We’re back! This week we have updates on a few happenings from our break as well as numerous new publications, upcoming events, and announcements. Happy (almost) First Day of Fall!
Kazakhstan Latest Kremlin Bioweapons Disinformation Target
Kazakhstan has joined the ever-growing list of countries targeted by Russia’s constant barrage of bioloigcal weapons-related disinformation. As Wilder Alejandro Sánchez explained in the Diplomat, “A recent fake news post about Kazakhstan in a Russian Telegram channel highlights how Astana must continue to walk a fine line regarding its interactions with Moscow and Washington…A July 21 post by the Telegram channel Baraeva, which has 2,300 followers, originally (and falsely) posted that Astana “has already given the US State Department consent to the relocation of almost 30(!) Pentagon biological laboratories from Ukraine.” The post covers its tracks fast, arguing that it is “waiting for official confirmation,” but still goes on to note that Kazakhstan would become a “biological weapons testing site if the news is true [reminder: it isn’t]. And this is right next to China.”’
“Alexander Kobrinsky, director of Russia’s Agency for Ethno-National Strategy, expanded on the Baraeva post in his own Telegram channel, Cobra, noting that Kazakhstan possesses Soviet-era labs which, “although in a semi-abandoned state, are suitable for the transfer of biological laboratories from Ukraine.” The transfer of these laboratories “is a threat not only to the host country and Russia but also to the whole of Southeast Asia,” including “China… India and Pakistan, [and] the entire Southeast Asia,” warned the Cobra channel. In so doing, it rephrased the Baraeva post, so it appears as if the fake agreement is a fact.”
The piece continues on, analyzing the absurdity of these claims targeting a country Moscow maintains a relatively warm relationship with. It seems nobody is safe from the Kremlin’s BW disinformation machine.
Wisconsin Legislature Considers Banning Gain of Function Research
Some state GOP lawmakers in Wisconsin have co-authored a bill that proposes a ban on gain of function research in response to incidents at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and amid growing similar sentiments in the Republican Party nationally. According to the Wisconsin Examiner, “Bill co-authors — Sen. Andre Jacque (R-DePere), Reps. Elijah Behnke (R-Oconto) and Ty Bodden (R-Hilbert) — stated in a memo that the “risks of these dangerous [gain of function] experiments are not only catastrophic, they are unnecessary.”’
“The University of Wisconsin-Madison has warned lawmakers against such a ban in a letter, saying it would stifle pathogen-related research and result in significant delays and uncertainty even for research that is not prohibited, including research being done to protect Wisconsin’s residents, crops and livestock.”
‘“Viruses mutate very rapidly all by themselves; they do not require humans conducting genetic engineering experiments to make them more lethally infectious,” the lawmakers said.”
Many worry that this will severely weaken the state’s contributions to scientific research and that this measure ignores the existing oversight GoF research has. Tom Still wrote in a piece for the Wisconsin Technology Council-“Wisconsin is Not Wuhan: Don’t Ban ‘Gain of Function Research'”-, “The Wisconsin legislation is a delayed reaction to accidents in 2013 and 2019 involving development of a potentially dangerous bird flu vaccine, and one in 2009 in which a lab broke federal rules by creating a drug-resistant strain of bacteria. The 2009 incident led to fines and the banning of a key scientist for five years. The 2013 and 2019 accidents were communicated properly and the UW-Madison complied with federal inspectors.”
Still continued, writing “These events happened, but what are the regulatory checks and balances today?”
“The UW-Madison has an Institutional Biosafety Committee and an Office of Biological Safety. Some “gain of function” experiments are run through the School of Veterinary Medicine and the Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Lab, focusing on bacteria or viruses that can harm poultry, trigger bovine mastitis and cause blight in potatoes.”
“Federal oversight includes the Select Agent Program, which oversees the possession, use and transfer of many biological agents and toxins, and the National Institutes of Health Office of Science Policy. The Center for Disease Control also shares in the oversight, which was evident in a recent investigation of a mysterious biolab with Chinese ties near Fresno, Calif. In short, internal and national reporting requirements are stringent.”
“Compare that to the black hole of information about Wuhan Institute for Virology, where Chinese authorities blocked investigations by the World Health Organization and others.”
He finished with an important question and call for existing oversight to be strictly enforced: “Let’s suppose that concern is real. What’s worse? Waiting for a foreign pathogen release, either accidental or deliberate, or allowing U.S. scientists to continue precautionary work?”
“Many safeguards are in place for “gain of function” research, and they should be strictly enforced. An outright ban on experiments in one state out of 50 causes more problems than it purports to solve.”
US Scraps DEEP VZN
In related news, the US government also recently ended the Discovery & Exploration of Emerging Pathogens – Viral Zoonoses (DEEP VZN) program. Matt Field covered this in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, writing “Back in 2009, the US government initiated a controversial $200 million program to identify new viruses in animals that might jump the species barrier and spark human pandemics. Although the Trump administration unceremoniously ended the PREDICT program in 2020, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which managed the effort, subsequently proceeded to double down on the virus-hunting strategy. DEEP VZN, an initiative begun in 2021, was supposed to go beyond the roughly 1,000 viruses that its predecessor had found and identify up to 12,000 new viruses in wild and domestic animals, sequencing the genomes of those that “pose the most risk to animal and human health.” The idea was to find dangerous pathogens before they cause problems.”
“But the critics of this type of predictive virus hunting—who see it as wasteful or dangerous—seem to have finally nudged the government toward their view. The UK medical journal The BMJ reported Thursday that USAID quietly wound down the DEEP VZN virus-hunting juggernaut over the summer.”
“USAID confirmed to the Bulletin that it began shuttering DEEP VZN as it assessed its “priorities and approach to pandemic preparedness,” an agency spokesperson said in a statement. “As a result, USAID and Washington State University began working together in July 2023 to end the DEEP VZN cooperative agreement.”’
“The agency’s years-long approach of partnering with organizations and researchers in far-flung corners of the world to seek out new viruses in animals was predicated on a seemingly obvious idea: By finding and characterizing viruses, researchers could understand which pathogens were poised to “spill over” to humans before an outbreak or pandemic began. Researchers could then monitor for dangerous viruses broadly. But critics argued this concept of pandemic prediction was inefficient and risky. By uploading to the web—as PREDICT has done—the genetic makeup of new viruses, the government could inadvertently offer up the recipes for potential bioweapons to terrorists or other bad actors.”
University of Birmingham PhD Student Allegedly Worked to Create Chemical Weapons Drone for IS
Late last month, a PhD student at the University of Birmingham reportedly “…plotted to supply Islamic State terrorists with a drone capable of delivering a bomb or chemical weapon, a terror trial jury has heard,” according to the Coventry Telegraph.
The same article explained: “Opening the Crown’s case, prosecutor Michelle Heeley KC told the court: “His home was searched and police found a drone. They also found material suggesting this defendant supported Islamic State, a terrorist organisation.”‘
“The court heard Al-Bared, who lived with his parents, was arrested while driving at the same time as the raid took place, and had a mobile phone which police also seized. A 3D printer, which could be used to make parts for the drone, was also found at the home of Al-Bared, who was studying for a PhD at the University of Birmingham, the court heard.”
“Written material saying the idea for the drone was ‘somewhat inspired by the design of the Tomahawk missile’ was put before the jury, in what the Crown claims was Al-Bared describing his build process. Of the evidence found on an electronic device, which also included reference to fuses, mechanical detonators and an explosive head, Ms Heeley added: “He is literally reporting back to someone about what it is that he is doing.”
“Public Health Position Available: Low Pay. Promise of Burnout and Harassment. Master’s Preferred.”
Biodefense PhD student and current Bulletin Editorial Fellow with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists recently published this piece discussing challenges in growing the United States’ public health workforce. She writes in her introduction, “Will there be another pandemic after COVID? Considering that there have been at least four major international disease crises in the last 20 years alone—plus a number of smaller but still serious outbreaks—smart money would say, “yes.” But a look at trends in the US public health workforce, at first glance, suggests that government agencies have taken the opposite bet. The state and local health departments responsible for disease surveillance, vaccination campaigns, and assistance in natural disasters like wildfires or hurricanes are hemorrhaging workers, with an additional 130,000 at risk of leaving the profession by 2025. Unless something changes soon, there will be too few new employees to backfill empty positions—or to make up for the loss of invaluable institutional knowledge.”
Journal of Science Policy & Governance, Special Issue-Policy and Governance on Science, Technology and Global Security
The Journal of Science Policy & Governance recently published a special issue in partnership with the APS Forum on Physics and Society, titled “Policy and Governance on Science, Technology and Global Security.” Multiple Schar School students, alumni, and staff published their work in this issue. These include Lewis Grant (Biodefense MS ’23), “Revisiting Presidential Nuclear Autonomy”; Layla M Hashemi (Public Policy PhD ’20 and current researcher at the Schar School’s Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center), “Advertising with Anonymity and Impunity: The Harmful Consequences of Counterfeit PPE Supply Chains”; and Aishwarya Sriraman (Biodefense PhD Student), “Optimizing Chemical Agent Medical Countermeasures in the Strategic National Stockpile”.
“China’s Quest for Human Genetic Data Spurs Fears of a DNA Arms Race”
The Washington Post‘s Joby Warrick and Cate Brown recently published this article discussing how one Chinese company amassed even more genomic information throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. They explain “That collection effort, underway for more than a decade, has included the acquisition of U.S. genetics companies as well as sophisticated hacking operations, U.S. and Western intelligence officials say. But more recently, it received an unexpected boost from the coronavirus pandemic, which created opportunities for Chinese companies and institutes to distribute gene-sequencing machines and build partnerships for genetic research in places where Beijing previously had little or no access, the officials said.”
This detailed article identifies several key facts and goes in-depth on the network BGI Group has built in recent years, providing important context to growing concerns about the PRC’s access to this kind of information.
“The Biodefense Posture Review Needs Focus to Succeed”
Al Mauroni’s recent piece for War on the Rocks tackles historical and current challenges in properly focusing government biodefense efforts. He writes in part, “As the first of its kind, the Biodefense Posture Review does not examine military biodefense capabilities and does not illuminate the department’s readiness posture. Instead, it obfuscates the department’s biopreparedness concepts, takes authorities away from military agencies that address biological threats, and calls for duplicating efforts of other government agencies that have significant national biopreparedness roles.”
“The Cyber-Biosecurity Nexus: Key Risks and Recommendations for the United States”
Abi Olvera recently published this briefer with the Council on Strategic Risks’ Nolan Center. It “…provides an overview of the trends and critical risks at the nexus of cybersecurity and biosecurity. It then offers high-level recommendations for addressing these risks.”
Olvera writes in part, “Whether to deny service, steal intellectual property, or propagate disinformation, countries such as Russia and North Korea have shown their willingness and ability to conduct malicious cyber activities through times of crisis and relative repose. Attacks on critical infrastructure, biotechnology enterprises, and medical research institutions highlight the need to prioritize prevention, improve detection, and scale national response mechanisms amidst the growing sophistication of malicious actors at this nexus. Such issues, which are increasingly referred to as “cyber-biosecurity” risks, have become a new toolset in the growing sub-threshold arsenals of those that oppose the rules-based international order.”
“A New Species of Trouble: Strengthening Capacity and Capability for the Identification, Attribution, and Consequence Management of Accidental and Deliberate Pathogen Releases in Africa”
New from Brown’s School of Public Health’s Pandemic Center, this policy brief provides a roadmap for preparing for the release of a deadly biolgoical agent. Its executive summary explains “Determining the origin of disease outbreaks and developing effective protocols based on the specific cause is critical to controlling the spread of disease and protecting human, animal, and environmental health and welfare as well as economies and national security. Many African countries have policies to address naturally occurring outbreaks. However, African countries are by no means alone in lacking the tools to identify and manage incidents caused by accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Recent growth in laboratory systems and widespread access to innovative but potentially dangerous technologies is creating a new species of trouble requiring a re-evaluation of the threat landscape. This policy brief, focused on Africa, discusses established protocols and measures aimed at preventing and containing outbreaks. It then takes a broad approach by recommending policies related to assessment and handling of accidental and deliberate pathogen releases as an integral part of existing outbreak protocols. The proposals provide specific strategies for surveillance, rapid response, containment, investigation, and mitigation of these human-made outbreaks, emphasizing strong biosafety and biosecurity measures. They further emphasize the importance of training, capacity building, collaboration (including collaboration in developing diagnostics and medical countermeasures), and early warning mechanisms. To further support the guidelines, the authors recommend establishing national multidisciplinary outbreak assessment units and consequence-management systems, capacity building of relevant security and law enforcement personnel, and sustainable domestic financing. The authors recommend piloting the guidelines outlined in this policy brief. Adopting the proposed strategies and instituting needed support structures will improve countries outbreak assessment and response capabilities and thus mitigate the health and economic consequences of accidental or deliberate infectious disease outbreaks.”
“Anthrax Revisited: How Assessing the Unpredictable Can Improve Biosecurity”
New from Sabra et al.: “B. anthracis is one of the most often weaponized pathogens. States had it in their bioweapons programs and criminals and terrorists have used or attempted to use it. This study is motivated by the narrative that emerging and developing technologies today contribute to the amplification of danger through greater easiness, accessibility and affordability of steps in the making of an anthrax weapon. As states would have way better preconditions if they would decide for an offensive bioweapons program, we focus on bioterrorism. This paper analyzes and assesses the possible bioterrorism threat arising from advances in synthetic biology, genome editing, information availability, and other emerging, and converging sciences and enabling technologies. Methodologically we apply foresight methods to encourage the analysis of contemporary technological advances. We have developed a conceptual six-step foresight science framework approach. It represents a synthesis of various foresight methodologies including literature review, elements of horizon scanning, trend impact analysis, red team exercise, and free flow open-ended discussions. Our results show a significant shift in the threat landscape. Increasing affordability, widespread distribution, efficiency, as well as ease of use of DNA synthesis, and rapid advances in genome-editing and synthetic genomic technologies lead to an ever-growing number and types of actors who could potentially weaponize B. anthracis. Understanding the current and future capabilities of these technologies and their potential for misuse critically shapes the current and future threat landscape and underlines the necessary adaptation of biosecurity measures in the spheres of multi-level political decision making and in the science community.”
“The Danger of ‘Invisible’ Biolabs Across the U.S.”
Dan Greene, Jassi Pannu, and Allison Berke recently published this piece discussing patchwork biosecurity regulations in the US and gaps in oversight, explaining in part “…bio labs in the U.S. fall through the cracks of government oversight if they are privately operated (i.e., not academic or government), do not receive funding from the government, and are not working with select agents. These “invisible” labs have much more leeway to work with pathogens that are not select agents but could still cause outbreaks, severe illness, and death—a category that includes some of the ones that the Reedley lab acquired. A forthcoming report by Gryphon Scientific, the biosafety and public health consultancy where one of us works, estimates that about ¼ of human pathogen research activities in the U.S. are performed by labs inside of private organizations, and about ¼ of those private organizations are “invisible.”’
“Impact Assessment of Research on Infectious Agents”
The American Society for Microbiology recently published this workshop summary. It explains in part “Infectious agents are a major source of death and disease worldwide. Research with infectious agents has provided many societal benefits but also has introduced concerns about the potential for negative impacts of modified pathogens on public health. There is an ongoing debate about what oversight, regulations and, potentially, legislative provisions are needed for a small subset of research with infectious agents commonly called gain of function research of concern (GOFROC) or enhanced potential pandemic pathogen (ePPP) research.”
“To develop a deeper scientific understanding, gathered from different perspectives of leading scientists who possess expertise on this issue, the American Society for Microbiology hosted a workshop. The goal of the event was to review the benefits and risks of GOFROC or ePPP research to science and society. The deliberation prompted 3 overarching recommendations from participants:
- The need for standardized research terminology and practices.
- Increased engagement and transparency with the public on infectious agents research.
- Strengthened biorisk management systems for safe, secure and responsible research.”
“Homeland Threat Assessment 2024”
The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis recently released its annual homeland threat assessment that covers several broad areas of homeland security, including a section dedicated to foreign misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Intelligence Enterprise Homeland Threat Assessment reflects insights from across the Department, the Intelligence Community, and other critical homeland security stakeholders. It focuses on the most direct, pressing threats to our Homeland during the next year and is organized into four sections. This assessment is organized around the Department’s missions that most closely align or apply to these threats—public safety, border and immigration, critical infrastructure, and economic security. As such, many of the threat actors and their efforts cut across mission areas and interact in complex and, at times, reinforcing ways.”
“Chemical Weapons: Status of Forensic Technologies and Challenges to Source Attribution”
New from the US Government Accountability Office: “Despite the Chemical Weapons Convention’s ban on their use, chemical weapons have been used in the past decade in assassinations and on civilian populations. To identify the use of a chemical weapon and then attribute that weapon back to its source, researchers rely on several technologies for chemical analysis. Chemical analysis is one piece of an overall chemical weapon investigation.”
“This report discusses (1) the status of key technologies available to identify a chemical agent or its source, including their strengths and limitations; (2) challenges researchers and investigators face in trying to identify a chemical agent or its source; and (3) policy options that may help address the challenges of using key technologies to identify a chemical agent and its source.”
“To conduct this technology assessment, GAO reviewed key reports and scientific literature; interviewed government, intergovernmental, and academic representatives; conducted site visits; and convened two meetings of experts with the assistance of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. GAO is identifying policy options in this report.”
“Conducting Public Health Workshops in Ukraine–Under Threat of Missile Attack”
Filippa Lentzos recently published this piece with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in which she discusses her experience running training workshops in Ukraine for public health officials and laboratory leads. She writes, “I was in Ukraine to run a series of training workshops for laboratory leads and public health officials. Designed with my King’s College London colleague Gemma Bowsher, the workshops focused on responding to bio-incidents—part of a US Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded project run through the Swiss Centre for Tropical and Public Health. The war has drawn increased political attention to ambiguous disease outbreaks in which it is unclear whether the incident is natural, accidental, or deliberate in origin; the workshops were in part a response to that attention.”
“The unfolding outbreak of Legionnaire’s Disease in Rzeszow, Poland, a small town turned logistical war hub for the West, is a good example. The outbreak—already infecting several dozens by the time I whizzed past on my way to Ukraine—is most likely of natural in origin. But with this bacterial pneumonia spreading through the water network (as it does all over Europe on occasion), there was concern that, in the context of continuous hybrid warfare attacks, the outbreak could be the result of sabotage meant to sow panic among Ukraine’s allies. Unfounded rumors of Russian responsibility were already circulating.”
“Avian H5N1 Flu Deaths are Marching Forward (The Beat Goes On)” and “Commentary: New Avian Flu Attacking More than Birds”
Lynn Klotz, a senior science fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, has provided updates and continuations of his June work discussing a highly transmissible H5N1 virus-“Avian H5N1 Flu Deaths are Marching Forward (The Beat Goes On)” and “Commentary: New Avian Flu Attacking More than Birds”. In them, he explains “Before the year 2015, the H5N1 bird flu virus killed over 52% of poultry workers and others who had close contact with infected poultry. Fortunately, the virus was rarely transmissible among humans. From 2015 to 2020, avian H5N1 fatalities in humans had almost disappeared, since the strains from nature that appeared in poultry markets were no longer deadly to humans. They were, so to speak, “defanged.” We thought we were finished with H5N1 bird flu. We thought we were in a good place.”
In the latter, he explains “Since 2021, we are facing a new threat to birds and mammals, a deadly and highly transmissible H5N1 bird flu virus. Worldwide, this new virus is responsible for the death of and purposeful culling of nearly a billion poultry birds; and according to one estimate, the deaths of 10 million wild birds. Recent deaths of large numbers of birds and a much smaller number of deaths of mammals who otherwise would be alive is alarming and sad.”
“What is the danger of the new H5NI bird flu virus to humans? So far, there have been almost no human fatalities. A protein called BTN3A3 protects humans from the virus. Analysis for the BTN3A3 genes of some primates that include humans, which separated in evolution around 40 million to 44 million years from other primates, show that humans have the gene that makes the BTN3A3 protein. The other primate group does not make the protein. So, an accident of genome evolution that occurred millions of years ago protects us from the new avian flu virus, an extraordinary bit of luck. It is possible but not yet probable that the virus could begin to infect humans too.”
“Perhaps a hundred species of mammals, which don’t usually reside on the seacoast, have been infected, and the number is growing. One recent example is noteworthy: an infected mountain lion in the state of Montana. But Montana is not on the seacoast, how did the mountain lion become infected? We don’t really know. For whatever reasons, infected mammals are found far inland. and the numbers of species and the number of animal deaths keep growing. The beat goes on.”
“A Virtual Dialogue Between Animal Health and Public Health Experts on Dual-Use Research”
“Life sciences research and associated technologies play a critical role in improving global public health supporting healthier populations worldwide and promoting health equity for all to achieve the health related United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Likewise, advances and innovation in the life sciences are essential for animal and plant health, for veterinary medicine and agriculture, and the environment. However, developments and advances in this field may also pose safety and security risks caused by accidents, as well as inadvertent and deliberate misuse to cause harm”
“A virtual dialogue between animal health and public health experts was co-organized by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) on 14 March 2023 to discuss experiences in working with dual-use research, the different perspectives and challenges associated with the oversight of dual-use research and key considerations and priorities for governing dual-use research within the context of One Health.”
“The dialogue facilitated the exchanges of experiences and perspectives on dual-use research and challenges associated with its oversight and allowed participants to raise issues and suggestions for joint actions at the global level. Follow-up actions could include the organization of a second dialogue with additional stakeholders from the One Health approach to discuss and agree on joint actions for the governance of dual use research; the joint development of key common lines of communication at international level (e.g., for WOAH and WHO to raise awareness on the governance of dual-use research) and cross-referencing relevant guidance and activities; the joint development of tools to strengthen the governance of dual-use research such as educational tools, advocacy and awareness raising tools in the context of One Health; the joint mobilization of resources to achieve common goals; and to explore the establishment of a mechanism to report biorisks and dual-use issues to enhance public trust. This dialogue is intended to be the beginning of a continuing discussion bringing together different organizations, sectors and perspectives to reach a concerted One Health approach on the governance dual-use research.”
The Era of Global Risk: An Introduction to Existential Risk Studies
“This innovative and comprehensive collection of essays explores the biggest threats facing humanity in the 21st century; threats that cannot be contained or controlled and that have the potential to bring about human extinction and civilization collapse. Bringing together experts from many disciplines, it provides an accessible survey of what we know about these threats, how we can understand them better, and most importantly what can be done to manage them effectively.”
“These essays pair insights from decades of research and activism around global risk with the latest academic findings from the emerging field of Existential Risk Studies. Voicing the work of world leading experts and tackling a variety of vital issues, they weigh up the demands of natural systems with political pressures and technological advances to build an empowering vision of how we can safeguard humanity’s long-term future.”
“The book covers both a comprehensive survey of how to study and manage global risks with in-depth discussion of core risk drivers: including environmental breakdown, novel technologies, global scale natural disasters, and nuclear threats. The Era of Global Risk offers a thorough analysis of the most serious dangers to humanity.”
“Inspiring, accessible, and essential reading for both students of global risk and those committed to its mitigation, this book poses one critical question: how can we make sense of this era of global risk and move beyond it to an era of global safety?”
NEW: Medical Countermeasures-Expanding Delivery and Increasing Uptake Through Public-Private Partnerships Upcoming Workshop Series
“WORKSHOP SERIES: Medical Countermeasures- Expanding Delivery and Increasing Uptake Through Public-Private Partnerships: A Workshop Series
WHEN: October 3, 12, 17, 26, and November 2, 2023
The National Academies Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies will host a series of virtual public workshops to examine lessons learned and future opportunities for public-private partnerships to facilitate delivery, monitoring, uptake, and utilization of medical countermeasures to the public during a public health emergency.
The workshop will be accessible via webinar. Learn more on the project page.”
NEW: 2nd International One Health Conference
“Health is a key aspect of our modern society that requires a multidisciplinary approach and that needs to bring together professionals, academics and decision makers in order to bridge the gap between current scientific knowledge and policies.”
“The Conference aims to activate synergic dialogues among disciplinary research fields and action domains among researchers, experts and students.”
“The One health conceptual framework and the possible contribution from the One Health approach in the urban resilience capacities enhancement will be the core of the congress dialogues.”
“The international One Health Conference 2022 will be in hybrid form from 19 to 20 of October at the Colegio de Medicos in Barcelona.”
Learn more and register here.
No Checkered Flag: The Perpetual Race Against Biological Threats
From the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense: “The Commission’s next meeting, No Checkered Flag: The Perpetual Race Against Biological Threats, will be held on September 27, 2023 in Indianapolis, Indiana. The meeting will take place at the historic Indianapolis Motor Speedway, the home of the Indianapolis 500.”
“The focus of this meeting will be to provide the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense with a better understanding of: (1) state and local efforts to strengthen public health and biodefense; (2) special security management of biological threats to mass gatherings; and (3) efforts to understand and mitigate the agricultural impact of biological threats to plants and animals.”
This all-day event will take place in Washington, DC on September 27 at 9 am EST. Learn more and register here.
Women Building Bio: Building Better
“Virginia Bio’s Women Building Bio Conference celebrates the contribution of women to the life sciences in the Commonwealth and beyond. The 8th annual conference theme, Building Better, will prompt us to explore how life sciences contribute to building a better future and highlight the increasingly significant role of women in it.”
This event will take place from 8:30-4 pm in Manassas, VA on September 28. Register here.
2023 EPA International Decontamination Research and Development Conference-“Advancing Preparedness through Science and Collaboration”
“The clean-up of chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) contamination incidents and natural disasters is a critical challenge for the United States. Understanding how to characterize and remediate affected areas of environmental contamination and waste is necessary for daily life to return.”
“The Decon Conference is designed to facilitate presentation, discussion, and further collaboration of research and development topics focused on an all-hazards approach to remediate contaminated indoor and outdoor areas, critical infrastructure, water distribution systems, and other environmental areas/materials.”
“This conference is free and open to the public. Content and presentations are geared towards the emergency response community, including local and state emergency mangers, homeland security officials, first responder coordinators, private sector industry, risk managers, educators in the field of emergency management, and others.”
This event will take place December 5-7 in Charleston, SC. Learn more and register here.
61st ISODARCO Course: Nuclear Order and International Security after Ukraine
“The war in Ukraine has had an enormous impact on global security, reviving nuclear fears, undermining the prospects for arms control, and shattering many of the norms and constraints that were the foundation of European security. ISODARCO 2024 will examine the global nuclear order in light of the Ukraine war, focusing on the states, the policies and the technologies that will shape the future in a much more difficult environment. How will we cope with this more dangerous world?”
This course will take place January 7-14, 2024, at the University of Trento. Learn more and register here.
Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open
Registration is now open for the Global Health Security 2024 conference in Sydney, Australia. This iteration will take place 18-21 June, 2024. The call for abstracts is also still open. “The mission of the Global Health Security conference is to provide a forum where leaders, researchers, policy-makers, and representatives from government, international organisations, civil society, and private industry from around the world can engage with each other, review the latest research and policy innovations, and agree solutions for making the world safer and healthier. To that end, our mission is to help foster a genuinely multidisciplinary community of practice that is committed to working collaboratively to enhance global health security and eliminate disease, irrespective of its origin or source.”
Notice with Comment Period: National One Health Framework To Address Zoonotic Diseases and Advance Public Health Preparedness in the United States: A Framework for One Health Coordination and Collaboration Across Federal Agencies
“The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), announces the opening of a docket to obtain comment on the draft National One Health Framework to Address Zoonotic Diseases and Advance Public Health Preparedness in the United States: A Framework for One Health Coordination and Collaboration across Federal Agencies (NOHF-Zoonoses). As directed by Congress through the House Appropriations Committee report accompanying the 2021 omnibus appropriations bill and the 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, CDC has partnered with the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and other departments and agencies to develop this One Health framework to address zoonotic diseases and advance public health preparedness. This framework will facilitate One Health collaboration for zoonotic disease prevention and control across the United States Government for the next five years. It describes a common vision, mission, and goals for key federal partners involved in implementing a One Health approach to address zoonotic diseases and advance public health preparedness in the United States.”
“You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. CDC–2023–0075 by either of the methods listed below. Do not submit comments by email. CDC does not accept comments by email.”
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
• Mail: RE: NOHF-Zoonoses Public Comments, 1600 Clifton Road NE, Mailstop H16–5, Atlanta, Georgia 30329.
“Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) and Docket Number. All relevant comments received will be posted without change to http://regulations.gov, including any personal information provided. For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov.”
One Health Day is Coming!
“Initiated in 2016 by the One Health Commission, the One Health Platform, and the One Health Initiative Team, International One Health Day is officially celebrated around the world every year on November 3. The One Health Platform closed its doors in 2021 so One Health Day was overseen in 2021 and 2022 by the One Health Commission and One Health Initiative Autonomous team.”
“The goal of One Health Day is to build the cultural will necessary for a sea change in how planetary health challenges are assessed and addressed and how professionals exchange information across disciplines. One Health Day brings global attention to the need for One Health collaborations and allows the world to ‘see them in action’. The One Health Day campaign is designed to engage as many individuals as possible from as many arenas as possible in One Health education and awareness events and to generate an inspiring array of projects worldwide.”
“Events do not have to fall right on November 3 but can occur anytime during the calendar year.”
Learn more and register events here.
The Pandora Report 