The George Mason Biodefense Department Fall Newsletter is out and should be waiting for you in your inbox. If it is not, you are not receiving any Mason emails, and Peg and Amanda are both very cross with you. While we don’t condone the bouncing back of emails, we do want you to see the Newsletter, so check it out here (and clean your inbox out!)
Highlights include Pakistan discussing a biological weapons “contingency plan” (no words), NEJM unmasking the new coronavirus, MRSA in your friendly neighborhood bunnies, more fungal meningitis, and bacteria-contaminated antibacterial soap.
Pakistan Today – Ambassador (r) Qazi Humayun said that despite the fact that development and use of chemical-biological weapons (CBW) has been prohibited by international conventions, Pakistan needs to develop a contingency plan, especially considering the vulnerable civilian population, so that it is not taken by surprise in case of a CBW attack.
He said this while chairing a session at the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) on “Chemical-Biological Weapons and Pakistan”, which featured a presentation by Dr. Tughral Yamin from National Defense University. Humayun said that there were weaknesses in the international conventions on chemical and biological weapons as they could not stop a country if it started making such weapons without declaring them.
The virus, poetically dubbed “HCoV-EMC”, is a novel betacoronavirus species whose closest cousin is found in bats. Before we collectively exhale, the NEJM wants to remind everyone that “animal coronaviruses can cause severe disease in humans”. Happy Friday.
NEJM – “A previously unknown coronavirus was isolated from the sputum of a 60-year-old man who presented with acute pneumonia and subsequent renal failure with a fatal outcome in Saudi Arabia.The clinical picture was remarkably similar to that of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003…”
For a less science-heavy summary, see the Wired article here.
Moral of the story? Don’t touch Thumper.
Wired Science – One of the most notorious and hard-to-treat bacteria in humans has been found in wildlife, according to a new study in the Journal of Wildlife Diseases. The researchers isolated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in two rabbits and a shorebird. Wild animals may act as an environmental reservoir for the disease from which humans could get infected. S. aureus can cause skin infections or, if it gets into the bloodstream, life-threatening illness. Most infections are easy to manage with penicillin and related antibiotics, but MRSA, the resistant variety, is on the rise; also known as a “superbug,” it kills an estimated 18,000 Americans a year.
CDC Update – The CDC and FDA have confirmed the presence of a fungus known as Exserohilum rostratum in unopened medication vials of preservative-free methylprednisolone acetate…from one of the three implicated lots … The laboratory confirmation further links steroid injections from these lots…to the multistate outbreak of fungal meningitis and joint infections.
If you are the proud owner of any Avmor Ltd Antibacterial Foaming Hand Soap with Triclosan, you should seriously consider switching to Dove.
CTV News – “Laval-based Avmor Ltd. is recalling 19 more lots of its Antimicrobial Foaming Hand Soap with Triclosan, and it is also recalling alcohol-free hand sanitizer. So far nobody has been reported ill, but the bacteria can be dangerous to those with weak immune systems, especially those with cystic fibrosis, cancer, diabetes, burns, lung disease or HIV/AIDS.”
In Case You Missed it:
– Where Will The Next Pandemic Come From? And How Can We Stop It? Popular Science
– E. coli cases tied to outbreak now at 61 WSOCTV
– When competition is intense, viruses spill over into new hosts, Discover Magazine
– Livermore Lab developing uniforms that repel biological and chemical agents, SF Business Times
– West Nile Cases Pass 4,500 Mark Nationwide: CDC, Health Day
By Julia Duckett, GMU Biodefense PhD Program
A review of the National Research Council report, “Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology”
The National Research Council recently released the results of a study commissioned by the US Department of Defense to review DOD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and to “identify the core capabilities in science and technology that must be supported by the program.”[1] The results in “Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology” indicate a disorganized collection of DOD offices ineffective at accomplishing the CBDP’s mission to enable US Armed Forces to “fight and win decisively in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments.” The study, attending only to the chemical and biological aspects of the CBDP, seeks to do three things: define the mission and role of CBDP, identify the technology the program must support and determine whether the technology should be pursued in a DOD lab or elsewhere, and address the efficiency of the CBDP’s organizational structure. The study found that as the CBDP currently operates, it is unable to effectively equip US Armed Forces for chemical and biological operating environments; the NRC suggested major fundamental changes to improve the program’s effectiveness.
Out of a long list of formal findings in the report, a few emerge as fundamental challenges the program must overcome. First, the mission of the program is too broad and the strategy for accomplishing its goals is unclear. The program encompasses a variety of DOD offices, each responsible for different aspects of research, development, and acquisition, and each office has a unique perspective on the purpose of the program. Second, most of the core technology the NRC identified as necessary to support the program’s mission is available in non-DOD labs including labs associated both with other government agencies and the private sector. However, the connection between the researchers in those labs and the users of the technology sponsored by CBDP is weak. As a result, funding is not focused, products are not directly applicable to the users’ needs, testing and evaluation of new products is faulty, and there is little opportunity to generate new and innovative solutions. Third, funding and management are unstable, which prevents the development of an integrated suite of tools for military personnel to use in a chemical or biological environment. Particularly a problem for medical products, the frequent turnover in leadership and short-term projection of funds stymies the ability to bring a solution from the R&D phase through to the acquisition phase.
Of note, the report does not distinguish between naturally occurring and man-made biological environments. This reflects the Obama Administration’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats regardless of their source. The report notes civilian as well as military benefits to advances in the technology for medical protection and response to outbreaks. This should encourage collaboration between the CBDP and pharmaceutical companies – an important relationship identified by the study. Emphasis was placed on integrating non-DOD entities into CBDP processes to facilitate a close relationship between researchers and users. This relationship is challenged, however, by the desire to protect sensitive information on both sides. Though this may be a surmountable challenge, there is also a need to consider the United States’ international treaty commitments, particularly regarding the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Other countries could potentially question the legitimacy of mobilizing a broad and collective effort to streamline research into bioweapons-related pathogens under BWC restrictions.
Ultimately, the NRC report found that in order to effectively accomplish the mission of enabling the US military to operate in chemical and biological environments, the CBDP must make major changes to the organization of the program and the level of integration among relevant parties. The report states; “tweaking the management or refocusing a few projects will not be sufficient,” rather, a new way of thinking about the problem and how to organize the response is needed. Following the release of the report, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, Gerald Parker, in an interview with Foreign Policy, acknowledged his office is taking this report seriously. However, he says, this is nothing new, the findings are a “natural evolution” as the threat itself evolves.[2] That may be precisely the point the report attempts to make; after all these years of working to prepare our armed forces to operate in a contaminated environment, we still lack the flexibility and mobility to respond to an evolving threat. In 2007 the Government Accountability Office released a report stating military units responsible for responding to a chemical or biological event, in the US or abroad, are ill prepared to perform their mission.[3] It is evident a complete change of approach to chemical and biological preparedness is necessary – the question that remains is how to impose flexibility and adaptability on stodgy bureaucracy in order to reflect the flexible and adaptable threat.
[1] National Research Council, “Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense and Technology,” National Academies Press, 2012.
[2] Baron, Kevin, “Pentagon behind on predicting chemical, biological threats,” September 24, 2012; http://e-ring.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/24/pentagon_behind_on_predicting_chemical_biological_threats.
[3] “Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National Priorities,” GAO-07-143, January 2007.
The GMU Biodefense Facebook page is officially up, and available at http://www.facebook.com/gmu.biodefense! For those of you that don’t check your mason email as often as you should, the Facebook page will be the place to go for useful information like job and internship opportunities, workshops, study resources, and biodefense news, as well as department updates and events. It will also be the place to go for less useful things (it’s Facebook, c’mon) like reviews of tangentially-related “science” movies (Prometheus is on DVD everyone) and the occasional zombie apocalypse infographic.
All you have to do is visit the page, click the “like” button, and its posts will automatically pop-up in your newsfeed! Anyone can suggest edits as well, so if you feel anything is lacking, please let us know. And if you’re tired of trying to explain to friends, family members, and coworkers what exactly it is you’re studying, we highly recommend sharing the page in a status update! So, head over to the page and like us now!
Highlights include potential Syrian BW, fungal meningitis, West Nile (stupid mosquitoes), developments in the quest for the fabled universal flu vaccine, gut bacteria using viruses to take out rival bacteria (it’s a bug-eat-bug world, eh?), quorum sensing (bacterial moochers may be good for you), and the President’s Bioethics Commission report on Genomics and Privacy.
Are Syrian shells raining biological agents down on Lebanese?
Christian Science Monitor – “Residents in Nourat al-Tahta and other villages under routine Syrian shellfire are complaining of unexplained symptoms may indicate artillery shells have been filled with a biological agent, but weapons experts discount the panicky assumptions.
Nazir Shrayteh, a doctor from the nearby village of Dousi, says he has received an unusually large number of patients from villages under shellfire in recent months complaining of rashes and diarrhea.
‘Since May we have been getting these skin problems,” he says. “I don’t know what it is, but I feel something odd is going on.’ ”
Biological weapons sites concern in Syrian civil war
The Guardian – “The United States has sent military troops to the Jordan-Syria border to help bolster Jordan’s military capabilities in the event that the violence in Syria spreads, according to defence secretary Leon Panetta.
Speaking at a Nato conference of defense ministers in Brussels, Panetta said the US has been working with Jordan to monitor chemical and biological weapons sites in Syria and also to help Jordan deal with refugees moving across the border.”
Multi-State Fungal Meningitis Death Toll Grows to 14
The fungal meningitis outbreak has spread to an 11th state, with over 170 cases and 14 fatalities.
ABC News – “State and local health officials have now contacted more than 12,000 of the estimated 14,000 people exposed to the steroid, which is thought to be contaminated by one or more species of fungus. The compounding pharmacy at the center of the fungal meningitis outbreak was not following the requirements of its state license, according to a spokeswoman for the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.”
The New England Compounding Center in Framingham, Mass., shipped more than 17,000 vials of a steroid — now implicated in the outbreak — to pain clinics in 23 states.”
CDC statement and latest news here.
West Nile case rate highest in nearly a decade
CDC – “As of October 9, 2012, 48 states have reported West Nile virus infections in people, birds, or mosquitoes. A total of 4,249 cases of West Nile virus disease in people, including 168 deaths, have been reported to CDC. Of these, 2,123 (50%) were classified as neuroinvasive disease (such as meningitis or encephalitis) and 2,126 (50%) were classified as non-neuroinvasive disease.
The 4,249 cases reported thus far in 2012 is the highest number of West Nile virus disease cases reported to CDC through the second week in October since 2003. Almost 70 percent of the cases have been reported from eight states (Texas, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Dakota, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Illinois) and over a third of all cases have been reported from Texas.”
A universal vaccine for all influenza A and B viruses?
Phys.org – “A research group from The Scripps Research Institute, Crucell Vaccine Institute, Gustav Wieds Vej (Denmark), and The University of Hong Kong, building upon their earlier work with influenza A viruses, has now discovered a similar phenomenon for neutralizing influenza B viruses. Their breakthrough results, aided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science’s Advanced Photon Source (APS), Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Lightsource (SSRL), and Advanced Light Source (ALS) pave the way for development of a universal vaccine for all influenza A and B viruses.”
Mad Max in your stomach: some gut bacteria produce their own viral bio-weapons
The Raw Story – “In a paper published Monday in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, scientists say that bacteria in the gut can manufacture and use viruses as weapons against other rival bacteria in what the website LiveScience.com calls ‘intestinal shootouts.’
Scientists hope to find a way to use this process to fight hostile bacteria in what could be a new way of treating infections, including diseases that are resistant to mankind’s current arsenal of antibiotics like multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and the new strains of antibiotic-resistant gonorrhea, diseases that are currently threatening patients around the world.”
Scientists focus on quorum sensing to better understand bacteria
Phys.org – “In a study appearing in the Oct. 12 issue of the journal Science, University of Washington researchers examine the pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa, which colonizes in the lungs of cystic fibrosis patients. While most cells “cooperate” with each other by producing and sharing public goods when there are enough of their “friends” around, researchers have found that certain individual cells, known as “cheater cells,” share in the use of these extracellular products without releasing any of these products themselves.
In Pseudomonas aeruginosa these cheaters are quorum sensing mutants that don’t make public goods in response to increasing population density. When the researchers manipulated the environment so that the cost of cell cooperation was high (so that the bacterial group had to produce a lot of public goods to survive), the cheater cells overtook the cooperating producer cells, the cooperators then became too rare, and the population collapsed. From this sequence of events, the researchers induced destabilization of cooperation.
‘Perhaps, one day, we’ll be able to manipulate infections so that bacterial cooperation is destabilized and infections are resolved,’ said Dr. Peter Greenberg, UW professor of microbiology and one of the three authors of the study.”
President’s Bioethics Commission Releases Report on Genomics and Privacy
Press release – “The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues today released its report concerning genomics and privacy. The report, Privacy and Progress in Whole Genome Sequencing, concludes that to realize the enormous promise that whole genome sequencing holds for advancing clinical care and the greater public good, individual interests in privacy must be respected and secured. As the scientific community works to bring the cost of whole genome sequencing down from millions per test to less than the cost of many standard diagnostic tests today, the Commission recognizes that whole genome sequencing and its increased use in research and the clinic could yield major advances in health care. However it could also raise ethical dilemmas.
‘Scientists and clinicians must have access to data from large numbers of people who are willing to share their private information. This in turn requires public trust that any whole genome sequence data shared by individuals with clinicians and researchers will be adequately protected,’ said Commission Vice Chair James W. Wagner, Ph.D .”
For the full report, see here.
Professor Greg Koblentz of the GMU Biodefense Program has a new piece in Global Studies Review:
State-sponsored nuclear proliferation, defined as a government’s intentional assistance to another state to acquire the means of producing nuclear weapons, including the transfer of weapons-grade fissile material, the technology to produce weapons-grade fissile material, or warhead design information, has had a crucial influence on the spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear warhead design supplied to Libya by the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan was initially obtained from China which was itself the recipient of extensive nuclear assistance from the Soviet Union. Iraq, Libya, and Syria might have become members of the nuclear club thanks to sensitive nuclear assistance from other states if outside intervention had not stopped their programs. The current nuclear crises with Iran and North Korea were triggered by the transfer of uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan. Iran is now offering to engage in ostensibly peaceful nuclear cooperation with countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela.
Link to the full piece is here.
Reviewed by Siddha Hover (GMU Biodefense PhD program)
The Obama administration published the National Strategy for Biosurveillance on July 31st of this year. The Strategy seeks to lay the foundation for the forthcoming biosurveillance strategic implementation plan, set to be published before the end of 2012. The self-expressed goal of the Biosurveillance Strategy is to provide “a well-integrated national biosurveillance enterprise that saves lives by providing essential information for better decisionmaking at all levels”. Although official recognition of the need for effective biosurveillance is important, the strategy has two key flaws; a general lack of originality and an over-broadening of that which constitutes biosurveillance.
Before the flaws of the Biosurveillance Strategy can be examined, however, a cursory overview of its content is necessary. The Strategy employs rhetorical mechanisms of “guiding principles”, “core functions” and “enablers” to present an introduction to US biosurveillance goals. Emphasizing the use of “existing, multipurpose capabilities” the strategy presents four key national goals – discerning the environment, identifying essential information, alerting decision makers, and forecasting. These goals are enabled by the aptly titled “enablers”, which include the integration of capabilities, capacity building, encouraging innovation, and strengthening interactions across multiple sectors.
These concepts are indeed relevant. Cross-sector information sharing is indeed crucial to effective biosurveillance, as is innovation in detection technologies. However, these and similar suggestions have already been made reiteratively over the last decade, by almost all relevant stakeholders, in relation both to biological threats specifically and terrorism writ-large. Gregory Koblentz, in his book Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security, published in 2009, calls explicitly for innovative “detection, protection, and treatment technologies”. The 9/11 Commission Report, published in 2004, has entire sections dedicated to the need for increased cross-sector information sharing. The choice to pursue status-quo principles, core functions, and enablers of the Strategy is not a negative reflection on the content itself, and there is merit in the argument that these suggestions remain pertinent. However, the lack of originality in the Strategy is nonetheless disheartening and concerning. Disheartening because the superficial treatment of the need for improvements in our national biosurveillance could be interpreted as official ambivalence. Concerning because the most virulent diseases, whether manufactured by terrorists or reassorted in pigs, are often characterized by a devastating aptitude for change.
The second flaw within the Strategy is the broadening of the concept of biosurveillance. Biosurveillance is defined as “the process of gathering, integrating, interpreting, and communicating essential information related to all-hazard threats or disease activity affecting human, animal, or plant health…”, where all-hazard is associated with all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. This Strategy takes this definition of biosurveillance and broadens it to include “emerging infectious diseases, pandemics, agricultural threats, and food-borne illnesses”. By positing itself as a continuation of both the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, the National Biosurveillance Strategy effectively securitizes all wide-scale health concerns. This broadening is problematic for a number of reasons, the foremost being a dilution of that which constitutes a “threat” almost to the point of meaningless. Processing the vast amount of information on intentional threats alone is already extremely challenging for the national security apparatus. The mandate to monitor all incidents of disease unnecessarily adds to this vast burden while expending limited security resources, leaving us less able to address immanent biological threats and exigencies.
The detrimental impact of this broadening is further visible when analyzing the Strategy’s policy suggestions. For instance, the aforementioned goal to “indentify and integrate essential information” encompasses within it the suggested development of a “discrete set of key questions to speed incident detection and awareness”. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks (Amerithrax) illustrate the difficulty in developing such a discreet set of questions. Despite occurring in the weeks following 9/11, and despite the staggered timing of the attacks, two of the latter Amerithrax victims still died due to misdiagnosis. Bacillus anthracis, like many of the other select agents, presents very similarly to pneumonia, making its initial diagnosis difficult. Thus, just as it remains difficult to synthesize a single set of questions to exclusively detect the symptoms of one, relatively uncommon disease, any set of questions which is expected to detect all potential effects from CBRN, emerging infectious diseases, pandemics, and food-bourne illnesses would be meaningless.
All criticisms aside, it should be kept in mind that the Biosurveillance Strategy is the first of its kind. The lack of originality could be interpreted as a summation of past precedent. The broadening of the scope of biosurveillance could be interpreted as recognition of the need for effective pandemic preparedness. As a first draft, then, while it definitely needs work, it’s very existence is a step in the right direction.
The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Harvard University Press 2012)
Raymond Zilinskas and Milton Leitenberg
Hardcover. 960 pages. $55.00
Reviewed by Justin Ludgate (GMU Biodefense MS Program)
In researching one of the most closely guarded secrets of the Soviet Union, Raymond Zilinskas and Milton Leitenberg’s work on the history of the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program (BW) program is ambitious to say the least. The authors describe the current view of the Soviet Union’s BW program as being an incomplete picture cobbled together from precious few, often flawed, primary sources due to the compartmentalization and secrecy that veiled the program. Zilinskas and Leitenberg bring new research and analysis to the table and provide the most comprehensive examination to date of the Soviet BW program. The book itself is vast and covers everything about the program from research on weaponizing Francisella tularensis to Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin’s failures to end offensive BW research.
Overall, the tone of the book suggests future concerns regarding Russia’s failure to abide by international agreements, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, due to the ongoing concern of closed Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) biological research facilities. Though not without criticism, the authors do note that U.S. efforts to prevent BW related proliferation of materials, technology, or personnel were largely successful thanks to programs such as the U.S. Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the Department of State’s International Science and Technology Center.
The book’s first goal is to describe the Soviet BW program as thoroughly as possible, as it was the largest of its kind in the world. The first chapter covers the program’s history between 1918 and 1972, or the “first generation” of the Soviet BW program. The Soviet BW program was initially influenced by the parallel needs of combating endemic diseases and preventing a recurrence of the high level of disease-related deaths suffered by the armed forces during World War I and the subsequent civil war. Prior to World War II, the military concentrated its efforts on weaponizing agents such as Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, and various types of Rickettsiae. All of these pathogens were endemic to the Soviet Union and defensive research efforts such as vaccine development often paralleled offensive research, creating a complicated dual-use relationship. The Soviet Union later exploited this dual-use relationship to establish cover stories for institutions dedicated to offensive BW research during the program’s second generation which ran from 1972 until 1992.
The authors credit the massive growth of the “modern” Soviet BW program experienced after 1970 to the machinations of a scientist named Yury A. Ovchinnikov, who convinced the MOD that biotechnology research could provide the Soviet Union with a potent weapon. At that time, scientists were dependent on the patronage of the Soviet government, as there were no private institutions capable of funding scientific projects. The MOD and the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) in particular were highly sought after patrons due to their deep pockets. However, the funding came with strings attached. Scientists interested in studying bacteria, viruses, and genetics were often obliged to conduct military research, whether they were aware of it or not. While Ovchinnikov was successful in securing funding from the MOD, the bargain ensured the continued militarization of biology in the Soviet Union for years to come.
By 1972, the 15th Directorate of the MOD was tasked with overseeing a network of BW research institutes, located in Kirov, Zagorsk, and Sverdlovsk. In 1973, a new network of offensive and defensive BW research institutes, named Biopreparat, was established. Officially reporting to a civilian authority, many aspects of offensive research were undertaken by military scientists and senior officials within the new organization held military rank. The book provides a host of details about the history, research, and current workings of former Biopreparat institutes such as Vector, the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology, and the Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental-Industrial Base. This includes the dire economic situation these institutes found themselves in following the cessation of funds flowing from the Soviet state apparatus after the fall of the Soviet Union.
The second goal of the book is to ascertain whether the drastic loss of funding to BW institutes within Biopreparat and the MOD, following the end of the Soviet Union, caused a “brain drain” of former BW scientists to other nations or the proliferation and sale of BW-related material. The authors argue that U.S. threat reduction programs were largely successful in preventing the proliferation of BW research, materials, and personnel. However, a closed system of institutes with historic ties to the Soviet BW program still exists today. Worse, the authors argue that a regression has taken place in Putin’s Russia. The Russian government now refuses to admit that there ever was an offensive BW program and has reverted to the Soviet-era story that the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk was caused by contaminated meat and not an accident at a military BW site.
In writing this book, the authors faced a daunting task. Compartmentalization within the Soviet BW program ensured that even high-level sources, such as Ken Alibek, Vladimir Pasechnik, and Igor Domaradsky, did not necessarily possess the full picture of the Soviet BW program. The authors interviewed various other scientists involved in Biopreparat, but their identities are largely kept anonymous due to a decree from the Russian government that criminalizes any discussion of former Soviet state secrets. The lack of sources within the MOD leads to significant gaps in the book regarding Soviet BW munitions, doctrine, and strategy.
Overall, the book is a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet BW program, including its origin, evolution, motivation, and accomplishments and failures. The Soviet Union’s BW program is a great topic for anyone studying biodefense as it offers both scientific and political insights. The writing style is easy to follow, although readers with little scientific background may have to refer to the glossary during some of the more technical sections of the book. The acronyms and changing names of certain institutes involved in the BW program can be confusing, but that is to be expected given the sheer size and scope of the Soviet BW program. In synthesizing new and previously available sources, this book provides the most objective assessment of the Soviet Union’s BW program, as well as the implications of this program on the future of international security. That being said, the authors are careful to point out the limitations of their research and gaps in their knowledge of various aspects of the Soviet BW program, indicating that much remains to be learned about the largest and most advanced BW program in history.
Book Title: The Viral Storm: The Dawn of a New Pandemic Age (Times Books 2011)
Book Author: Nathan Wolfe
Reviewer: Kathleen Danskin, GMU M.S. in Biodefense Program
At first glance, the title of this book may bring to mind alarmist doomsday scenarios of a future filled with unstoppable global pandemics. However, the “new pandemic age” that Nathan Wolfe describes is instead one in which humans can anticipate pandemics and intervene in the early stages to prevent disaster. While the book does rely on a few of the standard ominous vignettes featuring H5N1, SARS, or bioterrorism to create a sense of fear and urgency, the overall message is one of optimism and confidence that these scenarios are not inevitable.
The Pandora Report 