Author: Siddha Hover

This Week in DC: Events

by Siddha Hover, posted in Events, Week In DC

Events this week are more international politics related.

DC EventsTuesday, June 11

The Case to Remove Cuba from the Terrorist List
CSIS
8:00AM – 9:00AM

Last week, in what has become an annual rite of passage since 1982, Cuba was placed on the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. Despite this, there are growing calls for Cuba to be taken off the list. Join us for a discussion and look at the arguments to be made for Cuba’s removal.

Open to the public; however, seating is limited. To RSVP, please send name and affiliation to the Americas Program at americas@csis.org.

Wednesday, June 12

Reform, Revolution or Status Quo? Regional Dynamics in a Changing Arab World
US Institute of Peace
10:00AM – 11:30AM

This meeting is co-sponsored by the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center and the U.S.Institute of Peace.

Some experts predicted that the ‘Arab spring’ rebellions would widen the strategic, political, and even ideological gap between Arab states undergoing dramatic change and those defending the status quo. In fact, no such clear breach has occurred. Instead, Dr. Adeed Dawisha, distinguished professor of political science at Miami University, argues that sectarian tensions and economic constraints have dampened the potentially ‘incendiary’ effect of the Arab political revolts. Please join us at USIP for an engaging discussion on these dynamics in the Middle East with Dr. Dawisha, the State Department’s Dafna Rand, and USIP’s Daniel Brumberg on June 12, from 10:00am to 11:30am.

The U.S. and China: A New Kind of Great Power Relationship?
Brookings Institution
2:00PM – 3:30PM

This weekend’s meeting between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping at the former Annenberg Estate in California presents the two leaders with an opportunity to address a wide range of pressing issues, from flash points in the Korean peninsula to climate change and the global economy. To China’s leaders, this meeting will contribute to the development of a “new kind of great power relationship,” a concept that has been heavily promoted in recent months in state media and official pronouncements. On June 12, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings will host Madame Fu Ying, the spokeswoman for the China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) and the chair of the NPC’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

Thursday, June 13

After the Arab Uprisings
New America Foundation
9:00AM – 10:30AM

Two years after the Arab uprisings began, many countries in the Middle East and North Africa are undergoing complex political, social and economic transformations. Arab countries in transition are trying to articulate economic reform agendas amidst tumultuous internal developments and a challenging external environment. The divergent economic interests of governments and civil society groups further complicate the reform process. Alongside these near-term obstacles to economic stability, the region must contend with the medium-term challenges of diversifying their economies, creating jobs, and generating more inclusive growth. On June 13, New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force will host Adnan Mazarei, the Deputy Director of the IMF’s Middle East and Central Asia Department, to discuss the region’s economic performance in 2012 and expectations for 2013.

Friday, June 14

The India-Pakistan Conundrum: Shooting for a Century
Brookings Institution
10:00AM – 11:30AM

The rivalry between India and Pakistan has proven to be one of the world’s most intractable international conflicts. In his new book, Shooting for a Century (Brookings Press, 2013), Brookings Senior Fellow Stephen P. Cohen explores the origins and costs of India-Pakistan hostility, various explanations of why the dispute endures, past and current efforts to normalize the relationship, as well as the consequences of nuclearization. He argues that the prospects for normalization are poor, but because of the stakes and urgency, it is a process deserving of bilateral effort and greater world attention. Cohen also outlines suggestions as to how the rivalry might end, as well as the approach he believes the United States should take vis-à-vis the rivalry. On June 14, the India Project at Brookings will host the launch of Shooting for a Century with a discussion on present and past ties between India and Pakistan, prospects for normalization, as well as what role, if any, the U.S. should play.

The Pandora Report

by Siddha Hover, posted in Pandora Report

Highlights include funding for detecting bioterror, how pandemics come to be, MERS: overblown?, antibiotics funding, and not Ebola. Happy Friday!

Funding shortfall could shut down bioterrorism lab

 (image courtesy of Sandia National Labs)

The ability of the Seattle area to detect its recent ricin letters was due entirely to a regional bioterrorism lab, the same lab which is now at risk of closure. Local officials were quick to point out that without the local lab, the suspicious substance would have had to be shipped to a different lab nearly 10 hours away. “If you have an instance where you have possible exposure minutes and hours count,”  said the local Sheriff, Ozzie Knezovich. Bioterrorism labs are critical points of first response.

KXLY – “With just one full time employee the lab costs $170,000 to operate each year. It serves not only Spokane but bioterrorism services for all of Eastern Washington and North Idaho. In the last seven years its tested more than 70 samples including the suspicious backpack found at the Martin Luther King Jr. Day Unity March in 2011. State Representative Marcus Riccelli from Spokane said its not just the high profile cases we hear about, but the tests that come back negative that justify keeping the lab. However the most recent work done at the lab in the Ricin investigation is the perfect example of why these local officials keeping the lab open is worth fighting for.”

How Nature Builds A Pandemic Flu Virus

Why isn’t H7N9 ravaging across the planet? Or MERS, for that matter? Not for want of capability. Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, conducted a study examining the genomes of past pandemic flu strains. The results? It turns out that since 1957, all our most virulent pandemic strains have evolved from the 1918 Spanish ( H1N1) strain.  Which isn’t to say the H7N9 can’t still mutate.

NPR – “Here’s a sobering thought: Wild birds — including city pigeons and ubiquitous Canada geese — carry 170 different types of bird flu. You know, all those viruses with the Hs and Ns in their names, like H1N1 and H5N1. Only a dozen of these viruses have infected humans so far, but many of those have been deadly, and three of them have caused global flu pandemics.Does every bird flu that leaps into people have the potential to turn into the next “big one” that spreads rapidly around the world?”

MERS Virus May Never Become Big Threat in U.S., Experts Say

The WHO recently reported another death from the Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), bringing the total number of case fatalities to 31. With just 55 total cases, there is no question of the virus’ virulence. In fact, the Obama Administration has declared the virus a public health emergency – not due to fears of a significant outbreak, but so as to speed up testing and diagnostic capabilities.  However, there has been significant recent debate surrounding the virus’ pandemic potential. While significant mutations leading to easier transmission remain possible, MERS in its current form does not seem to pose a significant pandemic threat.

USNWR – “‘Anytime there is a new virus that has the potential to kill people, we ought to take it seriously,’ said Dr. Marc Siegel, an associate professor of medicine at NYU Langone Medical Center in New York City. But while Siegel believes the virus’s spread should be tracked and studied, he doubts it will ever become a real threat. ‘Fear is the biggest virus going,’ he said. ‘The amount of concern is already outweighing the risk. People have seen Contagion too many times.'”

Obama Administration Seeks To Ease Approvals For Antibiotics

While not as attention-grabbing as MERS or H7N9 (bacteria always get the shaft), the rise of antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections is a growing concern. One of the ongoing difficulties in developing new drugs is lack of sufficient financial incentives – antibiotics tend to be less profitable than drugs for more common concerns (high blood pressure, etc).

NPR – “[The Obama Administration is] investing tens of millions in private drug companies to foster new germ-killing drugs. It’s setting up a new research network to develop new antibiotics. And, most controversially, federal health officials are pushing to loosen up the approval process for new antibiotics targeted at patients with life-threatening infections and dwindling treatment options. ‘Where we’re talking about life-threatening illnesses, you can do much less study and get those drugs out there — if in fact they’ll be limited to those kinds of uses,’ Dr. Janet Woodcock, the chief drug official at the Food and Drug Administration, tells Shots.”

Health officials rule out Ebola outbreak in DR Congo

News because it’s not Ebola. Last week, the UN announced six suspected cases of Ebola in the DRC, with three fatalities. However, following testing at the National Institute of Biomedical Research in Kinshasa, Ebola was ruled out, despite symptoms including severe hemorrhaging.  Possibly yellow fever?

Channel News Asia – “A senior health ministry official in the Democratic Republic of Congo on Monday ruled out an Ebola outbreak in the northeast of the country, after possible cases were reported by United Nations staff. OCHA  [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] had announced suspect cases recorded between May 1 and May 12 at Mongo in the Bas-Uele district of the northeastern Orientale province, about 240 kilometres (150 miles) from Isiro, where the last Ebola outbreak killed 34 people out of 62 confirmed cases between May and November 2012.”

 

GMU PhD recent grad publishes paper in Bioterrorism & Biodefense

by Siddha Hover, posted in Research Notes

Dr. Steve Medley, recent GMU Biodefense PhD graduate, has co-authored his first paper with GMU professor Dr. Monique Van Hoek and others, entitled “Transfer and Reaerosolization of Biological Contaminant following Field Technician Servicing of an Aerosol Sampler”. The paper was published in the journal Bioterrorism and Biodefense. Dr. Medley is working on two other papers with Dr. Van Hoek.

The entire paper is available through open access, but here’s an excerpt:

“Aerosol contaminants deposited on a surface are transferred by two primary means–direct surface contact and reaerosolization. When a surface contaminated with deposited aerosol is contacted, a portion of the particulate material will be transferred. The amount transferred is dependent upon several factors, with amount of pressure applied, static charge, moisture levels, contact frequency, contact motion, particle size and surface roughness being among the most significant [1]. Once particles are transferred to the clothing and/or gloves of a person, deposited particles may reaerosolize by several mechanisms, such as vibration and air flow [2]. As mentioned, physical characteristics of the surface and particles, as well as the environmental conditions, will affect reaerosolization potential. With the multitude of variables, it is difficult to predict the amount (or fraction) of contaminant that will be transferred.”

Download the full paper here!

As new security advisor, Rice stands to impact biosecurity

by Siddha Hover, posted in News

by Chris Brown

Former  U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice was yesterday named National Security Adviser (Image courtesy of the White House)

President Barack Obama announced yesterday that Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations whose consideration for Secretary of State was derailed by the Benghazi investigation, will replace Tom Donilon as National Security Advisor. Political arguments about her candidacy for the job aside, Rice in her new role has the potential to impact biosecurity and biodefense considerably through advice and action on issues involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats to national and international security.

Rice has often been called a liberal interventionist, particularly after she expressed regret for the Clinton administration’s failure to intervene during the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s.[1] More recently, as U.N. ambassador, she was an outspoken advocate for international intervention against Gadhafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 and more stringent sanctions against suspected nuclear weapons-seeking states, namely Iran and North Korea. Support for the latter evidences her commitment to controlling proliferation of nuclear arms, here by employing coercive diplomacy. Rice’s record on Libya and lessons learned from Rwanda—she had a much stronger position on involvement in what was then Zaire in 1996 than she did on Rwanda—suggest that she is not afraid to call for direct intervention when necessary.

One of Rice’s first marks on biodefense – and biosecurity – related matters may come from how her interventionist approach continues to shape U.S. and international action on Syria, where stocks of chemical (and potentially biological) weapons held by an unstable government pose major global security concerns. As U.N. ambassador, Rice has been a key player in international talks on handling the volatile conflict between the al Asaad regime’s forces and opposition groups. Now, she is particularly poised to help steer movement on Syria both because she has a very direct line of communication with the president—arguably even closer than she would have had as secretary of state—and, despite often tumultuous talks with her Russian counterpart at the U.N., the limited but important cooperation of Russia and China. Rice has helped win support from both countries for finding a political solution to the Syrian problem (particularly when it comes to controlling chemical weapons use by the al Asaad regime) despite their interests in preventing U.S. military intervention in Eurasian affairs. Rice is likely to continue in her new role to be an integral player in determining how the U.S. handles Syria—either with or without multilateral support from other U.N. security council members—and, consequently, what happens to Syrian chemical and biological weapons stockpiles if the al Asaad regime falls.

Rice’s track record suggests she would support continuing, if not expanding, efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in other countries, as well. One of the U.S.’ primary counter-proliferation strategies has been the implementation of cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs aimed at bolstering control over knowledge, materials, and other components of WMD, particularly in former Soviet states. Broadening application of CTR programs that productively and peacefully employ former weapons scientists and harden security at facilities where weapons are stored and destroyed offers an opportunity for Rice to manifest her liberal interventionist thinking in a way that meshes with the U.S.’ realist/neorealist foreign policy, in which actions promote security rather than increasing power.

At home, Rice also likely will take on responsibilities with which just four national security advisers before her have had to contend. Only since the September 11 terrorist attacks and anthrax letters in 2001, while Condoleezza Rice (no relation) held the post under President George W. Bush, has the national security adviser also dealt with the threat of WMD attacks on the U.S., outside of the context of war with an enemy state. As national security adviser, the newer Rice can be expected to have a significant say in how the federal government prepares for and responds to terrorist attacks on the homeland. And she will likely be around the table for exercising plans for these types of events, including those that simulate large-scale releases of biological and chemical agents or detonation of improvised nuclear or radiological devices.

Importantly, Rice’s ability to impact biodefense and biosecurity will depend upon her utilization within the administration. Despite traditional duties governing some aspects of the job, the role of the national security adviser is loosely defined at best, and varies widely depending upon the background and experience of the incumbent and the needs and desires of the president he or she serves. A swing in the Obama administration’s stance on any number of foreign or domestic threats either could dampen Rice’s influence or highlight the interventionist approaches she often supports.

—

Chris Brown is a PhD candidate in biodefense at George Mason University. He holds a Master of Public Health in biostatistics and epidemiology from the University of Nebraska Medical Center, and received his undergraduate degree in biology with a minor in Spanish from the University of Louisville. Contact him at cbrown12@gmu.edu or on Twitter @ckbrow07.

[1] Timothy P. Carney, “Obama aides find moral clarity in Libya’s foggy war,” The Washington Examiner, March 27, 2011, accessed June 5, 2013, http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/112169/.

Image of the Week

by Siddha Hover, posted in Images

Now in pastels – white blood cells! Pictured in the grey color below,  a white blood cell is seen here engulfing  Aspergillus fumigatus spores. A. fumigatus is a fungus is readily found in soil, which can cause severe lung infections in the immunocompromised.

white blood cells

Via The Scientist (Image credit: Priyanka Narang, Manfred Rohde, and Matthias Gunzer, Helmholtz Centre for Infection Research, PLoS Pathogens)

The Ricin Letter Epidemic

by Siddha Hover, posted in News

Dr. Trevor Thrall, GMU Biodefense Director, published a thought-provoking and timely piece in The National Interest yesterday exploring the potential motivations behind the sudden uptick in ricin use.

Ricin letters in Seattle (image courtesy of FBI)

“Against the backdrop of so much global suffering and conflict or the deadly attack at the Boston Marathon,” he writes, “the handful of ricin letters sent to U.S. political leaders last week seems insignificant, almost narcissistic. Certainly from a national security perspective there is little need for concern; the letters were clearly not the work of professional terrorists. And yet my sense is that officials are a bit too quick to dismiss the letters as simply the work of disturbed amateurs with no broader meaning. We need to ask two questions: Why ricin? Why now?”

“The ricin letters appear to be the updated and metastasized form of an old American tradition. The United States has long been known for the tendency of its crankier citizens to write letters to public officials. Of course, an equally time-honored tradition is for public officials to ignore letters from citizens. Thus, the new and improved 21st century version of the tradition adds punch by sprinkling the letters with biological agents, one of the most dreaded technologies of our day. Ricin thus serves to help cut through the clutter and get people’s attention.”

Read the full piece here.

GMU Alum Dr. Daniel Gerstein’s New Book

by Siddha Hover, posted in News, Reviews

GMU Biodefense PhD Alum Dr. Daniel Gerstein has a new book out! A must read, National Security and Arms Control in the Age of Biotechnology looks at the past, present and future of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The book examines the policies that served to undergird the establishment of the Convention and the impact of changes in biotechnology on this important treaty. The centerpiece of the book are the ten reasons that the author, Dr. Dan Gerstein, posits make the BWC the most important treaty of the 21st Century that most people have never heard of. Find out why the BWC is central to our national security and what can and must be done to ensure its continued relevance.

Order now at Rowman and Littlefied Publishers and receive a 35% discount! Visit their website here and enter the code 4M13NSARC to receive this discount.

About the Author: Dr. Daniel M. Gerstein is a security and defense professional who has served in a variety of positions as a Senior Executive Service (SES) government civilian, in uniform, and in industry. He is currently serving as the Deputy Under Secretary for Science & Technology in the Department of Homeland Security. He is also an Adjunct Professor at American University in Washington, DC at the School of International Service (SIS).

GMU Biodefense Policy Brief Series

by Siddha Hover, posted in CBRN Policy Brief, News, Research Notes

The CBRN Policy Brief Series provides the Program’s faculty and affiliated research scientists a platform for providing expert analysis on current issues in domestic and international security.

CBRN Policy Brief #1, Is the US Prepared for a Chemical Attack, is written by Dr. Alexander Garza, GMU Biodefense Affiliate Research Scientist and former Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and Chief Medical Officer at the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Garza’s policy brief analyzes federal government preparedness, in terms of prevention, detection, and response, to a chemical weapons attack on US soil.

Read the full brief here.

Image of the Week

by Siddha Hover, posted in Images

News reports are indicating that in at least two cases, H7N9 seems resistant to the antiviral Tamiflu. This troubling development prompted our image of the week – yes we’ve all heard of it, have followed the case counts closely, have written about it week after week, but who amongst us has stared the virus down, mano-a-mano? Now’s your chance  –

Here’s looking at you,  H7N9  (image courtesy of CDC)

Um, is anyone else reminded of a different highly pathogenic virus? Starts with an “E” and ends with hemorrhaging? No?  Just us? Filamentous morphology aside, the virus’ ability to evade a key antiviral is definitely not good news.

The Persistence of Anti-Vaccination Groups

by Siddha Hover, posted in News

needleby GMU Biodefense grad Ryan Gearheart

So where does this hostility and fear come from? From a historical perspective, anti-vaccination groups have existed since the start of state endorsed vaccination programs, and while the basic arguments are the same, the explosion of the Internet and increasing use of scientific jargon have allowed anti-vaccination groups to garner credibility and reach wider audiences. Today’s anti-vaccination groups and parents have been extremely vocal about what they perceive to be unsafe vaccines and vaccines’ correlation with increasing autism rates. Much of their anger can be traced back to the original Wakefield et al. (1998) article – now retracted – suggesting a link between enterocolitis infection, measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccinations, and subsequent increases in autism in the observed children.[1] Indeed, many of the parents suspecting a link between the MMR vaccines and the onset of autism funneled their cases to Dr. Wakefield over the course of several years, thereby affecting the scientific body of knowledge (Moore & Stilgoe, 2009, p. 668). Despite several major studies disproving the link between vaccinations containing the preservative thimerosal[2] and autism, as well as discrediting MMR vaccination-linked autism (MMR vaccines did not and do not contain thimerosal), enlivened parents continue to voice their opposition and seek legal compensation.

According to an article by Harris and O’Connor (2005): “Parents have filed more than 4,800 lawsuits – 200 from February to April alone – pushed for state and federal legislation banning thimerosal and taken out full-page advertisements in major newspapers.” Because of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 – created with the goal of preventing vaccine manufacturers from being sued out of business – all lawsuits regarding possible vaccine injuries must go through a special vaccines court, as opposed to civil court, thereby preventing class-action lawsuits from being filed (Kirkland, 2012, p. 238). Running from 2002 through 2010, Anna Kirkland (2012) cites the unusual nature of the vaccine-autism cases: “Because holding so many hearings was untenable, the cases were consolidated into the Omnibus Autism Proceeding (OAP) so that the causation issues could be tried in six test cases” (p. 238). With so much on the line for everyone involved in these cases, both sides undertook immense boundary work to discredit the other party and establish their own credibility zones.[3] How is it possible that such a resounding scientific consensus has failed to establish consensus in the overall public? Kirkland’s 2012 study, “Credibility Battles in the Autism Litigation,” does much to elaborate on how the petitioners – parents with autistic children – perceived the OAP as a “stacked deck” with the sole intent of protecting national vaccination campaigns (p. 254). Alternatively, Kirkland (2012) goes on to note that the “special masters” presiding over the hearing felt that they had done everything in their power to give the petitioners a chance to build the best case possible (p. 255). Of course, reaching an outcome agreeable to both sides was impossible from the start: “One significant schism in credibility zones in the OAP…lay between the mainstream toxicology and medical communities and the alternative autism community, with different labs, tests, standards, practices, and foundational assumptions for each” (Kirkland, 2012, p. 243). Without an agreed to set of facts, or even “foundational assumptions” to work from, the OAP’s attempt to reconcile the emotionally charged vaccine-autism issue was likely to fail from the start.

Continued anti-vaccination opposition reinforces the fact that the scientific community and the United States Government have been unable to establish cognitive authority because of some parents’ contextualization and, ultimately, rejection of mainstream scientific authority. Donald MacKenzie (1990) notes that these disputes are only natural when one considers that: “Knowledge is indeed a network wherein different kinds of test are performed against differently constructed backgrounds, with no one test – not even “use” – and no one background being accepted by all as the ultimate arbiter” (p. 378). As Stephen Turner (2001) notes:

What counts as “expert” is conventional, mutable and shifting, and that people are persuaded of claims to expertise through mutable, shifting conventions does not make the decisions to accept or reject the authority of experts less than reasonable in the sense appropriate to liberal discussion. To grant a role to expert knowledge does not require us to accept the immaculate conception of expertise (p. 146).

Wynne’s (1991) theory regarding society’s contextualization of scientific information holds particularly true here when considering the proximity of childhood vaccinations (one to two years of age) and the general timeframe for diagnosing autism in children (three to four years of age). It is not hard to understand why a parent would link childhood vaccinations to autism under these circumstances, even if scientific studies demonstrate no causal link between them.

Similar to the HCWs’ concerns described in the previous subsection, the overwhelming boundary-work undertaken to dismiss Wakefield’s work as ‘not-science’ has been insufficient to reassure parents with autistic children.

Additionally, parents with these concerns may be even less likely to give their children a live vaccine based on fears of their children actually contracting influenza – a fear likely to be higher than seen with the standard, inactivated vaccines – and compound fears regarding potential neurological disorders. This would mean that mass vaccination programs focusing on children are even more likely to encounter fierce opposition from anti-vaccination groups and concerned parents. Adverse events are an especially salient concern considering the recent Finnish study linking the 2009-2010 Pandemrix vaccine, produced by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), to narcolepsy in children (Pohjanpalo, 2011). The damage to vaccination programs should be even greater given that Helsinki is establishing a pooled fund to pay for the children’s medical costs, in addition to the ongoing fallout from the Wakefield et al. (1998) article. Given previous and ongoing concerns about vaccines’ links to autism and various other neurological disorders, healthcare and scientific personnel are going to be hard pressed to maintain what social and cognitive authority they still possess. As such, it will be increasingly important that the United States Government undertake a public relations campaign – using (generally) trusted sources such as the CDC and trusted, local healthcare providers – to accurately convey the risks and costs associated with influenza, as well as the community-wide benefits which can be achieved through mass-vaccinations of school-aged children.

Emily Martin (1998) proposes that the anti-vaccination movement may also be reflective of a new culture of health in the United States, wherein “…the very bodies of people are being categorized into two types: those that can survive the present intensely competitive environment and those that cannot” (p. 33). Martin (1998) takes her argument one step further and pushes the idea that the rigidity of scientific communication regarding vaccine safety has lost some of its purchase in the mainstream public because it is no longer culturally gripping – that is to say, a vaccine might be seen as “crudely bludgeoning the delicate adjustment of the finely tuned immune system at a time when there is no actual threat” and thereby “be seen as undermining health” (p. 33). If the United States Government and the scientific community are unable to convey that vaccines are a far cry from bludgeoning tools for the immune system, but are rather statistically safe and effective methods for molding it in advance of a life-threatening illness or pandemic, “good” science may gradually find itself unable to quickly achieve high vaccination rates prior to, and immediately after, the start of a pandemic. Therefore, it is absolutely essential for the United States Government and any other governments hoping to use and enforce a national vaccination campaign, to understand that opposition groups can use the government’s own findings and seemingly callous scientific communication as evidence of government conspiracies to promote vaccinations, while simultaneously downplaying and/or ignoring specific subsets of the population that may suffer elevated risks of adverse effects. Consequently, it is imperative for the United States Government to identify which credibility zones are most important to the survival of its vaccination campaigns and to focus its efforts there in the event of a pandemic.[4]

It will also be critical for the United States Government and mainstream healthcare community to address anti-vaccine groups on the Internet. Multiple studies have shown that user-generated information on the Internet, alternatively known as “Web 2.0”, supply large amounts of misinformation to users, often with the same themes: childhood diseases are not as severe as the public is led to believe; the threat from childhood diseases is either minimal or does not exist; vaccines are not safe; vaccines are not effective; vaccines contain poisons, such as ether, antifreeze, etc.; civil liberties infringement; that a government-biopharmaceutical conspiracy exists because vaccines are profitable; and the list goes on (Jacobson, Targonski, & Poland, 2007; Kata, 2010; Kata, 2012; Busse, Wilson, & Campbell, 2008; Keane et al., 2005; Betsch & Sacshe, 2012; Bean, 2011; Betsch et al., 2012; Manfredi et al., 2010; Downs, de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2008; Spier, 2002; Leask & McIntyre, 2003; Witteman & Zikmund-Fisher, 2012; Poland & Jacobson, 2001; Poland, Jacobson, & Ovsyannikova, 2009; Leask, Chapman, & Robbins, 2010). However, any attempt to counteract the anti-vaccine movement online must understand that this issue cannot be “fixed” by an educational campaign – the anti-vaccine movement has found a niche in a “postmodern” society that places an emphasis on individuals’ values, “prioritizing risk over benefit,” and promotes “the well-informed patient” (Kata, 2010, p. 1714). In this postmodern society, anyone is free to challenge the expertise of established authorities and, in effect, to become “lay experts” – an oxymoronic term itself – capable of forming and following their own knowledge and judgments (Kata, 2012).

Moreover, the broad distrust of government and mainstream healthcare harbored by anti-vaccine groups means that no amount of epidemiological statistics, no matter how extensive the study or its statistical power, will be able to override personal experience and anecdotal evidence. Nevertheless, efforts must be taken to improve the number of “hits” government and mainstream healthcare websites receive on the first page of search results, given the high number of people seeking healthcare and vaccination information on the internet (Kata, 2010; Kata, 2012; Betsch & Sachse, 2012; Bean, 2011; Betsch et al., 2012; Witteman & Zikmund-Fisher, 2012; Leask, Chapman, & Robbins, 2010). This is a particularly important endeavor given that anti-vaccination websites like the NVIC portray themselves as neutral information providers, advocating safer vaccines and informed choice – inarguable points intended to draw in larger audiences – while putting out information that is almost entirely anti-vaccine. Furthermore, distrust and/or frustration with mainstream healthcare have led to a resurgence in the number of people seeking complementary and alternative healthcare (CAM) in the U.S (Ernst, 2002). For those parents of autistic children, suffering from an ill-defined disease with few, if any, treatment options according to mainstream healthcare, it is unsurprising that many would turn to alternative healthcare treatments to find hope and a potential cure for their children. Still, many within the CAM community – certified and uncertified practitioners alike – actively and/or passively dismiss vaccines as ineffective at best and harmful at worst. The United States Government and mainstream healthcare community cannot afford to lose a credibility battle in doctors’ offices because they have failed to provide hope to parents at the cost of vaccination rates.

—————————————————————-

[1] Wakefield’s original article never explicitly stated a link between MMR vaccinations and autism, although the potential linkage could not be dismissed by the authors. As such, the original authors had called for further investigation. Nevertheless, the publicity surrounding this research led in no small part to significant decreases in MMR vaccination rates in the United Kingdom – predictably leading to upticks in measles outbreaks – and, to this day, continues to be cited by various anti-vaccination groups as evidence of a major government-biopharmaceutical conspiracy aimed at hiding any evidence of harm.

[2] Thimerosal is an organic ethyl mercury compound – approximately 50 percent ethyl mercury by weight – used as a preservative in many vaccines (Kirkland, 2012, p. 242). Although the toxic, neurological effects of methyl mercury – the type most commonly found in fish and the natural environment – are well documented, thimerosal never underwent the extensive safety testing of later preservatives, effectively having been “grandfathered” in prior to the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency.

[3] “Credibility zones are spaces of knowledge production for communities that have their own sources and forms of sustenance…” (Kirkland, 2012, p. 240).

[4] For an in-depth look at credibility zones and their impacts on mainstream consensus, see: Jasanoff, S. (2004). Sates of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order. New York: Routledge.