The Pandora Report

Happy Friday! This edition is packed with new publications, upcoming events, opportunities, and resources. Some highlights include a piece on rad and nuke threats from a Biodefense PhD alumna, an exciting new podcast from CSIS a current Biodefense MS student helped launch, a very helpful piece from the Washington Post outlining Russia’s disinformation, and an upcoming book talk covering “Lessons from the Covid War: A Report by the Covid Crisis Group” hosted by the Schar School.

“ASPR Releases Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise Multiyear Budget Assessment”

This week, “…the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) released the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise (PHEMCE) Multiyear Budget (MYB) for fiscal years 2022-2026. The report assesses budget needs to support medical countermeasure priorities which would allow the U.S. Government to prepare for the next public health threat. The multiyear budget projects an estimated overall funding need of $64 billion over the five-year period.”

‘“HHS’ recent responses to COVID-19, mpox, and Ebola, demonstrate the importance of a strong domestic medical countermeasure enterprise,” said Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Dawn O’Connell. “As the first PHEMCE multiyear budget released since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, it will serve as a useful tool for Congress to gauge ASPR’s funding levels to provide the country protection against whatever comes next.”’

“The PHEMCE is an interagency body that reviews the current threat landscape and makes recommendations to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on available or future medical countermeasures. This MYB was built over a period of time in which there were continuing resolutions, omnibus spending bills, and a near-simultaneously released President’s budget—this MYB is indicative of the assessed need and does not substitute for requested levels in the President’s Budget.”

“The multiyear budget also provides Congress and external stakeholders with funding information related to investments made in specified threats. The report highlights key priorities — from supporting innovative approaches to MCM development, to fostering clear, scientifically supported regulatory pathways for MCMs, to ensuring our national security.”

“The report, which picks up in 2022 – where the last MYB left off, estimates a gap of $35.3 billion between the flat fiscal year 2022 level and projected five-year total.  ASPR looks forward to working with Congress to overcome challenges and ensure America is prepared for whatever threat is around the corner.”

Read more here and download the full multiyear budget here.

ICYMI: “HERA Signs Agreement with ECDC and with EMA to Strengthen Cooperation on Health Emergency Preparedness and Response”

Earlier this month, the European Commission’s “Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), as well as HERA and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) have agreed to strengthen cooperation and to coordinate their work in support of health emergency preparedness and response in the area of medical countermeasures…The agreed working arrangements will help ensure that there are no unnecessary overlaps and that resources are used more efficiently.”

These arrangements aim to improve collaboration in areas like intelligence gathering and assessment, assessment of major cross-border health threats, and contribution to reinforcing the global health emergency preparedness and response architecture.

Learn more and read the agreements here.

“Civil Defense for Radiological Threats”

This CBNW article, written by Biodefense PhD alumna Dr. Mary Sproull, explores improvements made since 9/11 in American preparedness for radiological and nuclear threats and highlights key areas of mass casualty planning that require further improvement.

She writes in her conclusion, “As primary response for any emergency is initially a local response, development of a base of local radiation experts nationwide is an important step for civil defense.  Integration and establishment of working relationships between these local radiation SME and the first responders and medical professionals they will be supporting prior to future emergencies is also key to ensure a level of trust for effective mitigation of radiation dread.  The ROSS program is an important aspect of emergency preparedness which should receive more visibility, financial support, and resources to increase access for training opportunities at the local level.  Further, increased funding to support training of first responders and medical personal themselves on the relative health risks of radiation exposure is needed. “

“The Nonproliferation Compliance Cheminformatics Tool Completes a Second Test”

This project note from the Stemson Center provides an update on the Nonproliferation Compliance Cheminformativs Tool. The note explains, “The NCCT is a proof of concept of a practical tool to aid frontline officers – border security, customs, law enforcement, defense, chemical industry – to quickly check available chemical identifying information (name, registry number, molecular structure) against national or international control lists of chemical warfare agents or precursors. Frontline officers typically have just seconds to determine whether a given substance is a concern or not – a task that can be complex and time-consuming even for trained chemists. Developed jointly by the Stimson Center, Prof. Stefano Costanzi’s research group at American University, and Dr. Koblentz of George Mason University, and funded by Global Affairs Canada, the proof of concept consists of a database of chemical structures implemented and run through a commercial, desktop-based cheminformatics software (ChemAxon’s Instant JChem).”

“The Future of Chemical Disarmament in an Eroding Global Order”

“On February 7-8, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Future of Chemical Disarmament in an Eroding Global Order.” This workshop brought together over 100 participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities from nine countries and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The workshop aimed to examine: (1) the transformation of OPCW from an organization whose current primary mission is to verify and monitor the destruction of declared chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles to one that is focused on preventing their re-emergence and (2) the fate of multilateral arms control regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and multilateralism in an eroding global order.”

The workshop summary, which includes discussion of key takeaways and highlights from each panel, as well as the annotated bibliography for this workshop (both of which Biodefense PhD student Danyale Kellogg helped prepare) are available on CGSR’s website.

“A Short History of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense”

COL Paul Kassebaum and Dr. James Dillman chronicle and discuss the history of MRICD in this piece for CBNW, writing in part “Since 1917, U.S. Army scientists have developed medical solutions for chemical threats. That legacy is carried on today by the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (MRICD) at Aberdeen Proving Ground-South in Edgewood, Maryland. MRICD traces its origins to components of the Army Medical Department responsible for defense against chemical weapons during World War I. In October 1922, the Medical Research Division was organized at Edgewood Arsenal to study the pharmacological actions of chemical threat agents, to develop treatments for exposed casualties, and to provide the information generated to Army Medical Corps personnel. During this period, Edgewood Arsenal became the center for chemical defense research, development, and testing operations.”

“There’s a ‘ChatGPT’ for biology. What could go wrong?”

Sean Ekins, Filippa Lentzos, Max Brackmann, and Cédric Invernizzi tackle the security issues posed by models like ProtGPT2 and ProGen in this piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, explaining “In recent months ChatGPT and other AI chatbots with uncanny abilities to respond to prompts with fluid, human-like writing have unleashed torrents of angst flowing from different quarters of society; the chatbots could help students cheat, encroach on jobs, or mass produce disinformation. Outside of the spotlight shining on the chatbots, researchers in the life sciences have also been rolling out similar artificial intelligence-driven technology, but to much less fanfare. That’s concerning, because new algorithms for protein design, while potentially advancing the ability to fight disease, may also create significant opportunities for misuse.”

“As biotech production processes are evolving to make it easier for creators to make the synthetic DNA and other products they’ve designed, new AI models like ProtGPT2 and ProGen will allow researchers to conceive of a far greater range of molecules and proteins than ever. Nature took millions of years to design proteins. AI can generate meaningful protein sequences in seconds. While there are good reasons to develop AI technology for biological design, there are also risks to such efforts that scientists in the field don’t appear to have weighed. AI could be used to design new bioweapons or toxins that can’t be detected. As these systems develop alongside new easier, cheaper, and faster production capabilities, scientists should talk to and learn from peers who focus on biosecurity risks.”

“The Biorisk Management Casebook: Insights into Contemporary Practices”

New from Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation: “Stanford University’s Bio Policy & Leadership in Society Initiative (Bio.Polis), in collaboration with the Program on Science, Technology & Society at the Harvard Kennedy School and with support from the Global Biological Policy and Programs team at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI | bio), is pleased to announce the launch of The Biorisk Management Casebook: Insights into Contemporary Practices. The Casebook and the accompanying Biorisk Management Case Study Collection gathers and analyzes how biorisk management is practiced in diverse life science organizations across the research lifecycle.”

“As life science research matures globally, it is also vital to mature the management of biosafety and biosecurity risks that can accompany discovery and innovation. In this context generalized frameworks for biorisk management have been developed alongside guidance documents. However, the breadth of risks and the diversity of organizations supporting research pose challenges to the continued development, adaptation, and implementation of these frameworks. In addition, organizations lack access to concrete examples of how frameworks are or have been implemented in practice, hindering their ability to learn from one another. “

“How Russia Turned America’s Helping Hand to Ukraine Into a Vast Lie”

This piece by the Washington Post Editorial Board discusses Russia’s ongoing disinformation efforts, building on previous reporting on social media policing in authoritarian regimes. The authors write, “Disinformation is not just “fake news” or propaganda but an insidious contamination of the world’s conversations. And it is exploding.”

They continue on to explain the origin of the United States’ bio collaborations with Ukraine and Georgia, writing “The agreement with Ukraine grew out of the 1992 Nunn-Lugar legislation, sponsored by Mr. Lugar and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) to clean up the Cold War legacy of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union, an effort that became known as Cooperative Threat Reduction. In the 1990s, thousands of nuclear warheads and missiles were liquidated, followed by vast stocks of chemical weapons. Later, the Nunn-Lugar program expanded into reducing biological threats in Russian laboratories, as well as other former Soviet republics. Among other efforts, a public health reference laboratory — named the Lugar Center — was opened in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 2011. Pathogens stored in a Soviet-era research institute in the center of Tbilisi were moved to a purpose-built, secure facility.”

They explain the periodic attacks these programs have faced from Russia, describing the “firehose of falsehoods” aimed at them. At the end of this very detailed retelling of these long-standing efforts, they conclude “Open societies are vulnerable because they are open. The asymmetries in favor of malign use of information are sizable. Democracies must find a way to adapt. The dark actors morph constantly, so the response needs to be systematic and resilient.”

“In a world that connects billions of people at a flash, the truth may have only a fighting chance against organized lying. As an old saying has it: “A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes.”’

What We’re Watching and Listening To 🍿🎧

The CommonHealth 

Check out this new podcast from the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security: “On The CommonHealth, hosts J. Stephen Morrison, Katherine Bliss, and Andrew Schwartz delve deeply into the  puzzle that connects pandemic preparedness and response, HIV/AIDS, routine immunization, and primary care, areas of huge import to human and national security. The CommonHealth replaces under a single podcast the Coronavirus Crisis Update, Pandemic Planet and AIDS Existential Moment.”

Current episodes include interviews with Sherly Gay Stolberg and Dr. Raquel Bono covering different topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Biodefense MS student Sophie Hirshfield, a current CSIS intern, also helped create this podcast!

SIPRI Launches Video Series on Biosecurity Risks and Emerging Technology

From the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: “SIPRI is pleased to launch a new video series that explores biosecurity risks linked to emerging technologies and considers how these risks can be addressed. The series features international experts from the research fields of genetics, bioethics, international affairs and microbiology.”

“The interviews were conducted during an expert workshop in Stockholm in January 2023 on risk at the intersection of biological science and technological developments. The workshop and this video series are part of SIPRI’s work to develop a toolkit for biorisk assessment, targeting academics and researchers in the life sciences. This work, undertaken with support from the British Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, examines dual-use technologies that have implications for the proliferation, development and use of biological weapons. The series gives a voice to key stakeholders in the field, working towards a mutual understanding of the challenges affecting the convergence of biotechnology and emerging technologies.”

The Kremlin’s Bioweapons Lies

This YouTube short from the US Department of State’s Share America channel offers a succinct overview of Russia’s false BW claims and the threats this poses to legitimate, peaceful scientific collaboration globally.

Lessons From the COVID War: An Investigative Report

Beyond the Pandemic: Addressing Attacks on Researchers and Health Professionals

From the National Academies: “Last fall, the Committee on Human Rights (CHR) held a webcast series, Silencing Scientists and Health Workers during the Pandemic, which examined threats and attacks against science and health professionals connected to their work to combat the spread of COVID-19, as well as related implications for internationally-protected human rights.”

“On April 11 (3:00-4:15 pm ET), the CHR will host a webcast to mark the launch of the webcast series’ Proceedings-in Brief.  This event will gather experts to explore practical steps that scientists, researchers, and health professionals are taking to protect themselves and their colleagues from targeting—including violence, harassment, and other attacks.”

Learn more and register here.

Nobel Prize Summit-Truth, Trust and Hope

Taking place May 24-26 this year in DC and virtually, this Nobel Prize Summit asks “How can we build trust in truth, facts and scientific evidence so that we can create a hopeful future for all?”

“Misinformation is eroding our trust in science and runs the risk of becoming one of the greatest threats to our society today.”

“Join us at this years’ Nobel Prize Summit which brings together laureates, leading experts and you in a conversation on how we can combat misinformation, restore trust in science and create a hopeful future.”

Learn more and register here.

Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community

“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”

This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Call for Papers: “Training Programmes To Counter Current And Emerging Biological And Chemical Proliferation Risks: Themes, Practices, And Lessons Learnt”

From the Journal of Strategic Trade Control: “The purpose of this call for papers is to facilitate inter-disciplinary exchange regarding the implementation of training to counter emerging chemical and biological proliferation challenges. In particular, the call welcomes contributions in the form of JOSTC articles on the processes, mechanisms, and tools for creating awareness of the following topics:

– Cross-border movement (e.g. transport, shipment) of chemical and biological materials and equipment.
– Cross-border movement of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
– Trade in sensitive and dual-use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and equipment.
– Strategic trade control regimes of relevance to disarmament and non-proliferation.
– Information security, data sharing, and cybersecurity challenges to CBRN non-proliferation.
– Due diligence and risk management initiatives to safeguard global supply chains against misuse and diversion.

Information about this call is available on the JoSTC webpage and the full description of the call can be accessed here. The deadline for paper submission is 2 October 2023.”

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: “This well-known Irish-born American cook is thought to have infected as many as 122 people with typhoid fever and was the first person in the US identified as an asymptomatic carrier of the bacteria that cause the disease-Salmonella typhi. What was her legal name?”

Shout out to Georgios P. for correctly answering last week’s trivia. Our question was: “Before the infamous sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, Aum Shinrikyo attempted to use biological weapons. In July 1993, what agent did the cult attempt to spread from a cooling tower on the roof of their headquarters?” The answer is B. anthracis.

Happy Spring! Lest our readers in the northern hemisphere enjoy the added sunshine too much, this edition of the Pandora Report focuses heavily on a new report that suggests China CDC failed to disclose information connecting raccoon dogs to the initial outbreak of COVID-19 at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, potentially covering up critical evidence in understanding the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. We also tackle the signing of the COVID-19 Origins Act of 2023 into law, the continued discussion about biosecurity oversight, the Biden administration’s release of biotechnology and biomanufacturing goal documents, and the 28th anniversary of the Tokyo subway sarin attacks.

US Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Goals and Priorities Released

This week, in response to President Biden’s September Executive Order, the administration announced the release of three new documents: Harnessing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Research and Development (R&D) to Further Societal Goals; U.S. Department of Defense Biomanufacturing Strategy; and Developing a National Measure of the Economic Contributions of the Bioeconomy. According to the White House, the first is a report from the Office of Science and Technology Policy that outlines “a vision for what is possible with the power of biotechnology and biomanufacturing, and R&D needs to achieve this ambitious vision.”

In addition to these documents, “Other deliverables from the Executive Order are in development, including: a plan to expand training and education opportunities for the biotechnology and biomanufacturing workforce, a report on data needs for the bioeconomy, a national strategy for expanding domestic biomanufacturing capacity, actions to improve biotechnology regulation clarity and efficiency, and a plan for strengthening and innovating biosafety and biosecurity for the bioeconomy.”

COVID-19 Origins…More Politics, Some New Evidence

Raccoon Dogs Linked to Outbreak at Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market

This week, a researchers, including the Schar School’s Dr. Saskia Popescu, released a report on Zenodo titled “Genetic evidence of susceptible wildlife in SARS-CoV-2 positive samples at the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market, Wuhan: Analysis and interpretation of data released by the Chinese Center for Disease Control”. Nature discusses key findings of the report, writing “Particularly notable was the raccoon-dog mitochondrial DNA found in six samples from two stalls. These small fox-like animals are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, and can spread the infection to other raccoon dogs without showing clear signs of sickness. Raccoon dogs and masked palm civets have also been found with infections of viruses that are almost identical to the one that causes severe acute respiratory syndrome, which is related to SARS-CoV-2 and caused an outbreak in people in 2003. And work in palm-civet cells indicates that the creatures could possibly become infected with SARS-CoV-2.”

“The researchers were looking for evidence of mammals, which could have been intermediate hosts of the virus. They identified near-complete mitochondrial-DNA sequences — each some 16,000 base pairs long — for five species, including raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonoides), Malayan porcupine (Hystrix brachyura), Amur hedgehog (Erinaceus amurensis), masked palm civet (Paguma larvata) and hoary bamboo rat (Rhizomys pruinosus)…”

Furthermore, in their forward, the authors discuss their discovery of data posted publicly on the GISAID database corresponding to sequences from environmental samples collected at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan. Though metadata suggests this data was posted in June 2022, it was not made publicly available until recently. According to the report, “We downloaded the public data to search for genetic sequences from non-human animals, which the CCDC did not identify in their February 2022 preprint. The preprint also posited that all SARS-CoV-2-positive samples in the market were the result of human infections, claiming that the market was a site of amplification of an already widespread epidemic. We and others therefore had urgently requested release of the data. The potential for analysis of samples for animal DNA had also been recommended in the mission report of the World Health Organization (WHO)-convened global study of origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part, released March 2021.”

The researchers later explain “Once the data were identified on GISAID, it became possible to test the veracity of these claims. We found information that was critical to understanding the nature of the origins of the human infections at the Huanan market, as this was the early epicenter of SARS-CoV-2 spread and was likely where spillover occurred and sustained human-to-human transmission was established.”

They continue “Our analysis of these data found that genetic evidence of multiple animal species was present in locations of the market where SARS-CoV-2 positive environmental samples had been collected. This includes raccoon dogs, which are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2
infection and shed sufficient virus to transmit to other species. However, this also included other mammalian species that require consideration as possible intermediate hosts of SARS CoV-2. Although live mammals had previously been observed at Huanan market in late 2019, their exact locations were not conclusively known, and some of the animal species we identify in the report below were not included in the list of live or dead animals tested at the Huanan market, as reported in the 2021 WHO-China joint report on the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results show that they were present. In some cases, the amount of animal genetic material was greater than the amount of human genetic material, consistent with the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in these samples being due to animal infections.”

They then detail their attempts to inform an author of the Gao et al. preprint about the data and later accusations that they had violated GISAID’s terms of use. They then notified the WHO of their preliminary findings, at which point SAGO convened a meeting with some of these researchers and scientists from China CDC. SAGO explained in their statement that “The presentations from China CDC and invited international researchers indicated that there were newly available data from the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. This included metagenomic data of environmental samples from various stalls and wastewater collection sites collected as early as January 2020. Analyses of these data suggest that apart from SARS-CoV-2 sequences, some samples also contained human DNA, as well as mitochondrial DNA of several animal species, including some that are known to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. This included DNA from wild raccoon dogs, Malaysian porcupine, and bamboo rats among others, in SARS-CoV-2 positive environmental samples.”

Importantly, the statement explains “The findings suggest that animals were present at the market shortly before the market had been cleared on 1 January 2020, as part of the public health measures by Chinese authorities. These results provide potential leads to identifying intermediate hosts of SARS-CoV-2 and potential sources of human infections in the market.”

While GISAID allegedly made the data unavailable to the researchers because it is the basis for an update to an existing Liu et al. 2022 preprint that is in the process of being re-submitted for publication by China CDC, this presents a troubling twist in the COVID-19 origin saga. This information sat in GISAID hidden for the better part of a year, and was made unavailable when scientists outside China CDC sought to analyze it, even though they contacted the initial authors and requested to collaborate.

Among the abundant discussion this has brought has been outrage directed at the PRC for failing disclose this data. The WHO itself expressed concern, with Director-General Tedros saying “These data do not provide a definitive answer to the question of how the pandemic began, but every piece of data is important in moving us closer to that answer…And every piece of data relating to studying the origins of COVID-19 needs to be shared with the international community immediately.”

When asked in an interview why these data were not made available sooner, Maria Van Kerkhove (technical lead of the WHO’s COVID-19 response), said “That is the question. Why weren’t these data shared and analyzed with Chinese scientists? We have been calling for any and all data to be made available. Clearly there is more data that is out there. What is not clear is what else is out there,” adding another layer of concern in this ongoing search for the pandemic’s origin.

COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023 Signed by President Biden

Of course, concerns about lack of transparency regarding the COVID-19 pandemic are nothing new in the Beltway, as was further demonstrated this week. This Monday, President Biden signed a bill into law directing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to declassify certain information about COVID-19’s origin. President Biden said in a statement “We need to get to the bottom of COVID-19’s origins to help ensure we can better prevent future pandemics.  My Administration will continue to review all classified information relating to COVID–19’s origins, including potential links to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  In implementing this legislation, my Administration will declassify and share as much of that information as possible, consistent with my constitutional authority to protect against the disclosure of information that would harm national security.”

The bill indicates the information must be released within 90 days of being signed into law, and it covers information like names, symptoms, and roles of any researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology who became ill in the fall of 2019. The House passed the bill in a 419-0 vote following the Senate’s unanimous vote, in a rare showing of overwhelming bipartisanship. Rep. Jim Himes of Connecticut told The Washington Post the declassified information made available to the public will not be the raw transcripts from intercepted calls, but finished intelligence reports.

Biosecurity Discussion Continues

This entire saga has all brought renewed public debate over the safety of high-containment laboratories. Sam Weiss Evans and David Gillum write in STAT News, “The Covid pandemic exacerbated fear and panic regarding the potential for a future bioterrorism agent. As the lab leak theory continues to cause debate, politicians want to be able to tell their constituents that they are solving the problem by adding more oversight to biological research. But if all they are doing is adding more burden, bureaucracy, and box-checking, is it really making anyone more secure?”

“…governance systems are increasingly not up to the task of managing biosecurity risks. States, industry, and academia have been too focused on the technical frontiers in biotechnology, heralding cheaper, more efficient, and more sophisticated tools to conduct biological research, but not putting the same degree of curiosity or funding into how we might direct these advances in ways that protect the vulnerable and prevent catastrophe. Scientific advances such as CRISPR, gene drives, synthetic viruses, and increased pathogen capabilities, are rapidly proceeding while innovation in our collective ability to govern their security concerns is not.”

While the debate over the lab leak hypothesis has been politically charged from the start, there are broader biosecurity concerns that do deserve increased attention, as highlighted by the Global BioLabs project in its latest report-Global BioLabs Report 2023. Newsweek covered this report this week, writing in part ‘”We urgently need coordinated international action to address increasing bio-risks,” Gregory Koblentz, an author of the report with the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, said in a statement.”

Science summarizes much of the concern in their discussion of the report, writing “Concerns about an increasing number of BSL-4 and BSL-3 labs aren’t new, but they have grown since the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic began in 2019. One hypothesis is that the virus came from a lab. And many countries, particularly those building their first BSL-4 labs, lack strong policies and methods to monitor such labs, the report says. Only Canada has legislation overseeing all experiments, even those with no government funding, that are considered “dual use” because the results could potentially be used to cause harm.”

28th Anniversary of Tokyo Subway Attacks

The 28th anniversary of the Tokyo sarin attacks passed this week, marking nearly three decades since the horror unleashed by Aum Shinrikyo in March 1995. The cult staged five coordinated attacks on three lines of the Teito Rapid Transit Authority at rush hour near the Diet headquarters, killing 13, seriously injuring 50, and harming over 5,000 others. Some of those severely injured did later die as well. NHK, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, notes “Japan’s Public Security Intelligence Agency notes that successor groups of the cult are still active. It says a group known as Aleph is actively recruiting young people by concealing its name.”

“Infectious Disease as a Security Threat: A Mental Framework for Future Emergency Preparedness”

Biodefense PhD Student Ryan Houser recently published this article in the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: “The emergence of COVID-19 pandemic has had significant impacts on human lives as well as economic and social stability. The United States has a complicated history with biosecurity. The September 11th terror attacks uncovered various weaknesses in the national biosecurity infrastructure that have persisted into the current pandemic. This study explores the implications of framing the infectious disease biothreat as a security threat to improve our capabilities while protecting against the potential accelerated threat of bioterrorism in the post-COVID-19 era. To counter the increasing biothreats, the United States must invest in revamping the biodefense infrastructure to increase our resilience to various biothreats.”

“The BWC Ninth Review Conference: An Overview of Outcomes, Outlooks, and National Implementation”

Read this new report from VERTIC here: “2022 saw an important milestone for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), as it marked fifty years since its opening for signature. Since then, every five years, approximately, States Parties have convened for a Review Conference of the Convention. The Ninth Review Conference was held in the final quarter of 2022, amidst an international security landscape with a new set of challenges and priorities.”

“Upon the BWC’s entry into force in 1975, the UK’s then-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs noted that States Parties to the Convention “have both renounced this entire class of weapons and undertaken to prevent their future development, by appropriate national measures”.1 His statement highlights the essential nature of national measures to achieve the Convention’s ultimate goal of banning biological weapons. Following the conclusion of the Review Conference it is timely to take stock of the progress, challenges, and ways forward for national implementation of the BWC; a topic that VERTIC have been working on for over twenty years.2 This Brief will do so in two parts: Part I provides a consideration of the outcomes and outlook of the Ninth Review Conference; Part II examines the coverage of national implementation at the Conference and, ultimately, provides a series of recommendations for strengthening national implementation during the next review cycle of the Convention.”

“OK, But Where Will the Next Pandemic Come From?”

Angela Kane and Jaime Yassif discuss the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Joint Assessment Mechanism in this opinion piece for The Hill. They write “While the politics surrounding an outbreak cannot be ignored, the international community needs to get better at conducting evidence-based assessments of pandemic origins, in order to minimize and deflect the most polarizing voices in favor of objective scientific analysis. Nearly 7 million deaths from COVID-19 worldwide prove the stakes are high.”

“To address this need, the Nuclear Threat Initiative is working with international partners to establish a new Joint Assessment Mechanism (JAM) which would fill a significant gap in the international community’s ability to discern the source of high-consequence biological events of unknown origin. Its mandate would be to establish the facts — specifically, whether the event emerged naturally or was accidentally or deliberately released from an academic, commercial or government laboratory.”

“Avian Flu in Cambodia”

Rick A. Bright discusses the H5N1 outbreak in Cambodia and what it tells us about the importance of global surveillance and collaboration for Think Global Health, writing “As human and bird interactions increase, however, the likelihood of zoonotic transmission grows. The first confirmed bird-to-human transmission of these viruses occurred in Hong Kong in 1997, though seroprevalence studies in the same region suggest a substantial number of mild or asymptomatic infections among people who work closely with poultry. In Cambodia, where highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses have been detected in wild birds since 2003, fifty-eight cases of human infection and thirty-eight deaths have been documented, a fatality rate of 66 percent. The February cases are the first since 2014.”

“It used to take months to identify the pathogen, conduct genomic analytics, perform contact tracing, and alert the world of a potential outbreak of concern — but enhanced global surveillance capabilities, new genomic sequencing technologies, and real-time data sharing in publicly accessible databases have changed all that. This time, scientists at the Institute Pasteur Cambodia (IPC) and Cambodia’s National Institute of Public Health were able to share their findings globally within twenty-four hours of collecting the first clinical specimen. They quickly tempered concerns by confirming that virus collected from one of the patients, an eleven-year-old girl, was from a group of influenza viruses endemic in birds in the region and thus likely to have been transmitted without a human intermediary.”

“The Polarized Pandemic”

David P. Fidler breaks down the history of politicized health crises and how COVID-19 is likely to be remembered for Think Global Health, writing “The turmoil caused by COVID-19’s emergence and global spread triggered a tsunami of analyses on what went wrong and how the United States and other countries should transform policies on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. This series on U.S. foreign policy and global health participates in this effort at diagnosis and prescription. Synthesizing such commentary proves difficult, if not foolhardy, and the question of how the COVID-19 pandemic will be described in the future cannot be definitively answered today. Some themes, however, suggest that COVID-19 will be remembered as the polarized pandemic that cast a divisive shadow on U.S. public health, domestic politics, and foreign policy.”

“The Real Horrors of ‘The Last of Us’ May Already Be Here”

Erik English merges the post-apocalyptic fantasy world with real life in this piece for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the deeper story the video game and new HBO drama tells, writing “The show, based on the beloved video game from 2013, is split into two levels. In the foreground, it is a fairly conservative story of survivalism and kinship. In the background, it is telling a different story about the failure of institutions during crises, the breaking of the social contract amid a turn towards authoritarianism, and the tradeoffs between utilitarianism and individual justice.”

“U.S. Companies Must Stop Enabling Mass DNA Collection in Tibet”

Columnist Josh Rogin discusses an alarming trend in data collection for The Washington Post, writing “There is overwhelming evidence that Chinese authorities are using mass forced DNA collection in many parts of China — but Tibet is an especially cruel case. Human rights groups report that police are taking blood samples from men, women and children , with no legitimate justification , in all seven prefectures in the Tibetan autonomous region, often showing up at kindergartens. There’s zero indication Tibetans can refuse.”

“Drug Discovery Efforts at George Mason University”

Andalibi et al. discuss research at GMU in this article in SLAS Discovery, writing in their abstract: “With over 39,000 students, and research expenditures in excess of $200 million, George Mason University (GMU) is the largest R1 (Carnegie Classification of very high research activity) university in Virginia. Mason scientists have been involved in the discovery and development of novel diagnostics and therapeutics in areas as diverse as infectious diseases and cancer. Below are highlights of the efforts being led by Mason researchers in the drug discovery arena.”

“To enable targeted cellular delivery, and non-biomedical applications, Veneziano and colleagues have developed a synthesis strategy that enables the design of self-assembling DNA nanoparticles (DNA origami) with prescribed shape and size in the 10 to 100 nm range. The nanoparticles can be loaded with molecules of interest such as drugs, proteins and peptides, and are a promising new addition to the drug delivery platforms currently in use. The investigators also recently used the DNA origami nanoparticles to fine tune the spatial presentation of immunogens to study the impact on B cell activation. These studies are an important step towards the rational design of vaccines for a variety of infectious agents.”

“To elucidate the parameters for optimizing the delivery efficiency of lipid nanoparticles (LNPs), Buschmann, Paige and colleagues have devised methods for predicting and experimentally validating the pKa of LNPs based on the structure of the ionizable lipids used to formulate the LNPs. These studies may pave the way for the development of new LNP delivery vehicles that have reduced systemic distribution and improved endosomal release of their cargo post administration.”

“To better understand protein-protein interactions and identify potential drug targets that disrupt such interactions, Luchini and colleagues have developed a methodology that identifies contact points between proteins using small molecule dyes. The dye molecules noncovalently bind to the accessible surfaces of a protein complex with very high affinity, but are excluded from contact regions. When the complex is denatured and digested with trypsin, the exposed regions covered by the dye do not get cleaved by the enzyme, whereas the contact points are digested. The resulting fragments can then be identified using mass spectrometry. The data generated can serve as the basis for designing small molecules and peptides that can disrupt the formation of protein complexes involved in disease processes. For example, using peptides based on the interleukin 1 receptor accessory protein (IL-1RAcP), Luchini, Liotta, Paige and colleagues disrupted the formation of IL-1/IL-R/IL-1RAcP complex and demonstrated that the inhibition of complex formation reduced the inflammatory response to IL-1B.”

“Working on the discovery of novel antimicrobial agents, Bishop, van Hoek and colleagues have discovered a number of antimicrobial peptides from reptiles and other species. DRGN-1, is a synthetic peptide based on a histone H1-derived peptide that they had identified from Komodo Dragon plasma. DRGN-1 was shown to disrupt bacterial biofilms and promote wound healing in an animal model. The peptide, along with others, is being developed and tested in preclinical studies. Other research by van Hoek and colleagues focuses on in silico antimicrobial peptide discovery, screening of small molecules for antibacterial properties, as well as assessment of diffusible signal factors (DFS) as future therapeutics.”

“The above examples provide insight into the cutting-edge studies undertaken by GMU scientists to develop novel methodologies and platform technologies important to drug discovery.”

Women at the OPCW

From the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: “In this one-hour panel discussion, we will speak to four women leaders at OPCW on the importance of embedding gender equity and diversity in the culture of an organisation.”

“Starting with opening remarks by the OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, an International Gender Champion, to set the stage on how important it is to have people of diverse backgrounds in roles at all levels, including leadership, in furthering the mandate of OPCW. We will join our panelists to discuss their personal leadership journeys, learning experience, and advice on how to promote diversity and inclusion in a leadership role. There will be time for questions and answers at the event of the event.”

Learn more and register here. This event will take place on March 27 at 10 am EST.

Navigating Infodemics and Building Trust During Public Health Emergencies

“The National Academies will convene a virtual public workshop, April 10-11, to examine the history of public health infodemics, the impact of infodemics on trust in the public health enterprise, and tools and practices to address infodemics. This workshop builds upon a previous National Academies workshop on Building Trust in Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Science, and will go beyond what is known about risk and crisis communications to generate actionable, targeted insights that federal state, tribal, local, and territorial agencies and officials can take to prevent and respond to infodemics.”

Learn more and register here.

ICYMI- Webinar: Global Biolabs 2023 Report on Laboratories Handling the World’s Most Dangerous Pathogens

Watch the recording for this event here.

“On March 17, 2023, the Global Biolabs Initiative launched its latest report, Global BioLabs 2023, and released updates to its interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs.

With the global expansion of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, where the world’s most dangerous pathogens are studied, gaps in biosecurity and biosafety governance are widening. Since its inception in 2021, the Global Biolabs Initiative has tracked the proliferation of the highest containment labs, identified several key trends in their construction and operation, developed biorisk management scorecards to measure how well countries are governing biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research, and mapped the global biorisk management architecture.

The pace of BSL4/BSL3+ labs expansion is outpacing current biosafety and biosecurity regulations, and coordinated international action is needed to address increasing biorisks. In this webinar, Dr Filippa Lentzos, King’s College London, and Dr Gregory Koblentz, George Mason University, present the Global BioLabs 2023 report, describe key trends, and discuss recommendations for strengthening global biorisk management. The event also featured a demonstration of the interactive map.

In 2022, the Global Biolabs initiative partnered with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to relaunch the interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, which can be viewed here: https://thebulletin.org/global-biolabs/

Read the report and find more information about the Global Biolabs Initiative here: https://www.globalbiolabs.org/“

ICYMI- Cyberbiosecurity: The New Frontier of Counterproliferation

“On December 6, 2022, CRDF Global hosted a webinar titled “Cyberbiosecurity: The New Frontier of Counterproliferation.” The two-hour panel session featured cyberbiosecurity experts Randall Murch and Dr. Gemma Bowsher. Murch is a research lead for cyberbiosecurity at the Virginia Technical Institute and has been credited for the creation of the term “cyberbiosecurity.” Dr. Bowsher is a research associate and co-lead for Health Intelligence and Biosecurity at the Conflict and Health Research Group at King’s College London. Biorisk management expert Dr. Lora Grainger and Nathan Gwira, CRDF Global’s cybersecurity technical specialist, acted as moderators. Biosecurity Deputy Program Manager Urszula Velez was the logistics support leader for the event.”

Learn more and watch this event’s recording here.

Apply for the 2023 Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship

“The global norm against biological weapons cannot be maintained without youth voices  being  included  in the multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Youth perspectives are key to create innovative solutions and generate long-term engagement. There are particular benefits to including the perspectives of young people from developing countries, where most of the world’s youth is concentrated.”

“Organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva in partnership with key international actors empowering youth in science diplomacy and global biosecurity, the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship provides a unique learning and networking experience into multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva.”

“Launched in 2019 as a Biosecurity Diplomacy Workshop, the Youth for Biosecurity Initiative is for the first time in 2023 providing the opportunity for 15 young scientists from the Global South to join an online interactive training programme prior to a field visit during the meeting of the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention in Geneva.”

Learn more and apply here by March 29.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: “Before the infamous sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, Aum Shinrikyo attempted to use biological weapons. In July 1993, what agent did the cult attempt to spread from a cooling tower on the roof of their headquarters?”

Last week, our question was: “The Ides of March may have already passed, but this week’s question is still focused on classical antiquity: In about 129 BC, Manius Aquillius, a senator and consul, is thought to have ended an ongoing war in the Roman province of Asia by doing what to rebellious cities?” Florus describes in Epitome of Roman History how the notoriously brutal Aquillius poisoned the water supplies of several rebellious cities throughout Asia, including Pergamum. He wasn’t the only one to suffer, though! Adrienne Mayor, author of Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs, details in The Poison King: The Life and Legend of Mithridates how Aquillius was subjected to “a diabolical last meal for a glutton for gold”–execution by molten gold.

If you recall, a couple weeks ago we asked a trivia question about the murder of Georgi Markov, who reportedly was poisoned by a man who used a modified umbrella to push a pellet containing ricin into his leg. The Guardian recently covered a new Danish documentary on the life of Markov and the events that led to his death that can be accessed here.

Happy Spring Break! This week offers a mixed bag including coverage of the new Global BioLabs Report, many updates on and discussion of US pandemic policy, updates on the potential poisonings in Iran, and more. There are several new publications as well, with topics spanning South Korea’s COVID-19 response, the BWC Working Group, Russian disinformation, and more. As always, we have listed several upcoming events, professional opportunities, and a new trivia question.

2019 Biodefense Grad Receives Award from Institute for Defense Analyses

The Schar School recently featured Janet Marroquin Pineda (Biodefense MS ’19, Current Biodefense PhD Student) for her recognition by the Institute for Defense Analyses: “Marroquin Pineda, a 2019 graduate of the Schar School of Policy and Government’s Master of Biodefense program and current Schar School biodefense doctoral student, was recently awarded the 2022 David S. C. Chu Award for Excellence in Research at IDA. The award is presented annually to a research associate who has made outstanding analytic contributions in support of IDA’s mission to answer the most challenging U.S. security and science policy questions with objective analysis.”

Bonus-the Schar School piece was written by Biodefense MS Student Sophie Hirshfield!

Boom in Labs Handling Dangerous Pathogens Not Matched by Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulation

“The number of labs handling dangerous pathogens has risen to more than 100 around the world but has not been accompanied by sufficient oversight, raising biosafety and biosecurity concerns, a new report by King’s College London warns.”

“The Global BioLabs Report 2023 found the number of BSL4 labs in operation, under construction or planned has grown by 10 in two years, from 59 across 23 countries in 2021 to 69 across 27 countries. Three quarters of these are in urbanised areas exacerbating the impact of any accidental releases of pathogens.”

‘“We’re seeing rapid expansion of max containment labs in Asia but many of these countries score poorly on biorisk management,” report author Dr Filippa Lentzos said. “We found biosafety governance to be stronger than biosecurity, while the weakest component is management of dual-use research of concern.”’

“The report also highlights the rise in use of a new type of high-containment lab, known as ‘BSL3+’ or ‘BSL3-enhanced’ of which there are 57 around the world – mainly in Europe and most in urban centres. These labs adopt additional precautions when carrying out especially risky research, but there are few guidelines for what constitutes a BSL3+ lab and no evidence that the measures being taken in these facilities are adequate for the research they carry out.”

‘“We urgently need coordinated international action to address increasing biorisks,” says project-co lead Dr Gregory Koblentz of the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.”

“To address these risks, the report calls for:

• Labs conducting high-consequence work with pathogens to adopt the international standard for biorisk management (ISO 35001).
• Countries to incorporate current international biorisk management standards into their national legislation and guidance.
• The World Health Organisation (WHO) to develop criteria and guidance for BSL3+ labs as well as guidance on field biosafety, and to establish collaborating centres for biorisk management for every region.
• Countries to better leverage existing international biorisk management organisations to strengthen global biorisk management.”

“Dr Lentzos said: “There has been a global boom in construction of labs handling dangerous pathogens, but this has not been accompanied by sufficient biosafety and biosecurity oversight. Our new report documents for the first time the current picture around the world and sets out clear recommendations to help address current shortcomings that need to be implemented at the local, national and international level.”’

“The Global Biolabs project based at King’s College London began in 2021 and partners with George Mason University and The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Its new report scores the 27 countries with BSL4 labs on their biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research legislation and general implementation effectiveness. It shows the rapid increase in the number of BSL4 labs and says most of the increase is in Asia including India, Kazakhstan, and Singapore. It also identified trends around the size of the facilities and the level of personal protective equipment used in such labs.”

“For the first time the report also looked at ‘BSL3 enhanced’ and ‘BSL3+’ labs which it found are mainly used by public health institutions and universities, and tend to have a stronger focus on animal health research compared to BSL4 facilities.”

“The report also assessed biorisk management and governance at the international level and found that overall, biosafety governance was found to be much stronger than biosecurity. It highlighted how there are several informal multinational groups that emphasise biorisk management in their missions but lack authority and/or resources to mandate meaningful changes.”

“It also said that those international organisations that do have more resources, members and official mandates that could cover biorisk management place the issue lower down on their list of priorities and there are challenges achieving co-ordinated action and agreement.”

US COVID-19 Updates

House Backs COVID Origins Information Declassification

Last Friday, the US House of Representatives voted unanimously to require the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, to declassify information regarding the origin of COVID-19 in a 419 to 0 vote. The bill previously passed the Senate on March 1 with unanimous consent, so it is now awaiting signature by President Biden. This comes in the shadow of much controversy surrounding the Department of Energy’s updated assessment on the likelihood of a lab origin of SARS-CoV-2.

Biden Administration Requests $20 Billion in Mandatory Funding to Improve Public Health

President Biden’s budget request, released this Thursday, includes $20 billion in mandatory funding (available over five years) for “…the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of Health, and the Food and Drug Administration to support preparedness for pandemics and other biological threats.” Notably, as the end of the emergency declarations approaches, the administration did not request supplemental funding for COVID-19. GovExec explains further that, “For the CDC specifically, the budget proposal includes funding to support the agency’s restructuring, which it started in April 2022, based on issues identified during the pandemic as well as funding to improve public health data, which is something the director has told Congress the CDC desperately needs.”

End of Emergency Declarations Approaching

The COVID-19 Emergency Declaration that was enacted in March of 2020 is set to expire on May 11, 2023, marking a major shift in the federal government’s involvement and support for the ongoing COVID-19 response. In a recent brief for NACCHO Voice, Callahan and Ridley explained that “According to the CDC, as of February 2023, there are still over 200,000 new reported cases of COVID-19, nearly 2,500 COVID-19 related deaths a week, over 3,500 new hospital admissions daily because of COVID-19, and only 16 percent of the US population has received the updated booster dose. Although the Emergency Declaration is ending, COVID-19 is still very much present in our communities and still poses a threat to our health and well-being.”

Klotz and Sandbrink discussed what the end of this declaration will look like in a recent piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, writing in part “President Joe Biden’s administration announced that come May 11, COVID-19 will no longer be a public health emergency necessitating special governmental powers. Republicans in the House passed a bill to end the emergency immediately. And Biden himself famously declared the pandemic over at an auto show in September. Of course, no matter how many federal officials make pronouncements, the COVID-19 pandemic won’t be over any time soon. Trevor Bedford, a computational virologist at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle, told David Wallace-Wells of The New York Times that each year about 50 percent of Americans will get COVID-19 and 100,000 will die. The article was appropriately titled “Endemic Covid-19 Looks Pretty Brutal.” It will be, and society should be prepared to limit the carnage with better medicines, better vaccines, and better air filtration systems.”

Their piece covers a number of ways the US can help mitigate the severity of this situation, including reducing the number of hospitalizations and limiting the impact on the economy, through measures like embracing nasal vaccines, working to improve air quality, and navigating implementing effective but politically divisive measures like masking in public settings. They write in their conclusion, “Some strategies, like better medicines, will allow us to survive COVID. Others, like better vaccines and better air, could help quash outbreaks. Only time will tell if we will be able to ever rid ourselves of omicron and its subvariants. Others infectious disease threats could be looming, as well. H5N1 bird flu recently swept through a mink farm in Spain, raising concerns that the virus could mutate so it transmits more easily among mammals, including humans. That would be a potentially catastrophic development. The virus kills 50 percent of the people it infects. Far from being important only for taming COVID-19, new vaccines, therapies, and technologies may one day, unfortunately, be needed to thwart H5N1, too.”

Preparing for the Next Pandemic

Finally, if it isn’t clear by now, the start of the next pandemic is a question of when it will happen, not if it will happen. Dr. Tom Inglesby touched on some of the issues we might face when that does happen in a recent opinion piece for the New York Times. In it he explains: “Late last year, I participated in an exercise meant to play out what might happen if the world was presented with a new disease spreading quickly, with no warning…The exercise revolved around a number of simulated emergency meetings of the World Health Organization advisory board, called in response to a very serious new pandemic — a risk that the W.H.O. refers to as “Disease X.”’

“Among the exercise participants were highly experienced current and past health ministers and senior public health officials from nine countries. The urgent events required them to make hard policy decisions quickly, with little information. Each decision had huge consequences for society and for the course of the pandemic. This was how it was in the early days of Covid. It’s also how it will be in other pandemics.”

“Some of the smartest and most experienced international public health leaders had differing, sometimes opposing views on many fundamental questions about the response. Should they shut down travel in the earliest days? Should they close schools in the first affected countries? If a future pandemic has a much higher case fatality rate than Covid or if it severely affected children, should countries take different, stronger, faster measures to contain it? Top experts don’t yet agree.”

Furthermore, another key issue to successfully preparing for the next pandemic is not just recognizing how politicized public health is in the United States, but the negative impact this has had on the public health workforce. In a recent piece for Michigan Advance, Anna Gustafson writes about the difficult situation Governor Gretchen Whitmer and former Chief Medical Executive of Michigan’s Department of Health and Human Services, Dr. Joneigh Khaldun, faced. Gustafson writes ‘“I think in the very beginning I made a general assumption that if people were presented with the right information, and saw how this was impacting our society, we would come together and buckle down to prevent the spread of the virus,” Khaldun, who has since left her position with the state, told the Advance this week. “What I did not anticipate is just how political the pandemic response would become, and how that would hinder our response.”’

This points to a number of much deeper, systemic problems that simple public health funding will not be able to address, let alone in time for the next public health crisis.

“Navalny” Wins Oscar

“Navalny,” a documentary focused on former Russian presidential candidate Alexey Navalny, won the Oscar award for best documentary this Sunday at the Academy Awards. CNN explains, “The riveting real-life thriller follows Navalny’s political rise, his survival of an assassination attempt against him by poisoning and his subsequent imprisonment. Directed by Daniel Roher and presented by CNN Films and HBO Max, “Navalny” documents a methodical investigation by CNN Chief International Correspondent, Clarissa Ward, and journalist group, Bellingcat, to unmask Navalny’s would-be killers.”

Updates on Poisonings in Iran

Michele Catanzaro outlines what is known so far about this situation in Nature News, explaining “Iran’s government has arrested more than 100 people that it says are responsible for an unknown sickness that has affected potentially thousands of the country’s schoolgirls. Many are attributing the sickness to poisoning. As videos continue to emerge online of distressed young people being taken to clinics and hospitals, Nature spoke to toxicologists, chemical-weapons researchers, epidemiologists, political scientists and others to explore possible explanations.”

This piece addresses a number of facets, including the potential for the uptick in reported symptoms to be the result of the psychological stress fear of being poisoned can cause. Furthermore, on the topic of how these events should be investigated, Catanzaro writes “Researchers, human-rights groups and some governments say that an independent investigation is needed. Such an investigation would need the government to provide “access to health data, that are often extremely securitized in Iran”, says Behrouzan.”

This piece addresses a number of facets, including the potential for the uptick in reported symptoms to be the result of the psychological stress fear of being poisoned can cause. Furthermore, on the topic of how these events should be investigated, Catanzaro writes “Researchers, human-rights groups and some governments say that an independent investigation is needed. Such an investigation would need the government to provide “access to health data, that are often extremely securitized in Iran”, says Behrouzan.”

“A thorough investigation would include interviews with victims, toxicological tests, analyses of clinical histories, an epidemiological study and environmental sampling, according to researchers Nature has interviewed.”

““I would like to see an open discussion, with the clinicians that saw the girls speaking freely,” says Ward. “You have to bring the community with you. Community involvement for something sensitive is crucial for people to believe in the findings,” adds Hay, who carried out a process of this kind to understand mass sickness in Kosovo around the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia into separate countries² in 1991.”

“Iran has enough trained experts and equipment to carry out toxicological investigations, says Hay. This capacity was built during and after Iran’s war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, during which Iraq used chemical weapons.”

Man Arrested in November Claims He Sought to Release a Virus at Schiphol

Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport has had a rough go the last year, but this culminated in November when a 55-year-old man was arrested at Schiphol Plaza after claiming he wanted to release a virus at Schiphol airport. The man was arrested as the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) responded when he entered the airport carrying a suitcase he claimed contained a jar with a virus inside, according to recent reporting from NL Times.

“A few weeks before the incident, the man had sent an email claiming he wanted to release a virus at the airport, the Marechaussee said. The Marechaussee briefed airport security about the man, so he was immediately recognized when he entered Schiphol Plaza at the end of November 2022. Marechaussee officers stopped and searched the man. He told them he had a virus in his suitcase.”

Ultimately, RIVM determined the jar he had contained no hazardous materials, and the officers involved were not in danger. The man’s motivation is still unclear at this time.

“How South Korea Avoided a National Lockdown”

In a recent piece for the Telegraph, Nicola Smith discusses South Korea’s approach to responding to COVID-19, highlighting the country’s ability to rapidly roll-out testing in the early days of the pandemic. She writes, “Testing was the key to Korea’s success, said Dr Jee Young-mee, head of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA), in an exclusive interview with the Telegraph last week. Mass testing, quickly deployed, allowed South Korea to save lives, avoid a nationwide lockdown and keep its economy motoring.”

‘“We thought quick action starts from testing. We need to know the confirmed cases very quickly then we can isolate and treat. With that we can contain the virus,” she told the Telegraph in the KDCA’s state-of-the-art headquarters – a sprawling campus of polished buildings an hour from Seoul that’s been the vanguard of the country’s pandemic response.”

Dr. HyunJung Kim, an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD program, focused his dissertation on this topic and has published portions of his research, including his recent Globalization and Health article-“Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea.”

In this article, Kim explains “Emergency-use-authorization (EUA) is the representative biodefense policy that allows the use of unlicensed medical countermeasures or off-label use of approved medical countermeasures in response to public health emergencies. This article aims to determine why the EUA policies of the United States and South Korea produced drastically different outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how these outcomes were determined by the originations and evolutionary paths of the two policies…Historical institutionalism (HI) explains institutional changes—that is, how the institution is born and how it evolves—based on the concept of path dependency. However, the HI analytical narratives remain at the meso level of analysis in the context of structure and agency. This article discusses domestic and policy-level factors related to the origination of the biodefense institutions in the United States and South Korea using policy-learning concepts with the Event-related Policy Change Model.”

He finds that, “The evolution and outcomes of the two EUAs are different because both policies were born out of different needs. The United States EUA is primarily oriented toward protecting homeland security against CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) threats, whereas the South Korea EUA is specifically designed for disease prevention against infectious disease outbreak.”

“Biodefense: Actions Needed to Address Long-Standing Challenges”

This new Snapshot from the Government Accountability Office discusses several ways the federal government can strengthen its preparedness for a biological incident. GAO’s recommendations focus on addressing challenges in the National Biodefense Strategy, strengthening biodefense preparedness activities, addressing biodefence technology issues and challenges in biosurveillance efforts DHS faces.

“Improving U.S. Biosafety and Biosecurity: Revisiting Recommendations from the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel and the Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Regulations”

This article from Haines and Gronvall was recently published in Applied Biosafety. Their absrtact reads in part “In response to a series of biosafety incidents in 2014, the White House directed two high-level expert committees to analyze biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories and make recommendations for work with select agents and toxins. Overall, they recommended 33 actions to address areas related to national biosafety, including promoting a culture of responsibility, oversight, outreach and education, applied biosafety research, incident reporting, material accountability, inspection processes, regulations and guidelines, and determining the necessary number of high-containment laboratories in the United States”

“Further work is needed to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories handling regulated pathogens (biological select agents and toxins [BSAT]). These carefully considered recommendations should now be enacted, including determining if there is sufficient high-containment laboratory space for response to a future pandemic, developing a sustained applied biosafety research program to improve our understanding of how high-containment research should be performed, bioethics training to educate the regulated community on the consequences of unsafe practices in BSAT research, and the creation of a no-fault incident reporting system for biological incidents, which may inform and improve biosafety training.”

“The BWC Working Group: Setting the Scene for the Organizational Meeting”

The BioWeapons Prevention Project recently published this report discussing the taskings and organization of the Working Group established at the Ninth BWC Review Conference last year. The piece explains in part, “The Ninth five-yearly Review Conference for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC/BTWC) held at the end of 2022 agreed on the establishment of a ‘Working Group on the strengthening of the Convention’. Although the Review Conference was unable to agree many details of how the Working Group might operate, the creation of the Group is seen by many practitioners as an advance on earlier arrangements for activities between Review Conferences.”

“What’s Next? The Ninth Biological Review Conference and Beyond”

Zhang et al.’s latest piece for UNIDIR discusses the recent BWC RevCon and what the Final Document lays out for the next five years. They write in part, “Biosecurity and biological disarmament cannot remain siloed and insulated from wider trends in the scientific and technological community. As biotechnology continues to advance, converge and spread around the world, interaction with stakeholders working on relevant technologies internationally will become ever more important for both biosecurity and biological disarmament. The Working Group provides an important opportunity to advance the BWC and re-shape relations with external stakeholders. States should seize this chance in setting up the Working Group.”

“Nuclear Security During Armed Conflict: Lessons From Ukraine”

Check out this new publication by Vitaly Fedchenko for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: “The attacks on nuclear installations in Ukraine by the Russian military in 2022 were unprecedented. Nuclear security aims at prevention, detection and response to malicious or unauthorized acts by non-state actors, not the armed forces of a state. However, an international armed conflict creates new circumstances in which a national nuclear security regime must operate.”

“In March 2022 the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) highlighted ‘seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security’ in extraordinary circumstances. There are three further areas in which the international nuclear security framework can be strengthened and prepared for extraordinary events, including armed conflict. First, there is a need to further clarify and plan the actions of competent authorities. Second, the IAEA may be able to assist member states in developing guidance for specific scenarios during extraordinary events. Third, there should be further integration of nuclear security with nuclear safety and emergency preparedness and response.”

“The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons”

New from the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, this piece explains the history of Russia’s involvement in CTR-backed disarmament efforts and its ongoing disinformation campaigns. The piece explains that “Moscow continues to push false information about biological weapons, without providing any credible evidence. Over a thousand members of the scientific community have signed a letter  penned by Russian experts  openly disputing the Kremlin’s claim, saying the work of peaceful biological research laboratories in Ukraine does “not imply any development of biological weapons or even the use of particularly dangerous pathogens in the laboratories. The list of destroyed strains published by RIA Novosti and other Russian media outlets contains not a single particularly dangerous strain.”’

“The United States’ peaceful cooperation and assistance activities comply with and help fulfill our obligations under the BWC. These cooperation and assistance activities have been transparent and designed to help countries detect, prepare for, and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Russia seeks instead to cast peaceful research to prevent disease in Ukraine and around the world — and the U.S. cooperation and assistance to support it — as nefarious biological weapons programs. The Kremlin’s biological weapons disinformation campaign aims to deflect, distract, and misdirect. Russia has a history of accusing others of doing what it is doing itself, and its recent biological weapons claims related to Ukraine are no different. The United States assesses that Russia continues to maintain an offensive biological weapons program in violation of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.”

LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION FIFTH REVIEW CONFERENCE

Online Panel Discussions | 20 and 30 March 2023 | 13.00-14.30h CET

WHAT: The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is pleased to invite you to two online panel discussions on Lessons Learned for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Fifth Review Conference. They are part of a series of events the Institute is holding in preparation for the Fifth CWC Review Conference. The events will contribute to enhancing understandings of CWC Review Conferences and identifying lessons to be learned from past experiences. 

The set of speaker for each of the events will be announced shortly. The updated agenda can be found at: https://www.unidir.org/events/lessons-learned-chemical-weapons-convention-fifth-review-conference. Speakers for these events include former Review Conference office holders, national representatives, and experts. 

The panels will be moderated by James Revill and will include a question-and-answer session with the audience.

WHEN & WHERE: 20 and 30 March 2023 | 13.00-14.30h CET | Online

PARTICIPANTS: UNIDIR encourages the participation of representatives and experts specialized or interested in issues pertaining to the CWC.

RSVP: The link to the webinars will be shared with registered participants. Please register here: https://CWCLessonsLearned.eventbrite.com. For any questions, please contact: sarah.erickson@un.org

Online Event: Discussion with Amb. van der Kwast About What to Expect at the 5th CWC Review Conference

“The Fifth Five-Year Review Conference (RC-5) for the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention will be held in the Hague from May 15-19, 2023.”

“At the conference, member states and the broader chemical weapons disarmament community will gather to assess past achievements, treaty implementation, and compliance, and discuss plans to strengthen the CWC in the years ahead.”

“You are invited to join a virtual discussion with Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast, the chair-designate for the Review Conference, who will share his hopes and expectations for the conference’s outcomes.”

“Paul Walker, the Chair of the CWC Coalition, will moderate. Amb. van der Kwast’s remarks will be followed by a Q&A session.”

“This discussion will be on the record.”

“This special event will be open to all members of the CWC Coalition, and other interested members of the public, journalists, and diplomats.”

This webinar will take place on March 21 at 11 am EST. Register here.

Book Talk with Dr. Katherine Paris on “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse”

“Dr. Katherine Paris, an alumnus of the Mason Biodefense PhD program, recently released her new book “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse.” Join the NextGen Global Health Security Network for a conversation with Dr. Paris to learn about her research!” This event will take place on Wednesday, March 22, from 7-8 PM. Register for the Zoom here: https://cglink.me/2d7/r2064992

Intelligence Studies Consortium

“On March 24, 2023, the Intelligence Studies Consortium is convening its third symposium, entitled New Perspectives in Intelligence Studies. This year, George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting. The symposium will be from 8 AM to 4 PM in Rooms 125-126 Van Metre Hall, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA. The closest Metro is Virginia Square/GMU on the Orange and Silver lines.

The symposium will feature student presentations in four panels:

• Russia and China
• Violent Non-State Actors
• Emerging Technologies
• Transnational Challenges

There will be an 8:30 AM keynote address from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Shannon Corless, and a lunchtime conversation with General Michael V. Hayden.

We encourage students to attend in person. We have also provided a livestream option for those not in the Washington DC area.”

Learn more and register here.

Apply for the 2023 Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship

“The global norm against biological weapons cannot be maintained without youth voices  being  included  in the multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Youth perspectives are key to create innovative solutions and generate long-term engagement. There are particular benefits to including the perspectives of young people from developing countries, where most of the world’s youth is concentrated.”

“Organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva in partnership with key international actors empowering youth in science diplomacy and global biosecurity, the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship provides a unique learning and networking experience into multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva.”

“Launched in 2019 as a Biosecurity Diplomacy Workshop, the Youth for Biosecurity Initiative is for the first time in 2023 providing the opportunity for 15 young scientists from the Global South to join an online interactive training programme prior to a field visit during the meeting of the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention in Geneva.”

Learn more and apply here by March 29.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). The Ides of March may have already passed, but this week’s question is still focused on classical antiquity: In about 129 BC, Manius Aquillius, a senator and consul, is thought to have ended an ongoing war in the Roman province of Asia by doing what to rebellious cities?

Shout out to Sophie H. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to last week’s question, ” In 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident, was poisoned with what agent?” is ricin.

Happy (almost) Valentine’s Day! This week we’re covering Russia’s spats with the WHO and continued disinformation efforts, a Biodefense PhD Student’s recent research award, and more. This edition includes plenty of new publications, including several reports from the US and UK governments and the UN on topics ranging from most important health threats to the UN’s assessment of integrating the One Health approach in combatting superbugs. Of course, this one also has this year’s Pandora Report Valentine’s Day cards so you can spread all the love this year.

Biodefense PhD Student, MS Alumna Wins IDA Research Excellence Award

Janet Marroquin Pineda, an Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Scholar who is currently earning her PhD in Biodefense, recently received IDA’s Award for Research Excellence. IDA said of Marroquin Pineda, “Marroquin Pineda serves as a subject matter expert, provides her team with analytical guidance, and transitions from individual contributor to project lead as needed. She has exhibited skillful leadership, masterful diplomacy and expert ability to uphold quality and objectivity standards on multiple projects. She routinely develops unique methods and creative approaches to complete projects. In addition, her work is consistently well-received by sponsors. Further, Marroquin Pineda has become a thought leader within SFRD’s chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear portfolio. Her technical skills, analytic leadership and extensive sponsor network across the biotechnology community have been key to growing and maintaining this strategically important portfolio for IDA.” Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz said, “We are very proud of Janet and glad that IDA has recognized how exceptional she is.”

Congratulations to Janet! We are all so proud of you!

Russia Clashing with US, WHO, the Truth…

If you thought we were past Russia making ridiculous claims about supposed American BW facilities in Ukraine, it seems the Russians still just can’t help themselves. On January 30, Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, NBC chief at the Russian Ministry of Defence, claimed once again in a briefing that the United States developed biological weapons in facilities in Ukraine, including enhanced versions of SARS-CoV-2. Yahoo! News explains that “In his remarks, Kirillov claimed to have obtained 20,000 documents that show evidence of “illegal military and biological activities” on the part of the United States in Ukraine. He described the documents as “reference and analytical materials” but provided no other details.”

However, Kirillov went further than he has previously, this time referencing the EcoHealth Alliance in his claims that the US has done work “enhancing the pathogenic characteristics of COVID-19.” The same article explains this further with “The reference to EcoHealth Alliance, also disseminated uncritically by Russian state media, seemed calculated to appeal to Western outlets that have trafficked in conspiracy theories about both the coronavirus and the war in Ukraine. Kirillov said that organization played a “key role” in biological warfare, an assertion that goes well beyond what mainstream critics of EcoHealth Alliance have maintained.” This round of claims also include ones that the US has infected Ukrainian servicemembers, prisoners, and addicts with HIV using these weapons. Of course, this is part of a broader disinformation firehose created by the Russians, as EUvsDisinfo has covered extensively.

This wasn’t the only update in Russia’s saga of international embarrasment this week, as the Russian delegation to the WHO Executive Board called the organization’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine “politicized”. This was after the publication of a report this week discussing the WHO’s emergency response in Ukraine, which has been quite extensive given Russia’s repeated targeting of healthcare facilities in the country and other ongoing problems. Russia attempted to pressure the WHO into revising the report, taking particular issue with the agency’s use of the word “invasion” in reference to what the Russian Federation continues to describe as a “special military operation” in Ukraine. In response, WHO Director-General Tedros said, “I used the same word in a speech last year…I couldn’t find any other word that would represent it because it’s the truth. What could I say?” He later continued, saying “The report is truthful and was written in good faith, and it’s my report and I take full responsibility…We didn’t try to politicize anything. … There was no pressure.”

On a related note, the American Hospital Association recently released an analyst note discussing the Russian hacktivist group, KillNet, and its efforts targeting the US health and public health sector. As the note explains, the group uses DDoS attacks often and has “…previously targeted, or threatened to target, organizations in the healthcare and public health (HPH) sector. For example, Killmilk, a senior member of the KillNet group, has threatened the U.S. Congress with the sale of the health and personal data of the American people because of the Ukraine policy of the U.S. Congress. In December 2022, the pro-Russian hacktivist group claimed the compromise of a U.S.-based healthcare organization that supports members of the U.S. military and claimed to possess a large amount of user data from that organization.”

Scientists and Others Establish Protect Our Future Group

A team of scientists and other professionals have created Protect Our Future, a group that aims to create “…a future free of lab-generated pandemics, a future where reckless research on pathogens is ended, and a future where public trust in science is restored.” Science writes, “Protect Our Future co-founder Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, cites the 1977 influenza pandemic, which killed more than 700,000 people, as an example of what the group hopes to prevent; some researchers believe it was sparked by a leak of influenza from a lab in the Soviet Union. And Ebright and his new group also think virology experiments at a lab in Wuhan, China, could have sparked the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite a lack of direct evidence for that scenario, Ebright has regularly tweeted that officials at the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), which helped fund that work, potentially share blame for the deaths of millions in the current pandemic.”

The group hopes to reduce the number of laboratories undertaking research they deem problematic, and it is primarily interested in educating the public to influence the discussion of this topic among policymakers. Naturally, this is in contrast to those who argue that objectives like this and those in similar proposed legislation would inhibit or prevent beneficial research. However, others have also criticized the new group’s approach, which Science also explains: “But Stanford University microbiologist David Relman, who was part of the Cambridge Working Group, objects to the new organization’s “heavy top-down approach” and the lack of involvement from scientists who do research on dangerous human pathogens. He says guidelines crafted with input from scientists are more likely to change behavior without impeding research than rigid, punitive laws. Relman co-chairs a similar effort, the Pathogens Project, launched in September 2022 by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists to consider how to conduct responsible research with high-risk microbes. The Pathogens Project, he says, has a more “bottom-up” approach that incorporates the views of scientists working in the field.”

Spread the Love with Pandora Report Valentine’s Day Cards

Share the love with friends and family in style this year using our Valentine’s Day cards!

“Expanding the Australia Group’s Chemical Weapons Precursors Control List with a Family-Based Approach”

Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz recently co-authored this article with Costanzi and Cupitt in Pure and Applied Chemistry: “The Australia Group (AG) is a forum of like-minded states seeking to harmonize export controls to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The AG Chemical Weapons Precursors list features dual-use chemicals that can be used as precursors for the synthesis of chemical weapons, all individually enumerated. This is in contrast with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedules, which, alongside entries describing discrete chemicals, also include entries that describe families of chemicals. By using families of chemicals, the CWC achieves the objective of covering with a single entry a wide array of related chemicals of concern, including chemicals that have not yet been made. There are practical reasons why the AG Chemical Weapons Precursors list is exclusively based on the enumeration of individual chemicals. A cheminformatics tool of which we have developed a prototype, the Nonproliferation Compliance Cheminformatics Tool (NCCT), has the potential to enable export control officers to handle control lists that contain families of chemicals. Thus, it opens the way to expand the AG Chemical Weapons Precursors list to a family-based approach for some of its entries. Such a change would result in a closer alignment of the chemical space covered by the AG Chemical Weapons Precursors list with that covered by the CWC Schedules, thus closing loopholes that could be exploited by proliferators.”

“Preparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Issues”

“The Fifth CWC Review Conference is expected to take place in the second quarter of 2023. This event presents an important opportunity for CWC States Parties to take stock of the past and chart the future of this important disarmament agreement.”

“Progress with the CWC will however require careful preparation both in terms of the development of substantive inputs and ideas, but also raising awareness and understanding of the CWC and the Review Conference process. To support the CWC delegates, this report includes factual material on the historical experiences related to preparations, proposals, procedures, and participation in past Review Conferences.”

“It also includes a brief, balanced analysis of salient issues that are likely to be addressed at the Fifth Review Conference. Furthermore, it makes recommendation for preparing for the Review Conference.”

“The NIH-Led Research Response to COVID-19”

Science recently published this piece from Collins et al. discussing the NIH’s work to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic: “Though the COVID-19 pandemic, which has claimed the lives of at least 6.5 million individuals worldwide, is not yet over, it is not too soon to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the research response and some of the lessons that can be learned. Much important research has investigated key public health and clinical issues such as masking, indoor air ventilation, and prone ventilation. But, arguably, no research has been more innovative and impactful than that of the biomedical community around vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics. Drawing on our experience leading US-driven elements of this global biomedical research effort, we review here major cross-sector initiatives led by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and its partners. We outline key milestones…and crucial lessons learned, with the goal of informing and guiding the research community’s response to future pandemics…”

“American Democracy and Pandemic Security: Strengthening the U.S. Pandemic Response in a Free Society”

Check out this new report from the CSIS Global Health Policy Center , Brown University Pandemic Center , and COVID Collaborative discussing the findings from the first meeting of the Democracy and Pandemic Security roundtable. They write in part, “Going forward, a bipartisan approach is needed to protect public health and work to preserve individual freedom, drawing on the lived experiences of states and localities that did better at reducing deaths and hospitalizations while navigating impacts on education, the economy, and society. Such an effort will be mindful of the politics that have divided Americans during the Covid-19 response and will engage leaders and institutions reflecting the strength and pluralism of the United States to learn from the past and build a better future. A new, pragmatic consensus is needed that bridges deep divides and is fueled by candor, self-criticism, humility, a determined optimism, and civility. Mistakes stretch across every acre, as do quiet successes. Finding new solutions is the challenge. This report provides a description of the first convening and major findings of the Democracy and Pandemic Security roundtable.”

“Public Health Preparedness: HHS Should Plan for Medical Countermeasures Development and Manufacturing Risks”

This recent study from the Government Accountability Office reports on its ongoing monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic and HHS’ use of Centers for Innovation in Advanced Development and Manufacturing (CIADM) funds. However, HHS is ending the CIADM to transition to the National Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing Partnership (BioMaP). GAO explains that, “BioMaP is early in its development, and it is unclear how BioMaP will address some of the challenges faced by the CIADM program, as in the following examples.

• BioMaP is expected to use a different contracting structure intended to provide more incentives for industry partners to participate. However, this different structure requires additional expertise to manage effectively. Moreover, HHS told GAO that its contracting staff had previously faced resource challenges using this different contracting structure for other programs during the COVID-19 pandemic. HHS officials said in April 2022 that the agency has half the contracting staff needed to manage its contracting portfolio. This creates the risk that the agency may not have enough resources and expertise to manage this different structure effectively.

• HHS does not have a sustainable source of funding for the new program model, and it has not yet developed detailed plans or budgets. HHS officials said that, without sustained funding for BioMaP or a similar program, the agency would be unprepared to respond to the next pandemic.”

As a result, GAO “…is recommending that HHS incorporate into the development of its new program model an approach to systematically assess, and respond to, known challenges and risks associated with advanced development and manufacturing of medical countermeasures.”

“UKHSA Advisory Board: Preparedness for Infectious Disease Threats”

This report from the UK Health Security Agency’s Advisory Board aims to outline “…current infectious diseases threats, through the dominant routes of transmission and highlight the preparedness work within the organisation.” The report finds in part, “The UK has strong public health infrastructure in place, including robust surveillance systems, laboratories, and emergency response plans. Key components of this are outlined below, including developments to strengthen and improve. UKHSA will need to review the funding models available for each of these areas and agree the priorities for funding for future financial years. UKHSA has also enhanced its preparedness through the Centre for Pandemic Preparedness (CPP) and delivery and engagement with the G7 100-day mission for diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.”

“100 Days Mission: First Implementation Report”

“The independent International Pandemic Preparedness Secretariat (IPPS) has released a new report highlighting progress in the 100 Days Mission, an international effort to ensure that safe, effective vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics are available within 100 days of the onset of future pandemic threats. Victor J. Dzau, President of the National Academy of Medicine (NAM), is a member of the IPPS steering group and co-chair of the IPPS Science and Technology Expert Group, which provides technical input and assurance to the 100 Days Mission. “It is my privilege to serve as co-chair of this expert group, which will provide critical advice and evaluation of progress toward the 100 Days Mission,” Dzau shared.”

“Bracing for Superbugs: Strengthening Environmental Action in the One Health Response to Antimicrobial Resistance”

New from the UN Environment Programme: “The report Bracing for Superbugs: Strengthening environmental action in the One Health response to antimicrobial resistance provides evidence that the environment plays a key role in the development, transmission and spread of AMR.  Prevention is at the core of the action and environment is a key part of the solution.”

“The report aims to demystify and unpack the different, while interconnected, aspects of the environmental dimensions of AMR, offering a comprehensive overview of scientific findings on the subject. It provides actionable evidence of the importance of the environment in the development, transmission and spread of AMR, and it shows that environmental dimensions of AMR are multifaceted and the response rests on collaboration between sectors. A concerted systems approach such as “One Health,” which recognizes that the health of people, animals, plants and the environment are closely linked and interdependent, is the approach needed to tackle it.”

“This report analyzes the three economic sectors and their value chains that are key drivers of AMR development and spread in the environment: pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, agriculture and food, and healthcare, together with pollutants from poor sanitation, sewage and waste effluent in municipal systems. The report synthesizes current knowledge gaps, and it shows that while several actions are ongoing, more needs to be done and offers solutions to prevent and respond to AMR.”

“A One Health response to AMR will not only help reduce the risk and burden of AMR on societies but will also help address the triple planetary crisis.”

“Tracking the Bird Flu, Experts See a Familiar Threat–and a Virus Whose Course is Hard to Predict”

Helen Branswell discusses H5N1 in this piece for STAT News, writing about the history of this virus and Dr. Keiji Fukuda’s, a physician and epidemiologist who specializes in influenza, and others’ experience with it. She discusses the complex concerns surrounding its recent spread in a Spanish mink farm and potential changes in its epidemiology and ecology, writing “It is not clear how the virus entered the farm. But it seems possible, perhaps even probable, that at some point H5N1 spread from mink to mink. “Our findings also indicate that an onward transmission of the virus to other minks may have taken place in the affected farm,” the scientists who reported the event wrote in the journal Eurosurveillance. “This is suggested by the increasing number of infected animals identified after the confirmation of the disease and the progression of the infection from the initially affected area to the entire holding…The mere idea of mink-to-mink transmission gives flu researchers pause. If a virus can transmit from one mammal to another, what’s to stop it from transmitting between other mammalian species — like ours?”

Her piece concludes with a haunting quotation from Fukuda-“Fukuda concurred. “What has become clear to me over time is that the big challenge is not the viruses. That’s not what gives me a pit in my stomach,” he said. “The real challenge is whether people, whether governments, whether policymakers have the ability to actually address the challenge in the way that needs to be done. And I don’t see so much which encourages me, to be blunt. That’s what gives me a pit in my stomach.”

“Laying the Groundwork for the Bioeconomy”

Sarah Carter’s recent piece for the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) discusses the federal government’s role in the bioeconomy and the findings of an FAS workshop on this topic. She writes in part: “The December 7, 2022 workshop focused on government-based financial and economic tools and how they can best support the bioeconomy. Speakers provided context by describing the ways that the U.S. government is already planning to support regional biomanufacturing infrastructure through the National Science Foundation’s Regional Innovation Engine program and through the Department of Commerce’s Build Back Better Regional Challenge. Workshop participants also generated a range of specific ideas, including investment in networks of biomanufacturing infrastructure, direct government investment (e.g. tax incentives, subsidies, procurement, and improved grant opportunities) as well as development of resources and education to support small companies. Diverse workforce development was also identified as a critical factor, with an emphasis on programs and partnerships for technical programs and community colleges rather than Ph.D.-level education. The discussions revealed two overarching themes:

• There is a need for investments in a wide diversity of scale-up facilities and infrastructure for bio-based products.
• Investments will need to be sustained over time. Because biomanufacturing is rapidly advancing, ongoing funding will be needed to ensure that the facilities that are built and workforce development programs that are established now will be able to change and adapt in the future.”

“First Regional Workshop to Operationalize the Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences: Mitigating Biorisks and Governing Dual-Use Research (the Framework) in the WHO African Region”

This event summary from the WHO discusses a January workshop co-hosted by the WHO Science Division in collaboration with the WHO Regional Office for Africa and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention to operationalize the framework in the WHO African region. “The objectives of the two-day technical workshop were to present the framework and other related existing regional initiatives; to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and experience of countries on the challenges and needs in mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research; to strengthen collaboration among multiple and multidisciplinary stakeholders within the WHO African region; to test specific elements of the framework, including the six-step approach and the checklist for the national governments, and identify the needs for additional toolkits or regional guidance; and to recommend concrete actions for the roll-out of a national implementation of the framework.” A detailed report of this workshop will be published at a later date.

“What’s a Spillover? A Spillback? Here are Definitions for the Vocab of a Pandemic”

Max Barnhart’s recent piece for NPR covers commonly used terms like spillover, spillback, outbreak, epidemic, and more to help in understanding upcoming pieces in the “Goats and Soda: Stories of Life in a Changing World” series.

What We’re Listening To 🎧

“Special Online Briefing with Ambassador Joseph Manso, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons”

Amb. Joseph Manso’s briefing on the OPCW IIT report regarding the Assad regime’s use of CW in Douma in early 2018 is available here in both written and MP3 format. This briefing provides an overview of the IIT report’s findings and implications beyond these specific findings.

Publication Launch Event-Strategic Trade Review: 10th Issue

Join the Strategic Trade Research Institute on February 15, at 9 am EST for this launch event moderated by Dr. Andrea Viski, a Schar School adjunct professor who teaches courses on strategic trade controls. Featured authors will engage in a virtual interactive panel discussion discussing the new edition. Learn more and register here.

The 13th Annual Dupont Summit on Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy

“The purpose of the Dupont Summit is to promote interdisciplinary conversation about pressing issues related to the politics and policy of science, technology and the environment. The conference mirrors the interest of the PSO and its partners in promoting conversation about current policy concerns. The conference brings together academics, government, business and social leaders from a variety of backgrounds.” The hybrid conference will meet on Friday, February 17. Learn more and register here.

Personal Protective Equipment and Personal Protective Technology Product Standardization for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain

“The National Academies will convene a public workshop, March 1-2, to examine standards gaps related to personal protective equipment (PPE) and personal protective technology (PPT). The event will explore innovative approaches and technologies needed to update and streamline the U.S. standardization system for PPE and PPT in support of supply chain resiliency. Policymakers, manufacturers, users, and relevant technical contributors will discuss ways to improve the effectiveness, safety, supply stability, and accessibility of PPE and PPT in health care settings and increase usage by critical infrastructure workers and the general public.” Learn more and register here.

Novel Applications of Science and Technology to Address Emerging Chemical and Biological Threats

For the first time since 2019, this Gordon Research Conference is back, this time in sunny Ventura, CA. “The Chemical and Biological Defense GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.” The conference will be held March 19-24, 2023. Learn more and apply here by February 19.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). For this week, our question is: This disease, named for a Brazilian physician, is caused by the Trypanosoma cruzi parasite, and is commonly spread by kissing bugs. What is it?

Shout out to Georgios P. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to “In February 1964, Albert Nickel, an animal caretaker at Fort Detrick, contracted and died from a disease after he was bitten by an infected rodent. What is the name of the disease and what is its causative agent?” is Bolivian hemorrhagic fever caused by Machupo virus.