Lena Kropke, Biodefense MS Student
This year, I had the privilege of attending the 67th Annual Biosafety and Biosecurity Hybrid Conference of the American Biological Safety Association (ABSA International) in Phoenix, Arizona from November 4-6, 2024. The conference brought together a diverse array of speakers, posters, and abstracts from across the globe, fostering an exchange of ideas and highlighting the global nature of our work. With the U.S. presidential election occurring at the same time as the event, the importance of nonpartisan cooperation in addressing shared challenges and advancing collective goals was emphasized. During my attendance, I found four sessions on biosafety and biosecurity of particular interest.
Session 1: From a House on Fire to a World in Shutdown: The Intersection of Epidemiology and Vaccinology by Yvonne (Bonnie) Maldonado, MD, Stanford University School of Medicine
In her talk, that was awarded the Arnold G. Wedum Memorial Lecture Award, Dr. Maldonado discussed the epidemiological principles and strategies behind vaccine-mediated disease control. A key analogy she used was the “house on fire” concept, which emphasizes the importance of allocating resources to where they exercise the greatest impact rather than spreading efforts thinly. The underlying principles of disease control were outlined first to ensure appropriate distinction in terminology. While eradication, the global reduction of a disease to an incidence of zero, was achieved in the cases of smallpox and rinderpest, extinction – the total disappearance of a pathogen in both nature and laboratories – has yet to be accomplished. Success in eradication depends on factors such as effective and continuous strategies to interrupt transmission, sensitive diagnostic tools, a deep understanding of the pathogen’s lifecycle, and robust surveillance systems.
Dr. Maldonado highlighted several challenges to vaccine effectiveness. For example, antigenic mutation of pathogens such as influenza can create immunity gaps, which reduces the effectiveness of vaccines and can allow established pathogens to cause pandemics. Additionally, the success of vaccine strategies is influenced by the transmissibility of the pathogen, the durability of immunity, and the population’s behavior. Having overcome these challenges, the eradication of smallpox remains the gold standard for vaccine mediated disease control. Other diseases such as measles, mumps, rubella, malaria, and lymphatic filariasis, have the potential to be eradicated, but each faces unique obstacles. Polio eradication efforts have achieved significant progress in the control of the disease, yet challenges such as vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) and vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP), in addition to the underlying obstacles of disease control, have inhibited the successful eradication so far. In that regard, COVID-19 further underlined issues such as asymptomatic transmission, viral mutations, and the slow development of herd immunity. The pandemic also underscored the importance of addressing inequities in healthcare access, housing, and social security, as these determinants significantly influence disease prevention and control outcomes.
Overall, Dr. Maldonado’s talk emphasized that no one-size-fits-all policy exists for vaccination approaches. Instead, targeted and pathogen-specific strategies, tailored vaccination programs, and strong surveillance systems are crucial for eradication success. This comprehensive approach ensures that disease control efforts are both effective and equitable.
Session 8: Biosecurity: Complexity, Complacency, Connectivity and Commitment by George Poste, DVM, PhD, Arizona State University
Dr. Poste explored the current challenges for a global biosecurity framework and the importance of the “One Health” paradigm. He identified the underlying causes for these challenges as the rapid changes in our globalized world, where climate change, urbanization, habitat destruction, anti-vaccine campaigns, and antimicrobial resistances facilitate the spread of pathogens in an unprecedented manner. Additionally, he discussed advancements in biotechnologies and the associated risks of dual-use research of concern (DURC), as well as the intersection of biotechnology and artificial intelligence (BIOxAI). Key areas of focus included gene editing, enhanced pathogens with pandemic potential (ePPP), and gain-of-function (GOF) research that could lead to the creation of more dangerous pathogens. In comparison to chemical weapons, Dr. Poste criticized the lack of established verification or inspection processes for biological weapons. He therefore emphasized the urgent need for an enhanced regulatory framework to address these issues with a multisectoral approach that acknowledges the interconnectedness of humans, animals, and the environment.
Dr. Poste’s criticism of the current system stems from the misplaced comfort and complacency that was demonstrated by the international reaction to outbreaks of COVID-19, SARS, and Ebola. Despite the United States’ top ranking in biosecurity preparedness, the high mortality rate and economic toll of COVID-19 highlighted the urgency to move from a reactive to a proactive biosecurity framework where sustained efforts are employed to strengthen the healthcare infrastructure and improve pathogen surveillance. In Dr. Poste’s words, the system must finally move past a cycle of “neglect-panic-fund-forget” and adopt a strategy of convergence, connectivity, and commitment that brings together expertise and tools from diverse fields. In that regard, he advocated for aligning biosecurity responses with other disaster management systems, such as those for natural disasters or chemical emergencies. He also underscored the importance of sustained commitment by the international community for building such a cross-sectoral framework as continuous investment in emergency preparedness, increased diagnostic capabilities, stockpiling of medical supplies, and the development of clear response and report protocols are needed for enhancing our global biosecurity preparedness. This must be accompanied by international partnerships that ensure appropriate resource sharing and coordinated responses during global crises.
In his presentation, Dr. Poste criticized the current biosecurity frameworks while also advocating for a new path forward where interdisciplinary commitment, increased regulation and inspection, as well as proactive “whole-of-government” measures address the escalating biosecurity challenges of our time. Such changes require strong advocacy with political leaders to adopt a long-term biosecurity strategy.
Session 9.2: Using DNA-Tagged Aerosol Tracer Particles as Challenge Agents for Measurement and Verification of Engineering Controls, Nicholas Heredia, PhD, SafeTraces
Dr. Nicholas Heredia described how SafeTraces’ DNA-tagged aerosol tracer technology is used to assess the pathogen exposure risk and control efficacy of filtration and ventilation systems. The novelty of this process is demonstrated by its use of non-reactive and non-toxic DNA-tagged particles that offer a similar fluid matrix to the potential spread of pathogens. The company conducts four performance tests in the form of a survey test, aerosol clearance test, HEPA supply tests, and positive/negative pressure test. The respective results are then assessed by qPCR technology and visualized to portray air movements as well as leakage or infiltration. The technology can be used in a variety of settings, including hospitals, schools, or critical infrastructure as it offers a quantifiable and accurate assessment of the air system performance that previous testing (e.g. tracer gases) could not achieve. The talk generated high interest in the technology which will likely establish itself as a central safety feature of air system tracing.
Session 19: Biosecurity featuring Iris Magne, London Metropolitan University; Leyma P. De Haro, PhD, RBP(ABSA), Merrick & Company; and Michael Parker, PhD, Georgetown University
This panel was comprised of three distinguished speakers discussing their recent biosecurity projects. As the first speaker of the session, Iris Magne was awarded the Robert I. Gross Student Award for presenting on “International Biosecurity Education Network: A Timely Tool For Biosecurity.” She described the International Biological Security Engagement Network (IBSEN), a new initiative created earlier this year to enhance biosecurity education across the globe. IBSEN was established to foster an environment in which academics and policymakers could discuss biological risks and raise awareness of these issues. A particular focus of the network is reducing threats from the misuse of life sciences and DURC. IBSEN publishes a quarterly newsletter on biosecurity with the goal of providing in-depth biosecurity education on a national and regional level.
In the second presentation, titled “Biosecurity Risk Assessment for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Synthetic Biology: A Practical Approach,” Dr. Leyma P. De Haro outlined a seven-step biosecurity risk assessment that allows professionals to categorize potential dangers of AI in the realms of synthetic biology. The growing use of AI applications is facilitating advancements in areas such as de novo gene design, biological design tools (BDT), vaccine development, and automated laboratory experiments. However, these capabilities also pose significant risks when misused by malicious actors or implemented without proper safeguards as they enable unregulated individuals or those lacking sufficient safety expertise to conduct high-risk experiments. Even in regulated settings, unintended consequences could arise if AI systems inadvertently produce harmful or dangerous biological agents. Dr. De Haro emphasized the inadequacy of current oversight mechanisms, which do not yet cover unique risks associated with AI in these contexts. To mitigate these threats, she called for enhanced safeguards and comprehensive regulatory frameworks.
Lastly, Dr. Michael Parker presented “A Century of Assessment – The Collection of Biothreat Risk Assessment (COBRA).” A team of Georgetown University researchers created the COBRA (Catalog of Biothreat Risk Assessments) website to serve as the world’s first public repository of risk assessments related to biological agents. The website compiles assessments written over the course of the last century and categorizes them with specific tags for the purpose of identifying and evaluating the respective decisions and trends. Users can not only search the website, but also propose their own contributions to extend the scope of the archive. This resource was developed to centralize critical knowledge for understanding past decision-making as well as to inform current strategies.
Attending this conference not only reaffirmed that biosafety and biosecurity are vital components of international security, but also showcased the incredible dedication of professionals who work tirelessly toward this mission. Moreover, it offered an introduction to an amazing network of biosafety and security professionals. In addition to the outstanding panels and posters, the conference held a banquet at the breathtaking Desert Foothills on the outskirts of Phoenix. A major highlight for me was winning a free ABSA webinar as part of a raffle I was able to enter after visiting every participating vendor at the conference. I can’t wait to be granted additional insight into the educational and inspiring world of ABSA. I would encourage anyone interested in reducing biological risks to attend next year’s conference in Raleigh, NC from October 24-29, 2025.
Lena Kroepke is a student in the MS Biodefense program at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. An international student from Germany, Lena completed an MA in Peace and Conflict Research at Goethe University Frankfurt as well as a BA in European Studies at Maastricht University.
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