The Pandora Report

Pandora Report 7.21.2023

July 21, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

This week covers the Biden administration’s formal move to suspend funding for the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the introduction of multiple health security-related bills in the US House and Senate. Recent publications and several new upcoming events are also included.

Administration Suspends Funding for Wuhan Institute of Virology

The Biden administration announced this week that it has suspended funding for the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), stating in a memo from the Department of Health and Human Services that the Institute ““is not compliant with federal regulations and is not presently responsible…”

Science Insider reports “A nine-page HHS memo made public by a House of Representatives subcommittee that’s investigating the pandemic’s origin suspends and proposes debarment of the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) “from participating in United States Federal Government procurement and nonprocurement programs.” In effect, this bars WIV from receiving U.S. government funding now and possibly ever. The memo says the suspension is necessary “to mitigate any potential public health risk.”’

However, the memo does not allege the WIV had anything to do with the start of the pandemic. The same piece explains “The new memo focuses on WIV’s disclosures around mouse experiments it conducted as part of the 5-year grant that EcoHealth received from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) in 2014 to study the risk of coronaviruses in China moving from bats to humans, possibly through animals sold at wildlife markets. EcoHealth subcontracted with WIV to conduct some of the research, including studies in mice with coronaviruses isolated from bats…HHS does not allege that the experiments created SARS-CoV-2, but faults WIV for refusing to share its laboratory notebooks and electronic files related to the experiment.”

Congress Introduces Two Bills Aimed at Protecting Bio and Health Security

Rep. Anna Eshoo and Sen. Edward J. Markey introduced bills this week aimed at improving American health security. Including the Health Impacts of Nuclear War Act and the Securing Gene Synthesis Act. The latter “would direct HHS to assess the uncertainties, risks, costs, and benefits of different regulations of gene synthesis products, and to require gene synthesis providers to enact screening protocols for their gene synthesis products. The legislation would also mandate any federal agency or entity receiving federal funds that buys gene synthesis products to only purchase them from suppliers who are compliant with screening regulations. Gene synthesis is a widely used technique to create DNA for applications such as research and drug production. However, there is increasing concern that gene synthesis could be used to create pathogens capable of causing a new pandemic. Requiring synthesis companies to screen their products would protect the public from dangerous synthetic DNA, while still allowing for scientific and industrial uses. The Securing Gene Synthesis Act is supported by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Federation of American Scientists, and the Institute for Progress.”

‘“This proposed legislation is a pivotal chance to both reduce the risks posed by gene synthesis while at the same time ensuring that responsible companies are not disadvantaged by doing the right thing. Many leading U.S. gene synthesis companies already voluntarily screen orders and customers, but they now bear costs that other less responsible companies don’t have to carry. By making this screening a requirement, both for the companies that make these products and for the users of these products in the U.S., Congress can reduce the risks that dangerous viruses will be made from scratch and can strengthen the U.S. economy in the process,” said Dr. Tom Inglesby, Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.”

Sen. Markey (along with Sen. Ted Budd) also helped introduce the Artificial Intelligence and Biosecurity Risk Assessment Act alongside the the Strategy for Public Health Preparedness and Response to Artificial Intelligence Threats Act. The former was also introduced in the House by Rep. Eshoo and Rep. Dan Crenshaw. It “…requires the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) to conduct risk assessments and implement strategic initiatives to address potential threats to public health and national security due to technical advancements in artificial intelligence or other emerging technology fields, including open source artificial intelligence and large language models.”

‘“As we navigate the emerging landscape of technology and its impact on public health and national security, the introduction of the Artificial Intelligence and Biosecurity Risk Assessment Act marks a crucial step toward identifying and addressing major new risks,” said Dr. Inglesby. “By establishing a proactive approach to address novel threats stemming from artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies, the bill aims to ensure our nation remains at the forefront of innovation while prioritizing the safety of the public. I want to commend this legislation as a very important tool in the efforts to shape a secure and resilient future.”‘

“Third International Summit on Human Genome Editing-Expanding Capabilities, Participation, and Access: Proceedings of a Workshop-In Brief”

“On March 6-8, 2023, at the Francis Crick Institute in London, the UK Royal Society and Academy of Medical Sciences, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Medicine, and UNESCO-The World Academy of Sciences held the Third International Summit on Human Genome Editing. A follow-up to earlier international summits held in Washington, DC, in 2015 and in Hong Kong in 2018, the third summit examined scientific advances that have occurred since the previous summits and the need for global dialogue and collaboration on the safe and ethical application of human genome editing. The first two days of the summit focused largely on somatic human genome editing, where the cells being altered are non-reproductive cells – as a result genetic changes cannot be passed on to future generations. The third day of the summit broadened the discussion to include heritable human genome editing, in which genetic changes could be passed on to descendants. This publication highlights the presentations and discussion of the event.”

“Policy Pathways to Combat the Global Crisis of Antimicrobial Resistance”

From the American Society for Microbiology: “Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a top public health threat and national security issue, projected to cause 10 million deaths by 2050. As antimicrobial resistance grows, it will create increasingly complex challenges in the hospital, the lab, on the farm and in communities. A multifaceted problem like AMR requires a multidimensional approach, and microbiologists must be a part of the solution.”

“Policymakers need to understand the key components to tackling AMR and carefully coordinate policies to save lives. This report lays out clear, science-based solutions that, if taken together through a One Health framework, will address this problem from every angle. As the leading organization advancing the microbial sciences, the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) has identified areas where policies should be strengthened, emphasizing the role that microbiology plays in assessing the challenges and creating solutions. This paper aims to provide concrete action steps that policymakers, working together with microbiologists, can take to turn the tide.”

Pandora Report 7.14.2023

July 14, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

This week covers the United States’ destruction of the last of its chemical weapons stockpile, COVID-19 origin Congressional reporting and hearings, and plenty of new publications, upcoming events, and announcements.

US Destroys Last of Its Chemical Weapons Stockpile

Late last week, the OPCW issued a press release saying “The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) confirms that the last chemical weapon from the stockpiles declared by all States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was verified as destroyed. The last chemical munition of the United States of America’s declared chemical weapons stockpile was irreversibly destroyed in accordance with the CWC on Friday, 7 July 2023 at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant in Kentucky.”

“I congratulate all States Parties, and the United States of America in this instance, on this major achievement for the international community. The end of destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles is an important milestone for the Organisation. It is a critical step towards achieving its mission to permanently eliminate all chemical weapons,” said OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias.

President Biden said in a statement: “For more than 30 years, the United States has worked tirelessly to eliminate our chemical weapons stockpile. Today, I am proud to announce that the United States has safely destroyed the final munition in that stockpile—bringing us one step closer to a world free from the horrors of chemical weapons.”

“Successive administrations have determined that these weapons should never again be developed or deployed, and this accomplishment not only makes good on our long-standing commitment under the Chemical Weapons Convention, it marks the first time an international body has verified destruction of an entire category of declared weapons of mass destruction. I am grateful to the thousands of Americans who gave their time and talents to this noble and challenging mission for more than three decades.”

“Today—as we mark this significant milestone—we must also renew our commitment to forging a future free from chemical weapons. I continue to encourage the remaining nations to join the Chemical Weapons Convention so that the global ban on chemical weapons can reach its fullest potential. Russia and Syria should return to compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and admit their undeclared programs, which have been used to commit brazen atrocities and attacks. We will continue to stand with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to prevent the stockpiling, production, and use of chemical weapons around the world. And together with our partners, we will not stop until we can finally and forever rid the world of this scourge.”

🔴 #OPCW confirms: All declared #ChemicalWeapons stockpiles verified as irreversibly destroyed.

The last chemical munition of the US' declared chemical weapons stockpile was irreversibly destroyed in accordance with the #ChemicalWeaponsConvention.

🔗 Read the full press… pic.twitter.com/PQpymyvO0k
— OPCW (@OPCW) July 7, 2023

Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Releases Interim Reports, Holds Controversial Hearing

The House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic held a hearing this week titled “Investigating the Proximal Origin of a Cover Up,” alongside the release of an interim majority staff report titled “The Proximal Origin of a Cover-Up: Did the “Bethesda Boys” Downplay a Lab Leak?” The interim report’s executive summary reads:

“On February 16, 2020, Dr. Andrew Rambaut, on behalf of himself and his co-authors, Dr. Kristian Andersen, Dr. W. Tan Lipkin, Dr. Edward Holmes, and Dr. Robert Garry, posted “The Proximal Origin of SARS-Co V-2″ on the website Virological. One month later, on March 17, 2020, ‘The proximal origin of SARS-Co V-2” (Proximal Origin) was published in Nature Medicine. “

“Proximal Origin expressed two primary conclusions: (1) ” … [COVTD-19] is not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus,” and (2) “we do not believe that any type of laboratory-based scenario is plausible.”‘

“Since Proximal Origin was published, it has been accessed 5.84 million times. Further, it has garnered the third most attention of any paper of a similar age across all journals and the second most attention of any paper of a similar age in Nature Medicine. Finally, it has received the fifth most attention of any paper ever tracked.”

“This is one of the single most impactful and influential scientific papers in history, and it expressed conclusions that were not based on sound science nor in fact, but instead on assumptions. The question is why.”

“Since April 2020, House Republicans, specifically the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic (Select Subcommittee) and the Committee on Oversight and Accountability (Committee), have been investigating the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.”

“This includes investigating whether government officials, particularly Dr. Anthony Fauci or Dr. Francis Collins, exerted any undue influence over Proximal Origin to wrongly downplay the theory that COVID-19 is the result of a laboratory or research related incident”

“As of July 11, 2023, the Select Subcommittee has received more than 8,000 pages of documents from the U.S.-based Proximal Origin contributors and conducted five transcribed interviews-resulting in almost 25 hours of testimony. This report is the culmination of that work.”

“On January 31, 2020, Dr. Fauci “suggested” directly to Dr. Andersen draft a paper regarding a possible lab leak of COVID-19. Dr. Fauci warned that if Dr. Andersen determined COVID-19 was the result of a lab leak, then he would need to contact law enforcement. The next day, February 1, this time on a conference call with 11 international scientists, and included Dr. Collins and Dr. Tabak, Dr. Fauci again suggested drafting a paper regarding a possible lab leak. It was these two suggestions that prompted Dr. Andersen to begin drafting. A draft of what would become Proximal Origin was completed within hours.”

“After publication, Proximal Origin was used to downplay the lab leak hypothesis and call those who believe it may be true conspiracy theorists. Dr. Fauci and Dr. Collins tracked the paper through the review and publication process. And finally, Dr. Collins expressed dismay when Proximal Origin did not successfully kill the lab leak theory. He subsequently asked Dr. Fauci if there was anything more they could do. The next day, Dr. Fauci directly cited Proximal Origin from the White House podium.”

“On January 31, 2020, Dr. Fauci prompted Proximal Origin, which’s goal was to “disproven the lab leak theory to avoid blaming China for the COVID-19 pandemic. Proximal Origin employed fatally flawed science to achieve its goal. And, finally, Dr. Collins and Dr. Fauci used Proximal Origin to attempt to kill the lab leak theory.”

“This is the anatomy of a cover-up.”

At the same time, the select subcommittee’s minority released their own staff report, titled “They Played No Role”…”Select Subcommittee Republicans’ Own Investigation Disproves Allegations That Dr. Fauci and Dr. Collins Suppressed the Lab Leak Theory Through the “Proximal Origins” Paper”. The report explains that “This Democratic Staff Report culminates a review of more than ten thousand pages of documents and transcribed interview testimony provided in response to Select Subcommittee Republicans’ requests to the “Proximal Origin” researchers. This report concludes, based on evidence provided to the Select Subcommittee to date, that there was no cover-up of the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and no suppression of the lab leak theory on the parts of Dr. Fauci and Dr. Collins.”

It also finds that “Contrary to Select Subcommittee Republicans’ Allegations, Dr. Fauci and Dr. Collins Made No Effort to Suppress the Lab Leak Theory During the February 1, 2020, Conference Call on the Novel Coronavirus’s Origins and Had No Role in Organizing It,” and “Contrary to Select Subcommittee Republicans’ Allegations, Dr. Fauci and Dr. Collins Did Not Seek the Publication of “Proximal Origin” to Suppress the Lab Leak Theory and Had No Role in Leading, Overseeing, or Influencing the Drafting and Publication of the Paper.”

The subsequent hearing was full of energy. The Washington Post documented much of it, writing “Let me categorically say that these allegations are absurd and false,” Kristian Andersen, a Scripps Research scientist and co-author of the paper, testified in prepared remarks. The “conclusions stated in Proximal Origin were based on scientific data and analyses by a team of international scientists with extensive track records in studying virus emergence and evolution,” he said. “None of this work was influenced by Dr. Fauci.”

The Post also highlighted one member of the majority’s quote: ‘“This is not an attack on science. It’s not an attack on peer review,” Rep. Brad Wenstrup (R-Ohio), the chair of the House select subcommittee on the coronavirus pandemic, said in an opening statement at the oft-contentious hearing on Tuesday. “We are examining whether scientific integrity was disregarded in favor of political expediency, maybe to conceal or diminish the government’s relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology or perhaps its funding of risky gain-of-function coronavirus research.”’

The saga also ruffled feathers off the Hill, with the same article explaining “The hearing also prompted bitter recriminations from the paper’s authors, who said they have been wrongly and persistently maligned. “This is a black day for science. This is no more than a McCarthy-era show trial,” Edward Holmes, an Australian virologist and co-author of the paper, wrote in an email to The Washington Post. “We’ve experienced 3.5 years of harassment and lies for the apparent ‘crime’ of writing a scientific paper.”’

These ongoing efforts by Congressional Republicans to investigate the work of virologists has many concerned about the long term impacts this will have on scientific research and collaboration, in addition to potential damaging effects on pandemic preparedness and biosecurity.

“THE RED FLAG OF EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION (EUA): Institutional Conflict Resulting in Different COVID-19 Testing Outcomes Comparing the United States and South Korea”

Dr. HyunJung (Henry) Kim, an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD Program, recently published this article in World Affairs. “This article points out that the U.S. EUA revealed limitations in its integration with public health surveillance, laboratory partnerships, and insurance systems, which hampered the rapid expansion of testing capacities during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is because of the divergent origins of Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) policies between the United States and South Korea. the U.S. EUA’s homeland security objectives were specialized to deal with highly pathogenic biological agents that could be exploited for bioterrorism. On the other hand, the Korean EUA pursues disease containment purposes to strengthen mass-testing practices. Thereafter, once the limitations of the EUA were circumvented, the testing capacity of the United States began to catch up with that of South Korea, and later skyrocketed after solving these issues.”

“Schar School Scholar Warns of Existential Threats to Humanity by Terrorists”

The Schar School recently published this piece about Zachary Kallenborn, a policy fellow at the school whose research focuses on artificial intelligence, drones, and “how terrorists might use these emerging technologies to wipe out humanity”. The article explains “The rapidly circulating peer-reviewed study that has gripped the media describes existential terrorism as the desire to inflict damage of a magnitude so catastrophic that it threatens humanity’s survival. Even if the likelihood of such an event is minor, Kallenborn said it is vital to ask, “What if terrorists wanted to destroy all of humanity—what would that look like?” Most terrorists, he noted, are likely not interested in humanity’s annihilation “because [they] have constituencies and things they want to achieve.” Still, the possibility lingers.” Read more here.

“Future of the Nation’s Laboratory Systems for Health Emergency Response”

“The National Academies Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies and Forum on Microbial Threats cohosted a two-day public workshop in March 2023 to explore U.S. laboratory and testing responses to past, present, and potential health emergencies (e.g., COVID-19, monkey pox, chemical, radiological or nuclear threats). Speakers addressed the future of laboratory capabilities, capacities, and coordination for national health emergencies response across public and private entities. The workshop culminated with a discussion envisioning the ideal structure, characteristics, components, capabilities, and functions of what could be considered a coordinated national laboratory system, a coordinated system of public and private laboratories, manufacturers, pharmacies, and other entities, that is prepared to respond to future public health threats and emergencies. This Proceedings of a Workshop-in Brief summarizes the discussions held during the workshop.”

“Artificial Intelligence: Possible Risks and Benefits for BWC and CWC”

CBWNet recently released this working paper in which they explain, “Artificial intelligence (AI) is an emerging technology with a dual-use character. Concerns have been raised that some of its applications in life sciences can be misused by nefarious actors for the development of biological and chemical weapons, prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Areas of AI applications relevant to the BWC and CWC include rational drug design, retrosynthesis planning, and synthetic biology. Research in such areas might also unintentionally produce knowledge, products, or technologies that could be used by others to cause harm.”

“Most of the current limitations in the AI field will likely be overcome in the near future with the emergence of more efficient algorithms and the increasing amount and accessibility of the reported data. The threat landscape is also shaped by the availability of a great number of open-source tools to develop the respective AI-based computational tools “from scratch”. Therefore, a comprehensive legally binding framework is required to regulate AI in the context of biosecurity. The current solutions such as e.g. “Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence” of the EU (“AI Act”) are not sufficient to adequately address the biosecurity risks posed by some of the AI applications in life sciences. Last but not least, AI itself can play a role in strengthening biosecurity by expediting the development of vaccines and antidotes, introducing and improving detection methods, and supporting the implementation of BWC and CWC.”

“COVID-19: GAO Recommendations Can Help Federal Agencies Better Prepare for Future Public Health Emergencies”

From GAO: “The nation is still recovering from the public health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and needs to be ready for future emergencies.”

“In this report, we summarize our newer recommendations in key areas, including public health preparedness and the distribution of federal assistance. We also update our data on COVID-19 funds spent.”

“We’ve regularly reported on the federal government’s $4.7 trillion pandemic response since 2020. As of April 2023, we’ve made 386 recommendations to 26 federal agencies and 19 suggestions to Congress to strengthen response and preparedness. About 45% of those have been fully or partially addressed.”

“A Strategic Challenge: A Peddling Peril Index Analysis of Countries’ Restricted Russia Trade”

David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso discuss ways to mitigate Russia’s violations of sanctions and export controls in this report for the Institute for Science and International Security. They find, among other things, that “More action is needed to thwart Russia’s illicit acquisition of goods. The mature export control systems in many states provide a sound basis to create more effective tools to act against Russia’s threat to the system of international trade and security. At the same time, these countries can press nations with inadequate transshipment controls to both improve them and participate more actively in thwarting Russia’s illicit trade.”

“Funding Global Health Engagement to Support the Geographic Combatant Commands”

From RAND: “The combined challenges that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) faces in addressing the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and preparing for a potential conflict with a near-peer adversary have made the need to protect the health and safety of U.S. forces more acute. Global health engagement (GHE) provides an important mechanism to work with allies and partners to develop their medical capacity and medical support capabilities and improve U.S. interoperability with allies and partners to help ensure U.S. force protection and medical readiness. Although the defense community has a broad remit to engage in global health activities with partner nations for the purpose of improving the health and safety of U.S. warfighters, it has not integrated GHE into combatant command operational or security cooperation planning, nor has it provided consistent funding for these activities.”

“In this report, the authors identify the evolving GHE priorities of five of the six geographic combatant commands (GCCs) and the challenges they face supporting combatant command objectives with current sources of funding. They reviewed the relevant GHE instructions and policies and engaged in discussion with more than 75 DoD policy and service leaders and members of the medical community in five GCCs and their service components, as well as members of the policy, legal, and financial communities across DoD. Based on these discussions and a series of follow-up group discussions, they propose several courses of action for providing more-targeted resources to conduct GHE activities in support of GCC objectives.”

“Narratives of the Middle East WMD-Free Zone: Drivers, Themes and Historical Accounts”

From UNIDIR: “The quest to establish a Zone free of nuclear weapons and, subsequently, all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East has spanned nearly 50 years. While notable progress has been made, a treaty for such a Zone still remains a distant objective.”

“This study chronicles the narratives of key stakeholders – the Arab states, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America – who have been closely involved in Zone-related processes since 1974. By distilling insights from these narratives, the study uncovers major drivers and themes that underlie the behaviour of these stakeholders toward the Zone. Additionally, it provides a comprehensive historical account of important Zone-related processes and events from all of these perspectives.”

“The study draws upon information gathered through more than 80 interviews conducted with current and former officials as well as experts from over 20 states and regional and international organizations that have played significant roles in Zone-related processes. It also incorporates primary sources from UNIDIR’s Documents Depository.”

“The insights presented in this study offer a deeper understanding of the experiences and perspectives of contemporary witnesses involved in the ME WMDFZ issue throughout its history. The narratives shed light on how various stakeholders have perceived and interpreted historical events, revealing their diverse motivations, objectives, and perspectives assigned to other stakeholders, emphasizing the complexity and multifaceted nature of the Zone.”

“By identifying differing accounts and uncovering points of convergence, divergence, and misunderstanding about historical events, these narratives identify areas that require further dialogue and cooperation to bridge gaps and foster mutual understanding.”

“Cyber-Biosecurity: How Can India’s Biomedical Institutions Develop Cyber Hygiene?”

Shruti Sharma explains key cyber threats facing India’s biomedical institutions in this piece for Carnegie India, writing “Last year, cyber attacks exposed the increasing vulnerability of India’s biomedical institutions. This article serves as a primer for how such institutions can ensure the cybersecurity of their organizations.”

Release of the 2023 Nuclear Security Index

“Join NTI Co-Chair and CEO Ernest J. Moniz for the release of the 2023 NTI Nuclear Security Index—a comprehensive assessment of nuclear and radiological security across 175 countries and Taiwan.”

“The 2023 NTI Index provides new data-driven insights and recommendations on nuclear security trends at a critical time as nuclear materials and facilities face an array of dangers—from theft and sabotage to powerful storms fueled by climate change, and as made painfully clear over the past year-and-a-half, to global instability and active assaults from countries.”

“The NTI Index, developed by NTI and Economist Impact, uses publicly available information to track progress and recommend actions for governments, regulators, international institutions, industry, and civil society to take to better protect nuclear and radioactive materials and nuclear facilities around the world.”

This event will take place on July 18 at 10 am EDT. Streaming is available through YouTube. Learn more and register here.

Encouraging Congressional Action on Dual-Use Bioscience Research of Concern

This event will take place on July 25 at 12 pm EDT in 2044 Rayburn House Office Building. Register here.

PNNL-The Advancing Threat Agnostic Biodefense Webinar Series: Advances in Functional-Based Assays for Detection of Novel Pathogens

This event will take place on July 25 at 12 pm PT. Register here.

In-Person Event (July 26): Demystifying Russia’s Tactical Nukes and Raising the West’s Nuclear IQ

Learn more and register here.

Summer Certificate Course on Combating Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trade: A Focus on the Americas

Learn more and register here.

Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open

Call for Experts – Technical Advisory Group on Genomics

Deadline: 16 July 2023

“The World Health Organization (WHO) is seeking experts to serve as members one of the Technical Advisory Group on Genomics. This “Call for experts” provides information about the advisory group in question, the expert profiles being sought, the process to express interest, and the process of selection.”

Read the call here.

Now Hiring: Chief Strategy & Bioeconomic Development Officer

Learn more and apply here.

7th Annual Next Generation for Biosecurity Competition Open for Applications

“Winners of the Biosecurity Competition will be awarded the following:

Online publication of their paper on the NTI website
The opportunity of travel to, attend, and present during a side event at a prestigious international biosecurity event, such as the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties”

Learn more here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: What were 18th century British officers in India and other tropical areas prescribed to prevent malaria infections?

Shout out to Josh W. for correctly answering our trivia question last week! Our question was “The spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (commonly known as mad cow disease) to humans is believed to cause what disease?” The answer is variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (vCJD), commonly referred to as “human mad cow disease.”

Pandora Report 7.7.2023

July 7, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

The summer heat is in full effect for many of us, but you can take a minute to cool off while you read this week’s newsletter. This edition covers the findings of the OPCW’s fact-finding mission in Kharbit Massasneh, Syria, the introduction of the Disease X Act of 2023 and a move to reauthorize the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act in the Senate, and recent reporting on infectious disease-related consequences of climate change. New publications and other content, upcoming events, and more are also included. ☀️☀️☀️

OPCW Announces Conclusion of Fact-Finding Mission in Kharbit Massasneh, Syria

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons announced this week that its Fact-Finding Mission “…concluded that there are no reasonable grounds to determine that chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incidents which occurred in Kharbit Massasneh on 7 July 2017 and 4 August 2017.”

OPCW explained the situation further, writing “On 26 October 2017, the Syrian Arab Republic reported to the OPCW Technical Secretariat a “mortar attack with poisonous gas” on positions of the Syrian Arab Army in Kharbit Massasneh resulting in several casualties among soldiers. The Syrian Arab Republic requested the Technical Secretariat to investigate both incidents.”

“The FFM obtained information regarding the incidents from different sources, including interviews with witnesses, videos, and photographs of medical records. In addition, the FFM exchanged correspondence and held meetings with the Syrian Arab Republic to clarify inconsistencies observed in the course of its investigation.”

“Based on the examination of all data obtained and collected and on the analysis of all evidence taken as a whole, the FFM concludes that there are no reasonable grounds to determine that chemicals were used as a weapon in any of the two reported incidents.”

“The FFM report was shared with States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as well as transmitted to the United Nations Security Council through the UN Secretary-General.”

The full report is available here.

Happenings On the Hill

Senators Baldwin and Tillis introduce Disease X Act of 2023

Last week, Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) and Thom Tillis (R-NC) introduced the Disease X Act of 2023 in the US Senate after it was introduced in the House last month. As Sen. Baldwin’s office notes, “The Disease X Act of 2023 protects Americans by establishing a Disease X Medical Countermeasures Program at the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) by:

Providing funding of $40 million per year for five years specifically for Disease X MCMs;
Clarifying the HHS may award contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements, or enter into other transactions, to promote the development of Disease X MCMs;
Directing BARDA to accelerate and support the advanced research, development, and procurement of countermeasures and products to address Disease X threats; and
Requiring products developed using funding from the Disease X Program be substantially manufactured in the United States.”

“The Disease X Act of 2023 has been supported by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Biotechnology Innovation Organization, Infectious Diseases Society of America, Dr. Caroline Schuerger, Research Fellow, Georgetown Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Dr. Steph Batalis, Research Fellow, Georgetown Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Ginkgo Bioworks, Institute for Progress (IFP), Big Cities Health Coalition, FluGen Inc., US Biologic, Inc., Vir Biotechnology, The Gerontological Society of America, Helix, New Orleans BioInnovation Center, American Society for Microbiology, The Medical Countermeasures Coalition, 1Day Sooner, and Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Director, Biodefense Graduate Program, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University.”

Senate HELP Committee Release Staff-Level Discussion Draft to Reauthorize Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act

This week, the staffs of Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) (Chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee), Senator Bill Cassidy (R-LA) (Ranking Member of the HELP Committee), and Senators Bob Casey (D-PA) and Mitt Romney (R-UT) released and are seeking feedback on a staff-level bipartisan discussion draft to reauthorize the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA).

According to the same press release, “Outside of the staff-level agreement, the Chair’s staff is requesting feedback on policy to require that all BARDA and CDC-supported products be sold to the Federal Government or in the U.S. commercial market at the lowest price among G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) and at a reasonable price. Brackets surrounding this provision in Title VI – Additional Policies Outside the Staff Agreement for Stakeholder Feedback – indicate that this policy has not been agreed to.”

“Also outside of the staff-level agreement, the Ranking Member’s staff is requesting feedback on policy to incentivize the development of more medical countermeasures (MCMs) by extending the Priority Review Voucher program through the duration of PAHPA and (1) providing a new, non-transferrable priority review voucher to companies that develop new MCMs on top of the transferrable voucher they currently receive; and (2) including threats to the Armed Forces. Brackets surrounding this provision in Title VI – Additional Policies Outside the Staff Agreement for Stakeholder Feedback – indicate that this policy has not been agreed to.”

“The Senate HELP Committee is requesting comments on the discussion draft. Comments must be submitted to PAHPA2023Comments@help.senate.gov by Monday, July 10, at 10:00 a.m. ET, to be considered.”

“Last month, the HELP Committee held a hearing to consider the reauthorization of PAHPA and heard from experts including Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Dawn O’Connell, CDC Director Rochelle Walensky, and FDA Commissioner Robert Califf.”

The full text of the draft is available here.

Worse Than High A/C Bills…Mosquitoes Are Thriving as Incidences of Certain Diseases Increase

With global hottest day records recently broken and frustration over experiencing climate change in action at a high, concerns about mosquitoes and a number of infectious disease are also rising. CNN reported this week “For the first time in decades, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is warning of several locally acquired cases of malaria in the United States – news that has thrust mosquitoes into the spotlight. While it’s too soon to know whether these specific cases are connected to climate change, scientists have been warning that malaria could become more common in the US as temperatures rise there.”

“There have been locally spread outbreaks in Texas, Florida, Hawaii and Arizona. And last week, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control warned that the Aedes albopictus species – which can transmit dengue and chikungunya – is pushing northwards and westwards in Europe as climate change grips the world’s fastest warming continent.”

“This is a photograph depicting a female, *Aedes aegypti* mosquito, after taking her blood meal. *Ae. aegypti* is also known as the yellow fever mosquito.”| Credit: CDC PHIL

On a related note, MRI Global also recently posted a featured news piece discussing the spread of five disease drive by climate change, covering Sin Nombre virus, schistosomiasis, malaria, Lyme disease, and Valley fever. They explain in their introduction, “With recent changes in weather toward warm and humid conditions as a result of changes in climate, infectious diseases that are spread to humans through nonhuman vectors are candidates for changes in their geographic location. These changes will potentially affect the ability of those vectors to survive, both increasing and decreasing areas of disease prevalence. To address these vectors and resulting emerging infectious diseases, it is necessary to utilize AI/ML and “team science” across a variety of areas like infectious disease surveillance, animal-human-plant health, ecology, and the environment.”

They conclude with “While the multifaceted effects of climate change are complex, one of them is believed to be the increased incidence of infectious diseases. A team science approach is necessary to help mitigate the threat. “

“A New U.S. Foreign Policy for Global Health”

From CFR: ‘“The United States should, at long last, treat pandemics and global warming as [major] threats to its national interests—especially the vital interests of security and economic power,” argues Senior Fellow for Global Health and Cybersecurity David P. Fidler in a new Council Special Report. The United States needs “a new foreign policy on global health that protects those national interests through pandemic preparedness and climate adaptation strategies.”’

“The report, A New U.S. Foreign Policy for Global Health: COVID-19 and Climate Change Demand a Different Approach, examines U.S. global health policy before and during COVID-19 to identify why the United States failed “to protect vital national interests, develop public and global health capabilities, and maintain domestic and global solidarity against health threats.”’

‘“The United States,” Fidler writes, “was unprepared for a pandemic and is not ready for climate change—despite global health involvement, warnings about both threats, and no competition from authoritarian countries for global health leadership.”’

“Warning that “U.S. foreign policy on global health faces the worst domestic and international conditions it has ever encountered,” Fidler argues that a “new strategy for U.S. foreign policy on global health is needed to address the security, capability, and solidarity failures that COVID-19 and climate change have exposed.”’

“One Health High-Level Expert Panel Annual Report 2022”

From WHO: “This second annual report summarizes the activities and results achieved by the One Health High-Level Expert Panel (OHHLEP) during the year 2022, according to the updated work plan agreed by the Quadripartite Partners in 2021. The report highlights main outputs and deliverables produced by OHHLEP over the calendar year 2022.”

“2023 Emerging Technologies and Scientific Innovations: A Global Public Health Perspective”

From WHO: “This publication presents the findings of a global horizon scan of innovations in science and technology that could help solve global health challenges. An expert group scored over 100 innovations for their potential impact and the chance of wide adoption within 5, 5–10 or > 10 years. They also discussed enablers that would facilitate adoption of the innovations.”

“Animal Markets and Zoonotic Disease in the United States”

This recent report from the Brooks McCormick Jr. Animal Law & Policy Program at Harvard Law School and the Center for Environmental & Animal Protection at New York University challenges assumptions and assesses the threats human-animal interactions pose to American public health. The authors explain in their introduction, “At the end of this discussion, we are left with the uneasy but unavoidable conclusion that, at present, the United States has no comprehensive strategy to mitigate zoonotic risk. While zoonotic risk cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced. Closer examination of these policy insights may foster ideas regarding how regulation can be better conceptualized and designed both to reflect and reduce such risk. This report provides a springboard for such conversations and begins laying the groundwork for much-needed reform. Recognizing the risks is an important first step, for only then will we be able to make clear-eyed appraisals of whether each practice is worth the danger it poses and what might be done to tip the scales in favor of prevention.”

“Pull Incentives for High-Value Antimicrobials”

From the Council of Canadian Academies: “Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a serious health threat with the potential to become a full-blown crisis as treatment options dwindle. In Canada, 26% of infections are resistant to the medicines generally first prescribed to treat an infection, a rate that could rise to 40% or beyond in the coming decades (see When Antibiotics Fail).“

“Timely, secure, and stable access to effective antimicrobials will be essential to mitigate future infectious disease pandemics and AMR. However, new antimicrobials have limited profitability because to curb resistance development, they are intended to be used sparingly ― in severe cases as a treatment of last resort.”

“Due to poor returns on investment and other barriers, traditional market forces alone are not enough to ensure the commercial launch and market sustainability of new antimicrobials in Canada. Economic pull incentives offer one method through which high-value antimicrobials ― those used to treat infections in humans for which there are no or few other options ― may be introduced and remain available in the Canadian market.”

What We’re Watching 🍿

“MATCH Demonstrated How DLT Can Reconcile Discrepancies in International Trade of Dual-Use Chemicals”

From the Stimson Center: “Discrepancies in declared trade of dual-use chemicals controlled under the Chemical Weapons Convention are a challenge for national authorities and chemical industry to reconcile.”

“This animated video provides an overview of the Stimson Center’s Monitoring and Tracking Chemicals (MATCH) proof-of-concept, demonstrating how distributed ledger technology (DLT), also known as blockchain, can automate and streamline data sharing and regulatory reporting between industry trade partners and national authorities within the prototype’s fictional ecosystem.”

“MATCH was developed in partnership with DLT developer OARO, with financial contribution by Global Affairs Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program.”

What We’re Listening To 🎧

Transmission Interrupted-Pathogens in Pop Culture: Contagion, Outbreak, and Pathogen Response

“On this episode of Transmission Interrupted, join hosts Lauren Sauer and Rachel Lookadoo, along with guest Syra Madad, as they discuss the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on emergency management, public health, and health care systems. They explore the challenges faced by hospitals, social vulnerabilities highlighted by the pandemic, and the importance of investing in resources for communities.”

“Additionally, they delve into the prevalence of infectious disease outbreaks in pop culture, including the movies Outbreak and Contagion. The speakers also discuss the tools and strategies used for emergency preparedness and response, how these have evolved over time, and the importance of prevention in addition to preparedness. Tune in to learn more about the impact of infectious diseases and pandemics on our society and health care systems.”

Listen here.

Summer Certificate Course on Combating Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trade: A Focus on the Americas

Learn more and register here.

Online Conversations: Reflections on the Fifth Review Conference and Looking Ahead

With the Fifth Five-Year Review Conference (RC-5) behind us and the end of United States chemical weapons stockpile destruction approaching, 2023 is a year of important milestones for the CWC. We will meet to assess the past, present, and future civil society participation in the CWC.

You are invited to join us for a CWC Coalition virtual discussion on Wednesday, July 12, 2023 at 4 pm CET. Topics will include:

A substantive overview of the Fifth Five-Year CWC Review Conference (if you missed it, here is the article from the June 2023 issue of Arms Control Today on the conference)

A discussion of civil society engagement at RC-5 and what can be improved for future Conferences of States Parties

Planning what is ahead: upcoming milestones, CWCC workshops, and other opportunities for civil society engagement

CWC Coalition Project Coordinator Mina Rozei will moderate a discussion on Coalition members’ thoughts on RC-5. Paul Walker, Chair of the CWC Coalition, will provide a brief update on the CWC Coalition’s work and upcoming plans for Coalition-organized events.

Please help us get your feedback by filling out this quick survey with your thoughts on the RevCon by Monday, July 10.

This discussion will be off-the-record. This session is open to all members of the CWC Coalition, and other members of civil society committed to supporting the goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open

7th Annual Next Generation for Biosecurity Competition Open for Applications

“Winners of the Biosecurity Competition will be awarded the following:

Online publication of their paper on the NTI website
The opportunity of travel to, attend, and present during a side event at a prestigious international biosecurity event, such as the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties”

Learn more here.

Journal of Responsible Innovation – Special Issue Call for Papers

How Do Scandals Shape the Understanding and Practice of Responsible Research and Innovation?

“Scientific scandals are particularly important to our understanding and practice of responsible research and innovation (RRI). There is a shared belief that research scandals are most instrumental in shaking up scientific systems (Robaey, 2014) and a shared recognition of a rising frequency of research misconduct (Fanelli 2009, Drenth, 2010, Kornfeld and Sandra, 2016, O’Gardy, 2021, Roy and Edwards, 2023). Yet there is a dearth of systematic examination on how irresponsible research activities shape governance and scientific norms and on how we should engage with scandals or scandalous individuals responsibly and effectively to inform the future (Vinck, 2010, Owen, Macnaghten and Stilgoe, 2012, Meyer, 2022). This special issue aims to fill this gap. We invite empirically grounded and conceptually rigorous investigations on the mutual impacts of scandals and RRI.”

Key deadlines: 300 words abstract by 15 October 2023. Full papers by 31 January 2024

Learn more and submit here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: The spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (commonly known as mad cow disease) to humans is believed to cause what disease?

Shout out to Drew F. for correctly answering our trivia question last week! Our question was “What 2002 book by Richard Preston, author of The Hot Zone, primarily focuses on smallpox and anthrax?” The answer is The Demon in the Freezer.

Pandora Report 6.30.2023

June 30, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

This week focuses on the recent release of a ten-page declassified report on the origins of COVID-19 from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. New publications, an interview with a Biodefense PhD alumnus, upcoming events, and a new publishing opportunity are also covered.

ODNI Releases Declassified Report on Link Between Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Start of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released a highly anticipated declassified report on the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic late last week. The report was released in response to the passage of the COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023 in March which compelled the IC to release within 90-days intelligence related to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). Specifically, the act required the IC to release intelligence covering reported WIV researchers who fell ill in the fall of 2019, any connections between WIV and the PLA, and coronavirus research taking place at the facility.

The act specifically outlines that “…the Director of National Intelligence should declassify and make available to the public as much information as possible about the origin of COVID-19 so the United States and like minded countries can–

A) identify the origin of COVID-19 as expeditiously as possible, and

B) use that information to take all appropriate measures to prevent a similar pandemic from occurring again.”

Naturally, the short length of the document and the lack of information outside of what was outlined in the law has attracted criticism. Furthermore, the report also doesn’t provide much in the way of new information or insight into whether the community has come to favor one possible origin more in the months since the Department of Energy assessed with low confidence that the pandemic began with a lab leak. All this has many arguing this further demonstrates a serious need to improve awareness and funding for pandemic response-related programs across the government, with NTI’s Jaime Yassif telling Vanity Fair “The fact that it’s proven so challenging to answer this question in a way that is satisfying to everyone highlights that the capabilities in the United States and internationally to resolve these kinds of open questions are very weak…We have a lot of work to do domestically and internationally to shore up our capabilities.”’

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists‘ Matt Field summarized the report’s contents, writing “The report, The Potential Links Between the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Origin of the COVID-19 Pandemic, disclosed a lot of information that has previously been reported about the virological research center in Wuhan, the city where the first cases of COVID-19 were detected in late 2019. Some biosafety standards and equipment at the facility were found to be lacking, including appropriate precautions for working with SARS-like coronaviruses and aging infrastructure. Workers at the lab had been ill at around the time the pandemic started. The lab held an incredibly large collection of bat samples, conducted genetic engineering experiments on coronaviruses, and conducted experimentation on making hybrid coronaviruses. Also previously reported, the lab had links to the Chinese military—reportedly for public health work.”

In addition to these criticisms and concerns in the United States has come alongside pushback from those working at the WIV in late 2019, particularly concerning allegations scientists at the lab were sick with a COVID-19-like illness at the time. Science reports ‘“The recent news about so-called ‘patient zero’ in WIV are absolutely rumors and ridiculous,” Ben Hu emailed Science in his first public response to the charges, which have been attributed to anonymous former and current U.S. Department of State officials. A WIV colleague who has also been named as one of the first COVID-19 cases denies the accusation as well.”

“Hu and two of his WIV colleagues were thrown into the furious COVID-19 origin debate on 13 June when an online newsletter called Public said the three scientists developed COVID-19 in November 2019. That was prior to the outbreak becoming public when a cluster of cases at the end of December 2019 surfaced in people linked to a Wuhan marketplace. Public’s report was quickly embraced by a camp that argues COVID-19 came from a virus stored, and possibly manipulated, at WIV, rather than from infected animal hosts, perhaps being sold at the Wuhan market. A Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article on 20 June that said it had “confirmed” the allegations against the three, without referring to any public evidence or named sources with direct knowledge, fueled the flames even more. Social media and other publications spread the charges—and the scientists’ names.”

Ultimately, not only did the report fail to include a “smoking gun” to settle the debate, but it also left many with more questions than answers about the IC’s ability to handle similar situations in the future and greater concern about the overarching state of the US government’s ability to effectively respond to pandemics.

report-on-potential-links-between-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology-and-the-origins-of-covid-19-20230623 Download

“COVID-19, Religious Freedom and the Law: The United States’ Case”

Biodefense PhD Student Ryan Houser published an article with Acting Director of Health Law Programs at O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Andrés Constantin, in the American Journal of Law & Medicine. During his master’s program at Georgetown University, Ryan was a Global Health Initiative student fellow, and he conducted research under Dr. Constantin to provide legal analysis of the policies meant to curb the COVID-19 pandemic and their implications for religious freedom. During the COVID-19 pandemic, public health officials often exercised their police powers to combat the spread of the virus. The pandemic-related legal interventions which were meant to promote the general welfare of the public, in defense of common good, were met with legal challenges, especially in opposition to interventions’ impact on the exercise of religion. The aim of their piece was to contribute to future legal analyses concerning the balance between public health and religious freedom in the context of pandemic legal preparedness efforts. The analysis sheds light on an ongoing dilemma faced by the United States, and other countries, whether religious freedom should supersede the protection of public health. The article contributes to the ongoing discussions on pandemic legal preparedness and looks to guide future decision-making processes that protect public health.”

“Dan Gerstein – COVID, Bioterror & The Next Pandemic”

Tim Ventura interview Biodefense PhD program alumnus, Dr. Dan Gerstein in this video: “What can we learn from COVID, and can it prevent bioterrorism & future pandemics? Dr. Dan Gerstein, author of “Bioterror in the 21st Century”, provides insights into rapid disease response in the modern world.”

“Dr. Dan Gerstein is a National Security author with extensive experience in the security and defense sectors across a variety of positions. He is the author of numerous books on national security topics including leadership, strategy, technology innovation, arms control, immigration & border control, bioterrorism, and his latest title, “Assignment Pentagon”, published in 2019.”

“Dan’s remarkable career includes experience in prestigious past roles such as the Acting Under Secretary & Deputy Under Secretary for Science & Tech at the Department of Homeland Security, the Principal Director for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, a full career in the US Army, retiring as a Col., and several C-level executive leadership roles in the private sector.”

“Dan has a PhD in Biodefense from George Mason University, a MNSS in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, an MMAS in National Security from the US Army Command & General Staff, an MSOR from Georgia Tech, and Graduated West Point as an engineer.”

“Building Sustainable Infection Prevention in the Era of COVID-19”

In a recent article in Health Security, Dr. Saskia Popescu and Rebecca Leach discuss the importance of IPC as part of a holistic approach to healthcare biopreparedness. They explain in their introduction, “For years, many working in hospital infection prevention and control (IPC) and healthcare biopreparedness drew attention to the gaps in response and virtually nonexistent attention and funding that plagued the US healthcare infrastructure. IPC programs are responsible for reducing the risk of disease spread within a healthcare setting, but they also ensure education, training, epidemiological investigations of outbreaks, disease reporting and surveillance, and a multitude of other efforts to keep patients and healthcare workers safe.¹ Unfortunately, IPC is often viewed as a cost center and not a revenue generator, meaning that these programs and departments have been inadequately funded and staffed.² The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the critical role that IPC departments have in biopreparedness efforts for healthcare settings. Unfortunately, even the mpox (monkeypox) outbreak during this pandemic could not avoid the institutional hurdles that led to woefully inadequate support for IPC programs. As the world inches toward a sustainable approach to managing COVID-19 and a growing realization that infectious disease threats are only increasing, there are several key lessons learned and strategic shifts needed for continuous IPC programs and healthcare biopreparedness efforts.”

“Personal Protective Equipment and Personal Protective Technology Product Standardization for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain”

“The National Strategy for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain lays out the U.S. government’s vision to protect the health and security of Americans by ensuring a supply chain for personal protective equipment (PPE) and technology (PPT), medical devices, medicines, and other public health supplies that is resilient against disruptions from pandemics and other biological threats. Additional forethought and collaboration amongst policy makers, manufacturers, and users is needed to make PPE and PPT innovation, standardization, stockpiling, and use more resilient.”

“The National Academies convened a public workshop in March 2023 to explore innovative approaches and technologies needed to update and streamline the U.S. standardization system for PPE and PPT in support of supply chain resiliency. Discussions included ways to improve the effectiveness, safety, supply stability, and accessibility of PPE and PPT designed for use in health care settings, by critical infrastructure workers, and by the general public. This Proceedings of a Workshop summarizes the discussions held during the workshop.”

“Review: The UK Government’s Updated Biological Security Strategy”

CSR’s Shannon L. Green and Skandan Ananthasekar discuss the UK’s new Biological Security Strategy in this piece, explaining that “The United Kingdom released its updated Biological Security Strategy on June 12, 2023. The UK has long had strong capabilities for addressing biological risks, yet more than ever its national strategy now recognizes the potential for biological threats to have catastrophic impacts and seeks to continue expanding on lessons from and capabilities developed during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also recognizes that future biological threats can be defeated through a combination of scientific innovation and government leadership and coordination with public, private, and international efforts.”

“…CSR applauds the efforts of experts and leaders from across the UK government in shaping the Biological Security Strategy. The strategy is an important step in improving health security in the UK and internationally. There will now need to be sustained attention on implementation, in addition to political leaders fully backing what its nation’s top experts recommend.”

“Will Invasive Fungal Infections be The Last of Us? The Importance of Surveillance, Public Health Intervention, and Antifungal Stewardship”

Rodríguez Stewart et al. discuss the growing threat of invasive fungal infections and the importance of antifungal stewardship in this article for the Expert Review of Anti-infective Therapy: “The video game-turned-HBO show ‘The Last of Us’ is a fanciful representation of a zombie apocalypse caused by a fungal infection. Although Ophiocordyceps, the ‘zombie fungi’ featured in the show, do not infect vertebrates, the show serves as a reminder that many fungi can cause life-threatening invasive fungal infections (IFIs). Candida and Aspergillus species are the most common and well-known causes of IFIs, but at least 300 species of opportunistic human pathogenic yeasts and molds exist.”

“Each year, IFIs are responsible for over 1.5 million deaths globally and, in the United States alone, impose health-care costs ranging from five to seven billion dollars [1,2]. During the COVID-19 pandemic, rates of death from fungal infections have increased [3], and the burden of IFIs is poised to grow given the expanding population of patients living with immunosuppressive conditions (e.g. solid organ and stem cell transplantation), increasing antifungal resistance, and potential climate-change related expansion of the geographic ranges in which pathogenic fungi live. Despite the morbidity and mortality associated with fungal infections and their growing public health importance, we still have much to learn about their diagnosis and management. In this review, we discuss gaps and global disparities in fungal laboratory capacity including antifungal susceptibility testing, the paucity of fungal surveillance, and the importance of antifungal stewardship, all against the backdrop of increasing antifungal resistance and a limited armamentarium of antifungal therapies.”

“Cyberattacks on Hospitals ‘Should Be Considered a Regional Disaster,’ Researchers Find”

Jenna McLaughlin breaks down the growing threat of cyberattacks targeting hospitals in this article for NPR, writing in part “According to Allan Liska, a ransomware expert at the cybersecurity firm Recorded Future, the numbers of attacks against hospitals dipped slightly in 2022, but are so far on track to increase in 2023. Part of the reason for that, Liska explained, is that the ransomware ecosystem is changing. For years, small-time cybercriminals were paying ransomware gangs to access their attack methods and malware. Ransomware gangs have professionalized over the years, and had some measure of control over their affiliates. But now, many of those groups’ hacking tools have been stolen and are easily accessible online. “Those guardrails, such as they were, are no longer in place,” said Liska.”

“What to Know About Malaria After U.S. Cases Were Reported”

Sareen Habeshian offers a quick rundown of malaria basics and answers FAQs in this piece for Axios after “The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announced Monday that four people in Sarasota County, Florida, and a person in Cameron County, Texas, contracted the disease between late May to late June through local transmission.”

Online Conversations: Reflections on the Fifth Review Conference and Looking Ahead

You are invited to join us for a CWC Coalition virtual discussion on Wednesday, July 12, 2023 at 4 pm CET. Topics will include:

A substantive overview of the Fifth Five-Year CWC Review Conference (if you missed it, here is the article from the June 2023 issue of Arms Control Today on the conference)

A discussion of civil society engagement at RC-5 and what can be improved for future Conferences of States Parties

Planning what is ahead: upcoming milestones, CWCC workshops, and other opportunities for civil society engagement

Please help us get your feedback by filling out this quick survey with your thoughts on the RevCon by Monday, July 10.

Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open

Biorisks, Biosecurity And Biological Disarmament Conference

“Advances in science and technology are taking place at an unprecedented rate, making vital contributions to addressing major societal challenges. Yet, transformative developments in a wide range of fields can also pose risks to society. As such, it has become more important than ever to monitor opportunities and risks posed by advances in science and technology for the biosecurity regime. This cannot be done by any one actor alone, rather it will require collaborative efforts by states and stakeholders from civil society, academia and industry, along with other actors.”

“In order to facilitate multi-stakeholder engagement around biological security and biological disarmament, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are co-organizing a stakeholder conference designed to bring together actors from civil society, academia and industry, along with diplomats, to stimulate the exchange of ideas and thinking around how to build biosecurity and bolster biological disarmament. The event will provide an opportunity to discuss ongoing diplomatic processes and current and upcoming issues in the areas of biorisk, biosecurity and biological disarmament.”

This hybrid event will take place July 4-5. Learn more and register here.

Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community

“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”

This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Journal of Responsible Innovation – Special Issue Call for Papers

How Do Scandals Shape the Understanding and Practice of Responsible Research and Innovation?

Key deadlines: 300 words abstract by 15 October 2023. Full papers by 31 January 2024

Learn more and submit here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: What 2002 book by Richard Preston, author of The Hot Zone, primarily focuses on smallpox and anthrax?

Our question was “What does “yellow” in yellow fever refer to?” The answer, as PAHO explains, is that “The “yellow” in the name refers to the jaundice that affects some patients.”

Pandora Report 6.23.2023

June 23, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

This week covers recent speculation about the US Intelligence Community’s assessments of COVID-19’s origin, a recent biosecurity-focused meeting between China and Russia, and updates on the case of a 22-year-old Iranian man arrested on suspicions he was plotting an extremist attack using chemical agents in Germany. New publications, upcoming events, and new professional opportunities are also included.

US Intelligence Agencies Still Haven’t Released Expected COVID-19 Materials

President Biden signed the COVID-⁠19 Origin Act of 2023 into law in late March, setting up a requirement for the US Intelligence Community to release as much information possible about the origin of COVID-19. Earlier that month, the Department of Energy and Federal Bureau of Investigation attracted controversy for their low and moderate confidence assessments that the virus originated in a lab. Other agencies maintained their assessments that it originated naturally, and one refused to commit to either hypothesis, similar to the breakdown in the 2021 declassified assessment. This week, the Wall Street Journal released an article that included the names of three Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers who were ill in November of 2019. Some have speculated that one of these researchers could have been the first person infected with COVID-19. However, according to an article from the New York Times this week, this information did not sway any agencies’ assessments:

“This week, intelligence agencies are expected to release declassified material on what they have learned about Covid’s origins, a subject of intense interest and scrutiny among American lawmakers. But people briefed on the material say there is no smoking gun, no body of evidence that sways the intelligence community as a whole, or top C.I.A. analysts, that a lab leak was the more likely origin of the pandemic than natural transmission, or vice versa…In fact, senior intelligence officials remain more convinced than ever that the agencies are not going to be able to collect a piece of evidence that solves the puzzle. Local and national authorities in China, U.S. officials say, destroyed some virus samples and used up others in research, all of which might have helped answer the questions over Covid’s origins. But those officials also caution against overstating the importance of the destroyed samples.”

Lawrence Gostin and Dr. Gigi Gronvall recently authored a piece in the New England Journal of Medicine discussing this last part, in which they write “When health emergencies arise, scientists seek to discover the cause — such a how a pathogen emerged and spread — because this knowledge can enhance our understanding of risks and strategies for prevention, preparedness, and mitigation. Yet well into the fourth year of the Covid-19 pandemic, intense political and scientific debates about its origins continue. The two major hypotheses are a natural zoonotic spillover, most likely occurring at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, and a laboratory leak from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). It is worth examining the efforts to discover the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the political obstacles, and what the evidence tells us. This evidence can help clarify the virus’s evolutionary path. But regardless of the origins of the virus, there are steps the global community can take to reduce future pandemic threats.”

Another important piece of the problem highlighted by the New York Times is that “American intelligence officials also believe the Chinese government impeded the international community’s efforts to better understand the coronavirus in the early months of the outbreak and refused to gather other information that could have aided the investigation.”

Irrespective of if SARS-CoV-2 came from a lab or not, the fact is the Chinese government delayed notifying the international community and has continuously refused to cooperate with ongoing efforts to respond appropriately to this pandemic. This should be addressed in future pandemic planning given the PRC’s past with this exact issue during earlier outbreaks.

Finally, this highlights the importance of transparency and good communications during global health crises. In the context of the Intelligence Community, however, this is more complicated. The IC has to protect its sources and methods, meaning declassification of even relatively mundane information may not always be possible. However, as mirrored by CDC’s challenges throughout this pandemic, it is still worth trying to release information when possible. As Zeynep Tufekci explained this week, “By keeping evidence that seemed to provide ammunition to proponents of a lab leak theory under wraps and resisting disclosure, U.S. officials have contributed to making the topic of the pandemic’s origins more poisoned and open to manipulation by bad-faith actors.”

“Treating crucial information like a dark secret empowers those who viciously and unfairly accuse public health officials and scientists of profiting off the pandemic. As Megan K. Stack wrote in Times Opinion this spring, “Those who seek to suppress disinformation may be destined, themselves, to sow it.”’

Biological Security Consultations Between China and Russia Take Place

This week, representatives of Russia and China met in Moscow for the first Russian-Chinese consultations on biological security. According to the Russian MID, “An exchange of biological security threat assessments was carried out. Particular attention was paid to the military and biological activities of the United States and strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The issues of bilateral cooperation in the field of biosecurity were discussed.”

“The meeting confirmed the unity of approaches of Russia and China to the biological security. The need for further close coordination and constructive interaction both in bilateral format and at relevant multilateral fora, primarily within the framework of the BTWC, the UN and the SCO was noted.”

The Russian News Agency TASS published multiple statements about the meeting from President Vladimir Putin, including ‘”Our country consistently advocates the strengthening of supranational mechanisms to prevent the development and proliferation of biological and toxin weapons,” the head of state said in his greeting telegram to the participants of the 4th International Scientific and Practical Conference ‘Global Threats to Biological Security: Problems and Solutions’.”

The same piece continued with “The president stressed that “in the current difficult international conditions, it is very important to preserve and strengthen the existing mechanisms of multilateral cooperation in combating various threats of a biological nature.” This concerns first and foremost the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which entered into force almost half a century ago.”

‘”Unfortunately, the principles established by this fundamental document have recently been systematically violated,” the head of state said. “Useful initiatives to strengthen the relevant non-proliferation regime are often opposed by a number of states that seek to use existing international problems to ensure their own biological security at the expense of others,” Putin pointed out.’

Iranian Man Charged in Alleged Chemical Attack Plot in Germany

A 26-year-old Iranian man who was arrested in Castrop-Rauxel in January was charged with preparing to conduct a serious act of violence and terror financing in Dusseldorf this week. The man, known only as J.J., was arrested following a tip from US officials indicating he was “plotting an Islamist attack using ricin or cyanide,” according to German prosecutors. The man’s 32-year-old brother, who was initially suspected of also being involved in the plot, had his case dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence. Prosecutors “…said the younger man had decided by the end of October to carry out an attack in line with the ideology of the Islamic State group by spreading ricin or a cyanide compound, and intended to kill as many people as possible by spreading the chemicals.”

Documents from the Dusseldorf Attorney General also indicate the suspect allegedly was in contact with extremists on messaging apps, where they provided him with instructions for how to prepare and disseminate the agents. J.J. also allegedly acquired the materials needed for the attack. Details on the nature of the US tip were not made available. A court in Dortmund will decide if this case will go to trial.

“The Rise of Maximum Containment Laboratories”

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists interviews Dr. Filippa Lentzos in this video, “to review the four biosafety levels and to understand the benefits these labs provide for studying pandemic capable diseases, as well as the risks they pose in a future during which pandemics may become more common,” covering insights gained from the Global Biolabs project she co-directs with George Mason’s Dr. Gregory Koblentz.

“Response to the UK Government’s Refreshed Biological Security Strategy (BSS)”

Experts in biosecurity react to the UK’s new Biological Security Strategy in this piece from the Centre for Long-Term Resilience. Summary “We are pleased to see many important commitments to strengthening the UK’s capabilities for preventing, detecting and responding to biological threats in the Biological Security Strategy (BSS), published on 12 June 2023.”

“We particularly welcome commitments to formalise the Government’s biosecurity leadership, governance and accountability structures, to invest in the UK’s real-time biosurveillance and detection capabilities, and to lead internationally in establishing standards of best practice for responsible innovation.”

“We also commend the Government on allocating £1.5 billion per year to support this work, but urge the Government to continue to sustain a level of investment commensurate with the urgency and importance of implementing the BSS’ priority outcomes.”

“To facilitate the delivery of the Strategy’s 15 priority outcomes on such an ambitious timeline, we suggest the Government should:

Identify reporting milestones and specific, measurable targets for each of the priority outcomes within the Strategy.
Set out how it will develop thoughtful regulatory standards and practices for ensuring responsible innovation.
Establish mechanisms for identifying and accessing the diversity of relevant expertise needed to support the Strategy’s implementation.
Ensure a variety of intervention options are being evaluated and appropriately incorporated into future biological event response planning.”

“VIEWPOINT: U.S. Must Strengthen Biodefense, Reauthorize Laws”

In this piece for National Defense, Retired Brig. Gen. William King discusses the need to improve the United States’ biodefense policies. He writes in his introduction, “Many Americans are tired of the trauma, life challenges and losses of Covid-19 and the scare of continued pandemics and catastrophic weapon of mass destruction events. Over the past three years of living through this pandemic, more than 1.1 million Americans lost their lives, costing more than $30 trillion of national treasure…Despite this, the nation is still dragging its feet and — in some cases — reversing efforts already made to prepare for the next pandemic.”

“Epidemiology of Pathogens Listed as Potential Bioterrorism Agents, the Netherlands, 2009‒2019”

Broertjes et al. discuss the potential for bad actors to isolate bioterrorism agents from natural sources in the Netherlands in this recent article for Emerging Infectious Diseases. Abstract: “We provide incidences (cases/10 million persons) in the Netherlands during 2009–2019 for pathogens listed as potential bioterrorism agents. We included pathogens from the highest categories of the European Medicines Agency or the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Notifiable diseases and recently published data were used to calculate the average annual incidence. Coxiella burnetii had the highest incidence because of a Q fever epidemic during 2007–2010. Incidence then decreased to 10.8 cases/. Pathogens with an incidence >1 were Brucella spp. (2.5 cases), Francisella tularensis (1.3 cases), and Burkholderia pseudomallei (1.1 cases). Pathogens with an incidence <1 were hemorrhagic fever viruses (0.3 cases), Clostridium botulinum (0.2 cases), and Bacillus anthracis (0.1 cases). Variola major and Yersinia pestis were absent. The generally low incidences make it unlikely that ill-meaning persons can isolate these pathogens from natural sources in the Netherlands. However, the pathogens are stored in laboratories, underscoring the need for biosecurity measures.”

“Have Chemical Weapons Been Used in Ukraine?”

This piece from RUSI discusses recent reports that Russia has used riot control agents in Ukraine and potential implications of these claims. The authors explain in their conclusion, “There appear to be minimal benefits for Russia in using CW in Ukraine, although conversely, there are not many downsides from a Russian perspective either. Negative public opinion certainly does not seem to concern those in the Kremlin, and the use of CW is unlikely to deter supporters of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, who already turn a blind eye to allegations of Russian forces breaking international law. Regardless, the indications are that Ukraine is collecting evidence for potential prosecution at the international level.”

“Could Chatbots Help Devise the Next Pandemic Virus?”

“Tech experts have been warning that artificial intelligence (AI) could turn against humanity by taking over everything from business to warfare. Now, Kevin Esvelt is adding another worry: AI could help someone with no science background and evil intentions order a virus capable of unleashing a pandemic.”

“Esvelt, a biosecurity expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, recently asked students to create a dangerous virus with the help of ChatGPT or other so-called large language models, systems that can generate humanlike responses to broad questions based on vast training sets of internet data. After only an hour, the class came up with lists of candidate viruses and companies that could synthesize their genetic code and assemble the pieces.”

Pandora Report 6.16.2023

June 16, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

This week we discuss the UK’s new Biological Security Strategy and a recent report from the United Nations Investigative Team for Accountability of Da’esh/ISIL on ISIL’s crimes in Iraq. Several new publications are included as well as multiple new job openings.

UK Announces New Biological Security Strategy

The United Kingdom recently unveiled its new Biological Security Strategy. The strategy describes a vision “…that, by 2030, the UK is resilient to a spectrum of biological threats, and a world leader in responsible innovation, making a positive impact on global health, economic and security outcomes.” The strategy is split into two parts. The first provides context, describing the strategic drivers of the strategy and identifying risks. The second outlines a strategic framework the country will use to meet its priorities. A concise high-level implementation plan is also included in the document.

However, despite initial praise for this strategy, it comes amid growing criticism of the UK’s dismantling of plans and programs put into place to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. A recent piece from the Guardian outlines many of these concerns, with Dr. Clive Dix, the former chair of the UK’s vaccine taskforce describing this abandonment as “fraught with danger.” Dix was quoted saying “The government has basically put all their money on mRNA vaccines. They’ve gambled recklessly. They have basically assumed mRNA is going to solve the problem. ‘Let’s forget about all these other vaccine technologies. Let’s forget about manufacturing. Let’s just encourage the likes of Pfizer and Moderna to come to the UK, then we’re covered.’…That’s our pandemic preparedness. Quite frankly, it’s not just reckless. It’s fraught with danger.”’

UNITAD Releases Latest Report on Da’esh/ISIL Crimes, Including CW Use

The United Nations Investigative Team for Accountability of Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD) recently released its tenth report to UNSC on crimes committed by ISIL. As the report’s summary explains, “Following previously reported investigative achievements, the Team successfully launched new lines of inquiry on the development and use of biological and chemical weapons, the destruction of cultural and religious heritage and the crimes committed against various communities of Iraq. The Team has started to be engaged in building criminal case files with its Iraqi counterparts – investigative judges, prosecutors and forensic and law enforcement experts – against Da’esh/ISIL perpetrators who escaped from Iraq and are residing in third States.”

The report outlines these findings in depth on page 5, explaining that substantial evidence to support the Team’s case assessment was found, and that its focus is on investigating main sites of CW production, better understanding ISIL/Da’esh’s delivery systems, and collecting and preserving evidence linked to 12 separate attacks.

During the UNSC meeting where this report was discussed, “…numerous Council members commended UNITAD’s progress in its investigative priorities, including the launch of new lines of inquiry on the development and use of biological and chemical weapons; the destruction of cultural and religious heritage; and crimes committed against different Iraqi communities. However, several speakers emphasized that handing evidence over to the law enforcement and judicial bodies of Iraq is a key part of UNITAD’s mandate.”

UN coverage of that meeting recalls several council members’ comments on the report, explaining in part “While the number of attacks has decreased and its capability has been degraded, Da’esh “remains a critical threat in Iraq and globally”, said the representative of the United States. Accordingly, he highlighted UNITAD’s essential role in reducing this threat by supporting the Government of Iraq in repatriating Iraqi Da’esh members from detention centres in north-east Syria to face justice before national courts. Also, the Team can help other countries prosecute the thousands of Da’esh foreign fighters in detention centres in Iraq and Syria.”

However, despite the praise for UNITAD’s work on this issue, there is still the question of if the international community or domestic authorities will actually do something about it. In another UN post on this topic, the author explained “Christian Ritscher, Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD, recalled that chemical weapons use is outlawed internationally and could constitute a crime against humanity, war crime or even contribute to genocide, if a specific group is targeted…“To the best of my knowledge, the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors has rarely been adjudicated, if at all, in any court – whether national or international – around the world. As UNITAD, we would like to play our part and aim to change this,” he said.”

“Building Sustainable Infection Prevention in the Era of COVID-19”

“Examining the Impacts of Title 42 in the Rio Grande Valley, Texas: Perceptions From Stakeholders in Immigrant Health and Wellbeing”

In this Health Security article, Dr. Christine Crudo Blackburn and Ava Garrett discuss the recently-expired Title 42 and its impact on the spread of COVID-19 in the Rio Grande Valley. They explain in their abstract, “During the initial weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services implemented a little-known public health law, referred to as “Title 42.” The law immediately received criticism from public health professionals and pandemic response experts around the country. Years after its initial implementation, however, the policy has been consistently maintained through numerous court decisions as necessary to prevent COVID-19. This article explores the perceived impact of Title 42 on COVID-19 containment and overall health security in the Rio Grande Valley, Texas, based on interviews conducted with public health professionals, medical professionals, nonprofit staff, and social workers. Our findings show that Title 42 was not perceived to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and likely decreased overall health security in this region.”

Applied Biosafety Biosafety Research Roadmap Special Issue

Applied Biosafety recently produced a special issue with multiple articles covering the new Biosafety Research Roadmap, a projected shared by the Organization for Animal Health, the WHO, and Chatham House. The introductory article explains the context behind this in its abstract:

“Introduction: Lack of evidence-based information regarding potential biological risks can result in inappropriate or excessive biosafety and biosecurity risk-reduction strategies. This can cause unnecessary damage and loss to the physical facilities, physical and psychological well-being of laboratory staff, and community trust. A technical working group from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), World Health Organization (WHO), and Chatham House collaborated on the Biosafety Research Roadmap (BRM) project. The goal of the BRM is the sustainable implementation of evidence-based biorisk management of laboratory activities, particularly in low-resource settings, and the identification of gaps in the current biosafety and biosecurity knowledge base.”

“Methods: A literature search was conducted for the basis of laboratory design and practices for four selected high-priority subgroups of pathogenic agents. Potential gaps in biosafety were focused on five main sections, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Categories representing miscellaneous, respiratory, bioterrorism/zoonotic, and viral hemorrhagic fever pathogens were created within each group were selected for review.”

“Results: Information sheets on the pathogens were developed. Critical gaps in the evidence base for safe sustainable biorisk management were identified.”

“Conclusion: The gap analysis identified areas of applied biosafety research required to support the safety, and the sustainability, of global research programs. Improving the data available for biorisk management decisions for research with high-priority pathogens will contribute significantly to the improvement and development of appropriate and necessary biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity strategies for each agent.”

“Once ‘Defanged,’ H5N1 Bird Flu is Gaining Teeth Again”

In this article for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr. Lynn C. Klotz discusses the potential for H5N1 to become a pandemic threat, writing in part “Now we are seeing the prolific spread of avian H5N1. Writing this year in The Lancet Infectious Diseases, scientists noted that for “the first time, in 2021, the virus remained present year-round in wild birds in Europe, spread to North America, and spread onwards to South America in 2022, where it is still expanding southward.” So far, H5N1 has caused the deaths of 100 million poultry birds in the United States and Europe. And worse still, repeated outbreaks among mammals could allow the virus to mutate and begin to pose a greater threat to humans, especially given worrying signs that mammals are already spreading the virus through the air. H5N1 has infected some 30 mammalian species and has sparked outbreaks and deaths in seals in North America and farmed mink in Spain. “It’s certainly plausible that those animals are spreading virus by droplet or aerosol to each other,” Tufts University veterinarian Jonathan Runstadler said of the seal outbreak in an interview with the Journal of the American Medical Association. “They’re having interactions at close range, and a lot of vocalizations…. But there’s other routes in that scenario that we can’t rule out.”

Biorisks, Biosecurity And Biological Disarmament Conference

This hybrid event will take place July 4-5. Learn more and register here.

Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community

This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Job Opening: Consultant-WHO Training On Responsible Use of the Life Sciences and Dual-Use Research

The WHO Science Division is currently hiring for a six-month consultancy focused on developing an online training on the responsible use of the life sciences and dual-use research. The post includes this background: “The Science Division, through the EPS Unit, issued a Global guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences: mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research in September 2022. The guidance calls on WHO Member States and other stakeholders to mitigate biorisks and safely govern dual-use research, which has a clear benefit but can be misused to harm humans, other animals, agriculture and the environment. The framework underlines that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to mitigate biorisks and governing dual-use research. The framework adopts an integrated approach of biorisk management, which relies on three core pillars: biosafety, laboratory biosecurity and the oversight of dual-use research. The framework raises awareness about the importance of undertaking biorisk management within the context of the One Health approach to optimize the health of people, animals and ecosystems. To ensure uptake and use of these foundational elements, awareness raising, education, codes of conduct, ethical reviews, training and capacity-building are required for stakeholders in the research ecosystem. Therefore, the development of a training course to accompany the implementation of the different elements of the framework would be essential.”

The application and more information can be accessed here. This posting will close on June 23.

Job Opening: Two Full-Time Researchers for Research Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons Control

Learn more and apply here. This application closes on June 30.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: In 1893, the German physician Richard Pfeiffer incorrectly identified which microbe as that causative agent of influenza?

Our question last week was “Boston opened a smallpox quarantine hospital on which island in 1717?” The answer is Spectacle Island.

Pandora Report 6.9.2023

June 9, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

This week is another mixed bag, covering suspected schoolgirl poisonings in Afghanistan, the introduction of the Disease X Act of 2023 in the US House of Representatives, and growing concern about generic drug safety in the Department of Defense. Several new publications, upcoming events, and announcements are also included.

Suspected Schoolgirl Poisonings in Afghanistan

Multiple poisonings of primary schoolgirls were reported this week in Afghanistan’s Sar-e-Pul province. The Guardian reports that nearly 80 girls were attacked and hospitalized in two separate incidents in the northern province, according to local education officials. According to CBS, “The first incident took place Saturday, when 63 people, including three female teachers, one male teacher, another school staffer and a parent of one student “were poisoned at Kabud Aab school” for girls, according to Mawlavi Sadruddin Adib Faroogi, the Sancharak district education director, who was quoted in the statement released by the governor’s office…In the second incident, which happened Sunday in the same district, the statement said 22 female students and four female teachers were poisoned at Faizabad school.”

This is not the first time Afghan schoolgirls have been deliberately poisoned, with the Taliban previously having been accused of conducting numerous similar attacks. For example, the Taliban was blamed for several attacks in multiple provinces in 2012. However, this is thought to be the first of this kind of attack since the Taliban took power in the country in August 2021.

CBS’ Ahmad Mukhtar explains, “Sodaba Bayani, an Afghan education and women’s rights activist, told CBS News she believed the Taliban authorities were “using chemicals to scare people off, and somehow prevent parents from letting their girls attend school, as this has occurred in Iran so many times.”‘

Disease X Act of 2023 Introduced

A bipartisan group of US representatives recently introduced the Disease X Act of 2023, which aims to ensure that the country is able to prepare for and rapidly develop medical countermeasures for future pandemics. This legislation would “Direct BARDA to accelerate and support the advanced research, development, and procurement of countermeasures and products to address Disease X threats,” and “Allow HHS to award contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements, or enter into other transactions, to promote the development of Disease X medical countermeasures for viral families with pandemic potential.”

Rep. Lori Trahan’s office explained in a press release about the bill “In addition to bipartisan support in Congress, the Disease X Act of 2023 is supported by leaders and experts in academia, industry, and think tanks, including Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Biotechnology Innovation Organization, Infectious Diseases Society of America, CEPI U.S., Dr. Caroline Schuerger, Research Fellow, Georgetown Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Dr. Steph Batalis, Research Fellow, Georgetown Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Ginkgo Bioworks, Institute for Progress (IFP), Big Cities Health Coalition, FluGen Inc., US Biologic, Inc., Vir Biotechnology, The Gerontological Society of America, Global Health Technologies Coalition, Helix, New Orleans BioInnovation Center, Medical Countermeasures Coalition, 1Day Sooner, and Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Director, Biodefense Graduate Program, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University.”

A summary of the bill and relevant background is also available here.

Department of Defense Concerned About Quality of Generic Drugs

Bloomberg News reported this week that the Department of Defense is in talks with Valisure, an independent lab, to test the safety and quality of generic drugs purchased by the Department for servicemembers and their families. Bloomberg explains further: “The move raises questions about the Food and Drug Administration’s ability to adequately police generic medicines. With mounting drug shortages, most of which are caused by quality problems, military officials have gone so far as to call vulnerabilities in the drug supply chain a national security threat.”

“The FDA is responsible for ensuring that America’s drugs are safe, but it’s gotten harder for the agency to police quality because generic drugmakers have shifted operations to India and China where costs are lower and the US has little oversight. The Pentagon’s proposed program isn’t currently targeting the expensive, brand-name drugs advertised on TV, but rather the older copycat drugs that make up more than 9 out of 10 prescription medications that Americans take.”

“Aware of growing quality problems, the White House has convened a task force that’s exploring whether testing could be expanded more broadly in the US. If the Pentagon pilot is successful, it could serve as a model for Medicare or the Department of Veterans Affairs, people familiar with the matter said. But there are tensions in Washington: In conversations with the White House, the FDA has pushed back against additional quality checks, questioning the accuracy of third-party labs like Valisure.”

This comes after years of concerns about the safety and stability of the United States’ drug supply, such as those outlined in the 2018 book, China Rx, by Rosemary Gibson and Janardan Prasad Singh. The US Congress passed the Drug Quality and Security Act in November 2013. At the time, the FDA said of the act “…[it] outlines steps to achieve interoperable, electronic tracing of products at the package level to identify and trace certain prescription drugs as they are distributed in the United States. This will enhance FDA’s ability to help protect consumers from exposure to drugs that may be counterfeit, stolen, contaminated, or otherwise harmful. These requirements will also improve detection and removal of potentially dangerous drugs from the drug supply chain to protect U.S. consumers.”

“Chinese Media Is Wrong, US Funded Lab in Kazakhstan Is to Prevent Bioterrorism”

This piece by Polygraph.info’s Lin Yang tackles ongoing Chinese allegations that the US is creating in Central Asia pathogens for use in bioterrorist attacks. Yang writes in part, “On May 26, China’s state-run Global Times newspaper claimed that the U.S. is investing in building biological weapons in Central Asia:

“Funded by the United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Central Reference Laboratory near Almaty, Kazakhstan’s most populous metropolis, is researching lethal pathogens that could be used in bio-terrorist attacks like plague and cholera, according to media reports.”

“That is misleading…This is a recurring conspiracy theory, pushed by Russia and China, about U.S. funding of biological research facilities around the world. While the Central Reference Laboratory in Kazakhstan does conduct research on lethal pathogens, its mission is to prevent these dangerous pathogens from being used as biological weapons or becoming the next pandemic, exactly the opposite of what the Global Times claimed.”

This has coincided with pushback in Chinese state media against the BBC’s late May article-“Covid: Top Chinese scientist says don’t rule out lab leak“-that said the former director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Dr. George Gao, told the BBC not to rule out the possibility that SARS-CoV-2 leaked from a laboratory. China Daily recently published an article on this, reporting “However, when guancha.cn sought verification from Gao regarding the accuracy of the story, Gao told them that John Sudworth and Simon Maybin, the co-authors of the BBC article, had never interviewed him, and he had not participated in any activities organized by the BBC recently….Gao stated that the BBC’s “outrageous” quotation of his words was taken out of context from an online conversation he had with several scientists at the end of 2022.”

“Preventing Pandemics by (Not) Seizing the Low-Hanging Fruit (Bat)”

This post from Cornell’s College of Veterinary Medicine discusses how faculty members are working with the Wildlife Conservation Society in a partnership with The Lancet Planetary Health to understand “…how such surges in deaths, illness, and suffering – as well as their economic costs – can be prevented in the future. One basic solution, the authors argue, may lie in a global taboo against harming or disturbing bats and their habitats.”

The post explains later that, “Given that most, but not all, of the identified bat-related activities of concern – such as bat hunting, consumption, and trade; bat guano harvesting, use, and trade; cave tourism; and incursions into key bat habitats with livestock, homesteads, mines, and crop agriculture at smallholder and industrial scales – occur in low-income and middle-income countries, the authors recognize the need to try to mitigate any socioeconomic or cultural burdens that voluntary changes in behavior would cause, and call for wealthier countries to provide logical forms of compensation. “Such compensation would undoubtedly be a small price to pay to lessen the risk of future pandemics,” said Osofsky, who believes that preventing pandemics at the source is the most equitable way to benefit all of humanity.”

“The key, the authors say, is not to fear, chase away or cull bats – which may be counterproductive, because dispersing the animals only increases the odds of zoonotic spillover. On the contrary, allowing bats to survive and thrive by letting them exist undisturbed in their habitats can pay other dividends around the world. The ecosystem services bats provide – from control of mosquitos and other harmful insects to crop pollination – are worth many billions of dollars annually.”

“Health Security Intelligence: Intelligence, Biosecurity, and the Bioeconomy”

In this article in International Studies, Gaudys L. Sanclemente and Fredy Rivera-Vélez uses the actor-network theory to better understand the intersection of security, intelligence, health, and cybersecurity. They write in their abstract: “Technology advancements and instruments present a beneficial influence in the bioeconomy at the intersection of security, intelligence, health, and cybersecurity. The actor–network theory inspires theoretical reflections on the importance of key actors interweaving in the information ecosystem, including human and nonhuman actors. Alliances, instruments, and public representation can raise awareness of research and development in the life sciences. The analysis focuses on the bioeconomy where the economy, biological sciences, and Big Data intersect as a source for understanding how boundary objects influence avenues of potential threats. As an emerging sector, the bioeconomy proposes using biological sciences and resources and transforming them into valuable products to enhance economic activity and drive innovation. However, the growth of the bioeconomy may lead to an expansion of security risks and threats. The increasing amount of information, coupled with data sharing and technology advancements in the biosphere, raises security concerns. The research reflects on two emerging fields, biosecurity and cyberbiosecurity, safeguarding the bioeconomy. This contribution highlights the value of knowledge production, preserving security, and awareness of vulnerabilities and risks regarding nefarious activities while not hindering research, development, and innovation in the bioeconomy. As the sector grows, more strategic protection may be necessary for the betterment of sustainable growth and development. The research contributes to the intelligence, security studies, and science and technology studies disciplines and as a source for military experts, security professionals, researchers, and intelligence analysts.”

What We’re Listening To 🎧

Fever: The Hunt for Covid’s Origin

“Cover-ups, coincidences, and conspiracy theories: where did Covid come from?”

“John Sudworth was the BBC’s China correspondent when an unexplained pneumonia started worrying Wuhan doctors in December 2019. Since then, he’s been investigating the origin of the virus that would turn into a devastating global pandemic.”

“From the beginning, there have been claims of certainty. Many scientists say the virus that causes Covid came from nature – probably carried from bats to other animals, and then to humans in a Wuhan market.”

“But an alternative possibility – that it leaked from a laboratory – has refused to go away. And other scientists claim there’s uncertainty. For them, the mystery of Covid’s origin remains unsolved.”

“So, where did Covid come from? For every one of the millions of lives lost, for every long sufferer, for the pain, the isolation, and the incalculable economic cost, the answer matters. It might also help us prevent another – maybe even worse – pandemic.”

“But it’s a debate that’s become politicised, toxic, and a bit crazy.”

Listen to all available episodes here.

FP Global Health Forum 2023

“Global health is more than a humanitarian issue — it’s a critical component of foreign policy, international security, and economic stability. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed glaring weaknesses in global healthcare systems and medical supply chains, prompting urgent calls for reform and resilience-building. Meanwhile, shifting demographics have increased the burden of non-communicable diseases that disproportionately impact some of the world’s most impoverished nations. Climate change further complicates the situation, as rising temperatures and extreme weather events impact well-being, and populations flee sea-level rise, drought, and resource scarcity to regions ill-equipped to handle an influx of migrants.”

“In the face of these unprecedented challenges, the global health community acknowledges the need to develop sustainable solutions that can withstand the trials of an ever-changing world. FP’s Global Health Forum is an opportunity to engage with those leading the charge, and to discuss how investments in health can ultimately strengthen resilience and stability around the globe.”

This hybrid event will take place June 13 from 8-11:30 am EST. Learn more and register here.

CSWMD 2023 Annual Symposium: WMD in the Decisive Decade

“The National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) invites you to join us on 14 June 2023 for the virtual Annual CSWMD Symposium, titled WMD in the Decisive Decade.”

“This year’s symposium will explore the cognitive impacts WMD has on strategic decision making and the challenges associated with operating in an environment where WMD has been employed. It will be an opportunity for the WMD community to engage with officials and thought leaders on current WMD challenges at the unclassified level, including keynote addresses by Richard Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and CWMD Policy and Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.”

“For more information and to register for this event click here. Please RSVP by 9 JUNE 2023.”

“We look forward to hosting you for the event. For more information about the WMD Center and reference our research, please visit our website at https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/ and follow us on Twitter and on LinkedIn.”

Intelligent Immunity – Drawing from Innate Immune Mechanisms to Design Pathogen-agnostic Diagnostics for Emerging Threats

From PNNL: “Join us as we welcome Harshini Mukundan, program manager for the chemical and biological technologies at the Office of National Homeland Security (OHNS), and scientist in the biosciences area. Her talk, titled “Intelligent Immunity – Drawing from Innate Immune Mechanisms to Design Pathogen-agnostic Diagnostics for Emerging Threats” will be Thursday, June 15, at noon PT.“

“The human innate immune system is a classic example of a pathogen agnostic diagnostic and therapeutic system. Mimicking innate immunity in the laboratory can allow for the universal identification of emerging threats, increasing our preparedness against future pandemics and biowarfare events. We have been working on understanding core principles guiding host-pathogen interactions and adapting them to design tailored assays for the direct detection of pathogen signatures in complex clinical samples. A snapshot of design to deployment of this approach – including preliminary clinical studies in blinded cohorts will be presented. Finally, we will touch on current work intended to expand the scale of this understanding in order to achieve a machine learning model of innate immunity that is truly agnostic.”

Biorisks, Biosecurity And Biological Disarmament Conference

This hybrid event will take place July 4-5. Learn more and register here.

Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community

This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Job Announcement: Director, Office of Biodefense Research and Surety at National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

“The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) is seeking an exceptional and visionary leader to serve as director, Office of Biodefense Research and Surety (OBRS) reporting to the Deputy Director for Science Management, NIAID.”

“OBRS serves as the NIAID focal point for coordinating, planning, and implementing the biodefense research supported by NIAID. OBRS disseminates information on the Institute’s biodefense research programs, policies, and funding opportunities and coordinates biodefense and biodefense-related research issues across NIH. A key responsibility of OBRS is oversight of the Chemical Countermeasures Research Program (CCRP), which consists of an annual discovery research and early development budget of approximately $52M and includes the participation of eight NIH institutes and centers. OBRS oversees the NIAID Emergency Preparedness planning and Continuity of Operations planning offices. In addition, OBRS participates in the governance of the high-containment taskforce and serves as the NIAID liaison with the NIH Office of the Director, the Department of Health and Human Services, and other Federal departments and agencies regarding intelligence gathering and analysis which may impact NIH programs and operations.”

“The OBRS director provides overall executive direction and scientific leadership to this complex operation. The director oversees and coordinates both branches of the OBRS: the Biodefense Research Countermeasures Branch and the Surety and Preparedness Coordination Branch. Additionally, the director serves as principal advisor to the Director, NIAID and Deputy Director for Science Management on matters related to biosafety, biocontainment, and surety. The director represents NIAID/NIH on interagency and interdepartmental committees, working groups, and professional meetings, as well as international forums and symposia dealing with biodefense, emerging infections, biosecurity, and biocontainment. The director participates in the governance of the NIH High Containment Taskforce and provides support to the NIH Biodefense Research Coordination Committee, a central resource for trans-NIH communication and planning of biodefense activities.”

Learn more and apply to this position here.

Medical Countermeasures- Expanding Delivery and Increasing Uptake Through Public-Private Partnerships: A Workshop Series: Call for Experts

From the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine: “The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine is seeking nominations for experts to participate in a workshop planning committee for the “Medical Countermeasures- Expanding Delivery and Increasing Uptake Through Public-Private Partnerships: A Workshop Series”. This planning committee will plan and conduct a virtual workshop series to examine lessons learned and future opportunities for public-private partnerships to facilitate delivery, monitoring, uptake, and utilization of medical countermeasures (MCM) to the public during a public health emergency.”

“The workshop will build on lessons learned from various models deployed during the COVID-19 response, such as retail pharmacies as points of diagnosis and MCM dispensing, outpatient infusion centers and home health care providers as collaborators in administering monoclonal antibodies, employer-led initiatives, uses of telehealth, and collaborations between telehealth providers and various dispensing options to provide access to MCMs for the public.”

Learn more and submit nominations here.

Application for iGEM Judges Open Now

“Judging in iGEM is a fun, rewarding experience and requires commitment! Through the judging process, our judges will evaluate, celebrate, and help guide the next generation of synthetic biologists. Judges help the entire iGEM community celebrate the hard work and achievements of our iGEM teams.”

“We need judges — both experienced and new — who understand and value iGEM. Many of our judges come back year after year, and we gladly welcome new judges to apply as well.”

Learn more and apply here.

BARDA Announces New FDA Approval for Medical Countermeasures Supported by BARDA Under Novel-Public Private Partnerships

From BARDA: “BARDA is excited about the recent U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of OPVEE (nalmefene) nasal spray, an emergency opioid overdose reversal treatment, from our partner Indivior (through its wholly owned subsidiary, Opiant Pharmaceuticals, Inc). This drug-device combination product is approved as a fast and long-acting emergency treatment for known or suspected opioid overdoses. This decision marks the newest FDA approval for medical countermeasures supported by BARDA under novel public-private partnerships.”

Biodefense Representation at the 2022 NACCHO Preparedness Summit

June 5, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Program News

Emily Lu, Biodefense MS Graduate

COVID-19 has had an enormous negative impact on healthcare systems. The 2022 Preparedness Summit, hosted by the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) in Atlanta, Georgia, took place April 4-7 and aimed to cover the entire scope of issues and solutions discussed during these two years. The main purpose of this summit was to collaborate and share information as well as collaboration on what actions have been taken.

This conference covered a variety of topics, including biodefense, biosecurity, public health awareness, and biotechnologies and their role in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The conference’s slogan-“Reimagining Preparedness in the Era of COVID-19”- is evidence of that. The conference was organized into several sessions. Track 5, Strengthening Global Health Security, is one that I chose to focus on, specifically biosecurity and public health emergency preparedness and management. One of the key highlights of Track 5: Strengthening Global Health Security was Ryan Houser’s presentation, “The Security Threat of Infectious Disease: Applying a Public Health Emergency Management Approach to Biodefense”. Houser, an emergency preparedness professional and Biodefense PhD student, defines biodefense as “any actions designed to counter biological threats, reduce risks, and prepare for, respond to, and recover from bio incidents.” Houser’s definition of biosecurity is the “strategic and integrated approach to analyzing and managing relevant risks to human, animal, and plant life.” He explained that, in examining the COVID-19 pandemic from a biodefense and biosecurity viewpoint, shortcomings are most obvious in the inadequate amount of funding that the government gives out via routine congressional appropriations.

Funding

Houser highlighted that “public health emergency preparedness grants decreased from $939 million in 2003 to $675 million in 2020.” These grants, funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), are designed to prevent and respond to terrorism and future natural disasters. This number is similar to the Public Health Emergency Preparedness budget in 2020, which totaled $622,850,000 and increased to $637,850,603 in 2021. Regarding the argument that $675 million may not be enough funding for the United States, it would be difficult to assess partially because the amount and how this money is distributed within each state can have an impact on their response.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, FEMA conducted a study in New Jersey that found the pandemic response was successful in providing support and coordination efforts, improving relationships between the urban area security initiative members, and enhancing communications with the public and other stakeholders. However, the success of this 2020 study may have to do with the total amount of funding available to New Jersey, which, in 2020, was $15,144,167. However, this is not the case for all states, which have different amounts of funding.

Funding for each state is calculated by adding a base amount to an amount relative to the state’s population, which is then added to that amount set aside by each state. Chemical laboratory funding is also included if there is a chemical laboratory available within the state. Therefore, money may impact response efforts, but there is not enough evidence to determine if it is the main factor in response success. However, what can be said is that the amount of financial support given towards hospital preparedness as well as public preparedness has increased slightly for each state. It’s more likely that how this money is spent and where it is being distributed within the state impacts the situation even more.

Healthcare Response

The lack of cohesion between government funding and healthcare was a recurring theme at the conference. Healthcare management during the COVID-19 pandemic has tended to fare better in some areas over others. For example, around 95% of hospitals passed a compliance check conducted by the Unified Hospital Data Surveillance System with scores between 90 and 100% that was conducted by the Unified Hospital Data Surveillance System (UHDSS) during its enforcement period in 2020.

However, the COVID-19 pandemic has also created many challenges for healthcare institutions. For example, hospitals can quickly near maximum capacity based on the circumstances in their state and local area. An example of this was when, due to Arizona re-opening early, ICU units in the state’s hospitals rapidly came close to 80% capacity as new cases were admitted in 2020. In some states, circumstances make it difficult for individuals to follow protocols. Again, using Arizona as an example, the state re-opened due to many different factors, including high temperatures motivating individuals to violate regulations and seek indoor shelter, and a general avoidance of hospital environments.

Other issues in the healthcare system include shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE), including the shortage of N95 respirators, surgical/procedure masks, eye protection (including face shields and goggles), single-use gowns, and exam gloves. This could be attributed to a lack of funding, though this may not necessarily be the case.

Lastly, there may have been difficulties regarding the coordination of staff within large hospital systems. In larger systems, changes can become difficult to execute during a short amount of time. Throughout the COVID-19 response, hospital staffing has been inconsistent and limited. For example, at the start of the pandemic, according to ECRI (formerly the Emergency Care Research Institute), a nonprofit patient safety organization, “staffing shortages are the nation’s top safety concern”, especially in 2022. Ways to compensate for this have come in the form of adding staff and bringing more interest to keep medical students within the field.

Highlights

Despite the issues discussed above, there are some examples of successes in the United States’ COVID-19 response. An example of this is the successes of fusion centers in assisting institutions and the public with accessing quality resources during this crisis. Fusion centers, according to the Department of Homeland Security, “are state-owned and operated centers that serve as focal points in states, and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information…”. Individuals can report certain concerns, which then allows the fusion center to connect them to the right resources.

One example of this was offered by Jarad Modaber of the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, in which there was a case of counterfeit N95s being stored and distributed from a warehouse. These were seized by the Department of Homeland Security with this news reported on Feb 18, 2021. Later, it was revealed that China was the source of the fake masks with around 6,000 victims of the massive scam. This demonstrates that during the pandemic, attention towards biosecurity measures and reporting them was helpful in the long run. For biosecurity and biodefense, there is a sense of coordination between law enforcement and healthcare backers that exists within the fusion center. Individuals from different backgrounds are grouped to help with calls regarding healthcare and suspicious activity.

For the 2022 Preparedness Summit, biodefense representation and its impact on decisions was only a small part of the entire picture. Funding, hospital management and coordination within organizations also plays a part in response efforts for the COVID-19 pandemic. However, despite its small role, biodefense, and biosecurity play an important role in being part of the solution in improving healthcare funding and communication between organizations. As shown by this summary, every part plays a critical role in successful response.

Pandora Report 6.2.2023

June 2, 2023June 2, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

This week is another mixed bagged, covering updates on several different topics, including the recently acknowledged Enzo Biochem ransomware attack. Several recent publications, write-ups of recent events, and multiple upcoming events are also covered.

Stimson Center Releases The Nonproliferation Cheminformatics Compliance Tool (NCCT) Proof-of-Concept

The Stemson Center recently released this complete proof of concept for a low-cost and accessible tool for front-line customs officers to identify controlled chemicals. The Center explained in this recent post “Frontline officers for border security and trade controls must quickly determine whether chemicals declared for export can be utilized as a chemical warfare agent or precursor. A proposed web-based Nonproliferation Compliance Cheminformatics Tool (NCCT) would digitize and automate this complex and time-consuming task and address vulnerabilities to the CW nonproliferation regime caused by manual cross referencing of chemical export declarations with lists of chemicals of proliferation concern.”

Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of George Mason’s Biodefense Graduate Program, serves as a consultant on the project. Learn more about it here.

DHS Completes Construction, Commissioning of National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility

From DHS: “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has completed the construction and commissioning of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas. NBAF is the first U.S. laboratory with biosafety level-4 containment, capable of housing large livestock animals; and one of only a few facilities in the world with these capabilities. With contract administration support from DHS’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) managed and completed the project under the $1.25 billion budget for the construction and commissioning effort, which spanned 17 years from initial planning to completion.”

“DHS is preparing to formally transfer ownership of the NBAF site to USDA in the coming weeks as the final step of a unique phased transition of operations that began in April 2021. Full mission transfer from the PIADC to NBAF is projected to take a couple of years…While the completion of construction and commissioning ends DHS’s responsibility for NBAF, DHS and USDA will maintain a strategic partnership by utilizing this national security asset to successfully execute their joint mission to protect the nation’s food supply, agriculture economy, and public health.”

Pandora Report 5.26.2023

May 26, 2023May 26, 2023 by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

This week’s edition of the Pandora Report focuses primarily on the recent release of Senator Marco Rubio’s COVID-19 origins report. Updates on the ongoing 76th World Health Assembly, new publications, and upcoming events are also included. Have a safe Memorial Day weekend!

Congratulations Again to Our Biodefense MS Graduates!

We would like to give one more round of congratulations to our incredible Biodefense MS students, who walked the stage last week. Check out some pictures from graduation below!

Senator Marco Rubio’s COVID-19 Origins Report: Circumstantial Evidence or Just a Lack of Context?

Last week, Senator Marco Rubio’s office released a 328-page report titled “A Complex and Grave Situation: A Political Chronology of the SARS-CoV-2 Outbreak.” This write-up aims to address some reoccurring issues in the report as well as broader implications of these problems. The report, which the office self-describes as “groundbreaking,” claims to present “…a mountain of circumstantial evidence that the Covid-19 pandemic came from a lab accident in Wuhan, China.” Furthermore, according to the report’s executive summary, “This study draws on English and Chinese sources to examine the origins of COVID-19. It indicates that a serious biosafety incident occurred at the state-run Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) during the second half of 2019.”

Video produced by Sen. Marco Rubio’s office covering this report

The report’s summary explains that the authors borrowed the legal standard of the preponderance of the evidence in their analysis. This is a type of evidentiary standard that can be used in burden of proof analysis. Under this standard, the burden of proof is met if the party that is burdened convinces the fact finder that there is a greater than 50% chance the claim is true. In other words, the party that has the burden of proof has to convince the court that it is more probable than not that their argument is correct. The utility of this standard in a report that admits it relies on circumstantial evidence and lacks a “smoking gun” is questionable given that the report focuses on a hotly contested question about a virus’s origin, rather than a known and agreed upon event.

The report also quickly runs into factual trouble, such as in its Summary of Findings where it reads in part:

“The inconsistency between Beijing’s urgent and aggressive reaction to the outbreak itself and its lackluster efforts to ascertain the virus’s origin – alas, its policy has been to actively frustrate international efforts to identify the origin and to punish PRC citizens who try to investigate on their own – suggests that Beijing already knows the origin, and fears that public confirmation of the origin could precipitate an existential crisis for the CCP and therefore must be avoided at all costs. The failure of local authorities to regulate the trade of wildlife at wet markets giving rise to the zoonotic spillover of a novel human pathogen is a crisis that the CCP has weathered before. There is no reason to believe that they could not survive it again.“

This last bit appears to reference the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak and outbreaks of H7N9 avian influenza (which were much smaller than those of SARS and COVID-19) in China in the last decade. While China was praised internationally for its response to the latter, its management of the former is a notorious failure that every subsequent Chinese outbreak response has been compared to-including its response to H7N9. Given the Party’s failure to stage good responses to HIV/AIDS in Henan province and SARS in recent decades, this statement implying the Party is good to go on handling something like a zoonotic origin of COVID-19 is nonsensical, let alone the idea that this is good evidence that such an origin is unlikely.

This apparently poor understanding of the gravity of SARS and the impact it had on the field of global health security is demonstrated throughout the piece as the authors appear perplexed at the frequent mention of SARS and SARS-like diseases. However, this is just the start of the report’s problems.

The document also dives into lengthy discussion of China’s background in BW disarmament and increasing strategic interests in biotechnology. This section, which borrows substantially from Elsa B. Kania’s work for the National Defense University and Defense One (in which she does a great job contextualizing what is being said and analyzing what it means in terms of long-term Chinese interests), aims to “…aid the reader in understanding the political, economic, and security backdrop against which the initial outbreak occurred in China.”

While there are sub-sections dedicated to topics like China’s embrace of Military-Civil Fusion, which is relevant in discussing Chinese life sciences research, it also devotes a lot of space to discussing assessments of China’s compliance with international disarmament treaties. To be clear, the State Department has concerns about China engaging in activities with potential BW applications and concerns that China has not eliminated its assessed historical BW program, but what does this have to do with a lab leak at the WIV? This is especially troubling given ongoing problems in the US and globally with BW-related disinformation.

The early portion of the report devotes space to explaining how shengwu anquan (生物安全) is used in Chinese, noting that it is commonly translated to biosecurity and biosafety in English. The authors point to a definition provided to Xinhua by Wu Guizhen of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention: “Shengwu anquan is classified as non-traditional security. It includes emerging and sudden outbreaks of infectious disease, erroneous use and deliberate misuse of new biotechnology, biosafety in laboratories, and the loss of national important hereditary materials and genetic data, etc.”⁴

This is worth highlighting now, particularly as the video released by Senator Rubio’s office emphasizes a statement from Gao Hucheng in which he said “…the biosecurity situation in our country is grim.” However, as the report does actually include, this was part of a larger statement that reads:

“At the same time that biotechnology has brought progress and benefits to humanity, it has also brought new biosecurity problems and threats. Currently the biosecurity situation in our country is grim. Bio-warfare and traditional biological threats from major emerging and sudden outbreaks of infectious diseases represented by SARS, Ebola, and African Swine Fever, as well as animal and plant epidemics, are occurring as frequently as ever before. Non-traditional biological threats, [such as] bioterrorist attacks, the erroneous use and deliberate misuse of biotechnology, and laboratories that leak biological agents, are clear and obvious.⁷⁰²“

From the start, this report seems to confuse biosecurity and biosafety in its efforts to present “circumstantial evidence” to prove a pre-determined conclusion.

A Big Ball of Wibbly-Wobbly, Timey-Wimey Stuff (Emphasis on Wibbly-Wobbly)

The big promise of this report is its chronicling of events, actions, statements, etc. “…in the PRC that pertain to biosecurity, biosafety, and public health – both as general matters and specifically in response to the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2.” The authors note they likely missed important events. They also seem to have predicted the criticism that several of their entries are irrelevant to the focus of this report, as they explain:

“Not every entry that follows should be seen as somehow directly related to the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2, because no such implication was intended by its inclusion in the chronology. Some entries beginning in 2019 are clearly related to the outbreak. Others could very well be related, but it is hard to draw a clear conclusion based on the information currently available. Some entries are most likely unrelated, or only tangentially related, but they nevertheless captured the prevailing pressures of the day and preexisting concerns about biosafety and biosecurity that may have influenced the authorities’ response. To be clear, many entries appear simply for the purpose of providing broader context to the reader. The result is a report that is far from concise, and some might even call cumbersome, but there is no glide path to clarity on the origin of this virus. We could only plod patiently through the confusing morass that surrounded the initial outbreak in China in the hope that clues would be gathered along the way”

However, as this is a report published by a US Senator promising to give the American people answers about the origins of this pandemic, this is not a helpful explanation. The political back-and-forth over where this virus came from has harmed public discourse on the troubled state of public health in this country, and Senator Rubio has directly involved himself in this, which is highlighted on his official Senate website and is evident in his repeated efforts to downplay the severity of COVID-19. Sen. Rubio said himself of this report, “After years of censorship, there is growing evidence that some type of lab accident is responsible for the Covid-19 pandemic. This report, which took two years to compile, edit, and refine, is a groundbreaking look at what was happening in China during the years and months leading up to the known outbreak of the pandemic.”

As such, inclusion of events on this timeline either implies to the public that the event is considered relevant to the start of the pandemic, or is admittedly inclusion of irrelevant information (which the general public is still likely to interpret as being relevant to the start of the pandemic). The video released in conjunction with the report also does not make this distinction, though it references several seemingly irrelevant events. An example of this is the dramatically presented response exercise hosted in China in late 2019 that focused on a novel coronavirus which, again, makes sense given the severity of the outbreak of SARS in 2002. The report even mentions an exercise hosted by Johns Hopkins in 2019 that also focused on a novel coronavirus, which only further highlights how important SARS and, later, MERS were/are to the field. The fact is there are implied connections throughout this document and its accompanying materials that warrant substantial criticism, particularly given the flawed information provided in this section.

For example, on page 44, the timeline includes a description for January 2018, titled “U.S. Diplomats Visit WIV and Report Safety Issues to Washington.” The description reads:

“After visiting the WIV and speaking with its researchers, U.S. diplomats conveyed concerns about the training of personnel and biosafety conditions at the newly constructed BSL-4 laboratory complex located on the WIV’s Zhengdian Research Industrial Park campus in Jiangxia District²⁸³ in an internal cable transmitted to Foggy Bottom on January 19, according to the Washington Post.²⁸⁴ “During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high containment laboratory,” the January 19 cable stated, relaying comments from WIV researchers. The cable further cautioned that the WIV’s work with bat coronaviruses potentially posed a risk of new SARS-like pandemic.²⁸⁵“

The Washington Post opinion piece referenced was widely criticized at the time of its release for its misrepresentation of this cable. The Post itself later acknowledged that the piece “…sparked unproven speculation from senior U.S. officials beginning in April that the outbreak occurred as a result of an accident at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.” In short, the cable is talking about how the state-of-the art WIV facility was limited in its productivity because of a “…shortage of the highly trained technicians and investigators required to safely operate a BSL-4 laboratory and a lack of clarity in related Chinese government policies and guidelines.”

The cable later says “Thus, while the BSL-4 lab is ostensibly fully accredited, its utilization is limited by lack of access to specific organisms and by opaque government review and approval processes. As long as this situation continues, Beijing’s commitment to prioritizing infectious disease control – on the regional and international level, especially in relation to highly pathogenic viruses, remains in doubt.”

It continues with, “REDACTED noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory. University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston (UTMB), which has one of several well-established BSL-4 labs in the United States (supported by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID of NIH)), has scientific collaborations with WIV, which may help alleviate this talent gap over time. Reportedly, researchers from GTMB are helping train technicians who work in the WIV BSL-4 lab. Despite this REDACTED they would welcome more help from U.S. and international organizations as they establish “gold standard” operating procedures and training courses for the first time in China. As China is building more BSL-4 labs, including one in Harbin Veterinary Research Institute subordinated to the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) for veterinary research use REDACTED the training for technicians and investigators working on dangerous pathogens will certainly be in demand.”

While the Rubio report indicates this cable “…further cautioned that the WIV’s work with bat coronaviruses potentially posed a risk of new SARS-like pandemic…”, that kind of warning does not appear in the cable. Rather, the cable positively discusses WIV scientists’ efforts to undertake productive research related to the origin of SARS despite the limitations on the new BSL-4 facility which the researchers were frustrated by and working to address. So, to summarize, the cable was about the WIV opening a state-of-the-art BSL-4 laboratory that it could not fully use because of the Chinese government’s concerns about the need for more trained personnel at the WIV.

cable Download

There are other points of ambiguity and concern throughout the chronology portion, such as poorly contextualized references to “SARS-like” diseases and more quotes seemingly taken out of context. For example, the Rubio report discusses an event in September 2018 on page 54, stating:

“On September 10 and 14, the WIV held political study sessions at which a number of its strategic goals and challenges were discussed.³⁴⁴ Brief reports of the meetings posted on the WIV’s website brought into clear focus the state-run nature of the WIV, including its obligations to meet goals set by the central CCP authorities in Beijing. It further suggested that the WIV leadership was already aware of problems that could later have implications for biosafety and biosecurity – problems that would be discussed with greater frequency and urgency in 2019.”

“Chen Xinwen, director of the WIV from 2008 to late 2018, was described as having brought attention to unspecified “shortcomings and inadequacies in the current work at the CAS,” ³⁴⁵and having “highlighted the imperative to tightly grasp the critical [technological] fields and the ‘stranglehold’ problem that affects the overall situation of the nation and its long-term development.”³⁴⁶ The “stranglehold problem” is a recurring theme of concern at the WIV and among other state-run research entities charged with meeting the science and technology goals set by Beijing. It refers to the “direct [deleterious] effects created by cutting off the supply of foreign key and core technologies” to China,³⁴⁷ which means technologies that China “must import because it is unable to produce them domestically in sufficient quality or quantity.”³⁴⁸“

However, the section of the WIV’s post the authors quoted in English as “shortcoming and inadequacies in the current work at the CAS, (“陈新文从中科院当前工作的短板和不足…”)” is part of a much larger paragraph that provides helpful context to what Chen actually said. Chen’s speech, which the post’s author says conveyed the spirit of Xi Jinping’s previous speeches on the matter, began with discussion and praise of the country’s scientific and technological achievements. He then made a statement about improving the work of CAS (from its shortcoming and deficiencies) so that the organization can better support strategic goals and address the stranglehold issues referenced throughout. He then concluded with some goals the WIV should strive towards meeting, such as clarifying its work priorities, strengthening its party building work, and providing a strong political and organizational guarantee for the scientific and technological advancement of the WIV. So, in context, this is a much more general statement of how the WIV should try to continuously improve, rather than some statement about specific problems at the Institute. This makes sense given the public-facing nature of the website.

Another particularly troublesome section begins on page 197, where the report discusses a COVID-19 patent application made in February 2020. The report says:

“On February 24, Zhou Yusen, a virologist at the PLA AMMS Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, led a team of 11 researchers that filed a patent application with the PRC National Intellectual Property Administration for a COVID-19 vaccine, becoming the first in China to do so.¹²⁶² The application indicated that the patent rights would belong to two organizations, the PLA AMMS Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology where Zhou worked and a biopharmaceutical firm in Beijing called JOINN Biologics.¹²⁶³ The vaccine was developed under the auspices of an “emergency project” authorized by the MOST, according to JOINN Biologics.¹²⁶⁴“

“Zhou’s filing came only 35 days after the PRC authorities admitted to the public that human-to-human transmission was occurring, only 46 days after they had confirmed that the causative agent of the pneumonia outbreak was a novel coronavirus, and only 55 days since their first public acknowledgment that a pneumonia outbreak had been detected. The genomic sequence used in the patent, which remains unexploited insofar as can be determined through the available literature, may represent the earliest available sequence of SARS-CoV-2.”

“Based on the methodology that Zhou’s team used to develop the vaccine and the three experiments conducted to complete the underlying study, U.S. experts in vaccinology and immunology consulted during this study estimated that a minimum of 12-16 weeks lead time (three to four months) would have been required to conduct the necessary technical and animal experimentation to prepare this patent application for submission by February 24. This estimated timeline places the beginning of Zhou’s research in early November 2019 at the latest, perhaps as early as mid-October.”‘

While the names of the US experts in vaccinology and immunology are not included in the report, the overarching claim in this section is reminiscent of that made in the ProPublica piece last year and the recent report from the Senate HELP Committee. Unfortunately, these arguments about these patent filings’ timelines have still struggled to find acceptance-including among those who are prominent proponents of the lab leak hypothesis.

The vaccine date argument made its way to a @HouseIntelGOP report, with an erroneous description of the Feb patent application (WT/humanized mice infections in May preprint)@R_H_Ebright, is there any way you can let them know about what you said?⏬https://t.co/ym3csCSQtC p12-13 https://t.co/U7VIZJXUv9 pic.twitter.com/kis6blDvVl
— Flo Débarre (@flodebarre) December 16, 2022

That Pandora’s Box Line Strikes Again

The myth of Pandora and the theodicy that branched from her story has influenced theologies, stories, and other works for centuries…including a certain global health security newsletter you know and love. The same appears to be true for the WIV, as they referenced Pandora’s mythical box in a November 2019 post on their website. That reference is, again, at the center of the debate over COVID-19’s origin. On pages 115 and 116, the Rubio report references the post dated November 12, 2019, just as ProPublica and Vanity Fair did last year, as evidence that there were significant concerns about the WIV’s day-to-day operations. We discussed the problems with this in our post about the ProPublica piece last year, but we will go over this a bit more now too.

The Rubio report says in this section:

“The second issue of particular significance that featured in this November 12 report was its surprisingly frank description of the routine dangers of the work at the WIV’s BSL-4 lab, including its insinuation that a biosafety incident involving a dangerous pathogen had occurred:”

“Owing to [the fact] that the subject of research at the P4 lab is highly pathogenic microorganisms, inside the laboratory, once you have opened the stored test tubes, it is just as if having opened Pandora’s Box. These viruses come without a shadow and leave without a trace. Although [we have] various preventive and protective measures, it is nevertheless necessary for lab personnel to operate very cautiously to avoid operational errors that give rise to dangers. Every time this has happened, the members of the Zhengdian Lab Party Branch have always run to the frontline, and they have taken real action to mobilize and motivate other research personnel.⁷³⁶“

“Third, this WIV report described a high-pressure work environment and other disadvantageous conditions that could create biosafety risk factors. “In the laboratory, they often need to work for four consecutive hours, even extending to six hours,” the report revealed: “During this time, they cannot eat, drink, or relieve themselves. This is an extreme test of a person’s will and physical endurance. This not only demands that research personnel possess proficient operational skills, but they also…possess the ability to respond to various unexpected situations.”⁷³⁷ U.S. biosafety experts who have managed BSL-4 labs told Senator Rubio’s staff that exceeding two consecutive hours of work in a BSL-4 environment is likely to lead to fatigue, and that they would not recommend going beyond three hours. The report noted that the lab’s political leadership, specifically Tong Xiao, was constantly pushing the researchers at the BSL-4 lab to do more: “Don’t look at your work duties as pressure. Every task is an opportunity and a ladder for continuous self-improvement. Our team’s belief is that suffering losses is good fortune….”⁷³⁸“

“Fourth, the WIV report referenced problems with the construction of the BSL-4 lab, inadequate standards, and a lack of experience with relevant technologies. The party branch reported:”

“From the outset of construction, the Wuhan P4 Lab had been facing a predicament [caused by] the “three nos”: no equipment and technology standards, no design and construction teams, and no experience operating or maintaining [a lab of this caliber]. Through the party members of the Zhengdian Lab Party Branch taking the lead to attack and conquer these difficulties, [and] bravely pressing forward, in the end, [we] brought into reality the “three haves” of a complete system of standards, a superior team that operates and maintains [the lab], and valuable experience with construction.⁷³⁹“

This is also cited in the report’s two-page executive summary, which reads in part:

“In November 2019, the Chinese government documented several cases of COVID-19, but kept the matter hidden. CCP officials at the WIV published a report that said: “Once you have opened the stores test tubes, it is just as if having opened Pandora’s Box. These viruses come without a shadow and leave without a trace.” Seven days later, a Chinese official traveled from Beijing to the WIV to deliver “important oral and written instructions” from Xi Jinping in response to “the complex and grave situation currently facing safety work.”

Viruses slipping out of Pandora’s test tube and vanishing without a trace is pretty scary…until you consider that this was written in a post on the WIV’s general news page as part of a peppy update on the facility’s work. It will likely come as a shock to nobody that it is in fact dangerous to work in a BSL-4 facility. According to the CDC’s very quick and openly accessible Recognizing the Biosafety Levels training, “The microbes in a BSL-4 lab are dangerous and exotic, posing a high risk of aerosol-transmitted infections. Infections caused by these microbes are frequently fatal and without treatment or vaccines. Two examples of microbes worked with in a BSL-4 laboratory include Ebola and Marburg viruses.”

This is helpful context for a news post bragging about the progress the WIV has made and how dedicated its staff is, which is what this “report” actually is. This post talks about how researchers have to wear space suit-like protective gear, work in a physically challenging environment, and go through multiple layers of decontamination, including a chemical shower. The dramatic language of this post makes sense in context. This is the cool kind of cool work that makes for great scenes in Hollywood outbreak movies, so of course a Party-run page would want to brag about it on its public site.

The piece about the “three nos” has also been addressed at length, including by Brendan O’Kane, a career translator, in an interview with James Fallows. O’Kane explained in that interview that his translation of the portion in question would be “At the outset of construction, the Wuhan P4 lab faced the dilemma of the “three ‘nos’”: no equipment or technical standards, no design and construction teams, and no operations or maintenance experience — but with Party members from the Zhengdian Lab [BSL4]’s Party branch leading the charge and bravely pushing forward, [the lab] achieved the ‘Three ‘Yes’es’: a well-developed set of standards, a seasoned operations and maintenance team, and invaluable construction experience.”

More simply, as Fallows explained and O’Kane agreed, “…this would be like a sentence in English saying “we used to be so terrible, but now we’re great.”’ So, rather than discussing an ongoing problem with a lack of equipment, the section about the “three nos” was actually yet another example of Party members bragging about their progress at the facility, something that is, again, expected on a publicly-facing WIV webpage.

As we argued previously, there is a major logical flaw here in relying so heavily on the WIV’s webpage (even if ProPublica, Vanity Fair, and multiple Senate committees want to call them reports, dispatches, etc. or any other cooler sounding term). If the overarching argument is that the CCP is so deeply secretive and worried about the international community knowing the truth about how the pandemic started, why would a state-owned facility (particularly one as high-profile as the WIV) be allowed to post publicly about its supposed biosafety failures? Why would those posts remain up for years after the supposed event at the lab that led to the COVID-19 pandemic?

These are just some of the flaws of this report, which are particularly troubling because the document admittedly relies on circumstantial evidence to lend credence to the lab leak hypothesis. The next sections discuss recent assessments of China’s biosecurity and biosafety, the problems of these kinds of flawed reports on the pandemic’s start, and concluding thoughts.

How Does China Actually Fare in Biosecurity?

Though China, like any country, could stand to improve its regulations and enforcement of biosafety and security rules, the country scores fairly well on measurements of both its biosafety and biosecurity governance. However, this report, in including several examples of concerns and challenges and different Chinese facilities, paints a picture contrary to this.

In this year’s Global BioLabs Report (a report produced by a project led by George Mason’s Dr. Gregory Koblentz, King’s College London’s Dr. Filippa Lentzos, and supported by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists), China scored high in both biosafety governance (18/20) and biosecurity governance (15/18), outscoring countries like South Korea and Sweden. When combined with poor use of other materials like the State Department cable obtained by The Washington Post, this report from Sen. Rubio paints a picture of a country completely incompetent in these areas, when it is clear the situation is much more nuanced.

Don’t Throw the Baby Out With the Bathwater

Furthermore, on multiple occasions, this report from Senator Rubio’s office highlights an important issue that is generally agreed upon, but the authors take it in a direction not supported by their sourcing and critical analysis. For example, the report’s summary reads in part:

“Awareness of a laboratory incident seemed to have shaped the CCP leadership’s response to SARS-CoV-2: a response characterized by strict controls of information, obfuscation, misdirection, punishment of whistleblowers, and the destruction of key clinical evidence. A closer look at the early days of the pandemic revealed that even when Beijing shared information with the international community – such as the initial notice of a pneumonia outbreak, the later admission that a novel coronavirus was its causal agent, and the publishing of its genomic sequence – it did so belatedly. In all three cases, Beijing possessed the relevant information for some time before sharing it, and disclosed it only when compelled to do so by circumstances beyond its control.”

The CCP undeniably mounted “…a response characterized by strict controls of information, obfuscation, misdirection, punishment of whistleblowers, and the destruction of key clinical evidence [albeit from unauthorized labs].” However, this doesn’t mean the virus began to spread in Wuhan because of a lab incident, as evidenced by the Party’s historical outbreak response failures that progressed in similar manners following natural origins. Why is more emphasis not placed on doing something about what we do know happened, both in China and at home?

As we explained earlier this year, “…it is important to address the question of to what extent we can know this [how SARS-CoV-2 came to be] and what it would change at this point. China is clearly not going to cooperate on any kind of investigation into COVID-19’s origin. That has been clear since the early days of the pandemic and is part of a pattern of behavior on the part of the CCP. Irrespective of where this virus actually came from, it is clear that China did cover up its initial spread in the population, censoring netizens and healthcare professionals until it was impossible to conceal further. While an in-depth investigation into the start of this pandemic has always been needed, hyper focusing on this runs the risk of diverting attention from other critical issues we have much more information readily available on. China did cover up the initial spread of this virus and has been disingenuous in its reporting and handling of it ever since. The United States failed to adequately respond to this pandemic for a variety of reasons, a fact that does not depend on how the virus initially spread. It is vital to balance desires to find the truth of COVID-19’s origins, something that is indisputably important, with using the information that is available and can reasonably be acquired to address these problems before the next pandemic. This information could inform debates on laboratory safety and oversight, though, as Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz demonstrated in his interview with the New York Times…there is a wealth of information available already driving these discussions.”

Concluding Thoughts

Like we said during the publication of the ProPublica piece, Vanity Fair article, and Senate HELP Committee reports, bad faith takes on China, COVID-19, and biosafety hurt us all. This report is correct in that it highlights that scientific analysis alone cannot tell us what all went wrong with China’s response to COVID-19. Political and social analysis is absolutely needed, but that has to be based in linguistic and area expertise in addition to an agnostic approach to the facts. Trying to gather circumstantial evidence, specifically poorly contextualized quotations, to support a pre-determined conclusion is not going to cut it.

The report’s reliance on circumstantial evidence to meet a borrowed legal standard for burden of proof analysis is also flawed. If this were a debate about how an outbreak originated from the WIV, then perhaps that legal standard would be more useful, but this is a debate about how an event with an uncertain timeline began-and one with substantial evidence for a zoonotic origin at that.

This flawed reporting appears to be symptomatic of hawkish attitudes in Washington that employ poor translation and analysis in order to reach a politically convenient conclusion about China. The Chinese Communist Party is not innocent in this matter by any stretch of the imagination, but throwing the same flawed materials at the wall repeatedly in hopes something will stick does nothing but arm the Party with potential propaganda and talking points. At a time where the US-China relationship is on shaky ground and scientific collaborations are suffering as a result, it is vital that US leadership addresses the established issues and helps the nation and world prepare for future global health crises. It is clear that the PRC is not interested in handling outbreaks appropriately, irrespective of where this pandemic started. Acknowledging this and working to address it and prepare for the likelihood it will happen again is a more productive way to move forward than rehashing these same points over and over again.

Seventy-Sixth World Health Assembly Convenes

The 76th World Health Assembly (WHA) is currently being held in Geneva under the theme “WHO at 75: Saving lives, driving health for all.” Livestreams and interpretations are available here in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. So far, the meeting has seen 80 WHO member states vote to move the Moscow-based European Office for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases to Copenhagen, while also urging Russia to stop attacking hospitals and other healthcare facilities in Ukraine. 52 states abstained while eight, including North Korea, China, and Belarus, voted against the draft decision.

‘“Far from politicising the situation, [the draft decision] focuses specifically on lingering health impacts of the war,” said Ukraine’s delegate, addressing the assembly before Wednesday’s vote.”

‘“The full-scale aggression launched by Russia against Ukraine … has triggered one of the largest health and humanitarian crises,” she said. “More than 1,256 health facilities have been damaged and 177 reduced to rubble leaving about 237 health workers and patients dead or injured.”’

While not part of the WHA meeting, the WHO is also currently working on negotiations for a new pandemic accord. Reuters explains, “A new pact is a priority for WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus who called it a “generational commitment that we will not go back to the old cycle of panic and neglect” at the U.N. agency’s annual assembly. It seeks to shore up the world’s defences against new pathogens following the COVID-19 pandemic that has killed nearly 7 million people.”

Elaine Ruth Fletcher explains in Health Policy Watch “A new “Zero+” version of a proposed World Health Organization pandemic accord being negotiated by member states has dropped previously strong language that conditioned use of public R&D funds to private sector commitments to price transparency and tech transfer of end products, among other measures.”

“However, the updated draft text, obtained by Health Policy Watch, still contains ‘optional’ language linking developing countries’ sharing of pathogen information to a guaranteed supply of drugs, vaccines and other health tools that they would access a WHO distribution scheme.”

“While not a formal part of this week’s World Health Assembly (WHA) proceedings, the text drafted by the “Bureau” of six member states guiding the talks is being circulated this week as they prepare for another round of negotiations over the new accord, scheduled by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) 12-16 June.“

“The latest draft of the “WHO Convention, Agreement or other International Instrument”, dubbed WHO CA+, offers a range of “options” where there are diverging opinions between member states with consensus yet to be reached.”

“Russia Must Stop Its Attacks on Food Security”

This new bulletin from the State Department’s Global Engagement Center covers a wide-range of food security issues stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including Kremlin officials’ calls to weaponize hunger. The document explains in part “The Kremlin’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war against Ukraine has severely damaged Ukraine’s economy and exacerbated global food insecurity, especially in developing countries. Ukraine has long been the “breadbasket of Europe,” feeding millions across the globe. It was a top grain supplier to dozens of African and Middle Eastern countries in 2021, but after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, Russia blockaded Ukrainian trade routes through the Black Sea, mined Ukrainian agricultural fields, burned crops, destroyed Ukraine’s food storage supplies, created labor shortages, and attacked merchant shipping vessels and ports. Russia is also stealing Ukraine’s grain for its own profit, according to Ukrainian authorities, media reports, and the Kremlin’s own proxies in the occupied areas of Ukraine. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine has “disrupted agricultural production and trade in the Black Sea region, triggering an unprecedented peak in international food prices in the first half of 2022.”’

New Digital Report Warns That World Not Prepared for the Next Pandemic

A new interactive, digital report from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Munich Security Conference finds that the world is underprepared for biological catastrophes. The report relies on a table top exercise of an outbreak of AKMV in cattle in the fictional country of Andoriban. The outbreak quickly spills over into the human population, first causing a local epidemic that soon becomes a global pandemic. The scenario incorporates response challenges and flawed intelligence that fails to attribute the attack to the fictional country’s adversary. The exercise ended in 2.2 billion AKMV cases and 120 million deaths in just 20 months. In the end, “Tabletop exercise participants agreed that, despite some improvements following the global response to COVID-19, the international system of pandemic prevention, detection, and response is woefully inadequate to address current and anticipated future biological threats.”

“Biosafety Needs to Redefine Itself as a Science”

In this piece for Issues in Science and Technology, Antony Schwartz, Andrea Vogel, and Mary Brock discuss the growing demand for biosafety workers and issues with the field being viewed more as a compliance problem than a science. They write in part, “Risk assessment is already at the core of most biosafety professionals’ daily work. Some hazards can indeed be mitigated with standardized practices and procedures. However, most circumstances require careful study of the biohazards, the procedures performed, the equipment used, and the mitigation measures available (facilities, containment devices, or personal protective equipment, for instance). Establishing biosafety as an innovative research discipline will enable the field to keep pace with a sector that is going through momentous changes.”

“A Shot of Resilience: A Critical Analysis of Manufacturing Vulnerabilities in Vaccine Production”

Steph Batalis and Anna Puglisi explain in this policy brief for the Center for Security and Emerging Technology, “Vaccines are a key aspect of national security and underpin U.S. strategies for public health, biosecurity, and pandemic preparedness. Routine vaccinations keep the American public healthy, decrease healthcare spending, and increase workforce productivity. In a public health emergency, vaccines are an important line of defense against new and emerging threats…Despite the importance of a secure vaccine supply, our analysis finds two major vulnerabilities in the biomanufacturing landscape for U.S. vaccines: a reliance on foreign manufacturers and a lack of manufacturing redundancy. Together, these two factors limit the country’s ability to respond to emerging health threats.”

“Deaths From Drug-Resistant Infections Set To Skyrocket”

Statista’s Anna Fleck discusses the growing threat of antimicrobial resistance in this analysis. She explains in part, “Deaths from drug-resistant infections are set to skyrocket by 2050, according to the UN 2023 report ‘Bracing for Superbugs: Strengthening environmental action in the One Health response to antimicrobial resistance.’ Unless drastic action is taken to tackle the problem, it could also lead to a GDP shortfall of $3.4 trillion annually in the next decade and push 24 more people into extreme poverty.”

“Although the risks of AMR will impact people worldwide, Low-Income Countries (LICs) and Lower-Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) are expected to see the highest death tolls. By region, Asia is predicted to see the highest number of AMR-related deaths per 10,000 population in 2050 (4,730,000), followed by Africa (4,150,000), Latin America (392,000), Europe (390,000), North America (317,000) and Oceania (22,000).”

https://www.statista.com/chart/3095/drug-resistant-infections/

“Up To 500,000 Killed by Fake Medicines in Sub-Saharan Africa”

Anna Fleck also recently published this work for Statista covering the challenges of counterfeit medications in sub-Saharan Africa. She explains “Nearly half a million people are estimated to be killed by counterfeit medicines in sub-Saharan Africa every year, according to data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Of these, 267,000 deaths are believed to be linked to falsified or substandard antimalarial medicines, while a further 169,271 are linked to falsified or substandard antibiotics for severe pneumonia in children.”

https://www.statista.com/chart/30068/falsified-medicines-in-sub-saharan-africa/

Fast Updates

“The World’s Top Chemical-Weapons Detectives Just Opened a Brand-New Lab”

From Nature News: “The international body that banned chemical weapons is due to celebrate its first major milestone sometime this year — the completed destruction of the world’s declared stockpiles of banned substances. But at the organization’s brand-new facility in the Netherlands, scientists from around the world will continue its work to prevent, spot and respond to chemical warfare.”

“On 12 May, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) officially inaugurated its new Centre for Chemistry and Technology near The Hague, where the international body will bring together its existing laboratories and add new monitoring and training programmes.”

“IARPA Pursuing Breakthrough Biointelligence and Biosecurity Innovations”

From Homeland Security Today: “The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) — the advanced research and development arm of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence — recently launched a program to develop new innovations for tackling threats and advances inherent within the rapidly changing biointelligence and biosecurity landscapes.”

“The Biointelligence and Biosecurity for the Intelligence Community (B24IC) program represents the Intelligence Community’s (IC) latest investment in research that pushes the boundaries of our biointelligence and biosecurity understanding and technologies. The resulting innovations could have far-reaching impacts, with the potential to develop new ways to collect, detect, analyze, and prevent traditional biothreats, while addressing possibilities and dangers associated with biotechnology. To address these challenges, the IC seeks to advance research across multiple biology sub-disciplines.”

“Plan for UK ‘Genomic Transformation’ Aims to Act on Lessons of COVID”

From The Guardian: “Health officials in the UK have drawn up plans for a “genomics transformation” that aims to detect and deal with outbreaks of infectious diseases faster and more effectively in the light of the Covid pandemic.”

“Information gleaned from the genetics of Covid proved crucial as the virus swept around the globe, revealing how the pathogen spread, evolved, and responded to a succession of vaccines and medicines developed to protect people.”

“The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) now aims to build on the lessons of the pandemic by embedding genomics into routine public health practice. The move intends to bolster surveillance for outbreaks, drive down cases of infections such as TB, measles, hepatitis C and HIV/Aids, and predict the course of future threats, such as avian flu and diseases borne by mosquitoes and ticks as they gain ground in a warming climate.”

NEW: Fighting Antimicrobial Resistance with Vaccine Innovation: Obstacles & Insights

“What are some of the challenges being faced in vaccine innovation and development? How can the biotech industry come together to bring innovative AMR-relevant vaccines to the market?”

NEW: Biorisks, Biosecurity And Biological Disarmament Conference

This hybrid event will take place July 4-5. Learn more and register here.

Building Capacity for Dual-Use Oversight in the Life Sciences through the IEGBBR

Join the International Experts Group of Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulators for this virtual event on May 30 at 7 am EDT. This event will discuss “how to identify, assess, and mitigate dual-use concerns in the life sciences – two examples of oversight measures in a national oversight system”. Register here.

Soft Launch of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Measures Database

From UNIDIR: “The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) National Implementation Measures Database is a searchable, publicly accessible database containing information about the national implementation measures undertaken by BWC States Parties. The database is designed to strengthen the implementation of the BWC, allowing States Parties, Signatories, and other stakeholders to better understand different approaches to national implementation from around the world and identify possible gaps and limitations in BWC implementation.”

“As part of the development of the database, UNIDIR’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and VERTIC’s National Implementation Measures Programme are organising an online event to introduce the tool and showcase its structure and functions.”

This event will take place on May 31, at 1 pm CEST. Learn more and register here.

CSWMD 2023 Annual Symposium: WMD in the Decisive Decade

“For more information and to register for this event click here. Please RSVP by 9 JUNE 2023.”

Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community

This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: In 1968, the so-called “Hong Kong flu” killed an estimated one million people globally. What strain of Influenza A caused this pandemic?

Our question last week was: “In late 2019, what two nerve agents were added to the CWC’s Schedule 1?” Many on Twitter recognized it was a trick question and did correctly note that two families of nerve agents-Novichoks and carbamates-were added to Schedule 1. You can read more about this in “Updating the CWC,” an article published in Arms Control Today by Drs. Stefano Costanzi and Greg Koblentz.

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