Pandora Report 10.13.2023

This week’s issue covers GMU Biodefense students’ recent trip to Mason’s own BSL-3 facility, Russia’s new Commission on Combating Biosecurity Threats, ARPA-H’s new vaccine discovery program, and the ticking clock for securing DHS’s CWMD Office’s future amid Congressional turbulence. Several new publications, upcoming events, and more are included.

Join Us on October 16 for a Virtual Schar School PhD Information Session

“Prospective international students are invited to attend a virtual information session to learn more about the admission requirements for our PhD programs that are unique to you. This session will be led by Katy Sombito, PhD Admissions Coordinator. Join us to learn more about the admission process for international students and get your questions answered.”

This includes the Schar School’s unique Biodefense PhD program!

Register here for this virtual information session taking place on October 16 at 10 am EDT.

Biodefense Students Get a Tour of George Mason’s BSL-3 Lab

Biodefense students got a chance to tour George Mason’s Biomedical Research Laboratory (BRL) this week while the lab was shut down for routine annual maintenance. The 52,000 square-foot laboratory was established in 2010 as one of 12 NIAID-funded regional biocontainment facilities to conduct research and development on novel diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines against viral and bacterial infectious agents.  Rachel Pepin, director of research support operations for the BRL, led the tour and provided a behind-the-scenes look at the lab’s BSL-3 and ABSL-3 suites, aerosol test chamber, and sophisticated HVAC system.  The tour provided the Biodefense students with insights into how infectious diseases research is conducted and the types of biosafety and biosecurity measures that are used by high containment labs.

Biodefense Program Director Gregory Koblentz with Biodefense students outside George Mason’s Biomedical Research Laboratory.

Russia Announces New Commission on Combating Biosecurity Threats

The Russian News Agency (TASS) announced this week that, “Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree on the creation of an interdepartmental commission of the Russian Security Council that will be responsible for countering modern threats to biological security. It will be headed by Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev.”

“The same decree abolished another Security Council commission which was headed by Medvedev – responsible for creating a national system of defense against new infections. Its functions were transferred to the new entity.”

“The document also sets out the new commissions’ functions. These include assessing threats to biological security, facilitating scientific research in the field of biotechnology development, creating state policy in the field of biosecurity, developing measures to prevent and eliminate biological threats, international cooperation in the field of biotechnology development and biosecurity, as well as countering the policies of foreign countries that pose a threat to Russia’s national interests.”

The official President of Russia webpage posted a statement explaining the executive order, reading in part “In accordance with the Federal Law On Security of December 28, 2010, and the Regulations on the Security Council of the Russian Federation, approved by Presidential Executive Order On Certain Aspects of the Security Council of the Russian Federation of March 7, 2020, the President decided to establish an Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council on Countering Modern Threats to Biological Security.”

“The Executive Order abolished the Security Council’s Interdepartmental Commission on the creation of a national system for protection against new infections. Its functions have been transferred to the new body.”

TASS further explained that “The commission will meet at least once every six months, and more often if necessary…According to the decree, the commission, which will be headed by Medvedev, will include the heads of the Interior, Health, Education and Science, Natural Resources, Economic Development Ministries, as well as the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing, the Federal Agency for Forestry and others.”

ARPA-H Launches APECx Program to Transform Vaccine Discovery

HHS announced this week that ARPA-H is launching the APECx to advance vaccine discovery. The Department said in its October 10 press release “The Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H) launched today a research program to develop a computational toolkit that helps design vaccines that target many viruses at once. The program is called the Antigens Predicted for Broad Viral Efficacy through Computational Experimentation, or APECx.”

“Viruses remain a significant threat to global health and security, causing pandemics, cancers, and chronic illness — yet we lack vaccines for most of these viral diseases. The current methods for vaccine and drug development are often slow and expensive, due in part to an incomplete understanding of a virus protein’s structure and function, leading to years of research that is targeted narrowly to one virus.”

“To accomplish genus- and family-level vaccine development, APECx will leverage emerging computational innovations coupled with high-throughput biochemical and immunological data generation on a scale that has not been approached before. ARPA-H is emphasizing collaboration across academia and industry to accelerate these discoveries with unique tools that have yet to be tested for vaccine development.”

“Through a forthcoming Broad Agency Announcement (BAA), APECx will solicit proposals focused on three technical areas: high-throughput biochemical analysis and protein engineering, protein modeling toolkit development for antigen design, and translational candidate development and clinical evaluation. Antigens and targets identified through these technical areas will be transitioned to a development pipeline to produce vaccines and other treatments with the goal of targeting entire viral families with a single vaccine. The resulting vaccines would represent entirely new approaches to preventing the viral infections that are causing large acute and chronic health burdens across America.”

Congressional Turbulence Threatens CWMD Office

Amid yet another leadership shuffle in the House, the fate of the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office hands in the balance. Ellen Gilmer explains in her deep dive for Bloomberg Government, “Mary Ellen Callahan, assistant secretary for the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office at the Department of Homeland Security, took the helm with just months to lock in support for the troubled office as lawmakers consider whether to renew it. Without a reauthorization, her office closes, and the US loses a division that trains first responders, researches and distributes technology, and helps detect threats nationwide.”

This comes after Federal News Network reported earlier this year that the office faced “…employee engagement scores near the bottom of the federal government.” That same piece explained some of the challenges this officefaces further, writing “DHS has consistently ranked near the bottom of the 17 “large” agencies in the “Best Places to Work in the Federal Government” rankings compiled by the Partnership for Public Service. Those low scores are largely driven by challenges at large DHS components like Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Transportation Security Administration.”

“But the component with the lowest employee engagement score in all of DHS is the little known Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction office. Its employee engagement score of 39.4 in 2022 ranked 430th out of 432 subcomponents across the entire federal government…With approximately 230 employees, the CWMD office is responsible for working with state and local governments as well as international partners to guard against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats to the United States.”

The product of a merger between the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the Office of Health Affairs, “One of the root causes of the low scores was a clash of different cultures between the two legacy offices, according to a GAO report from April 2022. While DNDO worked with physicists and law enforcement officials to detect and prevent threats, OHA was more focused on working with public health officials to coordinate preparedness and response, GAO reported.”

“Reimagining Incident Management Systems for Public Health Responses”

Hawkins et al. recently published this article in Health Security. They explain in their introduction: “In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic brought a “perfect storm” to disaster response efforts in the United States: a large-scale emergency response, many uncertainties, a dearth of public health resources, uncoordinated state efforts inherent to our federalist form of government, and severe political tensions that led to unprecedented involvement by elected officials—many of whom were experiencing a public health response for the first time in their careers. Although some jurisdictions had previously responded to severe, large-scale natural disaster incidents (including widespread wildfires or devastating hurricanes), they did not have experience with response and recovery processes for infectious disease outbreaks, which are less routine. Response efforts for natural disasters are more routine because they occur more frequently, resources can be garnered from unaffected jurisdictions, lessons learned are incorporated from previous disasters, and mitigation actions are taken between each response. In contrast, SARS-CoV-2 brought a plethora of unknowns, with impacts on health, economies, educational systems, and most other foundational components of everyday life throughout most communities across the globe. No “pandemic response model” existed, and the public health system found itself stretched to a perpetual state of almost breaking.”

This article was co-authored by Kimberly Ma, a current Biodefense PhD Student.

“Strengthening Warfighter Resiliency Using Broad-Spectrum or Host-Directed Therapies within the Rapid Acquisition and Investigation of Drugs for Repurposing (RAIDR) Program”

From Quattrochi et al. in The Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics: “The ecosystem of CBRN threats is evolving and becoming more complex. To maintain cadence with looming threats in a prolonged field care environment, the broader medical countermeasure (MCM) enterprise must adopt new strategies for CBRN-addressing drug development. The Countering Emerging Threats – Rapid Acquisition and Investigation of Drugs for Repurposing (CET RAIDR) program within the JPM Medical is designed to rapidly tackle known, unknown, and emerging threats by utilizing late-stage or licensed therapeutics. Responsible and relevant care must be more responsive to needs of expansive and novel threats, as showcased by lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic. Repurposing is one such method. The focus of the CET RAIDR effort is to bridge treatment gaps between threat identification and the implementation of licensed targeted MCMs, thereby strengthening warfighter resiliency. The CET RAIDR program conserves both time-to-market and funds by leveraging previous conventional development work as a launch point for repurposing efforts. The CET RAIDR program minimizes development and procurement costs by supplementing the military medical providers’ toolbox with post-Phase II therapies that demonstrate established safety and manufacturing processes, leading to a cost-sparing model for niche medicines (i.e., CBRN MCMs). The CET RAIDR program currently focuses on strengthening collaborations with industry, academia, and other government partners to survey and test and evaluate (T&E) U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved products, such as LEUKINE ®, PRECEDEX ®, Ketamine, Isoflurane, and XOFLUZA ®, as well as other promising developmental products against known or undocumented threats.”

Dr. Lauren Quattrochi is a classically trained electrophysiologist and neuro-pharmacologist currently serving as an Adjunct Professor in the Biodefense Graduate Program. Over the evolution of her career, she has worked within the biopharma industry, non-profits and for the past several years, in support of the government. Learn more about her here.

“Inside The Program To Dismantle Ukraine’s Nuclear Weapons”

Amos Cahpple recently published this article with Radio Free Europe discussing the work of the United States’ Defense Threat Reduction Agency, offering an easy-to-read review of the organization’s work in Ukraine accompanied by a number of pictures from DTRA’s work in the country in the 1990s. Chapple writes in the introduction, “In a “secret room” in Kyiv on April 13, 1993, Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of Ukraine, sat down with his Georgian counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze over borscht and puffy “pampushka” dumplings…Between bites, the Ukrainian reportedly confided that, even amid rampant corruption and economic turmoil, his “biggest headache” was pressure from Washington to hand over hundreds of Soviet-made nuclear weapons to Russia.”

“The Georgian president lowered his voice as he sympathized. Americans, he said, “do not understand the complicated, immensely difficult and brutal history of our relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, or other empires.”‘

“Shevardnadze then pitched an idea. Instead of allowing Ukraine to be entirely defanged, the country should keep just one functioning nuclear missile on its territory, to “ward off any madman.” After all, the Georgian president added, “today we have ‘democratic’ [Boris] Yeltsin” in the Kremlin, but “who knows who may come after him.”‘

“How Doing Justice to Ukraine Can Help Win the Battle for the Future of Nuclear Security”

Valeriia Hesse authored this issue brief for the Stimson Center explaining how “Russia occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has serious implications for nuclear security: urgent action is needed to mitigate risk.” She writes “The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine has created unprecedented risk in an era of increasing geopolitical tension. Deterring future attacks against nuclear facilities during armed conflict is an essential component of reducing nuclear risk and supporting nuclear industry – but how can this be achieved at a time when international cooperation has waned to new lows? This issue brief explores how the international nuclear security system must avoid nuclear disaster at ZNPP, end the Russian occupation of the plant, and prevent similar high-risk events from taking place in the future.”

Read more here.

“Distracted Politicians Have Given Terrorists Chemical Targets in US”

This piece discusses the expiration of the statutory authority for the  Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) earlier this year and the work of one activist to hold lawmakers accountable for this. The piece explains in part “Progressive Democratic activist Lisa McCormick is taking lawmakers to task for allowing the statutory authority for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) to expire on July 28, 2023.”

‘“While US Senator Bob Menendez was busy stuffing his pockets with bribe money and hiding gold bars in his home, Congress allowed the statutory authority for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (6 CFR Part 27) to expire on July 28, 2023, so it has been 69 days since the CFATS program lapsed. Congress must reinstate CFATS now,” said McCormick. “Attacks on U.S. chemical facilities have the potential to affect thousands, possibly millions of people, yet many of them remain poorly secured and a program to provide security has been allowed to lapse.”’

“CFATS is the nation’s first regulatory program focused specifically on security at high-risk chemical facilities. It identifies and regulates these facilities to ensure security measures are in place to reduce the risk that certain dangerous chemicals are weaponized by terrorists.”

‘“Our own representatives have joined our adversaries by creating a heightened threat environment that puts more of us in danger than ever before, especially here in New Jersey along what was described as ‘the most dangerous two miles in America’,” said McCormick.”

“Strategic Posture Commission Report Calls For Broad Nuclear Buildup”

The Federation of American Scientists released this backgrounder on “America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States”. FAS explains in part, “On October 12th, the Strategic Posture Commission released its long-awaited report on U.S. nuclear policy and strategic stability. The 12-member Commission was hand-picked by Congress in 2022 to conduct a threat assessment, consider alterations to U.S. force posture, and provide recommendations.”

“In contrast to the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, the Congressionally-mandated Strategic Posture Commission report is a full-throated embrace of a U.S. nuclear build-up.”

“It includes recommendations for the United States to prepare to increase its number of deployed warheads, as well as increasing its production of bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, ballistic missile submarines, non-strategic nuclear forces, and warhead production capacity. It also calls for the United States to deploy multiple warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and consider adding road-mobile ICBMs to its arsenal.”

“The only thing that appears to have prevented the Commission from recommending an immediate increase of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is that the weapons production complex currently does not have the capacity to do so.”

“The Commission’s embrace of a U.S. nuclear buildup ignores the consequences of a likely arms race with Russia and China (in fact, the Commission doesn’t even consider this or suggest other steps than a buildup to try to address the problem). If the United States responds to the Chinese buildup by increasing its own deployed warheads and launchers, Russia would most likely respond by increasing its deployed warheads and launchers. That would increase the nuclear threat against the United States and its allies. China, who has already decided that it needs more nuclear weapons to stand up to the existing U.S. force level (and those of Russia and India), might well respond to the U.S and Russian increases by increasing its own arsenal even further. That would put the United States back to where it started, feeling insufficient and facing increased nuclear threats.”

“Characterizing Private-Sector Research on Human Pathogens in the United States”

This new report from Gryphon Scientific assesses the extent of private-sector human pathogens research in the US and discusses policy challenges this poses. It explains in its executive summary: “Improperly protected human pathogen research poses risks to human health and wellbeing through laboratory accidents and the malicious misuse of laboratory materials or information. A patchwork of US government policies serves to manage these risks, but private non-profit and for-profit performers of human pathogen research are subject to less oversight than government or academic research performers.”
“To support informed decisions about regulation, we estimated the size, nature, and oversight capacities of the US private sector in human pathogen research by using data from multiple sources, including publications, funding streams, records from comparable foreign governments, customer records from providers of research materials, and lists of organizations themselves. Each of these estimates is imperfect alone, but together forms a picture of the research community. Overall, we estimate that about one quarter of human pathogen research performed in the United States occurs in the private sector.”

“Of the institutions that perform human pathogen research in the United States that are not run by the government or confer degrees, 54 of the 86 for-profits (63%) and all 19 of the non-profits that we identified had accepted federal funding in the last five years, making them subject to US government’s policies for managing dual-use research of concern (DURC). The remaining 32 for-profits appeared to be unfunded by the US government and are thus only subject to OSHA workplace safety requirements.”
“In addition, we held discussions with representatives from six major non-profits, for profits, and funders involved with US human pathogen research to learn more about their current oversight practices. Overall, the research funders that we spoke to relied heavily on research performers to manage day-to-day biosafety and biosecurity risks. Research performers reported strong biosafety and biosecurity practices and close alignment with US government documentation.”

Access a copy of this report below.

“How the Ecological Crisis of Bird Flu Could Become a Human Pandemic”

This recent article in PLOS Pathogens was authored by members of the One Health High-Level Expert Panel. They write in their background section, “The devastating impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on human health globally has prompted extensive discussions on how to better prepare for and safeguard against the next pandemic. Zoonotic spillover of pathogens from animals to humans is recognized as the predominant cause of emerging infectious diseases and as the primary cause of recent pandemics [1]. This spillover risk is increased by a range of factors (called drivers) that impact the nature, frequency, and intensity of contact between humans and wild animals. Many of these drivers are related to human impact, for example, deforestation and changes in land use and agricultural practices. While it is clear that the triad of prevention-preparedness-response (P-P-R) is highly relevant, there is much discussion on which of these 3 strategic activities in the field of emerging infectious disease should be prioritized and how to optimally target resources. For this, it is important to understand the scope of the respective activity and the consequences of prioritization.”

“Already, the World Bank Pandemic Fund and forthcoming global Pandemic instrument [2] negotiated by the World Health Organization (WHO) [3] appear primarily focused on the early detection, and reaction to the appearance of human illnesses, often with explicit focus only on action to be taken once pathogen spillover and spread have occurred. Strategies to reduce the probability of spillover events are under-prioritized and underutilized, as highlighted by recent infectious disease crises such as Ebola and Mpox epidemics, and have been lost in overall preparedness discussions and recovery financing. This “more of the same” focus suggests that it is politically more expedient to allocate financial resources to deal with a problem once it has arisen, rather than taking the steps necessary to reduce the risk of it occurring in the first place. It is often claimed that allocating resources to prevent something from happening is politically difficult as the value of prevention is largely “invisible” (prevention paradox) or it will take a long time to show effects. However, there are now several communications highlighting the economic benefits of prevention of spillover [1,4,5]. If taken, actions to prevent spillover are estimated at $10 to 31 billion per year globally, as a cumulative investment from preventive actions achievable by specific industries. However, addressing the drivers of pathogen spillover through a One Health approach has significant subsequent economic co-benefits; for example, reducing deforestation is estimated to create $4 billion per year in social benefits from reduced greenhouse gas emissions [4]. COVID-19 has demonstrated the immense burden of a pandemic, including significant mortality resulting in economic recession, with the global economy contracting by 4.4 percent in 2020. The expected economic losses from this pandemic are estimated at nearly $14 trillion up to 2024 [6,7]. These losses parallel those incurred by other infectious disease emergencies, including the 2003 SARS pandemic with an estimated economic loss of $52 billion; the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014 to 2016 with a GDP loss of $2.8 to 32.6 billion and the comprehensive economic and social burden estimated to be $53.19 billion [8]; and the 2015 to 2016 Zika virus disease outbreak with an estimated loss in the United States, Caribbean, and Latin America of $20 billion [9,10]. If invested in, prevention strategies would reduce the likelihood of another pandemic substantially and likely generate sufficient return on investment over time while also having the potential to generate substantial co-benefits [1,10]. Prevention is already valued in other sectors: policymakers and industries have led on prevention in other areas, such as expenditure on counter-terrorism, driving laws and insurance incentives to reduce the frequency of traffic accidents, on the nuclear deterrent, and in some cases on flood prevention and other water management measures, exemplifying a political willingness to spend vast sums of money to preempt a harmful event in certain areas or circumstances, but not on pandemic prevention.”

“Prevention of Zoonotic Spillover: From Relying on Response to Reducing the Risk at Source”

Georgios Pappas recently published this piece with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. In it he explains, “In early 2022, almost 10 percent of the global Dalmatian pelican population perished. The near-threatened species, one of the world’s largest freshwater birds, was not particularly susceptible to avian influenza in the past, but as soon as the pelicans arrived in their colonies in northwestern Greek lakes, they began to die—first by the hundreds and then the thousands as “bird flu” took hold. The disease has caused similar massive die-offs in other wild birds; it’s led officials in various countries to cull tens of millions of farm poultry; and it’s spread among and killed huge numbers of wild and farmed mammals—3,000 dead sea lions in Peru, 120,000 culled fur animals in Finland. The toll in domestic poultry has led many national organizations to employ the controversial technique of vaccinating farm birds against avian influenza, which some fear could—by not completely preventing infections—allow the virus to mutate in domestic flocks.”

“All these events, evolving in succession, may sound like the beginning of an apocalyptic fiction novel or film. Instead, they’re real-life ecologic emergencies. They haven’t yet had a large-scale direct impact on people, but scientists are racing to evaluate how likely an adapted-to-humans avian influenza strain is, and how soon such a virus may evolve. There are several key points to consider in analyzing the threat of avian influenza as the virus continues its global spread.”

“Surveillance of Laboratory Exposures to Human Pathogens and Toxins, Canada, 2022”

New in CCDR: “Background: The Laboratory Incident Notification Canada (LINC) surveillance system was launched in 2015 to monitor the mandated national reporting of laboratory incidents. This report describes the laboratory exposures reported in 2022.

Methods: Exposure incidents were analyzed by activity, occurrence, sector, root cause and pathogens/toxins implicated, while affected individuals were analyzed by education, exposure route, role and years of laboratory experience. An analysis of the median number of exposures per month was conducted, and time between the exposure incident date and the date the incident was reported to LINC was examined.

Results: Forty confirmed laboratory exposure incident reports were received, with two suspected laboratory-acquired infections. The exposure incident rate per 100 active licences was 3.8, and the number of exposure incidents was highest in September. The majority of exposure incidents involved risk group 2 pathogens (n=27; 63%) and non-security sensitive biological agents (n=36; 84%). Microbiology was the most cited activity occurring during the exposure event (n=20; 50%), and sharps and procedure-related issues were the most common occurrences (n=15; 24.2% each). Most incidents were reported by the academic sector (n=16; 40%). Human interaction was the most common root cause (n=20; 23.8%) and most affected individuals were technicians/technologists (n=68; 73.1%). The median time delay between the incident date and reporting date was 5.5 days.

Conclusion: The exposure incident rate was lower in 2022 than in 2021. Incidents related to sharps and standard operating procedures remained the most common occurrence types. The most cited root cause of exposure incidents involved human interaction.”

NEW: 2023 Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

From Brookings: “The Department of Defense (DoD) recently released its 2023 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), rescinding and replacing the CWMD strategy last issued in 2014. Expanding on the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the 2023 CWMD strategy focuses on defending the American homeland from WMD attack, deterring WMD use against the United States and its allies and partners, enabling U.S. forces to operate and prevail in a WMD environment, and preventing new WMD threats in an environment complicated by emerging WMD threats.”

“On October 18, Brookings will host a public event to share key highlights from the 2023 CWMD Strategy. Assistant Secretary of Defense John F. Plumb will provide an overview of the strategy, followed by a panel discussion and questions from the audience.”

Learn more and register for this 10 am EST event here.

NEW: A Tale of Two Pandemics: Lessons from the 1889 & 2019 Pandemics and Insight for Pandemic Preparedness

“Please join the Foreign Policy Association for A Tale of Two Pandemics: Lessons From the 1889 & 2019 Pandemics and Insights for Pandemic Preparedness. This distinguished panel will discuss the similarities and differences of the two pandemics and highlight their societal and economic responses as a template for pandemic preparedness. This event will be held at the United Nations, which requires photo ID to enter the building with a guest pass. You can collect your guest passes outside the Visitor’s Center located on 46th Street and 1st Avenue. Please register using the same name that appears on your photo ID. Registration will open at 4:00pm with the panel set to begin at 4:45pm. The event is free to attend with registration. Space is limited based on availability.”

This event will take place on October 19 at 4 pm EST. Learn more and register here.

NEW: Biological Weapons: The Interconnectivity of Norms

“The bans on chemical and biological weapons (CBW) are central elements of the international disarmament and security architecture. We however need to consider how these regimes  can overcome current issues and strengthen themselves for the future. What can be done to ensure the strength of the taboos against chemical and biological weapons is not weakened. In light of this the conference seeks to understand the relevant normative regimes for Chemical and Biological weapons and especially how different norms and levels of norms interact with one another.”

This conference will take place on October 23 and 24 in Gießen, DE. Learn more and register here.

NEW: The Convergence of AI and the Life Sciences: New Report on Safeguarding Technology, Rethinking Governance, and Preventing Catastrophe

“Join NTI | bio for the launch of the new report, “The Convergence of Artificial Intelligence and the Life Sciences: Safeguarding Technology, Rethinking Governance, and Preventing Catastrophe,” which draws on interviews with more than 30 experts in AI, biotech industry, bioscience research, and biosecurity. The report offers recommendations for governance approaches to safeguard AI-bio capabilities in order to reduce biological risks without unduly hindering scientific advances.”

This event will take place on October 30 at 3 pm GMT. Learn more and register here.

Digital Tools for Disarmament: An Overview of UNIDIR Portals and Databases (Side Event)

“Over the course of the last years, UNIDIR has developed a range of digital tools to support arms control and disarmament processes related to a number of different areas including: cyber security, artificial intelligence, space security and biological disarmament. These tools have provided States and stakeholders with a valuable resource that has helped support policy processes and promote trust, transparency, and cooperation in different areas of technology governance.”

“This event will provide an overview of UNIDIR’s growing collection of digital tools and will be an opportunity to have an interactive discussion around the methods, scope and opportunities presented by these resources.”

This hybrid event will take place on October 18 at 1:15 EDT. Learn more and register here.

Advancing One Health in the United States through Interagency Collaboration

“The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of the Interior (DOI) are hosting two informational webinars to brief the public on the recently published Federal Register Notice for the draft National One Health Framework to Address Zoonotic Diseases and Advance Public Health Preparedness in the United States: A Framework for One Health Coordination and Collaboration across Federal Agencies (NOHF-Zoonoses).”

This will include a briefing for state, local, and tribal officials on October 3 at 10 am EST (valid government email address required), as well as public ones on October 13 at 12 pm EST and October 19 at 3 pm EST.

Lessons Learned from the Pediatric Tripledemic: Systems, Staff, Space, and Supplies

“The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange (ASPR TRACIE) and ASPR’s Pediatric Disaster Care Centers of Excellence invite you to “Lessons Learned from the Pediatric Tripledemic: Systems, Staff, Space, and Supplies,” where panelists will share lessons learned from the 2022 2023 pediatric surge due to influenza, COVID-19, and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). Participants will learn about successes and challenges in information sharing, the use of specialty resources in response (e.g., Medical Operations Coordination Centers), augmenting staff, the use of telemedicine, and coordination with supply chain and coalition partners on medication shortage solutions. These findings can help participants prepare for and respond to future surge events.”

Register here for this event taking place on October 17 at 1 pm EST.

Medical Countermeasures-Expanding Delivery and Increasing Uptake Through Public-Private Partnerships Upcoming Workshop Series

“WORKSHOP SERIES: Medical Countermeasures- Expanding Delivery and Increasing Uptake Through Public-Private Partnerships: A Workshop Series
WHEN: October 3, 12, 17, 26, and November 2, 2023

The National Academies Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies will host a series of virtual public workshops to examine lessons learned and future opportunities for public-private partnerships to facilitate delivery, monitoring, uptake, and utilization of medical countermeasures to the public during a public health emergency. 

The workshop will be accessible via webinar. Learn more on the project page.”

2nd International One Health Conference

“Health is a key aspect of our modern society that requires a multidisciplinary approach and that needs to bring together professionals, academics and decision makers in order to bridge the gap between current scientific knowledge and policies.”
“The Conference aims to activate synergic dialogues among disciplinary research fields and action domains among researchers, experts and students.”

“The One health conceptual framework and the possible contribution from the One Health approach in the urban resilience capacities enhancement will be the core of the congress dialogues.”

“The international One Health Conference 2022 will be in hybrid form from 19 to 20 of October at the Colegio de Medicos in Barcelona.”

Learn more and register here.

2023 EPA International Decontamination Research and Development Conference-“Advancing Preparedness through Science and Collaboration”

“The clean-up of chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) contamination incidents and natural disasters is a critical challenge for the United States. Understanding how to characterize and remediate affected areas of environmental contamination and waste is necessary for daily life to return.”

“The Decon Conference is designed to facilitate presentation, discussion, and further collaboration of research and development topics focused on an all-hazards approach to remediate contaminated indoor and outdoor areas, critical infrastructure, water distribution systems, and other environmental areas/materials.”

“This conference is free and open to the public. Content and presentations are geared towards the emergency response community, including local and state emergency managers, homeland security officials, first responder coordinators, private sector industry, risk managers, educators in the field of emergency management, and others.”

This event will take place December 5-7 in Charleston, SC. Learn more and register here.

61st ISODARCO Course: Nuclear Order and International Security after Ukraine

“The war in Ukraine has had an enormous impact on global security, reviving nuclear fears, undermining the prospects for arms control, and shattering many of the norms and constraints that were the foundation of European security.  ISODARCO 2024 will examine the global nuclear order in light of the Ukraine war, focusing on the states, the policies and the technologies that will shape the future in a much more difficult environment.  How will we cope with this more dangerous world?”

This course will take place January 7-14, 2024, at the University of Trento. Learn more and register here.

Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open

Registration is now open for the Global Health Security 2024 conference in Sydney, Australia. This iteration will take place 18-21 June, 2024. The call for abstracts is also still open. “The mission of the Global Health Security conference is to provide a forum where leaders, researchers, policy-makers, and representatives from government, international organisations, civil society, and private industry from around the world can engage with each other, review the latest research and policy innovations, and agree solutions for making the world safer and healthier. To that end, our mission is to help foster a genuinely multidisciplinary community of practice that is committed to working collaboratively to enhance global health security and eliminate disease, irrespective of its origin or source.”

Request for Information: Design and Development of ARPA-H Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) Initiative

“The Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H) is seeking unique and creative ideas to help the agency develop a well-informed, comprehensive, and actionable Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) of research framework. This framework will help to guide, clarify, justify, and evaluate ARPA-H investments as the agency seeks to support the development of high-impact health solutions. Given that ARPA-H will invest in tools and technologies that push the boundaries of currently available solutions and capabilities, the agency must consider the secondary impacts – both positive and negative – that these advancements may have on individuals and on society. ARPA-H understands that the pace of technological innovation can exceed the pace of regulatory, policy, or framework development, and as such is also seeking revolutionary ideas, technologies, and capabilities for the implementation and incentivization of ELSI activities within the agency’s programs, projects, or as stand-alone efforts. A proactive approach will enable and enhance responsible biomedical and health research innovation and will promote a future that upholds ethical principles, adheres to legal requirements, ensures broad accessibility to all who may benefit, and is cognizant of the potential societal implications.”

Learn more here.

Screening Framework Guidance for Providers and Users of Synthetic Nucleic Acids

“The Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response is issuing this screening framework guidance, which sets forth baseline standards for the gene and genome synthesis industry, as well as best practices for all entities involved in the provision, use, and transfer of synthetic nucleic acids, regarding screening orders and recipients and maintaining records. In addition, this guidance seeks to encourage best practices to address biosecurity concerns associated with the potential misuse of synthetic nucleic acids in order to bypass existing regulatory controls and commit unlawful acts.”

Learn more in this Federal Register notice from HHS.

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