This week focuses on the recent release of a ten-page declassified report on the origins of COVID-19 from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. New publications, an interview with a Biodefense PhD alumnus, upcoming events, and a new publishing opportunity are also covered.
ODNI Releases Declassified Report on Link Between Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Start of the COVID-19 Pandemic
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released a highly anticipated declassified report on the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic late last week. The report was released in response to the passage of the COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023 in March which compelled the IC to release within 90-days intelligence related to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). Specifically, the act required the IC to release intelligence covering reported WIV researchers who fell ill in the fall of 2019, any connections between WIV and the PLA, and coronavirus research taking place at the facility.
The act specifically outlines that “…the Director of National Intelligence should declassify and make available to the public as much information as possible about the origin of COVID-19 so the United States and like minded countries can–
A) identify the origin of COVID-19 as expeditiously as possible, and
B) use that information to take all appropriate measures to prevent a similar pandemic from occurring again.”
Naturally, the short length of the document and the lack of information outside of what was outlined in the law has attracted criticism. Furthermore, the report also doesn’t provide much in the way of new information or insight into whether the community has come to favor one possible origin more in the months since the Department of Energy assessed with low confidence that the pandemic began with a lab leak. All this has many arguing this further demonstrates a serious need to improve awareness and funding for pandemic response-related programs across the government, with NTI’s Jaime Yassif telling Vanity Fair “The fact that it’s proven so challenging to answer this question in a way that is satisfying to everyone highlights that the capabilities in the United States and internationally to resolve these kinds of open questions are very weak…We have a lot of work to do domestically and internationally to shore up our capabilities.”’
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists‘ Matt Field summarized the report’s contents, writing “The report, The Potential Links Between the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Origin of the COVID-19 Pandemic, disclosed a lot of information that has previously been reported about the virological research center in Wuhan, the city where the first cases of COVID-19 were detected in late 2019. Some biosafety standards and equipment at the facility were found to be lacking, including appropriate precautions for working with SARS-like coronaviruses and aging infrastructure. Workers at the lab had been ill at around the time the pandemic started. The lab held an incredibly large collection of bat samples, conducted genetic engineering experiments on coronaviruses, and conducted experimentation on making hybrid coronaviruses. Also previously reported, the lab had links to the Chinese military—reportedly for public health work.”
In addition to these criticisms and concerns in the United States has come alongside pushback from those working at the WIV in late 2019, particularly concerning allegations scientists at the lab were sick with a COVID-19-like illness at the time. Science reports ‘“The recent news about so-called ‘patient zero’ in WIV are absolutely rumors and ridiculous,” Ben Hu emailed Science in his first public response to the charges, which have been attributed to anonymous former and current U.S. Department of State officials. A WIV colleague who has also been named as one of the first COVID-19 cases denies the accusation as well.”
“Hu and two of his WIV colleagues were thrown into the furious COVID-19 origin debate on 13 June when an online newsletter called Public said the three scientists developed COVID-19 in November 2019. That was prior to the outbreak becoming public when a cluster of cases at the end of December 2019 surfaced in people linked to a Wuhan marketplace. Public’s report was quickly embraced by a camp that argues COVID-19 came from a virus stored, and possibly manipulated, at WIV, rather than from infected animal hosts, perhaps being sold at the Wuhan market. A Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article on 20 June that said it had “confirmed” the allegations against the three, without referring to any public evidence or named sources with direct knowledge, fueled the flames even more. Social media and other publications spread the charges—and the scientists’ names.”
Ultimately, not only did the report fail to include a “smoking gun” to settle the debate, but it also left many with more questions than answers about the IC’s ability to handle similar situations in the future and greater concern about the overarching state of the US government’s ability to effectively respond to pandemics.
“COVID-19, Religious Freedom and the Law: The United States’ Case”
Biodefense PhD Student Ryan Houser published an article with Acting Director of Health Law Programs at O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Andrés Constantin, in the American Journal of Law & Medicine. During his master’s program at Georgetown University, Ryan was a Global Health Initiative student fellow, and he conducted research under Dr. Constantin to provide legal analysis of the policies meant to curb the COVID-19 pandemic and their implications for religious freedom. During the COVID-19 pandemic, public health officials often exercised their police powers to combat the spread of the virus. The pandemic-related legal interventions which were meant to promote the general welfare of the public, in defense of common good, were met with legal challenges, especially in opposition to interventions’ impact on the exercise of religion. The aim of their piece was to contribute to future legal analyses concerning the balance between public health and religious freedom in the context of pandemic legal preparedness efforts. The analysis sheds light on an ongoing dilemma faced by the United States, and other countries, whether religious freedom should supersede the protection of public health. The article contributes to the ongoing discussions on pandemic legal preparedness and looks to guide future decision-making processes that protect public health.”
“Dan Gerstein – COVID, Bioterror & The Next Pandemic”
Tim Ventura interview Biodefense PhD program alumnus, Dr. Dan Gerstein in this video: “What can we learn from COVID, and can it prevent bioterrorism & future pandemics? Dr. Dan Gerstein, author of “Bioterror in the 21st Century”, provides insights into rapid disease response in the modern world.”
“Dr. Dan Gerstein is a National Security author with extensive experience in the security and defense sectors across a variety of positions. He is the author of numerous books on national security topics including leadership, strategy, technology innovation, arms control, immigration & border control, bioterrorism, and his latest title, “Assignment Pentagon”, published in 2019.”
“Dan’s remarkable career includes experience in prestigious past roles such as the Acting Under Secretary & Deputy Under Secretary for Science & Tech at the Department of Homeland Security, the Principal Director for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, a full career in the US Army, retiring as a Col., and several C-level executive leadership roles in the private sector.”
“Dan has a PhD in Biodefense from George Mason University, a MNSS in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, an MMAS in National Security from the US Army Command & General Staff, an MSOR from Georgia Tech, and Graduated West Point as an engineer.”
“Building Sustainable Infection Prevention in the Era of COVID-19”
In a recent article in Health Security, Dr. Saskia Popescu and Rebecca Leach discuss the importance of IPC as part of a holistic approach to healthcare biopreparedness. They explain in their introduction, “For years, many working in hospital infection prevention and control (IPC) and healthcare biopreparedness drew attention to the gaps in response and virtually nonexistent attention and funding that plagued the US healthcare infrastructure. IPC programs are responsible for reducing the risk of disease spread within a healthcare setting, but they also ensure education, training, epidemiological investigations of outbreaks, disease reporting and surveillance, and a multitude of other efforts to keep patients and healthcare workers safe.1 Unfortunately, IPC is often viewed as a cost center and not a revenue generator, meaning that these programs and departments have been inadequately funded and staffed.2 The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the critical role that IPC departments have in biopreparedness efforts for healthcare settings. Unfortunately, even the mpox (monkeypox) outbreak during this pandemic could not avoid the institutional hurdles that led to woefully inadequate support for IPC programs. As the world inches toward a sustainable approach to managing COVID-19 and a growing realization that infectious disease threats are only increasing, there are several key lessons learned and strategic shifts needed for continuous IPC programs and healthcare biopreparedness efforts.”
“Personal Protective Equipment and Personal Protective Technology Product Standardization for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain”
“The National Strategy for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain lays out the U.S. government’s vision to protect the health and security of Americans by ensuring a supply chain for personal protective equipment (PPE) and technology (PPT), medical devices, medicines, and other public health supplies that is resilient against disruptions from pandemics and other biological threats. Additional forethought and collaboration amongst policy makers, manufacturers, and users is needed to make PPE and PPT innovation, standardization, stockpiling, and use more resilient.”
“The National Academies convened a public workshop in March 2023 to explore innovative approaches and technologies needed to update and streamline the U.S. standardization system for PPE and PPT in support of supply chain resiliency. Discussions included ways to improve the effectiveness, safety, supply stability, and accessibility of PPE and PPT designed for use in health care settings, by critical infrastructure workers, and by the general public. This Proceedings of a Workshop summarizes the discussions held during the workshop.”
“Review: The UK Government’s Updated Biological Security Strategy”
CSR’s Shannon L. Green and Skandan Ananthasekar discuss the UK’s new Biological Security Strategy in this piece, explaining that “The United Kingdom released its updated Biological Security Strategy on June 12, 2023. The UK has long had strong capabilities for addressing biological risks, yet more than ever its national strategy now recognizes the potential for biological threats to have catastrophic impacts and seeks to continue expanding on lessons from and capabilities developed during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also recognizes that future biological threats can be defeated through a combination of scientific innovation and government leadership and coordination with public, private, and international efforts.”
“…CSR applauds the efforts of experts and leaders from across the UK government in shaping the Biological Security Strategy. The strategy is an important step in improving health security in the UK and internationally. There will now need to be sustained attention on implementation, in addition to political leaders fully backing what its nation’s top experts recommend.”
“Will Invasive Fungal Infections be The Last of Us? The Importance of Surveillance, Public Health Intervention, and Antifungal Stewardship”
Rodríguez Stewart et al. discuss the growing threat of invasive fungal infections and the importance of antifungal stewardship in this article for the Expert Review of Anti-infective Therapy: “The video game-turned-HBO show ‘The Last of Us’ is a fanciful representation of a zombie apocalypse caused by a fungal infection. Although Ophiocordyceps, the ‘zombie fungi’ featured in the show, do not infect vertebrates, the show serves as a reminder that many fungi can cause life-threatening invasive fungal infections (IFIs). Candida and Aspergillus species are the most common and well-known causes of IFIs, but at least 300 species of opportunistic human pathogenic yeasts and molds exist.”
“Each year, IFIs are responsible for over 1.5 million deaths globally and, in the United States alone, impose health-care costs ranging from five to seven billion dollars [1,2]. During the COVID-19 pandemic, rates of death from fungal infections have increased [3], and the burden of IFIs is poised to grow given the expanding population of patients living with immunosuppressive conditions (e.g. solid organ and stem cell transplantation), increasing antifungal resistance, and potential climate-change related expansion of the geographic ranges in which pathogenic fungi live. Despite the morbidity and mortality associated with fungal infections and their growing public health importance, we still have much to learn about their diagnosis and management. In this review, we discuss gaps and global disparities in fungal laboratory capacity including antifungal susceptibility testing, the paucity of fungal surveillance, and the importance of antifungal stewardship, all against the backdrop of increasing antifungal resistance and a limited armamentarium of antifungal therapies.”
“Cyberattacks on Hospitals ‘Should Be Considered a Regional Disaster,’ Researchers Find”
Jenna McLaughlin breaks down the growing threat of cyberattacks targeting hospitals in this article for NPR, writing in part “According to Allan Liska, a ransomware expert at the cybersecurity firm Recorded Future, the numbers of attacks against hospitals dipped slightly in 2022, but are so far on track to increase in 2023. Part of the reason for that, Liska explained, is that the ransomware ecosystem is changing. For years, small-time cybercriminals were paying ransomware gangs to access their attack methods and malware. Ransomware gangs have professionalized over the years, and had some measure of control over their affiliates. But now, many of those groups’ hacking tools have been stolen and are easily accessible online. “Those guardrails, such as they were, are no longer in place,” said Liska.”
“What to Know About Malaria After U.S. Cases Were Reported”
Sareen Habeshian offers a quick rundown of malaria basics and answers FAQs in this piece for Axios after “The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announced Monday that four people in Sarasota County, Florida, and a person in Cameron County, Texas, contracted the disease between late May to late June through local transmission.”
Online Conversations: Reflections on the Fifth Review Conference and Looking Ahead
With the Fifth Five-Year Review Conference (RC-5) behind us and the end of United States chemical weapons stockpile destruction approaching, 2023 is a year of important milestones for the CWC. We will meet to assess the past, present, and future civil society participation in the CWC.
You are invited to join us for a CWC Coalition virtual discussion on Wednesday, July 12, 2023 at 4 pm CET. Topics will include:
- A substantive overview of the Fifth Five-Year CWC Review Conference (if you missed it, here is the article from the June 2023 issue of Arms Control Today on the conference)
- A discussion of civil society engagement at RC-5 and what can be improved for future Conferences of States Parties
- Planning what is ahead: upcoming milestones, CWCC workshops, and other opportunities for civil society engagement
CWC Coalition Project Coordinator Mina Rozei will moderate a discussion on Coalition members’ thoughts on RC-5. Paul Walker, Chair of the CWC Coalition, will provide a brief update on the CWC Coalition’s work and upcoming plans for Coalition-organized events.
Please help us get your feedback by filling out this quick survey with your thoughts on the RevCon by Monday, July 10.
This discussion will be off-the-record. This session is open to all members of the CWC Coalition, and other members of civil society committed to supporting the goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Register here.
Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open
Registration is now open for the Global Health Security 2024 conference in Sydney, Australia. This iteration will take place 18-21 June, 2024. The call for abstracts is also still open. “The mission of the Global Health Security conference is to provide a forum where leaders, researchers, policy-makers, and representatives from government, international organisations, civil society, and private industry from around the world can engage with each other, review the latest research and policy innovations, and agree solutions for making the world safer and healthier. To that end, our mission is to help foster a genuinely multidisciplinary community of practice that is committed to working collaboratively to enhance global health security and eliminate disease, irrespective of its origin or source.”
Biorisks, Biosecurity And Biological Disarmament Conference
“Advances in science and technology are taking place at an unprecedented rate, making vital contributions to addressing major societal challenges. Yet, transformative developments in a wide range of fields can also pose risks to society. As such, it has become more important than ever to monitor opportunities and risks posed by advances in science and technology for the biosecurity regime. This cannot be done by any one actor alone, rather it will require collaborative efforts by states and stakeholders from civil society, academia and industry, along with other actors.”
“In order to facilitate multi-stakeholder engagement around biological security and biological disarmament, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are co-organizing a stakeholder conference designed to bring together actors from civil society, academia and industry, along with diplomats, to stimulate the exchange of ideas and thinking around how to build biosecurity and bolster biological disarmament. The event will provide an opportunity to discuss ongoing diplomatic processes and current and upcoming issues in the areas of biorisk, biosecurity and biological disarmament.”
This hybrid event will take place July 4-5. Learn more and register here.
Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community
“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”
This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.
Journal of Responsible Innovation – Special Issue Call for Papers
How Do Scandals Shape the Understanding and Practice of Responsible Research and Innovation?
“Scientific scandals are particularly important to our understanding and practice of responsible research and innovation (RRI). There is a shared belief that research scandals are most instrumental in shaking up scientific systems (Robaey, 2014) and a shared recognition of a rising frequency of research misconduct (Fanelli 2009, Drenth, 2010, Kornfeld and Sandra, 2016, O’Gardy, 2021, Roy and Edwards, 2023). Yet there is a dearth of systematic examination on how irresponsible research activities shape governance and scientific norms and on how we should engage with scandals or scandalous individuals responsibly and effectively to inform the future (Vinck, 2010, Owen, Macnaghten and Stilgoe, 2012, Meyer, 2022). This special issue aims to fill this gap. We invite empirically grounded and conceptually rigorous investigations on the mutual impacts of scandals and RRI.”
Key deadlines: 300 words abstract by 15 October 2023. Full papers by 31 January 2024
Learn more and submit here.
Weekly Trivia Question
You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: What 2002 book by Richard Preston, author of The Hot Zone, primarily focuses on smallpox and anthrax?
Our question was “What does “yellow” in yellow fever refer to?” The answer, as PAHO explains, is that “The “yellow” in the name refers to the jaundice that affects some patients.”
The Pandora Report 