Pandora Report 3.17.2023

Happy Spring Break! This week offers a mixed bag including coverage of the new Global BioLabs Report, many updates on and discussion of US pandemic policy, updates on the potential poisonings in Iran, and more. There are several new publications as well, with topics spanning South Korea’s COVID-19 response, the BWC Working Group, Russian disinformation, and more. As always, we have listed several upcoming events, professional opportunities, and a new trivia question.

2019 Biodefense Grad Receives Award from Institute for Defense Analyses

The Schar School recently featured Janet Marroquin Pineda (Biodefense MS ’19, Current Biodefense PhD Student) for her recognition by the Institute for Defense Analyses: “Marroquin Pineda, a 2019 graduate of the Schar School of Policy and Government’s Master of Biodefense program and current Schar School biodefense doctoral student, was recently awarded the 2022 David S. C. Chu Award for Excellence in Research at IDA. The award is presented annually to a research associate who has made outstanding analytic contributions in support of IDA’s mission to answer the most challenging U.S. security and science policy questions with objective analysis.”

Bonus-the Schar School piece was written by Biodefense MS Student Sophie Hirshfield!

Boom in Labs Handling Dangerous Pathogens Not Matched by Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulation

“The number of labs handling dangerous pathogens has risen to more than 100 around the world but has not been accompanied by sufficient oversight, raising biosafety and biosecurity concerns, a new report by King’s College London warns.”

“The Global BioLabs Report 2023 found the number of BSL4 labs in operation, under construction or planned has grown by 10 in two years, from 59 across 23 countries in 2021 to 69 across 27 countries. Three quarters of these are in urbanised areas exacerbating the impact of any accidental releases of pathogens.”

‘“We’re seeing rapid expansion of max containment labs in Asia but many of these countries score poorly on biorisk management,” report author Dr Filippa Lentzos said. “We found biosafety governance to be stronger than biosecurity, while the weakest component is management of dual-use research of concern.”’

“The report also highlights the rise in use of a new type of high-containment lab, known as ‘BSL3+’ or ‘BSL3-enhanced’ of which there are 57 around the world – mainly in Europe and most in urban centres. These labs adopt additional precautions when carrying out especially risky research, but there are few guidelines for what constitutes a BSL3+ lab and no evidence that the measures being taken in these facilities are adequate for the research they carry out.”

‘“We urgently need coordinated international action to address increasing biorisks,” says project-co lead Dr Gregory Koblentz of the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.”

“To address these risks, the report calls for:

  • Labs conducting high-consequence work with pathogens to adopt the international standard for biorisk management (ISO 35001).
  • Countries to incorporate current international biorisk management standards into their national legislation and guidance.
  • The World Health Organisation (WHO) to develop criteria and guidance for BSL3+ labs as well as guidance on field biosafety, and to establish collaborating centres for biorisk management for every region.
  • Countries to better leverage existing international biorisk management organisations to strengthen global biorisk management.”

“Dr Lentzos said: “There has been a global boom in construction of labs handling dangerous pathogens, but this has not been accompanied by sufficient biosafety and biosecurity oversight. Our new report documents for the first time the current picture around the world and sets out clear recommendations to help address current shortcomings that need to be implemented at the local, national and international level.”’

“The Global Biolabs project based at King’s College London began in 2021 and partners with George Mason University and The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Its new report scores the 27 countries with BSL4 labs on their biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research legislation and general implementation effectiveness. It shows the rapid increase in the number of BSL4 labs and says most of the increase is in Asia including India, Kazakhstan, and Singapore. It also identified trends around the size of the facilities and the level of personal protective equipment used in such labs.”

“For the first time the report also looked at ‘BSL3 enhanced’ and ‘BSL3+’ labs which it found are mainly used by public health institutions and universities, and tend to have a stronger focus on animal health research compared to BSL4 facilities.”

“The report also assessed biorisk management and governance at the international level and found that overall, biosafety governance was found to be much stronger than biosecurity. It highlighted how there are several informal multinational groups that emphasise biorisk management in their missions but lack authority and/or resources to mandate meaningful changes.”

“It also said that those international organisations that do have more resources, members and official mandates that could cover biorisk management place the issue lower down on their list of priorities and there are challenges achieving co-ordinated action and agreement.”

US COVID-19 Updates

House Backs COVID Origins Information Declassification

Last Friday, the US House of Representatives voted unanimously to require the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, to declassify information regarding the origin of COVID-19 in a 419 to 0 vote. The bill previously passed the Senate on March 1 with unanimous consent, so it is now awaiting signature by President Biden. This comes in the shadow of much controversy surrounding the Department of Energy’s updated assessment on the likelihood of a lab origin of SARS-CoV-2.

Biden Administration Requests $20 Billion in Mandatory Funding to Improve Public Health

President Biden’s budget request, released this Thursday, includes $20 billion in mandatory funding (available over five years) for “…the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of Health, and the Food and Drug Administration to support preparedness for pandemics and other biological threats.” Notably, as the end of the emergency declarations approaches, the administration did not request supplemental funding for COVID-19. GovExec explains further that, “For the CDC specifically, the budget proposal includes funding to support the agency’s restructuring, which it started in April 2022, based on issues identified during the pandemic as well as funding to improve public health data, which is something the director has told Congress the CDC desperately needs.”

End of Emergency Declarations Approaching

The COVID-19 Emergency Declaration that was enacted in March of 2020 is set to expire on May 11, 2023, marking a major shift in the federal government’s involvement and support for the ongoing COVID-19 response. In a recent brief for NACCHO Voice, Callahan and Ridley explained that “According to the CDC, as of February 2023, there are still over 200,000 new reported cases of COVID-19, nearly 2,500 COVID-19 related deaths a week, over 3,500 new hospital admissions daily because of COVID-19, and only 16 percent of the US population has received the updated booster dose. Although the Emergency Declaration is ending, COVID-19 is still very much present in our communities and still poses a threat to our health and well-being.”

Klotz and Sandbrink discussed what the end of this declaration will look like in a recent piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, writing in part “President Joe Biden’s administration announced that come May 11, COVID-19 will no longer be a public health emergency necessitating special governmental powers. Republicans in the House passed a bill to end the emergency immediately. And Biden himself famously declared the pandemic over at an auto show in September. Of course, no matter how many federal officials make pronouncements, the COVID-19 pandemic won’t be over any time soon. Trevor Bedford, a computational virologist at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle, told David Wallace-Wells of The New York Times that each year about 50 percent of Americans will get COVID-19 and 100,000 will die. The article was appropriately titled “Endemic Covid-19 Looks Pretty Brutal.” It will be, and society should be prepared to limit the carnage with better medicines, better vaccines, and better air filtration systems.”

Their piece covers a number of ways the US can help mitigate the severity of this situation, including reducing the number of hospitalizations and limiting the impact on the economy, through measures like embracing nasal vaccines, working to improve air quality, and navigating implementing effective but politically divisive measures like masking in public settings. They write in their conclusion, “Some strategies, like better medicines, will allow us to survive COVID. Others, like better vaccines and better air, could help quash outbreaks. Only time will tell if we will be able to ever rid ourselves of omicron and its subvariants. Others infectious disease threats could be looming, as well. H5N1 bird flu recently swept through a mink farm in Spain, raising concerns that the virus could mutate so it transmits more easily among mammals, including humans. That would be a potentially catastrophic development. The virus kills 50 percent of the people it infects. Far from being important only for taming COVID-19, new vaccines, therapies, and technologies may one day, unfortunately, be needed to thwart H5N1, too.”

Preparing for the Next Pandemic

Finally, if it isn’t clear by now, the start of the next pandemic is a question of when it will happen, not if it will happen. Dr. Tom Inglesby touched on some of the issues we might face when that does happen in a recent opinion piece for the New York Times. In it he explains: “Late last year, I participated in an exercise meant to play out what might happen if the world was presented with a new disease spreading quickly, with no warning…The exercise revolved around a number of simulated emergency meetings of the World Health Organization advisory board, called in response to a very serious new pandemic — a risk that the W.H.O. refers to as “Disease X.”’

“Among the exercise participants were highly experienced current and past health ministers and senior public health officials from nine countries. The urgent events required them to make hard policy decisions quickly, with little information. Each decision had huge consequences for society and for the course of the pandemic. This was how it was in the early days of Covid. It’s also how it will be in other pandemics.”

“Some of the smartest and most experienced international public health leaders had differing, sometimes opposing views on many fundamental questions about the response. Should they shut down travel in the earliest days? Should they close schools in the first affected countries? If a future pandemic has a much higher case fatality rate than Covid or if it severely affected children, should countries take different, stronger, faster measures to contain it? Top experts don’t yet agree.”

Furthermore, another key issue to successfully preparing for the next pandemic is not just recognizing how politicized public health is in the United States, but the negative impact this has had on the public health workforce. In a recent piece for Michigan Advance, Anna Gustafson writes about the difficult situation Governor Gretchen Whitmer and former Chief Medical Executive of Michigan’s Department of Health and Human Services, Dr. Joneigh Khaldun, faced. Gustafson writes ‘“I think in the very beginning I made a general assumption that if people were presented with the right information, and saw how this was impacting our society, we would come together and buckle down to prevent the spread of the virus,” Khaldun, who has since left her position with the state, told the Advance this week. “What I did not anticipate is just how political the pandemic response would become, and how that would hinder our response.”’

This points to a number of much deeper, systemic problems that simple public health funding will not be able to address, let alone in time for the next public health crisis.

“Navalny” Wins Oscar

“Navalny,” a documentary focused on former Russian presidential candidate Alexey Navalny, won the Oscar award for best documentary this Sunday at the Academy Awards. CNN explains, “The riveting real-life thriller follows Navalny’s political rise, his survival of an assassination attempt against him by poisoning and his subsequent imprisonment. Directed by Daniel Roher and presented by CNN Films and HBO Max, “Navalny” documents a methodical investigation by CNN Chief International Correspondent, Clarissa Ward, and journalist group, Bellingcat, to unmask Navalny’s would-be killers.”

Updates on Poisonings in Iran

Michele Catanzaro outlines what is known so far about this situation in Nature News, explaining “Iran’s government has arrested more than 100 people that it says are responsible for an unknown sickness that has affected potentially thousands of the country’s schoolgirls. Many are attributing the sickness to poisoning. As videos continue to emerge online of distressed young people being taken to clinics and hospitals, Nature spoke to toxicologists, chemical-weapons researchers, epidemiologists, political scientists and others to explore possible explanations.”

This piece addresses a number of facets, including the potential for the uptick in reported symptoms to be the result of the psychological stress fear of being poisoned can cause. Furthermore, on the topic of how these events should be investigated, Catanzaro writes “Researchers, human-rights groups and some governments say that an independent investigation is needed. Such an investigation would need the government to provide “access to health data, that are often extremely securitized in Iran”, says Behrouzan.”

This piece addresses a number of facets, including the potential for the uptick in reported symptoms to be the result of the psychological stress fear of being poisoned can cause. Furthermore, on the topic of how these events should be investigated, Catanzaro writes “Researchers, human-rights groups and some governments say that an independent investigation is needed. Such an investigation would need the government to provide “access to health data, that are often extremely securitized in Iran”, says Behrouzan.”

“A thorough investigation would include interviews with victims, toxicological tests, analyses of clinical histories, an epidemiological study and environmental sampling, according to researchers Nature has interviewed.”

““I would like to see an open discussion, with the clinicians that saw the girls speaking freely,” says Ward. “You have to bring the community with you. Community involvement for something sensitive is crucial for people to believe in the findings,” adds Hay, who carried out a process of this kind to understand mass sickness in Kosovo around the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia into separate countries2 in 1991.”

“Iran has enough trained experts and equipment to carry out toxicological investigations, says Hay. This capacity was built during and after Iran’s war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, during which Iraq used chemical weapons.”

Man Arrested in November Claims He Sought to Release a Virus at Schiphol

Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport has had a rough go the last year, but this culminated in November when a 55-year-old man was arrested at Schiphol Plaza after claiming he wanted to release a virus at Schiphol airport. The man was arrested as the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) responded when he entered the airport carrying a suitcase he claimed contained a jar with a virus inside, according to recent reporting from NL Times.

“A few weeks before the incident, the man had sent an email claiming he wanted to release a virus at the airport, the Marechaussee said. The Marechaussee briefed airport security about the man, so he was immediately recognized when he entered Schiphol Plaza at the end of November 2022. Marechaussee officers stopped and searched the man. He told them he had a virus in his suitcase.”

Ultimately, RIVM determined the jar he had contained no hazardous materials, and the officers involved were not in danger. The man’s motivation is still unclear at this time.

“How South Korea Avoided a National Lockdown”

In a recent piece for the Telegraph, Nicola Smith discusses South Korea’s approach to responding to COVID-19, highlighting the country’s ability to rapidly roll-out testing in the early days of the pandemic. She writes, “Testing was the key to Korea’s success, said Dr Jee Young-mee, head of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA), in an exclusive interview with the Telegraph last week. Mass testing, quickly deployed, allowed South Korea to save lives, avoid a nationwide lockdown and keep its economy motoring.”

‘“We thought quick action starts from testing. We need to know the confirmed cases very quickly then we can isolate and treat. With that we can contain the virus,” she told the Telegraph in the KDCA’s state-of-the-art headquarters – a sprawling campus of polished buildings an hour from Seoul that’s been the vanguard of the country’s pandemic response.”

Dr. HyunJung Kim, an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD program, focused his dissertation on this topic and has published portions of his research, including his recent Globalization and Health article-“Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea.”

In this article, Kim explains “Emergency-use-authorization (EUA) is the representative biodefense policy that allows the use of unlicensed medical countermeasures or off-label use of approved medical countermeasures in response to public health emergencies. This article aims to determine why the EUA policies of the United States and South Korea produced drastically different outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how these outcomes were determined by the originations and evolutionary paths of the two policies…Historical institutionalism (HI) explains institutional changes—that is, how the institution is born and how it evolves—based on the concept of path dependency. However, the HI analytical narratives remain at the meso level of analysis in the context of structure and agency. This article discusses domestic and policy-level factors related to the origination of the biodefense institutions in the United States and South Korea using policy-learning concepts with the Event-related Policy Change Model.”

He finds that, “The evolution and outcomes of the two EUAs are different because both policies were born out of different needs. The United States EUA is primarily oriented toward protecting homeland security against CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) threats, whereas the South Korea EUA is specifically designed for disease prevention against infectious disease outbreak.”

“Biodefense: Actions Needed to Address Long-Standing Challenges”

This new Snapshot from the Government Accountability Office discusses several ways the federal government can strengthen its preparedness for a biological incident. GAO’s recommendations focus on addressing challenges in the National Biodefense Strategy, strengthening biodefense preparedness activities, addressing biodefence technology issues and challenges in biosurveillance efforts DHS faces.

“Improving U.S. Biosafety and Biosecurity: Revisiting Recommendations from the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel and the Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Regulations”

This article from Haines and Gronvall was recently published in Applied Biosafety. Their absrtact reads in part “In response to a series of biosafety incidents in 2014, the White House directed two high-level expert committees to analyze biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories and make recommendations for work with select agents and toxins. Overall, they recommended 33 actions to address areas related to national biosafety, including promoting a culture of responsibility, oversight, outreach and education, applied biosafety research, incident reporting, material accountability, inspection processes, regulations and guidelines, and determining the necessary number of high-containment laboratories in the United States”

“Further work is needed to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories handling regulated pathogens (biological select agents and toxins [BSAT]). These carefully considered recommendations should now be enacted, including determining if there is sufficient high-containment laboratory space for response to a future pandemic, developing a sustained applied biosafety research program to improve our understanding of how high-containment research should be performed, bioethics training to educate the regulated community on the consequences of unsafe practices in BSAT research, and the creation of a no-fault incident reporting system for biological incidents, which may inform and improve biosafety training.”

“The BWC Working Group: Setting the Scene for the Organizational Meeting”

The BioWeapons Prevention Project recently published this report discussing the taskings and organization of the Working Group established at the Ninth BWC Review Conference last year. The piece explains in part, “The Ninth five-yearly Review Conference for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC/BTWC) held at the end of 2022 agreed on the establishment of a ‘Working Group on the strengthening of the Convention’. Although the Review Conference was unable to agree many details of how the Working Group might operate, the creation of the Group is seen by many practitioners as an advance on earlier arrangements for activities between Review Conferences.”

“What’s Next? The Ninth Biological Review Conference and Beyond”

Zhang et al.’s latest piece for UNIDIR discusses the recent BWC RevCon and what the Final Document lays out for the next five years. They write in part, “Biosecurity and biological disarmament cannot remain siloed and insulated from wider trends in the scientific and technological community. As biotechnology continues to advance, converge and spread around the world, interaction with stakeholders working on relevant technologies internationally will become ever more important for both biosecurity and biological disarmament. The Working Group provides an important opportunity to advance the BWC and re-shape relations with external stakeholders. States should seize this chance in setting up the Working Group.”

“Nuclear Security During Armed Conflict: Lessons From Ukraine”

Check out this new publication by Vitaly Fedchenko for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: “The attacks on nuclear installations in Ukraine by the Russian military in 2022 were unprecedented. Nuclear security aims at prevention, detection and response to malicious or unauthorized acts by non-state actors, not the armed forces of a state. However, an international armed conflict creates new circumstances in which a national nuclear security regime must operate.”

“In March 2022 the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) highlighted ‘seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security’ in extraordinary circumstances. There are three further areas in which the international nuclear security framework can be strengthened and prepared for extraordinary events, including armed conflict. First, there is a need to further clarify and plan the actions of competent authorities. Second, the IAEA may be able to assist member states in developing guidance for specific scenarios during extraordinary events. Third, there should be further integration of nuclear security with nuclear safety and emergency preparedness and response.”

“The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons”

New from the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, this piece explains the history of Russia’s involvement in CTR-backed disarmament efforts and its ongoing disinformation campaigns. The piece explains that “Moscow continues to push false information about biological weapons, without providing any credible evidence. Over a thousand members of the scientific community have signed a letter  penned by Russian experts  openly disputing the Kremlin’s claim, saying the work of peaceful biological research laboratories in Ukraine does “not imply any development of biological weapons or even the use of particularly dangerous pathogens in the laboratories. The list of destroyed strains published by RIA Novosti and other Russian media outlets contains not a single particularly dangerous strain.”’

“The United States’ peaceful cooperation and assistance activities comply with and help fulfill our obligations under the BWC. These cooperation and assistance activities have been transparent and designed to help countries detect, prepare for, and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Russia seeks instead to cast peaceful research to prevent disease in Ukraine and around the world — and the U.S. cooperation and assistance to support it — as nefarious biological weapons programs. The Kremlin’s biological weapons disinformation campaign aims to deflect, distract, and misdirect. Russia has a history of accusing others of doing what it is doing itself, and its recent biological weapons claims related to Ukraine are no different. The United States assesses that Russia continues to maintain an offensive biological weapons program in violation of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.”


Online Panel Discussions | 20 and 30 March 2023 | 13.00-14.30h CET

WHAT: The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is pleased to invite you to two online panel discussions on Lessons Learned for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Fifth Review Conference. They are part of a series of events the Institute is holding in preparation for the Fifth CWC Review Conference. The events will contribute to enhancing understandings of CWC Review Conferences and identifying lessons to be learned from past experiences. 

The set of speaker for each of the events will be announced shortly. The updated agenda can be found at: Speakers for these events include former Review Conference office holders, national representatives, and experts. 

The panels will be moderated by James Revill and will include a question-and-answer session with the audience.

WHEN & WHERE: 20 and 30 March 2023 | 13.00-14.30h CET | Online

PARTICIPANTS: UNIDIR encourages the participation of representatives and experts specialized or interested in issues pertaining to the CWC.

RSVP: The link to the webinars will be shared with registered participants. Please register here: For any questions, please contact:

Online Event: Discussion with Amb. van der Kwast About What to Expect at the 5th CWC Review Conference

“The Fifth Five-Year Review Conference (RC-5) for the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention will be held in the Hague from May 15-19, 2023.”

“At the conference, member states and the broader chemical weapons disarmament community will gather to assess past achievements, treaty implementation, and compliance, and discuss plans to strengthen the CWC in the years ahead.”

“You are invited to join a virtual discussion with Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast, the chair-designate for the Review Conference, who will share his hopes and expectations for the conference’s outcomes.”

“Paul Walker, the Chair of the CWC Coalition, will moderate. Amb. van der Kwast’s remarks will be followed by a Q&A session.”

“This discussion will be on the record.”

“This special event will be open to all members of the CWC Coalition, and other interested members of the public, journalists, and diplomats.”

This webinar will take place on March 21 at 11 am EST. Register here.

Book Talk with Dr. Katherine Paris on “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse”

“Dr. Katherine Paris, an alumnus of the Mason Biodefense PhD program, recently released her new book “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse.” Join the NextGen Global Health Security Network for a conversation with Dr. Paris to learn about her research!” This event will take place on Wednesday, March 22, from 7-8 PM. Register for the Zoom here:

Intelligence Studies Consortium

“On March 24, 2023, the Intelligence Studies Consortium is convening its third symposium, entitled New Perspectives in Intelligence Studies. This year, George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting. The symposium will be from 8 AM to 4 PM in Rooms 125-126 Van Metre Hall, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA. The closest Metro is Virginia Square/GMU on the Orange and Silver lines.

The symposium will feature student presentations in four panels:

  • Russia and China
  • Violent Non-State Actors
  • Emerging Technologies
  • Transnational Challenges

There will be an 8:30 AM keynote address from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Shannon Corless, and a lunchtime conversation with General Michael V. Hayden.

We encourage students to attend in person. We have also provided a livestream option for those not in the Washington DC area.”

Learn more and register here.

Apply for the 2023 Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship

“The global norm against biological weapons cannot be maintained without youth voices  being  included  in the multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Youth perspectives are key to create innovative solutions and generate long-term engagement. There are particular benefits to including the perspectives of young people from developing countries, where most of the world’s youth is concentrated.”

“Organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva in partnership with key international actors empowering youth in science diplomacy and global biosecurity, the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship provides a unique learning and networking experience into multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva.”

“Launched in 2019 as a Biosecurity Diplomacy Workshop, the Youth for Biosecurity Initiative is for the first time in 2023 providing the opportunity for 15 young scientists from the Global South to join an online interactive training programme prior to a field visit during the meeting of the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention in Geneva.”

Learn more and apply here by March 29.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). The Ides of March may have already passed, but this week’s question is still focused on classical antiquity: In about 129 BC, Manius Aquillius, a senator and consul, is thought to have ended an ongoing war in the Roman province of Asia by doing what to rebellious cities?

Shout out to Sophie H. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to last week’s question, ” In 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident, was poisoned with what agent?” is ricin.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s