This week’s edition covers a recently-released CSIS intelligence assessment discussing the firing of infectious disease laboratory scientists accused of sharing sensitive information with the PRC, ongoing challenges in the aftermath of the cyberattack on Change Health, the Biden administration’s recent efforts to protect sensitive information about Americans from adversarial foreign countries, and more.
Biodefense PhD Program Alumnus Joins Institute of National Security Strategy
”Dr. HyunJung (Henry) Kim, Biodefense PhD ’21, recently joined the Institute of National Security Strategy (INSS), the premier national think-tank in South Korea supporting the South Korean government with policy proposals for diplomacy, national security, and unification. Dr. Kim is a research fellow in the Department of Emerging Security Studies at the INSS. Before entering INSS, he was a research professor at Yonsei University in South Korea. Dr. Kim’s latest publication (in Korean) is “National Security in the Digital-Biological Era as Seen Through the U.S. Biosecure Act,” INSS Issue Brief No. 516 (February 2024).”
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Says Fired Winnipeg Scientists Intentionally Shared Scientific Information With China
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) recently released an intelligence assessment and other documents pertaining to the 2019 firing of Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Chen, former scientists with Canada’s top infectiouse disease laboratory. The CBC explains that “The documents show the service had a more rosy initial assessment of Qiu’s motivation, noting in spring of 2020 that she could be “susceptible … based on the belief in the power of science to help humanity…” “But as the investigation went deeper, CSIS’s concerns deepened. A few months later, CSIS wrote Qiu was using the level 4 lab in Canada “as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly-pathogenic pathogens” and “achieved brilliant results…”Qiu provided Beijing “with the Ebola genetic sequence, which opened a door of convenience for China,” wrote CSIS.”
Qiu is accused by CSIS of involvement with multiple talent programs administered by organizations affiliated with the PRC government. “Those programs are set up to “boost China’s national technological capabilities and may pose a serious threat to research institutions, including government research facilities, by incentivizing economic espionage and theft of intellectual property,” said CSIS in the report.”
CSIS further cautioned that reinstating Qiu would put Canadians’ health in jeopardy.
Healthcare Providers Face Long Waits for Reimbursements Following Cyber Attack on UnitedHealth
Weeks after a cyber attack targeted UnitedHealth Group’s subsidiary, Change Healthcare, many hospitals, doctors, and clinics are now stuck waiting weeks for remibursements. Change, the nation’s largest billing and payment clearing house, said it would take at least another two weeks before it could resume a steady flow of payments, leaving many providers cash-strapped. Worse yet, many processors, including California’s Noridian Healthcare Solutions, are refusing to accept paper claims, though those can take up to six months to result in provider payments.
HHS said in its statement about the attack, “This incident is a reminder of the interconnectedness of the domestic health care ecosystem and of the urgency of strengthening cybersecurity resiliency across the ecosystem. That’s why, in December 2023, HHS released a concept paper that outlines the Department’s cybersecurity strategy for the sector. The concept paper builds on the National Cybersecurity Strategy that President Biden released last year, focusing specifically on strengthening resilience for hospitals, patients, and communities threatened by cyber-attacks. The paper details four pillars for action, including publishing new voluntary health care-specific cybersecurity performance goals, working with Congress to develop supports and incentives for domestic hospitals to improve cybersecurity, increasing accountability within the health care sector, and enhancing coordination through a one-stop shop.”
Related: “HSCC Issues Cyber ‘Call to Action’ Plan for Health Sector”
Ukraine Reports “Startling Spike” in Russian Chemical Weapons Use
25% of all Russia CW used against Ukraine in the last two years were used in February 2024, according to the Ukranian military. As the Kyiv Post explains, “An early, possible indicator of Russian chemical weapon use against Ukrainian troops came on Nov. 15, when the independent military information platform DeepState reported Moscow’s forces had hit defenders in the northeastern Sviatisky and southeastern Bakhmut sectors with an unidentified weapon deploying the chloropicrin, a chemical widely used in tear gas weapons during World War I. The report was widely repeated in Ukrainian media but never independently confirmed.”
“According to Ukrainian army briefing materials published on Jan. 25, Russian forces at the start of 2024 expanded use of toxic gas grenades dropped by hobby drones, almost always quadcopters, and started using a new grenade designed to pump out gas at a pre-set altitude above the ground.”
The same article later explains “Russia has accused Ukraine repeatedly of using chemical weapons. On Tuesday, in comments by the Kremlin-run media platform Izvestiya Kirill Lysogorskiy, Deputy Head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, was quoted as stating Ukrainian forces target Russian troops and civilians in occupied territories with chemical weapons.”
Read more here.
President Biden Issues Executive Order Aimed at Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Personal Data from Foreign Countries, Especially China
President Biden recently issued an executive order “…which marks the most significant executive action any President has ever taken to protect Americans’ data security, authorizes the Attorney General to prevent the large-scale transfer of Americans’ personal data to countries of concern and provides safeguards around other activities that can give those countries access to Americans’ sensitive data.”
According to the White House’s press statement on the EO, “The President’s Executive Order focuses on Americans’ most personal and sensitive information, including genomic data, biometric data, personal health data, geolocation data, financial data, and certain kinds of personally identifiable information. Bad actors can use this data to track Americans (including military service members), pry into their personal lives, and pass that data on to other data brokers and foreign intelligence services. This data can enable intrusive surveillance, scams, blackmail, and other violations of privacy.”
“Companies are collecting more of Americans’ data than ever before, and it is often legally sold and resold through data brokers. Commercial data brokers and other companies can sell this data to countries of concern, or entities controlled by those countries, and it can land in the hands of foreign intelligence services, militaries, or companies controlled by foreign governments.”
“The sale of Americans’ data raises significant privacy, counterintelligence, blackmail risks and other national security risks—especially for those in the military or national security community. Countries of concern can also access Americans’ sensitive personal data to collect information on activists, academics, journalists, dissidents, political figures, and members of non-governmental organizations and marginalized communities to intimidate opponents of countries of concern, curb dissent, and limit Americans’ freedom of expression and other civil liberties.”
Following years of concerns voiced by federal officials about data brokers and hackers gaining access to information like geolocation, genomic, and other sensitive data about Americans on behalf of countries like Russia and China, this order is designed to stem these information flows. The Washington Post‘s article on the order explains the severity of these risks briefly: “China’s siphoning of tens of millions of Americans’ data, whether through hacking or the purchasing of companies, has long been of concern to U.S. officials. A massive Chinese cyber breach of federal personnel records discovered in 2014 and of Marriott Hotels’ database a few years later, merged with existing intelligence and commercially available information, prompted worry that Beijing — and, to a certain extent, Moscow — was building an ability to track individuals, including undercover CIA officers.”
A Framework for Tomorrow’s Pathogen Research: Final Report
This report covers the findings of the Pathogens Project, a task force created by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and “composed of globally recognized experts to generate new thinking on research with pandemic risk.” The report’s summary explains that “The Task Force’s report discusses the potential benefits of virology research and outlines how advances in science and technology may increase certain benefits. It then focuses on some of the potential risks of virology research, including biosafety and biosecurity, and outlines how advances in science and technology may increase some of these risks. The Task Force also examined ethical obligations to make research with pandemic risks more safe, secure, and responsible, suggesting actionable and sustainable strategies to effectively maximize the potential benefits and mitigate the foreseeable potential harms of research with known or potential pandemic pathogens, while attending to issues of equity and proportionality. The report argues for empirical studies on biosafety and biosecurity to make research with pandemic risks more safe, secure, and responsible. It also reviews the contemporary governance space for research with known or potential pandemic pathogens and argues that effective legislation, regulations, policies, and guidelines specifically regulating such research will strengthen the scientific enterprise and should be put in place and implemented without delay. It discusses challenges in building and sustaining trust in science in general and research with pandemic risks more specifically. Finally, the Task Force has issued several recommendations.”
Bonus: Read Science News’ discussion of the report here.
“How the Biological Weapons Convention Could Verify Treaty Compliance”
James Revill recently published this piece with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, discussing the Ninth BWC Review Conference and how the BWC can improve treaty compliance verification: “Despite the challenging geostrategic context, the group engaged in a constructive dialogue over three days in December 2023, managing to move beyond the impasse around the failed verification protocol negotiations decades ago that stymied discussion on verification and compliance ever since. Moreover, the group recognized significant scientific and technological developments, including new open source verification opportunities and microbial forensic techniques that weren’t available in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but may be now. But there remains a gap between what is technically possible in terms of verifying that countries are in compliance with the treaty, and what BWC member states view as politically feasible and financially acceptable.”
“Comparing Sampling Strategies for Early Detection of Stealth Biothreats”
Will Bradshaw and Simon Grimm recently authored this explainer on the Nucleic Acid Observatory and its goals, explaining in their introduction: “The NAO’s fundamental mission is to ensure that humanity can reliably detect stealth pandemics as soon as possible. To achieve this, we need to implement a monitoring system capable of reliably detecting novel outbreaks even in the absence of a strong clinical signal. Such a system could be based on a wide range of possible sampling strategies, including both those that collect material from individuals (individual sampling) and those that collect it from the human environment (environmental sampling). Different sampling strategies differ in key properties, including detection capability, cost, and credibility to those with the power to initiate an effective response to detection.”
“The detection capability of a sampling strategy depends on both the size and composition of its catchment (the population of individuals contributing material to the sample) and the microbial composition of the resulting samples. How these affect detection depends in turn on the methods used to analyze the resulting sequencing data, which can be divided into static detection (which detect potential threats based on nucleic-acid sequence features) and dynamic detection (which detect potential threats based on suspicious temporal patterns of sequence abundance). Dynamic detection methods are typically more vulnerable to noise arising from temporal variability in catchment and microbial composition, and hence benefit more from large, consistent catchments and stable microbial communities with high pathogen abundance.”
“Major costs associated with biosurveillance include those associated with gaining and maintaining approval; sample collection; sample processing; metagenomic sequencing; and computational analysis. The cost of a given sampling strategy will depend in many ways on its scale, in terms of the size of the catchment sampled; the geographic area covered; the temporal density of sampling; and the degree of sequencing effort. In general, individual sampling approaches will exhibit a steeper increase in costs as scale increases, due to the need to collect and process rapidly increasing numbers of individual samples. Conversely, environmental sampling approaches will typically exhibit flatter financial and personnel costs with increasing scale, at the cost of decreasing per-person sensitivity. Environmental sampling strategies also seem likely to incur substantially lower regulatory burdens than individual strategies that involve collecting and handling individually identifiable medical information.”
“Finally, in addition to detection capability and cost, sampling strategies differ in their ability to enable and motivate an effective response to a novel outbreak. In general, sampling strategies with smaller catchments will provide more actionable information to policymakers when it comes to targeted responses (e.g. contact tracing and isolation). Sampling strategies that provide identifiable cases and affected constituencies may also prove more effective at motivating a response from policymakers with strong political incentives to avoid drastic interventions. However, sampling strategies that might struggle to enable and motivate an immediate targeted response can still provide scientists and policymakers with invaluable situational awareness about pathogen distribution, prevalence and spread. Overall, a multi-tiered approach, in which large-catchment surveillance triggers more targeted monitoring when signs of an outbreak are found, may prove most effective at balancing competing needs for sensitivity, credibility, and cost-effectiveness.”
“Biotech Matters: Automated Scientists Will Power Tomorrow’s Bioeconomy”
David A. Markowitz recently authored this piece for CNAS, writing in part “Twenty years ago, it was barely plausible that soon every person on Earth would have a supercomputer in their pocket with ready access to the world’s information. Even though mobile phones were pervasive in the United States—itself a technological revolution—the number of advances needed for the smartphone revolution to occur made this seem impossible, until suddenly, it felt inevitable. History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes. Today, biotechnology is pervasive in the United States, already playing a significant role in agriculture and healthcare and enabling new domestic supply chains to support manufacturing and other sectors of the economy.1 The growth of today’s bioeconomy was hard won, built on decades of steady research and development (R&D) and gradual market adoption. Given that gradual rate of progress, it’s difficult to imagine biotechnology may soon have its own “smartphone moment.” But that moment is right around the corner. How the United States responds to this technology shift will have profound consequences for its economy and national security.”
“Smallpox is Still a Threat to America, 40 Years After Its Eradication”
Tom Daschle and Fred Upton recently published this opinion piece in The Hill, writing in part “So why then is there mounting concern about the reemergence of smallpox today? We need no longer worry about smallpox circulating naturally, but it remains a dangerous threat as a biological weapon — particularly now that the global population is no longer routinely immunized. As a result of this threat, vaccines, antivirals and diagnostic tests for smallpox continue to be developed and stockpiled in the U.S. and around the world. But we believe our country can, and must, do better.”
“Progress Deferred: Lessons From mRNA Vaccine Development”
Tim Hwang recently authored this piece for IFP, writing in its introduction: “Much of the fundamental groundwork needed to make mRNA vaccines a practical reality had been available years before it was used to fight COVID-19. That Operation Warp Speed was able to quickly resolve many issues of vaccine design and manufacturing within months is indicative. It suggests that the primary limitation to achieving mRNA vaccines was resourcing, rather than fundamental barriers of understanding or technology.”
“This paper reckons with this incongruity: post hoc, mRNA vaccines were clearly a major breakthrough. But for a long period, investigators like Karikó and Weissman and startups like Moderna and BioNTech languished in relative obscurity. Why were mRNA vaccines not developed and made practical for use significantly earlier?”
“Anonymous Answers: What Are the Biggest Misconceptions About Biosecurity and Pandemic Risk?”
Anemone Franz and Tessa Alexanian recently discussed common misconceptions and mistakes several experts identified as common in the field of biosecurity, “…particularly as it realtes to people working on global catastrophic risks and in the effective altruism community.” Read more here.
“Are U.S. Health Agencies Prepared for the Next Pandemic? It’s Entirely Unclear”
Randall Lutter recently authored this issue brief for the Manhattan Institute: “This issue brief will discuss the measures that U.S. federal health agencies are taking—or, more accurately, not taking—to prepare for the next pandemic, and evaluate whether the funds reserved for pandemic preparedness are being effectively used. It is in the national interest to reauthorize PAHPA, but Congress must demand that federal agencies adopt and implement quantifiable measures of preparedness.”
“The National Security Rationale for Stockpiling Key Pharmaceutical Ingredients”
Vic Suarez recently published this briefer for CSR’s Nolan Center, arguing that stockpiling key pharmaceutical ingredients is necessary for the US because:
- “Critical commodity which could undermine the nation’s healthcare system and national defense mobilization and sustainment capabilities during geopolitical tensions.”
- “Depending on the nation’s pacing military threat and largest economic competitor for these materials is a significant security threat.”
- “Key Starting Materials (KSM) and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) stockpiles in the US would provide strategic flexibility and agility and can be stored for many more years than finished pharmaceutical products. They also can cover a broad spectrum of finished products further up the supply chain.”
- “The US government has a long history of stockpiling materials deemed essential for national security.”
- “Pharmaceutical ingredient stockpiles can provide a solid foundation to stabilize the economy, advance the continuity of high-quality patient care and long-term health outcomes, and provide essential predictability to patients, government and first responder actors, and the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries.”
2024 AMR Preparedness Index Progress Report
Recently, “the Global Coalition on Aging (GCOA) and the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) launched the 2024 AMR Preparedness Index Progress Report. Released in the lead up to the United Nations General Assembly 2024 High-level Meeting on Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) this September, the 2024 Progress Report assesses how the eleven largest global economies have advanced on calls to action laid out in the 2021 AMR Preparedness Index. The 2021 Index examined over 100 metrics to evaluate and rank countries’ performance against AMR and establish benchmarks for policy action and leadership.”
“Each year, nearly 5 million deaths are associated with AMR, with disproportionate impact on low-and middle-income countries. Without the creation of innovative and novel antimicrobials, growing resistance to our existing drugs threatens our ability to perform even routine medical care. AMR is a significant barrier to health system sustainability and public health, including healthy aging. It is also an economic challenge – without correcting course on AMR, the World Bank estimates that AMR could cost the global economy as much as $3.4 trillion USD annually by 2023.”
“The 2024 Progress Report assessed the same eleven countries as the 2021 Index: Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). The UK maintained its position as the global leader in the fight against AMR, and many of the countries showed promising progress in many areas, but there is still greater action and targeted investment needed across all countries evaluated, particularly to revive the floundering pipeline of novel antibiotics.”
“New Building in Hamhung Area: North Korea’s Chemical Facilities: Site Profile 2”
This new piece from RUSI discusses a new building identified in North Korea’s Hamhung Area that is potentially linked to the DPRK CW program: “The production or storage of chemical warfare agents in this building has not been determined, but the building’s construction and layout, associated facilities and proximity to industrial chemical production facilities make it a site of particular interest. These nearby chemical production facilities include the Hungnam Fertiliser Complex and the 8th February Vinalon Complex, which between them handle or produce several industrial chemicals that could be used as precursors or intermediates in the production of chemical warfare agents.”
“The Chemical Weapons Convention After Its Fifth Review Conference: Key Issues for the European Union”
Alexander Ghionis and Alexander Kelle recently published this article with the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium: “This paper analyses key issues for the European Union (EU) regarding the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) after the 2023 Fifth Review Conference. It reviews the EU’s longstanding support to strengthen CWC implementation across five areas: upholding the norm against chemical weapons use; adapting the verification regime; capacity building; organizational governance; and external engagement. The paper then identifies specific challenges and opportunities post-review conference in these priority areas and provides targeted recommendations for the EU to leverage its influence and resources through diplomatic pressure, funding instruments, partnerships and reform advocacy. The paper argues that the EU can play an enhanced role to address polarization, deliver accountability for violations and strengthen the impact of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ implementation support. Creative and determined EU efforts are essential to revitalize norms, build capacity, enable organizational change/evolution and strengthen partnerships for more effective CWC implementation.”
“The US Has Lost a Critical Tool for Handling Chemical Emergencies–Let’s Get It Back”
Nitin Natarajan recently published this opinion piece in The Hill discussing the expiration of CFATS. They write in part “Thanks to the efforts of CISA employees and the partnership of the chemical industry that it regulated, the CFATS program was a huge success. Chemical security inspectors conducted an average of 160 site inspections per month across the nation, and more than one in three of those inspections led to security improvements. Critically, the program also provided a mechanism to conduct background checks — including screening for links to terrorists — on employees, contractors, and visitors who have access to these chemicals within these facilities. Absent the program, we remain unable to vet the average of 300 new names per day to determine whether these individuals have ties to terrorists.”
“Restoring National Chemical Security Program Vital to Combating Terrorism”
From the American Chemistry Council: “According to a new survey report released by the American Chemistry Council (ACC), the country lost valuable tools to fight terrorism and secure chemical facilities when Congress allowed the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) to expire last July…The chemical industry manufactures products that are vital to the everyday health and well-being of our nation, which is why Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2006 to create CFATS to help protect the chemical sector…After delivering solid results for almost two decades Congress failed to pass legislation to reauthorize CFATS. ACC conducted a survey of member companies to better understand the concerns and impacts regarding the expiration of CFATS.”
Read more here.
“A Framework to Evaluate the Risks of LLMs for Assisting CBRN Production Processes”
Ian Stewart recently authored this paper for CNS’ Nonpro Notes series: “This paper examines how Large Language Models (LLMs) could contribute to the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. A framework for examining the potential contribution of LLMs is presented. This framework identifies five areas of possible contribution, including brainstorming production processes, providing technical assistance, generating scripts or code for process simulation, aiding in designing relevant parts, and potentially linking to manufacturing services. It also outlines mitigation measures, distinguishing between built-in limitations of current LLMs and proactive strategies to prevent misuse. Finally, the paper underscores the importance of balancing the restriction of LLMs in CBRN applications with the preservation of their beneficial uses in advancing scientific research and development.”
“BOOK REVIEW: The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, The CIA, and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq”
Charles Duelfer recently published his review of Steve Coll’s recent book, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq, in the Cipher Brief. Duelfer writes in his intro, “This is the book I’ve been hoping for since completing the CIA’s Iraq Survey Group (ISG) mission in Iraq in 2004. Steve Coll has doggedly obtained documents and interviews to illuminate the Iraq perspective of events from the beginning to end of the Saddam Regime. He provides comparative perspectives—Iraq and U.S.—that yield understanding of the miscalculations producing three wars (four if you count ISIS post-Saddam). Moreover, he does all this via an entertaining narrative featuring an array of fascinating characters.”
ICYMI-Regulating Risky Research: The Science and Governance of Pathogens of Pandemic Potential
“On February 21, AEI’s Center for Technology, Science, and Energy hosted an event on the science and governance of risky pathogen research. M. Anthony Mills of AEI introduced and moderated the first panel, featuring Marc Lipsitch of the Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health and Gustavo Palacios of the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, who joined remotely. The panelists discussed different kinds of pathogen experiments and their risks and benefits, why scientists might want to pursue such experiments and the tradeoffs involved, what alternative approaches exist, and the ongoing need for definitional clarity in the debate.”
“Texas A&M University’s Gerald Parker introduced and moderated the second panel, featuring Greg McKelvey Jr. of the RAND Corporation, Alan Slobodin of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Carrie D. Wolinetz of Lewis-Burke Associates. The panelists provided an overview of the regulations and policies that have governed biorisk management from the 1970s to the present, new challenges and opportunities posed by artificial intelligence technology, and current congressional oversight inquiries. Both panels concluded with an audience Q&A.”
Read the event summary and watch the recorded event here.
International Conference, CBRNE Research & Innovation
“The last 40 years have demonstrated that both military and civilian populations could be exposed to highly hazardous CBRNE agents following conflicts, natural outbreaks and disasters, industrial incidents or terrorist attacks.”
“Worldwide, researchers, responders and industrial capacities have been commited to provide adapted response to these challenges.”
“Building on the success of the first 5 International Conferences « CBRNE Research and Innovation » which took place in Antibes (2015), Lyon (2017), Nantes (2019), on line (2021) and Lille (2022), we want to give you a new opportunity to build up or strengthen collaborative networks in Strabourg (March 19th – 21rst 2024).”
“The CBRNE R&I Conference is specifically devoted to scientific updates, responders’ feedbacks and expression of needs. It also includes workshops and demonstrations of innovative materials, technologies and procedures, according to the following themes: DETECTION – IDENTIFICATION, PROTECTION – DECONTAMINATION, MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES, RISKS & CRISIS MANAGEMENT.”
“Looking forward to your proposals for communication and to welcoming you at Strasbourg in March 2024!”
Learn more here.
Artificial Intelligence and Automated Laboratories for Biotechnology: Leveraging Opportunities and Mitigating Risks
From the National Academies’ Board on Life Sciences: “Please join us April 3-4, 2024 for a hybrid workshop on the opportunities and mitigation of risks of the use of artificial intelligence and automated laboratories (i.e., self-driving labs) for biotechnology.”
“The workshop will consider opportunities to leverage AI and laboratory automation capabilities for discovery and development, explore methods and approaches to identify, track, and forecast the domestic and international development of such technologies, and convene experts across sectors to highlight recent advances and explore implications for the development and use of these technologies.”
Learn more and register here.
Launch of the 2024 National Blueprint on Biodefense
From the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense: “On the 10th anniversary of its inception, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense will release its 2024 National Blueprint on Biodefense: Immediate Action Needed to Defend Against Biological Threats.”
“Please join us for this momentous event at the Congressional Auditorium, Capitol Visitor Center, on April 17th at 4:30pm.”
“The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense (formerly the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense) was established in 2014 to provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of United States biodefense efforts and to issue recommendations that foster change. Subsequently, the Commission has briefed White House Administrations (including then Vice President Biden); testified before Congress; convened numerous meetings with experts; released 12 reports; produced the graphic novel Germ Warfare; and mobilized biodefense conversations and actions in the private and public sectors.”
Learn more and register here.
Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open
Registration is now open for the Global Health Security 2024 conference in Sydney, Australia. This iteration will take place 18-21 June, 2024. The call for abstracts is also still open. “The mission of the Global Health Security conference is to provide a forum where leaders, researchers, policy-makers, and representatives from government, international organisations, civil society, and private industry from around the world can engage with each other, review the latest research and policy innovations, and agree solutions for making the world safer and healthier. To that end, our mission is to help foster a genuinely multidisciplinary community of practice that is committed to working collaboratively to enhance global health security and eliminate disease, irrespective of its origin or source.”
SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology, and Biosecurity Conference in Africa
“Join us for the SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Conference in Africa, a groundbreaking event that brings together experts, researchers, and enthusiasts in the field of synthetic biology. This in-person conference will take place at the Laico Regency Hotel from Wed, Jul 17, 2024 to Friday, Jul 19, 2024.”
“Get ready to dive into the exciting world of synthetic biology and explore its potential applications in Africa. From cutting-edge research to innovative solutions, this conference offers a unique opportunity to learn, network, and collaborate with like-minded individuals.”
“Discover the latest advancements, trends, and challenges in synthetic biology through engaging keynote speeches, interactive workshops, and thought-provoking panel discussions. Immerse yourself in a vibrant atmosphere where ideas flow freely and new connections are made.”
“Whether you’re a seasoned professional or just starting your journey in synthetic biology, this conference provides a platform to expand your knowledge, exchange ideas, and contribute to the growth of the field in Africa.”
“Don’t miss out on this extraordinary event that promises to shape the future of synthetic biology and biosecurity in Africa. Mark your calendars and join us at the SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Conference in Africa!”
Learn more and register here.
“Reintroducing the Saddam Hussein Regime Collection of the Conflict Records Research Center”
This post is from the Wilson Center: “Michael Brill introduces the new collection of documents, The Saddam Files. These records, donated by Steve Coll, are a subset of the materials once held at the Conflict Records Research Center.”
The Pandora Report 