Pandora Report 8.8.2025

by dkellogg97, posted in Pandora Report

This week’s Pandora Report covers program news, updates on avian influenza, discussion of HHS’ termination of contracts funding mRNA vaccine development research, and more.

Biodefense Alum Named CEO of Global Health Security Network

Dr Saskia Popescu, Biodefense PhD ’19 and adjunct professor in the Biodefense Graduate Program at the Schar School of Policy and Government, has been named the new Chief Executive Officer of the Global Health Security Network (GHSN). Dr Popescu is an internationally recognized infectious disease epidemiologist, biodefense expert, and leader in global health security. With a distinguished career spanning hospital outbreak response, pandemic preparedness, and biosecurity policy, she brings a wealth of expertise and leadership to GHSN. GHSN is an Australia-based non-profit that supports and disseminates independent, data-driven, policy-relevant research in global health security that results in inclusive and equitable health outcomes, fosters education and mentorship opportunities, and advocates for the adoption of policies and initiatives that enhance national, regional, and global health security.  As GHSN’s new CEO, Dr Popescu will lead the organization into its next phase of growth—expanding its global reach, deepening partnerships, and advancing bold, evidence-based solutions to today’s most pressing biological threats. GHSN’s signature event, the Global Health Security Conference, will take place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in June 9-12, 2026.

Avian Influenza Updates

By Margeaux Malone, Pandora Report Associate Editor 

Scientists Monitor Dairy H5N1 Outbreak Patterns Ahead of Fall Flu Season

Recent research from two major studies has provided critical insights into the behavior of H5N1 bird flu in U.S. dairy cattle. Dairy herd cases have dropped sharply over the last few months; however, new herd infections continue to be reported every few weeks. The last reported confirmed case is from August 1, 2025, on a dairy farm in California. Since early 2024, 1,078 infected herds have been confirmed in 17 U.S. states, with the majority of detections (771) on farms in California.

Contaminated milking equipment and direct contact with contaminated milk were initially thought to play major roles in viral transmission. However, a comprehensive study from Emory University examined 14 California dairy farms and found evidence of multiple potential transmission pathways. Using three different air-sampling devices, including backpack-mounted filters to model worker exposure, researchers detected H5N1 viral RNA and infectious virus in multiple air samples during milking operations. The study also found viral RNA throughout farm wastewater systems at every point in the waste stream, including manure lagoons frequented by migratory birds. This demonstrates that airborne transmission and contaminated water sources may create additional infection vectors for both cattle and farm workers beyond direct milk contact.

While additional research is needed to ascertain how bird flu spreads within farms to improve biosecurity and mitigation protocols, research from St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital offers cautiously optimistic findings about the virus’s pandemic potential. Their analysis of H5N1 strains from dairy cattle shows that the virus is retaining primarily avian characteristics rather than adapting to better infect mammals. The bovine viruses remain more similar to bird flu strains than human influenza viruses, suggesting limited mutation pressure toward human adaptation. The overall threat to humans appears low, but the risk of direct infection for those working closely with these animals still remains high. Fortunately, the virus also does not appear to be developing immunity to commonly used antivirals; thus, these drugs would likely be effective to treat infected individuals when cases arise.

Public health experts will closely monitor dairy farms, commercial poultry, and migratory bird populations throughout the upcoming fall season, when increased avian influenza circulation typically occurs, to track whether H5N1 makes a resurgence. Although population-level pandemic risk appears low based on current evidence, continued surveillance and worker protection remain critical as the virus continues evolving in agricultural environments.

Further Reading:

First Bird Flu, Now Screwworms: The U.S. Livestock Industry Can’t Catch a Break

A major outbreak of New World screwworms, flesh-eating maggots that infest wounds of living animals, has been spreading across Central America since 2023. It reached southern Mexico in November and now a case has been reported less than 400 mile south of the Texas-Mexico border, raising concerns about invasion into the U.S. These parasitic larvae of metallic green-blue flies (Cochliomyia hominivorax) burrow into animal wounds, essentially eating the infested animals from the inside-out, and can kill livestock within 1-2 weeks if untreated. Although agricultural animals would take the biggest hit, New World screwworms can infest any living mammal, meaning pets like cats and dogs as well as humans would also be at risk.

No vaccines or effective repellents exist, so prevention currently relies on avoiding livestock procedures that create wounds during warmer months when the tropical flies are most active. The U.S. previously eradicated screwworms in the 1960s-70s using a “sterile insect technique”, creating millions of sterilized male flies and releasing them from planes to mate with wild females to prevent reproduction and gradually eliminating populations. Currently, only one facility in Panama produces sterile flies, but hundreds of millions more are needed to combat the spreading outbreak. In response, the USDA announced in June its plans to build a new “fly factory” near the border, estimated to cost $8.5 million. The USDA has also announced $25 million plans to renovate an old fly factory in Mexico by the end of 2025. Officials view this as a worthwhile investment compared to the potential $10 billion economic impact on the livestock industry if the screwworms become established in the U.S.

Further Reading:

GAO Finds Administration Violated Impoundment Law in Cancelling NIH Grants and Delaying New Awards

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued this week its findings that the NIH has illegally frozen 1,800 research grants. Specifically, the administration’s freeze on $8 billion of congressionally appropriated funding for the NIH was illegal as it violated the Impoundment Control Act.

In its report, GAO explains, “Congress appropriated amounts to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to carry out various research objectives for fiscal year 2025. In accordance with several executive orders, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its agencies, including NIH, began canceling existing grants. HHS also issued a memorandum directing its agencies to cease the publication of grant review meeting notices in the Federal Register, a key step in NIH’s grant review process. As a result, NIH reduced its awarding of new grants. NIH’s actions to carry out these executive directives, coupled with publicly available data showing a decline in NIH’s obligations and expenditures, establishes that NIH intended to withhold budget authority from obligation and expenditure without regard to the process provided for by the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA).”

Between February and June, NIH released $8 billion less that it obligated in the previous two year, which GAO says is a decline of more than 1/3. The gap between 2025 spending and previous years’ spending has continued to grow, according to GAO, with NIH obligating a lower amount of grant funding month-to-month. GAO explains that, if a law is passed by Congress and signed by the president, it must be carried out by the executive branch. There are exceptions, such as under a recissions law, but GAO says there are no such exceptions in this case.

The report further explains that, “In its response to GAO, HHS indicated that it had lifted the pause relating to the publication of Federal Register notice submissions and resumed scheduling meetings. However, HHS’s response did not include information regarding current obligations of NIH funds for FY 2025. Furthermore, HHS showed no sufficient justification for the pause that it instituted…GAO is aware of ongoing litigation involving the termination of NIH grants in which HHS has taken the position that it was authorized to terminate the grants. GAO will continue to monitor this and any other litigation related to the delay in the obligation and disbursement of NIH funds. If a court makes relevant findings of fact relating to NIH funds, we will update this decision as necessary.”

Further Reading:

HHS Halts Millions in Funding for mRNA Vaccine Development

HHS announced this week that it has started a “coordinated wind-down” of its mRNA vaccine development activities under the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). This amounts to cancellation of $500 million in government-funded research projects to create new mRNA vaccines. In the announcement of the cancellation, Secretary Kennedy said, “We reviewed the science, listened to the experts, and acted. BARDA is terminating 22 mRNA vaccine development investments because the data show these vaccines fail to protect effectively against upper respiratory infections like COVID and flu. We’re shifting that funding toward safer, broader vaccine platforms that remain effective even as viruses mutate.”

The statement further explained that this action includes termination of contracts with Emory University and Tiba Biotech; de-scoping of mRNA-related work in existing contracts with Luminary Labs, ModeX, and Seqirus; rejection or cancellation of multiple pre-award solicitations, including proposals from Pfizer, Sanofi Pasteur, CSL Seqirus, Gritstone, and others, as part of BARDA’s Rapid Response Partnership Vehicle and VITAL Hub’ and restructuring of collaborations with DoD-JPEO, affecting nucleic acid-based vaccine projects with AAHI, AstraZeneca, HDT Bio, and Moderna/UTMB.

The statement continued, explaining that, “While some final-stage contracts (e.g., Arcturus and Amplitude) will be allowed to run their course to preserve prior taxpayer investment, no new mRNA-based projects will be initiated. HHS has also instructed its partner, Global Health Investment Corporation (GHIC), which manages BARDA Ventures, to cease all mRNA-based equity investments. In total, this affects 22 projects worth nearly $500 million. Other uses of mRNA technology within the department are not impacted by this announcement.”

The rollback has also caught unrelated contracts in its crosshairs. Tiba Biotech was included in the cancellation of grants that funded mRNA vaccine development. However, Tiba Biotech’s project does not use mRNA, and it is not producing a vaccine. Rather, Tiba Biotech was awarded $749,999 by BARDA last July to develop a lung-targeted treatment for influenza infection using RNA interface. The project had just three months remaining at the time of cancellation and was successful in achieving its objectives.

Secretary Kennedy has a history of faulty criticisms of mRNA vaccines. For example, he claimed in 2021 that mRNA vaccines for COVID-19 are “the deadliest vaccine ever made.” Kennedy said later in HHS’ announcement, “Let me be absolutely clear: HHS supports safe, effective vaccines for every American who wants them. That’s why we’re moving beyond the limitations of mRNA and investing in better solutions.”

Using mRNA vaccine technology allows for faster production of vaccines than older vaccine technologies. The “plug-and-play” ability afforded by mRNA vaccines enables rapid development and lower costs, an invaluable capability in preparing for future respiratory illness outbreaks that threaten global health. Michael Osterholm of the University of Minnesota told PBS News recently that using older technology to create a vaccine targeting a pandemic flu strain would take 18 months just to “make enough vaccine to vaccinate only about one-fourth of the world.” Meanwhile, mRNA vaccines “could change that dramatically, such that by the end of the first year, we could vaccinate the world.”

Further Reading:

Most US Adults Do Not Plan to Get COVID-19 Vaccine Amid Confusion Following Changes in Vaccine Policies

With COVID-19 cases on the rise in 27 states as the Stratus variant gains traction, new polling shows relatively few adults in the US plan to be vaccinated for COVID-19 this fall. KFF polling found that 23% of US adult respondents say they will “probably not” get the vaccine, while 37% say they will “definitely not” get it. KFF also found that those who say they will “probably” or “definitely” not get the vaccine were more likely to say that they think changes to vaccine policy are “major” and will likely make people less safe. This comes after Secretary Kennedy announced earlier this year that the COVID-19 vaccine will no longer be recommended for healthy children and pregnant women.

Further Reading:

Other Relevant Happenings

Picking Up Where He Jiankui Left Off?

Radioactive Wasps

The EU Commission Announces EU Stockpiling Strategy and Medical Countermeasures Strategy

“Antimicrobial Resistance: Addressing the Risks”

This Expert Insights piece from RAND Europe was co-authored by Biodefense PhD Program alumna Saskia Popescu, along with Sarah Parkinson and Hampton Toole: “RAND Europe submitted evidence for the Public Accounts Committee’s investigation of how the UK is implementing the UK National Action Plan (NAP) to respond to risks associated with AMR. Our evidence focused primarily on infrastructure and capabilities that the UK has built that can be helpful in achieving the NAP’s aims, and what will be needed to achieve the plan’s objectives.”

“In this, we find that the UK has a strong base upon which to build when implementing the NAP. It is a world leader in several areas related to AMR, including research and science, genomic surveillance capabilities, and collaborations across One Health sectors. In addition, innovative programmes in the UK—such as PATH-SAFE and the National Biosurveillance Network—have helped build AMR-related capabilities and are generating knowledge on what works and what does not. These capabilities will be crucial in supporting the objectives of the NAP.”

“However, generating long-term benefits from the UK’s existing investments will require further investigation, prioritisation, implementation, and scale-up. Without this, the UK will not realise the full benefits of its AMR investments. Prioritising potential initiatives will require consideration early in the funding process of how programmes will achieve long-term impact, how findings will inform specific AMR responses, and what support will be needed to realise these impacts. Implementing the NAP will also require breaking down silos between sectors, addressing challenges in data sharing, and improving preparedness in emergency scenarios.”

“Defining Access to Countermeasures: Landscape Report 2024”

From WHO: “This report presents a landscape analysis of the key activities related to MCMs for pandemic response. With the adoption of the WHO Pandemic Agreement and amendments to the International Health Regulations, the global community has laid the groundwork for a more integrated and resilient health emergency architecture. These instruments represent a major shift in global health governance, placing equitable access to MCMs, including vaccines, diagnostics, therapeutics, and other essential tools, at the core of future pandemic prevention, preparedness, response to build resilient health systems.”

“Viral Outbreaks, Biosecurity, and Preparing for Mass Casualty Infectious Diseases Events, Edition 1”

“Written by authorities in infectious disease and disaster preparedness, this one-stop resource covers the relevant theoretical, historical, and pragmatic considerations of viral outbreaks and bioterrorism. It provides an expert overview of this complex area for infectious disease physicians, emergency medicine physicians, hospital administrators, and more.”

Read more about this new textbook here.

Advances in Virus Research, “Volume 121: Biosafety Level 4 (BSL4) – Virus Research at the Highest Level of Biosafety and Biosecurity”

“Biosafety Level 4 (BSL4) – Virus Research at the Highest Level of Biosafety and Biosecurity, Volume 121 highlights new advances, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters on highly important topics such as Molecular virulence determinants of human-pathogenic filoviruses, Mucosal Sudan virus infection results in a lethal disease in ferrets with previous Lloviu virus infection not providing cross-protection, Transcriptional signatures of Ebola and Marburg virus infection in a Bat-Immune-System (BIS) mouse model, Divergences in the microbial inactivation pattern between vaporized hydrogen peroxide and aerosolized peracetic acid by dry fogging, and much more.”

“Other chapters cover Molecular expressions in tissues and blood following Reston and Bundibugyo virus infection in swine, De novo rescue of new BSL4 henipaviruses – from sequence to pathogen, Semi-automated diagnostic RT-PCR as a screening assay for antiviral compounds in a 96-well format against highly pathogenic RNA viruses, and Relevance of studying virus – natural reservoir interactions: SNV in deer mice and LASV in Mastomys natalensis.”

Both Part A and Part B are accessible on ScienceDirect.

“Biorisk Governance: Advancing Biosecurity Education for Life Scientists”

Sarah Ruth Opatowski recently authored this report for UNIDIR: “Educating life scientists on biosecurity and dual-use issues has been recognized as one of several approaches that can, in combination with other measures, enhance biorisk governance and biosecurity. However, the topic of biorisk is often overlooked or underemphasized in education and training, and there is a prevailing lack of awareness of how life science research could be exploited for hostile purposes.”

“This report outlines seven approaches to biosecurity related educational initiatives drawing from a wide range of past and present activities in this area. It provides a general overview of the relevance of this form of education in the work of both the Biological Weapons Convention and the World Health Organization. The report then explores a roadmap for the development of a systematic process of integrating biosecurity into life science teaching. Finally, the appendix showcases some of the biosecurity-related education initiatives undertaken by national, regional and international actors.”

“Trimming Tiers – Motivations and Means for De-Risking Select Agents”

Elizabeth Wells, Christopher Grisham, and Michael T. Parker recently published this article in Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology: “In the United States, pathogens and toxins that pose a significant threat to public health are regulated via the Select Agents and Toxins list (SATL). Of those on the list, biological select agents and toxins (BSAT) deemed especially dangerous are designated “Tier 1”, and are subject to more stringent regulations. While general criteria for the addition of BSAT to the SATL have been published, along with criteria for Tier 1 designation, there are no clearly defined, publicly available steps for de-tiering or de-listing BSAT, making it difficult to decipher paths to risk reduction. We set out to better understand how the government has historically chosen to list and tier BSAT, to create a generalized profile of Tier 1 and non-Tier 1 BSAT, and to design a methodology that the government can utilize in efforts of de-risking BSAT. To these ends, we conducted a literature review compiling key information on all BSAT, with a specific focus on development and availability of vaccines and therapeutics, as well as evidence and/or reports of prior weaponization efforts. We then performed statistical analyses to compare Tier 1 BSAT to non-Tier 1 BSAT, allowing us to develop a “prototype” that describes the characteristics that are typical of each. Finally, we used these results to design a set of “priority” experiments and threshold goals for perceived risk criteria, the results of which enable clearer avenues to de-risking, and potentially also de-tiering and de-listing, of BSAT. Our results represent a call to action to bolster biosecurity through the utilization of BSAT prototyping, key experiments, and threshold implementation, all in an effort to enable evidence-based risk reduction of select agents.”

“Assessing Dual-Use Issues at the AIxBio Convergence”

From CSR: “Emerging and disruptive technologies, including artificial intelligence and biotechnology, have the potential to influence the threat landscape and battlespace significantly. Such technologies, both individually and as they converge, simultaneously offer both new military and civilian solutions to historic problems and generate potential threats from adversarial states and non-state actors. The convergence of AI and biology has been facilitated by the digitization of biology, which has gradually brought physical experimentation with living organisms into the cyber domain. AI technologies are now enabling the faster design of effective vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics, thereby expediting the delivery of medical countermeasures and enhancing the detection of threats in previously intractable datasets.”

“This evolution has created specific dual-use risks and accelerated others. In response, CSR initiated a study to advance the intellectual, stakeholder, and policy foundations necessary to anticipate and address the risks that arise at this nexus. This study equips policymakers to make more informed decisions as they consider how to balance concerns related to innovation, security, and safety. Yet, as this report demonstrates, the field is highly dynamic—a feature that will persist for the foreseeable future.”

“To more effectively understand and anticipate the opportunities and risks arising at this nexus, building on in-depth research and expert interviews, CSR employed methods within the strategic foresight toolkit. This included scenario exercises, horizon scanning, and backcasting to develop a more nuanced understanding of how future uncertainties might unfold, stretch, and stress-test expert assumptions, and conceptualize global complexities that could enable or constrain alternative future pathways. Through scenario mapping with a diverse cohort of experts from academia, governments, industry, and think tanks, a preferred future scenario was articulated for the AIxBio nexus and used to identify the steps that could be taken over the next five years to achieve that preferred scenario.”

Read here.

“Opportunities to Strengthen U.S. Biosecurity from AI-Enabled Bioterrorism: What Policymakers Should Know”

This analysis from CSIS was authored by Georgia Adamson and Gregory C. Allen, and discusses specific dangers AI poses in the face of what they describe as “falling barriers to bioterrorism.” The authors discuss threats posed by LLMs and future AI BDTs, shortcomings of current US biosecurity measures, and recommendations to strengthen US biosecurity to address AI threats.

“Preliminary Taxonomy of AI-Bio Misuse Mitigations”

From Frontier Model Forum: “Frontier AI presents transformative opportunities within the biological sciences, including the potential to rapidly accelerate beneficial research discoveries and development. However, the dual-use nature of these technologies may also introduce novel risks. One potential harm involves the misuse of legitimately accessed frontier AI systems by malicious actors to create biological threats, such as a bioweapon.1 As frontier AI capabilities advance, it is crucial to develop robust risk management practices that enable society to harness the benefits of AI in biology while proactively managing its most severe potential risks.” 

“In light of this challenge, frontier model developers have committed to researching, implementing, validating, and sharing mitigation measures (also known as safeguards) to prevent the misuse of their models. This issue brief presents a preliminary taxonomy of safeguards designed to reduce the risk of biological misuse stemming from access to frontier AI models. Drawing from discussions with experts within the Frontier Model Forum (FMF) and the broader biosafety and biosecurity communities, this brief outlines the current landscape of AI-bio misuse safeguards, identifies potential future approaches to mitigations, and underscores the importance of implementing societal-level measures as a complement to technical safeguards.”

“White Paper: A Proposal for Biodesign Metadata Exchange for Use in Biosecurity”

From NTI: “Accelerating advances in biodesign offer significant potential societal benefits, including advancing public health through the development of new vaccines and treatments. However, these advances also pose growing biosecurity risks, particularly, the accidental or intentional creation of harmful biological agents.”

“Current biosecurity frameworks, such as those used by the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, rely on the ability to compare DNA synthesis orders to known sequences to determine if they may be concerning. However, as biodesign tools—especially those powered by artificial intelligence (AI)—begin exploring novel biological designs that deviate substantially from organisms found in nature, traditional screening methods are likely to struggle to interpret these novel designs.  This makes it difficult for DNA synthesis providers and other service providers, who support bioscience and biotechnology research and development, to detect potential threats, as it involves assessing the risks of entirely new designs that do not resemble known organisms or toxins.”

“To address these challenges, NTI | bio partnered with Lattice Automation to design and pilot a standard for capturing and transmitting metadata—such as design provenance, editing history, and intended use—alongside DNA or protein sequences. The additional context provided by this standard, known as the Biodesign Metadata Exchange (BMDE), can help biosecurity decision-makers assess risks more effectively by increasing their understanding of not only the sequence itself but also the design process behind it.”

Read the white paper here.

“As AI Worsens WMD Threat, Australia Must Lead Response”

Devon Whittle recently published this piece for ASPI, writing in part, “At a minimum, Australia needs to move forward with mandatory guardrails for high-risk and general-purpose AI, completing a process that was underway at the end of 2024. These guardrails need to set clear minimum standards for AI developers and deployers in Australia, ensuring we are not at the mercy of the weakest or least scrupulous link in the AI supply chain. They should also clarify legal responsibility and liability to incentivise developers and deployers to ensure their systems cannot be misused.”

Read more here.

Journal of Science Policy & Governance, “Advancing Science & Technology Policy for the Next-Generation Bioeconomy”

The Journal of Science Policy & Governance and the Engineering Biology Research Consortium have released the journal’s special topics issue for this year, on Advancing Science & Technology Policy for the Next-Generation Bioeconomy: “This issue demonstrates the extraordinary range of policy questions emerging from the modern bioeconomy. Across seven rigorously reviewed manuscripts, authors tackle the transition to climate‑smart protein sources and new opportunities for U.S. farmers, propose community‑centered governance frameworks for releasing genetically modified microbes into fragile ecosystems, and dissect the U.S. Supreme Court’s Loper‑Bright decision to show how the end of Chevron deference could reshape federal biosecurity regulation. Complementing these federal‑level analyses, contributors outline a micro‑credential strategy to close critical workforce gaps in biotechnology, detail how regional food‑focused biomanufacturing hubs can strengthen supply‑chain resilience and national security, and chart a path for safely deploying engineered microbes to clean up persistent contaminants. Together, the papers form a timely roadmap for policymakers seeking to harness life‑science innovation while safeguarding communities, ecosystems, and economic competitiveness.”

“From Tunisia to the World: A Scientist’s Bold Vision for Biosecurity”

From Brown School of Public Health: “As part of Brown’s new Biosecurity Game Changers fellowship, pharmacist and policy expert Sana Masmoudi is working to close critical biosecurity gaps—building systems, shaping policy and mentoring future leaders across the Global South.”

Read here.

“Verify, Verify, Verify: How Technological Disruption is Redefining Nuclear Risk”

Cindy Vestergaard recently published this commentary piece with the Stimson Center: “The next wave of technological evolution is disrupting nuclear stability, reshaping verification, and challenging the future of arms control and nonproliferation.”

“Potential Environmental Effects of Nuclear War”

From NASEM: “In response to the buildup of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals during the Cold War, a series of major scientific studies conducted in the 1980s issued warnings about the potential for a “nuclear winter” scenario – the possibility that a large-scale nuclear exchange could inject massive amounts of soot and particulates into the upper atmosphere that would block incoming solar radiation and cause major ecosystem and societal disruptions. In the decades since that concept emerged, profound military, political, and technological changes have reshaped the nuclear landscape, while scientific advances have deepened the understanding of, and ability to model, Earth system processes. It is in this context that the U.S. Congress asked for this report to re-examine the potential environmental, social, and economic effects that could unfold over the weeks to decades after a nuclear war.”

“The effects of any given nuclear exchange would depend on key processes and interactions along a causal pathway with six stages: weapon employment scenarios and effects; fire dynamics and emissions; plume rise, fate, and transport; physical Earth system impacts; ecosystem impacts; and socioeconomic impacts. Impacts of radioactive fallout were not included in the assessment. Potential Environmental Effects of Nuclear War identifies major uncertainties and data gaps at each stage of the causal pathway that currently limit researchers’ ability to understand and model the effects of a nuclear war. This report recommends that relevant U.S. agencies coordinate the development of and support for a suite of model intercomparison projects to organize and assess models to reduce uncertainties in projections of the climatic and environment effects of nuclear war.”

What We’re Watching

How Many People Were Killed by the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

“The only instances of atomic weapons being used against a civilian population occurred in 1945 at the tail end of World War II. On August 6, 1945, “Little Boy” was detonated above the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, “Fat Man” was detonated above Nagasaki. The aftermath of the bombings was the complete devastation of both cities in which countless numbers of people lost their lives.”

“In 2020, nuclear historian Alex Wellerstein published original research with the Bulletin, describing the challenges of tabulating the casualties of the bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Without accurate records of the population prior to the bombings, Allied forces and the Japanese government relied on proxy figures to come up with their estimates. Decades later, those estimates were revisited to account for information that was excluded at the time. The result is a recognition that we may never be able to fully account for the devastation of one of the world’s deadliest weapons.“

Watch here.

What We’re Listening To

Docology, Ep23: Biosecurity Uncovered
“What if the next war doesn’t come with bombs or bullets — but with a virus?”

“In this eye-opening episode of Docology, we’re joined by Rear Admiral Ken Bernard, one of the world’s foremost experts on pandemic preparedness and biosecurity. We break down the growing overlap between biological science, global politics, and security strategy.”

“This conversation isn’t about panic — it’s about preparedness. Because next time, we might not get a warning shot.”

“Take a look and let us know what you think. You can listen to the podcast here on Substack or anywhere you get your podcasts!”

“If you want to watch the full episode, you can watch it here on YouTube.“

What Has Changed in the Biosecurity Threat Landscape?

A Moment in Health with Dr. Ashish Jha, Ep. 16
“In this episode of A Moment in Health, Dr. Ashish Jha shares a striking data point: 6.8 million veterans receive care each year through the VA Health System. He highlights a systematic review comparing the quality of care in VA versus non-VA settings, finding that VA care is generally as good or better compared to non-VA care. Senior Adviser to the Brown Pandemic Center Beth Cameron joins to discuss how the COVID-19 pandemic and rapidly advancing technologies like AI and synthetic biology have elevated the urgency of biosecurity. She warns that despite the increasing risks of large-scale biological events—whether natural, accidental, or deliberate—the U.S. still lacks a cohesive, long-term strategy to address these threats.”

NEW: Mission Critical: How One Hospital Maintained Operations and Protected Patients and Staff After Hurricane Helene

From ASPR TRACIE: “In September 2024, Hurricane Helene made landfall as a Category 4 storm, causing historic flooding, tornadoes, and widespread infrastructure damage across the Southeastern U.S. Despite total utility failures, road closures, and supply shortages, Mission Health—comprised of six acute care hospitals in the Western North Carolina region—successfully maintained critical operations, protected patients and staff, and continued providing essential services.”

“The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange (ASPR TRACIE) invite you to learn more about this webinar featuring HCA Healthcare representatives. They will share lessons learned, including how leadership made key decisions to sustain operations, secure essential resources, ensure patient and staff safety, and expand support to the surrounding community. Learn how strong leadership, planning, and adaptability enabled a comprehensive and resilient response during and after the storm.”

This event will take place on August 27, 12:30-1:45 PM ET. Register here.

NEW: Biological Threats in the Age of Emerging Biotechnology – A Workshop Series

From NASEM: “The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) will convene an ad hoc planning committee to organize a workshop series with international scientists. The series will engage early-career and established experts to: a) examine dual-use risks in biotechnology research; b) explore potential misuse of knowledge, tools, and materials; c) review existing frameworks for assessing and mitigating dual-use concerns; and d) identify steps to reduce exploitation while promoting responsible innovation. The workshops will focus on balancing scientific progress with security considerations. Key insights and recommendations will be compiled in a publicly available workshop proceedings document.”

These workshops will take place 10 am-1 pm ET on September 10, 17, and 18. Register here.

Mirror Image Biology: Pushing the Envelope in Designing Biological Systems – A Workshop

From NASEM: “Most biological molecules are chiral entities where their mirror images have different structures and functional characteristics. Scientists have begun synthesizing left-handed DNA and RNA and creating proteins that can write left-handed nucleic acids. This, and other related research, is described as “mirror biology” and includes research toward creating mirror-image self-replicating living systems. The National Academies will host a foundational workshop on mirror biology, focusing on the state of the science, trends in research and development, risks and benefits of this research, and considerations relating for future governance of relevant enabling technologies.”

This event will take place virtually, September 29-30. Register here.

CTD–SPECTRE Symposium, “Tropical and Emerging Infectious Diseases for Clinicians and Translational Scientists” 

“The CTD-SPECTRE Symposium on Tropical and Emerging Infectious Diseases for Clinicians and Translational Scientists 2025 offers a unique opportunity to connect with global experts, gain cutting-edge insights, and collaborate with peers dedicated to infectious disease research and treatment.”

“Taking place September 16 -19, 2025, at the historic Grand Galvez in Galveston, TX, this immersive symposium will unite clinicians, translational investigators, and trainees to explore the latest breakthroughs in tropical and emerging infectious diseases.”

“Hosted by the Division of Infectious Diseases at UTMB, Center for Tropical Diseases (CTD) and Special Pathogens Excellence in Clinical Treatment, Readiness, & Education (SPECTRE) Program.”

Learn more and register here.

Global Conference on Biological Threat Reduction

From the World Organisation for Animal Health: “In October 2025, WOAH is hosting its third Global Conference, with the goal of galvanising advocacy efforts to manage the rising risk of biological threats from across the world.”

“The Global Conference on Biological Threat Reduction – which will take place in Geneva on 28-30 October 2025 – will bring together top minds in the fields of
health-security, emerging technologies, and biothreat reduction policies, from the public and private sectors – to focus on the latest strategies, challenges and innovations in combating biological threats to our interconnected ecosystems.”

“The Conference will bring together approximately 400 participants from different sectors, including animal health, law enforcement and security, public health, international and regional organisations, investment and development partners, private sector and industry representatives, research, academia and regulatory authorities, youth organisations.”

“Attendees will engage in thought-provoking discussions and innovative technical presentations aimed at strengthening prevention, preparedness and response capabilities across the world.”

“The event will be guided by a narrative that traces WOAH’s commitment to biological threat reduction and the increasingly relevant role it plays at the health-security interface. Against the backdrop of an uncertain future, WOAH believes that synergies between sectors can drive positive change – making the world a safer and healthier place. ”

Learn more and register here.

NEW: New Call for Experts to Join the Second Term of the Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO)

“Opening call for applications from 30 July–30 August 2025”

“WHO welcomes expressions of interest for SAGO’s second term 2025-2027 from individuals with significant expertise in one or more of the technical disciplines listed below in order to ensure a multi-disciplinary One Health approach.”

“The call will open from 30 July–30 August 2025, closing at 24:00 Central European Summer Time (CEST; UTC +2) on 30 August 2025. Applications require a Curriculum Vitae, a cover letter, and signed Declaration of Interests form.”

Read more here.

Applied Biosafety Call for Papers

“The Editors of Applied Biosafety are pleased to announce a forthcoming Special Issue focused on the myriad of topics associated with global biosafety management. This special issue will showcase examples of innovative approaches, creative solutions, and best practices developed and used around the world for managing risks associated with the handling, use, and storage of infectious biological agents, toxins, and potentially infectious materials in research and clinical settings.”

Learn more and submit by November 1 here.

64th ISODARCO Course

From ISODARCO: “In recent years, the global security landscape has become increasingly volatile, shaped by a convergence of geopolitical tensions, technological advancements, and evolving nuclear doctrines. The post-Cold War order that once provided a measure of predictability in global security has eroded. Conflicts such as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific, and strategic competition between major powers have reshaped alliances and strategic postures.”

“At the same time, disruptive technologies including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonic missiles, and cyber threats – are adding new layers of complexity to both nuclear and conventional deterrence dynamics. These technologies are not only distorting the information landscape but also compressing decision-making timelines and complicating signaling mechanisms, increasing the risk of miscalculation.”

“Effectively managing nuclear escalation risks in this environment will require a combination of innovative diplomacy, technological safeguards, and renewed dialogue mechanisms to rebuild trust, reduce misperceptions, and stabilize strategic relations.”

“The ISODARCO 2026 Winter Course presents an invaluable opportunity for students and experts to discuss and examine these dynamics in depth and explore approaches to re-establishing strategic stability and reducing nuclear dangers in a volatile world.”

This course will take place January 11-18, 2026, in Andalo. Learn more and apply here.

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