Category: Research Notes

Bragging About Our Faculty: Round VII

by Siddha Hover, posted in News, Research Notes
(image credit Issac Shepherd)
(image credit Issac Shepherd)

GMU Biodefense Faculty member Dr. Gregory Koblentz, who is also the Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was interviewed by Executive Magazine for a piece on Syrian chemical weapons:

“’The United States and other nations have issued strong statements to deter the Assad regime from using chemical weapons. It is hard to think of how the Assad regime could use chemical weapons where the benefits outweigh the costs,’ says Gregory Koblentz, a proliferation and terrorism expert at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Indeed, the use of chemical weapons has become understood as the “red line” that would prompt western military intervention in the Syrian conflict. One possible situation for chemical weapons use, however, is if the regime is on the verge of collapse, says Koblentz. In such a scenario, ‘these rational cost-benefit calculations may not apply.’ But then again, ‘the issue becomes whether [Assad’s] order can be transmitted to chemical weapons-armed units in the field and if those orders would be obeyed.’ ”

Read the full piece here

State Sponsored Nuclear Proliferation: Why States Share Nuclear Weapons Technology

by spopescu, posted in Research Notes

Professor Greg Koblentz of the GMU Biodefense Program has a new piece in Global Studies Review:

State-sponsored nuclear proliferation, defined as a government’s intentional assistance to another state to acquire the means of producing nuclear weapons, including the transfer of weapons-grade fissile material, the technology to produce weapons-grade fissile material, or warhead design information, has had a crucial influence on the spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear warhead design supplied to Libya by the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan was initially obtained from China which was itself the recipient of extensive nuclear assistance from the Soviet Union. Iraq, Libya, and Syria might have become members of the nuclear club thanks to sensitive nuclear assistance from other states if outside intervention had not stopped their programs. The current nuclear crises with Iran and North Korea were triggered by the transfer of uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan. Iran is now offering to engage in ostensibly peaceful nuclear cooperation with countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela.

Link to the full piece is here.

M.S. in Biodefense Project Paper: Predicting BW Proliferation

by spopescu, posted in Research Notes

Project Title: Germ Games (click for pdf)
Author: Lindsay N. Lundberg, GMU M.S. in Biodefense Program

Like the microbes they attempt to harness, state bioweapon (BW) programs are often elusive, miniscule, and shrouded in secrecy. Because BW programs lack the obvious clues of nuclear or even chemical weapons programs, the hunt becomes one for measurable indicators that predict a nation’s likelihood to have or pursue an offensive capability. BW programs are usually highly classified, tightly guarded state secrets, but common indicators should exist even as the line between offensive and defensive capabilities blurs. Using a two-dimensional index, indicators of the capability and motivation of a nation to escalate research into offensive biological weapons will be objectively measured to predict where BW proliferation may occur. Constructed from quantitative and case study analyses, the index ranks contrasting example nations on the ability and predisposition to possess offensive BW capabilities. In the first section of this project, indicators will be derived from past, known state BW programs. Next, the index of capability and motive will be constructed from the indicators. Finally, individual countries will be scored on the index to predict areas of potential proliferation.

The Pandora’s Box of Biology

by spopescu, posted in Research Notes

Biodefense faculty member Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley has a new piece out in the most recent issue of the George Mason Global Studies Review:

The Pandora’s Box of Biology

On December 20, 2011, the press announced that the US government had requested two scientific journals – Science and Nature – to refrain from publishing a full account of an experiment that increased the transmissibility of bird flu virus H5N1.1 Government concerns that bioterrorists might use published data on the experimental details to recreate the deadly virus and unleash a pandemic across the globe motivated this unprecedented action. This is not the first time that scientific breakthroughs have set off alarm bells. Since the anthrax-laced letters of 2001, the US government has been on high alert, issuing regular warnings about the misuse of biotechnology. This anxiety finds its roots in the belief that globalization and the rapid development of biotechnology facilitate access to specialized knowledge, making it easier for terrorists to apply scientific advances to nefarious purposes. Yet, the idea that knowledge created by highly specialized scientists will easily trickle down to “comparatively low-skilled practitioners” via written documents has no solid foundation. Research in the field of science and technology studies has shown that knowledge remains confined to small groups of scientists who created it, because it has a tacit component that cannot readily be transferred to other individuals or locations. Science and weapons developments are also subject to organizational and managerial demands that also affect scientific results. Therefore, access to written information alone does not allow the easy replication of previous work. The question remains: what conditions are required to replicate past work, and can terrorist groups create such conditions?