Author: dkellogg97

It’s the Revenge of the Fifth! This week we are discussing ongoing poisonings of schoolgirls across Iran, the WHO’s announcement that it is ending the COVID-19 PHEIC declaration, the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s request for a GAO scientific audit, and more. We also have several new publications, including many from Biodefense PhD students and alumni. There are new events as well, including an upcoming event on climate change and national security with the Schar School’s Hayden Center.

Iran Schoolgirl Poisoning Attack Threat Continues

Since November, more than 13,000 schoolgirls in Iran have reportedly been hospitalized due to poisonings in twenty-eight of Iran’s thirty-one provinces. Mahnaz Vahdati discussed this recently for the Atlantic Council, writing in part “Since the first poisoning incident in November 2022, thousands of female students in different regions of the country have reported experiencing severe symptoms, including shortness of breath, dizziness, numbness in limbs, and nausea, after inhaling scents often described as citrus and chloride. In the first few weeks, reports of schoolgirl poisonings were limited to the holy city of Qom. However, the frequency and geographic spread of the incidents quickly escalated, such that many parents across the country refused to send their daughters to school. In the meantime, the Islamic Republic’s response followed a pattern similar to past crises: denial, cover-ups, silencing of protesting students and families, and detention of at least one journalist covering the issue. The Islamic Republic’s inadequate and irresponsible response to the safety of schoolgirls quickly fueled public outrage, prompting parents and teachers in at least twenty cities to gather in front of the Education Ministry buildings, demanding accountability for the perpetrators.”

They continued “From the outset, many individuals and analysts directed blame toward the government. Since the beginning of the Women, Life, Freedom movement in September 2022, young women and girls—particularly those in high schools and universities—have been at the forefront of this movement. Consequently, girls’ schools were repeatedly targeted and attacked by security forces. Some analysts believe that serial attacks against girls’ schools are a means of punishment and revenge by the government against female students. They argue that the government seeks to control and silence one of the main sites of protests by creating fear among female students. This theory suggests that the government, which has failed to indoctrinate the young generation—Generation Z—through ideological education, may also be allowing its extremist supporters to act against schoolgirls. As Nadia Aghtaie, a senior lecturer on Gender and Violence at the University of Bristol, states, “Currently, education in Iran is a mobilizing force for women, and the government’s attempt to Islamize society through education has failed. This is why insiders want to reverse the government’s education policies and force girl students to stay at home.”

An anonymous analyst in Tehran authored a piece about this for the Stimson Center, writing “Originally, it seemed that religious extremists with Taliban-like mentality were responsible, especially given the fact that the attacks began in Qom not long after nationwide protests erupted over the death in police custody of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, for wearing supposedly inadequate hijab. Since then, however, the security forces’ lack of concern; the crackdown on people who raised questions about the attacks; the suppression of students, their families, and medical staff; and a disinformation campaign by the government, the parliament, and the judiciary have only intensified suspicions that the regime is responsible.”

They continued, writing “Mohammad Reza Hashemian, an emergency room doctor at Daneshvari hospital in Tehran, told the Ham-Mihan newspaper that the gas used in the attack “is a complicated combination of several gas agents impossible for ordinary people to access.” He added that the compound “has been cleverly produced” to cause illness but not death. Students have said they smelled rotten fish, rotten oranges, and diesel fuel before experiencing dizziness, headaches, nausea, and partial and mild paralysis.”

“The health ministry, despite weeks of testing, has yet to announce any cause. A ministry statement said tens of its best scientists had tested the samples but have not been able to isolate and identify the gas involved. Worse, the ministry has downplayed the severity of the incidents, saying that “in 95 percent of the cases, symptoms were the result of mental and psychological tensions and not gas attacks.” Yet, the minister contradicted his ministry’s own official statement, saying the symptoms “may have been due to a mild poisoning by an unknown factor.”’

They conclude with “It seems that Khamenei has learned a lot from his mentor, Putin. And like the Russian dictator known for his brutality in Chechnya and now Ukraine, it will be hard for him to escape ultimate blame.”

Amnesty International said in a statement, “The rights to education, health and life of millions of schoolgirls are at risk amid ongoing chemical gas attacks deliberately targeting girls’ schools in Iran. Since November 2022, thousands of schoolgirls have been poisoned and hospitalized. The authorities have failed to adequately investigate and end the attacks and dismissed girls’ symptoms as “stress”, “excitement” and/or “mental contagion”.”

Vahdati urges in their conclusion, “As the primary organization responsible for promoting children’s rights under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), UNICEF must immediately start a prompt investigation into these incidents. Furthermore, the World Health Organization (WHO) and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) must utilize their technical expertise to discover the nature of these poisonings and deliver their findings to the UN Human Rights Council. Additionally, given that several analyses suggest a potential link between these attacks and the recent protests in Iran, it is within the mandate of the fact-finding mission on Iran, recently established by the UN Human Rights Council, to investigate these poisonings in the context of the government’s response to these protests. Their findings can be the basis for the decision-making process of international courts and the UN Human Rights Council.”

“Through these channels, the international community must take decisive and expeditious measures to ensure accountability and safeguard the human rights of Iranian citizens, especially women and girls. Further passivity by international organizations conveys the message that hardliners and extremists in Iran will not face any consequences on the international stage, regardless of how heinous their actions might be.”

WHO Ends COVID-19 Emergency Designation, US CDC Reportedly to End COVID-19 Community Level Tracking, Walensky Out as CDC Director

The John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center’s Beth Blauer, Lauren Gardner, Sheri Lewis and Lainie Rutkow authored an opinion essay in the New York Times this week in which they explain, “The four of us spent the last three years immersed in collecting and reporting data on Covid-19 from every corner of the world, building one of the most trusted sources of information on cases and deaths available anywhere. But we stopped in March, not because the pandemic is over (it isn’t), but because much of the vital public health information we need is no longer available.”

They continue, writing “This is a dangerous turn for public health. The data on cases and deaths is critical for tracking and fighting the coronavirus, which has killed more than 1.1 million people in the United States and nearly 6.9 million worldwide. For the week of April 13 to April 19, 1,160 people were reported to have died from the virus in the United States. This is, in all likelihood, an underestimate…Unfortunately, nearly all states have stopped frequent public reporting of new cases and deaths, making it difficult to enable us to see how the virus is trending. And the widespread use of at-home tests has meant that most positive results almost never get recorded in public health databases, making it virtually impossible to detect and monitor outbreaks in a timely way.”

This comes amid reports the CDC will end its community levels tracking of COVID-19, President Biden’s ending of the pandemic emergencies in the US, and the WHO’s announcement today that it will end its COVID-19 emergency declaration. The WHO said in a statement today, “On 5 May 2023, more than three years into the pandemic, the WHO Emergency Committee on COVID-19 recommended to the Director-General, who accepted the recommendation, that given the disease was by now well-established and ongoing, it no longer fit the definition of a PHEIC [public health emergency of international concern]. This does not mean the pandemic itself is over, but the global emergency it has caused is, for now. A Review Committee to be established will develop long-term, standing recommendations for countries on how to manage COVID-19 on an ongoing basis.”

Regarding the CDC’s decision, the Guardian reports “Instead of using its colour-coded Covid-19 tracking system that focuses on the spread of the virus by counties, the CDC will pivot its tracking focus mostly to hospitalisation rates, CNN first reported on Friday.”

With the US national emergency over, the US public health emergency expiring next week, and the WHO’s announcement today, Dr. Rochelle Walensky submitted her letter of resignation as the Director of CDC to President Biden today. The AP reports “Walensky, 54, has been the agency’s director for a little over two years. In her letter to Biden, she expressed “mixed feelings” about the decision and didn’t say exactly why she was stepping down, but said the nation is at a moment of transition as emergency declarations come to an end.”

So is this the end of the COVID-19 era? Not quite. As many have already pointed out today, the WHO’s announcement won’t change much, particularly as so many countries have already seemingly abandoned all COVID-19 precautions. It does mark a significant point as ending the PHEIC is a move many point to as the closest thing to the definitive end of a pandemic. The first week of April saw 525,841 cases of COVID-19 reported globally, which is a far cry from the 45 million reported weekly at the pandemic’s height, but it’s still far from a small number of cases, particularly as global reporting declines. Furthermore, as Dr. Raed Dweik recently explained for the Cleveland Clinic, the death rate is still pretty high. He explained “While the death rate has dropped significantly from its peak in January 2021 — when more than 102,000 people died in a single week — the numbers still fluctuate. That’s partly because of the virus and partly because reporting procedures differ from country to country. For example, only 260 people officially died of COVID-19 on April 4, 2023; but 2,438 deaths were reported just three days earlier. To put that number in perspective, the worst day on record saw approximately 20,000 COVID-19 deaths reported.”

So where does that leave us? In the end, there have been 765,222,932 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 6,921,614 deathsthat the WHO knows about. The world is fundamentally different in many ways because of this pandemic, especially because several million of us are no longer here because of it. While these kinds of administrative changes may not mean much to many, the fact is people are still contracting and dying from this disease every day, it remains a highly politicized issue, and it has showed us how vulnerable many of us are. The PHEIC may be over, but the hard work to get ready for the next pandemic has just begun.

House E&C Committee Republicans Ask GAO to Conduct Scientific Audit on Prospecting Unknown Viruses

The House E&C Committee announced this week that “House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), and Subcommittee on Health Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY) today asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a scientific audit to analyze whether the dangers of prospecting for unknown viruses outweighs the benefits.” This requested scientific audit would address several questions outlined in the announcement, including “Have any of these activities resulted in the infection of research personnel or the spread of pathogens in a larger geographic area? and “What is known about whether field-based collection of virus samples from wildlife and the environment improves our ability to predict, prevent, and respond to pandemics?”

“The request comes on the heels of an Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee hearing titled “Biosafety and Risky Research: Examining if Science is Outpacing Policy and Safety,” which was held on Thursday, April 27.” Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz was a witness at this hearing.”

“Who Will Vaccinate People During the Next Pandemic? The US Public Health Sector is Falling Behind”

In this piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Kimberly Ma discusses the warning signs that US public health remains unprepared for the next pandemic, paying particular attention to the instability of the public health work force. She writes in part, “Despite its critical role in responding to biological threats (and more), public health has always faced difficulty with sufficient investment. Each year, or with each crisis, Congress passes funding for the CDC, which then distributes resources to states. Despite arguably greater needs, the CDC has suffered an overall 2 percent budget decrease over the past decade (after adjusting for inflation). And while Congress may point to one-time pandemic-era funding pots like the Infectious Disease Rapid Response Reserve Fund, these are primarily restricted to COVID-19 response activities; they’re the opposite of the sustained, steady funding needed.”

She writes in her conclusion “The Biden administration will lift the COVID-19 public health emergency declaration on May 11, an official end, of sorts, to the pandemic response in the United States. To ensure US biodefense capabilities are robust and ready, whether for the next variant tomorrow or a bioweapon attack in ten years, every single critical component, public health staff included, cannot just exist, hanging by a thread. Rather, they all need to be well-resourced, diverse, and thriving.”

Kimberly Ma is a Biodefense PhD student and a senior analyst at ASTHO. She is currently a Bulletin Editorial Fellow.

“Can a 50-Year-Old Treaty Still Keep the World Safe From the Changing Threat of Bioweapons?”

Jen Kirby tackles the changing threat landscape for Vox in this piece, quoting several biodefense rockstars, including Drs. Yong-Bee Lim and Saskia Popescu, both alumni of the Biodefense Graduate Program:”Biological weapons are the “poor man’s atom bomb,” said Yong-Bee Lim, the deputy director of the Converging Risks Lab and Biosecurity Projects Manager at the Council on Strategic Risks. They are weapons that can often be built on the cheap, using materials found in nature. Even before the world understood what caused disease, countries used things against their enemies they knew carried contagion: catapulting plague-infested corpses over fortified walls, or giving or selling clothes or blankets from smallpox patients.”

Kirby continues writes later in the piece, “Biological attacks can also be difficult to verify because pathogens are naturally occurring, and even if scientists detect a new one, it’s difficult — if not impossible — to know if it’s something that has been deliberately created or something that emerged accidentally from nature or a lab. And given what Covid-19 demonstrated about the cracks in our defense against biological threats — and how little has been done to fix them over the past few years — a future bioweapon might “prey upon those existing vulnerabilities that haven’t been addressed,” said Saskia Popescu, a biodefense expert at George Mason University.”

Kirby covers a broad spectrum of issues in this piece, including disinformation, writing in their conclusion “In the meantime, the threats to the BWC are accelerating. The world is a more dangerous and tense place. Disinformation around bioweapons is also eroding the taboo against the use. This includes Russia’s playbook of continued accusations about bioweapons in Ukraine and elsewhere. But a top Republican recently claimed, with zero evidence, that the Chinese spy balloon shot down over the Atlantic Ocean in February was equipped with bioweapons.”

“Battling Catastrophic Biological Threats: Cost-Effective Solutions for National Security”

New from the Council on Strategic Risks: “This report begins by outlining biological risks and their evolution, followed by discussions on approaches to addressing these risks and how the landscape is changing. It concludes by demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of pursuing more aggressive investment to mitigate these risks to save lives.”

“The 21st century presents an increasingly challenging and complex risk landscape, with thousands of biological laboratories worldwide and rapid democratization of biology. Countering biological threats is imperative for the US, as every goal of national and strategic importance is jeopardized by these risks. The article suggests investing additional resources in developing pathogen-agnostic defensive measures and other steps to reduce pandemic risks, which could save countless lives in the future.”

This report was edited by Dr. Yong-Bee Lim, an alumnus of the Biodefense MS and PhD programs, Deputy Director, Converging Risks Lab and Biosecurity Projects Manager, Council on Strategic Risks.

“A Road Map for a World Protected from Pandemic Threats”

This new report from Her Excellency Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the Right Honourable Helen Clark “warns that patchy and limited implementation of recommendations from previous reports reviewing major outbreaks, including Ebola in West Africa in 2014-2016, left gaps and contributed directly to the COVID-19 outbreak becoming a pandemic.” They aim to “provide a global road map that if implemented in full, will contribute to protecting the world’s peoples from the development of another devastating pandemic like COVID-19.  The leaders underscore the role of the UNGA to commit to a comprehensive reform agenda that can ensure the multisectoral, multilateral collaboration required, led by Heads of State and Government.”

“The CWC at 25: From Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction to Attribution of Their Use”

In this recent article in the Nonproliferation Review, Alexander Kelle discusses the changing security environment and its impact on the CWC: “This article analyzes the shifting focus of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) during the first 25 years of its implementation, from the verification of destruction of declared chemical-weapon (CW) stockpiles to the attribution of CW use. The article identifies the repeated use of chemical weapons by Syria and the resultant creation of a new attribution norm under the CWC as a critical juncture in the regime’s evolution. Repeated calls for accountability for the use of so-called Novichok nerve agents for assassination purposes serve as the first manifestation of the new attribution norm. The article further outlines steps CWC states parties should take in the context of the Fifth CWC Review Conference in May 2023 to prepare the CW-prohibition regime for its next 25 years of operation by (1) adapting the implementation of key regime norms following the anticipated completion of CW destruction later in 2023 and (2) incorporating the investigation and attribution work of the Investigation and Identification Team into the programmatic work of the OPCW.”

“Lost in the Gap: Toxin and Bioregulator Weapons”

In this piece for Arms Control Today, Michael Crowley and Malcolm Dando discuss the widening gap between the BWC/CWC and rapidly advancing science. They write in part “Building on the existing capabilities of the chemical, life, and associated sciences and postulating potential research trajectories, it can be imagined how the malign application of future developments, if insufficiently regulated, could enable states to chemically manipulate and subjugate large swaths of their own or foreign populations. Although such repressive capabilities are speculative now, the world’s rapidly increasing knowledge of and ability to manipulate the body’s bioregulatory pathways, coupled with advances in wide-area agent dissemination, mean that such threats are likely to increase in the coming years if not addressed now.”

“The BWC and CWC were primarily intended to prevent and address the development and use of biological and chemical weapons in armed conflict and to facilitate the destruction of all extant weapons production capacity and stockpiles. There are serious questions about whether these conventions and the associated control regimes can respond adequately to the diverse and potentially malign applications of the chemical and life sciences on the battlefield and beyond. The CWC review conference beginning May 15 will be an important indicator about whether that treaty can meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.”

Informing Blueprint 2.0: Know the Enemy

Join the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense on May 9, at 10:30 am. This meeting will “Provide the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense with a better understanding of: (1) prevention; (2) deterrence; and (3) attribution of biological threats. This is the fourth Commission meeting to inform our refresh of the National Blueprint for Biodefense.” Learn more and register here.

The Heat is On: Climate Change, the Arctic, and National Security

“Join the Michael V. Hayden Center for Intelligence, Policy, and International Security as we host a discussion on climate change and its intersection with national security and intelligence. In October 2022, the Biden Administration released its National Security Strategy, in which climate change is noted as one of the most significant challenges for all nations. In February 2023, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence followed with its Annual Threat Assessment, in which climate change is mentioned first on the topic of shared global challenges. The growing concerns of climate change have greatly impacted traditional security challenges, and are affecting migration, agriculture-dependent communities, natural resources, illicit activities, violence, and geopolitics. Additionally, it has spurred a dramatic growth in strategic competition over critical minerals, technologies, and economic opportunities in the Arctic.”

This hybrid event will take place on May 10 at 7 pm EST. Register for the in-person event here, and for the livestream here.

Benchtop DNA Synthesis Devices: Capabilities, Biosecurity, Implications, and Governance

From NTI: “Synthetic DNA is used by bioscience laboratories globally and plays a fundamental role in a wide range of science and biotechnology advances. A new generation of benchtop DNA synthesis devices will soon enable users to print DNA more quickly and easily. This advanced technology has the potential to disrupt the DNA synthesis market and its associated biosecurity practices and could allow malicious actors to more easily obtain pathogen or toxin DNA.”

“This new report, Benchtop DNA Synthesis Devices: Capabilities, Biosecurity Implications, and Governance, draws on more than 30 interviews with experts from benchtop DNA synthesis companies, the broader biotechnology industry, the biosecurity and bioscience research communities, and other sectors. The report addresses the anticipated capabilities, biosecurity implications, and governance of benchtop DNA synthesis devices, and it makes recommendations for future oversight.”

“Refreshments will be served from 10:30 am. The event will start promptly at 11:00 am.”

Learn more and register for this May 10 hybrid event here.

Nobel Prize Summit-Truth, Trust and Hope

Taking place May 24-26 this year in DC and virtually, this Nobel Prize Summit asks “How can we build trust in truth, facts and scientific evidence so that we can create a hopeful future for all?”

“Misinformation is eroding our trust in science and runs the risk of becoming one of the greatest threats to our society today.”

“Join us at this years’ Nobel Prize Summit which brings together laureates, leading experts and you in a conversation on how we can combat misinformation, restore trust in science and create a hopeful future.”

Learn more and register here.

Building Capacity for Dual-Use Oversight in the Life Sciences through the IEGBBR

Join the International Experts Group of Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulators for this virtual event on May 30 at 7 am EDT. This event will discuss “how to identify, assess, and mitigate dual-use concerns in the life sciences – two examples of oversight measures in a national oversight system”. Register here.

CSWMD 2023 Annual Symposium: WMD in the Decisive Decade

“The National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) invites you to join us on 14 June 2023 for the virtual Annual CSWMD Symposium, titled WMD in the Decisive Decade.”

“This year’s symposium will explore the cognitive impacts WMD has on strategic decision making and the challenges associated with operating in an environment where WMD has been employed. It will be an opportunity for the WMD community to engage with officials and thought leaders on current WMD challenges at the unclassified level, including keynote addresses by Richard Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and CWMD Policy and Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.”

“For more information and to register for this event click here. Please RSVP by 9 JUNE 2023.”

“We look forward to hosting you for the event. For more information about the WMD Center and reference our research, please visit our website at https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/ and follow us on Twitter and on LinkedIn.”

Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community

“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”

This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: What nerve agent has the military designation “GB”?

Shout out to Jeffrey L. for correctly answering last week’s question. Our question was: “Before their famous work finding the source of the 1854 cholera outbreak in London’s Soho district, which physician administered chloroform to Queen Victoria during childbirth?” The answer is John Snow.

Happy Arbor Day! 🌳 This week we are covering a recent House hearing on biosafety, the evolving situation in Sudan involving a public health laboratory, and Bavian Nordic’s efforts to improve its production capacity based on its experience with the spread of mpox last year. This week also includes several new publications, upcoming events, and professional development opportunities, including a MOOC from OpenWHO and upcoming events hosted by George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government.

Energy and Commerce Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Science Policy and Safety

Yesterday, the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee held a hearing titled “Biosafety and Risky Research: Examining if Science is Outpacing Policy and Safety”. Among the witnesses testifying were Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of George Mason’s Biodefense Graduate Program. In his testimony, Dr. Koblentz presented the findings of Global Biolabs Report 2023 from the Global BioLabs initiative.

He explained in part that “Since its inception in May 2021, the Global BioLabs initiative has identified more than 100 BSL-4 and BSL-3+ labs around the world that conduct high consequence biological research, with more planned and under construction. Europe is home to half of these labs while the United States is home to the single largest concentration of such labs. 11 out of the 20 highest containment facilities that are planned or under construction are in Asia…The Global BioLabs Initiative has also identified several trends that raise biosafety and biosecurity concerns given the global boom in construction of these labs, particularly where biorisk management oversight is weak.”

In his conclusion, he told the subcommittee “The biological risk landscape is rapidly evolving and presents significant new challenges to preventing the accidental, reckless, or malicious misuse of biology. At the same time, oversight systems to ensure that life sciences research is conducted safely, securely, and responsibly are falling behind. An urgent overhaul to realign biorisk management with contemporary risks is needed.”

Watch the hearing recording here and access information about other witnesses and their testimonies here.

Fighting in Sudan Threatens National Laboratory

The World Health Organization announced this week that it is assessing threats posed to public health in Sudan after fighters occupied a national public health laboratory. Nima Saeed Abid, the WHO’s representative in the country, told reporters that “There is a huge biological risk associated with the occupation of the central public health lab,” and that this occupation is an “extremely, extremely dangerous” situation. As Politico explains, “A power struggle between Sudan’s military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemeti,” has plunged Sudan into fierce fighting.” However, the WHO has not specified which side is responsible for the lab seizure.

Olivier le Polain, the WHO’s incident manager for the organization’s Sudan’s response, said Wednesday that the facility holds samples of the causative agents of measles, tuberculosis, cholera, polio, and COVID-19, among other pathogens. “The assessment is ongoing to better understand what the public health threats might be with those, and of course, the risk as well of having untrained personnel or untrained individuals in the lab,” he said.

Politico reports that “Fighters “kicked out all the technicians from the lab … which is completely under the control of one of the fighting parties as a military base,” Abid said, adding that this created an “extremely, extremely dangerous” situation.”

This has, naturally, led many to jump on this opportunity to further ongoing disinformation narratives, with many prominent accounts claiming this Sudanese public health lab is producing biological weapons on behalf of the US government or asserting that Sudan is an odd place to have such a facility. Of course, it is not strange for any country to have a national laboratory focused on public health work, and US support for these kinds of facilities is strictly peaceful as we have discussed at length previously. Furthermore, it seems that the biggest threats posed by this situation are those to the state of public health in the country by threatening the facility, personnel, and the legitimacy of the lab’s work.

Bavarian Nordic Says Mpox Outbreak Was a “Wake Up” Call for Smallpox Preparation

Bavarian Nordic’s CEO Paul Chaplin told CNBC this week that the spread of mpox last year was a wake-up call for his company. CNBC explains that the Danish company is looking to dramatically scale up its production capacity to make larger quantities of its JYNNEOS vaccine. Chaplin said this week “If it wasn’t mpox but it was smallpox, we are completely at the wrong scale…We’re looking at ways we can dramatically change the way we manufacture to increase our scale.”

According to CNBC, “Bavarian Nordic plans to simplify its production process so it can easily partner with other manufacturers and scale up production capacity to hundreds of millions of doses in the event of an emergency.”

WHO Launches Preparedness and Resilience for Emerging Threats Initiative

This week, the World Health Organization released a statement about the launch of its new Preparedness and Resilience for Emerging Threats Initiative, reading in part: “To help countries better prepare for future pandemics, WHO launched a new initiative today that provides guidance on integrated planning for responding to any respiratory pathogen such as influenza or coronaviruses.”

“The new Preparedness and Resilience for Emerging Threats Initiative, or PRET, incorporates the latest tools and approaches for shared learning and collective action established during the COVID-19 pandemic and other recent public health emergencies.”

“Through the initiative, WHO will use a mode of transmission approach to guide countries in pandemic planning, given that many capacities and capabilities are common among groups of pathogens. PRET answers the call for technical guidance and support for promoting and strengthening integrated preparedness and response, as outlined in World Health Assembly resolutions.”

“Improved Understanding of Biorisk for Research Involving Microbial Modification Using Annotated Sequences of Concern”

In this new article in Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology, Godbold et al. discuss challenges of sequences of concern in biorisk management. Abstract: “Regulation of research on microbes that cause disease in humans has historically been focused on taxonomic lists of ‘bad bugs’. However, given our increased knowledge of these pathogens through inexpensive genome sequencing, 5 decades of research in microbial pathogenesis, and the burgeoning capacity of synthetic biologists, the limitations of this approach are apparent. With heightened scientific and public attention focused on biosafety and biosecurity, and an ongoing review by US authorities of dual-use research oversight, this article proposes the incorporation of sequences of concern (SoCs) into the biorisk management regime governing genetic engineering of pathogens. SoCs enable pathogenesis in all microbes infecting hosts that are ‘of concern’ to human civilization. Here we review the functions of SoCs (FunSoCs) and discuss how they might bring clarity to potentially problematic research outcomes involving infectious agents. We believe that annotation of SoCs with FunSoCs has the potential to improve the likelihood that dual use research of concern is recognized by both scientists and regulators before it occurs.”

This article was co-authored by Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University.

“Finding the Origin of a Pandemic Is Difficult. Preventing One Shouldn’t Be.”

In this opinion piece for the New York Times, Dr. W. Ian Lipkin explains “Finding the origin of a viral outbreak can be incredibly difficult, even with full government cooperation and the best available technologies. It’s important to try, because the insights into how a virus emerged may be useful in reducing the risk of future outbreaks. But these efforts and debates over uncertainties cannot come at the expense of action. We cannot wait for answers that may never come before doing what must be done to prevent the next pandemic.”

“There have been several news cycles dedicated to theories about the origin of C‌ovid-19 that focus on the roles of wild animal markets versus research-related incidents. The latest revelations have gotten us no closer to resolution and agreement than when I visited China in January 2020 at the outset of the pandemic to try to investigate the cause and contain it. To the contrary, rancor has increased and the relentless focus on the origins of the virus has obscured the primary objective: preventing future pandemics.”

“Even if ‌scientists could confirm the link of SARS-CoV-2 to a laboratory or to a raccoon dog, that wouldn’t mean that wild animal markets in cities ‌‌can safely continue or that regulations concerning scientific experimentation with infectious agents ‌‌are less important. And yet very little has been done in the wake of this pandemic to better either source of risk.”

“Chinese Censorship Is Quietly Rewriting the Covid-19 Story”

In this piece for the New York Times, Mara Hvistendahl and Benjamin Mueller write, “Under government pressure, Chinese scientists have retracted studies and withheld or deleted data. The censorship has stymied efforts to understand the virus.” They explain later in their piece that “That the Chinese government muzzled scientists, hindered international investigations and censored online discussion of the pandemic is well documented. But Beijing’s stranglehold on information goes far deeper than even many pandemic researchers are aware of. Its censorship campaign has targeted international journals and scientific databases, shaking the foundations of shared scientific knowledge, a New York Times investigation found.”

“Under pressure from their government, Chinese scientists have withheld data, withdrawn genetic sequences from public databases and altered crucial details in journal submissions. Western journal editors enabled those efforts by agreeing to those edits or withdrawing papers for murky reasons, a review by The Times of over a dozen retracted papers found.”

“A Memo for the President on Preserving U.S. Leadership in Biotechnology”

Check out this piece from the Special Competitive Studies Project’s (SCSP) Future Technology Platforms team, in which they make “the tech competition case for why we need a National Action Plan for U.S. Leadership in Biotechnology in the style of a Memo to the President of the United States.” SCSP also explains that “Today, April 12, the SCSP’s Platforms Panel released its National Action Plan for U.S. Leadership in Biotechnology, which outlines a series of policy recommendations the United States should take to ensure American leadership in biotechnology through 2030 and beyond. This will be the first of a series of action plans that will be published throughout the year focused on the battleground technologies SCSP identified in last year’s Mid-Decade Challenges to National Competitiveness report.”

“The Call is Coming From Inside the House: U.S. Misinformation Agents Fuel Global Vaccine Opposition”

From Public Good News (PGN): “For six years, PGP’s Monitoring Lab has monitored public media data, collecting insights on the most pressing public health topics, including the opioid epidemic, mental health, sexual and reproductive health, nutrition, school wellness, tobacco products, gun violence, outbreaks and pandemics, and vaccines. But vaccines have special standing. When PGP created North America’s largest vaccine misinformation monitoring program in 2019, it tried to mobilize public health and its allies against what was already a well-funded and highly organized global network of vaccine opponents. In mid-2020, PGP co-founded a United Nations global vaccination demand program that helped Country Offices respond to vaccine misinformation. Running these two programs in parallel granted PGP unique visibility into global vaccine discourse. For four years, PGP’s analysts watched the anti-vaccine movement evolve within the U.S., and for three, they have seen how misinformation and disinformation travel through global social networks. In 2022, PGP launched PGN to partner with trusted local voices and combat the spread of misinformation in communities.”

“Today’s vaccine opposition landscape is unrecognizable compared to the pre-pandemic period. More vaccine misinformation reaches more people at a faster rate than ever before. Recognition of a problem may be the first step toward solving it. Since the pandemic began, the White House’s National Security Strategy referenced misinformation as a driver of polarization, the U.S. surgeon general issued an Advisory on misinformation, and the CDC and FDA tasked multiple media monitoring teams with tackling the problem. Numerous state and local health departments have also taken on “infodemic management,” training professionals in social listening and anti-misinformation tactics. Congress has even attempted to hold social media companies and their executives to account for their misinformation policies. And yet the problem persists.”

“This report is titled “The Call Is Coming From Inside the House,” a line popularized by horror movies meaning the villain already controls the space you thought was safest—your home. The U.S. creates and spreads most of the world’s vaccine misinformation and disinformation. Reporting to date has focused on the smoke but largely missed the fire. The many urgent calls to address the global infodemic skirt around the primary source of the problem: Vaccine misinformation is now a chief export of the U.S., benefiting from decades of unchecked anti-vaccine organizing, the ease with which many Americans can create compelling media, and the unrivaled influence of the U.S. on global media.”

Pandora’s Gamble: Lab Leaks, Pandemics, and a World at Risk

From Kaiser Family Foundation News: “In 2019, federal lab regulators ordered the prestigious U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases to halt all work with dangerous pathogens, such as Ebola and anthrax, which can pose a severe threat to public health and safety.”

“Army officials had assured the public there was no safety threat and indicated that no pathogens had leaked outside the laboratory after flooding in 2018. But in a new book released April 25, investigative reporter Alison Young reveals there were repeated and egregious safety breaches and government oversight failures at Fort Detrick, Maryland, that preceded the 2019 shutdown. This article is adapted from “Pandora’s Gamble: Lab Leaks, Pandemics, and a World at Risk.”’

“Science and Tech Spotlight: Synthetic Biology”

This Science and Tech Spotlight from the Government Accountability Office offers a brief overview of synthetic biology and discusses opportunities and challenges it poses to the US. It explains in part “Synthetic biology can modify or create organisms to help address challenges in medicine, agriculture, manufacturing, and the environment. This technology is already being used for commercial products, and recent advances in biotech and computation have broadened its potential benefits. But it also may raise safety, national security, and ethical concerns.”

“2022 Preparedness Profile Study Preview Report”

New from NACCHO: “Since 2016, the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) has conducted the Preparedness Profile study every few years to provide a foundation for future public health preparedness initiatives. This nationally representative survey gathers information about preparedness trends and emerging issues at LHDs to inform priorities at the local, state, and national levels. This preview report provides a highlight of key findings from the 2022 Preparedness Profile on a multitude of important topics in local preparedness. A full report will be released in Summer 2023.”

“Lessons Learned From a COVID-19 Dog Screening Pilot in California K-12 Schools”

In this Research Letter for JAMA Pediatrics, Glaser et al. write “The California Department of Public Health sponsors a statewide, school-based COVID-19 antigen testing program. Although effective, this program requires personnel, testing resources, and sample collection and generates medical waste. Scent-trained dogs are a strategy for rapid, noninvasive, low-cost, and environmentally responsible COVID-19 screening. We conducted a dog screening program to complement a school antigen testing program.”

“Dog screening for COVID-19 infection can be completed in a matter of seconds. However, dog screening directly on individuals introduced variables, such as distractions (eg, noises, young children) and environmental factors (eg, wind, smells), that likely contributed to decreased sensitivity and specificity. We considered other options, including a sample collection strategy used by other investigators…however, those options would sacrifice cost and time efficiency. Study limitations included the low prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 during the study period and the consequently low number of COVID-19 infections.”

What We’re Listening To 🎧

SynBioBeta Podcast-From Ideas to Reality: Synthetic Biology Comes of Age – with Jason Kelly

“Today John Cumbers talks with Jason Kelly, Co-founder and CEO of Ginkgo Bioworks. Together they will discuss synthetic biology’s coming of age” and get Jason’s take on several topics, such as the history of programmable biology, Sam Altman, Ai and the role of AI in biology, and the new congressional commission covering national security and emerging biotechnology.” Listen here.

“The Coming of Age of Global Health Podcasts”

Speaking of podcasts…check out this story written by Parth Chandna discussing global health podcasts and how they can further discourse.

Advancing Threat Agnostic Biodefense Webinar: Technologies Accelerating Infectious Disease Research

“PNNL’s invited speaker is Dr. Reed Shabman, program officer in the Office of Genomics and Advanced Technologies at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). The systems biology program consists of a community that integrates experimental biology, computational tools and modeling across temporal and spatial scales to develop strategies that predict and alleviate disease severity across multiple human pathogens. Reed will describe the program history and notable accomplishments leveraging “multi-omics” infectious disease data. He will also highlight additional NIAID programs and provide perspectives on potential future applications for “omics” technology in the infectious disease space.” This event will take place on May 3 at 12 pm PT. Register here.

Lessons From the COVID War: An Investigative Report

The independent, nonpartisan Covid Crisis Group has spent two years investigating the causes and consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Schar School of Policy and Government and Biodefense Graduate Program are proud to host two members of the group, Andrew Kilianski and Melissa Harvey, for an in-depth discussion of the group’s long-awaited report on what went wrong—and right—with America’s response to the pandemic: Lessons from the Covid War: An Investigative Report (Public Affairs, 2023).

The Covid Crisis Group is a remarkable group of 34 distinguished practitioners and scholars from a variety of backgrounds who came together determined to learn and share the most valuable lessons from the worst peacetime catastrophe of modern times. Lessons from the Covid War is plain-spoken and clear-sighted. It cuts through the jumble of information to make some sense of it all and answer: What just happened to us, and why? And crucially, how, next time, could we do better? Because there will be a next time.

Register here: https://gmu.universitytickets.com/w/event.aspx?id=1471 

National Biodefense Science Board Public Meeting

The NBSB will meet virtually on May 4 at 2 pm EST to discuss lessons from COVID-19 and will present recommendations on several topics, including collection, analysis, and sharing of operational health data, uses of virtual healthcare during disaster response, and disaster response challenges specific to rural and underserved communities. Register here.

Virtual Workshop: Prioritizing Actions for Epidemic and Pandemic Preparedness

From the National Academies: “Please join us May 4 & 18, 2023 from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. ET for a virtual symposium examining how to strengthen the evidence-based prioritization of epidemic and pandemic preparedness and response capabilities.

The symposium will convene global health planning stakeholders, including those in government and academia, and across health- and non-health sectors to:

• Review assessment tools and how, independently and together, they relate to national action planning.
• Gain insight into how countries and organizations currently select priorities in funding for epidemic prevention, detection, and response.
• Assess evidence for effective prioritization approaches to building disease surveillance and risk communication capabilities.
• Identify governance structures that can support robust and reliable systems for epidemic and pandemic preparedness and response investments.

This symposium is in collaboration with the Division on Earth and Life Studies. Learn more about this workshop by visiting the event webpage.”

The Heat is On: Climate Change, the Arctic, and National Security

“Join the Michael V. Hayden Center for Intelligence, Policy, and International Security as we host a discussion on climate change and its intersection with national security and intelligence. In October 2022, the Biden Administration released its National Security Strategy, in which climate change is noted as one of the most significant challenges for all nations. In February 2023, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence followed with its Annual Threat Assessment, in which climate change is mentioned first on the topic of shared global challenges. The growing concerns of climate change have greatly impacted traditional security challenges, and are affecting migration, agriculture-dependent communities, natural resources, illicit activities, violence, and geopolitics. Additionally, it has spurred a dramatic growth in strategic competition over critical minerals, technologies, and economic opportunities in the Arctic.”

This hybrid event will take place on May 10 at 7 pm EST. Register for the in-person event here, and for the livestream here.

Benchtop DNA Synthesis Devices: Capabilities, Biosecurity, Implications, and Governance

From NTI: “Synthetic DNA is used by bioscience laboratories globally and plays a fundamental role in a wide range of science and biotechnology advances. A new generation of benchtop DNA synthesis devices will soon enable users to print DNA more quickly and easily. This advanced technology has the potential to disrupt the DNA synthesis market and its associated biosecurity practices and could allow malicious actors to more easily obtain pathogen or toxin DNA.”

“This new report, Benchtop DNA Synthesis Devices: Capabilities, Biosecurity Implications, and Governance, draws on more than 30 interviews with experts from benchtop DNA synthesis companies, the broader biotechnology industry, the biosecurity and bioscience research communities, and other sectors. The report addresses the anticipated capabilities, biosecurity implications, and governance of benchtop DNA synthesis devices, and it makes recommendations for future oversight.”

“Refreshments will be served from 10:30 am. The event will start promptly at 11:00 am.”

Learn more and register for this May 10 hybrid event here.

Nobel Prize Summit-Truth, Trust and Hope

Taking place May 24-26 this year in DC and virtually, this Nobel Prize Summit asks “How can we build trust in truth, facts and scientific evidence so that we can create a hopeful future for all?”

“Misinformation is eroding our trust in science and runs the risk of becoming one of the greatest threats to our society today.”

“Join us at this years’ Nobel Prize Summit which brings together laureates, leading experts and you in a conversation on how we can combat misinformation, restore trust in science and create a hopeful future.”

Learn more and register here.

CSWMD 2023 Annual Symposium: WMD in the Decisive Decade

“The National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) invites you to join us on 14 June 2023 for the virtual Annual CSWMD Symposium, titled WMD in the Decisive Decade.”

“This year’s symposium will explore the cognitive impacts WMD has on strategic decision making and the challenges associated with operating in an environment where WMD has been employed. It will be an opportunity for the WMD community to engage with officials and thought leaders on current WMD challenges at the unclassified level, including keynote addresses by Richard Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and CWMD Policy and Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.”

“For more information and to register for this event click here. Please RSVP by 9 JUNE 2023.”

“We look forward to hosting you for the event. For more information about the WMD Center and reference our research, please visit our website at https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/ and follow us on Twitter and on LinkedIn.”

Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community

“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”

This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Request for Proposals: Foresight Process Horizon Scan Exercise for Dual-Use Research in One Health Context

From the UN Global Marketplace: “The purpose of this Request for Proposals (RFP) is to enter into a contractual agreement with a successful bidder and select a suitable contractor to carry out the following work: foresight process, a horizon scan exercise for dual-use research in One Health context.” Learn more and express interest here.

Foresight Approaches in Global Public Health

From OpenWHO: “The course “Foresight Approaches in Global Public Health” provides an overview of various methods and tools that can be used to understand emerging trends and changes with a futuristic lens and to explore their potential impacts on global public health. Foresight creates space for thinking about new opportunities and possibilities, taking a longer-term perspective, and articulating current needs and priority actions that can be taken to shape the preferred future scenario.” Take the course and others from OpenWHO here.

Call for Applications: Early-Career Fellowship for Reducing Nuclear Weapons Risks

The Council on Strategic Risks “is announcing a continuation of its Early-Career Fellowship for Reducing Nuclear Weapons Risks. Through this six-month program, early-career professionals will work with leading experts from CSR’s team and network to develop a better understanding of practical risk reduction concepts and to generate new ideas regarding:

• Nuclear strategic stability
• Strengthening norms against nuclear weapons threats and use
• Avoiding miscalculations and preventing accidents/incidents
• Preventing and addressing nuclear proliferation
• Responsibilities of nuclear weapons-capable states”

Learn more and apply here.

Seeking Subject Matter Expert(s) (SMEs) with Experience Educating Global Audiences on the Importance of Securing Emerging Technologies

“CRDF Global is seeking subject matter expert(s) (SMEs) to engage and educate global audiences. The expert(s) will work on deliverables relating to building a culture of security in the private sector. These deliverables will include the development of an online asynchronous course and four hybrid hackathons, which will take place at local incubator hubs in several countries.”

“The expert(s) will design and develop an asynchronous course to counter misuse and raise awareness of emerging technologies with potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related applications by state and non-state actors. The audience for this course will be individuals in the private sector (particularly in start-ups, innovation hubs, and incubator spaces) in various countries globally. This asynchronous course should train key stakeholders on how to develop and foster a culture of security.”

Learn more here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: “Before their famous work finding the source of the 1854 cholera outbreak in London’s Soho district, which physician administered chloroform to Queen Victoria during childbirth?”

Shout out to Don S. for correctly answering last week’s question. Our question was: “In 1984, what group spread Salmonella enterica at restaurants and shops in Dulles, Oregon in an attempt to influence local elections?” The answer is the Rajneeshee cult.

Happy Friday! This edition is packed with new publications, upcoming events, opportunities, and resources. Some highlights include a piece on rad and nuke threats from a Biodefense PhD alumna, an exciting new podcast from CSIS a current Biodefense MS student helped launch, a very helpful piece from the Washington Post outlining Russia’s disinformation, and an upcoming book talk covering “Lessons from the Covid War: A Report by the Covid Crisis Group” hosted by the Schar School.

“ASPR Releases Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise Multiyear Budget Assessment”

This week, “…the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) released the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise (PHEMCE) Multiyear Budget (MYB) for fiscal years 2022-2026. The report assesses budget needs to support medical countermeasure priorities which would allow the U.S. Government to prepare for the next public health threat. The multiyear budget projects an estimated overall funding need of $64 billion over the five-year period.”

‘“HHS’ recent responses to COVID-19, mpox, and Ebola, demonstrate the importance of a strong domestic medical countermeasure enterprise,” said Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Dawn O’Connell. “As the first PHEMCE multiyear budget released since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, it will serve as a useful tool for Congress to gauge ASPR’s funding levels to provide the country protection against whatever comes next.”’

“The PHEMCE is an interagency body that reviews the current threat landscape and makes recommendations to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on available or future medical countermeasures. This MYB was built over a period of time in which there were continuing resolutions, omnibus spending bills, and a near-simultaneously released President’s budget—this MYB is indicative of the assessed need and does not substitute for requested levels in the President’s Budget.”

“The multiyear budget also provides Congress and external stakeholders with funding information related to investments made in specified threats. The report highlights key priorities — from supporting innovative approaches to MCM development, to fostering clear, scientifically supported regulatory pathways for MCMs, to ensuring our national security.”

“The report, which picks up in 2022 – where the last MYB left off, estimates a gap of $35.3 billion between the flat fiscal year 2022 level and projected five-year total.  ASPR looks forward to working with Congress to overcome challenges and ensure America is prepared for whatever threat is around the corner.”

Read more here and download the full multiyear budget here.

ICYMI: “HERA Signs Agreement with ECDC and with EMA to Strengthen Cooperation on Health Emergency Preparedness and Response”

Earlier this month, the European Commission’s “Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), as well as HERA and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) have agreed to strengthen cooperation and to coordinate their work in support of health emergency preparedness and response in the area of medical countermeasures…The agreed working arrangements will help ensure that there are no unnecessary overlaps and that resources are used more efficiently.”

These arrangements aim to improve collaboration in areas like intelligence gathering and assessment, assessment of major cross-border health threats, and contribution to reinforcing the global health emergency preparedness and response architecture.

Learn more and read the agreements here.

“Civil Defense for Radiological Threats”

This CBNW article, written by Biodefense PhD alumna Dr. Mary Sproull, explores improvements made since 9/11 in American preparedness for radiological and nuclear threats and highlights key areas of mass casualty planning that require further improvement.

She writes in her conclusion, “As primary response for any emergency is initially a local response, development of a base of local radiation experts nationwide is an important step for civil defense.  Integration and establishment of working relationships between these local radiation SME and the first responders and medical professionals they will be supporting prior to future emergencies is also key to ensure a level of trust for effective mitigation of radiation dread.  The ROSS program is an important aspect of emergency preparedness which should receive more visibility, financial support, and resources to increase access for training opportunities at the local level.  Further, increased funding to support training of first responders and medical personal themselves on the relative health risks of radiation exposure is needed. “

“The Nonproliferation Compliance Cheminformatics Tool Completes a Second Test”

This project note from the Stemson Center provides an update on the Nonproliferation Compliance Cheminformativs Tool. The note explains, “The NCCT is a proof of concept of a practical tool to aid frontline officers – border security, customs, law enforcement, defense, chemical industry – to quickly check available chemical identifying information (name, registry number, molecular structure) against national or international control lists of chemical warfare agents or precursors. Frontline officers typically have just seconds to determine whether a given substance is a concern or not – a task that can be complex and time-consuming even for trained chemists. Developed jointly by the Stimson Center, Prof. Stefano Costanzi’s research group at American University, and Dr. Koblentz of George Mason University, and funded by Global Affairs Canada, the proof of concept consists of a database of chemical structures implemented and run through a commercial, desktop-based cheminformatics software (ChemAxon’s Instant JChem).”

“The Future of Chemical Disarmament in an Eroding Global Order”

“On February 7-8, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Future of Chemical Disarmament in an Eroding Global Order.” This workshop brought together over 100 participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities from nine countries and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The workshop aimed to examine: (1) the transformation of OPCW from an organization whose current primary mission is to verify and monitor the destruction of declared chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles to one that is focused on preventing their re-emergence and (2) the fate of multilateral arms control regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and multilateralism in an eroding global order.”

The workshop summary, which includes discussion of key takeaways and highlights from each panel, as well as the annotated bibliography for this workshop (both of which Biodefense PhD student Danyale Kellogg helped prepare) are available on CGSR’s website.

“A Short History of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense”

COL Paul Kassebaum and Dr. James Dillman chronicle and discuss the history of MRICD in this piece for CBNW, writing in part “Since 1917, U.S. Army scientists have developed medical solutions for chemical threats. That legacy is carried on today by the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (MRICD) at Aberdeen Proving Ground-South in Edgewood, Maryland. MRICD traces its origins to components of the Army Medical Department responsible for defense against chemical weapons during World War I. In October 1922, the Medical Research Division was organized at Edgewood Arsenal to study the pharmacological actions of chemical threat agents, to develop treatments for exposed casualties, and to provide the information generated to Army Medical Corps personnel. During this period, Edgewood Arsenal became the center for chemical defense research, development, and testing operations.”

“There’s a ‘ChatGPT’ for biology. What could go wrong?”

Sean Ekins, Filippa Lentzos, Max Brackmann, and Cédric Invernizzi tackle the security issues posed by models like ProtGPT2 and ProGen in this piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, explaining “In recent months ChatGPT and other AI chatbots with uncanny abilities to respond to prompts with fluid, human-like writing have unleashed torrents of angst flowing from different quarters of society; the chatbots could help students cheat, encroach on jobs, or mass produce disinformation. Outside of the spotlight shining on the chatbots, researchers in the life sciences have also been rolling out similar artificial intelligence-driven technology, but to much less fanfare. That’s concerning, because new algorithms for protein design, while potentially advancing the ability to fight disease, may also create significant opportunities for misuse.”

“As biotech production processes are evolving to make it easier for creators to make the synthetic DNA and other products they’ve designed, new AI models like ProtGPT2 and ProGen will allow researchers to conceive of a far greater range of molecules and proteins than ever. Nature took millions of years to design proteins. AI can generate meaningful protein sequences in seconds. While there are good reasons to develop AI technology for biological design, there are also risks to such efforts that scientists in the field don’t appear to have weighed. AI could be used to design new bioweapons or toxins that can’t be detected. As these systems develop alongside new easier, cheaper, and faster production capabilities, scientists should talk to and learn from peers who focus on biosecurity risks.”

“The Biorisk Management Casebook: Insights into Contemporary Practices”

New from Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation: “Stanford University’s Bio Policy & Leadership in Society Initiative (Bio.Polis), in collaboration with the Program on Science, Technology & Society at the Harvard Kennedy School and with support from the Global Biological Policy and Programs team at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI | bio), is pleased to announce the launch of The Biorisk Management Casebook: Insights into Contemporary Practices. The Casebook and the accompanying Biorisk Management Case Study Collection gathers and analyzes how biorisk management is practiced in diverse life science organizations across the research lifecycle.”

“As life science research matures globally, it is also vital to mature the management of biosafety and biosecurity risks that can accompany discovery and innovation. In this context generalized frameworks for biorisk management have been developed alongside guidance documents. However, the breadth of risks and the diversity of organizations supporting research pose challenges to the continued development, adaptation, and implementation of these frameworks. In addition, organizations lack access to concrete examples of how frameworks are or have been implemented in practice, hindering their ability to learn from one another. “

“How Russia Turned America’s Helping Hand to Ukraine Into a Vast Lie”

This piece by the Washington Post Editorial Board discusses Russia’s ongoing disinformation efforts, building on previous reporting on social media policing in authoritarian regimes. The authors write, “Disinformation is not just “fake news” or propaganda but an insidious contamination of the world’s conversations. And it is exploding.”

They continue on to explain the origin of the United States’ bio collaborations with Ukraine and Georgia, writing “The agreement with Ukraine grew out of the 1992 Nunn-Lugar legislation, sponsored by Mr. Lugar and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) to clean up the Cold War legacy of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union, an effort that became known as Cooperative Threat Reduction. In the 1990s, thousands of nuclear warheads and missiles were liquidated, followed by vast stocks of chemical weapons. Later, the Nunn-Lugar program expanded into reducing biological threats in Russian laboratories, as well as other former Soviet republics. Among other efforts, a public health reference laboratory — named the Lugar Center — was opened in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 2011. Pathogens stored in a Soviet-era research institute in the center of Tbilisi were moved to a purpose-built, secure facility.”

They explain the periodic attacks these programs have faced from Russia, describing the “firehose of falsehoods” aimed at them. At the end of this very detailed retelling of these long-standing efforts, they conclude “Open societies are vulnerable because they are open. The asymmetries in favor of malign use of information are sizable. Democracies must find a way to adapt. The dark actors morph constantly, so the response needs to be systematic and resilient.”

“In a world that connects billions of people at a flash, the truth may have only a fighting chance against organized lying. As an old saying has it: “A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes.”’

What We’re Watching and Listening To 🍿🎧

The CommonHealth 

Check out this new podcast from the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security: “On The CommonHealth, hosts J. Stephen Morrison, Katherine Bliss, and Andrew Schwartz delve deeply into the  puzzle that connects pandemic preparedness and response, HIV/AIDS, routine immunization, and primary care, areas of huge import to human and national security. The CommonHealth replaces under a single podcast the Coronavirus Crisis Update, Pandemic Planet and AIDS Existential Moment.”

Current episodes include interviews with Sherly Gay Stolberg and Dr. Raquel Bono covering different topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Biodefense MS student Sophie Hirshfield, a current CSIS intern, also helped create this podcast!

SIPRI Launches Video Series on Biosecurity Risks and Emerging Technology

From the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: “SIPRI is pleased to launch a new video series that explores biosecurity risks linked to emerging technologies and considers how these risks can be addressed. The series features international experts from the research fields of genetics, bioethics, international affairs and microbiology.”

“The interviews were conducted during an expert workshop in Stockholm in January 2023 on risk at the intersection of biological science and technological developments. The workshop and this video series are part of SIPRI’s work to develop a toolkit for biorisk assessment, targeting academics and researchers in the life sciences. This work, undertaken with support from the British Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, examines dual-use technologies that have implications for the proliferation, development and use of biological weapons. The series gives a voice to key stakeholders in the field, working towards a mutual understanding of the challenges affecting the convergence of biotechnology and emerging technologies.”

The Kremlin’s Bioweapons Lies

This YouTube short from the US Department of State’s Share America channel offers a succinct overview of Russia’s false BW claims and the threats this poses to legitimate, peaceful scientific collaboration globally.

Lessons From the COVID War: An Investigative Report

Beyond the Pandemic: Addressing Attacks on Researchers and Health Professionals

From the National Academies: “Last fall, the Committee on Human Rights (CHR) held a webcast series, Silencing Scientists and Health Workers during the Pandemic, which examined threats and attacks against science and health professionals connected to their work to combat the spread of COVID-19, as well as related implications for internationally-protected human rights.”

“On April 11 (3:00-4:15 pm ET), the CHR will host a webcast to mark the launch of the webcast series’ Proceedings-in Brief.  This event will gather experts to explore practical steps that scientists, researchers, and health professionals are taking to protect themselves and their colleagues from targeting—including violence, harassment, and other attacks.”

Learn more and register here.

Nobel Prize Summit-Truth, Trust and Hope

Taking place May 24-26 this year in DC and virtually, this Nobel Prize Summit asks “How can we build trust in truth, facts and scientific evidence so that we can create a hopeful future for all?”

“Misinformation is eroding our trust in science and runs the risk of becoming one of the greatest threats to our society today.”

“Join us at this years’ Nobel Prize Summit which brings together laureates, leading experts and you in a conversation on how we can combat misinformation, restore trust in science and create a hopeful future.”

Learn more and register here.

Gordon Research Conference: Cross-Cutting Science Facilitating Collaboration Across the Threat-Science Research Community

“The Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Disarmament Science GRC is a premier, international scientific conference focused on advancing the frontiers of science through the presentation of cutting-edge and unpublished research, prioritizing time for discussion after each talk and fostering informal interactions among scientists of all career stages. The conference program includes a diverse range of speakers and discussion leaders from institutions and organizations worldwide, concentrating on the latest developments in the field. The conference is five days long and held in a remote location to increase the sense of camaraderie and create scientific communities, with lasting collaborations and friendships. In addition to premier talks, the conference has designated time for poster sessions from individuals of all career stages, and afternoon free time and communal meals allow for informal networking opportunities with leaders in the field.”

This conference will take place July 9-14 in Ventura, CA. Learn more and register here.

Call for Papers: “Training Programmes To Counter Current And Emerging Biological And Chemical Proliferation Risks: Themes, Practices, And Lessons Learnt”

From the Journal of Strategic Trade Control: “The purpose of this call for papers is to facilitate inter-disciplinary exchange regarding the implementation of training to counter emerging chemical and biological proliferation challenges. In particular, the call welcomes contributions in the form of JOSTC articles on the processes, mechanisms, and tools for creating awareness of the following topics:

– Cross-border movement (e.g. transport, shipment) of chemical and biological materials and equipment.
– Cross-border movement of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
– Trade in sensitive and dual-use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and equipment.
– Strategic trade control regimes of relevance to disarmament and non-proliferation.
– Information security, data sharing, and cybersecurity challenges to CBRN non-proliferation.
– Due diligence and risk management initiatives to safeguard global supply chains against misuse and diversion.

Information about this call is available on the JoSTC webpage and the full description of the call can be accessed here. The deadline for paper submission is 2 October 2023.”

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: “This well-known Irish-born American cook is thought to have infected as many as 122 people with typhoid fever and was the first person in the US identified as an asymptomatic carrier of the bacteria that cause the disease-Salmonella typhi. What was her legal name?”

Shout out to Georgios P. for correctly answering last week’s trivia. Our question was: “Before the infamous sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, Aum Shinrikyo attempted to use biological weapons. In July 1993, what agent did the cult attempt to spread from a cooling tower on the roof of their headquarters?” The answer is B. anthracis.

Happy Spring! Lest our readers in the northern hemisphere enjoy the added sunshine too much, this edition of the Pandora Report focuses heavily on a new report that suggests China CDC failed to disclose information connecting raccoon dogs to the initial outbreak of COVID-19 at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, potentially covering up critical evidence in understanding the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. We also tackle the signing of the COVID-19 Origins Act of 2023 into law, the continued discussion about biosecurity oversight, the Biden administration’s release of biotechnology and biomanufacturing goal documents, and the 28th anniversary of the Tokyo subway sarin attacks.

US Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Goals and Priorities Released

This week, in response to President Biden’s September Executive Order, the administration announced the release of three new documents: Harnessing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Research and Development (R&D) to Further Societal Goals; U.S. Department of Defense Biomanufacturing Strategy; and Developing a National Measure of the Economic Contributions of the Bioeconomy. According to the White House, the first is a report from the Office of Science and Technology Policy that outlines “a vision for what is possible with the power of biotechnology and biomanufacturing, and R&D needs to achieve this ambitious vision.”

In addition to these documents, “Other deliverables from the Executive Order are in development, including: a plan to expand training and education opportunities for the biotechnology and biomanufacturing workforce, a report on data needs for the bioeconomy, a national strategy for expanding domestic biomanufacturing capacity, actions to improve biotechnology regulation clarity and efficiency, and a plan for strengthening and innovating biosafety and biosecurity for the bioeconomy.”

COVID-19 Origins…More Politics, Some New Evidence

Raccoon Dogs Linked to Outbreak at Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market

This week, a researchers, including the Schar School’s Dr. Saskia Popescu, released a report on Zenodo titled “Genetic evidence of susceptible wildlife in SARS-CoV-2 positive samples at the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market, Wuhan: Analysis and interpretation of data released by the Chinese Center for Disease Control”. Nature discusses key findings of the report, writing “Particularly notable was the raccoon-dog mitochondrial DNA found in six samples from two stalls. These small fox-like animals are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, and can spread the infection to other raccoon dogs without showing clear signs of sickness. Raccoon dogs and masked palm civets have also been found with infections of viruses that are almost identical to the one that causes severe acute respiratory syndrome, which is related to SARS-CoV-2 and caused an outbreak in people in 2003. And work in palm-civet cells indicates that the creatures could possibly become infected with SARS-CoV-2.”

“The researchers were looking for evidence of mammals, which could have been intermediate hosts of the virus. They identified near-complete mitochondrial-DNA sequences — each some 16,000 base pairs long — for five species, including raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonoides), Malayan porcupine (Hystrix brachyura), Amur hedgehog (Erinaceus amurensis), masked palm civet (Paguma larvata) and hoary bamboo rat (Rhizomys pruinosus)…”

Furthermore, in their forward, the authors discuss their discovery of data posted publicly on the GISAID database corresponding to sequences from environmental samples collected at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan. Though metadata suggests this data was posted in June 2022, it was not made publicly available until recently. According to the report, “We downloaded the public data to search for genetic sequences from non-human animals, which the CCDC did not identify in their February 2022 preprint. The preprint also posited that all SARS-CoV-2-positive samples in the market were the result of human infections, claiming that the market was a site of amplification of an already widespread epidemic. We and others therefore had urgently requested release of the data. The potential for analysis of samples for animal DNA had also been recommended in the mission report of the World Health Organization (WHO)-convened global study of origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part, released March 2021.”

The researchers later explain “Once the data were identified on GISAID, it became possible to test the veracity of these claims. We found information that was critical to understanding the nature of the origins of the human infections at the Huanan market, as this was the early epicenter of SARS-CoV-2 spread and was likely where spillover occurred and sustained human-to-human transmission was established.”

They continue “Our analysis of these data found that genetic evidence of multiple animal species was present in locations of the market where SARS-CoV-2 positive environmental samples had been collected. This includes raccoon dogs, which are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2
infection and shed sufficient virus to transmit to other species. However, this also included other mammalian species that require consideration as possible intermediate hosts of SARS CoV-2. Although live mammals had previously been observed at Huanan market in late 2019, their exact locations were not conclusively known, and some of the animal species we identify in the report below were not included in the list of live or dead animals tested at the Huanan market, as reported in the 2021 WHO-China joint report on the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results show that they were present. In some cases, the amount of animal genetic material was greater than the amount of human genetic material, consistent with the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in these samples being due to animal infections.”

They then detail their attempts to inform an author of the Gao et al. preprint about the data and later accusations that they had violated GISAID’s terms of use. They then notified the WHO of their preliminary findings, at which point SAGO convened a meeting with some of these researchers and scientists from China CDC. SAGO explained in their statement that “The presentations from China CDC and invited international researchers indicated that there were newly available data from the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. This included metagenomic data of environmental samples from various stalls and wastewater collection sites collected as early as January 2020. Analyses of these data suggest that apart from SARS-CoV-2 sequences, some samples also contained human DNA, as well as mitochondrial DNA of several animal species, including some that are known to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. This included DNA from wild raccoon dogs, Malaysian porcupine, and bamboo rats among others, in SARS-CoV-2 positive environmental samples.”

Importantly, the statement explains “The findings suggest that animals were present at the market shortly before the market had been cleared on 1 January 2020, as part of the public health measures by Chinese authorities. These results provide potential leads to identifying intermediate hosts of SARS-CoV-2 and potential sources of human infections in the market.”

While GISAID allegedly made the data unavailable to the researchers because it is the basis for an update to an existing Liu et al. 2022 preprint that is in the process of being re-submitted for publication by China CDC, this presents a troubling twist in the COVID-19 origin saga. This information sat in GISAID hidden for the better part of a year, and was made unavailable when scientists outside China CDC sought to analyze it, even though they contacted the initial authors and requested to collaborate.

Among the abundant discussion this has brought has been outrage directed at the PRC for failing disclose this data. The WHO itself expressed concern, with Director-General Tedros saying “These data do not provide a definitive answer to the question of how the pandemic began, but every piece of data is important in moving us closer to that answer…And every piece of data relating to studying the origins of COVID-19 needs to be shared with the international community immediately.”

When asked in an interview why these data were not made available sooner, Maria Van Kerkhove (technical lead of the WHO’s COVID-19 response), said “That is the question. Why weren’t these data shared and analyzed with Chinese scientists? We have been calling for any and all data to be made available. Clearly there is more data that is out there. What is not clear is what else is out there,” adding another layer of concern in this ongoing search for the pandemic’s origin.

COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023 Signed by President Biden

Of course, concerns about lack of transparency regarding the COVID-19 pandemic are nothing new in the Beltway, as was further demonstrated this week. This Monday, President Biden signed a bill into law directing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to declassify certain information about COVID-19’s origin. President Biden said in a statement “We need to get to the bottom of COVID-19’s origins to help ensure we can better prevent future pandemics.  My Administration will continue to review all classified information relating to COVID–19’s origins, including potential links to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  In implementing this legislation, my Administration will declassify and share as much of that information as possible, consistent with my constitutional authority to protect against the disclosure of information that would harm national security.”

The bill indicates the information must be released within 90 days of being signed into law, and it covers information like names, symptoms, and roles of any researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology who became ill in the fall of 2019. The House passed the bill in a 419-0 vote following the Senate’s unanimous vote, in a rare showing of overwhelming bipartisanship. Rep. Jim Himes of Connecticut told The Washington Post the declassified information made available to the public will not be the raw transcripts from intercepted calls, but finished intelligence reports.

Biosecurity Discussion Continues

This entire saga has all brought renewed public debate over the safety of high-containment laboratories. Sam Weiss Evans and David Gillum write in STAT News, “The Covid pandemic exacerbated fear and panic regarding the potential for a future bioterrorism agent. As the lab leak theory continues to cause debate, politicians want to be able to tell their constituents that they are solving the problem by adding more oversight to biological research. But if all they are doing is adding more burden, bureaucracy, and box-checking, is it really making anyone more secure?”

“…governance systems are increasingly not up to the task of managing biosecurity risks. States, industry, and academia have been too focused on the technical frontiers in biotechnology, heralding cheaper, more efficient, and more sophisticated tools to conduct biological research, but not putting the same degree of curiosity or funding into how we might direct these advances in ways that protect the vulnerable and prevent catastrophe. Scientific advances such as CRISPR, gene drives, synthetic viruses, and increased pathogen capabilities, are rapidly proceeding while innovation in our collective ability to govern their security concerns is not.”

While the debate over the lab leak hypothesis has been politically charged from the start, there are broader biosecurity concerns that do deserve increased attention, as highlighted by the Global BioLabs project in its latest report-Global BioLabs Report 2023. Newsweek covered this report this week, writing in part ‘”We urgently need coordinated international action to address increasing bio-risks,” Gregory Koblentz, an author of the report with the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, said in a statement.”

Science summarizes much of the concern in their discussion of the report, writing “Concerns about an increasing number of BSL-4 and BSL-3 labs aren’t new, but they have grown since the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic began in 2019. One hypothesis is that the virus came from a lab. And many countries, particularly those building their first BSL-4 labs, lack strong policies and methods to monitor such labs, the report says. Only Canada has legislation overseeing all experiments, even those with no government funding, that are considered “dual use” because the results could potentially be used to cause harm.”

28th Anniversary of Tokyo Subway Attacks

The 28th anniversary of the Tokyo sarin attacks passed this week, marking nearly three decades since the horror unleashed by Aum Shinrikyo in March 1995. The cult staged five coordinated attacks on three lines of the Teito Rapid Transit Authority at rush hour near the Diet headquarters, killing 13, seriously injuring 50, and harming over 5,000 others. Some of those severely injured did later die as well. NHK, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, notes “Japan’s Public Security Intelligence Agency notes that successor groups of the cult are still active. It says a group known as Aleph is actively recruiting young people by concealing its name.”

“Infectious Disease as a Security Threat: A Mental Framework for Future Emergency Preparedness”

Biodefense PhD Student Ryan Houser recently published this article in the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: “The emergence of COVID-19 pandemic has had significant impacts on human lives as well as economic and social stability. The United States has a complicated history with biosecurity. The September 11th terror attacks uncovered various weaknesses in the national biosecurity infrastructure that have persisted into the current pandemic. This study explores the implications of framing the infectious disease biothreat as a security threat to improve our capabilities while protecting against the potential accelerated threat of bioterrorism in the post-COVID-19 era. To counter the increasing biothreats, the United States must invest in revamping the biodefense infrastructure to increase our resilience to various biothreats.”

“The BWC Ninth Review Conference: An Overview of Outcomes, Outlooks, and National Implementation”

Read this new report from VERTIC here: “2022 saw an important milestone for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), as it marked fifty years since its opening for signature. Since then, every five years, approximately, States Parties have convened for a Review Conference of the Convention. The Ninth Review Conference was held in the final quarter of 2022, amidst an international security landscape with a new set of challenges and priorities.”

“Upon the BWC’s entry into force in 1975, the UK’s then-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs noted that States Parties to the Convention “have both renounced this entire class of weapons and undertaken to prevent their future development, by appropriate national measures”.1 His statement highlights the essential nature of national measures to achieve the Convention’s ultimate goal of banning biological weapons. Following the conclusion of the Review Conference it is timely to take stock of the progress, challenges, and ways forward for national implementation of the BWC; a topic that VERTIC have been working on for over twenty years.2 This Brief will do so in two parts: Part I provides a consideration of the outcomes and outlook of the Ninth Review Conference; Part II examines the coverage of national implementation at the Conference and, ultimately, provides a series of recommendations for strengthening national implementation during the next review cycle of the Convention.”

“OK, But Where Will the Next Pandemic Come From?”

Angela Kane and Jaime Yassif discuss the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Joint Assessment Mechanism in this opinion piece for The Hill. They write “While the politics surrounding an outbreak cannot be ignored, the international community needs to get better at conducting evidence-based assessments of pandemic origins, in order to minimize and deflect the most polarizing voices in favor of objective scientific analysis. Nearly 7 million deaths from COVID-19 worldwide prove the stakes are high.”

“To address this need, the Nuclear Threat Initiative is working with international partners to establish a new Joint Assessment Mechanism (JAM) which would fill a significant gap in the international community’s ability to discern the source of high-consequence biological events of unknown origin. Its mandate would be to establish the facts — specifically, whether the event emerged naturally or was accidentally or deliberately released from an academic, commercial or government laboratory.”

“Avian Flu in Cambodia”

Rick A. Bright discusses the H5N1 outbreak in Cambodia and what it tells us about the importance of global surveillance and collaboration for Think Global Health, writing “As human and bird interactions increase, however, the likelihood of zoonotic transmission grows. The first confirmed bird-to-human transmission of these viruses occurred in Hong Kong in 1997, though seroprevalence studies in the same region suggest a substantial number of mild or asymptomatic infections among people who work closely with poultry. In Cambodia, where highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses have been detected in wild birds since 2003, fifty-eight cases of human infection and thirty-eight deaths have been documented, a fatality rate of 66 percent. The February cases are the first since 2014.”

“It used to take months to identify the pathogen, conduct genomic analytics, perform contact tracing, and alert the world of a potential outbreak of concern — but enhanced global surveillance capabilities, new genomic sequencing technologies, and real-time data sharing in publicly accessible databases have changed all that. This time, scientists at the Institute Pasteur Cambodia (IPC) and Cambodia’s National Institute of Public Health were able to share their findings globally within twenty-four hours of collecting the first clinical specimen. They quickly tempered concerns by confirming that virus collected from one of the patients, an eleven-year-old girl, was from a group of influenza viruses endemic in birds in the region and thus likely to have been transmitted without a human intermediary.”

“The Polarized Pandemic”

David P. Fidler breaks down the history of politicized health crises and how COVID-19 is likely to be remembered for Think Global Health, writing “The turmoil caused by COVID-19’s emergence and global spread triggered a tsunami of analyses on what went wrong and how the United States and other countries should transform policies on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. This series on U.S. foreign policy and global health participates in this effort at diagnosis and prescription. Synthesizing such commentary proves difficult, if not foolhardy, and the question of how the COVID-19 pandemic will be described in the future cannot be definitively answered today. Some themes, however, suggest that COVID-19 will be remembered as the polarized pandemic that cast a divisive shadow on U.S. public health, domestic politics, and foreign policy.”

“The Real Horrors of ‘The Last of Us’ May Already Be Here”

Erik English merges the post-apocalyptic fantasy world with real life in this piece for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the deeper story the video game and new HBO drama tells, writing “The show, based on the beloved video game from 2013, is split into two levels. In the foreground, it is a fairly conservative story of survivalism and kinship. In the background, it is telling a different story about the failure of institutions during crises, the breaking of the social contract amid a turn towards authoritarianism, and the tradeoffs between utilitarianism and individual justice.”

“U.S. Companies Must Stop Enabling Mass DNA Collection in Tibet”

Columnist Josh Rogin discusses an alarming trend in data collection for The Washington Post, writing “There is overwhelming evidence that Chinese authorities are using mass forced DNA collection in many parts of China — but Tibet is an especially cruel case. Human rights groups report that police are taking blood samples from men, women and children , with no legitimate justification , in all seven prefectures in the Tibetan autonomous region, often showing up at kindergartens. There’s zero indication Tibetans can refuse.”

“Drug Discovery Efforts at George Mason University”

Andalibi et al. discuss research at GMU in this article in SLAS Discovery, writing in their abstract: “With over 39,000 students, and research expenditures in excess of $200 million, George Mason University (GMU) is the largest R1 (Carnegie Classification of very high research activity) university in Virginia. Mason scientists have been involved in the discovery and development of novel diagnostics and therapeutics in areas as diverse as infectious diseases and cancer. Below are highlights of the efforts being led by Mason researchers in the drug discovery arena.”

“To enable targeted cellular delivery, and non-biomedical applications, Veneziano and colleagues have developed a synthesis strategy that enables the design of self-assembling DNA nanoparticles (DNA origami) with prescribed shape and size in the 10 to 100 nm range. The nanoparticles can be loaded with molecules of interest such as drugs, proteins and peptides, and are a promising new addition to the drug delivery platforms currently in use. The investigators also recently used the DNA origami nanoparticles to fine tune the spatial presentation of immunogens to study the impact on B cell activation. These studies are an important step towards the rational design of vaccines for a variety of infectious agents.”

“To elucidate the parameters for optimizing the delivery efficiency of lipid nanoparticles (LNPs), Buschmann, Paige and colleagues have devised methods for predicting and experimentally validating the pKa of LNPs based on the structure of the ionizable lipids used to formulate the LNPs. These studies may pave the way for the development of new LNP delivery vehicles that have reduced systemic distribution and improved endosomal release of their cargo post administration.”

“To better understand protein-protein interactions and identify potential drug targets that disrupt such interactions, Luchini and colleagues have developed a methodology that identifies contact points between proteins using small molecule dyes. The dye molecules noncovalently bind to the accessible surfaces of a protein complex with very high affinity, but are excluded from contact regions. When the complex is denatured and digested with trypsin, the exposed regions covered by the dye do not get cleaved by the enzyme, whereas the contact points are digested. The resulting fragments can then be identified using mass spectrometry. The data generated can serve as the basis for designing small molecules and peptides that can disrupt the formation of protein complexes involved in disease processes. For example, using peptides based on the interleukin 1 receptor accessory protein (IL-1RAcP), Luchini, Liotta, Paige and colleagues disrupted the formation of IL-1/IL-R/IL-1RAcP complex and demonstrated that the inhibition of complex formation reduced the inflammatory response to IL-1B.”

“Working on the discovery of novel antimicrobial agents, Bishop, van Hoek and colleagues have discovered a number of antimicrobial peptides from reptiles and other species. DRGN-1, is a synthetic peptide based on a histone H1-derived peptide that they had identified from Komodo Dragon plasma. DRGN-1 was shown to disrupt bacterial biofilms and promote wound healing in an animal model. The peptide, along with others, is being developed and tested in preclinical studies. Other research by van Hoek and colleagues focuses on in silico antimicrobial peptide discovery, screening of small molecules for antibacterial properties, as well as assessment of diffusible signal factors (DFS) as future therapeutics.”

“The above examples provide insight into the cutting-edge studies undertaken by GMU scientists to develop novel methodologies and platform technologies important to drug discovery.”

Women at the OPCW

From the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: “In this one-hour panel discussion, we will speak to four women leaders at OPCW on the importance of embedding gender equity and diversity in the culture of an organisation.”

“Starting with opening remarks by the OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, an International Gender Champion, to set the stage on how important it is to have people of diverse backgrounds in roles at all levels, including leadership, in furthering the mandate of OPCW. We will join our panelists to discuss their personal leadership journeys, learning experience, and advice on how to promote diversity and inclusion in a leadership role. There will be time for questions and answers at the event of the event.”

Learn more and register here. This event will take place on March 27 at 10 am EST.

Navigating Infodemics and Building Trust During Public Health Emergencies

“The National Academies will convene a virtual public workshop, April 10-11, to examine the history of public health infodemics, the impact of infodemics on trust in the public health enterprise, and tools and practices to address infodemics. This workshop builds upon a previous National Academies workshop on Building Trust in Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Science, and will go beyond what is known about risk and crisis communications to generate actionable, targeted insights that federal state, tribal, local, and territorial agencies and officials can take to prevent and respond to infodemics.”

Learn more and register here.

ICYMI- Webinar: Global Biolabs 2023 Report on Laboratories Handling the World’s Most Dangerous Pathogens

Watch the recording for this event here.

“On March 17, 2023, the Global Biolabs Initiative launched its latest report, Global BioLabs 2023, and released updates to its interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs.

With the global expansion of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, where the world’s most dangerous pathogens are studied, gaps in biosecurity and biosafety governance are widening. Since its inception in 2021, the Global Biolabs Initiative has tracked the proliferation of the highest containment labs, identified several key trends in their construction and operation, developed biorisk management scorecards to measure how well countries are governing biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research, and mapped the global biorisk management architecture.

The pace of BSL4/BSL3+ labs expansion is outpacing current biosafety and biosecurity regulations, and coordinated international action is needed to address increasing biorisks. In this webinar, Dr Filippa Lentzos, King’s College London, and Dr Gregory Koblentz, George Mason University, present the Global BioLabs 2023 report, describe key trends, and discuss recommendations for strengthening global biorisk management. The event also featured a demonstration of the interactive map.

In 2022, the Global Biolabs initiative partnered with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to relaunch the interactive map of BSL4 and BSL3+ labs, which can be viewed here: https://thebulletin.org/global-biolabs/

Read the report and find more information about the Global Biolabs Initiative here: https://www.globalbiolabs.org/“

ICYMI- Cyberbiosecurity: The New Frontier of Counterproliferation

“On December 6, 2022, CRDF Global hosted a webinar titled “Cyberbiosecurity: The New Frontier of Counterproliferation.” The two-hour panel session featured cyberbiosecurity experts Randall Murch and Dr. Gemma Bowsher. Murch is a research lead for cyberbiosecurity at the Virginia Technical Institute and has been credited for the creation of the term “cyberbiosecurity.” Dr. Bowsher is a research associate and co-lead for Health Intelligence and Biosecurity at the Conflict and Health Research Group at King’s College London. Biorisk management expert Dr. Lora Grainger and Nathan Gwira, CRDF Global’s cybersecurity technical specialist, acted as moderators. Biosecurity Deputy Program Manager Urszula Velez was the logistics support leader for the event.”

Learn more and watch this event’s recording here.

Apply for the 2023 Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship

“The global norm against biological weapons cannot be maintained without youth voices  being  included  in the multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Youth perspectives are key to create innovative solutions and generate long-term engagement. There are particular benefits to including the perspectives of young people from developing countries, where most of the world’s youth is concentrated.”

“Organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva in partnership with key international actors empowering youth in science diplomacy and global biosecurity, the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship provides a unique learning and networking experience into multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva.”

“Launched in 2019 as a Biosecurity Diplomacy Workshop, the Youth for Biosecurity Initiative is for the first time in 2023 providing the opportunity for 15 young scientists from the Global South to join an online interactive training programme prior to a field visit during the meeting of the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention in Geneva.”

Learn more and apply here by March 29.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). Our question this week is: “Before the infamous sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, Aum Shinrikyo attempted to use biological weapons. In July 1993, what agent did the cult attempt to spread from a cooling tower on the roof of their headquarters?”

Last week, our question was: “The Ides of March may have already passed, but this week’s question is still focused on classical antiquity: In about 129 BC, Manius Aquillius, a senator and consul, is thought to have ended an ongoing war in the Roman province of Asia by doing what to rebellious cities?” Florus describes in Epitome of Roman History how the notoriously brutal Aquillius poisoned the water supplies of several rebellious cities throughout Asia, including Pergamum. He wasn’t the only one to suffer, though! Adrienne Mayor, author of Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs, details in The Poison King: The Life and Legend of Mithridates how Aquillius was subjected to “a diabolical last meal for a glutton for gold”–execution by molten gold.

If you recall, a couple weeks ago we asked a trivia question about the murder of Georgi Markov, who reportedly was poisoned by a man who used a modified umbrella to push a pellet containing ricin into his leg. The Guardian recently covered a new Danish documentary on the life of Markov and the events that led to his death that can be accessed here.