This week covers the updated Doomsday Clock time, new HHS cybersecurity performance goals for the health sector, a podcast episode with our own Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley covering her work on barriers to biological weapons, new publications, and more!
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board Leaves Doomsday Clock at 90 Seconds to Midnight
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board recently announced that it left the Doomsday Clock at 90 seconds to midnight this year, based on threats like nuclear risk, climate change, biological threats, and disruptive technologies. In its statement, the board said in part “Ominous trends continue to point the world toward global catastrophe. The war in Ukraine and the widespread and growing reliance on nuclear weapons increase the risk of nuclear escalation. China, Russia, and the United States are all spending huge sums to expand or modernize their nuclear arsenals, adding to the ever-present danger of nuclear war through mistake or miscalculation.”
“In 2023, Earth experienced its hottest year on record, and massive floods, wildfires, and other climate-related disasters affected millions of people around the world. Meanwhile, rapid and worrisome developments in the life sciences and other disruptive technologies accelerated, while governments made only feeble efforts to control them.”
In its in-depth explanation of biological risks that factored into this decision, the board explains that “The revolution in the life sciences and associated technologies continues to accelerate and expand in scope, enabling an increasing number of individuals, in groups and alone, to pose threats arising from both accidental and deliberate misuse. During the past six months, the potential for artificial intelligence tools to empower individuals to misuse biology has become far more apparent.”
The same sidebar also explains that “Two other types of biological risks remain causes for concern: accidental release of organisms from laboratories and naturally occurring infectious diseases, especially those with pandemic potential. Deforestation, urbanization, and climate change continue to destabilize microbe-host relationships and facilitate the emergence of infectious diseases. Meanwhile, high-biosafety-level laboratories have proliferated around the world, as has risky research motivated by interests in controlling these diseases. Despite the importance of understanding and countering naturally occurring biological threats, it isn’t clear that all of these high-biosafety-level laboratories or high-risk experiments are needed for achieving these goals. As the number of laboratories and amount of risky research increases, and the failure to standardize safe laboratory practices and to institute adequate research oversight persists, the risk of accidental release of dangerous pathogens worsens.”
HHS Announces New Voluntary Performance Goals, Resources for Health Sector Cybersecurity
This week, the Department of Health and Human Services announced via the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) that it is releasing “voluntary health care specific cybersecurity performance goals (CPGs) and a new gateway website to help Health Care and Public Health (HPH) sector organizations implement these high-impact cybersecurity practices and ease access to the plethora of cybersecurity resources HHS and other federal partners offer.”
The statement further explained “As outlined in the recent HHS Health Care Sector Cybersecurity concept paper, HHS is publishing the CPGs to help health care organizations, and health care delivery organizations in particular, prioritize implementation of high-impact cybersecurity practices. The HPH CPGs are designed to better protect the healthcare sector from cyberattacks, improve response when events occur, and minimize residual risk. HPH CPGs include both essential goals to outline minimum foundational practices for cybersecurity performance and enhanced goals to encourage adoption of more advanced practices.”
Read more here.
“Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley on Barriers to Bioweapons”
From Hear This Idea: “Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is an associate professor at George Mason University and the deputy director of their biodefense program. Sonia has written extensively on the proliferation and non-proliferation of bioweapons, being one of the key voices to have emphasized the challenges that organizations, tacit knowledge, and other factors have caused for states and terrorists that have attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction.”
“In this episode we talk about:
- Misconceptions around the ease of bioweapon production — how and why bioweapons programs face unique challenges compared to nuclear weapons programs
- The crucial role of tacit knowledge in bioweapons production
- Will AI make bioweapons much easier to develop, or will human expertise remain a major bottleneck?
- Case studies of bioweapons programs, illustrating the practical difficulties and failures encountered even by well-resourced state actors.
- (How) has Biological Weapons Convention prevented bioweapon proliferation?
- Do global political trends point towards proliferation, even without AI?”
“How Reliable is ISIS’s Claiming Responsibility for Deadly Attacks in Iran?”
Schar School associate professor Mahmut Cengiz recently authored this piece for Homeland Security Today, in which he writes in part “These discrepancies related to the twin blasts bring up a question of how reliable ISIS is when the group claims responsibility for terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups aim to take credit when a group spokesperson, on behalf of the organization, states that the group is the perpetrator of the attack. They tend to claim responsibility for attacks—targeting state institutions and the military rather than civilians— when they aim to gain publicity and when the backlash from the government is not likely. As opposed to terrorist attacks that claimed most responsibility in the 1980s and 1990s, every one of seven attacks has been recorded claiming responsibility since 2018. According to the Global Terrorism and Trends Analysis Center (GTTAC) Records of Incidents Database (GRID), the attacks by ISIS and its affiliated organizations steadily increased from 2018 to 2022. They conducted 873 attacks in the first ten months of 2023. Contrary to increasing attacks, its attacks of claiming responsibility slightly increased between 2018 and 2020 and dropped in 2021 and 2022. ISIS groups claimed responsibility in its 161 attacks. “
“Beyond Borders, Beyond Biases: Building a Biosecure Future with Diverse Voices”
Aparupa Sengupta, Senior Program Officer for Global Biological Policy and Programs at NTI, discusses the importance of diversity and inclusion in biosafety and biosecurity governance in this piece for NTI. She writes in part “At NTI, we believe the greatest risk of these catastrophic effects is from the accidental or intentional misuse of a bio-engineered agent. Therefore, we focus on developing stronger biosafety and biosecurity policies and practices to protect against these manmade risks. This work requires global cooperation and shared responsibility, and an understanding that diverse perspectives and experiences are essential. Without them, we will face widening knowledge gaps and international resentment, ultimately sabotaging our ability to collectively address bio threats.”
“Recently, the Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS) published a report recommending actions to strengthen global biosafety and biosecurity. As someone with more than 15 years of experience working in the interface of science, technology, and biosafety/security, I endorse all eight recommendations in the report but suggest adding a ninth one to the list: “Prioritize diversity and inclusion for effective global biosafety and biosecurity governance.”’
“Did China Keep the COVID Virus Sequence Secret for Weeks?”
Matt Field breaks down questions surrounding China’s sharing of the SARS-CoV-2 genetic sequence in the early days of COVID-19 in this piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: “In outbreak response, speed is critical as authorities seek to quickly determine the cause of a disease and prevent it from spreading. A new report is now raising fresh questions about China’s early response to COVID-19. The Wall Street Journal revealed Wednesday that a researcher in Beijing attempted to upload the genetic sequence SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID, to a US-based public database about two weeks before the Chinese government publicized the pathogen’s sequence, a lag that potentially robbed scientists and health officials of valuable time.”
“Investigating the Potential Strategic Implications of COVID-19 for Biological Weapons Pursuit: A New Expert Simulation”
Ackerman et al. recently published this article in Health Security: “To investigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the strategic decisionmaking of leaders with respect to biological weapons, this study employed a prospective simulation technique called Asynchronous Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming. Using an immersive, multimedia simulation conducted remotely and asynchronously, the effort engaged 240 carefully selected and curated expert participants in either biological weapons or the countries of interest (as well as 60 naïve participants). Across our sample of 30 countries, simulated interest in pursuing some type of biological weapons program (defensive or offensive) remained low to moderate. While such interest increased after the simulated onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was limited overall, with only a handful of states showing salient increases in offensive biological weapon interest. When directly referencing why their countries might have changed their post-COVID-19 interest in biological weapons, the most commonly cited reasons were: (1) COVID-19 demonstrated the power of biological weapons to disrupt societies and cause large-scale economic harm, and (2) the pandemic revealed either the state’s own or its rivals’ vulnerability to diseases like COVID-19, as well as an inability to efficiently respond and contain such diseases. In sum, despite a global pandemic with massive consequences, the simulation revealed that most states are not likely to dramatically change their strategic posture regarding pursuit of offensive biological weapons.”
“Catalogue of Civil Society Assistance for BWC States Parties”
From the Stimson Center: “The Catalogue of Civil Society Assistance to States Parties annually highlights the contributions of civil society to the BWC and States Parties and to the enhancement of biological safety and security. From Ottawa to Hamburg, there are civil society assistance programs across the world that are available to support the implementation of the BWC. The catalogue includes organization and project descriptions and points of contact for each program, which aims to facilitate stronger connections between civil society and State Parties in need of assistance.”
“The Operational Risks of AI in Large-Scale Biological Attacks”
New from RAND: “The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) has far-reaching implications across multiple domains, including concern regarding the potential development of biological weapons. This potential application of AI raises particular concerns because it is accessible to nonstate actors and individuals. The speed at which AI technologies are evolving often surpasses the capacity of government regulatory oversight, leading to a potential gap in existing policies and regulations.”
“In this report, the authors share final results of a study of the potential risks of using large language models (LLMs) in the context of biological weapon attacks. They conducted an expert exercise in which teams of researchers role-playing as malign nonstate actors were assigned to realistic scenarios and tasked with planning a biological attack; some teams had access to an LLM along with the internet, and others were provided only access to the internet. The authors sought to identify potential risks posed by LLM misuse, generate policy insights to mitigate any risks, and contribute to responsible LLM development. The findings indicate that using the existing generation of LLMs did not measurably change the operational risk of such an attack.”
“Implementing The Bioeconomy Executive Order: Lessons Learned And Future Considerations”
Nazish Jeffrey breaks down the Federations of American Scientists’ Bioeconomy EO Tracker in this piece, writing “With the U.S. bioeconomy valued at over $950 billion and predicted to steadily increase, the potential for significant economic impact is unmistakable. To leverage this economic opportunity, the 2022 Bioeconomy Executive Order (EO) took a significant step towards addressing the complexities of the bioeconomy and creating a whole-of-government approach. The scope of the EO was vast, assigning around 40 tasks to many different federal agencies, in order to create a national framework to leverage bio-based innovations for sustainable economic growth.”
“To track the numerous tasks assigned by the EO, the Federation of American Scientists have put together a living Bioeconomy EO tracker to monitor the progress of these tasks, enhance accountability and to allow stakeholders to stay informed on the state of the U.S. bioeconomy as it evolves. This FAS tracker was inspired by the initial tracker created by Stanford University when the EO was first published.”
“Public Health Preparedness: HHS Emergency Agency Needs to Strengthen Workforce Planning”
In this new Government Accountability Office report, GAO recommends that “ASPR (1) establish specific goals and performance measures to use for its new hiring office once it is fully operational, (2) develop tailored strategies for recruiting and hiring human capital staff for the new office, (3) identify the critical areas that need workforce assessments and develop plans to implement them, and (4) conduct an agency-wide workforce assessment. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with the first two recommendations and agreed with the last two recommendations. GAO believes actions are needed to address all of the recommendations.”
Read more here.
“Dissecting Pandemic-Prone Viral Families Volume 2: The Paramyxoviridae”
Amesh A. Adalja covers the Paramyxoviridae family in this volume of Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security’s Dissecting Pandemic-Prone Viral Families,” writing in part “Paramyxoviridae is a large viral family that contains many once common and wellknown human pathogens, such as measles and mumps, as well as other pathogens that pose concerns for their potential to cause epidemic or pandemic disease.1″
“This family of viruses infects a wide variety of species, ranging from reptiles to rodents and fish to birds. While diseases such as measles and mumps cause little morbidity and mortality in advanced societies today—because of high levels of vaccine-induced immunity—other members of this viral family have considerable burdens of infection with attendant morbidity and mortality risks. Also, within this family, there is one genus of consequence – Henipavirus – that has already been responsible for a number of serious emerging infectious diseases. The table below summarizes key genera and viruses of this family.1”
“The Overlooked Bacterial Pandemic”
Moriel et al. recently published this work in Seminars in Immunopathology: “The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant economic and health impact worldwide. It also reinforced the misperception that only viruses can pose a threat to human existence, overlooking that bacteria (e.g., plague and cholera) have severely haunted and shaped the course of human civilization. While the world is preparing for the next viral pandemic, it is again overlooking a silent one: antimicrobial resistance (AMR). This review proposes to show the impact of bacterial infections on civilization to remind the pandemic potential. The work will also discuss a few examples of how bacteria can mutate risking global spread and devastating outcomes, the effect on the global burden, and the prophylactic and therapeutic measures. Indeed, AMR is dramatically increasing and if the trend is not reversed, it has the potential to quickly turn into the most important health problem worldwide.”
“Etymologia: Ring Vaccination”
Sharma et al. recently published this short piece covering ring vaccination’s etymology in Emerging Infectious Diseases: “Ring Vaccination [rɪŋ-væk-sɪ′-neɪ-ʃn] Ring vaccination (expanding ring, surveillance and containment) is a public health measure designed to prevent spread of disease from infected persons to others. This approach targets persons who have had close contact with confirmed or suspected cases and are at a higher risk of infection by vaccinating them first (Figure).”
Read more here.
“Russian Military Thought and Doctrine Related to Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons: Change and Continuity”
William Alberque tackles Russian nuclear doctrine in this report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies: “Russian nuclear doctrine, especially regarding its large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons, has become one of the most pressing issues in Euro-Atlantic security. This report aims to build an understanding of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons doctrine through empirical research, including by examining the continuities and discontinuities in doctrine across time, through the Cold War, to the collapse of the Soviet Union, to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and in Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine.”
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Newsletter
The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction’s newsletter is published quarterly and is available for subscription here. This quarter’s edition focuses on Italy’s upcoming Global Partnership presidency, the Partnership’s 2023 Programming Annex, featured articles, community updates, and more.
“UNITAD – Key Investigations as UN Mechanism Reaches Its Final Reporting Year”
Sam Biden covers the work of the UN Investigate Team to Promote Accountability Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD), providing an overview of its key investigations in the last two years in this piece for the Human Security Centre. This includes UNITAD’s work on biological and chemical weapons, under which Biden explains in part, “2023 marked a significant stride in the relentless pursuit of accountability for ISIL’s chemical and biological weapons program. The investigation during this reporting period yielded substantial evidence from earlier inquiries strategies regarding the production and delivery of the weapons themselves. These key lines of inquiry harnessed new collaborations with technical experts, including those from the Mine Action Service, provided essential insights into a wide array of attacks. UNITADs work extended to collecting and preserving evidence linked to 12 attacks yet continued to focus on gathering further evidence from the 2016 attack on Tazah Khurmatu. This ultimately led to the collection of new battlefield evidence and files, shedding light on ISIL’s operations in Kirkuk and implicating specific persons of interest. A comprehensive report focused on the 2016 attack on Tazah Khurmatu was shared with the Iraqi judiciary, encapsulating critical findings from the ongoing investigation.”
ICYMI-“Event Summary: U.S.–UK Strategic Dialogue on Biosecurity”
“On January 16, the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) hosted senior government leaders for the launch of the U.S.–UK Strategic Dialogue on Biosecurity at the historic National Academy of Sciences Building in Washington, D.C.”
“Building upon decades of partnership between the two countries, the Strategic Dialogue is a core component of the Atlantic Declaration—the new bilateral economic partnership established in 2023 to adapt, reinforce, and reimagine the U.S.-UK alliance for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Following the event, the U.S. National Security Council and the UK Cabinet Office released a joint statement outlining the Strategic Dialogue’s intent, including coordination to uphold global norms and commitments to lead on innovation in biotechnology and biosecurity.”
Read more here.
NEW: AI Rewards, Risks, and the Future of Biosecurity by Design (Pandemic Center Webinar)
From the Brown School of Public Health: “On January 24th at 1:00 PM EST the Pandemic Center will host a webinar titled AI Rewards, Risks, and the Future of Biosecurity by Design.”
“This event will bring together experts in biosecurity, global health, and pandemic prevention and response. Together, they will discuss the relationship between AI and biosecurity, with a focus on benefits, risks, and pragmatic solutions.”
“This event will be hosted and moderated by Beth Cameron, PhD, Professor of the Practice and Senior Advisor to the Pandemic Center.”
Learn more and register here.
NEW: Kazakhstan’s Actions to Address Nuclear and Biological Risks
From the Cargenie Endowment for International Peace: “Upon the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan found itself in possession of the world’s fourth-largest nuclear weapons stockpile and the former union’s most significant biological weapons factory. Kazakhstan’s subsequent decision to return and dismantle these weapons has solidified its position as a leader in nuclear and biological risk reduction. For the last thirty years, Kazakhstan’s actions have served as a core model for regional and international security.”
“Please join the Carnegie Endowment and the Council on Strategic Risks for a hybrid panel on Kazakhstan’s increasingly global role in the changing threat landscape of weapons of mass destruction. The discussion will feature Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to the United States of America Yerzhan Ashikbayev, the Honorable Andrew Weber, and Dr. Toghzan Kassenova. It will be moderated by Shannon Green, senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks.”
This event will take place on January 30 at 1:30 pm EST. Learn more and RSVP here.
NEW: WEBINAR: State Department 2023 Global Terrorism Data: Trends & Warnings
From Homeland Security Today: “Join HSToday for a Law Enforcement-only analysis of global terrorism trends from 2023 and threat forecasts for 2024. The Department of State’s yearly Annex of Statistical Information Reports uses The Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) database.”
“Dr. Mahmut Cengiz, a senior data analyst at GTTAC since 2018, will discuss terrorism trends from 2023 and areas of concern for law enforcement in the United States (US). More specifically, his analyses will focus on HAMAS and Iran-backed terror groups targeting American facilities in the Middle East, Al Qaeda- and ISIS-affiliated organizations actively involved in terrorist attacks worldwide, increasing far-right terrorism and emerging lone actor threats in the US and Europe. The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) is the first center in the United States devoted to understanding the links among terrorism, transnational crime and corruption, and to teach, research, train and help formulate policy on these critical issues. TraCCC is a research center within the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. TraCCC also houses the innovative and highly-respected Anti-Illicit Trade Institute (AITI).”
This event will take place on February 8 at 2 pm EST. Learn more and register here.
AI Executive Order Report Card Reviewing the First 90 Days
“On October 30, 2023, the Biden Administration issued a call to action outlining a host of requirements and deliverables for U.S. government agencies on artificial intelligence. The executive order touched on a range of AI-relevant issues, including testing and evaluation of new AI systems, developing a healthy and capable U.S. AI workforce, and ensuring U.S. competitiveness in the years to come.”
“Join CSET researchers on January 31, 2024, for a discussion of what the U.S. Government has accomplished so far, what have we learned, and what’s left to do to complete the EO’s ambitious goals.”
This online event will begin at 12 pm EST. Learn more and register here.
GP Nonproliferation and Strategic Trade Hub Virtual Launch & Demo
“The Strategic Trade Research Institute (STRI) invites you to participate in the Global Partnership Nonproliferation and Strategic Trade Hub Virtual Launch and Demo event taking place on February 27, 2024, from 9:00-10:00 am EST.”
“Please join us to learn about the main features of the Hub, how to use it, and how it can be useful and impactful for nonproliferation and export control professionals. The event will feature Andrea Viski, Director of STRI, as well as introductory remarks from the Hub’s sponsor, the United Kingdom’s Counter-proliferation and Arms Control Center (CPACC).”
Learn more and register here.
International Conference, CBRNE Research & Innovation
“The last 40 years have demonstrated that both military and civilian populations could be exposed to highly hazardous CBRNE agents following conflicts, natural outbreaks and disasters, industrial incidents or terrorist attacks.”
“Worldwide, researchers, responders and industrial capacities have been commited to provide adapted response to these challenges.”
“Building on the success of the first 5 International Conferences « CBRNE Research and Innovation » which took place in Antibes (2015), Lyon (2017), Nantes (2019), on line (2021) and Lille (2022), we want to give you a new opportunity to build up or strengthen collaborative networks in Strabourg (March 19th – 21rst 2024).”
“The CBRNE R&I Conference is specifically devoted to scientific updates, responders’ feedbacks and expression of needs. It also includes workshops and demonstrations of innovative materials, technologies and procedures, according to the following themes: DETECTION – IDENTIFICATION, PROTECTION – DECONTAMINATION, MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES, RISKS & CRISIS MANAGEMENT.”
“Looking forward to your proposals for communication and to welcoming you at Strasbourg in March 2024!”
Learn more here.
Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open
Registration is now open for the Global Health Security 2024 conference in Sydney, Australia. This iteration will take place 18-21 June, 2024. The call for abstracts is also still open. “The mission of the Global Health Security conference is to provide a forum where leaders, researchers, policy-makers, and representatives from government, international organisations, civil society, and private industry from around the world can engage with each other, review the latest research and policy innovations, and agree solutions for making the world safer and healthier. To that end, our mission is to help foster a genuinely multidisciplinary community of practice that is committed to working collaboratively to enhance global health security and eliminate disease, irrespective of its origin or source.”
The Pandora Report 