; the principal deputy director; the deputy director for program and science/chief medical officer; the deputy director for policy, communications, and legislative affairs/chief strategy officer; the deputy director for global health; the chief operating officer; and the chief of staff.”

“These changes will improve efficiency, speed decision-making, and strengthen the communication of scientific information to the American public, ensuring CDC’s science reaches the public in an understandable, accessible, and implementable manner as quickly as possible,” an unnamed staffer told The Hill.

OIG Report Finds NIH and EcoHealth Alliance Fell Short in Monitoring and Oversight

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) at HHS released this week the findings of its audit of the National Institutes of Health’s grants to the EcoHealth Alliance. This audit was initiated because of concerns over NIH’s grant awards to EcoHealth as well as EcoHealth’s subawards to foreign entities. OIG aimed to “…determine whether NIH monitored grants to EcoHealth in accordance with Federal requirements, and whether EcoHealth used and managed its NIH grant funds in accordance with Federal requirements.”

The Office found that, “Despite identifying potential risks associated with research being performed under the EcoHealth awards, we found that NIH did not effectively monitor or take timely action to address EcoHealth’s compliance with some requirements. Although NIH and EcoHealth had established monitoring procedures, we found deficiencies in complying with those procedures limited NIH and EcoHealth’s ability to effectively monitor Federal grant awards and subawards to understand the nature of the research conducted, identify potential problem areas, and take corrective action. Using its discretion, NIH did not refer the research to HHS for an outside review for enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPPs) because it determined the research did not involve and was not reasonably anticipated to create, use, or transfer an ePPP. However, NIH added a special term and condition in EcoHealth’s awards and provided limited guidance on how EcoHealth should comply with that requirement. We found that NIH was only able to conclude that research resulted in virus growth that met specified benchmarks based on a late progress report from EcoHealth that NIH failed to follow up on until nearly 2 years after its due date. Based on these findings, we conclude that NIH missed opportunities to more effectively monitor research. With improved oversight, NIH may have been able to take more timely corrective actions to mitigate the inherent risks associated with this type of research.”

Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz was quoted in the New York Timespiece on this report, saying “Although concerns were identified by NIAID staff, the proposal was not referred to NIAID’s review committee for further consideration.” He continued, saying “On paper, NIAID staff were encouraged to ‘err on the side of caution’ in identifying and referring such proposals…but in practice it looks like they erred on the side of complacency.” 

Woman Pleads Guilty to Mailing Ricin Letters in 2020

Pascale Cecile Veronique Ferrier pleaded guilty this week in a US District Court “…to sending a threatening letter containing homemade ricin to then-President Donald J. Trump at the White House in September 2020, and eight similar letters, each containing ricin, to Texas State law enforcement officials.” Ferrier, a dual French-Canadian national, holds a French engineering degree and admitted in her plea agreements that she made ricin in her Quebec home in September 2020. According to the FBI, “Ferrier placed the ricin in envelopes containing letters she wrote to then-President Trump at the White House and to eight Texas State law enforcement officials.”

“Ferrier was detained in the State of Texas for around 10 weeks in the spring of 2019, and she believed that the law enforcement officials were connected to her period of detention. In early September 2020, Ferrier used the Twitter social media service to propose that someone should “please shoot [T]rump in the face.” The letters in the envelopes contained threatening language, and the letter addressed to then-President Trump instructed him to “[g]ive up and remove [his] application for this election.” Ferrier mailed each of the threatening ricin letters from Canada to the United States. Ferrier then drove a car from Canada to the Peace Bridge Border Crossing in Buffalo, New York, on Sept. 20, 2020, where border patrol officials found her in possession of a loaded firearm, hundreds of rounds of ammunition and other weapons.”

Ferrier is scheduled for sentencing on April 26. She faces 262 months imprisonment if her plea agreements are accepted.

An Oldie, But a (Not So) Goodie: Y. Pestis Strains May Have Been Around Centuries Before Outbreaks

A new article in Communications Biology discusses how Yersinia pestis spread globally over longer periods of time than previously estimated. Eaton et al. estimate that the strain of Y. pestis responsible for the Black Death in the mid-14th century diverged from the ancestral strain as early as 1214, while the one responsible for the Plague of Justinian may have cropped up between 272 and 465–up to nearly 270 years before the epidemic began in 541. “‘It shows that each major plague pandemic has likely emerged many decades to centuries earlier than what the historical record suggests,” study coauthor and evolutionary geneticist Hendrik Poinar, director of McMaster University’s Ancient DNA Centre in Canada,” said in a statement to CNN.

The authors write in their abstract: “Plague has an enigmatic history as a zoonotic pathogen. This infectious disease will unexpectedly appear in human populations and disappear just as suddenly. As a result, a long-standing line of inquiry has been to estimate when and where plague appeared in the past. However, there have been significant disparities between phylogenetic studies of the causative bacterium, Yersinia pestis, regarding the timing and geographic origins of its reemergence. Here, we curate and contextualize an updated phylogeny of Y. pestis using 601 genome sequences sampled globally. Through a detailed Bayesian evaluation of temporal signal in subsets of these data we demonstrate that a Y. pestis-wide molecular clock is unstable. To resolve this, we developed a new approach in which each Y. pestis population was assessed independently, enabling us to recover substantial temporal signal in five populations, including the ancient pandemic lineages which we now estimate may have emerged decades, or even centuries, before a pandemic was historically documented from European sources. Despite this methodological advancement, we only obtain robust divergence dates from populations sampled over a period of at least 90 years, indicating that genetic evidence alone is insufficient for accurately reconstructing the timing and spread of short-term plague epidemics.”

Read the entire article here.

“Produced by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), this digitally colorized scanning electron microscopic (SEM) image depicts a number of yellow-colored, Yersinia pestis bacteria, that had gathered on the proventricular spines of a Xenopsylla cheopis flea. These spines line the interior of the proventriculus, a part of the flea’s digestive system. The Y. pestis bacterium is the pathogen that causes bubonic plague.” Credit: CDC PHIL

It’s 90 Seconds to Midnight (That’s Not Good)

“This year, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moves the hands of the Doomsday Clock forward, largely (though not exclusively) because of the mounting dangers of the war in Ukraine. The Clock now stands at 90 seconds to midnight—the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been.” Read the Bulletin’s statement here (also available in РУССКИЙ and УКРАЇНСЬКА).

Say “Hello” to the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science

The Nuclear Threat Initiative recently announced the creation of the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), an organization “trying to prevent dramatic advances in bioscience from unleashing engineered pathogens from the lab, and wants research funders, scientists and journals to help.” NTI explains: “NTI is working with international stakeholders to establish the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), an independent organization dedicated to reducing emerging biological risks associated with technology advances. A core element of the IBBIS mission will be to strengthen international biosecurity norms and develop innovative, practical tools and incentives to uphold them. IBBIS has a broadly defined mission, but initially it will focus on preventing the misuse of DNA synthesis technology—with the understanding that it will expand its remit over time.”

“IBBIS will collaborate with stakeholders across the global bioscience and biotechnology enterprise including academia, industry, the public health community, governments and philanthropy. These activities will complement the important work of the World Health Organization, the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, and other national, regional, and international organizations. NTI’s work to establish IBBIS is rooted in the vision of a world in which bioscience and biotechnology flourish, with safeguards against deliberate or accidental misuse with potentially catastrophic consequences.”

David Matthews discusses IBBIS in-depth, including the fraught geopolitical situation it faces, in this piece for Science Business.

The Lancet Series on One Health and Global Health Security

Check out this recent series from the Lancet: “Following the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and the on-going global COVID-19 pandemic, the One Health approach (bridging the Animal-Environmental-Human Health interface)  has rapidly gained political and financial support, particularly in regional and transcontinental initiatives to improve Global Health Security, including through recently established institutions like Africa CDC and other multidisciplinary consortia. This four-paper Lancet Series explores the adoption of One Health approaches to improve health security and include an analysis of the current landscape of preventive, surveillance, and response measures in outbreak situations of emerging and re-emerging zoonotic infectious diseases with epidemic potential as well as other potential public health emergencies such as neglected endemic diseases, antimicrobial resistance, environmental and chemical hazards and natural disasters.”

“Combating Misinformation as a Core Function of Public Health”

Knudsen et al. discuss the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s role in countering misinformation in this New England Journal of Medicine Catalyst piece: “The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene determined that the spread of misinformation about Covid-19 was having a harmful health impact, particularly on communities of color with low vaccination rates. It established a dedicated Misinformation Response Unit to monitor messages containing dangerous misinformation presented on multiple media platforms, including social media, non-English media, and international sites, and proliferating in community forums. The Misinformation Response Unit and the Health Department collaborated with more than 100 community partners to tailor culturally appropriate, scientifically accurate messages to different populations. The Health Department and its partners were able to rapidly identify messages containing inaccurate information about Covid-19 vaccines, treatment, and other issues and to support the delivery of accurate information to various populations. Although the harms of misinformation and benefits of addressing the problem require additional evaluation, internal and external interviews suggested that the Misinformation Response Unit helped the Health Department counter misinformation and disseminate accurate scientific information to the community, thus improving health and vaccine equity during the Covid-19 pandemic.”

“Fault Lines: The Expert Panel on the Socioeconomic Impacts of Science and Health Misinformation”

This new report from the Council of Canadian Academies includes a number of important findings, including that COVID-19 misinformation cost at least 2,800 Canadian lives and CAD 300 million in hospital expenses over a period of just nine months. “Fault Lines details how science and health misinformation can proliferate and its impacts on individuals, communities, and society. It explores what makes us susceptible to misinformation and how we might use these insights to improve societal resilience to it. The report includes a model of the impacts of COVID‑19 misinformation on vaccination rates in Canada, producing quantitative estimates of its impacts on our health and the economy, and situating these within a broader context of societal and economic harms.”

“Battling Biological Threats: Complacency, Progress, or Both?”

“As 2023 opens, there is apprehension that partisan divisions and politicized health security approaches may worsen as the United States moves into a divided government of ultra-thin margins. But over the course of 2022, several important new national security directives and policies and bipartisan legislative actions significantly advanced thinking on health security and what is required to better protect Americans—proving that progress remains in reach, despite tough odds. Global health security, including biodefense, has been elevated to new prominence in U.S. national security thinking. The Biodefense Posture Review, expected to be released in early 2023, is mandated to unify and modernize DOD’s broad, comprehensive biodefense capabilities, and synchronize these efforts with those of other federal departments in line with the recently released National Defense and Biodefense Strategies. The United States must be resolute and clear, leaning forward not backwards, investing in new capabilities sustained over many years to protect Americans and the larger world against future dangerous pathogens. In a new commentary, Thomas R. Cullison and J. Stephen Morrison argue that it remains possible to bridge divides and make measurable progress to prepare the United States for inevitable future biological threats.” Read this CSIS report here.

“The Pentagon’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program Moves Towards Modernization, Yet Congress Slashes Funding”

Dan Regan discusses DoD’s seemingly mismatched objectives and funding decisions in this piece for the Council on Strategic Risks. He writes, “To achieve its mission set, including investing in emerging biotechnologies and bolstering industrial capacity to scale MCMs to novel threats, developing and investing in stand-off pathogen early warning detection, and advancing protective equipment for the Joint Force, the CBDP budget requires a nearly two-fold increase from the President’s request of $1.32 billion in FY23 to $3 billion for FY24. However, Congress unfortunately just dealt a 7% cut to chemical and biodefense programs with the FY23 omnibus spending bill, following years of declining funds for CBDP. As the FY24 Presidential Budget Request is being drafted, the Biden Administration and Congress should consider significant increases to CBDP’s budget, along with the other biodefense and global health security priorities outlined in the 10 + 10 over 10 strategy, to combat biological threats.”

“Virology Under the Microscope–a Call for Rational Discourse”

In this commentary in mBio, more than 130 authors call for a return to rational discourse about virology and its role in modern issues like pandemic response and debates over GoF research. “Viruses have brought humanity many challenges: respiratory infection, cancer, neurological impairment and immunosuppression to name a few. Virology research over the last 60+ years has responded to reduce this disease burden with vaccines and antivirals. Despite this long history, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought unprecedented attention to the field of virology. Some of this attention is focused on concern about the safe conduct of research with human pathogens. A small but vocal group of individuals has seized upon these concerns – conflating legitimate questions about safely conducting virus-related research with uncertainties over the origins of SARS-CoV-2. The result has fueled public confusion and, in many instances, ill-informed condemnation of virology. With this article, we seek to promote a return to rational discourse. We explain the use of gain-of-function approaches in science, discuss the possible origins of SARS-CoV-2 and outline current regulatory structures that provide oversight for virological research in the United States. By offering our expertise, we – a broad group of working virologists – seek to aid policy makers in navigating these controversial issues. Balanced, evidence-based discourse is essential to addressing public concern while maintaining and expanding much-needed research in virology.”

“CRISPR Technology: A Decade of Genome Editing is Only the Beginning”

Wang and Doudna discuss the first decade of CRISPR in Science: “In the decade since the publication of CRISPR-Cas9 as a genome-editing technology, the CRISPR toolbox and its applications have profoundly changed basic and applied biological research. Wang and Doudna now review the origins and utility of CRISPR-based genome editing, the successes and current limitations of the technology, and where innovation and engineering are needed. The authors describe important advances in the development of CRISPR genome-editing technology and make predictions about where the field is headed. They also highlight specific examples in medicine and agriculture that show how CRISPR is already affecting society, with exciting opportunities for the future. —DJ”

“Zombie Viruses from the Arctic”

Jean-Michel Claverie’s new piece in Think Global Health discusses the threat global warming poses to global health by threatening Earth’s permafrost, potentially releasing ancient microbes. Claverie explains the evolution of this threat and how it may evolve throughout the piece, writing in part “This science fiction scenario became more realistic in 2015 when an international research team succeeded in resurrecting several viruses isolated from permafrost dating back 30,000 years. Following additional experiments, it is now clear that a significant proportion of prehistorical viruses can remain infectious for even longer periods of time. This article reviews the reality of the risks that their release might represent for the future.”

Science, Secrecy, and the Smithsonian

New from Ed Regis, author of The Biology of Doom, is this book, Science, Secrecy, and the Smithsonian:

“This is the story of how the Smithsonian Institute became intertwined in a secret biological warfare project.”

“During the 1960s, the Smithsonian Institution undertook a large-scale biological survey of a group of uninhabited tropical islands in the Pacific. It was one of the largest and most sweeping biological survey programs of all time, a six-year-long enterprise during which Smithsonian personnel banded 1.8 million birds, captured live specimens and took blood samples, and catalogued the avian, mammalian, reptile, and plant life of 48 Pacific islands.”

“But there was a twist. The study had been initiated, funded, and was overseen by the U.S. Biological Laboratories at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The home of the American biological warfare program. In signing the contract to perform the survey, the Smithsonian became a literal subcontractor to a secret biological warfare project. And by participating in the survey, the Smithsonian scientists were paving the way for top-secret biological warfare tests in the Pacific.”

“Critics charged the Smithsonian with having entered into a Faustian bargain that made the institution complicit in the sordid business of biological warfare, a form of combat which, if it were ever put into practice and used against human populations, could cause mass disease, suffering, and death. The Smithsonian had no proper role in any such activities, said the critics, and should never have undertaken the survey.”

Science, Secrecy, and the Smithsonian: The Strange History of the Pacific Ocean Biological Survey Program explores the workings of the survey program, places it in its historical context, describes the military tests that followed, and evaluates the critical objections to the Smithsonian’s participation in the project.”

Jonathan Tucker CBW Symposium

“The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies cordially invites you to the 11th annual Jonathan Tucker Symposium on chemical and biological weapons issues on February 9th and 10th, 2023.” BW topics include “Revisiting the Siege of Caffa & Catapulting Cadavers” and “Governance of Dual-Use Biological Research,” the latter of which will be moderated by Dr. Gregory Koblentz. CW topics include “Lessons learned from the U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Program” and “The 2023 CWC Review Conference”. Learn more and register for the virtual events here.

Novel Applications of Science and Technology to Address Emerging Chemical and Biological Threats

For the first time since 2019, this Gordon Research Conference is back, this time in sunny Ventura, CA. “The Chemical and Biological Defense GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.” The conference will be held March 19-24, 2023. Learn more and apply here by February 19.

High School and College Student Internship: Data Analytics for Elite Young Scholars – Biology and Medical Science Experience

“This Young Scholars Research Program is designed for Elite High School Students and Undergrad Students, who are interested in pursuing their study and/or career in the fields of biology or medical science with emphasis on advanced data analytics. You will work with our esteemed George Mason University faculty members on a specific team project. The team will consist of about three to four members of both high school and undergraduate students. The project will be assigned to the students at the beginning of the program based on the preference indicated by the students prior to the program. Two outputs will be expected from each team at the end of the programs: i) a final paper which will be published on the Center for Biomedical Science and Policy website as well as a special issue of World Medical & Health Policy; and ii) Team presentation at a symposium at which students compete for prizes.”

“During this program, students will be participating in a research project applying some of the following methods, including but not limited to biostatistics using R or Stata, data visualization using QGIS or ArcGIS, and network visualization using Gephi.”

“During this program, students will be participating in a research project applying some of the following methods, including but not limited to biostatistics using R or Stata, data visualization using QGIS or ArcGIS, and network visualization using Gephi.”

Special Call for Papers-Journal of Science Policy & Governance

The Journal of Science Policy & Governance recently announced a special call for papers “and competition to provide policymakers with a new perspective on how scientific expertise could be useful to the complex brew of 21st foreign policy and national security challenges, resulting in a special issue on Policy and Governance on Science, Technology and Global Security.” The journal invites “students, post-doctoral researchers, policy fellows, early career researchers and young professionals from around the world to submit op-eds, policy position papers and other articles addressing foreign policy and national security challenges. These include concerns about the use of nuclear or radiological weapons driven by the war in the Ukraine, hypersonic weapons, immigration driven by climate change, and emerging threats in cybersecurity and biosecurity.” The deadline for submission is April 30.

Additionally, there will be a science policy writing workshop on January 30 in addition to two webinars on February 20 and March 30 (one on Policy and Governance on Science and Technology and one on Foreign Policy and National Security, respectively) to help prospective authors prepare their submissions. Learn more about these events and register here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). For this week, our question is “On April 22, 1915, the German Army infamously unleashed more than 160 tons of chlorine gas on French trenches near which Belgian city?”

Shout out to Morgan M. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to “In 1985, an American extremist group’s compound was raided by more than 300 law enforcement officers from several federal, state, and local agencies following a three-day standoff. Among other items, officers seized about thirty gallons of potassium cyanide the group intended to use to poison water supplies of several cities. What was the name of this group?” is the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord.