Pandora Report 2.2.2024

This week’s Pandora Report covers newly introduced legislation that could ban foreign biotech companies like BGI Group from doing business in the US, OpenAI’s evaluation of large language model-aided biological risks, interesting new publications, upcoming events, and multiple announcements.

BGI Group, Other Foreign Biotech Companies Targeted by New US Bills

Recently, members of the House Select Committee on the CCP and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee introduced legislation that would ban foreign adversary bioetchnology companies from doing business in the United States, including BGI Group. This follows years of warnings from the Intelligence Community that Chinese companies are amassing American genetic information, threatening national security. As we discussed in 2022, “Early in the pandemic, as the US struggled to build testing capacity and states could not run their own tests in their state labs, BGI Group (formerly known as Beijing Genomics Institute) targeted US state governments with cheap tests that promised to rapidly increase their capacity. The problem, however, was that BGI is known to have used its NIFTY test, a prenatal test used by pregnant people globally, to collect data in collaboration with the People’s Liberation Army, the military wing of the CCP.”

The Pentagon explicitly acknowledged BGI Group’s collaboration with the PLA in 2021, and five subsidiaries and affiliates of the company have since been sanctioned by the US Department of Commerce. However, according to NBC News, “The U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center reacted to the Reuters report by warning that “non-invasive prenatal testing kits marketed by Chinese biotech firms serve an important medical function, but they can also provide another mechanism for the People’s Republic of China and Chinese biotech companies to collect genetic and genomic data from around the globe,” the center said.”

BGI Group responded, stating in part “BGI fully embraces the bill’s premise of protecting Americans’ personal data. Unfortunately, this legislation will succeed only in driving BGI out of the US and will not accomplish its stated goal. Rather, the bill will further strengthen the effective market monopoly held by one company that controls more than 90 percent of the market, resulting in increased healthcare costs and limited access to technologies and services.”

The company further denied that it is controlled by the PRC government, CCP, or PLA, emphasizing that it is a privately owned company. However, PRC data security laws implemented in recent years ensure the government is able to access data collected by private Chinese companies and those doing business with Chinese citizens.

Check out our March 2023 reporting on the US Department of Commerce’s addition of three BGI Group subsidiaries to the Entity List.

Open AI Announces Blueprint for LLM-Aided Biological Threat Creation

OpenAI, the organization responsible for ChatGPT, announced this week that it is developing a blueprint for “evaluating the risk that a large language model (LLM) could aid someone in creating a biological threat,” following recent concerns that the platform and others like it could aid potential bioterrorists.

The company explained in a statement that “In an evaluation involving both biology experts and students, we found that GPT-4 provides at most a mild uplift in biological threat creation accuracy. While this uplift is not large enough to be conclusive, our finding is a starting point for continued research and community deliberation.”

Read more about OpenAI’s evaluation and blueprint here.

“Who Are Iran-Backed Militia Groups Targeting U.S. Bases in the Middle East?”

Schar School faculty member Mahmut Cengiz for Homeland Security Today: “Iran-backed militia groups have increasingly targeted the United States (U.S.) military bases and facilities in the Middle East after Hamas’s October 7th terrorist attacks. The U.S. airstrikes continuously retaliate from these groups and target their facilities. The most recent one took place on January 24th and targeted the facilities of Kataib-s Hezbollah in Iraq. However, these militia groups used an uncrewed aerial system and attacked the Tower 22 U.S. military outpost in Jordan on January 27, 2023, killing three U.S. service members and wounding 40 others. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) claimed responsibility for this attack.”

“The operational capacity of Iran-backed militia groups has threatened U.S. interests in the region, given the fact that these groups recently seem to be more capable and organized than even jihadist terrorist groups in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. This article uses the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) Records of Incidents Database (GRID) and examines active terror groups backed by Iran in the Middle East.”

Read more here.

“NTI Begins Scoping New International AI-Bio Forum”

From NTI: “Significant advances in artificial intelligence (AI) in recent years offer tremendous potential benefits for modern bioscience and bioengineering by supporting the rapid development of vaccines and therapeutics, enabling the development of new materials, fostering economic development, and helping fight climate change. However, AI-bio capabilities—AI tools and technologies that enable the engineering of living systems—also could be accidentally or deliberately misused to cause significant harm, with the potential to cause a global biological catastrophe.”

“To reduce biosecurity risks that arise at the intersection of AI and the life sciences, NTI | bio convened experts in the fields of synthetic biology, machine learning, bioinformatics, and international security policy on January 11, 2024 to outline steps toward establishing an international AI-Bio Forum.”

Read more here.

“Towards Risk Analysis of the Impact of AI on the Deliberate Biological Threat Landscape”

Matthew E. Walsh recently authored this article: “The perception that the convergence of biological engineering and artificial intelligence (AI) could enable increased biorisk has recently drawn attention to the governance of biotechnology and artificial intelligence. The 2023 Executive Order, Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, requires an assessment of how artificial intelligence can increase biorisk. Within this perspective, we present a simplistic framework for evaluating biorisk and demonstrate how this framework falls short in achieving actionable outcomes for a biorisk manager. We then suggest a potential path forward that builds upon existing risk characterization work and justify why characterization efforts of AI-enabled tools for engineering biology is needed.”

“Lessons from Kazakhstan for 2024: On the Front Lines of Nuclear and Biological Risks”

From CSR: “The paper starts with a section on Kazakhstan’s past and current roles regarding nuclear risks, and continues with a section on its past and current roles regarding biological risks. Each section starts with a summary of the Soviet weapons of mass destruction legacy that Kazakhstan inherited upon independence. We then provide an overview of Kazakhstan’s decision to relinquish and eliminate these legacies, followed by a discussion of the nation’s unique current roles regarding the NPT and IABS. In each of these sections, we include pertinent background to show why progress in 2024 is central to the international community, remaining confident that existing norms and agreements will persist and be implemented as intended.”

“We then conclude the paper with brief recommendations on how Kazakhstan can leverage its past decisions and current leadership roles to drive such progress, summarized here. First, Kazakhstan and other nations playing key roles in the NPT process should elevate the urgency of reducing the role of nuclear weapons. There is also an opportunity to parse how this might be pursued, in particular in calling for an end to tactical nuclear weapons as one concrete step. Second, Kazakhstan should continue the push within the NPT forum for a nuclear weapons database and universal reporting template to encourage trust and mitigate miscalculation risks. Third, Kazakhstan should continue to pursue the IABS in the manner it has over the past year: driving dialogue on the most important ways such an entity could augment the existing international system and begin filling some of its gaps, and scoping what an achievable launch of the IABS would look like. Finally, while Kazakhstan is presently playing unique leadership roles, no single nation can make progress alone. We hope that all nations will cooperate in advancing concrete steps for the 2026 NPT Review Conference and help perpetuate positive discourse regarding a future IABS.”

“Addressing Misconceptions About Biological and Chemical Weapons and Related Legal Frameworks”

From VERTIC: “This webpage and the related report form the primary outputs of a project undertaken by VERTIC in 2022 and 2023, funded by the UK Chemical and Biological Weapons, Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. The main purpose of this resource is to disprove misconceptions about chemical and biological weapons and related international instruments. It addresses misconceptions about biological and chemical weapons and related legal frameworks that VERTIC staff have identified through interactions with states over 20 years’ work on these treaties, and from other sources such as the media. Each misconception is broken down into an explanation of the misconception and its implications, and how to address it. The misconceptions are then disproved through factual and legal discussions, supported by expert commentary.”

Countering WMD Journal

From USANCA: “Published semi-annually, this edition of the Countering WMD Journal includes articles from authors across the CWMD community on a range of topics relevant to professionals in this field. We would like to publicly acknowledge all the effort put forth by the contributors to the 27th Edition.”
 
“Among the articles published in the 27th Edition are “The CWMD ‘Operational Void” by Mr. Paul Sigler and Maj. James Bowen, “Avoiding Strategic Miscalculation” by Maj. Kirk Shoemaker, and “A Unique Solution to Nuclear Reactor Parameter Centralization: Streamlining the Search and Analysis of WMD Reactors of Concern” by Cadet Aaron Calhoun and Cadet Matthew Eckert. New sections in this edition of the journal include book reviews and “Journal Article Watch” by Dr. Jeffrey Rolfes, which spotlights policy and scientific research of interest to the CWMD community.”

“Protein Design Meets Biosecurity”

From Science: “The power and accuracy of computational protein design have been increasing rapidly with the incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) approaches. This promises to transform biotechnology, enabling advances across sustainability and medicine. DNA synthesis plays a critical role in materializing designed proteins. However, as with all major revolutionary changes, this technology is vulnerable to misuse and the production of dangerous biological agents. To enable the full benefits of this revolution while mitigating risks that may emerge, all synthetic gene sequence and synthesis data should be collected and stored in repositories that are only queried in emergencies to ensure that protein design proceeds in a safe, secure, and trustworthy manner.”

Read this editorial here.

WHO Releases Draft Decision on Strengthening Laboratory Biological Risk Management

The WHO recently uploaded this draft decision proposed by the EU and the US.

“Integrating Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratories for Emergency Use Testing during Pandemics”

Hodges et al. recently published this article in Emerging Infectious Diseases: “The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic showed limitations in human outbreak testing. Veterinary diagnostic laboratories (VDLs) possess capabilities to bolster emergency test capacity. Surveys from 26 participating VDLs found human SARS-CoV-2 testing was mutually beneficial, including One Health benefits. VDLs indicated testing >3.8 million human samples during the pandemic, which included some challenges.”

“ASPR TRACIE 2023 Year in Review”

From ASPR TRACIE: “In September 2023, ASPR TRACIE celebrated our eighth anniversary; by the end of 2023, we cumulatively tallied nearly 2 million visits to our website and responded to close to 12,000 TA requests (while maintaining a 99% user satisfaction rating). For close to four years, we have addressed a surge of COVID-19- specific TA requests (over 3,000 TA were related to COVID-19), maintained 20 COVID-19-specific resource collections, and created/refreshed nearly 100 resources to help our stakeholders make their way through this unprecedented challenge. As communities grappled with concurrent disasters and mass casualty incidents, our team worked hard to ensure our website remained available 24/7 and our materials were supportive and timely.”

Read more here.

“An Open Letter to World Leaders: Now Is the Time to Lead and Achieve an Ambitious, Legally-Binding Pandemic Accord”

A recently signed letter from “more than 40 senior representatives from The Elders, The Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, The Independent Panel, Pandemic Action Network, The Panel for a Global Public Health Convention and Spark Street Advisors”: “Therefore, our Chairs, leaders, and members of the Secretariat have come together for the first time to sign this open letter to world leaders.

“They outline the need for leadership, urgency and commitment to conclude a pandemic accord that goes well beyond business as usual, and guarantees the equitable access, finance and accountability needed to make COVID-19 the last pandemic of such devastation.”
“Their call represents their ongoing commitment to continue to advocate for a world protected from pandemics, and their knowledge that business as usual will absolutely not do.”

Read more here.

“The Pipeline for Pandemic Products is Bare. Here’s Why It Matters”

Jenny Lei Ravelo recently published this article in Devex: “One of the key concepts born out of the COVID-19 pandemic is the 100 Days Mission, an initiative endorsed by the Group of Seven major economies and the Group of 20 industrialized and emerging-market nations whose goal is to have effective diagnostics, treatments, and vaccines within 100 days of a public health emergency declaration.”

“But a new report reveals serious gaps in the clinical pipeline for diseases with pandemic potential, and limited investments in their research and development over the years.”

“There are no approved treatments and very few in clinical trials for diseases with high fatality rates, such as Marburg and Nipah. There are also no diagnostics in late-stage clinical development for Zika and SARS.”

Read more here.

“Why Drug Resistance is Becoming One of Our Biggest Global Health Security Blind-Spots”

Manica Balasegaram recently authored this piece for the World Economic Forum, writing in part “Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is already one of the biggest global killers, with nearly 5 million deaths a year. Yet, few people know what it is, let alone the threat it poses to them. One reason for this is its insidious nature. AMR likely won’t hit us hard and fast like a pandemic; instead we’ll see a steady rise in cases of treatable infections becoming once again untreatable, with even minor infections or medical procedures becoming life-threatening.”

“In time, the 23-year global increase in life expectancy we have experienced thanks to antibiotics could be steadily reversed. Given that all this could be prevented, perhaps one of the things that makes drug resistance now one of our greatest global health security threats is the very fact that too few people view it as one.”

“Knowledge Is Power in the Fight Against Synthetic Opioids”

From DHS S&T: “The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland Security Investigations recently announced in its Strategy for Combating Illicit Opioids that the agency has seized more than 54,000 pounds of fentanyl and interdicted over 2.2 million pounds of synthetic drug precursor chemicals over the last five years. Still, overdose deaths continue to rise, and the ways opioids reach users constantly evolve.”

“The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is working with partners at every government level on opioid detection and is curtailing the illicit flow of fentanyl into the country, both cornerstones of the Biden Administration’s Unity Agenda Strategy for defeating the overdose epidemic. S&T’s Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC), the preeminent national laboratory dedicated to identifying and assessing chemical threats, has been researching opioids since its establishment in 2006 and currently has a number of efforts focusing on combating the threat that synthetic opioids pose.”

Read more here.

What We’re Listening To 🎧

Poisons and Pestilence Bonus Episode: The French Connection with Etienne Aucouturier

“In this episode, we examine the development of the French CBW programme  post WW-2″.

NEW: Enhancing the Global Food System’s Resilience to Biological Threats

“This virtual event, hosted by the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at Texas A&M, will take place on February 20, 1:00-2:30 PM [CST].”

“A year after the Biden Administration’s National Security Memorandum on Strengthening the Security and Resilience of United States Food and Agriculture (NSM-16), Scowcroft is convening stakeholders from across industry, academia, and government to identify the policies and technologies needed to safeguard the world’s food system against biological threats. Planned topics include microbial food production, AI-enabled crop disease surveillance, and genomic engineering to improve plant disease resistance, among others.”

“For more details, find a draft agenda here

Speakers include:

  • David Stiefel, National Security Policy Analyst, National Security Division, USDA and former Director for Biodefense on the National Security Council
  • Nils Justen, Policy Analyst, National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB)
  • Shannon Nangle, CEO and Co-Founder, Circe Biosciences 
  • Seth Murray, Professor Butler Chair, Soil and Crop Sciences, Texas A&M University
  • Yiping Qi, Professor, Plant Sciences and Landscaping, University of Maryland”

Register here.

NEW: The Advancing Threat Agnostic Biodefense Webinar Series

From PNNL: “Join us as we welcome Dr. Tony Goldberg, professor in the School of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His talk, titled “Assessing the Zoonotic Risk of Pre-emergent Viruses” will be Tuesday, February 20, at noon PT.

“Exploration of the “virosphere” is in its golden age. The sheer number of new viruses discovered daily, and the fact that most cannot be cultured, creates enormous uncertainty about where to allocate attention and resources. It is not an intractable problem, however, to distinguish those few viruses that are likely to emerge as zoonoses from the many others that are not. This talk describes two diametric approaches to addressing this problem.”

Learn more and register here.

NEW: Introducing IBBIS: Safeguarding Bioscience and Biotechnology for a Safer Future

“The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is launching the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS) during an official side event at the 2024 Munich Security Conference. IBBIS is a new, independent organization based in Geneva that will work with global partners to strengthen biosecurity norms and develop innovative tools to uphold them. IBBIS will help reduce the risk of catastrophic events that could result from deliberate abuse or accidental misuse of bioscience and biotechnology so they can flourish, safely and responsibly.”

“NTI Co-Chair and CEO Ernest J. Moniz will moderate a senior-level panel discussion featuring: Weiwen Zhang, director, Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University; James Diggans, head of biosecurity, Twist Bioscience; Luciana Borio, venture partner, ARCH Venture Partners and senior fellow for global health, Council on Foreign Relations; and Piers Millett, executive director, IBBIS. Amandeep Gill, UN Secretary General’s Envoy on Technology, will provide recorded remarks.”

This in-person event will take place at Literaturhaus München on Thursday, February 15. Learn more and RSVP here.

NEW: Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria Public Meeting

“The 24th PACCARB public meeting will be held virtually on February 22, 2024. This will be the second of two meetings to address the task provided to the PACCARB by the Secretary of HHS to address antimicrobial resistance globally. The focus of the meeting will be on international implementers and the gaps, challenges, and opportunities they see to combat AMR globally – specifically focusing on low- and middle-income countries. Current times are tentative and subject to change.”

This event will take place on February 22, at 9 am. Submit public comments and register to attend here.

NEW: SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology, and Biosecurity Conference in Africa

“Join us for the SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Conference in Africa, a groundbreaking event that brings together experts, researchers, and enthusiasts in the field of synthetic biology. This in-person conference will take place at the Laico Regency Hotel from Wed, Jul 17, 2024 to Friday, Jul 19, 2024.”

“Get ready to dive into the exciting world of synthetic biology and explore its potential applications in Africa. From cutting-edge research to innovative solutions, this conference offers a unique opportunity to learn, network, and collaborate with like-minded individuals.”

“Discover the latest advancements, trends, and challenges in synthetic biology through engaging keynote speeches, interactive workshops, and thought-provoking panel discussions. Immerse yourself in a vibrant atmosphere where ideas flow freely and new connections are made.”

“Whether you’re a seasoned professional or just starting your journey in synthetic biology, this conference provides a platform to expand your knowledge, exchange ideas, and contribute to the growth of the field in Africa.”

“Don’t miss out on this extraordinary event that promises to shape the future of synthetic biology and biosecurity in Africa. Mark your calendars and join us at the SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Conference in Africa!”

Learn more and register here.

Policy Frontiers: Realizing the Benefits, Managing the Risks of Artificial Intelligence-Driven Biotechnology

From the Center for Health Security: “The conversation will delve into the impact and implementation of the President’s AI Executive Order related to the convergence of AI and biotechnology, challenges and opportunities that still need to be addressed, and Congress’ role in governance of these rapidly evolving technologies.”

“The panel, moderated by Dr. Inglesby, will examine AI in the life sciences and health security, both the potential for advances in pandemic preparedness as well as what needs to be done now to guard against potentially consequential risks of accidents or misuse.”

“A reception including hors d’oeuvres and beverages will follow the program. This is a great opportunity for you to network and engage in meaningful conversations on this timely topic.”

This event will take place on February 8 at 5 pm EST. RSVP here.

ICYMI: CNS Seminar on the Intersection of Artificial Intelligence and WMD Nonproliferation

From CNS: “On January 24, 2024, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) convened a timely seminar to address the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation.”

“The seminar showcased the wide range of CNS expertise and its collaborative relationships with industry. Dr. Sarah Shoker from Open AI spoke about ongoing efforts to evaluate the potential exploitation of frontier models by nefarious actors seeking WMD capabilities. Dr. Ian Stewart, Head of the CNS DC office, demonstrated how one can leverage cutting-edge AI tools to streamline nonproliferation workflows while Steven de la Fuente discussed how AI approaches can enhance and expedite open-source data collection and imagery analysis. Pivoting to risks, Dr. Allison Berke, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, presented her research assessing the potential dangers of AI-enabled bio-design technologies, which could allow nefarious actors to engineer novel toxins. CNS Scientist-in-Residence Dr. Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress explored classroom applications of AI tools to enhance arms control pedagogy and research through AI agent-based simulations. Dr. Ian Stewart closed out the speaker session by examining emerging policy and governance challenges.”

Read more here.

WEBINAR: State Department 2023 Global Terrorism Data: Trends & Warnings

From Homeland Security Today: “Join HSToday for a Law Enforcement-only analysis of global terrorism trends from 2023 and threat forecasts for 2024. The Department of State’s yearly Annex of Statistical Information Reports uses The Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) database.”

“Dr. Mahmut Cengiz, a senior data analyst at GTTAC since 2018, will discuss terrorism trends from 2023 and areas of concern for law enforcement in the United States (US). More specifically, his analyses will focus on HAMAS and Iran-backed terror groups targeting American facilities in the Middle East, Al Qaeda- and ISIS-affiliated organizations actively involved in terrorist attacks worldwide, increasing far-right terrorism and emerging lone actor threats in the US and Europe. The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) is the first center in the United States devoted to understanding the links among terrorism, transnational crime and corruption, and to teach, research, train and help formulate policy on these critical issues. TraCCC is a research center within the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. TraCCC also houses the innovative and highly-respected Anti-Illicit Trade Institute (AITI).”

This event will take place on February 8 at 2 pm EST. Learn more and register here.

GP Nonproliferation and Strategic Trade Hub Virtual Launch & Demo  

“The Strategic Trade Research Institute (STRI) invites you to participate in the Global Partnership Nonproliferation and Strategic Trade Hub Virtual Launch and Demo event taking place on February 27, 2024, from 9:00-10:00 am EST.”

“Please join us to learn about the main features of the Hub, how to use it, and how it can be useful and impactful for nonproliferation and export control professionals. The event will feature Andrea Viski, Director of STRI, as well as introductory remarks from the Hub’s sponsor, the United Kingdom’s Counter-proliferation and Arms Control Center (CPACC).”

Learn more and register here.

International Conference, CBRNE Research & Innovation

“The last 40 years have demonstrated that both military and civilian populations could be exposed to highly hazardous CBRNE agents following conflicts, natural outbreaks and disasters, industrial incidents or terrorist attacks.”

“Worldwide, researchers, responders and industrial capacities have been commited to provide adapted response to these challenges.”

“Building on the success of the first 5 International Conferences « CBRNE Research and Innovation » which took place in Antibes (2015), Lyon (2017), Nantes (2019), on line (2021) and Lille (2022), we want to give you a new opportunity to build up or strengthen collaborative networks in Strabourg (March 19th – 21rst 2024).”

“The CBRNE R&I Conference is specifically devoted to scientific updates, responders’ feedbacks and expression of needs. It also includes workshops and demonstrations of innovative materials, technologies and procedures, according to the following themes: DETECTION – IDENTIFICATION, PROTECTION – DECONTAMINATION, MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES, RISKS & CRISIS MANAGEMENT.”

“Looking forward to your proposals for communication and to welcoming you at Strasbourg in March 2024!”

Learn more here.

Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open

Registration is now open for the Global Health Security 2024 conference in Sydney, Australia. This iteration will take place 18-21 June, 2024. The call for abstracts is also still open. “The mission of the Global Health Security conference is to provide a forum where leaders, researchers, policy-makers, and representatives from government, international organisations, civil society, and private industry from around the world can engage with each other, review the latest research and policy innovations, and agree solutions for making the world safer and healthier. To that end, our mission is to help foster a genuinely multidisciplinary community of practice that is committed to working collaboratively to enhance global health security and eliminate disease, irrespective of its origin or source.”

High School and College Student Internship: Data Analytics for Elite Young Scholars – Biology and Medical Science Experience

“The Young Scholars Research Program is tailored for high-achieving high school and undergraduate students aspiring to delve into the realms of biology or medical science, with a strong focus on advanced data analytics. Participants will have the unique opportunity to collaborate with esteemed faculty members from GMU, forming interdisciplinary teams comprising 3 to 4 individuals encompassing both high school and undergraduate students.”

“At the outset of the program, students will be assigned to specific team projects based on their indicated preferences. Each team is expected to produce two significant outputs by the program’s conclusion. Firstly, a final paper showcasing their research findings will be published on the Center for Biomedical Science & Policy (CBSP) website and the Schar School Young Scholars Journals Webpage. Secondly, teams will present their projects at a conference where students have the chance to compete for prizes.”

“Throughout the program, participants will engage in hands-on research projects employing a variety of methodologies. This may include but is not limited to, biostatistics utilizing R or Stata, data visualization employing QGIS or ArcGIS, and network visualization using tools like Gephi. The comprehensive nature of the program ensures a rich and immersive experience for students passionate about advancing their understanding and skills in the fields of biology and medical science.”

Learn more here.

Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List

“In accordance with the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, we are proposing to amend and republish the list of select agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to animal or plant health, or to animal or plant products. This Act requires the biennial review and republication of the list of select agents and toxins and the revision of the list as necessary. This action would implement findings from the biennial review for the list. The biennial review was initiated within 2 years of the completion of the previous biennial review. In addition, we are proposing to add definitions for several terms; codify policies regarding the role of responsible officials and alternate responsible officials, conclusion of patient care, and annual internal inspections; and revise or clarify provisions related to validated inactivation procedures and viable select agent removal methods, recordkeeping, non-possession of select agents and toxins, electronic Federal Select Agent Programs, registration, Tier 1 enhancements, and exclusion of naturally infected animals. We are also proposing to add requirements for reporting discoveries of select agents and toxins, provisions regarding effluent decontamination system, biosafety provisions for facility verification requirements for registered biosafety level 3 and animal biosafety level 3 laboratories, a new requirement related to restricted experiments, and to correct editorial errors. These proposed changes would economically benefit producers, research and reference laboratories, and State and Federal oversight agencies, while also maintaining adequate program oversight of select agents and toxins.”

Read more and submit comments here.

Pandora Report 3.10.2023

This week we tackle the addition of three subsidiaries of BGI Group (formerly the Beijing Genomics Institute) to the US Entity List, the ongoing discussion regarding DOE’s recent COVID-19 origins assessment, congressional hearings on the same subject, and updates on the suspected poisonings of school girls in Iran. This issue also has several new publications and upcoming events, including one discussing the outcome of Germany’s intervention in a suspected IS-inspired plot using ricin and an upcoming book talk with Dr. Katherine Paris, an alumna of the Biodefense PhD program.

US Department of Commerce Adds Three BGI Subsidiaries to Entity List

Effective March 2, 2023, the US Department of Commerce officially added three subsidiaries of BGI Group, formerly the Beijing Genomics Institute, to the Entity List. The Entity List is published by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and requires foreign persons, entities, and governments to meet US licensing requirements for export and transfer of certain items. Placement on the list does not prohibit companies and persons in the US from purchasing from or doing business with these entities. About 600 Chinese entities are on the list, including many known to have aided the PLA in creating artificial islands throughout the South China Sea. The Biden administration has added over 110 Chinese entities to the list, in large part because of the PRC’s military-civil fusion policies and the two-way transfers they have facilitated between companies, research institutions, universities, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The BIS announcement read in part: “The ERC [End-User Review Committee] determined to add BGI Research; BGI Tech Solutions (Hongkong) Co., Ltd.; and Forensic Genomics International, to the Entity List, under the destination of China, pursuant to § 744.11 of the EAR. The addition of these entities is based upon information that indicates their collection and analysis of genetic data poses a significant risk of contributing to monitoring and surveillance by the government of China, which has been utilized in the repression of ethnic minorities in China. Information also indicates that the actions of these entities concerning the collection and analysis of genetic data present a significant risk of diversion to China’s military programs. These entities are added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR.”

BGI released a statement in response to the announcement, saying “We believe the BIS’s decision may have been impacted by misinformation and we are willing and able to clarify. BGI Group’s work strictly abides by local, regional, and global moral and ethical standards, and adheres to all required laws and regulations. BGI Group does not condone and would never be involved in any human-rights abuses. None of BGI Group is state-owned or state-controlled, and all of BGI Group’s services and research are provided for civilian and scientific purposes.”

As we discussed early last year, BGI is known to have used its NIFTY test, a prenatal test used globally, to collect data in collaboration with the PLA. Furthermore, early in the pandemic, as the US struggled to build testing capacity and states could not run their own tests in their state labs, BGI Group targeted US state governments with cheap tests that promised to rapidly increase their capacity. The company also worked with the PLA on projects aiming to make ethnic Han Chinese people less susceptible to altitude sickness, though BGI Group claims this work was purely academic in nature. The all adds to growing concerns that foreign entities are using seemingly harmless products, such as at-home DNA tests like 23andMe or AncestryDNA, can be exploited by adversaries.

COVID-19 Origins…Familiar Arguments, Renewed Vitriol

Predictably, discussion of last week’s announcement that the Department of Energy assesses with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 very likely originated in a laboratory has continued with much fervor this week. This section covers some recent publications discussing this as well as the recent congressional hearing focused on the matter.

Updates on Discussion of DOE and FBI’s Assessments

As we discussed last week, there has been a lot of online discussion of the updated intelligence assessment from DOE that inadequately explains what the Department actually found and what it means. Cheryl Rofer explains in her recent Scientific American piece that 90 day intelligence estimates are not the end-all and be-all, especially in a situation like this. She writes that “An intelligence assessment isn’t a scientific conclusion. They are different beasts. The summary itself observes that different agencies weigh intelligence reporting and scientific publications differently. The important factor for intelligence assessments is the veracity of sources, whereas scientific conclusions depend on data and the coherence of the argument the data support. However, data from a scientist who has proved unreliable in the past will weigh less heavily in scientific conclusions, and intelligence analysts will regard fanciful stories from an otherwise reliable informant skeptically. The scientific data are available to the public, unlike the reporting that underlies the intelligence assessments.”

Rofer also explains how the intelligence divisions of national laboratories work, writing “Cutting-edge science is the expertise of the Department of Energy, however, which runs 17 national laboratories, several studying SARS-CoV-2 and its origins. Intelligence professionals in the national laboratories work with scientists to develop assessments. Because they are embedded in the laboratories, they can develop working relationships to explore puzzles of science and intelligence. Because I was responsible for a similar environmental cleanup site at Los Alamos National Laboratory, a question that I was involved in during the 1990s was whether the Soviets had done hydrodynamic tests at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, scattering metallic plutonium chunks. Members of the intelligence division came to me and other chemists, and our physicist colleagues, to learn how and why such tests would have been performed, and what clues they would leave behind for analysts to spot. Eventually, we found that indeed tests were run in this way. A joint program with Russia and Kazakhstan recovered 100 kilograms of plutonium that might have gone to scavengers, as a result of this detective work.”

Furthermore, as Drs. Angela Rasmussen and Saskia Popescu (assistant professor in the Schar School Biodefense Program) explain in their piece for the Washington Post, “No new evidence is available for public scrutiny. It is impossible to evaluate the Energy Department’s claims. Yet they have been repeated in many quarters as if they were proof of a lab origin — a belief that fuels demands to curtail work on dangerous infectious agents…This circus makes the United States and the world less prepared, not more, to defend itself against emerging pathogens that could lead to pandemics, including the alarming influenza strain H5N1 spreading globally in animals or the deadly Marburg virus outbreakin Equatorial Guinea.”

In their piece, Rasmussen and Popescu highlight the critical oversight of the risk that cities where people and animals live in close contact pose. They write “Only in a city with a large, mobile, interactive population of people and animals could the virus establish sustained onward transmission from person to person. This pandemic could have just as easily begun in Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou — where SARS-CoV-1 emerged in 2002, also as a direct result of the sale of live animals at “wet markets.”

Promised Congressional Hearings Kick-Off with House Oversight Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Hearing

Rasmussen and Popescu summarize much of the problems and concerns with the congressional hearing in their piece mentioned previously, writing “Deepening partisanship on covid-19 hinders progress at home and abroad. None of the witnesses called so far by the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic for its first hearing this week has technical expertise on SARS-CoV-2 origins science. Few have experience within the covid-19 response effort. All have promoted pro-lab leak opinions without providing any evidence to support their claims. It is easier to place blame than to address systemic issues that led to more than a million covid deaths in the United States.”

The majority’s witnesses included Dr. Jamie Metzl, a historian of Southeast Asia whose career has largely centered on humanitarian policy; Nicholas Wade, a former science editor at the New York Times who drew criticism for his 2014 book that asked, in reference to economic issues in many African countries, whether “variations in their nature, such as their time preference, work ethic and propensity to violence, have some bearing on the economic decisions they make.”; and Dr. Robert Redfield, a physician who was the CDC director during the Trump administration and has ample clinical research experience, largely focused on HIV/AIDS. The minority witness was Dr. Paul Auwaerter, an infectious disease physician whose researcher includes work on Lyme Disease and EBV.

As Jon Cohen explains in Science Insider-“Some scientists and legislators might have hoped this morning’s U.S. congressional hearing on the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic would move beyond partisan politics and seriously investigate what has become a deeply divisive debate. But members of the House of Representatives’ Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic mostly hammered home long-standing Republican or Democratic talking points, shedding no new light on the central question: Did SARS-CoV-2 naturally jump from animals to humans or did the virus somehow leak from a laboratory in Wuhan, China?”

Of course, much of the witness statements and questions focused on the EcoHealth Alliance and its role in projects with the Wuhan Institute of Virology. In response to several of the statements, the EcoHealth Alliance issues these corrections to assertions made at the hearing. Of particular interest is the status of the DEFUSE proposal that was submitted to DARPA, a frequent talking point in online lab-leak discussions. Of this, the Alliance writes plainly “…the proposal was not funded and the work was never done, therefore it cannot have played a role in the origin of COVID-19.”

Bloomberg also published a piece discussing how this drawn out, unproductive discourse obscures the rise globally of high-security biolabs, which features the work of Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz and Dr. Filippa Lentzos of King’s College London. Of the politicization this has brought, Dr. Koblentz was quoted saying “Nobody wants lab accidents…Unfortunately this issue has become politicized and polarized. That’s because the people with the loudest voices have had the microphone.

Iran Poisonings

According to NBC, at least 2,000 people in Iran have reported symptoms since concerns about deliberate poisonings of schoolgirls in the country first emerged, though some members of parliament estimate that number could be as high as 5,000. This comes as videos circulate of young girls coughing profusely as they are escorted out of school, with others showing girls slumped over and struggling to breathe in hospitals. So far, 30 schools in at least 10 provinces have reported cases of girls mysteriously falling ill. This has led to mounting protests in Tehran, which is particularly troubling in light of recent protests over the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini, a young Kurdish woman, in police custody after she was arrested by the Islamic religious police for allegedly violating modesty standards.

President Ebrahim Raisi spoke out this week about the issue, ordering investigations and telling the cabinet that these incidents are “an inhumane crime” aimed “at intimidating the students, our dear children, and their parents,” according to state media. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene, also said that, if these allegations are confirmed, that they constitute a “great and unforgivable crime” and that “the culprits must face the toughest of punishments.”

“Can a 1975 Bioweapons Ban Handle Today’s Biothreats?”

In this piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Matt Field writes “Rapid advances in biotechnology and the lack of an enforcement mechanism are challenging the Biological Weapons Convention. Amid swirling allegations that countries are violating the treaty, are slow-moving attempts to update it enough to prevent biological doom?” In it, he discusses challenges in adapting the treaty to current issues, quoting Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz, writing “It is worrisome that states parties can’t agree on relatively simple propositions that would ensure that the Article 1 prohibition on developing biological weapons includes biological agents produced or modified via emerging technologies such as genome editing,” Koblentz, the George Mason University biosecurity expert, said.”

“Model Law for National Implementation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Related Requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540”

New from VERTIC: “This Model Law was developed to assist countries in drafting legislation to implement the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the biological weapons-related provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.”

“It can be used to identify all the relevant measures that should be included in national legislation to give effect to the BWC and related provisions of UNSCR 1540. It can further be used during the legislative drafting process. As there is no “one size fits all” approach for the drafting of national implementing legislation, each state should determine the type of implementing measures it requires in accordance with its constitutional processes, legal tradition, existing legal framework, activities in the field of bioscience and other national circumstances. The Model Law is therefore intended to provide a useful basis to draft BWC implementing legislation and can be used to draft new legislation, or amend existing laws and/or regulations.”

“Ricin’s Round Two: Germany Prevents Another Islamic State-Motivated Bioterrorism Attack”

Herbet Maack’s piece in the Terrorism Monitor discusses the outcomes of Germany’s January intervention in a suspected IS-inspired attack. Maack writes in his conclusion, “The disrupted plot of Monir J. and Jalal L. shows the continued threat from loosely IS-connected and IS-inspired individuals. It also underscores the continued interest of Islamist-motivated perpetrators in bioterrorism and their desire to inflict significant losses of life. For Germany, the disrupted plot was already the second one involving ricin. While US-German counterterrorism intelligence cooperation seems to be functioning well, the potentially catastrophic consequences for any failure should cause Berlin to consider strengthening its own domestic counter-terrorism intelligence gathering capabilities.”

“Diverse Voices in International Security: NTI’s Gabby Essix on Promoting Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the Biosecurity Field”

This interview with Grabby Essix, a Bio Program Officer at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, discusses DEI efforts in the biosecurity field: “NTI is committed to highlighting and supporting diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in the peace and security field. During February, Black History Month, NTI Deputy Vice President for Communications Rachel Staley Grant sat down with NTI | bio Program Officer Gabrielle (Gabby) Essix to discuss DEI efforts in the biosecurity field. Essix supports NTI’s efforts to increase global action on biological and health security through the Global Biosecurity Dialogue and the Global Health Security Index and she leads NTI’s annual Next Generation for Biosecurity Competition. Since 2017, this competition has fostered professional development for rising global leaders in the field of biosecurity and biosafety, and it promotes DEI within the global health security community.”

“Toxic Inheritance: Assessing North Korea’s Chemical Weapons Capability”

This essay from Royal United Services Institute discusses ongoing work using open source research and remote sensing technologies to assess the DPRK’s CW capabilities and production capacity. This essay provides a review of historical documents related to the program and identifies 33 sites of interest in the country, with the promise of creating a map of more sites at a later date with alleged links to CW production.

“Verification of Exposure to Chemical Warfare Agents Through Analysis of Persistent Biomarkers in Plants”

De Bruin-Hoegée et al. discuss the possibility of using plant biomarkers in forensic reconstructions of chemical warfare attacks in their article in Analytical Methods. Abstract: “The continuing threats of military conflicts and terrorism may involve the misuse of chemical weapons. The present study aims to use environmental samples to find evidence of the release of such agents at an incident scene. A novel approach was developed for identifying protein adducts in plants. Basil (Ocimum basilicum), bay laurel leaf (Laurus nobilis) and stinging nettle (Urtica dioica) were exposed to 2.5 to 150 mg m−3 sulfur mustard, 2.5 to 250 mg m−3 sarin, and 0.5 to 25 g m−3 chlorine gas. The vapors of the selected chemicals were generated under controlled conditions in a dedicated set-up. After sample preparation and digestion, the samples were analyzed by liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) and liquid chromatography high resolution tandem mass spectrometry (LC-HRMS/MS), respectively. In the case of chlorine exposure, it was found that 3-chloro- and 3,5-dichlorotyrosine adducts were formed. As a result of sarin exposure, the o-isopropyl methylphosphonic acid adduct to tyrosine could be analyzed, and after sulfur mustard exposure the N1- and N3-HETE-histidine adducts were identified. The lowest vapor exposure levels for which these plant adducts could be detected, were 2.5 mg m−3 for sarin, 50 mg m−3 for chlorine and 12.5 mg m−3 for sulfur mustard. Additionally, protein adducts following a liquid exposure of only 2 nmol Novichock A-234, 0.4 nmol sarin and 0.2 nmol sulfur mustard could still be observed. For both vapor and liquid exposure, the amount of adduct formed increased with the level of exposure. In all cases synthetic reference standards were used for unambiguous identification. The window of opportunity for investigation of agent exposure through the analysis of plant material was found to be remarkably long. Even three months after the actual exposure, the biomarkers could still be detected in the living plants, as well as in dried leaves. An important benefit of the current method is that a relatively simple and generic sample work-up procedure can be applied for all agents studied. In conclusion, the presented work clearly demonstrates the possibility of analyzing chemical warfare agent biomarkers in plants, which is useful for forensic reconstructions, including the investigation into alleged use in conflict areas.”

“Twenty Years Ago in Iraq, Ignoring the Expert Weapons Inspectors Proved To Be a Fatal Mistake”

In this essay for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Robert E. Kelley discusses the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and faulty claims about Iraqi WMD programs that drove the decision to invade. He writes in part, “I was in Iraq in those final months before the 2003 invasion as Deputy for Analysis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Action Team tasked with the nuclear side of the weapons inspections, while the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) worked in parallel, looking for biological and chemical weapons, as well as illicit missile programmes. We studied a few outstanding questions regarding the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme that had been discovered and dismantled in the early 1990s; we looked for new evidence and investigated leads and suspicions passed on to us by national governments; we inspected many sites and interviewed Iraqi scientists and officials in person; and we analysed the data. By early 2003 we knew at a very high level of confidence that there was no nuclear weapons effort of any kind in Iraq, and we were regularly passing this information back to the UN Security Council. We were not wrong.”

“ChatGPT: Opportunities and Challenges for the Nuclear Agenda”

In this work published by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Yanliang Pan discusses the potential for misuse of ChatGPT in academia, politics, and cybersecurity, focusing on the nuclear agenda. He writes in part, “However, just as AI instruments can be used to advance the nuclear agenda, they also present risks that cannot be ignored. For instance, ChatGPT’s potential to enhance the capabilities of malign cyber actors represents a serious danger to nuclear security. With the digitalization of instrumentation and control systems, nuclear facilities are increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats, including malware and phishing attacks that ChatGPT is most proficient in assisting.  Testing shows, for example, that the AI model has no qualms about writing fake emails to nuclear facility employees asking for access credentials – in different languages and styles of writing as requested…Indeed, it has no way of knowing whether the email is fake at all as it lacks the ability to check the user’s credentials. Upon the user’s request, the AI model will also identify common vulnerabilities in specific systems of a nuclear facility and list the malware that has been used in the past to target those systems…”

“Now AI Can Be Used to Design New Proteins”

In this piece for TheScientist, Dr. Kamal Nahas explains advancements in AI, writing “Artificial intelligence algorithms have had a meteoric impact on protein structure, such as when DeepMind’s AlphaFold2 predicted the structures of 200 million proteins. Now, David Baker and his team of biochemists at the University of Washington have taken protein-folding AI a step further. In a Nature publication from February 22, they outlined how they used AI to design tailor-made, functional proteins that they could synthesize and produce in live cells, creating new opportunities for protein engineering. Ali Madani, founder and CEO of Profluent, a company that uses other AI technology to design proteins, says this study “went the distance” in protein design and remarks that we’re now witnessing “the burgeoning of a new field.”

“Trust In US Federal, State, And Local Public Health Agencies During COVID-19: Responses And Policy Implications”

From Health Affairs: “Public health agencies’ ability to protect health in the wake of COVID-19 largely depends on public trust. In February 2022 we conducted a first-of-its-kind nationally representative survey of 4,208 US adults to learn the public’s reported reasons for trust in federal, state, and local public health agencies. Among respondents who expressed a “great deal” of trust, that trust was not related primarily to agencies’ ability to control the spread of COVID-19 but, rather, to beliefs that those agencies made clear, science-based recommendations and provided protective resources. Scientific expertise was a more commonly reported reason for “a great deal” of trust at the federal level, whereas perceptions of hard work, compassionate policy, and direct services were emphasized more at the state and local levels. Although trust in public health agencies was not especially high, few respondents indicated that they had no trust. Lower trust was related primarily to respondents’ beliefs that health recommendations were politically influenced and inconsistent. The least trusting respondents also endorsed concerns about private-sector influence and excessive restrictions and had low trust in government overall. Our findings suggest the need to support a robust federal, state, and local public health communications infrastructure; ensure agencies’ authority to make science-based recommendations; and develop strategies for engaging different segments of the public.”

Global BioLabs 2023 Launch- “High Consequence Bio Labs: Growing Risks and Lagging Governance”

“The Global Biolabs Initiative is proud to announce the launch of its new report, Global BioLabs 2023, and an updated interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs. With the global expansion of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, gaps in biosecurity and biosafety governance are widening. Since its inception in 2021, the Global Biolabs Initiative has tracked the proliferation of the highest containment labs, identified several key trends in their construction and operation, developed biorisk management scorecards to measure how well countries are governing biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research, and mapped the global biorisk management architecture. The pace of BSL4/BSL3+ labs expansion is outpacing current biosafety and biosecurity regulations, and coordinated international action is needed to address increasing biorisks.”

“Dr Filippa Lentzos, King’s College London, and Dr Gregory Koblentz, George Mason University, will present the Global BioLabs 2023 report, describe key trends, and discuss recommendations for strengthening global biorisk management. The event will also feature a demonstration of the interactive map: globalbiolabs.org.”

This event will take place March 16, 2023, 1 pm GMT. Register for the Zoom webinar here and access Global Biolabs tools and resources at globalbiolabs.org.

Credit: The BulletinGlobal Biolabs

Penetrate, Exploit, Disrupt, Destroy – with Dr. Craig J. Wiener

From the Alperovitch Institute: “Join us on Wednesday, March 15th at 5pm at the SAIS Hopkins Kenney Auditorium. Dr. Craig J. Wiener is recognized as an expert in major foreign adversary espionage, sabotage and strategic capabilities that pose threats to the U.S. Government (USG) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dr. Wiener’s previous position was as the Senior Technical Analyst for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence where he fulfilled a role as DOE’s lead all source cyber threat analyst, the Department’s representative to the National Security Council for Cyber Operations, a key member of National Intelligence Council Special Analytic Groups, and a government briefer and/or advisor for Defense Science Board studies on Cyber as a Strategic Capability, Homeland Defense, Strategic Surprise and the future of US Military Superiority among other topics. Additionally, Dr. Wiener initiated and led studies for special nuclear weapons related threat and vulnerability analyses and advanced technical security threats to USG equities by foreign adversaries and engaged in the development, planning and operationalization of counter-adversary strategies across multiple domains of operations. Dr. Wiener joined the MITRE Corporation as a Technical Fellow in early-2020, where he supports key U.S. Government (USG) national security initiatives. He was recently appointed by the Secretary of Energy to the Electricity Advisory Committee to advise DOE on current and future electric grid reliability, resilience, security, sector interdependence, and policy issues.”

Dr. Wiener is an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD Program! Learn more and register for this event here.

Online Event: Discussion with Amb. van der Kwast About What to Expect at the 5th CWC Review Conference

“The Fifth Five-Year Review Conference (RC-5) for the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention will be held in the Hague from May 15-19, 2023.”

“At the conference, member states and the broader chemical weapons disarmament community will gather to assess past achievements, treaty implementation, and compliance, and discuss plans to strengthen the CWC in the years ahead.”

“You are invited to join a virtual discussion with Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast, the chair-designate for the Review Conference, who will share his hopes and expectations for the conference’s outcomes.”

“Paul Walker, the Chair of the CWC Coalition, will moderate. Amb. van der Kwast’s remarks will be followed by a Q&A session.”

“This discussion will be on the record.”

“This special event will be open to all members of the CWC Coalition, and other interested members of the public, journalists, and diplomats.”

This webinar will take place on March 21 at 11 am EST. Register here.

Book Talk with Dr. Katherine Paris on “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse”

“Dr. Katherine Paris, an alumnus of the Mason Biodefense PhD program, recently released her new book “Genome Editing and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Risk of Misuse.” Join the NextGen Global Health Security Network for a conversation with Dr. Paris to learn about her research!” This event will take place on Wednesday, March 22, from 7-8 PM. Register for the Zoom here: https://cglink.me/2d7/r2064992

Intelligence Studies Consortium

“On March 24, 2023, the Intelligence Studies Consortium is convening its third symposium, entitled New Perspectives in Intelligence Studies. This year, George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting. The symposium will be from 8 AM to 4 PM in Rooms 125-126 Van Metre Hall, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA. The closest Metro is Virginia Square/GMU on the Orange and Silver lines.

The symposium will feature student presentations in four panels:

  • Russia and China
  • Violent Non-State Actors
  • Emerging Technologies
  • Transnational Challenges

There will be an 8:30 AM keynote address from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Shannon Corless, and a lunchtime conversation with General Michael V. Hayden.

We encourage students to attend in person. We have also provided a livestream option for those not in the Washington DC area.”

Learn more and register here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: In 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident, was poisoned with what agent?

Shout out to Scott H. for winning last week’s trivia! The correct answer to last week’s question, “This chemical agent features in Roald Dahl’s famous short story, The Landlady, in which the main character is given a tea that tastes of bitter almonds. What is the name of this agent?” is potassium cyanide.