Emily McHarg is a student in the MS Biodefense program at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.
On March 25, 2024, the first case of H5N1 was confirmed in dairy cattle in the United States. Since then, dairy cattle in 17 states have experienced H5N1 outbreaks, there have been 70 human cases of H5N1, including one death, and millions of poultry birds have been culled. Now, a year later, government, academia and industry are reflecting on lessons learned while still being in the thick of the outbreak.
On March 18, 2025, almost a year after the first case of H5N1 was detected in dairy cattle in the United States, the 2025 Scowcroft Institute Policy Summit was convened to bring together experts from government, academia, and industry to examine the response to H5N1, discuss current challenges, and identify strategies for moving forward. H5N1 has been a hot topic over the past year, and it has kept government, academia, industry, and the general public on the edge of their seats tracking this outbreak in real time. Unfortunately, we don’t know how close we are to a pandemic strain of H5N1, but it’s been a fear of researchers since H5N1 was first discovered, and it feels like we are moving closer to that fear becoming realized.
The summit consisted of four different panels and a presentation on the following topics: Etiology and Epidemiology of H5N1, a Presentation from Voices of the Industry, a Student Simulation Presentation, Lessons Observed Through a Year of H5N1, and the Policy to Move Forward. This report provides an overview, details, and comments on those sessions.
Etiology and Epidemiology of H5N1
High Path Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 was discovered in waterfowl in Southern China in 1996 and began to circulate globally in the early 2000s. The current strains of the virus have spread to more species and to regions of the world that had not previously seen outbreaks. Understanding the transmission of H5N1 is therefore important for monitoring the virus and protecting public health.
This panel consisted of Dr. Kiril Dimitrov, Assistant Director for Microbiology and Research at the Texas A&M Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory; Dr. Jeff Bender, Professor of Environmental Health and Director of the National Institutes of Occupational Safety and Health at the University of Minnesota; and Dr. James Lawler, Associate Director of the Global Center for Health Security, Deputy Medical Director for the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit, and Professor of Medicine in Infectious Disease at the University of Nebraska Medical Center. The panelists stressed the virus’s capability to mutate and undergo recombination, and the danger of transmission either mammal-to-mammal or farm-to-farm. Dr. Dimitrov acknowledged that 85% of poultry farms have HPAI H5N1 infections from migratory birds, but the majority of dairy farms have been infected with H5N1 from farm-to-farm transmission, which highlights the importance of implementing biosecurity measures on farms. Dr. Bender emphasized the impact and stigma especially in rural communities of a farm having been infected by H5N1, underscoring the need for better protections for farmworkers, producers, and veterinarians. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the greatest concern currently is for those working on poultry and dairy farms dealing with H5N1 infections. However, Dr. Lawler pointed out that this virus is being detected in wastewater surveillance across the country in places with neither known human infections nor dairy or poultry farm infections.
There are unanswered questions about transmission and this virus is acting in ways that no one expected, notably its ability to infect cows, which up until a year ago was not considered possible. Dr. Dimitrov shared that the samples taken from an infected cat’s brain contained more viral load than one is able to grow in a laboratory setting, underscoring this virus’s ability to surprise the scientific community. The way this virus has startled government, academia and industry has significant consequences for public messaging and Dr. Lawler noted that the way the H5N1 outbreak is being downplayed to the public is especially dangerous. He also discussed how the foundation of science is to be transparent and tell the truth, even during a post-COVID era where public mistrust of science and government is high. Most Americans have probably found out about this outbreak through rising egg prices and may not understand the significance and potential pandemic threat of the virus, which raises the question of how and what to communicate to the public.
Voices of the Industry
This presentation on perspectives from the dairy industry on H5N1was given by Miquela Hanselman, Director of Regulatory Affairs at the National Milk Producers Federation. Ms. Hanselman emphasized that the industry has long prepared for an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), not an H5N1 outbreak. She noted the collaboration between the federal government and industry on responding to this outbreak in dairy cattle. For example, the industry urged the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to conduct studies on the effectiveness of pasteurization against any H5N1 virus in milk and the CDC used feedback from the industry to incorporate into their farmworkers’ surveys. Ms. Hanselman also acknowledged that the H5N1 outbreak has affected the dairy industry differently than other livestock industries. She noted that prior to this outbreak biosecurity on dairy farms was not as high of a priority, unlike on poultry farms. Dairy farms are adopting biosecurity best practices now, including addressing potential pathways for introduction, such as establishing a line of separation or “moat” around the farm. So far, there has not been a noticeable impact on the demand for dairy products, and the prices of those products have not increased as much as they have for eggs. Ms. Hanselman also underscored the policies that the federal government has developed including required testing before moving lactating cattle across interstate lines, the optional Dairy Herd Status Program, and the National Milk Testing Strategy. However, she noted that there have been different levels of buy-in from industry and farms, depending in part on if there was a perceived need on the ground.
Student Simulation
At their College Station campus, Texas A&M hosted a student simulation focused on how to respond to an outbreak of a genetically engineered H5N1 strain with students taking on roles within federal and state governments, international health agencies, and more. Three students, Abby Heye, Samuel Park, and Alexander Alvarado, shared their experiences in the simulation and discussed the challenges they encountered. Notably, one of the most common problems they faced was one that government, academia and industry are facing right now: how to make decisions based on incomplete information and how aggressively to respond.
Lessons Observed Through a Year of H5N1
This panel consisted of Janet Bailey, CEO of Kansas Dairy, Dr. Samantha Holeck, State Veterinarian of New Mexico, and Michaela Simoneau, Associate Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Bailey emphasized how much the dairy industry depends on consumer confidence and lauded FDA’s pasteurization studies as contributing to reassuring the public of the safety of dairy products. She underscored that having concerns like that extinguished early in the outbreak was vital for the industry. However, other parts of the federal government’s response have presented issues, including that this virus in dairy cattle cannot be categorized as HPAI and does not fall under the USDA framework devised for the poultry industry responding to HPAI infections on their farms. Ms. Bailey discussed how this virus affects dairy cattle much differently than poultry. for example, many cows are recovering from this virus, while poultry are required to be culled once a farm discovers an infection due to the high mortality rate in poultry and to be eligible for indemnity payments.
While the existing regulatory framework may not have been devised with H5N1 infections among dairy cattle in mind, Dr. Holeck mentioned that the dairy industry has been training for an outbreak of FMD for years. However, Dr. Holeck highlighted that this outbreak was such a surprise, so the training for FMD may not have prepared the industry as much as was hoped for. Dr. Holeck also emphasized the disconnect between government and industry, and the fear that industry has of regulation, informed by their concerns not being understood. For example, Dr. Holeck emphasized that even seemingly simple biosecurity practices, including farmworkers wearing personal protective equipment like goggles, may be harder to mandate on dairy farms, considering environmental factors like farmworkers having limited visibility and potentially being kicked by cows. Hearing directly from those who work either in the industry or closely with industry regarding the issues they are facing is important to continue informing best practices to keep farmworkers, producers, and veterinarians safe throughout this outbreak.
There are other compounding factors to this outbreak that Ms. Simoneau brought up including the new administration’s actions that may impact the federal government’s response to H5N1 such as cuts at the CDC and the National Institutes of Health, a potential withdrawal from the World Health Organization, and ongoing reviews of current programs and funding. She also emphasized how important an operationalized One Health approach with comprehensive testing is, especially considering that the risk of H5N1 to humans can change on a dime with additional mutations to the virus. However, numerous problems exist including the lack of funding at the state and local level, a lag in identifying spillover events, uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of the vaccines in the Strategic National Stockpile if the virus mutates, and the number of rural hospitals that have been shuttered, thus limiting access to medical treatment. Having representatives from industry, state government, and academia discuss the lessons learned from this year and identify problems that exist underscored how important integrating the boots on the ground, state, national, and international level responses are.
The Policy to Move Forward
Hosted by the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service and the USA Center for Rural Public Health Preparedness at Texas A&M University, the goal of the summit was to identify actionable solutions and produce a white paper to guide policymakers in how to respond to this ongoing outbreak, which will be published in the future. This panel consisted of Dr. Rebecca Katz from the Georgetown Center for Global Health Science and Security, Dr. Robert Hagevoort from New Mexico State University, Dr. Ashley Peterson from the National Chicken Council, and Miquela Hanselman from the National Milk Producers Federation to discuss how to move forward.
Dr. Hagevoort opened the discussion by talking about how public trust needs to be built before a pandemic, posing challenges during a new, unexpected outbreak. He also questioned what the goal is with our response to H5N1 — are we aiming for eradication or can we adapt to live with this virus? Should the virus be built into the business models for these industries? Is eradication even possible at this point? These central questions dominated this panel, and there was a disconnect between the industry and public health perspectives.
Dr. Peterson represented the broiler chicken perspective, which is distinct from the perspective of the egg layer industry, especially in terms of using a vaccine in poultry. She advocated for protecting export markets and acknowledged that the broiler industry is concerned with using a vaccine because it can mask infections in poultry, which could cause trade partners to seek another source for products. Dr. Peterson underscored that for the broiler chicken industry, eradication is the ultimate goal, which Ms. Hanselman echoed on behalf of the dairy industry. However, Dr. Katz believed that at this point, it is not possible to eradicate the virus, but that doesn’t mean strong steps cannot be taken to limit the spread. Considering the high number of infected species with H5N1 (currently detected in about 50 mammal species and 500 avian species), it is understandable how insurmountable eradication feels. In addition, the virus’s presence in wild migratory birds with global migration patterns adds additional challenges.
Dr. Katz also focused on how the regulatory space has changed since the decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and mentioned a court case to track in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. In November 2024, the New Civil Liberties Alliance filed a complaint against the USDA and its Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regarding a rule requiring electronically readable ear tags for monitoring the movement of certain cattle across state lines. Dr. Katz believed this case could have important consequences for disease surveillance. She also emphasized the importance of an operationalized One Health approach to fully understand the outbreak and be able to respond, especially if the virus mutates and becomes the next pandemic if the United States does not do enough to contain the current outbreak. With conflicting goals and expectations, it is hard to chart a path forward for what the federal government’s response should be, but that is the challenge of this outbreak. It is affecting industries in vastly different ways and posing unique challenges while also threatening public health.
Final Thoughts: The OODA Loop
Developed by Air Force Colonel John Boyd, the OODA loop, which stands for orient, observe, decide, act, is a decision-making model that rewards those who make timely decisions based on current and often incomplete information, but which are not necessarily the “right” decisions. This model was mentioned several times throughout the conference as a way to remind everyone to evaluate where we currently are in the “loop” and where we should be. Over the past year, we have answered some vital questions, and while there are even more unanswered questions, this must not hinder our imperative to act. The threat of mutation and spillover events and the potential consequences for public health are too high for inaction. Major General Dr. Paul Friedrichs gave the closing keynote speech and emphasized that it will take at least 50 years for us to know if we made the “right” decisions, so right now we just need to act.
The Pandora Report 