Jay Bickell is a student in the MS Biodefense program at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. In her current position as a Staff Scientist at MRIGlobal, Jay supports biorisk management programs for various commercial, academic, and government clients.
There is a deep interconnection between agricultural biorisks and human health. It is critical that this perspective is brought to the forefront of policy and research discussions so that agricultural biorisks are prioritized as a threat to national security and receive the necessary research funding. My attendance at the USDA Agriculture Research Services (ARS) 8th International Biosafety & Biocontainment Symposium in Baltimore, Maryland on February 11-13, 2025 couldn’t have illustrated this more clearly.
The International Biosafety & Biocontainment Symposium, offered in cooperation with the American Biosafety Association International (ABSA), brings together approximately 200 biosafety and biosecurity, pharmaceutical, biotechnology research, development, and clinical organizations every two years to address agricultural biorisks. While perhaps this event could be considered a small gathering, the breadth of topics and issues discussed were anything but.
Briefly, agricultural biorisks refer to the potential threats posed by biological agents (such as pathogens, pests, and toxins) to agricultural systems including crops, livestock, and food production. These risks can arise naturally, accidentally, or intentionally and have significant implications for food security, public health, and economic stability.
Given the broader climate of uncertainty surrounding emerging biological threats, this symposium provided a crucial platform for dialogue and collaboration. While the themes of applied biosafety, biosecurity, and highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) clearly stood out in the agenda, it was the interconnectedness of agricultural biorisk and human health that served as the underlying theme.
Applied Biosafety and Biosecurity
There is global recognition that current laboratory biological risk management and biosafety policies are not always rooted in evidence-based practices. Applied biosafety is a term used to describe the research being done to address these gaps and better inform both institutional and government-level policies. While most of the 14 sessions at the symposium included some form of call to action or contribution to this topic, I was particularly appreciative of the two sessions specifically focused on applied biosafety because of their meaningful impact on safety culture.
While at the symposium, I had the opportunity to present some of the work that my colleagues and I at MRIGlobal are doing in this space. One gap we have identified in laboratory biorisk management is the lack of guidance regarding wearing jewelry associated with body piercings in laboratories. We presented a poster of our research, “A Piercing Issue: Assessing the Ability to Decontaminate Body Piercings,” which demonstrates that this gap can be addressed through the generation of qualitative data. Our research also explored the implications of our findings for safety culture and its relationship to other gaps in understanding about fomite transmission in a laboratory setting.
One of the biggest hurdles to generating evidence-based practices is funding. In a special session of the symposium, an exciting funding opportunity for Addressing Agricultural Biorisk Evidence Base Gaps with Applied Research through the Elizabeth R. Griffin Program was announced. This came on the heels of the announcement that the Elizabeth R. Griffin Program has moved to a new home at the John Hopkins Center for Health Security.
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV)
If there is one project at the symposium that bridged the two themes of applied biosafety and HPAI, it was the work presented by Dr. John Luchansky with the U.S. Department of Agriculture looking at “If Avian Influenza Virus Were Found in Raw (Ground) Beef – Would Cooking Kill it?” This preliminary work indicated that when cooked to recommended temperatures, the virus responsible for HPAI was killed. This was just a small (but very cool!) piece of the puzzle presented throughout the week, looking at how the United States is responding to HPAI and preparing for its increasing presence.
Naturally, conversations then shifted to African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV) and the work being done to prepare if a case of this disease is identified in the United States. One of the most interesting bits of information I learned during the symposium was that more than one million swine are transported in the United States every day, and that a two-year outbreak of ASFV could cost more than $15 billion.
Final Thoughts
During this symposium, biosafety and biosecurity were described as one of the invisible waters of national security. It was highlighted throughout the event that the impacts of a biological disaster, whether in the form of a human, animal, or plant outbreak, could be far-reaching. As a result, it is crucial that biosafety and biosecurity do not remain invisible. As we face increasingly frequent, evolving, and complex biological threats, our preparedness, vigilance, and investment in these research areas is more important than ever. For this reason, agriculture biorisk mitigation must be further integrated into policy and research discussions, including national security strategies. Only by making biosafety and biosecurity visible, prioritized, and fully understood will we build the resilience needed to address the growing challenges agriculture biorisks present.
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