ASM Biothreats 2019

We’re the source for all things health security and the annual ASM Biothreats conference is no different. GMU’s biodefense program was fortunate to send several students to attend the 2019 ASM Biothreats conference in which topics ranged from diagnostics to technology as a source for biothreats. Held in Arlington, Virginia on January 29-31, this was an exciting event highlighting the importance of conversations surrounding high consequence pathogen research, biological threat reduction, and product development and policy. Our student attendees have reported back on some of the enlightening and captivating sessions during the biothreat event. Below you’ll find several commentaries from each student who attended:

Nicolas Bertini -Nicolas is currently pursuing an M.S. in Biodefense degree at George Mason University and hold an undergraduate degree in Government and International Politics with a double minor in Intelligence Analysis and Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University as well. He expects to graduate in the Fall of 2019 and plans to pursue a career in biodefense and biosecurity. He aims to identify new vulnerabilities in the national security apparatus while utilizing science and policy to propose creative and effective solutions that will strengthen the nation’s detection, mitigation, and response capabilities. At ASM, Nick attended a session on the different international perspectives on biodefense, noting that “One unique item that stood out is the recognition of the use of the internet to acquire materials that could be used to generate a biological threat. The United Kingdom is focused on modernizing their biodefense strategies to tackle future challenges by addressing the rising importance of new technologies and emphasizing fluid cooperation with international partners.” Nick also attended a session on WHO research and development roadmaps, which ” focused on the research and development roadmaps that the WHO has implemented and managed to initiate a targeted research campaign for the early delivery of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics of Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) and Nipah Virus.”

Georgia Ray – Georgia is a first-year master’s student in George Mason University’s Biodefense program. She studied microbiology and bacteriophage physiology at The Evergreen State College, and has done research with the Effective Altruism Foundation and the Future of Humanity Institute. She is interested in policy, synthetic biology, and averting global catastrophic biological risks. Georgia provides us with a recap of the keynote speakers and their talks on the biodefense landscape and historical lessons from Ebola. “Kadlec also talked about the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy. He likes that it’s deliberate and detailed, and includes risks from emerging technology. Often, bold strategies of its ilk are not tied to reality – for instance, to budgets or the skill levels.” Next, Georgia provides us with a recap of a panel on converging technologies and emerging risks, which also included GMU Biodefense graduate program director Dr. Gregory Koblentz. “Koblentz discussed his work on Editing Biosecurity, a multidisciplinary study on gene editing technology and biosecurity issues. He criticized reliance on “agent-specific” models – security measures that ban specific agents, like smallpox or Clostridium botulinum. In the age of genetic engineering, those boundaries fall apart – what does this system do with a disease that is a genetic combination of smallpox and an unlisted agent? Or a normally-harmless E. coli with an inserted plasmid that codes for botulinum toxin?”

Katelyn Smith – Katelyn Smith graduated from Virginia Tech in May 2018 with a Bachelors of Science in Biological Sciences and a Minor in Psychology. Now, Katelyn is a second semester Masters Student in the Biodefense program at George Mason, planning to graduate in May 2020.  Her academic and research interests include pathogenic bacteriology and epidemiology.  She hopes to one day to work in the field, studying biological agents and diseases and their potential roles in bioterrorism. Katelyn attended an informative session on R&D – from detection to diagnosis to vaccines, focusing on “research projects and product development from all over the United States pertaining to detection, diagnosis, and/or vaccines. Each of the six speakers, ranging from engineer to scientist, brought something unique and different to the table, from a dog’s nose, to immunoassays, to accelerated vaccines.” Next, Katelyn discusses the section of biological agents in the field, involving discussions on the latest bio-detection efforts, as well as historical practices. “Mediated by Dr. Kenneth B. Yeh, a senior science advisor at MRIGlobal, the panel of members were able to comment and answer questions, speaking about previous experiences of their own, as well as some of the research that they do.To start off the session, the panelists discussed a comparison of Real-Time qPCR and Sequencing, the roles they have played overtime in the biological field, as well as changes in the biodefense field in the last few decades.  More than 20 years ago, two major platforms were yielded in the Department of Defense: a real-time PCR system and a current generation diagnostic system.”

Justin Hurt – Justin Hurt is a student in GMU’s Biodefense PhD program, and is currently preparing for his comprehensive exams and dissertation proposal work. In addition to his part-time studies, he is an active duty officer in the United States Army, specializing in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) matters and is currently detailed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a Defense Liaison in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD), where he advises the Assistant Director and WMDD staff on interagency operations and capabilities and assists in policy development. Justin attended the Clade X panel at ASM – “A pandemic tabletop exercise hosted by JHU’s Center for Health Security on 15 May 2018, Clade X sought to identify important national policy issues and preparedness challenges that could be solved with sufficient political will and attention. Built on a fictional scenario based on epidemiological principles and challenges identified and unresolved in response to past outbreaks, key takeaways from Clade X were intended to inform senior leaders and decision makers at high levels in the government on how to deal with the potential for future pandemic events.”

 

 

ASM Biothreats – Keynote

By Georgia Ray

Two keynote speakers kicked off the 2019 ASM Biothreats meeting with some words about horrific diseases, and how health security learns from experience. Robert Kadlec and Anne Schuchat led this informative and engaging keynote event.

Robert Kadlec is a guru of the US Biodefense landscape. He was the main author on the Pandemic and All-Health Preparedness Act. He directed Biodefense efforts at the White House, first as the biodefense director of the Homeland Security Council, and then as the Special Assistant for Biodefense Policy to George W. Bush. Now, he’s the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the US Department of HHS.

During the keynote speech of the 2019 ASM Biothreats conference, he talked about the 2014 Ebola pandemic, one of the worst outbreaks of one of the most lethal diseases seen in recent memory. As he saw it, this outbreak proved that two changes to the US disease response system were needed:

  • Training (since answered by the GHSA)
  • Medical countermeasures (still unsolved)

The response to Ebola and other high-consequence infectious diseases in the US is in a fragile state. While funding may run out, Ebola, obviously, will not. Kadlec also talked about the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy. He likes that it’s deliberate and detailed, and includes risks from emerging technology. Often, bold strategies of its ilk are not tied to reality – for instance, to budgets or the skill levels. That’s what Kadlec is working on. For U.S. biodefense efforts, HHS is most involved, but so is the DoD as well as others, including local governments and communities. Right now, ASPR (Kadlec’s office) is fleshing out the National Biodefense Strategy, starting with assessment and data-gathering methods. The B-PLAT, a policy exploration tool put together by PNNL, will explain this as it happens. Note that the plan is intended to be a living document, with refinements every year. As it develops, the office will seek feedback feedback from public groups, including from ASPR’s existing connections. Continue reading “ASM Biothreats – Keynote”

Policy Approaches to Synthetic Biology and Do-it-yourself Biology

By Georgia Ray

Synthetic biology, emerging technology, DIYbio, CRISPR-cas9, and other genetic modification tools – whatever you want to call this category, it’s coming in waves and it’s posing big problems to biodefense experts and regulators. An expert panel convened at the 2019 ASM Biothreats conference to discuss what it means.

Panelists:

Jessica Dymond, senior research scientist at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Matthew Walsh, associate staff at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory

Aditya Kunjapur, principle investigator of the Kunjapur Labat the University of Delaware and biocontainment expert

Jessica Tucker, director of theNIH Office of Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Emerging Biotechnology

Mary Delarosa, at HHS ASPR

Peter Carr, senior scientist at MIT’s Synthetic Biology Center (moderating)

Dymond kicked off the panel by discussing distributed technology. These technologies pose special risks – they can be developed or owned by individuals or small groups, and do not come from a small number of controllable sources. We’ve seen national security grapple with this genre in the past: the proliferation of amateur radio, then cyber capacities, then drones. Biology is another step in this progression – it is, arguably, just worse than the others.

Recent red-teaming efforts have suggested that virus acquisition is doable through legal and black market sources. Constraints like tacit knowledge and funding are barriers, but not insurmountable ones.

So how do we govern this? Lessons from cybersecurity suggest the following:

  • Developing norms
  • No one-size-fits-all solution
  • Stakeholder engagement
  • Be willing to consider unusual approaches

Continue reading “Policy Approaches to Synthetic Biology and Do-it-yourself Biology”

International Perspectives on Biodefense Strategies

By Nick Bertini

Biodefense is an international undertaking. The successful implementation of biodefense strategies demands cooperation from global partners. This session, moderated by the National Defense University’s Dr. Gerald Epstein, analyzed different perspectives on biodefense issues ranging from policies to practices.

First to present was Sarah Telford from the British Embassy in Washington. Telford presented the United Kingdom’s newly published UK Biological Security Strategy. The document was designed to be a transparent and accessible plan for the public to obtain and understand. Telford highlighted that more than 13 government departments collaborated on the drafting of the document. The main focus of the document aims towards improving coordination and capabilities. One unique item that stood out is the recognition of the use of the internet to acquire materials that could be used to generate a biological threat. The United Kingdom is focused on modernizing their biodefense strategies to tackle future challenges by addressing the rising importance of new technologies and emphasizing fluid cooperation with international partners. Telford finished her presentation by illustrating the need for further cooperation on the global scale in order to keep the UK and its partner nations safe. Continue reading “International Perspectives on Biodefense Strategies”

The WHO Research and Development Roadmaps

By Nick Bertini

The World Health Organization (WHO) is constantly attempting to address public health threats before they become major local, regional, and global issues. This session focused on the research and development roadmaps that the WHO has implemented and managed to initiate a targeted research campaign for the early delivery of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics of Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) and Nipah Virus. Moderated by Tim Brooks of Public Health England, the session was geared toward educating the audience on the research and development frameworks that the WHO has in place in order to address the potential major public health threats of the near to midterm future.

Marie-Pierre Prezios, the head of the R&D roadmap program at WHO, started the session off with a general overview of what the WHO’s goals are for implementing these research blueprints. Prezios laid out the strategic priorities of her program by stating that the goals of the WHO are to “keep the world safe, improve health, and serve the vulnerable.” According to Prezios, the framework is designed to improve coordination, map the key stakeholders, and clearly identify products in the drug development pipeline. If these steps are completed, then the research and development process should be accelerated—specifically for priority pathogens and diseases. The roadmaps are generated using two key steps. First, a Baseline Situation Analysis (BSA) is conducted to identify gaps in knowledge and survey the current public health landscape. Second, a diverse technical taskforce is assembled and comes to a consensus regarding the results of the BSA. After a consensus is made, the technical taskforce drafts the research and development roadmaps. Finally, Prezios highlights the success of the roadmap by sharing that in May 2018 there was an outbreak of Nipah Virus in Kerala, India and a successful response was initiated within the first 24 hours. Furthermore, researchers and developers were able to provide the field with monoclonal antibodies within a week, stemming the number of cases and allowing the community to address the public health concerns and to recover from the outbreak. Continue reading “The WHO Research and Development Roadmaps”

From Detection to Diagnosis to Vaccines

By Katelyn Smith

During the “From Detection to Diagnosis to Vaccines” symposium, we were able to hear about research projects and product development from all over the United States pertaining to detection, diagnosis, and/or vaccines. Each of the six speakers, ranging from engineer to scientist, brought something unique and different to the table, from a dog’s nose, to immunoassays, to accelerated vaccines.

The first speaker was Matthew Staymates, a mechanical engineer from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, who spoke on a project titled “Non-Contact Aerodynamic Sampling Approaches for Aerosols and Airborne Particles: Lessons Learned from the Dog Nose”.  This project focused primarily on the olfaction background of canines, studying how a dog’s nose is a great detector system, and is “considered the gold standard in trace chemical sampling”.  Matthew spoke about how this research included looking into the fluid dynamics of the olfaction system of a canine, and how important biomimicry may be. He ended his session by asking this question: “Is there a smarter way to sample our environment (based on lessons learned from the dog’s nose)?”. Continue reading “From Detection to Diagnosis to Vaccines”

Detection of Biological Agents in the Field: Then and Now

By Katelyn Smith

Biology is an ever-changing, growing, and evolving field. To increase our defenses against biological agents in natural occurrences, accidental occurrences, and deliberate occurrences. At the ASM Biothreats Conference this year, there was a panel session organized to hear multiple experts’ commentary on biological agent detection in the field over the years.  Mediated by Dr. Kenneth B. Yeh, a senior science advisor at MRIGlobal, the panel of members were able to comment and answer questions, speaking about previous experiences of their own, as well as some of the research that they do.

To start off the session, the panelists discussed a comparison of Real-Time qPCR and Sequencing, the roles they have played overtime in the biological field, as well as changes in the biodefense field in the last few decades.  More than 20 years ago, two major platforms were yielded in the Department of Defense: a real-time PCR system and a current generation diagnostic system.   Continue reading “Detection of Biological Agents in the Field: Then and Now”

Converging Technologies & Emerging Risks

By Georgia Ray

This was a panel discussion involving four speakers discussing biotechnologies and the potential for mis-use, and the challenges of regulatory oversight.

Jesse Kirkpatrick– GMU’s assistant director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy.

Chris Oehmen– PNNL cybersecurity expert

Gregory Koblentz– The GMU Biodefense program’s very own director.

Megan Palmer– A senior research scholar at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Oehmen kicked off the panel by drawing parallels between the fields of cybersecurity and biosecurity. First he noted how we tend to misinterpret them – we draw on our classic metaphors for defense and security, and imagine building a castle or a fortress with physical walls, to guard that which we want to keep safe. But information is not a physical material. Its transfer is not cleanly constrained by energy, time, or physical space as physical matter is, and nor are the defenses we build. Oehmen suggests we replace this with a resilience-based model, taking other approaches to thinking of security in flawed systems. What assumptions are we relying on when we think of biosecurity? Are they true? Continue reading “Converging Technologies & Emerging Risks”

Clade X Discussion Panel

By Justin Hurt

Moderator: Gigi Gronvall, PhD

Julie Gerberding, PhD, former CDC Director

Jeffrey Smith, Partner, Arnold and Porter

Imagine a never-before-seen virus emerging simultaneous in multiple places on Earth with no warning, no current countermeasures, and no idea as to the origin. Think about the difficulties that leaders could encounter if one of the outbreaks was in a nation with which we had less than desirable relations, but was close enough that it was likely to spread to our shores quickly. What could that mean for effective response or humanitarian assistance and how would we broach that with our own leaders and diplomatically with our international partners? What if the virus was found to have been engineered and intentionally released? Finally, how do we determine the most effective distribution of any countermeasures we might develop? Continue reading “Clade X Discussion Panel”

Pandora Report: 2.1.2019

We’re in the middle of a polar vortex and Gov. Jay Inslee just announced a state of emergency in Washington due to a measles outbreak, but the world of biodefense doesn’t rest, so we’re here to keep you up to date.

Talking Biodefense with Senator Daschle
The Biodefense Graduate Program at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University invites you to an informal discussion about key issues in biodefense with former Senator Thomas Daschle, founder of the Daschle Group and a Panel Member on the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. The event will be held on February 19 but is open only to Schar/GMU faculty, students, and alum. Look for an email coming soon if you’re able to attend with details regarding registration.

Recap of the National Defense University’s “Digitization of WMD” Symposium 
Schar Biodefense doctoral student Justin Hurt attended this January 17th event and has provided a recap in case you missed it. He notes that “Some trends that have been notable, especially in terms of synthetic biology, is that automation is becoming increasingly critical and pertinent for emerging biological technologies. The associated computational systems and machinery have inherent cyberbiosecurity risks, including privacy risks, system operation issues, manufacturing risks (that include issues with attributing who made what), and the risk of possible sabotage. As genomics grows, it becomes increasingly automated, thus increasing the system risks. As an emerging consumer product, genomics becomes harder to control and secure at scale. In addition, as an internet connected technology, firewalling becomes variable and not generally standardized. Modeling appropriate measures for large-scale genomics is important because it helps to understand the effects of big data, the similarities and differences between the plethora of different open source bioinformatics software systems which don’t always adhere to security best practices.”

Meeting of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense: Fighting the Next War- Defense Against Biological Weapons
You can join the latest Blue Ribbon Study Panel event “on February 5th, 2019, when we hold a meeting to get a better understanding of the responsibilities and requirements for federal biodefense efforts that are unique to the U.S. Department of Defense. Participants will share their experiences regarding the current threat environment, research and development programs, the Department’s biodefense policies, and implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy. Speakers will include: Congressman Jim Langevin (D-RI) – Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities; Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, and Derek Maurer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Department of Defense”

 Trust Issues Worsen Outbreak Response
A lack of trust in politicians, public health, and even healthcare, are all critical for responding to an outbreak. Consider if you didn’t trust public health responders knocking on your door to ask questions about contact with a potentially infected person. Or the physicians to give you a treatment. Even more so, consider if you didn’t trust the government to provide you with accurate information and do their best to stop the outbreak. If all of these were true, the chances of getting you to seek care or provide information…well, they’d be pretty abysmal. Laura Kahn discusses the implications of this trust breakdown  during an outbreak. “There are many examples of what can happen to public health when trust breaks down. The ongoing Ebola outbreak in the Northeastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo is a case in point. The current outbreak, centered in North Kivu province, was first identified last August. Since then, the outbreak has spiraled out of control—despite new diagnostics, experimental treatments, and a vaccine that mostly wasn’t avaible during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The problem is, the people living in violence-plagued North Kivu don’t trust anybody or anything. Rumors and hatreds spread easily, residents have refused to cooperate with outbreak responders, and some don’t necessarily even believe that an Ebola virus exists.” Consider even the anti-vaccination websites and posts you see on social media – this promotes a lack of trust in scientists and the CDC. “One result is that scientific experts are no longer widely trusted. The situation is made worse by politicians who legitimize falsehoods, spreading them in an attempt to peddle fear or hate for political gain. US President Donald Trump has tweeted about there being a link between vaccines and autism more than 20 times, the Independent reported last year. The results of spreading medical disinformation can be deadly.”

Why We Should Be Skeptical About Recent Reports on North Korea’s BW Program
John Parachini talks frankly about that recent and sensational news story regarding North Korea’s bioweapons program. “Many assessments of North Korea’s biological capabilities draw heavily from South Korean sources. These are legitimate sources of information, but like any stream of information, they are imperfect. In a 2012 white paper, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND), assessed that North Korea ‘likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, pest, francisella, tularensis, and hemorrhagic fever virus,’ but provided no supportive documentation or evidence. In 2016, the MND altered the language to ‘sources indicate that North Korea is capable of cultivating and producing various types of biological agents such as anthrax, smallpox, and pest on its own’.” Pointing to the bias of defector-based information, he notes that “During 2003–04 and again in 2009, several defectors claimed that North Korea tested poisonous materials on political prisoners. However, these charges refer to the use of chemicals on humans and not biological agents. In 2014, a group of scientists, Korea experts and human rights advocates attempted to verify these claims by speaking with South Koreans working with the North Koreans who made these allegations. The group was unable to corroborate the allegations and discovered inaccuracies discrediting the defectors’ claims” Overall, Parachini underscores the need for greater transparency and dialogue with North Korea. Lastly, he stresses that “As one scholar noted in a historical review of state biological weapons programs ‘Intelligence assessments of foreign BW programs often have been wrong, sometimes overestimating, sometimes underestimating, and sometimes missing them altogether’.”

Discord in Venezuela and the Impact on Infectious Diseases
Venezuela has been spiraling into an increasingly dangerous and precarious state, fueled by the election of Nicolás Maduro. As Juan Guaidó proclaimed himself the rightful head of state last week after over a million Venezuelans protested Maduro’s presidency, there is much at stake. Between the political and economic crisis, roughly 3 million have fled the country and estimates have found that maternal mortality has risen by 65% while malaria cases have increased by 76%. The state of Venezuela is chaotic and teetering on a dangerous brink. Unfortunately, in this environment, infectious diseases also thrive. Civil unrest, large bodies of people fleeing the country, and a collapsing infrastructure all create a ripe situation for the transmission of disease. A new article from the CDC’s Emerging Infectious Disease journal points to this very issue and the resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases in Venezuela. “The country is experiencing a massive exodus of biomedical scientists and qualified healthcare professionals. Reemergence of arthropod-borne and vaccine-preventable diseases has sparked serious epidemics that also affect neighboring countries. In this article, we discuss the ongoing epidemics of measles and diphtheria in Venezuela and their disproportionate impact on indigenous populations. We also discuss the potential for reemergence of poliomyelitis and conclude that action to halt the spread of vaccine-preventable diseases within Venezuela is a matter of urgency for the country and the region.”

Resistant Genes Found in Arctic
A team of researchers reported that they detected antibiotic resistant genes in soil samples collected from islands in the High Arctic. “Among the genes found by the team was blaNDM-1 (New Delhi metallo beta-lactamase-1), which confers resistance to a broad range of antibiotics and has been associated with highly resistant bacterial pathogens and severe, multidrug-resistant infections. The blaNDM-1 gene was first discovered in a patient treated at an Indian hospital in 2008 and subsequently in Indian surface waters. Since then, it has spread to hospitals in more than 70 countries. The genes were found in soil from the Kongsfjorden region of Svalbard, an archipelago in the Arctic Ocean roughly midway between Norway and the North Pole. While many resistance genes have spread around the world, and it’s a known fact that antibiotic resistance isn’t limited by borders, finding a multidrug-resistance gene in such a remote location, the scientists write, highlights ‘how rapidly AR [antibiotic resistance] can globalize’.”

 UNSC 1540 – The  Importance of Regional Coordination
GMU Biodefense doctoral alum Ashley Hess discusses the importance of regional coordinators for UN Security Council Resolution 1540. “United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540, adopted unanimously under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 2004, is a key component of the global security architecture, enumerating specific obligations for states, which ultimately aims to reduce the overall risk of weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation. However, although nearly fifteen years have passed since the adoption of the resolution, many states have still not implemented many of its requirements and obligations—meaning that at least some of the vulnerabilities and risks identified over a decade ago likely still exist, or have changed and expanded over time. This viewpoint discusses the establishment of dedicated UNSCR 1540 coordinators in regional organizations as an example of an effective practice that may contribute toward achieving full implementation of the resolution, fully consistent with established US policy. Since some regional organizations may not have the financial and administrative capacity, or political will, to host such a position, this viewpoint also proposes a variety of ways to address these shortfalls.”

ABSA Course Discount
The Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity has announced a discount on their courses. “Due to the difficulties of the current government shutdown we are now offering the Symposium Courses at 1/2 price. Half day courses will now be $150 and full day courses will be $255. The courses are listed below. The Symposium will proceed as planned, even if the government shutdown continues. Professional Development CoursesScenario-based Agricultural Risk Assessment, Animal Disease Response Training, Biosecurity 101, Risks of Deferred Maintenance in High-Containment Facilities, Implementing Biosecurity Solutions, Introduction to Strategic Leadership Principles for Biorisk Management”

DRC Ebola Outbreak Recap
Despite more than 70,000 people being vaccinated, there have been 7 new cases, which makes the total 759, including 468 deaths. You can also check out two interesting articles (you’ll need Google translate) – the first discusses the handling and safety practices (and some ethics) surrounding the blood samples. “During the epidemic, which killed more than 11,000 people in West Africa between 2014 and 2016, scientists collected thousands of blood samples for their research. Without always respecting ethics. September 2017, tarmac at Conakry Airport, Guinea. A small gray plane of the American company Phoenix Air is preparing to take off towards the United States. On board, a mysterious cargo: twenty sealed boxes, shipped by a team of American scientists. In a few hours, they will land on the other side of the Atlantic before being transported to Atlanta, to the headquarters of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the agency in charge of public health in the United States. Inside, hundreds of biological samples, all contaminated by Ebola, one of the deadliest viruses on the planet. Taken to diagnose patients during the epidemic that hit West Africa between 2014 and 2016 (more than 11,000 deaths), they had been in the US Department of State’s line of sight for several months. His fear? That these vials, hitherto stored in Conakry in freezers closed by simple padlocks, end up in the wrong hands; terrorists wanting to panic, or inexperienced lab technicians who might accidentally spread the virus.” The second article is in regards to the military aspect of Ebola and concerns for weaponizing the disease. “We are here at the Center for Research in Epidemiology-Microbiology and Medical Care (Crems), built by Russia during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak, and funded to the tune of $ 10 million ($ 8.8 million euros) by the Russian mining company Rusal, which operates in Guinea the largest bauxite deposit in the world. Shortly after the outbreak of the epidemic in August 2014, Russia dispatched two mobile laboratories and specialists to test for Ebola in the blood of patients. A few months later, a permanent treatment center was built, as well as a laboratory, where a dozen scientists are currently working to test a new vaccine against the virus. This research is done in secret. Even the senior officials of the Guinean Ministry of Health complain that they can not visit the premises. ‘With the Russians, it’s the total blackout,’ regrets one of them. A regular Cremean Guinean agrees to share the bits of information available to him, but says he ignores what has become of the many blood samples taken during the epidemic. ‘The Russians are doing what they want,’ he says, adding that they alone have the right to access the laboratories where research on the virus takes place. For him, there is no doubt that these researchers are military.” In terms of decontamination, MSF International’s Thomas Compigne recently discussed the role it has in controlling the outbreak.

 Tackling African Swine Fever Through Wild Boar Movement
While it doesn’t pose a risk to human health, African swine fever has considerable implications for the agriculture industry. An outbreak on a farm could mean culling the entire herd, which could cost billions across Europe. “As U.S. politicians continue to spar over the idea of building a border wall, Denmark is preparing its own controversial southern border-control barrier. The target is wild boars — specifically, wild boars from Germany. But environmentalists warn the planned 5 ft.-high, 40-mile fence will harm the region’s wildlife and may not even serve the function for which it’s intended. Understanding the rationale for spending $12 million on a fence that may not even work requires understanding the enormity of the Danish pig industry. At any given moment, Denmark is home to at least twice as many pigs as people (roughly 12 million pigs to not quite 6 million Danes). The country’s export market for pigs amounts to about $5 billion a year. At Berith Nissen’s farm in southern Denmark, visitors must change their clothes and socks, wash their hands and slip into borrowed shoes before she’ll open the door to reveal some of her 10,000-plus pigs.”

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Hedgehogs …Harbingers of Salmonella– “Since October, 11 people across eight states have been infected with a particular strain of salmonella, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported, and all but one of those infected said they had contact with a hedgehog. ‘Don’t kiss or snuggle hedgehogs because this can spread salmonella germs to your face and mouth and make you sick,’ the agency warned. No deaths have been reported and one person has been hospitalized, the C.D.C. said. Three cases have been reported in Missouri and two in Minnesota. Infections have also been reported in Colorado, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, Texas and Wyoming.”