Author: rachelpaigecasey

By Yong-Bee Lim, Biodefense PhD Candidate

Introduction

On May 28^th, the Council on Strategic Risks hosted a timely webinar to discuss The Future Bioweapons Threat: Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic. This webinar brought together a diverse panel of experts areas from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), film and media, biotechnology and data science, and public heath to discuss how the pandemic highlights existing gaps in addressing natural and potentially man-made biological threats; and understanding the obstacles and potential solutions to address future man-made and natural biological threats.

The panelists included the Honorable Andrew C. “Andy” Weber, Senior Fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks and the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs at the Pentagon; Max Brooks, the author of World War Z and Devolution, as well as a Nonresident Fellow at The Modern War Institute and the Atlantic Council; Dr. Alexander Titus, Chief Strategy Officer at the Advanced Regenerative Manufacturing Institute (ARMI) and Senior Fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks; and George Mason’s very-own Dr. Saskia Popescu, Senior Infection Preventionist and Epidemiologist at HonorHealth and Adjunct Professor at Mel and Enid Zuckerman College of Public Health at the University of Arizona.

The event was moderated by Dr. Natasha E. Bajema, Founder and CEO of Nuclear Spin Cycle Publishing and Senior Fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks; and Christine Parthemore, CEO of the Council on Strategic Risks.

Gaps in Biopreparedness and Biodefense

One main area the panelists and moderators focused on was understanding how the failures to detect, mitigate, and respond to COVID-19 may make a future biological weapon attack more likely. Mr. Weber warned how easily COVID-19 has spread through naval ships and other branches of the armed services, which enhances the allure of weaponizing biology to undermine operational readiness. Mr. Weber also argued that the cheapness and ease of developing biological weapons make them even more alluring in the modern day. These incentives, in turn, weaken deterrence against the use of offensive biological weapons.

Mr. Brooks echoed Mr. Weber’s thought and added how the superiority of U.S. conventional forces drives adversaries to find indirect ways to engage in conflict. Mr. Brooks noted that the ease of development and use of biological weapons makes it potentially attractive to use in a variety of situations – from deploying weapons at ports to shut down trade to even targeting American citizens to erode morale in the military.

Dr. Popescu expanded the conversation to include how the pandemic shed light on gaps in public health and its ability to detect, respond to, and recover from a large-scale bio-event. She highlighted how public health is expected to achieve the ideal (such as having testing every individual) in a reality where there are only a finite number of tests available, and a finite number of facilities and individuals to administer them. Dr. Popescu added preparedness is a difficult sell to senior hospital administrators since it requires private companies like hospitals to permanently assume additional overhead.

Dr. Titus discussed how the perception of technology as an end in and of itself, rather than a means to enhancing an organization’s mission, has slowed the adoption of emerging technologies like synthetic biology and big data science. These delays have significantly cost the U.S. in its ability to deter, detect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from biological events. Dr. Titus presented how the relationship between biotechnology development and application is not a one-to-one relationship: a biotech development that allows a more efficient way to produce molecules of interest in yeast cells does not mean that technology has to be limited to a single molecule of interest. Rather, he viewed investment and development in biotechnology as an opportunity to mitigate infinite threats with infinite capabilities.

Obstacles and Solutions to Future Biothreats

One major obstacle all the panelists discussed was the issue of sustained efforts and funding. All the panelists pointed out how money is thrown at an issue in any crisis setting. This includes biological events like Amerithrax in 2001 and the Ebola outbreak from 2014 – 2016. However, biodefense suffers significantly once the crisis passes and the funding streams dry up. Therefore, panelists argued that funding alone was insufficient to meet the biothreats challenges of the future – current and future Administrations need to consider biothreats a priority, with stable funding streams to match.

Mr. Weber highlighted his personal experiences as the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs during the Obama administration to display the bureaucratic and administrative complexities of addressing biothreats both domestically and internationally. He particularly emphasized a need to increase interagency communications and cooperation within the Department of Defense as well as other agencies to implement an all-hands approach to deal with future biological events.

Mr. Brooks saw a growing gap between citizens and policymakers as a major obstacle. Compared to the American citizens in the past, he viewed current citizens as disengaged from serious issues like biothreats and that this disengagement was encouraged, whether deliberately or not, by U.S. leadership. Mr. Brooks thought it was essential to bridge this gap, increase biodefense education, and cultivate buy-in from citizens if policymakers want to take concrete steps towards a safer world. He drew from his vast experience in helping shape the social consciousness to suggest making biodefense topics more tangible and impactful to the average citizen through fiction books, television shows, and movies, and recruiting influential celebrities as spokespeople for biodefense causes.

Dr. Popescu expressed concerns about communicating accurate information to the general public and a need to make this information that captures the general public’s attention. She also warned of potentially unscrupulous salesmen and armchair experts – individuals and companies that may exploit COVID-19 misinformation to sell “snake-oil” products ranging from sensationalist information to harmful cures, remedies, and cleaning agents to citizens. Finally, she strongly emphasized the need to discuss topics ranging from safer practices to operating in an ever-changing, uncertainty-filled environment as states begin to re-open after months of having citizens shelter in place.

Dr. Titus, along with other members of the panel, highlighted how inadvertent and deliberate misinformation is a major obstacle to getting buy-in and creating a plan of action to address biothreats. He, much in line with Dr. Popescu, noted that science communication alone is not sufficient to deal with misinformation campaigns on platforms like Twitter and Facebook. He asserted that disinformation spreads because it provides pay-offs to the recipient that factual information delivered in a dry, technical manner fails to deliver on. Compared to journal papers and books that experts often operate in, Dr. Titus noted that as little as 280 characters (2 tweets) is sufficient to sow doubt. Dr. Titus advocated for experts to find new ways to communicate with the public – new ways that do not require expertise to understand what experts are communicating.

Conclusion & Consensus

What is clear is the U.S. has a long way to go in addressing biological threats from natural and man-made sources. Further, the U.S. needs to adapt to new realities – a time where citizens’ trust of government is significantly lower, where citizens actively protest experts and their recommendations, and where misinformation is one tap on a smartphone away. And while the solutions are difficult to implement, the panelists and moderators of this timely webinar all believe that the end goal is worth it: a potential world where biological threats are a relic of history, as opposed to the unavoidable fate of humanity’s future.

By Stevie Kiesel, Biodefense PhD Student

On May 20^th, the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government hosted a webinar to discuss Public Policy in the Pandemic Age: How COVID-19 is Reshaping Our Government, Economy, and Society. Moderated by Biodefense Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz, this panel brought together experts in economics, presidential leadership, emergency management, and disease transmission to discuss public health response strategies; the economic impact of lockdowns and physical distancing; polarization; the role of state and local governments; and potential longer-term implications of COVID-19. Panelists included GMU Professor of Public Policy Dr. Maurice Kugler, GMU Associate Professor Dr. Jeremy Meyer, GMU Director for Extramural Projects Dr. Tonya Neaves, and Aerospace Physiologist Dr. Nereyda Sevilla.

Panelists described a variety of failures in the U.S. response to COVID-19, from the late implementation of physical distancing measures to insufficient testing capacity to inconsistent messaging and a lack of a coordinated strategy at the federal level. Dr. Mayer presented data on the number of tests being conducted per million people in a variety of countries; he found that low levels of testing in the U.S. blinded policymakers and scientists to the scope of the outbreak. Testing delays combined with uncoordinated federal messaging and a lack of a coherent national strategy set the U.S. on a path to failure that would see cases skyrocket at a rapid pace.

Dr. Kruger highlighted the economic challenges and dangers associated with lockdown policies that many countries put in place because they failed to enact physical distancing measures earlier in the outbreak. Lockdowns were meant to be used as a tool to flatten the curve, prevent a catastrophic surge of patients stressing hospital systems, and give the U.S. time to ramp up testing capacity. As many parts of the country prepare to lift lockdowns, the danger that the government did not adequately prepare during this time is high. As we saw recently in Wuhan, China when they emerged from lockdown, additional cases must be met with a massive testing capacity to contain a second wave. Dr. Kugler spoke favorably of the strategies implemented by South Korea, Germany, and Switzerland that involve massive testing and targeted care and isolation. While such a strategy has fewer drawbacks, particularly economic drawbacks, than lockdowns, Dr. Kugler believes that the U.S. does not have the resources, personnel, technology, and strategic vision to successfully implement a similar course of action.

Dr. Mayer makes the interesting point that, generally, in moments of national crisis, polarization is (at least briefly) reduced and the president enjoys a significant boost in his approval rating. Yet with COVID-19, Trump has had a noticeably smaller “crisis approval surge” than other presidents. Trump himself is likely partially to blame for this effect, because he has used the pandemic as a wedge to achieve political goals. His rhetoric has generally not invoked national unity, but has stoked opposition to his rivals. Dr. Mayer argues that polarization makes us more vulnerable and less able to recover quickly from a crisis. A point Dr. Kugler made seems to reinforce this idea—lockdown measures take a much greater toll on low-income Americans who are out of work and who have very few options to fall back on. How many of you reading this are teleworking? This “digital divide” is furthering the very economic inequality that has historically increased Americans’ susceptibility to polarizing messages.

As bleak a picture of our current situation as this may have painted, the panelists suggested steps the U.S. can take starting today to improve the response. For example, Dr. Kugler describes a testing strategy that would allow physical distancing measures to be relaxed. This strategy involves testing 23 million Americans every day, so that every American is tested on a roughly biweekly basis. While there are many questions about whether the U.S. can ramp up capacity and coordinate this level of testing, Dr. Kugler identifies five key criteria that will make such a policy successful: harnessing a wide range of laboratories’ capabilities, making data open source so that the private sector can fully mobilize, implementing robust oversight capabilities, establishing clear and effective lines of communication, and developing a strategy that defines a clear, simple, and achievable target.

Testing is just one part of the strategy the U.S. needs. Dr. Neaves highlighted the importance of state and local governments to this pandemic response; these leaders have stepped in to fill a vacuum left by the absence of national strategy and coordination. Dr. Neaves praised the regional partnerships that states have developed, and she argued that state governors should write an after-action report describing their successes and challenges, as well as those of the federal government’s. Such a report developed by a bipartisan group of governors will be key for improving pandemic response in the future and rebuilding the social capital and trust that the U.S. response to COVID-19 has eroded.

Finally, Dr. Sevilla made an important point about how the lessons we learned and the precautions we put in place because of COVID-19 could benefit the U.S. in unanticipated ways. For example, physical distancing measures, increased use of masks, reduced crowding, and increased handwashing could reduce the transmission of common pathogens, such as the flu virus. This prediction emphasizes the wide range of benefits that can be realized by prioritizing public health. Whether the U.S. next faces a natural or intentionally released outbreak from an emerging or well-known pathogen, broad-based improvements in public health infrastructure can bring benefits. The U.S. should prioritize improving laboratory capacity; bolstering state and local capabilities; helping medical systems prepare for a sudden surge in patients; and training in disease recognition the doctors and nurses who will be on the frontlines of the next outbreak.