This week we discuss the UK’s new Biological Security Strategy and a recent report from the United Nations Investigative Team for Accountability of Da’esh/ISIL on ISIL’s crimes in Iraq. Several new publications are included as well as multiple new job openings.
UK Announces New Biological Security Strategy
The United Kingdom recently unveiled its new Biological Security Strategy. The strategy describes a vision “…that, by 2030, the UK is resilient to a spectrum of biological threats, and a world leader in responsible innovation, making a positive impact on global health, economic and security outcomes.” The strategy is split into two parts. The first provides context, describing the strategic drivers of the strategy and identifying risks. The second outlines a strategic framework the country will use to meet its priorities. A concise high-level implementation plan is also included in the document.
However, despite initial praise for this strategy, it comes amid growing criticism of the UK’s dismantling of plans and programs put into place to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. A recent piece from the Guardian outlines many of these concerns, with Dr. Clive Dix, the former chair of the UK’s vaccine taskforce describing this abandonment as “fraught with danger.” Dix was quoted saying “The government has basically put all their money on mRNA vaccines. They’ve gambled recklessly. They have basically assumed mRNA is going to solve the problem. ‘Let’s forget about all these other vaccine technologies. Let’s forget about manufacturing. Let’s just encourage the likes of Pfizer and Moderna to come to the UK, then we’re covered.’…That’s our pandemic preparedness. Quite frankly, it’s not just reckless. It’s fraught with danger.”’
UNITAD Releases Latest Report on Da’esh/ISIL Crimes, Including CW Use
The United Nations Investigative Team for Accountability of Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD) recently released its tenth report to UNSC on crimes committed by ISIL. As the report’s summary explains, “Following previously reported investigative achievements, the Team successfully launched new lines of inquiry on the development and use of biological and chemical weapons, the destruction of cultural and religious heritage and the crimes committed against various communities of Iraq. The Team has started to be engaged in building criminal case files with its Iraqi counterparts – investigative judges, prosecutors and forensic and law enforcement experts – against Da’esh/ISIL perpetrators who escaped from Iraq and are residing in third States.”
The report outlines these findings in depth on page 5, explaining that substantial evidence to support the Team’s case assessment was found, and that its focus is on investigating main sites of CW production, better understanding ISIL/Da’esh’s delivery systems, and collecting and preserving evidence linked to 12 separate attacks.
During the UNSC meeting where this report was discussed, “…numerous Council members commended UNITAD’s progress in its investigative priorities, including the launch of new lines of inquiry on the development and use of biological and chemical weapons; the destruction of cultural and religious heritage; and crimes committed against different Iraqi communities. However, several speakers emphasized that handing evidence over to the law enforcement and judicial bodies of Iraq is a key part of UNITAD’s mandate.”
UN coverage of that meeting recalls several council members’ comments on the report, explaining in part “While the number of attacks has decreased and its capability has been degraded, Da’esh “remains a critical threat in Iraq and globally”, said the representative of the United States. Accordingly, he highlighted UNITAD’s essential role in reducing this threat by supporting the Government of Iraq in repatriating Iraqi Da’esh members from detention centres in north-east Syria to face justice before national courts. Also, the Team can help other countries prosecute the thousands of Da’esh foreign fighters in detention centres in Iraq and Syria.”
However, despite the praise for UNITAD’s work on this issue, there is still the question of if the international community or domestic authorities will actually do something about it. In another UN post on this topic, the author explained “Christian Ritscher, Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD, recalled that chemical weapons use is outlawed internationally and could constitute a crime against humanity, war crime or even contribute to genocide, if a specific group is targeted…“To the best of my knowledge, the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors has rarely been adjudicated, if at all, in any court – whether national or international – around the world. As UNITAD, we would like to play our part and aim to change this,” he said.”

“Building Sustainable Infection Prevention in the Era of COVID-19”
In a recent article in Health Security, Dr. Saskia Popescu and Rebecca Leach discuss the importance of IPC as part of a holistic approach to healthcare biopreparedness. They explain in their introduction, “For years, many working in hospital infection prevention and control (IPC) and healthcare biopreparedness drew attention to the gaps in response and virtually nonexistent attention and funding that plagued the US healthcare infrastructure. IPC programs are responsible for reducing the risk of disease spread within a healthcare setting, but they also ensure education, training, epidemiological investigations of outbreaks, disease reporting and surveillance, and a multitude of other efforts to keep patients and healthcare workers safe.1 Unfortunately, IPC is often viewed as a cost center and not a revenue generator, meaning that these programs and departments have been inadequately funded and staffed.2 The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the critical role that IPC departments have in biopreparedness efforts for healthcare settings. Unfortunately, even the mpox (monkeypox) outbreak during this pandemic could not avoid the institutional hurdles that led to woefully inadequate support for IPC programs. As the world inches toward a sustainable approach to managing COVID-19 and a growing realization that infectious disease threats are only increasing, there are several key lessons learned and strategic shifts needed for continuous IPC programs and healthcare biopreparedness efforts.”
“Examining the Impacts of Title 42 in the Rio Grande Valley, Texas: Perceptions From Stakeholders in Immigrant Health and Wellbeing”
In this Health Security article, Dr. Christine Crudo Blackburn and Ava Garrett discuss the recently-expired Title 42 and its impact on the spread of COVID-19 in the Rio Grande Valley. They explain in their abstract, “During the initial weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services implemented a little-known public health law, referred to as “Title 42.” The law immediately received criticism from public health professionals and pandemic response experts around the country. Years after its initial implementation, however, the policy has been consistently maintained through numerous court decisions as necessary to prevent COVID-19. This article explores the perceived impact of Title 42 on COVID-19 containment and overall health security in the Rio Grande Valley, Texas, based on interviews conducted with public health professionals, medical professionals, nonprofit staff, and social workers. Our findings show that Title 42 was not perceived to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and likely decreased overall health security in this region.”
Applied Biosafety Biosafety Research Roadmap Special Issue
Applied Biosafety recently produced a special issue with multiple articles covering the new Biosafety Research Roadmap, a projected shared by the Organization for Animal Health, the WHO, and Chatham House. The introductory article explains the context behind this in its abstract:
“Introduction: Lack of evidence-based information regarding potential biological risks can result in inappropriate or excessive biosafety and biosecurity risk-reduction strategies. This can cause unnecessary damage and loss to the physical facilities, physical and psychological well-being of laboratory staff, and community trust. A technical working group from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), World Health Organization (WHO), and Chatham House collaborated on the Biosafety Research Roadmap (BRM) project. The goal of the BRM is the sustainable implementation of evidence-based biorisk management of laboratory activities, particularly in low-resource settings, and the identification of gaps in the current biosafety and biosecurity knowledge base.”
“Methods: A literature search was conducted for the basis of laboratory design and practices for four selected high-priority subgroups of pathogenic agents. Potential gaps in biosafety were focused on five main sections, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Categories representing miscellaneous, respiratory, bioterrorism/zoonotic, and viral hemorrhagic fever pathogens were created within each group were selected for review.”
“Results: Information sheets on the pathogens were developed. Critical gaps in the evidence base for safe sustainable biorisk management were identified.”
“Conclusion: The gap analysis identified areas of applied biosafety research required to support the safety, and the sustainability, of global research programs. Improving the data available for biorisk management decisions for research with high-priority pathogens will contribute significantly to the improvement and development of appropriate and necessary biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity strategies for each agent.”
“Once ‘Defanged,’ H5N1 Bird Flu is Gaining Teeth Again”
In this article for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr. Lynn C. Klotz discusses the potential for H5N1 to become a pandemic threat, writing in part “Now we are seeing the prolific spread of avian H5N1. Writing this year in The Lancet Infectious Diseases, scientists noted that for “the first time, in 2021, the virus remained present year-round in wild birds in Europe, spread to North America, and spread onwards to South America in 2022, where it is still expanding southward.” So far, H5N1 has caused the deaths of 100 million poultry birds in the United States and Europe. And worse still, repeated outbreaks among mammals could allow the virus to mutate and begin to pose a greater threat to humans, especially given worrying signs that mammals are already spreading the virus through the air. H5N1 has infected some 30 mammalian species and has sparked outbreaks and deaths in seals in North America and farmed mink in Spain. “It’s certainly plausible that those animals are spreading virus by droplet or aerosol to each other,” Tufts University veterinarian Jonathan Runstadler said of the seal outbreak in an interview with the Journal of the American Medical Association. “They’re having interactions at close range, and a lot of vocalizations…. But there’s other routes in that scenario that we can’t rule out.”

Biorisks, Biosecurity And Biological Disarmament Conference
“Advances in science and technology are taking place at an unprecedented rate, making vital contributions to addressing major societal challenges. Yet, transformative developments in a wide range of fields can also pose risks to society. As such, it has become more important than ever to monitor opportunities and risks posed by advances in science and technology for the biosecurity regime. This cannot be done by any one actor alone, rather it will require collaborative efforts by states and stakeholders from civil society, academia and industry, along with other actors.”
“In order to facilitate multi-stakeholder engagement around biological security and biological disarmament, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are co-organizing a stakeholder conference designed to bring together actors from civil society, academia and industry, along with diplomats, to stimulate the exchange of ideas and thinking around how to build biosecurity and bolster biological disarmament. The event will provide an opportunity to discuss ongoing diplomatic processes and current and upcoming issues in the areas of biorisk, biosecurity and biological disarmament.”
This hybrid event will take place July 4-5. Learn more and register here.
Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community
“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”
This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Job Opening: Consultant-WHO Training On Responsible Use of the Life Sciences and Dual-Use Research
The WHO Science Division is currently hiring for a six-month consultancy focused on developing an online training on the responsible use of the life sciences and dual-use research. The post includes this background: “The Science Division, through the EPS Unit, issued a Global guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences: mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research in September 2022. The guidance calls on WHO Member States and other stakeholders to mitigate biorisks and safely govern dual-use research, which has a clear benefit but can be misused to harm humans, other animals, agriculture and the environment. The framework underlines that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to mitigate biorisks and governing dual-use research. The framework adopts an integrated approach of biorisk management, which relies on three core pillars: biosafety, laboratory biosecurity and the oversight of dual-use research. The framework raises awareness about the importance of undertaking biorisk management within the context of the One Health approach to optimize the health of people, animals and ecosystems. To ensure uptake and use of these foundational elements, awareness raising, education, codes of conduct, ethical reviews, training and capacity-building are required for stakeholders in the research ecosystem. Therefore, the development of a training course to accompany the implementation of the different elements of the framework would be essential.”
The application and more information can be accessed here. This posting will close on June 23.
Job Opening: Two Full-Time Researchers for Research Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
“The positions are offered on a fixed-term basis until March 31, 2026 (under the terms of the WissZVG), with a possible extension until 31 December, 2026. The positions are part of the Research Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons Control that was recently established within the new Cluster for Natural and Technical Science Arms Control Research (CNTR) set up by PRIF in cooperation with the Technical University Darmstadt and Justus Liebig University Giessen (JLU). The Cluster is funded by the German Federal Foreign Office. The Research Group on CBW control is led by Prof. Dr. P. R. Schreiner (JLU, Institute of Organic Chemistry) and Dr. U. Jakob (PRIF). It aims to scrutinize current issues in biological and chemical weapons control in an interdisciplinary way from the perspectives of natural, technical and political sciences and to develop technologically-informed policy options for practitioners.”
Learn more and apply here. This application closes on June 30.
Weekly Trivia Question
You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: In 1893, the German physician Richard Pfeiffer incorrectly identified which microbe as that causative agent of influenza?
Our question last week was “Boston opened a smallpox quarantine hospital on which island in 1717?” The answer is Spectacle Island.