Pandora Report 12.20.2024

This week’s Pandora Report covers the first severe H5N1 case in the US, growing numbers of mpox cases in the DRC, updates to the BSAT list, the killing of Russian Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, and more. The Pandora Report will return from the holiday break on January 10.

Congrats to Our December Biodefense MS Grads!

Mpox Cases Rise Steadily

Mpox cases in Africa rose steadily in the last week with 3,095 more cases reported, 2,632 of which were in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Africa CDC reports that 31 more people have died, 29 of which were in the DRC. Nearly 70,000 cases have been reported in 20 countries is the region this year. Guinea has also moved recently from the controlled stage to active transmission. Read more about mpox’s spread in Africa here.

CDC Confirms First Severe H5N1 Case in the United States

The CDC announced yesterday that a patient has been hospitalized with a severe case of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection in Louisiana, marking the first instance of severe illness linked to the virus in the United States. The case was confirmed by CDC on December 13. The CDC’s press release on this matter explains that, “Partial viral genome data of the H5N1 avian influenza virus that infected the patient in Louisiana indicates that the virus belongs to the D1.1 genotype related to other D1.1 viruses recently detected in wild birds and poultry in the United States and in recent human cases in British Columbia, Canada, and Washington state. This H5N1 bird flu genotype is different than the B3.13 genotype detected in dairy cows, sporadic human cases in multiple states, and some poultry outbreaks in the United States. Additional genomic sequencing and efforts to isolate virus from clinical specimens from the patient in Louisiana are underway at CDC.”

An investigation is ongoing, but it has already been determined that the patient was exposed to sick and dead birds in backyard flocks. No person to person spread of H5 bird flu has been detected at this time. This is the first case of H5N1 avian influenza in the US that has been linked to exposure to a backyard flock. The agency explains that, “A sporadic case of severe H5N1 bird flu illness in a person is not unexpected; avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection has previously been associated with severe human illness in other countries during 2024 and prior years, including illness resulting in death.”

APHIS Updates Select Agents and Toxins Registration List

The US Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) recently completed it biennial review of the Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) list. As a result of this review, the agency is removing five select agents from the BSAT list, including Brucella abortusBrucella suis, and Brucella melitensis, African horse sickness virus, and Peronosclerospora philippinensis. The agency explained in a press release that, “Removing regulatory barriers will greatly advance research on vaccines and diagnostics, which will improve our efforts to control these diseases in animal populations.” Furthermore, it explained that the delisting of the Brucella spp. does not change the already recommended biosafety levels for work with this species of bacteria.

Russian Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov Assassinated by Ukrainian Security Forces

LTG Igor Kirillov, head of Russia’s Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense Troops, was killed this week just one day after Ukraine accused him of criminal activity in the “massive use of banned chemical weapons” in Ukraine. Kirillov and an aide died after an explosive device that was planted in a scooter by an entryway detonated as they passed by. According to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU, chemical weapons have been used by Russia more than 4,800 times since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Read more: “Protecting Our Precious Bodily Tissues. The Favourite Conspiracy Theories of General Kirillov, Assassinated in Moscow,” Nikita Sologub, Mediazona

Trump Nominees, Surrogates Continue to Disappoint

Washington Post Does Deep Dive on Dave Weldon’s Anti-Vaccine Past

The Washington Post recently published a piece on President-elect Trump’s pick to lead the CDC, Dave Weldon, and his longstanding history with anti-vaccination rhetoric and beliefs. The piece explains how Trump came to select the 71-year-old former Army physician to lead CDC on the advice of Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Trump’s equally troubling pick to lead HHS. The piece explains in part, “A Washington Post review of Weldon’s public comments, media appearances and congressional letters along with accounts of those who worked with him reveal a portrait of a politician and physician who emphasized the experiences of individuals while dismissing dozens of studies based on data from hundreds of thousands of patients that showed no link between vaccines and autism.”

Furthermore, “In Congress, Weldon was “absolutely and completely dismissive” of data showing vaccines were not associated with autism, recalled Josh Sharfstein, a former Democratic staff member on the House Government Reform Committee in the early 2000s when the Republicans who were in charge held regular hearings questioning vaccine safety.”

Despite this, Weldon has previously expressed support for coronavirus and influenza vaccines, offering them to patients who want them. Sharfstein, who is now Vice Dean for Public Health Practices and Johns Hopkins University and a former top FDA official, explained further that Weldon “…appeared to have a closed mind on the issue…He didn’t seem to understand that the core tool of population data analysis is one of the pivotal aspects of the work of CDC.”

Musk Shares False ‘Bioweapons Lab’ Tweet

This Wednesday, the infamous anti-LGBTQIA+ X account, Libs of TikTok, posted a screenshot of a portion of the resolution introduced by Speaker Mike Johnson aimed at averting a government shutdown on December 21. The bill would fund the government through March 14, but both President-elect Donald Trump and X owner Elon Musk have spoken out against the bill. The portion of the bill shared by Libs of TikTok reads:

SEC. 629. REGIONAL BIOCONTAINMENT RESEARCH LAB-ORATORIES.

(a) IN GENERAL—The Secretary of Health and Human Services (referred to in this section as the “Secretary”) shall make awards to establish or maintain, as applicable, not fewer than 12 regional biocontainment lab-oratories, for purposes of—

(1) conducting biomedical research to support public health and medical preparedness for, and rapid response to, biological agents, including emerging infectious diseases;

The Libs of TikTok account captioned the photo, “BREAKING: New Congressional Resolution bill includes funding for at least 12 new biolabs.” Must quote-tweeted it, adding “We’re funding bioweapon labs in this bill!” Musk’s post has been re-tweeted at least 60,000 times, yet the bill text says nothing about biological weapons. Furthermore, as noted by Politico, “The provision is part of a long-sought reauthorization of the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness and Response Act.”

Musk, who was recently denied a clearance and has done his best to insert himself into the Trump team, was named co-chair of the “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE) by Donald Trump. DOGE, which is a nod to the meme coin-Doge Coin-promoted by Musk, is a proposed presidential advisory commission that would be tasked with restructuring the federal government and removing regulations. Despite Musk’s only involvement with the government so far being receiving at least $15.4 billion in federal contracts in the last decade, he seems poised to play a prominent role in the incoming administration. That being the case, Musk should brush up on the United States’ role as a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits states from developing, producing, acquiring, transferring, stockpiling, or using biological and toxin weapons.

“The United States Needs to Step Up Its Response to Bird Flu”

Biodefense MS alumna Sophia Hirshfield recently co-authored this feature from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The authors write in part, “Since the turn of the century, every presidential administration has highlighted gaps in U.S. public health capabilities, and every Congress has left them underfunded. The H5N1 outbreak has revealed the resulting and dangerous shortcomings in U.S. pandemic preparedness: lagging data, incomplete surveillance, sluggish coordination, considerable mistrust, and insufficient planning and stockpiling of vaccines and therapies. That poor performance cuts across political parties, the federal interagency, and state leadership. Multiple players have sought to downplay the threat: the dairy industry fears further economic setbacks, state leaders are wary of federal intervention, and the Biden administration did not want to aggravate relations during the 2024 election cycle.”

They continue, “It is not too late to change course. Strong interagency, interstate, and global coordination; better protections for farm workers; accelerated planning and investment in surveillance; and the development and promotion of better vaccines and therapies remain the essential elements to prevent the sustained spread of H5N1.”

“Syria Still Has Chemical Weapons: How to Get the Country’s New Rulers to Help Eliminate Assad’s Deadly Arsenal”

Biodefense Graduate Program Director Gregory Koblentz recently co-authored this article in Foreign Affairs. The article describes the threat posed by Syria’s remaining chemical weapons, calls up on the new Syrian government to eliminate these weapons, and provides policy recommendations to the United States and its allies and partners for how they can assist in the process of destroying these weapons and holding accountable members of the former regime who conducting chemical attacks.

Koblentz was also quoted in these articles about Syria’s CW:

“Researcher Daniel Gerstein on Security Threats Posed by Drones”

RAND Corporation Senior Policy Researcher and Biodefense PhD Program alumnus Daniel Gerstein discusses threats posed by unmanned aerial systems in this interview with C-SPAN.

“Chemical and Biological Defense Program Enterprise Strategy”

The Department of Defense released the 2024 Chemical and Biological Defense Program (2024 CBDP) Enterprise Strategy. “It replaces the 2020 CBDP strategy and positions the Department to ensure the total force to carry out its missions in the face of advanced chemical and biological threats…Taking its lead from the 2022 National Defense Strategy, this strategy prioritizes delivery of operationally relevant chemical and biological defense (CBD) capabilities at speed and scale, to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence against the People’s Republic of China as the pacing challenge and Russia as the acute threat. The new strategy reinforces other strategic guidance including the 2023 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, inaugural National Defense Industrial Strategy, and the Biodefense Posture Review. It also calls for tighter integration of CBD capabilities with international Allies and partners to ensure our combined armed forces can deter or prevail against advanced chemical and biological threats.”

“The 2024 Seoul and Tokyo Biosecurity Dialogues”

Christopher East discusses dialogues held by the Council on Strategic Risks in November in this blog post, writing in part “On 18th and 20th November 2024 in Seoul and Tokyo respectively, the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) convened dialogues with biosecurity experts from the Republic of Korea, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and NATO, concluding with a series of practicable recommendations for the governments of the Republic of Korea and Japan.”

“Securing Benchtop DNA Synthesizers”

Max Langenkamp recently published this report with IFP: “This report examines the present and future of benchtop synthesizers and provides quantitative forecasts. The concrete threat model in the report helps characterize the threat of attack and leads to certain technical mitigations. Modern cryptographic methods can enable secure and centralized screening, even for air-gapped devices…The current benchtop policy would benefit from a security certification system, as well as standardized processes for benchtop and reagent screening. Such safeguards manage to mitigate risk while enabling innovation.”

“DNA Sequencing, Synthesis and Screening in Biosecurity”

From the Cluster for National and Technical Science Arms Control Research: “The second CNTR Fact Sheet by Liska Suckau (CNTR/PRIF) provides an overview of the characteristics of DNA sequencing, synthesis and screening in biosecurity. It compares different sequencing methods and gives a basic overview of DNA synthesis. In addition, it highlights the technologies’ potentials and risks and outlines various application possibilities.”

CNTR Monitor 2024 Perspectives on Dual Use

From CNTR: “The CNTR Monitor is an annual open-access publication and the core product of CNTR’s research. It highlights technological innovations and developments in the natural sciences that are relevant to peace and security. In addition to analyses of individual technologies and reports on research and development (R&D) activities, the Monitor also explores opportunities for arms control and outlines options for political regulation.”

This year’s edition includes articles like “Technological Implications of AI in Biorisk,” “Implications of Technological Advancements for Biosecurity,” and more.

“Toward a Safer and More Secure US Bioeconomy”

Watson et al. recently published this comment in Nature Biotechnology, writing in part “To enhance the safety and security of the US bioeconomy, a new public–private partnership should be established to facilitate information sharing and threat analysis among industry, government and academia, and to develop and deploy safeguards.”

“Scientists Urge Halt to Research on Creating Synthetic “Mirror” Bacteria That Could Evade Human Immunity, Disrupt Ecosystems”

Matt Field breaks down concerns about research using mirror molecules in this piece for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, writing in part “Although the capability to create organisms or bacteria that utilize mirror molecules remains at least a decade away by many estimations, 38 authors of an article published in Science Thursday said that investigation into creating such “mirror life” should not be pursued. The authors said they “were initially skeptical that mirror bacteria could pose major risks,” but have since grown “deeply concerned.”’

“A Framework for Effective Risk Assessment of AI-Biotechnology Convergence”

Lakshmy Ramakrishnan recently authored this issue brief for the Observer Research Foundation: “Advances in disruptive technologies have enabled scientists to engineer biological systems and create more efficient and sustainable products for a range of purposes. The convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) with biotechnology has contributed to the development of therapeutics and vaccines, helped address food security, aided in generating innovative processes to mitigate the effects of climate change, and expanded the bioeconomy. However, there are concerns that AI-biotechnology tools can be misused to create harm, with catastrophic global consequences. This brief advocates for a nuanced approach to assess the risks associated with the convergence of AI with biotechnology and its potential for misuse and recommends a coordinated strategy.”

“U.S. Government Support for Global Health Security – Protecting Lives and Safeguarding Economies”

The Biden administration recently released its final annual global health security report-“U.S. Government Support for Global Health Security – Protecting Lives and Safeguarding Economies”. The report highlights progress in global health security and identifies remaining challenges in this area. A White House press release on the document’s announcement explains, “The Biden-Harris Administration has advanced a bold agenda to prevent the devastating toll of outbreaks and pandemics, including investing more than $3 billion in strengthening global health security (GHS) since 2020. These investments have helped to: prepare countries around the world to more effectively prevent, detect and respond to biological threats; build stronger and more effective regional and global institutions to support health emergency preparedness and response; and respond rapidly to numerous outbreaks – from Ebola to mpox – to limit the health and economic impacts on the American people, as well as people living around the world. U.S. leadership in global health security is built on decades of investments in global health and research and development, as well as strong partnerships with other countries, regional and multilateral institutions, civil society, and the private sector.”

ICYMI: In Conversation with Jon Finer: Recent Developments in the Biden Administration’s WMD Policies

Watch the recording of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s December 19 event here: “As the United States approaches the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in February 2026, there are critical questions about the future of nuclear arms control, strategic stability, and global nonproliferation efforts.”

“Join the Arms Control Association and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for remarks from U.S. Principal Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer on the Biden administration’s efforts to reduce nuclear dangers and adapt U.S. nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy to an uncertain world, as evidenced by the rapid changes occurring in Syria. Finer will take questions from the Arms Control Association’s Executive Director Daryl Kimball.” 

“Following Finer’s address, a distinguished panel will examine the implications of the looming expiration of New START. Madelyn Creedon, chair of the 2023 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Adam Mount, senior fellow and director of the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists, and James Acton, co-director of Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy program, will explore key considerations surrounding U.S. nuclear forces and requirements, arms control, and nonproliferation policy.”   

ICYMI: “NTI | bio Proposes New Solutions to Prevent Bioweapons Development and Use”

“The dual-use nature of modern bioscience and biotechnology, combined with the significant resources available to many states, makes it challenging to prevent the development of biological weapons using traditional arms control measures and policy approaches. During the fifth session of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Working Group meetings from December 2-13 in Geneva, Switzerland, NTI | bio presented solutions that could effectively reduce the risk of bioweapons development and use by states and other powerful actors.”

Read more here.

Understanding the Introduction of Pathogens into Humans- Preventing Patient Zero: A Workshop

“The past few decades have seen the emergence of several diseases with drastic public health and economic consequences. Understanding routes of pathogen emergence and transmission is critical to preventing and mitigating disease spillover and amplification. The National Academies Forum on Microbial Threats will host a hybrid public workshop to address gaps in understanding of disease emergence, with a focus on human-animal interaction and laboratory biosafety. The workshop will explore how applications of existing policy structures, emerging technologies, and actionable research can improve biosecurity measures and prevention of future disease emergence.”

This event will take place on January 15 and 16. Learn more and register here.

How to Avoid Human-Made Pandemics

From the Asia Centre for Health Security: “Studying viruses that could potentially cause outbreaks is one of the most effective ways to reduce the risk of pandemics. However, this type of research—especially when it involves collecting samples from the field and manipulating pathogens—can unintentionally lead to a pandemic if not managed carefully. Dr Lentzos will discuss her findings from the Pathogen Project, which brought together an international taskforce of scientists, biosecurity and public health experts, ethicists, and civil society leaders to seek consensus on this question: Can we agree on ways to manage research that carries pandemic risk as safely, securely and responsibly as possible?”

This event will take place on January 23 at 8 pm (GMT +8:00) via Zoom. RSVP here.

Preparedness in Rural Communities: National and State/Local Perspectives and Plans

From Penn State: “The COVID-19 pandemic and recent hurricanes have thrust the preparedness of rural communities into the national spotlight. At the federal level, the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have recently released national goals and plans for preparedness of rural communities. The overall objective of this virtual, 2-day mini-symposium is to identify opportunities in public health and agricultural preparedness and response in rural communities. The mini-symposium will focus upon national perspectives on Thursday, January 30 and the state/local perspectives on Friday, January 31. Speakers include representatives of the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, the Department of Homeland Security, US Department of Agriculture, the USA Center for Rural Public Health Preparedness, and state/local leaders.”

This event will take place on January 30 and 31, from 11 am to 2 pm ET each day. Learn more and register here.

Rise of the Zombie Bugs: The Surprising Science of Parasitic Mind-Control

Johns Hopkins APL’s colloquium will feature Mindy Weisberger, author of the upcoming book Rise of the Zombie Bugs: The Surprising Science of Parasitic Mind-Control: “Zombies are all around us—insect zombies, that is. In Rise of the Zombie Bugs, Mindy Weisberger explores the eerie yet fascinating phenomenon of real-life zombification in the insect class and among other invertebrates. Zombifying parasites reproduce by rewriting their victims’ neurochemistry, transforming them into the “walking dead”: armies of cicadas, spiders, and other hosts that helplessly follow a zombifier’s commands, living only to serve the parasite’s needs until death’s sweet release (and often beyond).”

Learn more about this January 31 event here.

Cyberbiosecurity Summit

From Johns Hopkins APL and Bio-ISAC: “Advancements in biomanufacturing and biotechnology drive the science we need to thrive, everything from apples to vaccines. The Cyberbiosecurity Summit 2025 convenes leading experts in biotechnology, biosecurity, and cybersecurity to explore the intersection of these fields and discuss the strategies to create a safe, secure future for us all.”
This event will take place February 25-26 in Laurel, MD. Register here and review the call for sessions here (closes 12/12).

NEW: The Independent Panel Solicits Views and Insights on Pandemic Prevention, and Response Efforts

The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, co-chaired by HE Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and RH Helen Clark, welcomes you to share your insights and expertise on the status of international and regional pandemic-related reform processes and initiatives, and how progress can be continued and accelerated in the months and years ahead.”

Learn more about this survey and submit by December 20 here.

Pandora Report 12.13.2024

This week’s Pandora Report covers the rush to find the former Assad regime’s hidden chemical weapons, a recent study on H5N1’s potential to become an efficient human pathogen, Nobel laureates’ call for the Senate to block RFK Jr. from becoming HHS Secretary, and more.

Assad Regime Falls

On Sunday, Syrian rebels continued their advance, taking the capital city of Damascus and forcing the country’s long-time leader, President Bashar al-Assad, to flee to Moscow. This ended the country’s 13-year-long civil war and toppled a brutal dictatorship known to have, among other things, used chemical weapons against its own civilians. Now, the country is strapped for cash and being led by opposition forces with limited experience in governance.

Adding to the chaos is the mad dash to locate the former Assad regime’s chemical weapons it hid from inspectors. Among the list of missing weapons are more than 360 tons of mustard gas that the Assad regime admitted to making, but never fully accounted for. There are also five missing tons of precursors for sarin that the Assad regime claimed were “Lost during transportation, due to traffic accidents.”

The OPCW said it is monitoring the situation, reaffirming its commitment to “clarifying gaps, discrepancies, and inconsistencies in Syrian chemical weapons declaration amidst political transition.” Rebels in the south of the country have reached out to the OPCW for support in safely disposing of a cache of CW they found. One US official told the press the US is working with other countries in the Middle East to prevent these weapons from falling into the wrong hands. Meanwhile, Israel reported that it has destroyed CW and other weapons caches while seizing areas along its shared border with the country it claims are part of a demilitarized buffer zone.

Further Reading and Listening:

New Study Finds Single Mutation in Bovine Influenza H5N1 Hemagglutinin Switches Specificity to Human Receptors

A recent study in Science found that a single glutamine to leucine mutation in clade 2.3.4.4b-an H5N1 virus widespread in US dairy cattle that has caused a few mild human cases-at residue 226 of the virus hemagglutinin “was sufficient to enact the change from avian to human specificity.” This means that this virus that currently cannot infect humans very easily could be just one mutation away from being able to do so much more effectively. This finding alone does not mean that this mutation in nature would be guaranteed to make this virus an efficient human pathogen, but it might mean that this version of the virus has a higher zoonotic potential than other H5N1 viruses.

Further Reading:

Investigation Launched into Queensland Lab Incident

An investigation has been launched by Australian authorities into the “major breach” of biosafety protocols that occurred at a state-run laboratory in Queensland in 2021. It was revealed that 323 virus samples-nearly 100 of which were live samples of Hendra virus-were missing. According to Health Minister Tim Nicholls, the incident was only discovered in August of 2023, and the lab is unable to confirm whether the materials were removed or destroyed, though there is no suggestion that they were taken or stolen from the lab.

Top Wuhan Virologist Says WIV Holds No Close Relatives to SARS-CoV-2

Shi Zhengli, the virologist leading coronavirus research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) when the COVID-19 pandemic began, presented data on dozens of new coronaviruses collected from bats in southern China at a conference in Japan last week. Shi has said repeatedly that SARS-CoV-2 was never seen nor studied in her lab, but some have continued to insist that one of the bat coronaviruses collected by her team was closely related to it. As a result, Shi promised to sequence the genomes of the viruses stored in her freezers and release the resulting data.

The analysis presented at the conference has not been peer reviewed and includes data from the whole genomes of 56 new betacoronaviruses in addition to some partial sequences. All of these viruses were collected between 2004 and 2021. Shi explained at the conference that none of the viruses she has sequenced are the most recent ancestors of SARS-CoV-2 and that “We didn’t find any new sequences which are more closely related to SARS-CoV-1 and SARS-CoV-2.”

The known viruses that are closest to SARS-CoV-2 were found in bats in Laos and southern China. However, years (or decades) have passed since these viruses split from their common ancestor with SARS-CoV-2. Shi has long since collaborated with EcoHealth Alliance, which previously received US federal funding that was suspended because of inadequate oversight of research activities at the WIV. This collaboration has produced a larger analysis of more than 230 sequences that EcoHealth Alliance’s Peter Daszak says will be submitted for peer review and publication in the coming weeks.

Further Reading: “PLA Looks into China-US Collaboration in Biosecurity Research,” Stephen Chen, SCMP

75+ Nobel Laureates Urge Senate Not to Confirm RFK Jr.

77 winners of the Nobel Prize in Medicine, Chemistry, Physics, and Economics have signed a letter (below) urging the Senate not to confirm President-Elect Trump’s pick to lead HHS-Robert F. Kennedy Jr.. This is a rare example of Nobel laureates coming together against a US Cabinet choice, according to Sir Richard Roberts, winner of the 1993 Nobel Prize in Medicine and a drafter of the letter. The letter criticizes Kennedy’s lack of experience in public health in addition to his widely criticized opinions on topics like drinking water fluoridation and vaccines for measles and polio. The letter reads in part, “In view of his record, placing Mr. Kennedy in charge of DHHS would put the public’s health in jeopardy and undermine America’s global leadership in the health sciences, in both the public and commercial sectors…We strongly urge you to vote against the confirmation of his appointment as Secretary of the DHHS.”

Further Reading:

“2024 ABSA Conference Summary”

Biodefense MS Student Lena Kropke discusses her experience at the 67th Annual Biosafety and Biosecurity Conference in this Pandora Report event summary, writing in part “Attending this conference not only reaffirmed that biosafety and biosecurity are vital components of international security, but also showcased the incredible dedication of professionals who work tirelessly toward this mission. Moreover, it offered an introduction to an amazing network of biosafety and security professionals.”

Read more about Lena’s time attending the conference in Phoenix here.

“Disincentivizing Bioweapons: Theory and Policy Approaches”

This NTI essay collection is “…designed to encourage the exploration and identification of potential solutions to disincentivize states from developing or using biological weapons,” and aims to “bridge theory and practical policy-relevant approaches to develop new approaches to invigorate international efforts to reduce biological threats.” Its fifth essay, “Two Competing Bioweapons Nonproliferation Policies: Deterrence by Denial and Discussion,” was authored by Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Associate Professor at the Schar School.

Mitigating Arboviral Threat and Strengthening Public Health Preparedness: Proceedings of a Workshop

From NASEM: “Arboviruses, or viruses carried by arthropods like mosquitoes or ticks, are responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths worldwide each year. As the climate changes globally, the geographic distribution of these diseases, including Zika, dengue, chikungunya, West Nile, and yellow fever, are steadily expanding. The National Academies Forum on Microbial Threats hosted a public workshop in December 2023 to explore avenues of threat reduction from known and emerging arboviral diseases in the context of public health preparedness and capacity building. The workshop featured talks from experts in entomology, public health, ecology, virology, immunology, disease modeling, and urban planning.”

Read this Proceedings of a Workshop for free here.

“The Current Pathogenicity and Potential Risk Assessment of Nipah Virus as Potential Cause of “Disease X”: A Narrative Review”

Mehnaz et al. recently published this article in Health Science Reports: “Background and Aims…The World Health Organization (WHO) recognized the potential for a severe international epidemic and introduced the term “Disease X” to classify pathogens that not yet identified. The Nipah virus (NiV) is highly dangerous due to its zoonotic nature, high mortality rate, and ability to cause severe clinical symptoms in humans. In this review, we gather the latest information on the NiV and its potential to become a significant candidate for Disease X.”

“Methods…We performed a thorough review of articles published in PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar using appropriate MeSH terms and keywords. Studies reported NiV infection were considered for this review.”

“Results…The NiV exhibits different epidemiological patterns in different countries that calls for customized prevention and control strategies. Genetic analysis highlights NiV’s ability to mutate that alters possible treatment options. Transmission typically involves bats as the primary reservoir, with humans becoming infected either through intermediate hosts or food. This shows NiV’s complex nature, including its ability to reach the central nervous system through the olfactory nerve. Promising treatment options, such as monoclonal antibodies, antivirals, and ongoing vaccine research, provide hope. However, the virus’s adaptability, human-to-human transmission, and the lack of specific antiviral therapy raise concerns about its potential to cause a global pandemic. The interconnection between animals, humans, and the environment stresses the need for a One Health approach to tackle emerging infectious disease by NiV.”

“Conclusion…Global collaboration, surveillance, and research investments are imperative for the preparation of future pandemics. The ongoing COVID-19 challenges underscoring the critical need for sustained scientific endeavors, global leadership, and recognition of the prominence of NiV as a candidate for the potential Disease X.”

“Engineering Biology Public Trust Survey Findings”

From the UK’s Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, these findings are the result of a survey on public perceptions of engineering biology in relation to five application areas: health, agriculture and food, low carbon fuels, chemicals and materials, and waste and environment. Key findings from this survey include “The majority of respondents felt comfortable with using new and emerging technologies on a day-to-day basis, but relatively few could explain what engineering biology is,” “There was a strong belief amongst respondents that applications of engineering biology could be useful. Similarly, the majority were comfortable with each of the specific applications and believe that they will be positive for society,” “There was broad agreement that the government is well placed to make decisions about the use of engineering biology but the public should also be involved in decision making,” and more.

“CSR Biodefense Scorecard: Winter 2024 Update”

From the Council on Strategic Risks: “In the fall of 2023, we kicked off our Biodefense Scorecard series to help inform the public on the progress and implementation status of past CSR recommendations on reducing biological risks. This update captures several areas of sustained positive action across pathogen early warning, diplomacy, and biomanufacturing.”

“Ignoring the Real Biowarfare Threat”

David Heslop and Joel Keep discuss the potential implications of recent renovations at Sergiev Posad-6 in this piece from the Lowy Institute, writing in part “While much attention has been paid to nuclear arms, Washington and Moscow must also address biological weapons, which both nations claimed to renounce many years ago. The fate of such programs is not only a matter for Russia and the United States, but for global health security at large.”

“Instrumentalising Biological Weapons-Related Allegations: Russia’s Compliance Politics and the Norms Against Biological Weapons”

Una Jakob recently published this working paper with CBWNet discussing Russia’s use of BWC compliance procedures and their effect on norms against BW. Jakob explains in part of the paper’s executive summary, “Seen in this light, the Russian activities may counterintuitively have contributed to strengthening the norms against biological weapons at the discursive level, as no actor has called them into question and as their validity has been reaffirmed repeatedly in the process, including by Russia itself. This stands in contrast, however, to Russia’s policy which may contest biological weapons norms at the action level. This discrepancy between the discursive and practical level and its implications for norm strength merit further theoretical attention. On a policy level, it will be important to increase transparency, counter disinformation, and strengthen the means to demonstrate, verify and enhance confidence in compliance with the BWC. This would also strengthen the possibilities to address biological weapons-related allegations, including those made in bad faith, and help sustain the norms against biological weapons comprehensively and in the long term.”

“Workshop on S&T Developments with Relevance for the CWC and BWC”

Anna Krin and Gunnar Jeremias edited this CBWNet working paper detailing a workshop hosted in June at Hamburg University focused on challenges and opportunities facing biological and chemical arms control. Jeremias explains in the introduction, “Throughout the workshop, four panels delved into key topics: the general concept and application of scientific and technological advice in arms control in general and particularly in chemical and biological arms control; current developments in science and technology that may necessitate attention; potential frameworks for organizing verification under the CWC and the prospects for institution building for S&T advice and verification within the BWC; and the technologies and governance methods that could be employed to enhance the efficacy of arms control measures…The insights gathered during these discussions aim to contribute to the ongoing discourse on arms control, ensuring that both the BWC and CWC remain vital in a landscape marked by rapid scientific change. This compendium encapsulates the collaborative efforts and perspectives of workshop participants, reflecting a shared commitment to advancing arms control in an increasingly complex world.”

“High-Impact, Low-Probability: NATO-EUROPOL Cooperation in Countering the CBRN Terrorist Threat to Europe”

This JCBRN Defence COE report by Mathias Katsuya “…draws on secondary-source research and insights provided by JCBRN Defence COE personnel as well as Europol’s CBRN-E Team Leader. An initial threat assessment is followed by a review of Europol’s CBRN capabilities, centring on the role of its European Counter-Terrorism Centre and inhouse CBRN-E Team as key nodes in law enforcement information-sharing, capacity-building, and operational coordination. Having identified key doctrinal and capability overlaps with NATO in addition to a stated commitment by Europol’s CBRN-E Team to enhance its civil-military relations, the report outlines a three-pillar approach to deepening connections between NATO and Europol: short-term measures to foster staff-level contacts in both organisations, a formalised relationship between Europol’s CBRN-E Team and NATO’s JCBRN Defence COE, and deeper institutional linkages to effectively confront current and emerging CBRN threats.”

“Hybrid Threats in the CBRN Environment: Challenges and Implications”

This JCBRN Defence COE paper by Paulina Frederike Gogacz discusses hybrid CBRN threats and their use by actors like Russia. Gogacz explains in the paper’s summary that “An analysis of the six strategic enablers outlined in NATO’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy (2022) indicates important steps to ameliorate current defences and prepare NATO and its member states for future hybrid CBRN threats, thereby increasing overall resilience. They include important aspects: robust intelligence-sharing mechanisms to ensure timely and accurate threat information; comprehensive exercises to simulate and prepare for various CBRN scenarios; strong partnerships both within the alliance and with external entities to foster cooperation and resource sharing; effective strategic communication to manage information and public perception; collaborative scientific research to advance technological capabilities and countermeasures; and the resilience of medical infrastructure to ensure a rapid and effective response to CBRN incidents. These steps collectively aim to bolster NATO’s preparedness and adaptability in the face of evolving hybrid CBRN threats.”

“Securing a Strategic Advantage in Biosecurity for NATO”

Max Breet and Lauren Ross recently authored this commentary for RUSI, writing in their summary “NATO should recognise the importance of biosecurity by understanding it as a new domain. This would allow the Alliance to more effectively leverage existing structures to defend itself against hybrid biological threats.”

“The Rise of Mpox in a Post-Smallpox World”

McQuiston et al. recently published this article in Emerging Infectious Diseases: “Reports of mpox are rising in Africa where the disease is endemic and in new countries where the disease has not been previously seen. The 2022 global outbreak of clade II mpox and an ongoing outbreak of the more lethal clade I mpox highlight the pandemic potential for monkeypox virus. Waning population immunity after the cessation of routine immunization for smallpox plays a key role in the changing epidemiologic patterns of mpox. Sustained human-to-human transmission of mpox is occurring widely in the context of insufficient population immunity, fueling genetic mutations that affect the accuracy of some diagnostic tests and that could lead to changing virulence. Additional research should address complex challenges for control of mpox, including improved diagnostics and medical countermeasures. The availability of vaccines should be expanded not only for outbreak response but also for broader routine use for persons in mpox-endemic countries.”

“Confronting Risks of Mirror Life”

Adamala et al. recently published this Science Policy Forum piece, writing in part, “All known life is homochiral. DNA and RNA are made from “right-handed” nucleotides, and proteins are made from “left-handed” amino acids. Driven by curiosity and plausible applications, some researchers had begun work toward creating lifeforms composed entirely of mirror-image biological molecules. Such mirror organisms would constitute a radical departure from known life, and their creation warrants careful consideration. The capability to create mirror life is likely at least a decade away and would require large investments and major technical advances; we thus have an opportunity to consider and preempt risks before they are realized. Here, we draw on an in-depth analysis of current technical barriers, how they might be eroded by technological progress, and what we deem to be unprecedented and largely overlooked risks (1). We call for broader discussion among the global research community, policy-makers, research funders, industry, civil society, and the public to chart an appropriate path forward.”

Bonus: Read Carl Zimmer’s discussion of this warning in The New York Times here.

NEW: OneLab Network Webinar

“Clinical laboratories must be alert for unusual and potentially infectious agents and immediately notify their Laboratory Response Network (LRN) reference laboratory if routine diagnostic testing results in the potential identification of rare and unusual infectious agents that may be used in a bioterrorist attack or other bio-agent incident. This webinar will describe the LRN and highlight the clinical laboratory’s role and responsibilities in initiating contact with their LRN. Join us as we share an example of a response, new tools, and valuable resources to aid in the clinical laboratory’s response.”

This event will take place on December 17 at 12 pm ET. Register for this event here.

NEW: Understanding the Introduction of Pathogens into Humans- Preventing Patient Zero: A Workshop

“The past few decades have seen the emergence of several diseases with drastic public health and economic consequences. Understanding routes of pathogen emergence and transmission is critical to preventing and mitigating disease spillover and amplification. The National Academies Forum on Microbial Threats will host a hybrid public workshop to address gaps in understanding of disease emergence, with a focus on human-animal interaction and laboratory biosafety. The workshop will explore how applications of existing policy structures, emerging technologies, and actionable research can improve biosecurity measures and prevention of future disease emergence.”

This event will take place on January 15 and 16. Learn more and register here.

NEW: Rise of the Zombie Bugs: The Surprising Science of Parasitic Mind-Control

Johns Hopkins APL’s colloquium will feature Mindy Weisberger, author of the upcoming book Rise of the Zombie Bugs: The Surprising Science of Parasitic Mind-Control: “Zombies are all around us—insect zombies, that is. In Rise of the Zombie Bugs, Mindy Weisberger explores the eerie yet fascinating phenomenon of real-life zombification in the insect class and among other invertebrates. Zombifying parasites reproduce by rewriting their victims’ neurochemistry, transforming them into the “walking dead”: armies of cicadas, spiders, and other hosts that helplessly follow a zombifier’s commands, living only to serve the parasite’s needs until death’s sweet release (and often beyond).”

Learn more about this January 31 event here.

How to Avoid Human-Made Pandemics

From the Asia Centre for Health Security: “Studying viruses that could potentially cause outbreaks is one of the most effective ways to reduce the risk of pandemics. However, this type of research—especially when it involves collecting samples from the field and manipulating pathogens—can unintentionally lead to a pandemic if not managed carefully. Dr Lentzos will discuss her findings from the Pathogen Project, which brought together an international taskforce of scientists, biosecurity and public health experts, ethicists, and civil society leaders to seek consensus on this question: Can we agree on ways to manage research that carries pandemic risk as safely, securely and responsibly as possible?”

This event will take place on January 23 at 8 pm (GMT +8:00) via Zoom. RSVP here.

Preparedness in Rural Communities: National and State/Local Perspectives and Plans

From Penn State: “The COVID-19 pandemic and recent hurricanes have thrust the preparedness of rural communities into the national spotlight. At the federal level, the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have recently released national goals and plans for preparedness of rural communities. The overall objective of this virtual, 2-day mini-symposium is to identify opportunities in public health and agricultural preparedness and response in rural communities. The mini-symposium will focus upon national perspectives on Thursday, January 30 and the state/local perspectives on Friday, January 31. Speakers include representatives of the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, the Department of Homeland Security, US Department of Agriculture, the USA Center for Rural Public Health Preparedness, and state/local leaders.”

This event will take place on January 30 and 31, from 11 am to 2 pm ET each day. Learn more and register here.

Cyberbiosecurity Summit

From Johns Hopkins APL and Bio-ISAC: “Advancements in biomanufacturing and biotechnology drive the science we need to thrive, everything from apples to vaccines. The Cyberbiosecurity Summit 2025 convenes leading experts in biotechnology, biosecurity, and cybersecurity to explore the intersection of these fields and discuss the strategies to create a safe, secure future for us all.”
This event will take place February 25-26 in Laurel, MD. Register here and review the call for sessions here (closes 12/12).

NEW: The Independent Panel Solicits Views and Insights on Pandemic Prevention, and Response Efforts

The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, co-chaired by HE Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and RH Helen Clark, welcomes you to share your insights and expertise on the status of international and regional pandemic-related reform processes and initiatives, and how progress can be continued and accelerated in the months and years ahead.”

Learn more about this survey and submit by December 20 here.