This week covers the failure to reach consensus at the Chemical Weapons Convention Fifth Review Conference and the recent release of a Senate Republican-led probe into the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. New publications and upcoming events are also discussed, including recent congressional testimony by a Biodefense PhD Program alumnus and a new publication discussing the full economic toll of the pandemic on the United States.
Biodefense PhD Student Wins Boren Fellowship
Biodefense PhD Student Danyale C. Kellogg recently received a David L. Boren Fellowship from the Defense Language and National Security Education Office. Named after former US Senator David L. Boren, the Boren Awards provide students with funding to study languages and cultures deemed critical to national security in exchange for a public service commitment. According to the program, “Through a competitive, national, merit-based annual competition, successful applicants distinguish themselves as highly motivated in their academic and career goals and in their strong commitment to public service. In return for support, award recipients agree to work in qualifying national security positions for at least one year.”
Kellogg will spend one year in Taiwan studying Mandarin at National Taiwan Normal University’s Mandarin Training Center in Taipei. She previously earned a Master of International Affairs concentrated in China Studies and Pandemics and Biosecurity from Texas A&M. Her research is focused on China’s failed outbreak responses, particularly the inner-workings of the Chinese Communist Party and the broader implications of China’s rise for global health security.
To read more about this and other national awards won by Mason students-including several from the Schar School-this cycle, check out this article.
Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference Held This Week
The Fifth Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference was held this week in The Hague, a little over a year after the 25th anniversary of the treaty’s entrance into force in 1997. As CBW Events explains, “The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was the second treaty to globally prohibit an entire class of weapons of mass destruction but the first to do so with a system of multilateral verification measures. The CWC was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. Treaties are always shaped by the concerns at the forefront of the minds of the negotiators during the period they were being negotiated, making them creatures of their time. Yet treaties have to operate within constantly evolving contexts – from the scientific and technical to the political – and be able to respond to events. With that in mind, a common feature of treaties dealing with active problems is a review process in order to ensure they stay relevant and up to date in their activities.”
The evolving nature of the security environment and its effect on the CWC was the subject of much discussion leading into this review conference, particularly as this is supposed to be the last of the review conferences to deal with CW stockpile destruction. Issues with non-compliance, such as Syria and Russia’s use of these weapons, were also important points of consideration heading into the week. The review conference also had to address more mundane, administrative tasks regarding the OPCW’s day-to-day functions, particularly as its mission evolves.
However, in a potential sign of the fragility of multilateral disarmament, the week ended in a failure to reach consensus of the conference’s final report. Richard Guthrie recalls this, writing “Immediately after lunch, the CoW was convened behind closed doors in the main meeting room to take the procedural steps to forward the text resulting from the informal group to the plenary. Immediately following this, the plenary received an oral report from the Chair of the CoW who informed delegates that there were still ‘outstanding issues’ on which ‘fundamental divergence of views’ continue to exist and so it had been impossible to reach consensus.”
“The Chair of the Conference announced that the plenary would reconvene on Friday afternoon to adopt the report of the Conference which would reflect that no consensus could be found. The plenary was then adjourned.”
“The atmosphere in the room was one of surprise at the suddenness of the end of the process. Some delegates wandered around the room speculating whether anything could be done to retrieve the situation but it was clear that the challenges were too great.”‘
Summaries of each day’s happenings are available on CBW Net.
Senate Republicans Release Another COVID-19 Origins Report
This week, Senator Marco Rubio released the findings of a probe into the origins of COVID-19 initiated nearly two years ago. Rubio, the vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, led the initial probe and released the report through his office. The report claims that new information discovered by the team involved with this probe lends credibility to the “lab leak theory.” However, the report’s introduction explains plainly “To be clear, it is the aggregate picture that emerges from this report – not any particular piece of information standing as a proverbial “smoking gun” – which matters most when assessing the origin question.”
Later in the introduction, the report also reads “It is not the limits of science that constrain our understanding of the origin of SARSCoV-2. It was the political decision to block scientists from accessing the clinical and genomic data that would have allowed them to methodically reconstruct what happened. For this reason, we approached the origin question as a political puzzle, first and foremost, with a scientific component that is important, but not decisively so. This report borrowed a legal standard – the preponderance of the evidence – to assess what we know at this juncture, using the admittedly incomplete information we have available. Whatever its limitations, we trust that most readers will judge this report to be a useful contribution to the search for answers and accountability.”
In the end of its introduction, the report makes a hefty promise: “Risky research conducted at a state-run laboratory having inadvertently unleashed a novel pathogen, which then set in motion a once-in-a-century pandemic of almost unimaginable devastation, is a decidedly different and unprecedented problem with a path of culpability that leads unquestionably back to Beijing. When one further considers that this state-run laboratory was built to showcase China’s growing scientific prowess, and at least some segment of its research involved state secrets, it is not hard to imagine the extreme embarrassment and sensitivity that such a scenario would elicit in CCP leaders, even if the accident had not precipitated a pandemic. Needless to say, we do not yet know with complete certainty that a biocontainment failure was responsible for the first human infection of SARS-CoV-2, but what we present below is a substantial body of circumstantial evidence that supports the plausibility of such a scenario.“
The 329-page report is available here. An in-depth analysis of this report will be available from the Pandora Report next week. Our discussion of last year’s reporting from the Senate HELP Committee and the corresponding article published by ProPublica and Vanity Fair is also available here.
“Biological Weapons Convention: In the Crosshairs of Geopolitical Tensions, Part 1”
Filippa Lentzos and Tancredi Francese explain in this piece that “The Biological Weapons Convention has become an outlet for geopolitical tensions heightened by the war in Ukraine. This two-part article charts how the diplomatic battle between Moscow and Washington for control of the narrative on treaty compliance and verification is at a precarious point.”
The first portion offers an in-depth recalling of Russia’s efforts last year to bring allegations of BWC non-compliance before the UNSC and into the consultative meeting process. The second discusses the outcome of last year’s BWC review conference with the authors writing “Ultimately, it seems clear that Russia will continue to demand clarifications from the United States, at least as long as the war in Ukraine continues. These allegations and their impacts on the international security community are part of the conflict; they are not a side show but instead a dimension of the clash between two different visions of the world. In terms of biosecurity, imagining reconciliation as long as this clash continues seems difficult, and it risks significantly eroding what remains of the international architecture against the proliferation of biological weapons. If there is a lesson to draw from the events in 2022, particularly the review conference, it is that the BWC still matters for many. Even when interests were far apart, states were still able to negotiate and agree on an ambitious plan for the next several years.”
“Public Health Preparedness: Critical Need to Address Deficiencies in HHS’s Leadership and Coordination of Emergencies”
In this recent report, the Government Accountability Office found “…persistent deficiencies in the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) ability to lead and coordinate the nation’s preparedness for, and response to, public health emergencies. Specifically, HHS has consistently fallen short in five areas of an effective national response…”
These areas are:
- “Establish clear roles and responsibilities
- Collect and analyze complete and consistent data
- Provide clear, consistent communication
- Establish transparency and accountability
- Understand key partners’ capabilities and limitations”
The report continues, explaining “For example, GAO found that HHS has not
- developed clear roles and responsibilities, including exercising them;
- developed an interoperable network of systems for near real-time public health situational awareness, as required in statute since 2006;
- provided clear, consistent communication about disease outbreaks, including information about COVID-19 testing;
- been transparent when disseminating information during an emergency, such as the scientific reasoning for changes to the COVID-19 testing guidelines; and
- undertaken key workforce planning to meet its emergency planning and response mission and goals.”
“Sustained leadership and attention from the executive branch and Congress in this area is needed to ensure the systemic issues GAO has identified are sustainably addressed so that the U.S. is adequately prepared for future emergencies. A whole-of-nation multidisciplinary approach to preparedness and response is essential. HHS partnership and engagement with nonfederal entities, including state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and the private sector are key elements of this approach. GAO will continue to monitor HHS’s efforts in this area.”
“COVID-19’s Total Cost to the Economy in US Will Reach $14 Trillion by End of 2023 – New Research”
In this piece for the Conversation Jakub Hlávka and Adam Rose hash out the economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic on the United States. Their modeling suggests that, by the end of 2023, that cost will total USD 14 trillion. They discuss this shocking sum, writing in part “The COVID-19 pandemic’s economic consequences are unprecedented for the U.S. by any measure. The toll we estimate that it took on the nation’s gross domestic product is twice the size of that of the Great Recession of 2007-2009. It’s 20 times greater than the economic costs of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 40 times greater than the toll of any other disaster to befall the U.S. in the 21st century to date.”
“Although the federal government has now lifted its COVID-19 Public Health Emergency declaration, the pandemic is still influencing the U.S. economy. The labor force participation rate, which stood at 62.6% in April 2023, has only recently neared the February 2020 level of 63.3%.”
War on All Fronts
“It is now widely recognized that disease pandemics are a threat to national and global security. Yet the field of health security remains under theorized, in particular in its relation to civil and human rights. In War on All Fronts, Nicholas G. Evans provides a novel theory of just health security and its relation to the practice of conventional public health. Using COVID-19 as a jumping-off point to examine wider issues, including how the US thinks about and prepares for pandemics, He asks what ethical principles justify declaring, and taking action during, a public health emergency such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic; and arrives at principles that parallel those of the ethics of armed conflict. Just as just war theory properly understood begins with pacifism and a commitment to the right not to be killed and then steps back to ask under what limited conditions it is permissible to kill, Evans argues that in a similar way a just health security must also begin with the idea that public health should hold human rights sacrosanct and then ask under what limited conditions other concerns might prevail. Evans’s overall goal is to formulate a guide to action, particularly as the world deals with the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Turning to the transition from war back to peace in public health, he looks at reparation, rebuilding, and the accountability of actors during the crisis.
Available from MIT Press“
“Woke Virology? Ron DeSantis Finds Another Thing to Ban in Florida”
In this piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Matt Field explains “On Thursday, the governor signed a host of bills on hot-button issues-of-the-day among Republican politicians and voters, including one that would prevent research involving potentially pandemic capable viruses that result from “enhancing the transmissibility or virulence of pathogen.” The US Department of Health and Human Services is reviewing recommendations to tighten its requirements for funding such projects, known colloquially as “gain of function” research, but DeSantis has now leapfrogged any federal decision.”
‘“We are the first state in the United States to ban, formally, gain of function research,” DeSantis said to cheers from a Florida audience.”
“According to the law, “any research that is reasonably likely to create an enhanced potential pandemic pathogen or that has been determined by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, another federal agency, or state agency…to create such a pathogen is prohibited in this state.”’
NEW: Soft Launch of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Measures Database
From UNIDIR: “The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) National Implementation Measures Database is a searchable, publicly accessible database containing information about the national implementation measures undertaken by BWC States Parties. The database is designed to strengthen the implementation of the BWC, allowing States Parties, Signatories, and other stakeholders to better understand different approaches to national implementation from around the world and identify possible gaps and limitations in BWC implementation.”
“As part of the development of the database, UNIDIR’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and VERTIC’s National Implementation Measures Programme are organising an online event to introduce the tool and showcase its structure and functions.”
This event will take place on May 31, at 1 pm CEST. Learn more and register here.
ICYMI: Oversight And Investigations Subcommittee Hearing: “Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyberattacks: Examining Expertise of Sector Specific Agencies”
The House Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing this week titled “Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyberattacks: Examining Expertise of Sector Specific Agencies.” The hearing’s recording is available here. Among the witnesses was Biodefense PhD Program alumnus and current Schar School adjunct Dr. Brian Mazanec, Deputy Director, Office of Preparedness, Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, Department of Health and Human Services. A copy of Mazanec’s testimony is available here.
Nobel Prize Summit-Truth, Trust and Hope
Taking place May 24-26 this year in DC and virtually, this Nobel Prize Summit asks “How can we build trust in truth, facts and scientific evidence so that we can create a hopeful future for all?”
“Misinformation is eroding our trust in science and runs the risk of becoming one of the greatest threats to our society today.”
“Join us at this years’ Nobel Prize Summit which brings together laureates, leading experts and you in a conversation on how we can combat misinformation, restore trust in science and create a hopeful future.”
Learn more and register here.
Building Capacity for Dual-Use Oversight in the Life Sciences through the IEGBBR
Join the International Experts Group of Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulators for this virtual event on May 30 at 7 am EDT. This event will discuss “how to identify, assess, and mitigate dual-use concerns in the life sciences – two examples of oversight measures in a national oversight system”. Register here.
CSWMD 2023 Annual Symposium: WMD in the Decisive Decade
“The National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) invites you to join us on 14 June 2023 for the virtual Annual CSWMD Symposium, titled WMD in the Decisive Decade.”
“This year’s symposium will explore the cognitive impacts WMD has on strategic decision making and the challenges associated with operating in an environment where WMD has been employed. It will be an opportunity for the WMD community to engage with officials and thought leaders on current WMD challenges at the unclassified level, including keynote addresses by Richard Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and CWMD Policy and Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.”
“For more information and to register for this event click here. Please RSVP by 9 JUNE 2023.”
“We look forward to hosting you for the event. For more information about the WMD Center and reference our research, please visit our website at https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/ and follow us on Twitter and on LinkedIn.”
Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community
“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”
This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.
Weekly Trivia Question
You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: In late 2019, what two nerve agents were added to the CWC’s Schedule 1?
Shout out to Alexander G. for correctly answering last week’s question. Our question was: “On what date did the CWC enter into force?” The answer is April 29, 1997.
The Pandora Report 