Happy Spring! Lest our readers in the northern hemisphere enjoy the added sunshine too much, this edition of the Pandora Report focuses heavily on a new report that suggests China CDC failed to disclose information connecting raccoon dogs to the initial outbreak of COVID-19 at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, potentially covering up critical evidence in understanding the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. We also tackle the signing of the COVID-19 Origins Act of 2023 into law, the continued discussion about biosecurity oversight, the Biden administration’s release of biotechnology and biomanufacturing goal documents, and the 28th anniversary of the Tokyo subway sarin attacks.
US Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Goals and Priorities Released
This week, in response to President Biden’s September Executive Order, the administration announced the release of three new documents: Harnessing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Research and Development (R&D) to Further Societal Goals; U.S. Department of Defense Biomanufacturing Strategy; and Developing a National Measure of the Economic Contributions of the Bioeconomy. According to the White House, the first is a report from the Office of Science and Technology Policy that outlines “a vision for what is possible with the power of biotechnology and biomanufacturing, and R&D needs to achieve this ambitious vision.”
In addition to these documents, “Other deliverables from the Executive Order are in development, including: a plan to expand training and education opportunities for the biotechnology and biomanufacturing workforce, a report on data needs for the bioeconomy, a national strategy for expanding domestic biomanufacturing capacity, actions to improve biotechnology regulation clarity and efficiency, and a plan for strengthening and innovating biosafety and biosecurity for the bioeconomy.”
COVID-19 Origins…More Politics, Some New Evidence
Raccoon Dogs Linked to Outbreak at Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market
This week, a researchers, including the Schar School’s Dr. Saskia Popescu, released a report on Zenodo titled “Genetic evidence of susceptible wildlife in SARS-CoV-2 positive samples at the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market, Wuhan: Analysis and interpretation of data released by the Chinese Center for Disease Control”. Nature discusses key findings of the report, writing “Particularly notable was the raccoon-dog mitochondrial DNA found in six samples from two stalls. These small fox-like animals are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, and can spread the infection to other raccoon dogs without showing clear signs of sickness. Raccoon dogs and masked palm civets have also been found with infections of viruses that are almost identical to the one that causes severe acute respiratory syndrome, which is related to SARS-CoV-2 and caused an outbreak in people in 2003. And work in palm-civet cells indicates that the creatures could possibly become infected with SARS-CoV-2.”
“The researchers were looking for evidence of mammals, which could have been intermediate hosts of the virus. They identified near-complete mitochondrial-DNA sequences — each some 16,000 base pairs long — for five species, including raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonoides), Malayan porcupine (Hystrix brachyura), Amur hedgehog (Erinaceus amurensis), masked palm civet (Paguma larvata) and hoary bamboo rat (Rhizomys pruinosus)…”
Furthermore, in their forward, the authors discuss their discovery of data posted publicly on the GISAID database corresponding to sequences from environmental samples collected at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan. Though metadata suggests this data was posted in June 2022, it was not made publicly available until recently. According to the report, “We downloaded the public data to search for genetic sequences from non-human animals, which the CCDC did not identify in their February 2022 preprint. The preprint also posited that all SARS-CoV-2-positive samples in the market were the result of human infections, claiming that the market was a site of amplification of an already widespread epidemic. We and others therefore had urgently requested release of the data. The potential for analysis of samples for animal DNA had also been recommended in the mission report of the World Health Organization (WHO)-convened global study of origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part, released March 2021.”
The researchers later explain “Once the data were identified on GISAID, it became possible to test the veracity of these claims. We found information that was critical to understanding the nature of the origins of the human infections at the Huanan market, as this was the early epicenter of SARS-CoV-2 spread and was likely where spillover occurred and sustained human-to-human transmission was established.”
They continue “Our analysis of these data found that genetic evidence of multiple animal species was present in locations of the market where SARS-CoV-2 positive environmental samples had been collected. This includes raccoon dogs, which are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2
infection and shed sufficient virus to transmit to other species. However, this also included other mammalian species that require consideration as possible intermediate hosts of SARS CoV-2. Although live mammals had previously been observed at Huanan market in late 2019, their exact locations were not conclusively known, and some of the animal species we identify in the report below were not included in the list of live or dead animals tested at the Huanan market, as reported in the 2021 WHO-China joint report on the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results show that they were present. In some cases, the amount of animal genetic material was greater than the amount of human genetic material, consistent with the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in these samples being due to animal infections.”
They then detail their attempts to inform an author of the Gao et al. preprint about the data and later accusations that they had violated GISAID’s terms of use. They then notified the WHO of their preliminary findings, at which point SAGO convened a meeting with some of these researchers and scientists from China CDC. SAGO explained in their statement that “The presentations from China CDC and invited international researchers indicated that there were newly available data from the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. This included metagenomic data of environmental samples from various stalls and wastewater collection sites collected as early as January 2020. Analyses of these data suggest that apart from SARS-CoV-2 sequences, some samples also contained human DNA, as well as mitochondrial DNA of several animal species, including some that are known to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. This included DNA from wild raccoon dogs, Malaysian porcupine, and bamboo rats among others, in SARS-CoV-2 positive environmental samples.”
Importantly, the statement explains “The findings suggest that animals were present at the market shortly before the market had been cleared on 1 January 2020, as part of the public health measures by Chinese authorities. These results provide potential leads to identifying intermediate hosts of SARS-CoV-2 and potential sources of human infections in the market.”
While GISAID allegedly made the data unavailable to the researchers because it is the basis for an update to an existing Liu et al. 2022 preprint that is in the process of being re-submitted for publication by China CDC, this presents a troubling twist in the COVID-19 origin saga. This information sat in GISAID hidden for the better part of a year, and was made unavailable when scientists outside China CDC sought to analyze it, even though they contacted the initial authors and requested to collaborate.
Among the abundant discussion this has brought has been outrage directed at the PRC for failing disclose this data. The WHO itself expressed concern, with Director-General Tedros saying “These data do not provide a definitive answer to the question of how the pandemic began, but every piece of data is important in moving us closer to that answer…And every piece of data relating to studying the origins of COVID-19 needs to be shared with the international community immediately.”
When asked in an interview why these data were not made available sooner, Maria Van Kerkhove (technical lead of the WHO’s COVID-19 response), said “That is the question. Why weren’t these data shared and analyzed with Chinese scientists? We have been calling for any and all data to be made available. Clearly there is more data that is out there. What is not clear is what else is out there,” adding another layer of concern in this ongoing search for the pandemic’s origin.
COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023 Signed by President Biden
Of course, concerns about lack of transparency regarding the COVID-19 pandemic are nothing new in the Beltway, as was further demonstrated this week. This Monday, President Biden signed a bill into law directing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to declassify certain information about COVID-19’s origin. President Biden said in a statement “We need to get to the bottom of COVID-19’s origins to help ensure we can better prevent future pandemics. My Administration will continue to review all classified information relating to COVID–19’s origins, including potential links to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. In implementing this legislation, my Administration will declassify and share as much of that information as possible, consistent with my constitutional authority to protect against the disclosure of information that would harm national security.”
The bill indicates the information must be released within 90 days of being signed into law, and it covers information like names, symptoms, and roles of any researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology who became ill in the fall of 2019. The House passed the bill in a 419-0 vote following the Senate’s unanimous vote, in a rare showing of overwhelming bipartisanship. Rep. Jim Himes of Connecticut told The Washington Post the declassified information made available to the public will not be the raw transcripts from intercepted calls, but finished intelligence reports.
Biosecurity Discussion Continues
This entire saga has all brought renewed public debate over the safety of high-containment laboratories. Sam Weiss Evans and David Gillum write in STAT News, “The Covid pandemic exacerbated fear and panic regarding the potential for a future bioterrorism agent. As the lab leak theory continues to cause debate, politicians want to be able to tell their constituents that they are solving the problem by adding more oversight to biological research. But if all they are doing is adding more burden, bureaucracy, and box-checking, is it really making anyone more secure?”
“…governance systems are increasingly not up to the task of managing biosecurity risks. States, industry, and academia have been too focused on the technical frontiers in biotechnology, heralding cheaper, more efficient, and more sophisticated tools to conduct biological research, but not putting the same degree of curiosity or funding into how we might direct these advances in ways that protect the vulnerable and prevent catastrophe. Scientific advances such as CRISPR, gene drives, synthetic viruses, and increased pathogen capabilities, are rapidly proceeding while innovation in our collective ability to govern their security concerns is not.”
While the debate over the lab leak hypothesis has been politically charged from the start, there are broader biosecurity concerns that do deserve increased attention, as highlighted by the Global BioLabs project in its latest report-Global BioLabs Report 2023. Newsweek covered this report this week, writing in part ‘”We urgently need coordinated international action to address increasing bio-risks,” Gregory Koblentz, an author of the report with the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, said in a statement.”
Science summarizes much of the concern in their discussion of the report, writing “Concerns about an increasing number of BSL-4 and BSL-3 labs aren’t new, but they have grown since the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic began in 2019. One hypothesis is that the virus came from a lab. And many countries, particularly those building their first BSL-4 labs, lack strong policies and methods to monitor such labs, the report says. Only Canada has legislation overseeing all experiments, even those with no government funding, that are considered “dual use” because the results could potentially be used to cause harm.”
28th Anniversary of Tokyo Subway Attacks
The 28th anniversary of the Tokyo sarin attacks passed this week, marking nearly three decades since the horror unleashed by Aum Shinrikyo in March 1995. The cult staged five coordinated attacks on three lines of the Teito Rapid Transit Authority at rush hour near the Diet headquarters, killing 13, seriously injuring 50, and harming over 5,000 others. Some of those severely injured did later die as well. NHK, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, notes “Japan’s Public Security Intelligence Agency notes that successor groups of the cult are still active. It says a group known as Aleph is actively recruiting young people by concealing its name.”

“Infectious Disease as a Security Threat: A Mental Framework for Future Emergency Preparedness”
Biodefense PhD Student Ryan Houser recently published this article in the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: “The emergence of COVID-19 pandemic has had significant impacts on human lives as well as economic and social stability. The United States has a complicated history with biosecurity. The September 11th terror attacks uncovered various weaknesses in the national biosecurity infrastructure that have persisted into the current pandemic. This study explores the implications of framing the infectious disease biothreat as a security threat to improve our capabilities while protecting against the potential accelerated threat of bioterrorism in the post-COVID-19 era. To counter the increasing biothreats, the United States must invest in revamping the biodefense infrastructure to increase our resilience to various biothreats.”
“The BWC Ninth Review Conference: An Overview of Outcomes, Outlooks, and National Implementation”
Read this new report from VERTIC here: “2022 saw an important milestone for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), as it marked fifty years since its opening for signature. Since then, every five years, approximately, States Parties have convened for a Review Conference of the Convention. The Ninth Review Conference was held in the final quarter of 2022, amidst an international security landscape with a new set of challenges and priorities.”
“Upon the BWC’s entry into force in 1975, the UK’s then-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs noted that States Parties to the Convention “have both renounced this entire class of weapons and undertaken to prevent their future development, by appropriate national measures”.1 His statement highlights the essential nature of national measures to achieve the Convention’s ultimate goal of banning biological weapons. Following the conclusion of the Review Conference it is timely to take stock of the progress, challenges, and ways forward for national implementation of the BWC; a topic that VERTIC have been working on for over twenty years.2 This Brief will do so in two parts: Part I provides a consideration of the outcomes and outlook of the Ninth Review Conference; Part II examines the coverage of national implementation at the Conference and, ultimately, provides a series of recommendations for strengthening national implementation during the next review cycle of the Convention.”
“OK, But Where Will the Next Pandemic Come From?”
Angela Kane and Jaime Yassif discuss the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Joint Assessment Mechanism in this opinion piece for The Hill. They write “While the politics surrounding an outbreak cannot be ignored, the international community needs to get better at conducting evidence-based assessments of pandemic origins, in order to minimize and deflect the most polarizing voices in favor of objective scientific analysis. Nearly 7 million deaths from COVID-19 worldwide prove the stakes are high.”
“To address this need, the Nuclear Threat Initiative is working with international partners to establish a new Joint Assessment Mechanism (JAM) which would fill a significant gap in the international community’s ability to discern the source of high-consequence biological events of unknown origin. Its mandate would be to establish the facts — specifically, whether the event emerged naturally or was accidentally or deliberately released from an academic, commercial or government laboratory.”
“Avian Flu in Cambodia”
Rick A. Bright discusses the H5N1 outbreak in Cambodia and what it tells us about the importance of global surveillance and collaboration for Think Global Health, writing “As human and bird interactions increase, however, the likelihood of zoonotic transmission grows. The first confirmed bird-to-human transmission of these viruses occurred in Hong Kong in 1997, though seroprevalence studies in the same region suggest a substantial number of mild or asymptomatic infections among people who work closely with poultry. In Cambodia, where highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses have been detected in wild birds since 2003, fifty-eight cases of human infection and thirty-eight deaths have been documented, a fatality rate of 66 percent. The February cases are the first since 2014.”
“It used to take months to identify the pathogen, conduct genomic analytics, perform contact tracing, and alert the world of a potential outbreak of concern — but enhanced global surveillance capabilities, new genomic sequencing technologies, and real-time data sharing in publicly accessible databases have changed all that. This time, scientists at the Institute Pasteur Cambodia (IPC) and Cambodia’s National Institute of Public Health were able to share their findings globally within twenty-four hours of collecting the first clinical specimen. They quickly tempered concerns by confirming that virus collected from one of the patients, an eleven-year-old girl, was from a group of influenza viruses endemic in birds in the region and thus likely to have been transmitted without a human intermediary.”
“The Polarized Pandemic”
David P. Fidler breaks down the history of politicized health crises and how COVID-19 is likely to be remembered for Think Global Health, writing “The turmoil caused by COVID-19’s emergence and global spread triggered a tsunami of analyses on what went wrong and how the United States and other countries should transform policies on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. This series on U.S. foreign policy and global health participates in this effort at diagnosis and prescription. Synthesizing such commentary proves difficult, if not foolhardy, and the question of how the COVID-19 pandemic will be described in the future cannot be definitively answered today. Some themes, however, suggest that COVID-19 will be remembered as the polarized pandemic that cast a divisive shadow on U.S. public health, domestic politics, and foreign policy.”
“The Real Horrors of ‘The Last of Us’ May Already Be Here”
Erik English merges the post-apocalyptic fantasy world with real life in this piece for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the deeper story the video game and new HBO drama tells, writing “The show, based on the beloved video game from 2013, is split into two levels. In the foreground, it is a fairly conservative story of survivalism and kinship. In the background, it is telling a different story about the failure of institutions during crises, the breaking of the social contract amid a turn towards authoritarianism, and the tradeoffs between utilitarianism and individual justice.”
“U.S. Companies Must Stop Enabling Mass DNA Collection in Tibet”
Columnist Josh Rogin discusses an alarming trend in data collection for The Washington Post, writing “There is overwhelming evidence that Chinese authorities are using mass forced DNA collection in many parts of China — but Tibet is an especially cruel case. Human rights groups report that police are taking blood samples from men, women and children , with no legitimate justification , in all seven prefectures in the Tibetan autonomous region, often showing up at kindergartens. There’s zero indication Tibetans can refuse.”
“Drug Discovery Efforts at George Mason University”
Andalibi et al. discuss research at GMU in this article in SLAS Discovery, writing in their abstract: “With over 39,000 students, and research expenditures in excess of $200 million, George Mason University (GMU) is the largest R1 (Carnegie Classification of very high research activity) university in Virginia. Mason scientists have been involved in the discovery and development of novel diagnostics and therapeutics in areas as diverse as infectious diseases and cancer. Below are highlights of the efforts being led by Mason researchers in the drug discovery arena.”
“To enable targeted cellular delivery, and non-biomedical applications, Veneziano and colleagues have developed a synthesis strategy that enables the design of self-assembling DNA nanoparticles (DNA origami) with prescribed shape and size in the 10 to 100 nm range. The nanoparticles can be loaded with molecules of interest such as drugs, proteins and peptides, and are a promising new addition to the drug delivery platforms currently in use. The investigators also recently used the DNA origami nanoparticles to fine tune the spatial presentation of immunogens to study the impact on B cell activation. These studies are an important step towards the rational design of vaccines for a variety of infectious agents.”
“To elucidate the parameters for optimizing the delivery efficiency of lipid nanoparticles (LNPs), Buschmann, Paige and colleagues have devised methods for predicting and experimentally validating the pKa of LNPs based on the structure of the ionizable lipids used to formulate the LNPs. These studies may pave the way for the development of new LNP delivery vehicles that have reduced systemic distribution and improved endosomal release of their cargo post administration.”
“To better understand protein-protein interactions and identify potential drug targets that disrupt such interactions, Luchini and colleagues have developed a methodology that identifies contact points between proteins using small molecule dyes. The dye molecules noncovalently bind to the accessible surfaces of a protein complex with very high affinity, but are excluded from contact regions. When the complex is denatured and digested with trypsin, the exposed regions covered by the dye do not get cleaved by the enzyme, whereas the contact points are digested. The resulting fragments can then be identified using mass spectrometry. The data generated can serve as the basis for designing small molecules and peptides that can disrupt the formation of protein complexes involved in disease processes. For example, using peptides based on the interleukin 1 receptor accessory protein (IL-1RAcP), Luchini, Liotta, Paige and colleagues disrupted the formation of IL-1/IL-R/IL-1RAcP complex and demonstrated that the inhibition of complex formation reduced the inflammatory response to IL-1B.”
“Working on the discovery of novel antimicrobial agents, Bishop, van Hoek and colleagues have discovered a number of antimicrobial peptides from reptiles and other species. DRGN-1, is a synthetic peptide based on a histone H1-derived peptide that they had identified from Komodo Dragon plasma. DRGN-1 was shown to disrupt bacterial biofilms and promote wound healing in an animal model. The peptide, along with others, is being developed and tested in preclinical studies. Other research by van Hoek and colleagues focuses on in silico antimicrobial peptide discovery, screening of small molecules for antibacterial properties, as well as assessment of diffusible signal factors (DFS) as future therapeutics.”
“The above examples provide insight into the cutting-edge studies undertaken by GMU scientists to develop novel methodologies and platform technologies important to drug discovery.”

Women at the OPCW
From the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: “In this one-hour panel discussion, we will speak to four women leaders at OPCW on the importance of embedding gender equity and diversity in the culture of an organisation.”
“Starting with opening remarks by the OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, an International Gender Champion, to set the stage on how important it is to have people of diverse backgrounds in roles at all levels, including leadership, in furthering the mandate of OPCW. We will join our panelists to discuss their personal leadership journeys, learning experience, and advice on how to promote diversity and inclusion in a leadership role. There will be time for questions and answers at the event of the event.”
Learn more and register here. This event will take place on March 27 at 10 am EST.
Navigating Infodemics and Building Trust During Public Health Emergencies
“The National Academies will convene a virtual public workshop, April 10-11, to examine the history of public health infodemics, the impact of infodemics on trust in the public health enterprise, and tools and practices to address infodemics. This workshop builds upon a previous National Academies workshop on Building Trust in Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Science, and will go beyond what is known about risk and crisis communications to generate actionable, targeted insights that federal state, tribal, local, and territorial agencies and officials can take to prevent and respond to infodemics.”
Learn more and register here.
ICYMI- Webinar: Global Biolabs 2023 Report on Laboratories Handling the World’s Most Dangerous Pathogens
Watch the recording for this event here.
“On March 17, 2023, the Global Biolabs Initiative launched its latest report, Global BioLabs 2023, and released updates to its interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs.
With the global expansion of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, where the world’s most dangerous pathogens are studied, gaps in biosecurity and biosafety governance are widening. Since its inception in 2021, the Global Biolabs Initiative has tracked the proliferation of the highest containment labs, identified several key trends in their construction and operation, developed biorisk management scorecards to measure how well countries are governing biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research, and mapped the global biorisk management architecture.
The pace of BSL4/BSL3+ labs expansion is outpacing current biosafety and biosecurity regulations, and coordinated international action is needed to address increasing biorisks. In this webinar, Dr Filippa Lentzos, King’s College London, and Dr Gregory Koblentz, George Mason University, present the Global BioLabs 2023 report, describe key trends, and discuss recommendations for strengthening global biorisk management. The event also featured a demonstration of the interactive map.
In 2022, the Global Biolabs initiative partnered with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to relaunch the interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, which can be viewed here: https://thebulletin.org/global-biolabs/
Read the report and find more information about the Global Biolabs Initiative here: https://www.globalbiolabs.org/“
ICYMI- Cyberbiosecurity: The New Frontier of Counterproliferation
“On December 6, 2022, CRDF Global hosted a webinar titled “Cyberbiosecurity: The New Frontier of Counterproliferation.” The two-hour panel session featured cyberbiosecurity experts Randall Murch and Dr. Gemma Bowsher. Murch is a research lead for cyberbiosecurity at the Virginia Technical Institute and has been credited for the creation of the term “cyberbiosecurity.” Dr. Bowsher is a research associate and co-lead for Health Intelligence and Biosecurity at the Conflict and Health Research Group at King’s College London. Biorisk management expert Dr. Lora Grainger and Nathan Gwira, CRDF Global’s cybersecurity technical specialist, acted as moderators. Biosecurity Deputy Program Manager Urszula Velez was the logistics support leader for the event.”
Learn more and watch this event’s recording here.

Apply for the 2023 Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship
“The global norm against biological weapons cannot be maintained without youth voices being included in the multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Youth perspectives are key to create innovative solutions and generate long-term engagement. There are particular benefits to including the perspectives of young people from developing countries, where most of the world’s youth is concentrated.”
“Organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva in partnership with key international actors empowering youth in science diplomacy and global biosecurity, the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship provides a unique learning and networking experience into multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva.”
“Launched in 2019 as a Biosecurity Diplomacy Workshop, the Youth for Biosecurity Initiative is for the first time in 2023 providing the opportunity for 15 young scientists from the Global South to join an online interactive training programme prior to a field visit during the meeting of the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention in Geneva.”
Learn more and apply here by March 29.
Weekly Trivia Question
You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: “Before the infamous sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, Aum Shinrikyo attempted to use biological weapons. In July 1993, what agent did the cult attempt to spread from a cooling tower on the roof of their headquarters?”
Last week, our question was: “The Ides of March may have already passed, but this week’s question is still focused on classical antiquity: In about 129 BC, Manius Aquillius, a senator and consul, is thought to have ended an ongoing war in the Roman province of Asia by doing what to rebellious cities?” Florus describes in Epitome of Roman History how the notoriously brutal Aquillius poisoned the water supplies of several rebellious cities throughout Asia, including Pergamum. He wasn’t the only one to suffer, though! Adrienne Mayor, author of Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs, details in The Poison King: The Life and Legend of Mithridates how Aquillius was subjected to “a diabolical last meal for a glutton for gold”–execution by molten gold.
If you recall, a couple weeks ago we asked a trivia question about the murder of Georgi Markov, who reportedly was poisoned by a man who used a modified umbrella to push a pellet containing ricin into his leg. The Guardian recently covered a new Danish documentary on the life of Markov and the events that led to his death that can be accessed here.