The month of June is nearly over, which means there’s only a few more weeks to register for the Workshop on Pandemics, Bioterrorism, and Global Health Security. Don’t miss out on the early registration discount if you sign up before July 1st!
Cost Analysis of 3 Concurrent Public Health Response Events: Financial Impact of Measles Outbreak, Super Bowl Surveillance, and Ebola Surveillance in Maricopa County
Have you ever wondered the cost of public health response for local health departments during a crisis? Imagine that within the course of six months, your county sees a measles outbreak, super bowl surveillance requirements, and Ebola surveillance. A new article is addressing the cost of this trifecta for the largest county health department in Arizona. GMU biodefense PhD student Saskia Popescu was a part of not only this response, but also aided in developing the research so that we can truly address the financial burden of public health events. “Maricopa County Department of Public Health (MCDPH) in Arizona. The nation’s third largest local public health jurisdiction, MCDPH is the only local health agency serving Maricopa’s more than 4 000 000 residents. Responses analyzed included activities related to a measles outbreak with 2 confirmed cases, enhanced surveillance activities surrounding Super Bowl XLIX, and ongoing Ebola monitoring, all between January 22, 2015, and March 4, 2015. Total MCDPH costs for measles-, Super Bowl-, and Ebola-related activities from January 22, 2015, through March 4, 2015, were $224,484 (>5800 hours). The majority was for personnel ($203,743) and the costliest response was measles ($122,626 in personnel costs). In addition, partners reported working more than 700 hours for these 3 responses during this period.” Public health is chronically underfunded, but the response efforts can be immensely expensive. Based off these events and the cost of response, perhaps it’s time we start investing more in public health.
Forget RoboCop, Meet the DNA Cops
Biotechnology is moving at a rapid pace and the ability for DIY biohacking means that frank conversations need to be had regarding the potential for someone to build a lethal biological weapon. Ginkgo Bioworks has just the team to overcome this herculean task. Remember that horsepox synthesis last year? “The study’s publication ‘crosses a red line in the field of biosecurity,’ wrote Gregory Koblentz, a professor in the biodefense department at George Mason University, in a public comment to the journal. ‘The synthesis of horsepox virus takes the world one step closer to the reemergence of smallpox as a threat to global health security’.” Hoping to get a leg up on the threat, the intelligence community is working with Ginkgo Bioworks to address the science, security, and safety. “Gingko quickly saw the potential security risks in its work. It began working with Weber, the former Obama administration official, in 2016 to get advice on how to best preserve national security. ‘We are doing more of this genetic engineering than anybody, we think we’re going to get better at it than anybody, so we have a responsibility to be keeping our eye on both sides of that coin,’ Kelly said. ‘How do we protect and defend against that while protecting our ability to get all the positive outputs of biotechnology?’” Synthetic biology has the potential to do damage, but also the chance to counter these threats (and even emerging infectious diseases) through vaccine development. Joint efforts like those between Ginkgo Bioworks and agencies like IARPA, are critical during this time when the technology is still spreading and evolving.
Genome Editing and Security: Governance of Non-Traditional Research Communities?
GMU Biodefense doctoral student Katherine Paris has provided a detailed account of the latest National Academies webinar on gene editing and biosecurity/biosafety developments. Paris notes that “at the workshop, concerns were expressed over the extent that advancements in technology allow a greater range of people to access, and possibility misuse, genome editing technologies. Dr. Millet and Dr. Kuiken addressed these concerns during the webinar by describing what two non-traditional research communities—the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition and do-it-yourself biology (DIYbio) community laboratories—are doing to foster biosafety and biosecurity.” Check out her account of this informative talk to learn more about how iGEM is demonstrating real-world application of biosecurity and biosafety practices.
The Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity and Responsible Conduct in the Life Sciences
Curious about biosecurity, biosafety, and what it means to have a culture of responsibility in the life sciences? Look no further than this amazingly comprehensive literature review by ABSA International, which happens to include former GMU Biodefense student Kathleen Danskin and current doctoral student Elise Rowe. Identifying over four thousand unique articles published between 2001 and 2017, they reviewed 326 articles to truly evaluate the literature on ways to strengthen the biosafety/biosecurity culture. “We found that while there were discussions in the literature about specific elements of culture (management systems, leadership and/or personnel behavior, beliefs and attitudes, or principles for guiding decisions and behaviors), there was a general lack of integration of these concepts, as well as limited information about specific indicators or metrics and the effectiveness of training or similar interventions. We concluded that life scientists seeking to foster a culture of biosafety and biosecurity should learn from the substantial literature in analogous areas such as nuclear safety and security culture, high-reliability organizations, and the responsible conduct of research, among others.”
Roadmap for Implementing Biosecurity and Biodefense Policy in the U.S.
This new report and roadmap from Gryphon Scientific, National Defense University, and Parsons, analyzes biosecurity and biodefense policy within the United States. “We developed a framework for analyzing opportunity costs of new or changing regulations (the opportunity cost analysis framework), and a framework for evaluating the successful implementation of biosecurity and biodefense policies. These analyses enabled the development of a roadmap for implementing U.S. biosecurity and biodefense policy to maximally leverage science and technology advances while simultaneously, minimizing risks. This project was funded by a generous grant from the U.S. Air Force Academy and Defense Threat Reduction Agency under their Program on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The report includes policy and opportunity cost case studies, as well as evaluation metrics framework.
How Will Trump Lead During A Pandemic and How Well Prepared Is Your Country?
Between several science vacancies within the administration and the fundamental truth that a global epidemic is on the horizon, many are concerned about what a response would be like under Trump. “’There is a real reason for us to be scared of the idea of facing this threat with Donald Trump in the White House,’ said Ron Klain, who served as President Obama’s Ebola czar, at the Spotlight Health Festival, which is co-hosted by the Aspen Institute and The Atlantic. Klain said the ‘president is anti-science’ and ‘trades in conspiracy theories. All those things would lead to the loss of many lives in the event of an epidemic in the United States, where we need the public not to trade in conspiracy theories, not to believe that the news was fake, but to respect scientific expertise,’ said Klain, a veteran Democratic operative who served in both the Clinton and Obama administrations.” Klain underscores the importance of having pro-science leadership, which isn’t exactly something the current administration is known for. He points to several gaps within U.S. preparedness – funding, leadership, science, policy, etc. “But the biggest gap, he said, is the global gap: ‘We can’t be safe here in America when there’s a risk of pandemics around the world,’ Klain said. ‘The world’s just too small. Diseases spread too quickly … There is no wall we can build that is high enough to keep viruses and the disease threat out of the United States. We have to engage in the world’.” If you’re curious about the current state of preparedness around the globe, check out the latest site from Resolve to Save Lives, the initiative run by former CDC director Dr. Tom Frieden. Prevent Epidemics is a tool that rates countries from 0-100 on their ability to find, stop, and prevent outbreaks. “ReadyScore is calculated using data from the Joint External Evaluation (JEE), a rigorous, objective and internationally-accepted epidemic preparedness assessment developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners. The ReadyScore consolidates key information from the JEE about a country’s preparedness in the form of a simple and easy-to-understand number that makes it easy for countries to measure their preparedness gaps and fill them”
UK, Allies – Empower Chemical Arms Watchdog to Assign Blame For Attacks
The UK, US, and EU are pushing a new proposal to increase the powers of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in efforts to strengthen the ban on chemical weapons and the ability to hold countries, like Syria, accountable for use. “‘The widespread use of chemical weapons by Syria in particular threatens to undermine the treaty and the OPCW,’ said Gregory Koblentz, a non-proliferation expert at George Mason University, in the United States. ‘Empowering the OPCW to identify perpetrators of chemical attacks is necessary to restoring the taboo against chemical weapons and the integrity of the chemical weapons disarmament regime’.”
Stories You May Have Missed:
- Pull Incentives – A New Strategy for AMR – The World Economic Forum is supporting these initiatives to help spur the development of new antibiotics and facilitate their profitability. The financial challenges for antibiotic development can be significant hurdles – demand is unpredictable, stewardship efforts seek to decrease use which decreases sales, and clinical trials are costly. “Existing incentives for developing new antibiotics are mostly of the ‘push’ type, the report notes. Push incentives provide support for research and development, but they don’t ensure that a company can get an adequate return on a new antibiotic once it wins approval. The concept of pull incentives has attracted increasing attention in recent years. A chart in the report shows that 10 current research and development initiatives on antimicrobial resistance (AMR) involve push incentives, while no such initiatives involve pull incentives exclusively. Combinations of push and pull incentives are being used to support four existing R&D initiatives, the chart indicates, but it doesn’t give any details on those.”
Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (firstname.lastname@example.org) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport