This spring, the Schar School of Policy and Government’s Biodefense Graduate Program welcomes Dr. Sarah R. Carter as a new adjunct professor who will teach BIOD 610: AI and Biosecurity, the first graduate-level course of its kind in the country. Artificial intelligence is changing what researchers can do with biology and raising new questions about how those capabilities could be misused. For students interested in what happens when emerging technology meets public policy, Carter’s course offers an opportunity to examine these challenges with someone who has worked at that intersection firsthand.
What to Expect in the Classroom
The rise of AI has accelerated biological discovery while introducing new security risks. This course will examine several ways AI intersects with biosecurity, from chatbots that could provide technical “uplift” to someone working in a laboratory to biological design tools that predict pathogen properties or generate viral genomes. While these technologies can support beneficial applications, the same capabilities create new opportunities for misuse. This dual-use dilemma raises difficult questions about how to encourage scientific innovation while reducing risks. Students will examine the risks and evaluate how new AI governance efforts fit alongside existing frameworks, such as the Biological Weapons Convention and nucleic acid synthesis screening. The goal is to provide students with the analytical tools to evaluate emerging technologies, understand the limits of what is known about their risks, and make sense of the policy debates shaping their future. Whether students ultimately work in government, research, consulting, or the private sector, these questions are increasingly relevant to the future of biodefense and biosecurity.
Meet Dr. Carter
For students who come to the Biodefense Graduate Program hoping to bridge the gap between science and policy, Dr. Carter’s path is proof that a lab background is a foundation, not a detour. She holds a bachelor’s degree in biology from Duke University and a PhD in neuroscience from the University of California, San Francisco, where she worked in molecular biology. She knew early on that a career at the lab bench was not for her. “I felt like the more I learned, the less I knew,” she recalls, describing the experience as “learning more and more about less and less.” That led her to science policy fellowships: the Mirzayan Science and Technology Policy Fellowship at the National Academy of Sciences, which she recommends to any graduate student curious about policy, and then two years as an AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellow in the federal government. Early in her career, she worked on policy at the J. Craig Venter Institute and at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, where she was able to use her scientific training doing work that felt productive and fulfilling in a way that working at the lab bench had not.
Today, Dr. Carter is the principal of Science Policy Consulting LLC, where she focuses on the societal and policy implications of emerging biotechnologies, including responsible innovation, biosafety, and biosecurity. In recent years she has supported the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) on DNA synthesis screening and on the implications of AI for biosecurity and has also supported the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) to develop practical biosecurity approaches for higher risk biological AI tools.
She traces the moment AI landed on the biosecurity radar to two milestones: AlphaFold 2’s leap in protein structure prediction in 2020, and the release of ChatGPT in November 2022. The latter, she recalls, gave people the feeling that they were talking to “another entity” for the first time. By the spring of 2023 she was working with NTI on a project that produced a report on the convergence of AI and life sciences, covering where the risks come from and how to address them. It was among the earliest comprehensive efforts on the topic. For Dr. Carter, biosecurity has always been about the preventing the misuse of the tools used to engineer biology. Over the last 50 years, advancements in recombinant DNA, PCR, synthetic DNA, and CRISPR have brought new security concerns and prompted questions about how those capabilities might be misused. For Dr. Carter, AI is “the latest and greatest enabler of engineering biology, and one of the more chaotic.” That combination of scientific promise and security risk is at the heart of Dr. Carter’s work—and the questions she will bring to the classroom this spring.
Current students can enroll in the class starting October 27 by logging into Patriot Web. To learn more about the Schar School’s Biodefense Graduate Programs, including the MS, PhD, and graduate certificates, click here.
Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines GMU’s new graduate course on AI and Biosecurity with Dr. Sarah Carter, a critical analysis of OPCW funding shortfalls and global chemical security, and the latest news in global health security.
Wishing all our readers a safe and happy Halloween weekend!🎃
📣Interested in Graduate Study in Public Policy, Biodefense, or International Security?
The Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting a series of upcoming virtual information sessions for prospective master’s and PhD students. These interactive sessions offer a direct opportunity to learn about curriculum structure, career pathways in biodefense and policy, and the student experience at George Mason University.
In this Lawfarearticle, Dr. Gregory Koblentz warns that a severe financial crisis at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) – primarily caused by the United States withholding its $17 million annual dues – endangers vital global nonproliferation operations. Although the U.S. State Department officially prioritizes the OPCW as critical to national security, the agency faces a massive budget shortfall that has already led to hiring freezes, depleted reserves, and potential cutbacks in core missions. This funding strain directly threatens the OPCW’s high-stakes efforts to locate and destroy leftover chemical arsenals in post-Assad Syria, investigate Russia’s ongoing use of riot control agents in Ukraine, and address emerging threats in Sudan and Iran. Koblentz argues that fully and promptly paying U.S. contributions is essential to maintain international chemical security and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
GMU Biodefense Program Welcomes Dr. Sarah R. Carter to Teach Nation’s First AI and Biosecurity Course
This spring, GMU’s Schar School of Policy and Government welcomes Dr. Sarah R. Carter as an adjunct professor leading BIOD 610: AI and Biosecurity—the country’s first graduate-level course dedicated to this emerging field. Dr. Carter, Principal of Science Policy Consulting LLC and a former White House OSTP policy analyst, brings extensive expertise from her work with the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and CEPI on evaluating biological AI design tools and governance. The course will equip students to navigate dual-use technological risks, AI governance, and the evolving policy frameworks shaping modern biodefense. Current students can enroll via PatriotWeb. Read the full profile on The Pandora Reporthere.
On Thursday, October 22nd, Issues in Science and Technology’s editors held an Open Editorial Meeting on the topic of “Making Sense of Biosecurity in the Age of AI”. Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Associate Professor and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, and Mr. Edward H. You, Founder of EHY Consulting LLC. and former FBI Special Agent, were featured experts. Members of the biosecurity field tuned in from all over the world, including Jamaica, Pakistan, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom. The event was moderated by Issues’ Editor-In-Chief, Lisa Margonelli, and included multiple thought-provoking questions from the audience.
The event opened with the question of reviewing the biosecurity landscape post-9/11 and the influence of AI. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley addressed misunderstandings about bioweapons and fears about AI’s role in facilitating and de-skilling the bioweapon development process. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley cited historical programs, stating that many traditional barriers to bioweapons such as multidisciplinary team-building and tacit knowledge cannot be overcome with AI. It is important to determine which stage of weapons development AI is most impactful in, and then create policy to disrupt that stage. Mr. You agreed with Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and highlighted the lack of understanding around both AI learning and systems biology. These gaps open the door to unforeseen consequences of adopting AI models and prompting them. Mr. You also encouraged a more positive mentality of platforming examples of responsible AI usage and looking for ways to use AI to create solutions to biosecurity problems.
The conversation then shifted to detecting signals and biosecurity risks with a question from Issues’ Senior Editor Megan Nicholson. Mr. You identified the logistical component of bioweapon development as a source of potential leads for law enforcement. Mr. You also suggested that AI could be a beneficial tool, studying what normal e-commerce looks like and flagging concerning interactions and transactions. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley agreed that AI could be a useful tool for processing and detecting signals but also clarified that procurement does not equal capability. Having the tools and skilled individuals is not a guarantee of success for a bioweapons program. Tying into a question from the audience, Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley illustrated the need for tacit knowledge and experience using the example of the Iraqi bioweapons program. The Iraqi program had state resources to bring together educated virologists. However, the agent they wanted to use was bacterial, so the scientists had to spend several years studying bacteriology. AI could have been helpful in the process, but the output of the system would only be as useful as the user’s ability to vet the AI’s answers and troubleshoot issues. Mr. You agreed, saying the AI advantage would be limited. Mr. You also brought attention to the potential effects of AI on crime. Just as the internet changed the landscape of gambling, Mr. You suggested that AI and biological design tools could have a large impact on developing narcotics and other drugs.
During questions from the audience, concerns were raised about AI companies recording lab workers to unlock tacit knowledge. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Mr. You were not convinced that the recordings would be successful. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley added that biology is a hands-on discipline requiring hands-on practice and Mr. You clarified that recordings primarily capture mechanistic knowledge rather than tacit knowledge. Mr. You also addressed the need for diverse perspectives (i.e. biosafety, commerce, and logistics professionals) to be present when tackling biosecurity issues and spoke to the lack of a robust reporting mechanism for biosecurity threats following the dissolution of the WMD directorate at the FBI and loss of capabilities at ODNI and DHS.
Other audience concerns included the fear that AI might supercharge biology, pointing to the example of AI solving difficult mathematical formulas, and questions about regulating open-source models, which were used to develop novel phage viruses. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley spoke to the uniqueness of biology, which, unlike mathematical formulas, is influenced by multiple variables that cannot all be controlled. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley also pointed out that for biology, AI solutions must produce a direct application, not just theoretical concepts. Mr. You pushed the need for more education and training in biosecurity, including a shout-out to GMU’s Biodefense program. Mr. You also mentioned introducing bioethics concepts like the BWC in high school biology classes, increasing funding for basic research in biology, and training assessors to do proper risk assessments. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley added that IRB reviewers should also be educated before approving research that combines AI with biology.
The final question of the afternoon asked about AI and biosecurity on the international scale. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley spoke about Russia and China’s regulations over the exchange of biodata and who has sovereignty over it. Mr. You also spoke about China, sharing that while their overall investments in biotechnology are high, they lacked investment in risk assessment. Mr. You criticized the lack of a US biotechnology strategy, sharing concerns about data privacy and falling behind in the bioeconomy.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) bird flu cases are climbing nationwide. USDA reported 29 confirmations in the past 30 days in 11 commercial and 18 backyard flocks, affecting about 1.32 million birds. Turkey farms in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and North Dakota were impacted, and an Illinois egg farm lost nearly 934,600 hens, the month’s largest outbreak. On the West Coast, backyard flocks in California and Washington have tested positive, and wild Canada geese and white pelican infections have been detected, consistent with fall migration.
In Washington, routine surveillance identified H5N1 in a Benton County dairy herd, which has been placed under quarantine. Bird flu has spread rapidly through the state’s dairy industry, with case numbers jumping from nine to 27 in the last week, only three weeks after the state’s very first confirmed cattle infection on a Yakima County farm. State Veterinarian Amber Itle said, “Seeing the virus move to another county is disappointing,” but credited farmers’ biosecurity efforts, noting the virus was caught before cows became sick.
Screwworm Spreads as Border Reopenings Continue
Like bird flu, New World screwworm cases are also on the rise as the outbreak spreads to a third US state. USDA has confirmed 71 cases, 18 of them currently active, up from just two active cases a month ago. Recent detections include the first case in US wildlife, an elk harvested on a Texas game ranch, and a beef cow in New Mexico. On Wednesday, a maggot-infested dog was confirmed in Cochise County, Arizona, the state’s first detection.
The elk case raises the stakes since wildlife “don’t stop at fences or checkpoints,” as one industry report put it. The discovery raises questions and concerns about how far the flesh-eating parasite may have spread and complicates ongoing eradication efforts. Texas is redrawing its infested zone, and USDA and Texas Parks and Wildlife are expanding surveillance in response.
Even so, USDA is pressing ahead with reopening the border to Mexican cattle. The import halt tightened US cattle supplies and pushed beef prices to record highs, adding pressure to resume trade. Under a phased plan that began in Arizona in August, trade has restarted at three ports of entry in Arizona and New Mexico. Columbus, New Mexico, is scheduled to reopen to cattle next, followed by Nogales, Arizona at the end of November if conditions remain favorable. It’s unclear whether these new detections in Arizona and New Mexico may impact this timeline.
NEW: Gordon Research Seminar (GRS) on Chemical and Biological Defense
Saturday, February 27 – Sunday, February, 2027 | Ventura, CA
Held directly before the main Gordon Research Conference (see below), this two-day seminar, “Integrated Response Strategies for Complex Threats in Chemical and Biological Defense,” provides a unique forum for early-career researchers, doctoral students, and postdocs to present original work, discuss emerging threats, and build professional networks. Key topics include threat detection, characterization, and convergent approaches spanning in silico, in vitro, and in vivo models. The program features oral presentations, poster sessions, and a mentorship panel on “Career Pathways and Perspectives in Chemical and Biological Defense.” Abstract submission deadline for talk consideration is November 22, 2026; general applications close January 30, 2027.
NEW: Gordon Research Conference (GRC) on Chemical and Biological Defense
Sunday, February 28 – Friday, March 5, 2027 | Ventura, CA
Join international researchers, policy leaders, and scientists for a Gordon Research Conference, “The Convergence of In Silico, In Vitro, and In Vivo Models to Address the Divergent and Intersecting Profiles of Chemical and Biological Threats.” This five-day premier conference focuses on cutting-edge research in chemical and biological defense. Session topics include AI-accelerated science, agent-agnostic threat detection, attribution of CBRN events, medical countermeasure design, and biosecurity policy governance. Applications are due by January 31, 2027.
Hiding in Plain Sight: Mpox and the Cost of Neglecting Known Threats
Friday, October 30 | 9:00 – 10:15 am ET
From the Independent Panel: “For decades, mpox caused sporadic outbreaks in parts of West and Central Africa, but the disease was largely neglected by the international community. That neglect later produced not one, but two international emergencies. Today the virus has spread worldwide, with multiple variants now established in the human population. Through research and conversations with those working on mpox, the report seeks to answer how this happened and, more importantly, what it will take to prevent the same failures in future.”
Understanding Zoonotic Disease Risk in Violent and Conflict-Affected Places: Where Do We Go from Here? – A Talk
Friday, October 30 | 11:00 am – 12:00 pm ET
From Johns Hopkins: “The next pandemic will likely be caused by a zoonotic pathogen and will likely emerge in a place affected by conflict and violence. As such, disease spillover and spread will likely be affected by informal and extralegal economies, population displacement, distrust between people and governmental authorities, and failing health and disease surveillance systems. This talk will discuss findings and lessons learned from collaborative, interdisciplinary research on zoonotic disease risk among pastoralists in eastern Ethiopia and gather feedback on remaining questions and potential next steps.”
AI, Biosecurity, and Pandemic Preparedness in the Global South
Monday, November 2, from 8:00-9:30 AM ET
Medical Events Global is hosting a free 90-minute virtual workshop examining how artificial intelligence and emerging technologies are reshaping biological risk and what preparedness requires in the Global South. The panel will explore where biological risks are concentrated, the capabilities of AI-enabled biological design, operational preparedness, and approaches to governance. Confirmed speakers include Alex Kyabarongo, BIOD MS student at George Mason University, along with Rahul Nagvekar of Stanford University’s Department of Genetics and Adam Abdullahi of the Institute of Human Virology Nigeria and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.
After NSCEB: What Comes Next for U.S. Biotech Policy
Tuesday, November 17 | 2:00 – 6:00 pm ET
From the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB): “The Commission’s authority ends December 31. What it built is the beginning. Carrying it forward takes Congress, industry and capital. In April 2025, the Commission called for $15 billion over five years to secure American leadership in biotechnology. Join Commission leadership, members of Congress, founders and investors for an afternoon on who carries that work into 2027.”
Strengthening Biosafety and Biosecurity in Farm and Livestock Settings: A One Health Approach to Influenza Preparedness – Call for Experts
Sunday, November 8 | 11:59 PM ET
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) are seeking nominations for a 10–12-member volunteer expert committee to evaluate biosafety and biosecurity across commercial and informal livestock systems (poultry, swine, cattle). The study will focus on mitigating influenza spillover risks, identifying implementation challenges, and developing near-term (2–5 years) and long-term One Health recommendations for federal/state agencies and producers. Targeted expertise includes influenza research, pandemic preparedness, veterinary epidemiology, farm biosecurity, agricultural economics, behavioral science, and agricultural occupational health.
Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines Russia’s biological weapons legacy and the unanswered questions surrounding a laboratory worker’s death, alongside the latest developments in H5N1 avian influenza in wildlife and dairy cattle. It also explores U.S. pandemic preparedness, the future of biodefense policy, and emerging biological risks at the intersection of artificial intelligence and biotechnology.
📣Interested in Graduate Study in Public Policy, Biodefense, or International Security?
The Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting a series of upcoming virtual information sessions for prospective master’s and PhD students. These interactive sessions offer a direct opportunity to learn about curriculum structure, career pathways in biodefense and policy, and the student experience at George Mason University.
Figure 1. From top left, clockwise: Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Associate Professor and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University; Dr. Kevin Esvelt, Associate Professor at the MIT Media Lab and Director of the Sculpting Evolution Group; John Herbst, Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan; and Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, participate in the Atlantic Council and Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense’s virtual event, “Russia’s Bioweapons Legacy and the Plague Scare,” on October 19, 2026.
The discussion was moderated by John Herbst, Senior Director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council and former US Ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The featured experts were Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government; Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Associate Professor and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason; and Dr. Kevin Esvelt, Associate Professor at the MIT Media Lab and Director of the Sculpting Evolution Group. A full recording of the event is available on YouTube.
Koblentz opened the event by noting that while Moscow rejected any connection to plague and had early online mentions of the disease taken down, authorities isolated nearly 200 contacts and tested them repeatedly before formally telling the World Health Organization (WHO) that the woman had died of pneumonia of undetermined etiology. The central questions, he said, remain unanswered. If plague killed her, what laboratory mishap caused the exposure? If it was ordinary pneumonia, what justified such an aggressive and sweeping response? And was the secrecy merely a reflection of a police state under Putin, or an indication of something more troubling?
Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, who has studied anti-plague facilities in several post-Soviet states, traced the laboratory network to the Tsarist era, when it was created to counter endemic and imported cases of plague, tularemia, cholera, and hemorrhagic fevers. Though built for public health, its expertise drew it into Soviet biodefense projects, giving the institutes a genuine dual-use role as they developed diagnostics, vaccines, and countermeasures to protect soldiers and civilians. She warned that this past reveals little about the institutes today: after the Soviet collapse, their budgets shrank, and their workforce fell by as much as 80 percent. Buildings and equipment deteriorated, and most attempts at commercialization failed. Judging any institute’s current capabilities requires knowing which skills survived and whether Moscow is investing enough for it to recover.
Esvelt argued that the goal should be reducing overall public risk, which means rebuilding the trust eroded during COVID-19 by sharing information promptly. He noted that the majority of laboratory accidents do not pose an epidemic risk to the public, because most pathogens that are researched are not easily transmissible from human to human. However, because a young, healthy adult so rarely dies of pneumonia, he concluded that an infection contracted in the lab is the likeliest cause, and that Russia should have disclosed the pathogen and the safeguards it was putting in place.
Koblentz urged the audience to distinguish the Irkutsk case from Russia’s weapons program. Russia inherited the world’s largest biological weapons enterprise in 1991, keeping three military-run biological weapon facilities. Moscow started upgrading these facilities roughly ten years ago and began constructing a second BSL-4 laboratory about two years ago, none of which it has declared under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). He said it is these activities that warrant greater attention from the current administration and NATO.
Ben Ouagrham-Gormley added that, unlike the nuclear field, biology often has no clear line distinguishing beneficial research from weapons development, and that the BWC requires the adoption of a means of verification to shed light on Russian activities.
Esvelt noted that current sequencing technology means that Moscow is all but certain to know the lab tech’s cause of death, forcing outside observers to deduce it from Russia’s actions, which he judged did not match a routine plague case. In the United States, plague is easily treated with antibiotics for patients and their contacts. Lab staff are generally immunized, and labs know their strains’ antibiotic resistance profile. Given Russia’s silence, he cautioned, a weapons-related explanation, including an engineered strain, cannot be ruled out.
Koblentz offered a more likely explanation. Vaccine protection can be incomplete, and often laboratory staff do not realize they have been exposed by a breach in biosafety. since it is currently flu season in Siberia, the technician may have mistaken early symptoms for influenza, reaching the hospital only after the disease had outpaced antibiotics, which sanctions have made scarcer in Russia. The heavy-handed public health response, he contended, looks more like a police state responding to an embarrassment than evidence of something more sinister. Koblentz advised tempered analysis rooted in facts, plausible explanations and cautioned against speculation.
Ben Ouagrham-Gormley furthered the Russian contextualization of the scenario, noting that both the disease’s evolution and the government’s response are consistent with plague. She urged that judgments be grounded in existing evidence before turning to worst-case scenarios.
During the Q&A, Esvelt cautioned that currently biodefense lag behind what modern biotechnology makes possible. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley countered that strengthening the BWC and norms against biological weapons is a more constructive, positive route to address such events. Koblentz assessed Western preparedness as being insufficient and added that stronger BWC norms, while desirable, may be unrealistic under Putin. He continued that the West must therefore pair defense with deterrence, anchored in the ability to attribute outbreaks to their source, which requires investing in the kind of pathogen analysis that Esvelt conducts. He closed by arguing that the most effective step Washington could take to prompt Russian reporting to the WHO would be for the United States to rejoin to the organization.
Necropsy results released October 14 by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife showed that highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) was the primary cause of death for Jackie, a beloved bald eagle watched by livestream viewers online for more than a decade. Jackie and her mate, Shadow, occupied a nest in Big Bear Valley, California, for years. A nest camera installed in 2015 by the nonprofit Friends of Big Bear Valley let viewers worldwide follow the pair as they raised eaglets. Jackie, about 14, died in August after weeks of treatment at the Ojai Raptor Center in California.
Her care team was surprised by the diagnosis, as the presentation of her illness was atypical for HPAI. The virus caused a severe stomach ulcer, an unusual complication that led to internal bleeding, anemia, and bacterial sepsis. Pathologists at San Diego Zoo Wildlife Alliance found chronic disease in the ventriculus, the muscular part of a bird’s stomach, along with inflammation and blood clots in her heart and major blood vessels. Brodifacoum, a common anticoagulant rodenticide was identified on a toxicology screen of her liver, but necropsy findings suggested it did not cause her illness and death. West Nile virus and heavy metals, including lead, were also ruled out. The USDA’s National Veterinary Services Laboratories confirmed the infection, and Jackie’s remains were cremated to prevent further spread. Fortunately, Shadow, who remains in Big Bear, and the pair’s final eaglets together have shown no signs of illness. Eagles and other raptors are often exposed to HPAI through contact with infected birds or by consuming infected prey.
First Washington Dairy Cattle Cases Bring Human Infection
Last week’s Pandora Report reported that Washington state confirmed its first cases of HPAI in dairy cattle in early October. Since then, additional cases have been detected, bringing the state’s total number of new confirmed cases to 8 in the last 30 days. Now, a dairy worker has tested positive as well, the first human case of H5N1 in the United States this year.
The worker has mild illness and is isolating at home. Health officials are contacting close contacts, offering testing, and supplying protective equipment to affected farms. Public risk still remains low, and human-to-human transmission has never been documented in the US. Pasteurized milk and dairy products remain safe, though raw milk should be avoided. Officials recommend seasonal flu vaccination for people with animal exposure. The last confirmed human case of H5N1 in the US was in February 2025, though Washington detected the first ever human case of H5N5 globally last November.
GMU Biodefense Alum Calls for Modernizing U.S. Pandemic Preparedness
In a new commentary for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Sophia Hirshfield, a George Mason University Biodefense MS alumna and CSIS Associate Fellow, coauthors an analysis with Paul Friedrichs, Senior Fellow at RAND, marking the 25th anniversary of the 2001 anthrax attacks. The authors argue that the United States remains insufficiently prepared for evolving biological threats and urge Congress to reauthorize and modernize the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA). Their recommendations include strengthening biosurveillance, clarifying federal agency responsibilities during biological emergencies, improving oversight of AI-enabled biological risks, and investing in medical countermeasures and public health preparedness.
IN OTHER NEWS
U.S. Public Health Policy, Research Funding, and Vaccines
NEW: Hiding in Plain Sight: Mpox and the Cost of Neglecting Known Threats
Friday, October 30 | 9:00 – 10:15 am ET
From the Independent Panel: “For decades, mpox caused sporadic outbreaks in parts of West and Central Africa, but the disease was largely neglected by the international community. That neglect later produced not one, but two international emergencies. Today the virus has spread worldwide, with multiple variants now established in the human population. Through research and conversations with those working on mpox, the report seeks to answer how this happened and, more importantly, what it will take to prevent the same failures in future.”
Biosecurity & Pandemic Preparedness: Why We Need a Stronger Health Emergency Workforce
Friday, October 23 | 11:00 am ET
From the Pandemic Center Biosecurity Game Changer Fellows: “The current Ebola outbreak and other recent health emergencies have highlighted the critical role of a well-prepared health emergency workforce in preventing and responding to biological threats. This seminar will explore approaches to strengthening health emergency workforces, including workforce capacity, surge preparedness, coordination, and leadership, while drawing on practical lessons to support preparedness and response.”
From Diversified Solutions Incorporated (DSI Groups): “This event will bring together senior thought leaders and stakeholders from across DoW, Military Research Labs, Federal Government, Commercial Industry, & Academia to discuss how each are advancing biomanufacturing to enhance national security objectives, produce critical materials for defense applications, and strengthen the overall U.S. bioindustrial manufacturing base. Biomanufacturing is crucial for U.S. national security because it enables domestic production of critical materials, medicines, and defense supplies, reducing reliance on foreign adversaries, which in turn creates resilient supply chains for the military and economy.”
Milbank Quarterly Webinar – State Policy Levers for Infectious Disease Control
Thursday, October 29 | 1:00 – 2:00 pm ET
From Milbank Memorial Fund: “Major infectious disease outbreaks in 2026, including a multi-state measles surge, the iceberg lettuce-linked cyclosporiasis outbreak, and the hantavirus outbreak, underscore the importance of infectious disease control infrastructure. Join us for a Milbank Quarterly webinar with the authors of two articles about state infectious disease policy from our special issue, Disease Burden, Mortality, and Life Expectancy in the United States: What Can State Policymakers Do to Meet the Challenges?”
Frontiers in Synthetic Biology: SpudCells, Mirror Life and Societal Implications
Thursday, October 29, 3:00 PM ET
From the Consortium on Law and Values: “Advances in cell engineering and synthetic biology offer enormous potential benefits, while raising ethical and policy issues. SpudCell, the first synthetic cell that can grow and reproduce, built from non-living chemicals, was developed by a team at the University of Minnesota. Scientists have cautioned against creating organisms with molecules that are mirror images of the biological components of known life, as existing organisms would have no immune defenses. Join three experts on synthetic biology, biosecurity, and bioethics to explore how to realize the promise of synthetic biology while controlling potential risks.”
Understanding Zoonotic Disease Risk in Violent and Conflict-Affected Places: Where Do We Go from Here? – A Talk
Friday, October 30 | 11:00 am – 12:00 pm ET
From Johns Hopkins: “The next pandemic will likely be caused by a zoonotic pathogen and will likely emerge in a place affected by conflict and violence. As such, disease spillover and spread will likely be affected by informal and extralegal economies, population displacement, distrust between people and governmental authorities, and failing health and disease surveillance systems. This talk will discuss findings and lessons learned from collaborative, interdisciplinary research on zoonotic disease risk among pastoralists in eastern Ethiopia and gather feedback on remaining questions and potential next steps.”
AI, Biosecurity, and Pandemic Preparedness in the Global South
Monday, November 2, from 8:00-9:30 AM ET
Medical Events Global is hosting a free 90-minute virtual workshop examining how artificial intelligence and emerging technologies are reshaping biological risk and what preparedness requires in the Global South. The panel will explore where biological risks are concentrated, the capabilities of AI-enabled biological design, operational preparedness, and approaches to governance. Confirmed speakers include Alex Kyabarongo, BIOD MS student at George Mason University, along with Rahul Nagvekar of Stanford University’s Department of Genetics and Adam Abdullahi of the Institute of Human Virology Nigeria and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.
After NSCEB: What Comes Next for U.S. Biotech Policy
Tuesday, November 17 | 2:00 – 6:00 pm ET
From the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB): “The Commission’s authority ends December 31. What it built is the beginning. Carrying it forward takes Congress, industry and capital. In April 2025, the Commission called for $15 billion over five years to secure American leadership in biotechnology. Join Commission leadership, members of Congress, founders and investors for an afternoon on who carries that work into 2027.”
Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines mounting pressures on global biosecurity, from a funding crisis threatening the OPCW to new H5N1 detections in Washington state and proposed changes to federal biosafety oversight.
OPCW Funding Crisis Threatens Global Chemical Weapons Oversight
Former Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Ahmet Üzümcü, warns that delayed member-state contributions are jeopardizing the organization’s ability to monitor and prevent chemical weapons proliferation. As of October 13, the OPCW had received less than 65% of its assessed contributions for the year. The United States, which contributes over 20 percent of the budget, reportedly owes $17 million for 2026. Üzümcü highlights the organization’s continuing work to investigate chemical weapons use in Syria, address allegations in Ukraine and Sudan, and strengthen safeguards against emerging chemical threats, including those enabled by artificial intelligence. He urges the United States and other member states to meet their financial obligations to ensure the OPCW can continue protecting international security.
Washington State to Washington DC: Bird Flu Hits the Headlines
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 has been detected in dairy cattle in Washington state for the first time. After two years and over 7,000 negative surveillance tests for HPAI, the Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory detected the virus on two Yakima County dairy farms. The USDA’s National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) confirmed the results via PCR on October 8, 2026. Both farms are under quarantine with strict biosecurity measures in place, and veterinarians are working to treat the sick cows.
Officials stated pasteurized milk remains safe and no supply shortages are expected but advised that raw milk and other raw dairy products are unsafe for consumption. CDC and the Washington State Department of Health consider the risk to the general public to be low, though people working closely with infected animals are advised to wear personal protective equipment.
Dairy cattle in 19 states have been infected since the outbreak began in March 2024. In the last 30 days, Kansas and Texas have also had confirmed cases of H5N1 in dairy herds. Veterinary officials urged implementation of enhanced biosecurity efforts and prompt reporting of any symptoms. Unlike in poultry, whose mortality rate from bird flu is 75-100%, most cattle affected by HPAI recover in about six weeks with supportive care.
As efforts to strengthen biosecurity across agricultural sectors continue into the fall flu season, discussions surrounding H5N1 vaccines have again made the headlines. News outlets recently reported that a federal strategy for vaccinating poultry against the virus was shelved due to vaccine hesitancy within the Trump administration. Insiders told Politico that although USDA gave conditional approval for a poultry vaccine against H5N1, Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins was concerned the plan would conflict with HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s views on vaccines. Kennedy publicly disavowed vaccinating chickens in March 2025 and suggested letting the disease “run through the flock” to identify birds with natural immunity. Veterinary experts criticized that idea, warning it could give the virus more opportunities to mutate. Rollins reportedly still urged the importance of a comprehensive vaccination strategy and directed USDA veterinary services staff to develop an internal plan. Although the strategy’s technical and communication components were reportedly ready by summer 2025, the final document was ultimately shared with fewer than a dozen people. At this time, USDA has not indicated that it plans to begin vaccinating domestic poultry against H5N1 in the near future.
NIH Seeks Public Comment on Draft Biosafety Policy
NIH has issued a request for public comment on its Draft Biosafety Policy for Research Involving Biohazards (Biosafety Policy). In September 2025, NIH announced its intention to strengthen and modernize biosafety oversight. Since then, NIH has extensively engaged stakeholders to inform the development of a new oversight paradigm better calibrated to risk. NIH invites stakeholders to provide feedback on the Draft Biosafety Policy and the associated Draft Incident Reporting Template and Draft Meeting Minutes Template. Comments must be submitted through the online portal and will be accepted until October 19. To further assist stakeholders in interpreting the Draft Biosafety Policy, NIH has also developed a summary table of proposed changes. Questions may be sent to SciencePolicy@od.nih.gov.
NEW:Biosecurity & Pandemic Preparedness: Why We Need a Stronger Health Emergency Workforce
Friday, October 23 | 11:00 am ET
From the Pandemic Center Biosecurity Game Changer Fellows: “The current Ebola outbreak and other recent health emergencies have highlighted the critical role of a well-prepared health emergency workforce in preventing and responding to biological threats. This seminar will explore approaches to strengthening health emergency workforces, including workforce capacity, surge preparedness, coordination, and leadership, while drawing on practical lessons to support preparedness and response.”
Cross-Sector Collaborations to Counter Deliberate Biothreats – A Webinar Series
Thursday, October 22 | 8:00 – 9:00 pm Singapore Time or 8:00 – 9:00 am ET
From Asia Centre for Health Security (ACHS): “Deliberate biothreats present complex challenges that cannot be addressed by health or security sectors acting alone. Effective prevention, detection, and response to biological threats require sustained intersectoral coordination, including across public health, animal health, law enforcement, and defense. Mr. Trevor Smith will speak from his extensive experience with Global Affairs Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program in international weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat reduction initiatives. We will explore how partnerships across sectors and countries can strengthen resilient systems to counter current and emerging deliberate biothreats.”
From Diversified Solutions Incorporated (DSI Groups): “This event will bring together senior thought leaders and stakeholders from across DoW, Military Research Labs, Federal Government, Commercial Industry, & Academia to discuss how each are advancing biomanufacturing to enhance national security objectives, produce critical materials for defense applications, and strengthen the overall U.S. bioindustrial manufacturing base. Biomanufacturing is crucial for U.S. national security because it enables domestic production of critical materials, medicines, and defense supplies, reducing reliance on foreign adversaries, which in turn creates resilient supply chains for the military and economy.”
Milbank Quarterly Webinar – State Policy Levers for Infectious Disease Control
Thursday, October 29 | 1:00 – 2:00 pm ET
From Milbank Memorial Fund: “Major infectious disease outbreaks in 2026, including a multi-state measles surge, the iceberg lettuce-linked cyclosporiasis outbreak, and the hantavirus outbreak, underscore the importance of infectious disease control infrastructure. Join us for a Milbank Quarterly webinar with the authors of two articles about state infectious disease policy from our special issue, Disease Burden, Mortality, and Life Expectancy in the United States: What Can State Policymakers Do to Meet the Challenges?”
Frontiers in Synthetic Biology: SpudCells, Mirror Life and Societal Implications
Thursday, October 29, 3:00 PM ET
From the Consortium on Law and Values: “Advances in cell engineering and synthetic biology offer enormous potential benefits, while raising ethical and policy issues. SpudCell, the first synthetic cell that can grow and reproduce, built from non-living chemicals, was developed by a team at the University of Minnesota. Scientists have cautioned against creating organisms with molecules that are mirror images of the biological components of known life, as existing organisms would have no immune defenses. Join three experts on synthetic biology, biosecurity, and bioethics to explore how to realize the promise of synthetic biology while controlling potential risks.”
Understanding Zoonotic Disease Risk in Violent and Conflict-Affected Places: Where Do We Go from Here? – A Talk
Friday, October 30 | 11:00 am – 12:00 pm ET
From Johns Hopkins: “The next pandemic will likely be caused by a zoonotic pathogen and will likely emerge in a place affected by conflict and violence. As such, disease spillover and spread will likely be affected by informal and extralegal economies, population displacement, distrust between people and governmental authorities, and failing health and disease surveillance systems. This talk will discuss findings and lessons learned from collaborative, interdisciplinary research on zoonotic disease risk among pastoralists in eastern Ethiopia and gather feedback on remaining questions and potential next steps.”
AI, Biosecurity, and Pandemic Preparedness in the Global South
Monday, November 2, from 8:00-9:30 AM ET
Medical Events Global is hosting a free 90-minute virtual workshop examining how artificial intelligence and emerging technologies are reshaping biological risk and what preparedness requires in the Global South. The panel will explore where biological risks are concentrated, the capabilities of AI-enabled biological design, operational preparedness, and approaches to governance. Confirmed speakers include Alex Kyabarongo, BIOD MS student at George Mason University, along with Rahul Nagvekar of Stanford University’s Department of Genetics and Adam Abdullahi of the Institute of Human Virology Nigeria and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.
After NSCEB: What Comes Next for U.S. Biotech Policy
Tuesday, November 17 | 2:00 – 6:00 pm ET
From the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB): “The Commission’s authority ends December 31. What it built is the beginning. Carrying it forward takes Congress, industry and capital. In April 2025, the Commission called for $15 billion over five years to secure American leadership in biotechnology. Join Commission leadership, members of Congress, founders and investors for an afternoon on who carries that work into 2027.”
Chief of Staff for the Responsible AIxBio Collaboration – Job Opening
From the R-ABC: “We are a new nonprofit working to make the world a safer place by reducing the misuse risk of AI-enabled biological tools. We do that by catalyzing and accelerating governance for AI x bio: bringing into being the standards and shared resources that don’t exist yet. Our stakeholders are the world-leading frontier companies, platforms, and research groups building AI for the life sciences. We work with them directly, not around them. R-ABC was founded in 2026 and is still small.”
Fellowship for Ending Bioweapons – Call for Applications
Monday, October 19
From the Council on Strategic Risks: “Whether biological threats arise naturally, by accident, or through a deliberate effort to weaponize pathogens, risks posed by biological threats are grave risks to international security and stability. The urgency for mitigating this area of catastrophic risks is driven home by the growing convergence of artificial intelligence and biological sciences, which may simplify pathways to the development of biological weapons and can spur the creation of novel pathogens.”
Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines unanswered questions surrounding a Russian plague lab researcher’s death, persistent gaps in U.S. biodefense preparedness, and new research challenging assumptions about H5N1’s ability to infect humans.
📢Interested in Graduate Study in Public Policy, Biodefense, or International Security?
The Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting a series of upcoming Faculty Information Sessions for prospective master’s and graduate certificate students. These interactive sessions offer a direct opportunity to learn about curriculum structure, career pathways in biodefense and policy, and the student experience at George Mason University.
A Plague Lab Worker Died in Russia. The WHO Still Wants Answers.
By Carmen Shaw, Managing Editor, The Pandora Report | PhD Biodefense, GMU
Figure 1. A researcher works inside a biosafety cabinet at a high-containment laboratory. (Credit: Pexels)
The death of a 28-year-old laboratory researcher at a Russian anti-plague research institute has raised questions from the international community about lab safety and transparency. Darya Shipilova, who worked at the Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute of Siberia and Far East, died on October 2 from pneumonia of unknown origin, according to Russian authorities. Media reports have suggested that a broken test tube containing Yersinia pestis, the bacterium that causes plague, may have been involved, but this has not been independently confirmed, and Russian officials have denied that plague caused her death. Authorities initially placed approximately 200 of her contacts under quarantine or medical observation. On October 7, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said that the WHO lacked sufficient information to conduct a full risk assessment and was seeking clarification about reports of a second employee with unexplained pneumonia.
Russian officials have since denied reports of a second case, stating that checks of Shipilova’s contacts found no evidence of dangerous pathogens. The cause of her death has not been definitively established publicly. Although a laboratory accident has not been confirmed and WHO has assessed the broader risk as low, the case highlights the challenges of assessing potential biological exposures when information is limited. For the biodefense community, the incident underscores the importance of transparent reporting, effective laboratory biosafety and biosecurity measures, and timely international communication when dealing with biorisks.
AI Biosecurity Risks Must Not Distract from Persistent Biodefense Gaps
In a new commentary for Nature, CEO of the Global Health Security Network (GHSN) and GMU’s BIOD 2019 alumna and Assistant Professor, Saskia Popescu, argues that growing concerns about AI-enabled biological threats must not overshadow longstanding vulnerabilities in biodefense and public health preparedness. Twenty-five years after the 2001 anthrax attacks, Popescu highlights persistent gaps in biosurveillance, oversight of private laboratories, bioattribution, and outbreak response. She calls for stronger government regulation, stronger monitoring processes, and robust safeguards. Read more here.
Lentzos and Lim Challenge Worst-Case Biological Warfare Scenarios
In a new analysis for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Filippa Lentzos and Yong-Bee Lim, GMU Biodefense 2021 alum, challenge the assumptions underpinning Annie Jacobsen’s bestselling book Biological War: A Scenario. The authors argue that the book’s catastrophic scenario stacks worst-case assumptions about pathogen transmissibility, blurred distinctions between dual-use research and weaponization, and overstating what AI changes about biological weapons development, making it a somewhat narrow-minded guide for assessing plausible biological threats. Their analysis highlights the importance of evidence-based threat assessments over sensationalized scenarios when shaping biological security policy.
A recent report published in the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) revealed the results of unannounced drills assessing the readiness of healthcare facilities to respond to a potential infectious disease outbreak. Between January and June 2026, 73 unannounced “mystery patient” drills were conducted in emergency departments, outpatient clinics, and urgent care centers in New Jersey, New York, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Professional actors presented with symptoms consistent with avian influenza A(H5), including simulated conjunctivitis, but without travel-related exposure.
Results were mixed. Symptom screening occurred in 93% of drills and travel history was obtained in nearly 80%, yet only 10% of the time did staff ask about exposure history specific to H5, such as contact with birds or livestock. Although fewer than half of the drills hit the target times of 1 minute for masking (43.1%) and 10 minutes for isolation (48.1%), the median times of 2 minutes and 11 minutes, respectively, were still very close. Concerningly, clinicians wore all recommended personal protective equipment (PPE) in only a quarter of encounters, and in 6% of encounters wore no PPE at all.
Overall, 44/73 drills (60.3%) were deemed successful because both patient masking and isolation were completed. The patient actor was identified as being at risk for avian influenza in 63.4% drills. Urgent care centers were slowest to mask patients, and outpatient clinics slowest to isolate them. The authors recommend role-specific training for front-line staff, such as receptionists and security, who are often first to meet patients, and updated screening protocols that reflect zoonotic exposure routes.
What Scientists Found in Canada’s First Human H5N1 Case
In November 2024, a teenager in British Columbia (B.C.) became critically ill with H5N1, Canada’s first human case. Sequencing by the B.C. Centre for Disease Control revealed two unusual mutations in the surface protein the virus uses to attach to cells. A similar mutation was later found in the Louisiana patient who died in the United States in January 2025, causing experts to speculate that these mutations may allow H5N1 to better infect humans. However, a University of British Columbia team tested that idea in a study published in Nature Communications and, surprisingly, found the opposite.
Using cryo-electron microscopy, they mapped the mutated protein at near-atomic detail and found the mutations actually weakened binding to human receptors. The protein could still trigger fusion with the cell membrane, the step that lets viral genetic material enter, though with far less efficiently than other H5N1 strains tested. The researchers suggest that many weak interactions may add up to enough attachment for infection. This case, in which the patient fully recovered, shows why infectious disease surveillance and research systems need to work together to assess emerging threats. Ongoing genetic surveillance can rapidly detect changes in a virus, and sustained laboratory capacity to investigate those changes helps scientists and public health officials separate meaningful warning signs from those that only look concerning on paper.
Publication Highlights: Global Molecular Detection of Influenza
GMU Biodefense PhD student Dara Russell, MPH, has published a new article in the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Division’s Medical Surveillance Monthly Report (MSMR) comparing influenza surveillance data from the U.S. Department of War’s Global Emerging Infections Surveillance (GEIS) program with the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) from 2025 through 2026. Read the full September 2026 report here.
IN OTHER NEWS
Infectious Disease Outbreaks and Public Health Preparedness
NEW:Milbank Quarterly Webinar – State Policy Levers for Infectious Disease Control
Thursday, October 29 | 1:00 – 2:00 pm ET
From Milbank Memorial Fund: “Major infectious disease outbreaks in 2026, including a multi-state measles surge, the iceberg lettuce-linked cyclosporiasis outbreak, and the hantavirus outbreak, underscore the importance of infectious disease control infrastructure. Join us for a Milbank Quarterly webinar with the authors of two articles about state infectious disease policy from our special issue, Disease Burden, Mortality, and Life Expectancy in the United States: What Can State Policymakers Do to Meet the Challenges?”
NEW:Understanding Zoonotic Disease Risk in Violent and Conflict-Affected Places: Where Do We Go from Here? – A Talk
Friday, October 30 | 11:00 am – 12:00 pm ET
From Johns Hopkins: “The next pandemic will likely be caused by a zoonotic pathogen and will likely emerge in a place affected by conflict and violence. As such, disease spillover and spread will likely be affected by informal and extralegal economies, population displacement, distrust between people and governmental authorities, and failing health and disease surveillance systems. This talk will discuss findings and lessons learned from collaborative, interdisciplinary research on zoonotic disease risk among pastoralists in eastern Ethiopia and gather feedback on remaining questions and potential next steps.”
NEW:After NSCEB: What Comes Next for U.S. Biotech Policy
Tuesday, November 17 | 2:00 – 6:00 pm ET
From the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB): “The Commission’s authority ends December 31. What it built is the beginning. Carrying it forward takes Congress, industry and capital. In April 2025, the Commission called for $15 billion over five years to secure American leadership in biotechnology. Join Commission leadership, members of Congress, founders and investors for an afternoon on who carries that work into 2027.”
Training Course on ‘Biotechnology Innovation and Biosecurity’
October 12-16 in New Delhi, India
From the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit: “This training focuses on strengthening capacities in biosecurity, biosafety, and biological risk management in the context of rapid advances in biotechnology with an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to manage biothreats at the intersection of humans, animals, plants and the environment. It addresses the governance, technical, and operational dimensions of preventing, detecting, and responding to biological threats, while promoting responsible and peaceful scientific research and innovation in accordance with Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).”
Cross-Sector Collaborations to Counter Deliberate Biothreats – A Webinar Series
Thursday, October 22 | 8:00 – 9:00 pm Singapore Time or 8:00 – 9:00 am ET
From Asia Centre for Health Security (ACHS): “Deliberate biothreats present complex challenges that cannot be addressed by health or security sectors acting alone. Effective prevention, detection, and response to biological threats require sustained intersectoral coordination, including across public health, animal health, law enforcement, and defense. Mr. Trevor Smith will speak from his extensive experience with Global Affairs Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program in international weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat reduction initiatives. We will explore how partnerships across sectors and countries can strengthen resilient systems to counter current and emerging deliberate biothreats.”
From Diversified Solutions Incorporated (DSI Groups): “This event will bring together senior thought leaders and stakeholders from across DoW, Military Research Labs, Federal Government, Commercial Industry, & Academia to discuss how each are advancing biomanufacturing to enhance national security objectives, produce critical materials for defense applications, and strengthen the overall U.S. bioindustrial manufacturing base. Biomanufacturing is crucial for U.S. national security because it enables domestic production of critical materials, medicines, and defense supplies, reducing reliance on foreign adversaries, which in turn creates resilient supply chains for the military and economy.”
Frontiers in Synthetic Biology: SpudCells, Mirror Life and Societal Implications
Thursday, October 29, 3:00 PM ET
From the Consortium on Law and Values: “Advances in cell engineering and synthetic biology offer enormous potential benefits, while raising ethical and policy issues. SpudCell, the first synthetic cell that can grow and reproduce, built from non-living chemicals, was developed by a team at the University of Minnesota. Scientists have cautioned against creating organisms with molecules that are mirror images of the biological components of known life, as existing organisms would have no immune defenses. Join three experts on synthetic biology, biosecurity, and bioethics to explore how to realize the promise of synthetic biology while controlling potential risks.”
AI, Biosecurity, and Pandemic Preparedness in the Global South
Monday, November 2, from 8:00-9:30 AM ET
Medical Events Global is hosting a free 90-minute virtual workshop examining how artificial intelligence and emerging technologies are reshaping biological risk and what preparedness requires in the Global South. The panel will explore where biological risks are concentrated, the capabilities of AI-enabled biological design, operational preparedness, and approaches to governance. Confirmed speakers include Alex Kyabarongo,BIOD MS student at George Mason University and former member of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BWC ISU) and NTI bio team, along with Rahul Nagvekar of Stanford University’s Department of Genetics and Adam Abdullahi of the Institute of Human Virology Nigeria and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.
NEW:Chief of Staff for the Responsible AIxBio Collaboration – Job Opening
From the R-ABC: “We are a new nonprofit working to make the world a safer place by reducing the misuse risk of AI-enabled biological tools. We do that by catalyzing and accelerating governance for AI x bio: bringing into being the standards and shared resources that don’t exist yet. Our stakeholders are the world-leading frontier companies, platforms, and research groups building AI for the life sciences. We work with them directly, not around them. R-ABC was founded in 2026 and is still small.”
Fellowship for Ending Bioweapons – Call for Applications
Monday, October 19
From the Council on Strategic Risks: “Whether biological threats arise naturally, by accident, or through a deliberate effort to weaponize pathogens, risks posed by biological threats are grave risks to international security and stability. The urgency for mitigating this area of catastrophic risks is driven home by the growing convergence of artificial intelligence and biological sciences, which may simplify pathways to the development of biological weapons and can spur the creation of novel pathogens.”
Director, Global Biological Policy and Programs – Job Opening
From the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI): “NTI – a nonprofit, nonpartisan global security organization focused on reducing nuclear, biological, and emerging technology threats imperiling humanity – is seeking a Director to join the Global Biological Policy and Programs team. The NTI | bio team is focused on reducing catastrophic biological risks, and we are working toward this goal by strengthening biotechnology governance; bolstering biosecurity in countries around the world; strengthening international capabilities to uphold the norm against bioweapon development and use; driving progress in Global Health Security; and building the biosecurity field.”
Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines the fallout from the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Meeting on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response, where Member States did not endorse a negotiated Political Declaration; questions surrounding the U.S. response to an H5N1 outbreak at a Utah mink farm; and calls to maintain U.S. support for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
📢Interested in Graduate Study in Public Policy, Biodefense, or International Security?
The Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting a series of upcoming Faculty Information Sessions for prospective master’s and graduate certificate students. These interactive sessions offer a direct opportunity to learn about curriculum structure, career pathways in biodefense and policy, and the student experience at George Mason University.
Biodefense MS Information Session on October 9 at 12:00 PM ET: Prospective students interested in the Biodefense MS program are invited to attend a virtual session with BIOD faculty and Program Director Greg Koblentz. The session will cover the program, application process, student experience, and graduate outcomes.
UNGA81: Pandemic Preparedness Takes Center Stage – But Declaration Stalls
At the UN General Assembly’s 81st session, pandemic preparedness and response (PPPR) remained a major focus amid the ongoing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On September 25, Member States convened the second UN High-Level Meeting on PPPR, where leaders discussed progress since the COVID-19 pandemic and the work still needed to strengthen global preparedness.
The Political Declaration negotiated ahead of the meeting was not endorsed at the High-Level Meeting, despite calls from the Friends of the HLM and others for Member States to adopt it. The President of the General Assembly said the declaration will instead move to the General Assembly for consideration, although a date has not yet been announced. The Independent Panel and Friends of the PPPR HLM are urging the President of the General Assembly and Member States to advance the declaration and move quickly to address remaining gaps in pandemic preparedness.
GMU Biodefense Student Represents G20 Youth (Y20) at UNGA81 Event
Participants in the “Diverse Voices, Shared Challenges, & Goals” session during UNGA81 in New York City. From left: Richard Ponzio (T20 U.S. 2026), Anne Simmons-Benton (W20 U.S. 2026), Gary Litman (U.S. Chamber of Commerce), Christine Sequenzia (Bread for the World), Mark Mittelhauser (Labor20 U.S. 2026), Sarah Howard (Values20 U.S. 2026), Carmen Shaw (Y20 U.S. 2026), and Reon Van Der Merwe (WINGS).
Carmen Shaw, PhD student in Biodefense at George Mason University, participated as the U.S. Head Delegate for the G20 Youth (Y20) Food Security and Global Health track at a UNGA81 event on Friday, September 25. The discussion, “Engaging Diverse Voices in the G20 U.S. for Better Policymaking and Action in Uncertain Times,” brought together representatives from the G20 engagement groups and senior officials to discuss global priorities ahead of the 2026 G20 Summit. Shaw joined representatives from the T20, W20, Labor20, Values20, and other engagement groups to discuss the digital divide, youth priorities, and what success should look like for the U.S. G20 presidency.
Questions Raised over Utah’s H5N1 Mink Outbreak Response
In September, USDA confirmed highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 outbreaks in 13 commercial farms and seven backyard flocks, affecting a total of 600,000 birds. Over half of these birds (~338,000) were at commercial turkey facilities in Minnesota, but the largest individual outbreak involved nearly 80,000 birds at a Wisconsin turkey operation. Other states with confirmed cases included North and South Dakota, Idaho, and Iowa. Minnesota also recorded at least 40 detections in wild birds, including mallards, Canada geese, and bald eagles.
In other news, particular concern has centered on an H5N1 outbreak at a Utah mink farm, the first documented outbreak in captive mink in the U.S. Following confirmation of H5N1 on the farm in mid-August 2026, state records indicated that officials considered vaccination, depopulation, or continued monitoring. Without intervention, the farm owner expected to lose 80% of their mink to the outbreak. Utah officials placed the facility under a hold to restrict activity and notified state health authorities, but due to the relative novelty of H5N1 infection in farmed mink and a lack of defined protocols to follow, agriculture officials have been limited in their response capacity. An H5N1 vaccine approved for animals exists, but it cannot be used without authorization from USDA Secretary Brooke Rollins. However, no decision has been made.
Response to the situation has drawn sharp criticism from veterinary and animal-welfare organizations, who have called for authorities to disclose more information. Previous H5N1 detections on European mink and fur farms, including a 2022 outbreak in Spain and a 2023 outbreak in Finland, suggested mink-to-mink transmission and mutations associated with mammalian adaptation. Extensive investigation, culling, and surveillance occurred in response. In contrast, it has been over a month since the H5N1 detection in Utah, yet limited information has been communicated to the public, including even the county of the affected farm. Multiple groups have now called on federal and state authorities to disclose information about herd size, mortality, worker exposure, possible mink-to-mink transmission, the suspected source of infection, and viral sequencing. They argue that detailed sequencing and epidemiologic investigation of the Utah outbreak could help determine whether the cases resulted from independent animal exposures or transmission within the farm, information which could be critical to guide surveillance for other potential mammalian outbreaks as H5N1 continues to spread globally.
The Trump Administration has refused to pay the United States’ assessed contribution to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Nobel Peace Prize-winning organization responsible for preventing the proliferation and use of chemcial weapons. Professor Gregory Koblenz, director of the Biodefense Graduate Program and a member of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation’s Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Security has written a letter, co-signed by 18 leading experts on chemical weapons and non-proliferation from across the political spectrum, on the importance of funding the OPCW. The OPCW has historically enjoyed strong bipartisan support in the United States. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention was drafted during the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and ratified by the Republican-controlled Senate in 1997. This is no time to shortchange the OPCW. The global chemical weapon landscape remains complex and challenging. The OPCW is currently engaged in operations in Syria and Ukraine and new missions involving Sudan and Cambodia/Thailand are on the horizon. The letter urges the United States to pay its assessed contribution as soon as possible to avoid any disruption to the OPCW’s activities, which are vital to U.S. national security.
NEW: Cross-Sector Collaborations to Counter Deliberate Biothreats – A Webinar Series
From Asia Centre for Health Security (ACHS): “Deliberate biothreats present complex challenges that cannot be addressed by health or security sectors acting alone. Effective prevention, detection, and response to biological threats require sustained intersectoral coordination, including across public health, animal health, law enforcement, and defense. Mr. Trevor Smith will speak from his extensive experience with Global Affairs Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program in international weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat reduction initiatives. We will explore how partnerships across sectors and countries can strengthen resilient systems to counter current and emerging deliberate biothreats.”
This webinar will be held on October 22 from 8:00-9:00 pm Singapore Time (GMT+08:00). Learn more and register here.
NEW: AI, Biosecurity, and Pandemic Preparedness in the Global South
Medical Events Global is hosting a free 90-minute virtual workshop examining how artificial intelligence and emerging technologies are reshaping biological risk and what preparedness requires in the Global South. The panel will explore where biological risks are concentrated, the capabilities of AI-enabled biological design, operational preparedness, and approaches to governance. Confirmed speakers include Alex Kyabarongo, BIOD MS student at George Mason University and former member of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BWC ISU) and NTI bio team, along with Rahul Nagvekar of Stanford University’s Department of Genetics and Adam Abdullahi of the Institute of Human Virology Nigeria and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.
This virtual workshop will take place on Monday, November 2, from 8:00-9:30 AM ET. Learn more and register here.
Training Course on ‘Biotechnology Innovation and Biosecurity’
From the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit: “This training focuses on strengthening capacities in biosecurity, biosafety, and biological risk management in the context of rapid advances in biotechnology with an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to manage biothreats at the intersection of humans, animals, plants and the environment. It addresses the governance, technical, and operational dimensions of preventing, detecting, and responding to biological threats, while promoting responsible and peaceful scientific research and innovation in accordance with article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).”
This in-person event will be held from October 12-16 in New Delhi, India. Learn more and apply here.
Biomanufacturing for Defense & Security Summit
From Diversified Solutions Incorporated (DSI Groups): “This event will bring together senior thought leaders and stakeholders from across DoW, Military Research Labs, Federal Government, Commercial Industry, & Academia to discuss how each are advancing biomanufacturing to enhance national security objectives, produce critical materials for defense applications, and strengthen the overall U.S. bioindustrial manufacturing base. Biomanufacturing is crucial for U.S. national security because it enables domestic production of critical materials, medicines, and defense supplies, reducing reliance on foreign adversaries, which in turn creates resilient supply chains for the military and economy.”
This event will take place from October 27-28 at the National Harbor, MD. Learn more and register here.
Frontiers in Synthetic Biology: SpudCells, Mirror Life and Societal Implications
From the Consortium on Law and Values: “Advances in cell engineering and synthetic biology offer enormous potential benefits, while raising ethical and policy issues. SpudCell, the first synthetic cell that can grow and reproduce, built from non-living chemicals, was developed by a team at the University of Minnesota. Scientists have cautioned against creating organisms with molecules that are mirror images of the biological components of known life, as existing organisms would have no immune defenses. Join three experts on synthetic biology, biosecurity, and bioethics to explore how to realize the promise of synthetic biology while controlling potential risks.”
This webinar will take place on Thursday, October 29, at 3:00 PM ET. Learn more and register here.
NEW: Fellowship for Ending Bioweapons – Call for Applications
From the Council on Strategic Risks: “Whether biological threats arise naturally, by accident, or through a deliberate effort to weaponize pathogens, risks posed by biological threats are grave risks to international security and stability. The urgency for mitigating this area of catastrophic risks is driven home by the growing convergence of artificial intelligence and biological sciences, which may simplify pathways to the development of biological weapons and can spur the creation of novel pathogens.”
Learn more and submit your application by October 19 here.
Director, Global Biological Policy and Programs – Job Opening
From the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI): “NTI – a nonprofit, nonpartisan global security organization focused on reducing nuclear, biological, and emerging technology threats imperiling humanity – is seeking a Director to join the Global Biological Policy and Programs team. The NTI | bio team is focused on reducing catastrophic biological risks, and we are working toward this goal by strengthening biotechnology governance; bolstering biosecurity in countries around the world; strengthening international capabilities to uphold the norm against bioweapon development and use; driving progress in Global Health Security; and building the biosecurity field.”
Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines ongoing international efforts to demilitarize Syria’s residual chemical weapons arsenal and seek accountability, community feedback on new U.S. implementation guidance for high-risk life sciences research, and new WHO global training tools on dual-use research oversight.
📢Interested in Graduate Study in Public Policy, Biodefense, or International Security?
The Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting a series of upcoming Faculty Information Sessions for prospective master’s and graduate certificate students. These interactive sessions offer a direct opportunity to learn about curriculum structure, career pathways in biodefense and policy, and the student experience at George Mason University.
Virtual Briefing: Syria’s Chemical Weapons Legacy – Current Issues and Challenges
Fifteen years after the forces of deposed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad used banned nerve agents outside Damascus, killing more than 1,200 people, Syria’s new government and the international community are working to address the deadly legacies of the civil war. The video recording for last week’s briefing on Syria’s Chemical Weapons Legacy: Current Issues and Challenges, moderated by Biodefense Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz, is now available online. Hosted in partnership with the Arms Control Association Inc., the panel features expert remarks from Amb. Katoub, former OPCW Director-General Amb. Ahmet Üzümcü, Fadel Abdulghany from the Syrian Network for Human Rights, and Richard Yates, the UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the OPCW on demilitarization, victim support, and accountability. Watch the full recording here.
A recently published study led by Arizona State University professor Matthew Scotch, found that the D1.1 variant of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, the avian influenza strain driving the global bird flu outbreak over the last several years, circulated undetected in North American wild birds for roughly three months before it was first identified in September 2024. By comparing Arizona samples against thousands of viral sequences nationwide, the team traced the virus’s spread in a west-to-east pattern, moving from the Pacific Flyway into the Central, then the Mississippi, and finally the Atlantic, with each region shifting between acting as a source or sink for transmission over the course of the fall migration. Notably, the Arizona samples lack the Q226L mutation linked to a shift toward binding human-type receptors, though Scotch cautioned the virus is still continually evolving. This avian influenza strain has already caused human infections, including the first U.S. death linked to H5N1, in Louisiana in early 2025. Looking ahead to the next migration season, Scotch recommends sequencing unusual detections more rapidly, strengthening genomic surveillance in the weeks before and during migration, and connecting surveillance across wildlife, poultry, and mammals under a unified “One Health” framework, with regions sharing data in real time rather than waiting until infection numbers rise.
Despite the need to strengthen surveillance and rapid data reporting for bird flu, some experts note it is easier said than done. Alveo Technologies is nearing USDA approval for a barn-side test for poultry that delivers results in 45 minutes from a single throat swab. The device uses a chemistry process that skips some of the steps required for PCR and validation reports 100 percent specificity against 12 influenza A strains and 19 non-influenza organisms. Since February 2022, bird flu has hit nearly 2,000 U.S. poultry premises and cost more than 185 million birds. The technology is paired with a predictive tool, UC Davis epidemiologist Maurice Pitesky’s Waterfowl Alert Network, which predicts daily waterfowl abundance around commercial poultry farms using empirical bird flu detections, weather radar, satellite imagery and telemetry. However, accessible detection alone is not the issue, reporting is. Only about 1,500 of the roughly 160,000 farms covered by the Network have opted in, leaving data too coarse to connect individual farm outbreaks to nearby waterfowl activity. Pitesky noted it is a collective-action problem that could be better addressed by giving farms a secure, confidential channel to share their data with researchers and suggests USDA consider withholding indemnity payments from farms that refuse to share.
Crowdsourcing Feedback on US Dual-Use Research Oversight Policy
David Gillum, Research Assistant Professor at Arizona State University, and Rebecca Moritz have developed a preliminary white paper, “A White Paper on Developing Implementation Guidance for the United States Government Policy for Stopping High-Risk Life Sciences Research,” for which they are seeking input from the scientific, biosafety, biosecurity, research compliance, research administration, research security, and broader life sciences communities. The experience of these communities will be important in identifying where federal guidance needs greater clarity, where implementation may be difficult in practice, and where additional tools, examples, or approaches are needed. Their practical input is essential to developing guidance that is scientifically sound, clear, and workable across institutions.
📄 Read the current version of the white paper here. The document is publicly available for viewing. David and Rebecca sincerely welcome proposed edits, additional examples, identification of gaps, alternative approaches, and other substantive comments. Anyone who would like access to comment can email David Gillum at David.Gillum@gmail.com.
WHO Academy Launches Online Training on Dual-Use Research and Responsible Life Sciences
With more than 1000 learners enrolled and 237 certificates awarded, the WHO Academyhosted a basic-level training course titled “Dual-use research and the responsible use of the life sciences,” which is helping professionals worldwide strengthen their understanding of biorisks, dual-use research oversight, and responsible research practices. Designed to be practical and interactive, this course equips researchers, laboratory personnel, policymakers, and regulators across the One Health spectrum with the knowledge and tools needed to identify, assess, and mitigate biorisks while promoting effective governance of dual-use research.
🌐 The course is available free of charge in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. Participants receive a certificate of completion upon finishing. Learn more and register via the WHO Academy here.
Since the December 2024 publication of the Science article, Confronting risks of mirror life, and the associated Technical Report on Mirror Bacteria: Feasibility and Risks, scientific, policy, and other conferences have explored the feasibility and risks of mirror life. Now, nearly two years later, the Singapore Conference on Mirror Life brings together senior experts from Singapore and the broader international community to discuss the policy implications of mirror life.
This webinar will take place on Monday, September 28, 3:00-6:00 AM ET. Learn more and register here.
International Bio-Responsibility Conference 2027
Organized under the Bio-Responsibility Initiative at the Centre for Society and Policy (CSP), the conference brings together people to advance dialogue, build partnerships, and promote safe, secure, and responsible life science research, development, and innovation. The conference will host experts, policymakers, and practitioners around the world to discuss emerging biological risks and ways to strengthen responsible governance.
The deadline to register is September 30. Learn more and register here.
Training Course on ‘Biotechnology Innovation and Biosecurity’
From the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit: “This training focuses on strengthening capacities in biosecurity, biosafety, and biological risk management in the context of rapid advances in biotechnology with an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to manage biothreats at the intersection of humans, animals, plants and the environment. It addresses the governance, technical, and operational dimensions of preventing, detecting, and responding to biological threats, while promoting responsible and peaceful scientific research and innovation in accordance with article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).”
This in-person event will be held from October 12-16 in New Delhi, India. Learn more and apply here.
Biomanufacturing for Defense & Security Summit
From Diversified Solutions Incorporated (DSI Groups): “This event will bring together senior thought leaders and stakeholders from across DoW, Military Research Labs, Federal Government, Commercial Industry, & Academia to discuss how each are advancing biomanufacturing to enhance national security objectives, produce critical materials for defense applications, and strengthen the overall U.S. bioindustrial manufacturing base. Biomanufacturing is crucial for U.S. national security because it enables domestic production of critical materials, medicines, and defense supplies, reducing reliance on foreign adversaries, which in turn creates resilient supply chains for the military and economy.”
This event will take place from October 27-28 at the National Harbor, MD. Learn more and register here.
Frontiers in Synthetic Biology: SpudCells, Mirror Life and Societal Implications
From the Consortium on Law and Values: “Advances in cell engineering and synthetic biology offer enormous potential benefits, while raising ethical and policy issues. SpudCell, the first synthetic cell that can grow and reproduce, built from non-living chemicals, was developed by a team at the University of Minnesota. Scientists have cautioned against creating organisms with molecules that are mirror images of the biological components of known life, as existing organisms would have no immune defenses. Join three experts on synthetic biology, biosecurity, and bioethics to explore how to realize the promise of synthetic biology while controlling potential risks.”
This webinar will take place on Thursday, October 29, at 3:00 PM ET. Learn more and register here.
NEW: Director, Global Biological Policy and Programs – Job Opening
From the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI): “NTI – a nonprofit, nonpartisan global security organization focused on reducing nuclear, biological, and emerging technology threats imperiling humanity – is seeking a Director to join the Global Biological Policy and Programs team. The NTI | bio team is focused on reducing catastrophic biological risks, and we are working toward this goal by strengthening biotechnology governance; bolstering biosecurity in countries around the world; strengthening international capabilities to uphold the norm against bioweapon development and use; driving progress in Global Health Security; and building the biosecurity field.”
Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines the renewed H5N1 activity as the fall season begins, the continuing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and emerging challenges shaping biosecurity and public health developments.
Since September 1, federal animal health officials have recorded seven H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) detections in commercial poultry, concentrated in turkey operations across the Dakotas, Minnesota, and Idaho. Over the past month, roughly 360,000 birds have been affected nationwide, though this total largely reflects the mandatory culling of entire flocks required once a single case is confirmed, not mass die-offs from illness itself. The increase in detections aligns with the autumn uptick in waterfowl migration, when wild birds most often introduce the virus into commercial barns. Separately, two Idaho dairy cow herds were also confirmed infected. Fortunately, human risk still remains low. The CDC has recorded 71 cases nationally since 2024, nearly all among agricultural workers with direct animal contact, and no sustained person-to-person spread has been detected.
A Different Kind of Risk: AI and Pathogen Research
Although the current HPAI outbreak is primarily an animal-health issue, a recent Anthropic safety report offered a stark reminder that avian influenza remains high on the list of pathogens with pandemic potential. Some worry this risk could be compounded by AI assistance, though not all experts are as concerned. Anthropic disclosed that researchers attempted to use its Claude models to plan experiments that would make mutations in HPAI to help it adapt to mammals and transmit more easily. This was one of three pathogen-related cases the company flagged, which also included chikungunya virus and an unspecified orthopoxvirus. Two additional cases involved toxins. The researchers disguised their access through VPNs, intermediate servers, and disguised accounts, which Anthropic treated as a red flag.
Some security experts called the cases seriously alarming, though others disagreed. Virologist Kristian Andersen argued that much of the work resembled ordinary virology using mutations already found in nature rather than novel dangerous engineering. George Mason University’s own biosecurity expert Gregory Koblentz was similarly untroubled, noting that researchers using VPNs or other workarounds to access AI models is unsurprising given how indispensable these tools have become across scientific fields. He also was not surprised that the research was done at state institutions or labs with ties to the military, pointing out that the U.S. military itself “conducts and sponsors research on a range of infectious diseases that pose a potential risk to our troops.” Despite the mixed reactions, it is clear that Anthropic’s disclosure has value, as it shows how AI models are actually being used in biological research and provides real-world evidence about biosecurity risks that have until now been mostly hypothetical. Even skeptics of the report’s framing agree that it points to a risk that will need regulation down the road.
The Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has surpassed 7,000 confirmed cases and nearly 3,500 deaths for the first time since the epidemic began in May. The outbreak, which has now spread to a province in the northwest of Congolese territory, has become the country’s largest in recent years, prompting an intensified response involving disease surveillance, contact tracing, vaccination, and community engagement. Although health officials have reported signs that transmission is slowing, the World Health Organization (WHO) has cautioned that the outbreak remains far from over and that continued vigilance is needed to prevent further spread.
WHO Launches New Tool for Biorisk and Dual-Use Research Governance
The World Health Organization (WHO) has launched the Biorisk Implementation and Evaluation Tool (BRIET), a new resource to help countries and institutions strengthen governance of biorisks and dual-use research of concern (DUR/DURC). BRIET operationalizes the WHO Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences: Mitigating Biorisks and Governing Dual-Use Research by providing a structured, action-oriented approach to evaluating existing governance capacities, identifying strengths and gaps, prioritizing areas for improvement, and supporting ongoing capacity development. The tool generates capacity assessments, risk scores, and tailored key actions to inform decision-making and implementation efforts.
U.S. Public Health Is Under Strain
Last week, Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) released Underfunded and Under Strain: The State of America’s Public Health System, a new report examining how longstanding funding disruptions, severe workforce reductions, and institutional uncertainty during 2025 and 2026, have critically weakened the public health system’s capacity across the United States. The report emphasizes that maintaining appropriations alone does not guarantee that public health programs can operate effectively, particularly when agencies also face staffing shortages, reduced institutional expertise, and administrative disruptions. The report features interviews with state and local health officials illustrating how federal funding and operational uncertainty complicate planning and compromise community response on the front lines. Click here for a fact sheet on the report.
BioGovernance Commons and China’s Role in Global Risk Governance
In this new volume, the authors address the critical question of how scientific collaboration can remain possible in an era of deepening geopolitical tension. Co-edited by Dr. Sonia Ouagrham-Gormley, Professor at George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, examines how scientific collaboration can persist amid growing geopolitical tensions.
Drawing on real transnational dialogue on biogovernance commons among scientists, ethicists, lawyers, and policy scholars, the book explores governance challenges of the life sciences spanning genetic data, biobanking, biosecurity, CRISPR, and global health, with particular attention to research cultures and regulatory dynamics in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and beyond. The volume is available for pre-order now and is scheduled to be published on October 29, 2026.
NEW: How do we Prevent Future Health Emergencies and Pandemics?
The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response will participate in several events during the 81st United Nations General Assembly (UNGA81), including discussions on pandemic prevention, preparedness, response, financing, and global health resilience. This event will bring together global health leaders and experts to examine persistent gaps between scientific knowledge and political action on pandemic prevention.
This event will take place on September 21 from 4:00-5:30 PM ET. Learn more and register for the in-person event here or follow the live stream here.
America’s Ebola Response: Travel Restrictions, Quarantines, and Citizen Rights
From The Pandemic Center: “As part of the U.S. response to the still-ongoing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Trump administration took unprecedented steps to block American citizens in the DRC from returning to the U.S., placing them on a “do-not-board” list until they spend at least 21 days in a third country. These travel restrictions, the quarantining and detainment of US citizens, and the construction of the facility in Kenya have spurred ethical concerns and even legal challenges.”
This webinar will take place on Friday, September 18 at 12:00 PM ET. Learn more and register here.
Bioeconomy Summit
The Bioeconomy Summit, hosted by TechConnect, will bring together industry leaders, investors, federal officials, and experts to examine how the United States can strengthen and scale its bioeconomy. The summit will focus on aligning capital, policy, infrastructure, procurement, and industrial capacity; addressing vulnerabilities in biomanufacturing supply chains; and accelerating the deployment of bioindustrial technologies.
The summit will take place on Monday-Tuesday,September 21-22, at the National Harbor in Maryland. Learn more and register here.
Science of Evaluation of Artificial Intelligence for Life Sciences and Biotechnology Conference
From the National Academies: “This meeting brings together researchers and practitioners across various fields to define the emerging scientific method for artificial intelligence, focusing on benchmarks, leaderboards, challenges, and the evidence needed to trust systems that reason, act, discover, and operate in high-stakes domains, including the life sciences and biotechnology sectors.”
This conference will take place on Tuesday-Wednesday, September 22-23. Learn more and register here.
Data and Situational Awareness for Medical and Public Health Preparedness and Response: A Workshop Series
From the National Academies: “The Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies workshop series will explore how medical, public health, emergency management, and critical infrastructure data are collected, integrated, analyzed, and translated into real-time information to support timely, coordinated decision-making before, during, and after disasters and emergencies.”
This workshop series will take place on September 23. Learn more and register here.
The Second Bio-Responsibility Policy Lecture: “From Lab Safety to Bio-Responsibility: Building the Human Infrastructure for Safe and Secure Science.”
From organizers: “Advances in the life sciences are creating new opportunities for health, biotechnology, and economic development while also presenting increasingly complex biosafety and biosecurity challenges. The lecture will examine how institutions can develop practical, risk-based biorisk management systems, with a focus on the trained professionals and institutional capacity needed to translate policy into practice. It will also explore approaches to expanding biorisk management capacity through scalable training, competency development, and institutional support, including in resource-constrained settings.”
The virtual lecture will take place on Thursday, September 24, 8:00 AM – 9:15 AM ET. Learn more and register here.
International Bio-Responsibility Conference 2027
Organized under the Bio-Responsibility Initiative at the Centre for Society and Policy (CSP), the conference brings together people to advance dialogue, build partnerships, and promote safe, secure, and responsible life science research, development, and innovation. The conference will host experts, policymakers, and practitioners around the world to discuss emerging biological risks and ways to strengthen responsible governance.
The deadline to register is September 30. Learn more and register here.
Training Course on ‘Biotechnology Innovation and Biosecurity’
From the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit: “This training focuses on strengthening capacities in biosecurity, biosafety, and biological risk management in the context of rapid advances in biotechnology with an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to manage biothreats at the intersection of humans, animals, plants and the environment. It addresses the governance, technical, and operational dimensions of preventing, detecting, and responding to biological threats, while promoting responsible and peaceful scientific research and innovation in accordance with article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).”
This in-person event will be held from October 12-16 in New Delhi, India. Learn more and apply here.
Biomanufacturing for Defense & Security Summit
From Diversified Solutions Incorporated (DSI Groups): “This event will bring together senior thought leaders and stakeholders from across DoW, Military Research Labs, Federal Government, Commercial Industry, & Academia to discuss how each are advancing biomanufacturing to enhance national security objectives, produce critical materials for defense applications, and strengthen the overall U.S. bioindustrial manufacturing base. Biomanufacturing is crucial for U.S. national security because it enables domestic production of critical materials, medicines, and defense supplies, reducing reliance on foreign adversaries, which in turn creates resilient supply chains for the military and economy.”
This event will take place from October 27-28 at the National Harbor, MD. Learn more and register here.
Frontiers in Synthetic Biology: SpudCells, Mirror Life and Societal Implications
From the Consortium on Law and Values: “Advances in cell engineering and synthetic biology offer enormous potential benefits, while raising ethical and policy issues. SpudCell, the first synthetic cell that can grow and reproduce, built from non-living chemicals, was developed by a team at the University of Minnesota. Scientists have cautioned against creating organisms with molecules that are mirror images of the biological components of known life, as existing organisms would have no immune defenses. Join three experts on synthetic biology, biosecurity, and bioethics to explore how to realize the promise of synthetic biology while controlling potential risks.”
This webinar will take place on Thursday, October 29, at 3:00 PM ET. Learn more and register here.
Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines the evolution of U.S. biodefense 25 years after 9/11, the continuing debate over H5N1 vaccination, and the emerging applications of AI for detecting biological threats.
Join the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition and Arms Control Association for a virtual briefing, “Syria’s Chemical Weapons Legacy: Current Issues and Challenges,” on September 16 from 11:00 AM-12:30 PM ET. The briefing will examine Syria’s ongoing efforts to address the chemical weapons legacy of the Assad regime. Gregory Koblentz, Director of GMU’s Biodefense Program, will moderate the discussion.
25 Years After 9/11: Remembering and Reflecting on the Evolution of Biodefense
On the 25th anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Pandora Report reflects on the lives lost, the attacks’ enduring impact, and how 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks reshaped U.S. approaches to biodefense and national security. Source: Pexels.
Twenty-five years ago today, the United States experienced one of the most consequential terrorist attacks in its history. On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people were killed in New York City, at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and in Pennsylvania. Thousands more were injured, and countless families, communities, and first responders have continued to live with the consequences of that day.
For the Pandora Report, September 11 offers an opportunity for both remembrance and reflection on how the attacks transformed the way the United States understands and prepares for modern security threats.
In the weeks following the attacks, letters laced with Bacillus anthracis spores were mailed to news media organizations and U.S. Senate offices, resulting in 22 cases of anthrax and five deaths. The 2001 anthrax attacks radically changed U.S. biosecurity and public health preparedness, including through the creation of the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) to regulate and oversee the use of dangerous biological agents that pose a threat to public, animal, or plant health.
Together, the September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks helped accelerate the development of the modern U.S. biodefense enterprise. They also triggered a broader transformation in homeland security, including the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, which expanded government surveillance and law enforcement powers to prevent future terrorism.
Twenty-five years later, the threat landscape has continued to evolve. Emerging infectious diseases, advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology, artificial intelligence (AI), and the possibility of biological misuse present challenges that require many of the same capabilities that became priorities after 2001: early warning and biosurveillance, scientific expertise, interagency information sharing and coordination, and the ability to respond quickly when the nature of a threat is uncertain.
At its core, 9/11 is about the people who were killed and the families, first responders, service members, public servants, and communities forever changed by that day.
We remember those who were lost, honor those who responded, and reflect on our shared responsibility to build a safer and more resilient future.
Bird Flu Season Returns, So Does the Vaccination Debate
As the northern hemisphere begins to head into autumn, Bulgaria and France each confirmed their first H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks of the season. France’s case was notable because the affected ducks had already been vaccinated under the country’s mandatory H5N1 immunization program. This recent outbreak in France, alongside two articles published this week, reignites the question of the role of vaccination in H5N1 control and prevention efforts.
The first article, published in Poultry Science and Management by researchers in Egypt, tested six commercial H5 vaccines against currently circulating clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 and H5N8 strains in chickens. Most vaccines prevented death, with 75-100% survival compared to 100% mortality in the unvaccinated control group. However, none stopped birds from shedding virus for up to a week after exposure, and vaccines built on older or more distantly matched strains produced weaker protection. The authors concluded vaccination reduces mortality but, without regularly updated strains, still permits silent spread. Furthermore, use of suboptimal vaccines or inadequate vaccination programs may contribute to the selection of mutant strains through immune pressure, potentially reducing vaccine effectiveness.
The second, a Viewpoint article in the Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, asks why the US still does not vaccinate its poultry against H5 HPAI at all? The authors, from the University of Minnesota’s Secure Food Systems team, note that while effective vaccines, risk-mitigation frameworks, and risk-based surveillance systems already exist in the US, trade is the biggest issue. Vaccination plans could alter trade agreements, putting the US poultry meat and egg trade surplus at risk. There are also fears that products from vaccinated flocks could carry undetected, asymptomatic infections, leading to import restrictions. Traceability is another major hurdle. A vaccination program would require tracking which flocks were vaccinated and following their products through the supply chain. The poultry industry already does this for other purposes, like antibiotic-free labeling, but adapting those systems to a centralized, auditable, and validated process that trading partners will accept remains a barrier.
Vaccination is a valuable tool, but it isn’t a complete solution. Vaccinated flocks can still become infected and continue shedding virus, particularly when vaccine strains fall out of step with circulating field viruses. Meanwhile, in places where vaccine adoption has stalled, the holdup often has less to do with vaccine efficacy and more to do with economic concerns. Closing the gap on H5N1 will require progress on both fronts. Vaccine programs need to become more adaptive and be backed by surveillance and policy frameworks that give countries the confidence to actually use them.
DHS S&T Launches “Ready, Set… ID The Biothreat” Prize Challenge to Advance AI-Assisted Biodefense
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) has launched “Ready, Set…ID the Biothreat,” a prize challenge seeking AI-assisted algorithms for biodefense. The challenge is seeking innovative artificial intelligence approaches to help identify biological threats in complex environmental data. Eligible U.S. innovators, companies, academics, laboratories, and other technology developers over the age of 18 who are U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents can compete for up to $999,990 in prizes, with submissions due October 14, 2026. To learn more about the Challenge, visit the website here.
NEW: America’s Ebola Response: Travel Restrictions, Quarantines, and Citizen Rights
From The Pandemic Center: “As part of the U.S. response to the still-ongoing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Trump administration took unprecedented steps to block American citizens in the DRC from returning to the U.S., placing them on a “do-not-board” list until they spend at least 21 days in a third country. These travel restrictions, the quarantining and detainment of US citizens, and the construction of the facility in Kenya have spurred ethical concerns and even legal challenges.”
This webinar will take place on Friday, September 18 at 12:00 PM ET. Learn more and register here.
Exponential AI and Biotech Growth: Translating Technical to Policy – Workshop
From AI for SynBio: “The continued acceleration of agentic artificial intelligence (AI), Biological Design Tools (BDTs), and Biological AI Models (BAIMs) has transformed the technological landscape, enabling tremendous benefits and potential misuse that could massively impact national security, defense, health, and economy. Mitigating this risk will require collaboration across Government, Industry, and Academia with both technical and policy focuses. Significant effort, especially at the federal level, has been made to raise awareness of this challenge, yet additional discussion is necessary to keep pace with the ever-evolving speed of this global technology.’
This workshop will take place from September 15-17 at the Hopkins Bloomberg Center in Washington, DC. Learn more and register here.
Bioeconomy Summit
The Bioeconomy Summit, hosted by TechConnect, will bring together industry leaders, investors, federal officials, and experts to examine how the United States can strengthen and scale its bioeconomy. The summit will focus on aligning capital, policy, infrastructure, procurement, and industrial capacity; addressing vulnerabilities in biomanufacturing supply chains; and accelerating the deployment of bioindustrial technologies.
The summit will take place on Monday-Tuesday,September 21-22, at the National Harbor in Maryland. Learn more and register here.
Science of Evaluation of Artificial Intelligence for Life Sciences and Biotechnology Conference
From the National Academies: “This meeting brings together researchers and practitioners across various fields to define the emerging scientific method for artificial intelligence, focusing on benchmarks, leaderboards, challenges, and the evidence needed to trust systems that reason, act, discover, and operate in high-stakes domains, including the life sciences and biotechnology sectors.”
This conference will take place on Tuesday-Wednesday, September 22-23. Learn more and register here.
Data and Situational Awareness for Medical and Public Health Preparedness and Response: A Workshop Series
From the National Academies: “The Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies workshop series will explore how medical, public health, emergency management, and critical infrastructure data are collected, integrated, analyzed, and translated into real-time information to support timely, coordinated decision-making before, during, and after disasters and emergencies.”
This workshop series will take place on September 23. Learn more and register here.
The Second Bio-Responsibility Policy Lecture: “From Lab Safety to Bio-Responsibility: Building the Human Infrastructure for Safe and Secure Science.”
From organizers: “Advances in the life sciences are creating new opportunities for health, biotechnology, and economic development while also presenting increasingly complex biosafety and biosecurity challenges. The lecture will examine how institutions can develop practical, risk-based biorisk management systems, with a focus on the trained professionals and institutional capacity needed to translate policy into practice. It will also explore approaches to expanding biorisk management capacity through scalable training, competency development, and institutional support, including in resource-constrained settings.”
The virtual lecture will take place on Thursday, September 24, 8:00 AM – 9:15 AM ET. Learn more and register here.
International Bio-Responsibility Conference 2027
Organized under the Bio-Responsibility Initiative at the Centre for Society and Policy (CSP), the conference brings together people to advance dialogue, build partnerships, and promote safe, secure, and responsible life science research, development, and innovation. The conference will host experts, policymakers, and practitioners around the world to discuss emerging biological risks and ways to strengthen responsible governance.
The deadline to register is September 30. Learn more and register here.
Training Course on ‘Biotechnology Innovation and Biosecurity’
From the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit: “This training focuses on strengthening capacities in biosecurity, biosafety, and biological risk management in the context of rapid advances in biotechnology with an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to manage biothreats at the intersection of humans, animals, plants and the environment. It addresses the governance, technical, and operational dimensions of preventing, detecting, and responding to biological threats, while promoting responsible and peaceful scientific research and innovation in accordance with article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).”
This in-person event will be held from October 12-16 in New Delhi, India. Learn more and apply here.
Biomanufacturing for Defense & Security Summit
From Diversified Solutions Incorporated (DSI Groups): “This event will bring together senior thought leaders and stakeholders from across DoW, Military Research Labs, Federal Government, Commercial Industry, & Academia to discuss how each are advancing biomanufacturing to enhance national security objectives, produce critical materials for defense applications, and strengthen the overall U.S. bioindustrial manufacturing base. Biomanufacturing is crucial for U.S. national security because it enables domestic production of critical materials, medicines, and defense supplies, reducing reliance on foreign adversaries, which in turn creates resilient supply chains for the military and economy.”
This event will take place from October 27-28 at the National Harbor, MD. Learn more and register here.
Frontiers in Synthetic Biology: SpudCells, Mirror Life and Societal Implications
From the Consortium on Law and Values: “Advances in cell engineering and synthetic biology offer enormous potential benefits, while raising ethical and policy issues. SpudCell, the first synthetic cell that can grow and reproduce, built from non-living chemicals, was developed by a team at the University of Minnesota. Scientists have cautioned against creating organisms with molecules that are mirror images of the biological components of known life, as existing organisms would have no immune defenses. Join three experts on synthetic biology, biosecurity, and bioethics to explore how to realize the promise of synthetic biology while controlling potential risks.”
This webinar will take place on Thursday, October 29, at 3:00 PM ET. Learn more and register here.
Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines the growing importance of local capacity in biodefense, the detection of H5N1 on a U.S. mink farm, and emerging questions at the intersection of AI, biotechnology, and biological security.
Join the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition and Arms Control Association for a virtual briefing, “Syria’s Chemical Weapons Legacy: Current Issues and Challenges,” on September 16 at 11:00 AM-12:30 PM ET. The event will examine Syria’s ongoing efforts to address the chemical weapons legacy of the Assad regime.
The Elephant in the Room: Biodefense Goes Local—or Outbreaks Go Viral
Figure 1. Fresh produce on display at a supermarket. Source: Pexels.
Washington has long approached biodefense through a centralized, top-down approach, with federal agencies setting national priorities and strategies. However, recent outbreaks expose a critical vulnerability in that model: national biodefense is only as resilient as the local systems that carry it out. During this year’s cyclospora outbreak, Michigan investigators waited 12 days for Taco Bell supply chain records that a delayed FDA traceability rule would have required within 24 hours – a delay compounded by staffing shortages and an estimated $5.8 billion cut to CDC grant funding since last year. Meanwhile, Michigan was tracking more than 12,000 cyclospora cases while the national count stood at just 145.
The answer is not to abandon federal leadership, but to strengthen frontline capacity at the state and local levels. On Sep. 1, ASPR and NETEC announced a second round of STAND Awards, adding 21 hospitals across 16 states and territories to the National Special Pathogen System (NSPS), bringing the network to 75 facilities. In Bethel, Alaska, the Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corporation has demonstrated how a tribal health system can build its own wastewater surveillance capacity, detecting influenza A up to 10 days before clinical data confirmed it and identifying rising COVID-19 and RSV activity. Uganda offers another example: during the 2026 Bundibugyo virus outbreak, the country met all three WHO 7-1-7 outbreak response benchmarks, detecting the outbreak in six days, notifying authorities in under one day, and completing early response actions within two days.
True biodefense preparedness requires federal leadership to actively strengthen state, local, tribal, and regional capacity, ensuring people and institutions are ready to detect and respond where threats first emerge.
The USDA confirmed avian influenza H5N1 on a Utah mink farm in mid-August, marking the virus’s first detection in a U.S. mink operation. Scientists have long flagged farmed mink as a potential pandemic risk as the size and density of the farms create a perfect environment in which the virus can mutate. An H5N1 outbreak in Spain in 2022 infected tens of thousands of minks and demonstrated the first documented evidence of mammal-to-mammal spread. Minks also have very similar respiratory systems to humans, creating conditions that researchers warn could help the virus evolve toward person-to-person transmission. Unfortunately, the concern isn’t purely theoretical. During the Covid-19 pandemic, mutated coronavirus strains circulated on fur farms across several European countries, and Denmark reported a dozen farm workers infected with a mink-linked variant that was less responsive to vaccines.
In addition to ethical and economic reasons, the zoonotic disease risk from farmed mink has already prompted most European countries to shut down or phase out fur farming. The U.S., however, has no federal ban on mink farming, and states including Utah, Wisconsin, and Minnesota still operate dozens of farms housing up to 12,000 animals apiece. Roughly 1.3 million pelts a year are produced in the U.S. for export, largely to Chinese fashion manufacturers. In response to the Utah detection, animal welfare groups are now pressing the USDA to phase out mink farming entirely, citing both the animal welfare concerns of the industry and its potential role as a breeding ground for the next pandemic virus.
Screwworm Zones Lifted in Texas
On a more encouraging note, USDA APHIS announced the release of two New World screwworm (NWS)-infested zones in Texas after coordinated surveillance, sterile fly releases, and livestock movement restrictions met federal criteria. It’s the first such release since the re-emergence of NWS in Texas in early June. The move lifts NWS-related movement requirements for producers in those zones, though other infested areas remain under restriction as the state-federal response continues. No new cattle infestations were detected in August in the U.S., but that does not mean NWS is disappearing just yet. Texas confirmed four new cases in domestic species in August: two in sheep, one in goats, and, most recently, in a dog detected on Monday, August 31st. Three of these cases remain active as of this week.
Schar School Professor Examines AI and Biological Weapons Risks
Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Associate Professor of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, examines the “de-skilling” narrative surrounding AI and biological weapons policy in a new article for the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. She argues that assessments of AI-driven biological threats often overestimate the ability of AI and other emerging technologies to lower barriers to biological weapons development while underestimating the importance of tacit knowledge, integration across stages of development, and the challenges of constructing durable sociotechnical systems. Ouagrham-Gormley calls for more empirically grounded threat assessments that consider the full bioweapons development process and inform targeted policy responses.
From Biotic: “Bloomsday 2026 will bring together researchers, ethicists, and policymakers to explore the emerging field of synthetic-cell engineering and the foundations needed to make the technology safe, reliable, and broadly accessible. The program will examine genome construction, computational tools, safety and security, dual-use risks, governance, and the ethical implications of engineered cellular systems.”
The event will take place on Thursday, September 10, 9:15 AM – 6:00 PM ET at the Science History Institute in Philadelphia. Learn more and register here.
NEW: Bioeconomy Summit
The Bioeconomy Summit, hosted by TechConnect, will bring together industry leaders, investors, federal officials, and experts to examine how the United States can strengthen and scale its bioeconomy. The summit will focus on aligning capital, policy, infrastructure, procurement, and industrial capacity; addressing vulnerabilities in biomanufacturing supply chains; and accelerating the deployment of bioindustrial technologies.
The summit will take place on Monday-Tuesday,September 21-22, at the National Harbor in Maryland. Learn more and register here.
NEW: Science of Evaluation of Artificial Intelligence for Life Sciences and Biotechnology Conference
From the National Academies: “This meeting brings together researchers and practitioners across various fields to define the emerging scientific method for artificial intelligence, focusing on benchmarks, leaderboards, challenges, and the evidence needed to trust systems that reason, act, discover, and operate in high-stakes domains, including the life sciences and biotechnology sectors.”
This conference will take place on Tuesday-Wednesday, September 22-23. Learn more and register here.
NEW: The Second Bio-Responsibility Policy Lecture: “From Lab Safety to Bio-Responsibility: Building the Human Infrastructure for Safe and Secure Science.”
From organizers: “Advances in the life sciences are creating new opportunities for health, biotechnology, and economic development while also presenting increasingly complex biosafety and biosecurity challenges. The lecture will examine how institutions can develop practical, risk-based biorisk management systems, with a focus on the trained professionals and institutional capacity needed to translate policy into practice. It will also explore approaches to expanding biorisk management capacity through scalable training, competency development, and institutional support, including in resource-constrained settings.”
The virtual lecture will take place on Thursday, September 24, 8:00 AM – 9:15 AM ET. Learn more and register here.
NEW: Frontiers in Synthetic Biology: SpudCells, Mirror Life and Societal Implications
From the Consortium on Law and Values: “Advances in cell engineering and synthetic biology offer enormous potential benefits, while raising ethical and policy issues. SpudCell, the first synthetic cell that can grow and reproduce, built from non-living chemicals, was developed by a team at the University of Minnesota. Scientists have cautioned against creating organisms with molecules that are mirror images of the biological components of known life, as existing organisms would have no immune defenses. Join three experts on synthetic biology, biosecurity, and bioethics to explore how to realize the promise of synthetic biology while controlling potential risks.”
This webinar will take place on Thursday, October 29, 3:00 PM ET. Learn more and register here.
Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria (PACCARB)
From the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health (OASH): “The 28th PACCARB public meeting will explore how microbiome science can support AMR prevention, drive novel interventions, and build public awareness and understanding of microbiome-focused health measures. The meeting will focus on innovative and emerging topics in antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and the microbiome.”
This hybrid meeting will take place on September 9-10 from 9:00 AM–5:00 PM ET. Learn more and register here.
Exponential AI and Biotech Growth: Translating Technical to Policy – Workshop
From AI for SynBio: “The continued acceleration of agentic artificial intelligence (AI), Biological Design Tools (BDTs), and Biological AI Models (BAIMs) has transformed the technological landscape, enabling tremendous benefits and potential misuse that could massively impact national security, defense, health, and economy. Mitigating this risk will require collaboration across Government, Industry, and Academia with both technical and policy focuses. Significant effort, especially at the federal level, has been made to raise awareness of this challenge, yet additional discussion is necessary to keep pace with the ever-evolving speed of this global technology.’
This workshop will take place from September 15-17 at the Hopkins Bloomberg Center in Washington, DC. Learn more and register here.
Data and Situational Awareness for Medical and Public Health Preparedness and Response: A Workshop Series
From the National Academies: “The Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies workshop series will explore how medical, public health, emergency management, and critical infrastructure data are collected, integrated, analyzed, and translated into real-time information to support timely, coordinated decision-making before, during, and after disasters and emergencies.”
This workshop series will take place on September 23. Learn more and register here.
International Bio-Responsibility Conference 2027
Organized under the Bio-Responsibility Initiative at the Centre for Society and Policy (CSP), the conference brings together people to advance dialogue, build partnerships, and promote safe, secure, and responsible life science research, development, and innovation. The conference will host experts, policymakers, and practitioners around the world to discuss emerging biological risks and ways to strengthen responsible governance.
The deadline to register is September 30. Learn more and register here.
Training Course on ‘Biotechnology Innovation and Biosecurity’
From the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit: “This training focuses on strengthening capacities in biosecurity, biosafety, and biological risk management in the context of rapid advances in biotechnology with an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to manage biothreats at the intersection of humans, animals, plants and the environment. It addresses the governance, technical, and operational dimensions of preventing, detecting, and responding to biological threats, while promoting responsible and peaceful scientific research and innovation in accordance with article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).”
This in-person event will be held from October 12-16 in New Delhi, India. Learn more and apply here.
Biomanufacturing for Defense & Security Summit
From Diversified Solutions Incorporated (DSI Groups): “This event will bring together senior thought leaders and stakeholders from across DoW, Military Research Labs, Federal Government, Commercial Industry, & Academia to discuss how each are advancing biomanufacturing to enhance national security objectives, produce critical materials for defense applications, and strengthen the overall U.S. bioindustrial manufacturing base. Biomanufacturing is crucial for U.S. national security because it enables domestic production of critical materials, medicines, and defense supplies, reducing reliance on foreign adversaries, which in turn creates resilient supply chains for the military and economy.”
This event will take place from October 27-28 at the National Harbor, MD. Learn more and register here.
