This week covers recent speculation about the US Intelligence Community’s assessments of COVID-19’s origin, a recent biosecurity-focused meeting between China and Russia, and updates on the case of a 22-year-old Iranian man arrested on suspicions he was plotting an extremist attack using chemical agents in Germany. New publications, upcoming events, and new professional opportunities are also included.
US Intelligence Agencies Still Haven’t Released Expected COVID-19 Materials
President Biden signed the COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023 into law in late March, setting up a requirement for the US Intelligence Community to release as much information possible about the origin of COVID-19. Earlier that month, the Department of Energy and Federal Bureau of Investigation attracted controversy for their low and moderate confidence assessments that the virus originated in a lab. Other agencies maintained their assessments that it originated naturally, and one refused to commit to either hypothesis, similar to the breakdown in the 2021 declassified assessment. This week, the Wall Street Journal released an article that included the names of three Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers who were ill in November of 2019. Some have speculated that one of these researchers could have been the first person infected with COVID-19. However, according to an article from the New York Times this week, this information did not sway any agencies’ assessments:
“This week, intelligence agencies are expected to release declassified material on what they have learned about Covid’s origins, a subject of intense interest and scrutiny among American lawmakers. But people briefed on the material say there is no smoking gun, no body of evidence that sways the intelligence community as a whole, or top C.I.A. analysts, that a lab leak was the more likely origin of the pandemic than natural transmission, or vice versa…In fact, senior intelligence officials remain more convinced than ever that the agencies are not going to be able to collect a piece of evidence that solves the puzzle. Local and national authorities in China, U.S. officials say, destroyed some virus samples and used up others in research, all of which might have helped answer the questions over Covid’s origins. But those officials also caution against overstating the importance of the destroyed samples.”
Lawrence Gostin and Dr. Gigi Gronvall recently authored a piece in the New England Journal of Medicine discussing this last part, in which they write “When health emergencies arise, scientists seek to discover the cause — such a how a pathogen emerged and spread — because this knowledge can enhance our understanding of risks and strategies for prevention, preparedness, and mitigation. Yet well into the fourth year of the Covid-19 pandemic, intense political and scientific debates about its origins continue. The two major hypotheses are a natural zoonotic spillover, most likely occurring at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, and a laboratory leak from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). It is worth examining the efforts to discover the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the political obstacles, and what the evidence tells us. This evidence can help clarify the virus’s evolutionary path. But regardless of the origins of the virus, there are steps the global community can take to reduce future pandemic threats.”
Another important piece of the problem highlighted by the New York Times is that “American intelligence officials also believe the Chinese government impeded the international community’s efforts to better understand the coronavirus in the early months of the outbreak and refused to gather other information that could have aided the investigation.”
Irrespective of if SARS-CoV-2 came from a lab or not, the fact is the Chinese government delayed notifying the international community and has continuously refused to cooperate with ongoing efforts to respond appropriately to this pandemic. This should be addressed in future pandemic planning given the PRC’s past with this exact issue during earlier outbreaks.
Finally, this highlights the importance of transparency and good communications during global health crises. In the context of the Intelligence Community, however, this is more complicated. The IC has to protect its sources and methods, meaning declassification of even relatively mundane information may not always be possible. However, as mirrored by CDC’s challenges throughout this pandemic, it is still worth trying to release information when possible. As Zeynep Tufekci explained this week, “By keeping evidence that seemed to provide ammunition to proponents of a lab leak theory under wraps and resisting disclosure, U.S. officials have contributed to making the topic of the pandemic’s origins more poisoned and open to manipulation by bad-faith actors.”
“Treating crucial information like a dark secret empowers those who viciously and unfairly accuse public health officials and scientists of profiting off the pandemic. As Megan K. Stack wrote in Times Opinion this spring, “Those who seek to suppress disinformation may be destined, themselves, to sow it.”’
Biological Security Consultations Between China and Russia Take Place
This week, representatives of Russia and China met in Moscow for the first Russian-Chinese consultations on biological security. According to the Russian MID, “An exchange of biological security threat assessments was carried out. Particular attention was paid to the military and biological activities of the United States and strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The issues of bilateral cooperation in the field of biosecurity were discussed.”
“The meeting confirmed the unity of approaches of Russia and China to the biological security. The need for further close coordination and constructive interaction both in bilateral format and at relevant multilateral fora, primarily within the framework of the BTWC, the UN and the SCO was noted.”
The Russian News Agency TASS published multiple statements about the meeting from President Vladimir Putin, including ‘”Our country consistently advocates the strengthening of supranational mechanisms to prevent the development and proliferation of biological and toxin weapons,” the head of state said in his greeting telegram to the participants of the 4th International Scientific and Practical Conference ‘Global Threats to Biological Security: Problems and Solutions’.”
The same piece continued with “The president stressed that “in the current difficult international conditions, it is very important to preserve and strengthen the existing mechanisms of multilateral cooperation in combating various threats of a biological nature.” This concerns first and foremost the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which entered into force almost half a century ago.”
‘”Unfortunately, the principles established by this fundamental document have recently been systematically violated,” the head of state said. “Useful initiatives to strengthen the relevant non-proliferation regime are often opposed by a number of states that seek to use existing international problems to ensure their own biological security at the expense of others,” Putin pointed out.’
Iranian Man Charged in Alleged Chemical Attack Plot in Germany
A 26-year-old Iranian man who was arrested in Castrop-Rauxel in January was charged with preparing to conduct a serious act of violence and terror financing in Dusseldorf this week. The man, known only as J.J., was arrested following a tip from US officials indicating he was “plotting an Islamist attack using ricin or cyanide,” according to German prosecutors. The man’s 32-year-old brother, who was initially suspected of also being involved in the plot, had his case dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence. Prosecutors “…said the younger man had decided by the end of October to carry out an attack in line with the ideology of the Islamic State group by spreading ricin or a cyanide compound, and intended to kill as many people as possible by spreading the chemicals.”
Documents from the Dusseldorf Attorney General also indicate the suspect allegedly was in contact with extremists on messaging apps, where they provided him with instructions for how to prepare and disseminate the agents. J.J. also allegedly acquired the materials needed for the attack. Details on the nature of the US tip were not made available. A court in Dortmund will decide if this case will go to trial.
“The Rise of Maximum Containment Laboratories”
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists interviews Dr. Filippa Lentzos in this video, “to review the four biosafety levels and to understand the benefits these labs provide for studying pandemic capable diseases, as well as the risks they pose in a future during which pandemics may become more common,” covering insights gained from the Global Biolabs project she co-directs with George Mason’s Dr. Gregory Koblentz.
“Response to the UK Government’s Refreshed Biological Security Strategy (BSS)”
Experts in biosecurity react to the UK’s new Biological Security Strategy in this piece from the Centre for Long-Term Resilience. Summary “We are pleased to see many important commitments to strengthening the UK’s capabilities for preventing, detecting and responding to biological threats in the Biological Security Strategy (BSS), published on 12 June 2023.”
“We particularly welcome commitments to formalise the Government’s biosecurity leadership, governance and accountability structures, to invest in the UK’s real-time biosurveillance and detection capabilities, and to lead internationally in establishing standards of best practice for responsible innovation.”
“We also commend the Government on allocating £1.5 billion per year to support this work, but urge the Government to continue to sustain a level of investment commensurate with the urgency and importance of implementing the BSS’ priority outcomes.”
“To facilitate the delivery of the Strategy’s 15 priority outcomes on such an ambitious timeline, we suggest the Government should:
- Identify reporting milestones and specific, measurable targets for each of the priority outcomes within the Strategy.
- Set out how it will develop thoughtful regulatory standards and practices for ensuring responsible innovation.
- Establish mechanisms for identifying and accessing the diversity of relevant expertise needed to support the Strategy’s implementation.
- Ensure a variety of intervention options are being evaluated and appropriately incorporated into future biological event response planning.”
“VIEWPOINT: U.S. Must Strengthen Biodefense, Reauthorize Laws”
In this piece for National Defense, Retired Brig. Gen. William King discusses the need to improve the United States’ biodefense policies. He writes in his introduction, “Many Americans are tired of the trauma, life challenges and losses of Covid-19 and the scare of continued pandemics and catastrophic weapon of mass destruction events. Over the past three years of living through this pandemic, more than 1.1 million Americans lost their lives, costing more than $30 trillion of national treasure…Despite this, the nation is still dragging its feet and — in some cases — reversing efforts already made to prepare for the next pandemic.”
“Epidemiology of Pathogens Listed as Potential Bioterrorism Agents, the Netherlands, 2009‒2019”
Broertjes et al. discuss the potential for bad actors to isolate bioterrorism agents from natural sources in the Netherlands in this recent article for Emerging Infectious Diseases. Abstract: “We provide incidences (cases/10 million persons) in the Netherlands during 2009–2019 for pathogens listed as potential bioterrorism agents. We included pathogens from the highest categories of the European Medicines Agency or the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Notifiable diseases and recently published data were used to calculate the average annual incidence. Coxiella burnetii had the highest incidence because of a Q fever epidemic during 2007–2010. Incidence then decreased to 10.8 cases/. Pathogens with an incidence >1 were Brucella spp. (2.5 cases), Francisella tularensis (1.3 cases), and Burkholderia pseudomallei (1.1 cases). Pathogens with an incidence <1 were hemorrhagic fever viruses (0.3 cases), Clostridium botulinum (0.2 cases), and Bacillus anthracis (0.1 cases). Variola major and Yersinia pestis were absent. The generally low incidences make it unlikely that ill-meaning persons can isolate these pathogens from natural sources in the Netherlands. However, the pathogens are stored in laboratories, underscoring the need for biosecurity measures.”
“Have Chemical Weapons Been Used in Ukraine?”
This piece from RUSI discusses recent reports that Russia has used riot control agents in Ukraine and potential implications of these claims. The authors explain in their conclusion, “There appear to be minimal benefits for Russia in using CW in Ukraine, although conversely, there are not many downsides from a Russian perspective either. Negative public opinion certainly does not seem to concern those in the Kremlin, and the use of CW is unlikely to deter supporters of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, who already turn a blind eye to allegations of Russian forces breaking international law. Regardless, the indications are that Ukraine is collecting evidence for potential prosecution at the international level.”
“Could Chatbots Help Devise the Next Pandemic Virus?”
“Tech experts have been warning that artificial intelligence (AI) could turn against humanity by taking over everything from business to warfare. Now, Kevin Esvelt is adding another worry: AI could help someone with no science background and evil intentions order a virus capable of unleashing a pandemic.”
“Esvelt, a biosecurity expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, recently asked students to create a dangerous virus with the help of ChatGPT or other so-called large language models, systems that can generate humanlike responses to broad questions based on vast training sets of internet data. After only an hour, the class came up with lists of candidate viruses and companies that could synthesize their genetic code and assemble the pieces.”
Read more at Science.
“The Impact of Chronic Underfunding on America’s Public Health System: Trends, Risks, and Recommendations, 2023”
From Trust for America’s Health: “This annual report tracks federal and state investment in public health and concludes that under-investment in public health programs leaves the nation less prepared for current and future health risks. One-time COVID-19 emergency funding helped control the pandemic but did not address structural weaknesses in the nation’s public health system.”
“Federal Research: NIH Could Take Additional Action to Manage Risks Involving Foreign Subrecipients”
This new report from the Government Accountability Office found that “All three of the selected Chinese entities GAO was asked to provide information on, received research funds in calendar years 2014 through 2021, whether directly through a federal award or indirectly through subawards to carry out part of the work of a federal award. Specifically, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) provided $200,000 in grant funding to Wuhan University, the only selected Chinese entity to receive funding directly from a federal agency. However, all three selected entities collectively received seven subawards, totaling over $2 million, from federal award recipients or a first-tier subrecipient…”
“Federal agencies and award recipients described efforts to assess risks, but gaps exist in NIH’s risk assessment efforts. In January 2023, the Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General recommended that NIH implement enhanced monitoring, documentation, and reporting requirements for award recipients with foreign subrecipients. To address this recommendation, NIH noted it may need additional authorities and plans to explore government-wide practices, which will take time. However, federal internal controls require that agencies take timely corrective actions to address risks. While NIH pursues long-term actions for award recipients, it has not conducted its own near-term assessments, which could enhance its internal oversight.”
“House GOP Inquiry Over Gain-of-Function Research Targets a Scientific Giant”
Helen Branswell discusses House Republicans’ interest in Bernie Moss’s work in this piece for STAT, writing in part “For more than half a century, scientist Bernard Moss has been commanding the attention of peers interested in prying biological secrets from poxviruses and other microbiological targets. Now he’s commanding the attention of a different audience: House Republicans….But last year, in an interview with Science, Moss said he planned to try to determine why one strain of mpox viruses, known as Clade 1, is so much more virulent than those in a second strain, Clade 2, by taking genes from the former and putting them into the latter. Clade 2 viruses are responsible for the ongoing mpox outbreak first detected in May 2022…Though the NIAID says Moss never actually conducted the work, his public expression of interest in research that might be seen as a so-called gain-of-function study appears to have been catnip to Republicans on the House Energy and Commerce Committee.”
“Cosmic Luck: NASA’s Apollo 11 Moon Quarantine Broke Down”
This piece from The New York Times discusses Dr. Dagomar Degroot’s article in Isis-“One Small Step for Man, One Giant Leap for Moon Microbes? Interpretations of Risk and the Limits of Quarantine in NASA’s Apollo Program”. The NYT piece explains “Dr. Degroot’s archival work also shows NASA officials knew that lunar germs could pose an existential (if low-probability) threat and that their lunar quarantine probably wouldn’t keep Earth safe if such a threat did exist. They oversold their ability to neutralize that threat anyway…This space age narrative, Dr. Degroot’s paper claims, is an example of the tendency in scientific projects to downplay existential risks, which are unlikely and difficult to deal with, in favor of focusing on smaller, likelier problems. It also offers useful lessons as NASA and other space agencies prepare to collect samples from Mars and other worlds in the solar system for study on Earth.”
CDC Virtual Town Hall on Regional Centers for Public Health Preparedness and Response
“On Wednesday, June 28, 2023, from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. EDT, CDC will host a virtual town hall meeting. Public input from the town hall will help shape the creation of a network of regional centers. During the town hall, members of the public may share challenges and opportunities from preparedness and response experiences in their communities and organizations.”
Learn more and register here.
Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open
Registration is now open for the Global Health Security 2024 conference in Sydney, Australia. This iteration will take place 18-21 June, 2024. The call for abstracts is also still open. “The mission of the Global Health Security conference is to provide a forum where leaders, researchers, policy-makers, and representatives from government, international organisations, civil society, and private industry from around the world can engage with each other, review the latest research and policy innovations, and agree solutions for making the world safer and healthier. To that end, our mission is to help foster a genuinely multidisciplinary community of practice that is committed to working collaboratively to enhance global health security and eliminate disease, irrespective of its origin or source.”
Summer Webinar Series on Emerging Technology & National Security Policy Careers
“The Horizon Institute for Public Service, in collaboration with partners at the Scowcroft Center for International Affairs at the Bush School of Texas A&M University and SeedAI, is excited to announce an upcoming webinar series on US emerging technology policy careers to help individuals decide if they should pursue careers in this field. In line with Horizon’s and our partners’ focus areas, the series will focus primarily on policy opportunities related to AI and biosecurity.”
“Sessions will not be recorded and individuals must sign up to receive event access — you can express interest in attending here.” Learn more about the series here.
Biorisks, Biosecurity And Biological Disarmament Conference
“Advances in science and technology are taking place at an unprecedented rate, making vital contributions to addressing major societal challenges. Yet, transformative developments in a wide range of fields can also pose risks to society. As such, it has become more important than ever to monitor opportunities and risks posed by advances in science and technology for the biosecurity regime. This cannot be done by any one actor alone, rather it will require collaborative efforts by states and stakeholders from civil society, academia and industry, along with other actors.”
“In order to facilitate multi-stakeholder engagement around biological security and biological disarmament, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are co-organizing a stakeholder conference designed to bring together actors from civil society, academia and industry, along with diplomats, to stimulate the exchange of ideas and thinking around how to build biosecurity and bolster biological disarmament. The event will provide an opportunity to discuss ongoing diplomatic processes and current and upcoming issues in the areas of biorisk, biosecurity and biological disarmament.”
This hybrid event will take place July 4-5. Learn more and register here.
Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community
“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”
This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.
CEPI Invites New Experts to Joins Its Scientific Advisory Committee
CEPI’s call for new individuals to join its Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC)—an external expert group providing guidance and recommendations to CEPI on R&D programmes and broader outbreak response efforts—is now open through 30 June 2023.
CEPI is recruiting approximately 10 senior experts and global health professionals with extensive experience across relevant scientific and product development disciplines to join its SAC, and is particularly interested in those with expertise in the following areas:
- Structural vaccinology/antigen design
- mAb product development experience
- mRNA
- Use of Artificial intelligence and Machine Learning in the development and manufacturing of vaccines/biologics
- Clinical development
- Process CMC development (including QbD, tech transfer and process validation)
- Analytical expertise
- Regulatory strategy
SAC member’s terms last three years and are renewable, starting in October 2023. Successful applicants’ scientific input, guidance and challenge will be critical in the continued implementation of the CEPI 2.0 strategy, which aims to accelerate the development of vaccines and other biological countermeasures to tackle emerging infectious diseases and enhance global preparedness for future threats.
Interested individuals can apply using our online form linked here.
NTI Internship Application – Fall 2023
“The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a non-profit whose mission is to transform global security by driving systemic solutions to nuclear and biological threats imperiling humanity, is now taking internship applications for FALL 2023.“
“Our highly competitive program offers internship opportunities 3x a year to undergraduate students with at least two years of study, graduate students, and/or those who demonstrate co-equal qualifying experience. NTI also welcomes applicants from university-sponsored internship programs.”
“NTI Interns play a critical role within each of our teams by working to advance our mission objectives while learning more about existential risks to humanity. Our internships are substantive opportunities where interns are deeply embedded into NTI’s teams, contributing research and analysis to ongoing projects, but do include administrative components as needed. NTI’s internship program prioritizes building skills and experience and includes structured professional development opportunities — many intern alumni have gone on to have stellar careers in their chosen fields.”
Learn more and apply here.
Job Opening: Two Full-Time Researchers for Research Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
“The positions are offered on a fixed-term basis until March 31, 2026 (under the terms of the WissZVG), with a possible extension until 31 December, 2026. The positions are part of the Research Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons Control that was recently established within the new Cluster for Natural and Technical Science Arms Control Research (CNTR) set up by PRIF in cooperation with the Technical University Darmstadt and Justus Liebig University Giessen (JLU). The Cluster is funded by the German Federal Foreign Office. The Research Group on CBW control is led by Prof. Dr. P. R. Schreiner (JLU, Institute of Organic Chemistry) and Dr. U. Jakob (PRIF). It aims to scrutinize current issues in biological and chemical weapons control in an interdisciplinary way from the perspectives of natural, technical and political sciences and to develop technologically-informed policy options for practitioners.”
Learn more and apply here. This application closes on June 30.
Weekly Trivia Question
You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: What does “yellow” in yellow fever refer to?
Shout out to Georgios P. for correctly answering last week’s question. Our question was “In 1893, the German physician Richard Pfeiffer incorrectly identified which microbe as that causative agent of influenza?” The answer is Haemophilus influenzae, formerly known as Bacillus influenzae or Pfeiffer’s bacillus.
The Pandora Report 