Tag: WHO

Happy Friday! This week focuses heavily on China and Russia, covering the recent ProPublica piece on the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Shanghai’s lockdown, Russia’s failed attempt at creating a UN Security Council committee to investigate its false claims about supposed US biological weapons facilities in Ukraine, and more. We also cover new publications, a new podcast release from the University of Bath’s Dr. Brett Edwards, upcoming events, and an exciting fellowship opportunity from the WHO.

About That ProPublica Piece

Late last week, ProPublica and Vanity Fair released a piece in conjunction with the Senate HELP Committee minority’s interim report, claiming to have unveiled new information from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) supporting the lab leak theory of COVID-19’s origin. In it, Katherine Eban and Jeff Kao rely heavily on the work of a single self-proclaimed polyglottal State Department political officer to translate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) “party speak,” which he claims native speakers “can’t really follow…” Now, the piece some have described as a train wreck is being heavily criticized for having faulty translations, mis-matched dates, misrepresenting the sources of the documents discussed in it, not understanding how common VPN usage is in China-related research, and more. ProPublica is reportedly scrambling to review critical details of their piece, but is it too late? Let’s talk about some core issues with the article and what they might mean long term.

‘Party Speak’ or Just Lost in Translation?

The first half of the ProPublica piece is dominated by glowing discussion of Toy Reid, a former RAND Corporation employee and East Asia political officer at the US Department of State, covering his blue collar origins and attendance at Harvard. The authors then discuss how Reid spent over a year working for the Senate HELP Committee, using a VPN to search “dispatches” on the WIV’s website from Hart Senate Office Building and his Florida home. They write, “These dispatches remain on the internet, but their meaning can’t be unlocked by just anyone. Using his hard-earned expertise, Reid believes he unearthed secrets that were hiding in plain sight.”

Plain sight is right! These “dispatches” were updates posted to the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s (WIV) homepage on the general news tab. In fact, you can go look through this whole tab here to see mundane entries ranging from a recent day reflecting on the 20th National Congress to a July post about WIV celebrating the 101st anniversary of the Party, to general updates about different trainings and publications related to the institute. Therein lies one of the fundamental problems with this piece-these were not secretive dispatches internal to the Party. These are essentially press releases meant to face outward. Yes, they are laden with mentions of comrades, references to struggles and frontlines, and key Chinese leaders, including Xi Jinping and the recently ousted Li Keqiang. They are, after all, written by Party members in a major facility of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. They are going to have this kind of language by default, especially around times like national congresses and major anniversaries.

To be clear, the CCP does use euphemisms and round-about language at times to describe high-level concepts and goals. In fact, some scholars spend the bulk of their careers conducting political discourse analysis and understanding leaders’ officialease or government-speak. Some do focus on CCP party speak, which has become especially interesting in the Xi years. However, this is definitely not unique to the CCP as one can find scholars dissecting and analyzing any number of world leaders’ speeches and government lexicons. It is also important to recognize that this concept is not some niche or extremely esoteric concept known only to a few in China watching circles. Students studying Chinese politics overwhelmingly have to learn things like “crossing the river by touching the stones” or “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as a Chinese-specific form of Marxism-Leninism throughout the periods of Dengism, Three Represents, Scientific Outlook on Development, and now Xi Jinping Thought. It it core to understanding national agendas throughout different leadership periods.

However, with this comes the understanding that Party documents are laden with this kind of jargon and narrative furthering. This also is not unique to the CCP. In fact, Harry Hodgkinson wrote an entire guide in 1955 on Soviet jargon and unique meanings Communist parties give to particularly terms. While this jargon and overarching nationalistic narratives offer important context for the WIV posts, they do not represent some in-between-the-lines version of Chinese that “even native Mandarin speakers can’t really follow…” Rather, they help explain why the language in the posts seems so dramatic and nationalistic.

What’s in a Narrative?

In October 1949, Mao Zedong declared the official founding of the People’s Republic of China. With Chiang Kai-shek and the remainder of the KMT exiled to the island of Taiwan and the decades long civil war over, Mao was left to figure out how to actually lead the new PRC. Central to this were narratives of overcoming the century of humiliation, protecting the sovereignty and integrity of Chinese territory, bringing justice for China against those who subjugated it, and building a strong, advanced country. These ideas were central to nationalism at the time and drove pushes to modernize like the infamous Great Leap Forward. As Dr. Kerry Brown of King’s College London writes, “That self-designated task of bringing about justice for China was the main justification for the Party’s many mistakes under Mao when the second resolution on its own history was produced a few years after his death in 1981.” Themes of struggle against western imperial powers and self-determination were critical political tools wielded by the Party, even in the face of wildly unpopular, destructive policies.

Though it looks different today, narratives of national struggle and rejuvenation are still important features of CCP rhetoric, even for Party members at a CAS laboratory. Brown discusses the power of narrative in modern China, writing, “For the current dominant leader Xi Jinping, the notion that the Party is a kind of epistemic community, one uniquely placed to carry China forwards to the fulfilment of its great quest for a just outcome to history, is becoming more powerful by the day.  Seen in these terms, the Party is not so much about power per se – but power to deliver this historic outcome. That perhaps explains why, despite the many challenges and problems with its practice and its own history, it still remains so dominant in China.” Today, concepts like the Chinese dream, national rejuvenation, and the goal of becoming fully modernized by 2049 are central themes Party rhetoric uses, even in discussing day-to-day work at different lower-level organizations.

In the context of the Wuhan Institute of Virology posts, this is seen in the framing of work at the lab as some kind of grand struggle. In one of the first WIV posts referenced by ProPublica and Vanity Fair (available here in its original format), the authors claim to have found a dispatch that “…referenced inhumane working conditions and “hidden safety dangers.” On Nov. 12 of that year, a dispatch by party branch members at the BSL-4 laboratory appeared to reference a biosecurity breach: “These viruses come without a shadow and leave without a trace.”

However, as a number of Mandarin speakers and China watchers have pointed out online, this was actually a very general post about how the facility went from humble beginnings at its founding to now being a training hub and “fighting fortress” of China’s research and public health. It is written not unlike other fictional and non-fictional works describing BSL-4 facilities in other countries (The Hot Zone, anyone?)-hours are long in these space suit-like positive pressure suits, the pathogens are unimaginably dangerous, and those doing the work are brave, hardworking, brilliant scientists.

Much of Toy Reid’s interpretation of this post depends on a misinterpretation of “每当这时” (Měi dāng zhè shí, “whenever”) in the context of a description of Party members leading by example whenever handling BSL-4 pathogens. Reid instead took this as “whenever there are biosafety breaches,” and not some inspirational statement about Party members. Other portions of the article focus on visits from Chinese Academy of Sciences officials and seminars on the importance of biosafety and commonly noted issues during safety inspections. However, these were updates about high-level visitors and general efforts to ensure the facility maintained safety standards, much like those any organization anywhere might make.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology boasts the PRC’s first BSL-4 (P4) facility, which opened in 2018, marking a major milestone for the country. A boastful post about how it came from humble beginnings but, through the work of very dedicated personnel, is now doing important, taxing work and striving to always be better is very par for the course. There is even a corny word play in the post about how Party members “infect” (Gǎnrǎn, “感染”) others with their practical actions and safety-conscious attitudes. As many have now pointed out, this is just the Party bragging about how dedicated their members are, how far the facility has come, and how personnel are constantly working to better themselves and their organization. In other words, it is furthering the Party narrative, not hinting at secret internal problems.

References throughout the posts cited by ProPublica to General Secretary Xi Jinping and his discussion of technology as a weapon make sense in the context of Party-authored news posts. Xi Jinping has achieved power unlike any previous leader, capturing himself a historic third term after the country removed presidential term limits in 2018. Xi Jinping Thought (“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”) was also formally enshrined in the Party’s constitution that year, further cementing Xi’s unique power over the Party with the CCP describing it as “Marxism of contemporary China and of the 21 century.” With this context in mind, it makes sense for Party members at WIV to frequently reference Xi and his national goals and speeches. However, Reid instead took this as literal input directly from Xi to the lab following the biosafety incident he claims a previous post references.

Finally, even if this was all true-the WIV had a 2019 biosafety incident and Xi Jinping was personally concerned enough to send an urgent message about it to WIV himself-why would any of that be posted on the institute’s website? As was just discussed, the narrative matters a lot in Chinese politics; image is everything and the Party is very secretive as a result. As the country continues to compete internationally in all areas, including the bioeconomy, it does not make sense for the Party to air dirty laundry about a supposed biosafety incident and workers’ concerns in a public space. If the core argument is that China is covering up a lab leak, the question of “Why would the Party allow the facility in question to publicly hint at mismanagement and safety issues on its own website?” must be answered.

Implications

Ultimately, bad faith takes on China, COVID-19, and biosafety hurt us all. There is a fundamental difference between calling for an in-depth investigation, holding the PRC accountable for its failures, working towards making sure we are better prepared for the next time something like this happens, and inappropriately equating mischaracterized and poorly translated press releases to some kind of damning evidence of a lab leak origin of SARS-CoV-2. The US-PRC relationship is in a very dangerous place and, while criticism of the CCP’s handling of COVID-19 is absolutely warranted, this article is likely to become political fodder for the Party. In fact, the Chinese government has already condemned the piece, claiming that it was driven by US politics.

While ProPublica claimed to have corroborated Reid’s work with unnamed “experts” on CCP communications, the swift backlash and ProPublica’s moves to reach out to other translators cast further doubt on the caliber and motivations of those consulted initially. This is in addition to concerns about the experts they claim to have consulted on the WIV’s claims about biosafety and time researchers spend in BSL-4. In the end, one can be both critical of the CCP and its practices while not resorting to an overly hawkish view that leads to finding suspicion in the mundane.

Finally, this points to a need for interdisciplinary collaboration and competent understanding of the political realities of the PRC in assessing issues like biosafety. What may look to someone with little knowledge of Chinese political discourse as alarming messages are actually pretty par for the course in terms of statements and news updates on an official website. Outside of debates on SARS-CoV-2’s origin in the scientific community, scholars in the social sciences and humanities and experts working in all sorts of fields can offer important context that, in this case, marks the difference between recognizing standard Party rhetoric and sounding alarm bells over normal updates on the WIV’s website.

For more on this, including discussions of the scientific debate about COVID-19’s origin as discussed in the Senate report and ProPublica article, check out Michael Hiltzik’s opinion piece on this article in the LA Times and Max Tani’s work in Semafor.

It’s the Happiest Place on Earth, Until You’re Stuck There-Welcome to Shanghai Disney

As China continues to cling to its zero-COVID policy, tourists at Shanghai Disney Resort now find themselves trapped in the park until they can test negative for COVID-19 amid yet another snap lockdown. South China Morning Post explains “…new variants have tested local officials’ ability to snuff out flare-ups faster than they can spread, causing much of the country to live under an ever-changing mosaic of Covid curbs.” The city announced Monday that it was going into lockdown and that visitors to the park would not be allowed to leave “until on-site testing returns a negative result.” SCMP writes, “It added that those who had visited the park since Thursday must obtain three negative Covid tests over three successive days and “avoid participating in group activities.’ The announcement came after Disney said it was “temporarily closing with immediate effect … in accordance with disease control requirements”.”

Turns Out the PRC Is Not the Only Place with Biosafety Issues

The discovery of vials labeled “smallpox” in a Merck & Co. facility near Philadelphia last year, last month’s controversy over Boston University’s NEIDL’s COVID-19 work using chimeric viruses, that time the Department of Defense accidentally mailed live anthrax spores to a US base in South Korea…the US is no stranger to biosafety issues and scares. This is the subject of a three part series of The Intercept, “Experimenting with Disaster,” focused on undisclosed biosafety incidents in the US. The first part focuses on a university lab accident, the second on work with the 1918 flu pandemic’s H1N1 virus, and the third on risky work with avian influenza. The Schar School’s Dr. Gregory Koblentz is quoted throughout the series as he provides context to the political and oversight issues surrounding these and other incidents.

Russia Fails (Again) to Garner International Sympathy for Bogus BW Claims

On Wednesday, the UN Security Council (UNSC) squashed Russia’s attempt to create a formal inquiry into its claims that the US and Ukraine are running a biological weapons program in Ukraine. Of the five permanent UNSC members, only China voted in support of Russia’s draft resolution on the measure. The US, UK, and France all voted against it while the other 10 UNSC members abstained from voting. According to the UN “Through the draft resolution, the 15-member Council would have decided to set up a commission to investigate the complaint of the Russian Federation in the context of the activities of biological laboratories in the territory of Ukraine, as well as present to the 15-member organ a report on the issue containing recommendations by 30 November 2022 and inform the States parties to the Convention at its Ninth Review Conference to be held in Geneva on 28 November–16 December 2022 of the results of the investigation.”

“The draft would also have the Council request the Secretary-General and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit provide, within their respective mandates, all necessary assistance to the commission.”

Cholera Outbreaks on the rise Globally

In case more COVID-19 variants, monkeypox, polio, and Ebola weren’t enough for you this year, the New York Times reports that a “…record number of [cholera] outbreaks have been reported after droughts, floods and wars have forced large numbers of people to live in unsanitary conditions.” So far, outbreaks have been reported in the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. NYT also explains “Cholera is typically fatal in about 3 percent of cases, but the World Health Organization says it is killing at an accelerated rate in recent outbreaks, even though it is relatively cheap and easy to treat. It is most often fatal in children, who progress swiftly to severe illness and organ failure.”

However, as case counts grow, vaccine supplies are coming up short. The WHO has already suspended its two-dose recommendation in favor of a single dose regimen that can help stretch supplies. “We have never had to make a decision like this about vaccination before, that’s the severity of this crisis,” Dr. Philippe Barboza, head of the WHO’s cholera team, said.

NYT explains part of why this is an issue, writing “The bulk of the world’s cholera vaccine is made by a South Korean company called EuBiologics. Some 15 percent of the global stockpile was produced by Shantha Biotechnics, a wholly owned Indian subsidiary of the French drugmaker Sanofi, but the company decided two years ago to stop production of its cholera vaccine by the end of this year and end supply by the end of 2023. That planned exit from the market coincides with the spike in demand…Dr. Barboza said that EuBiologics was producing at capacity and working to expand its production, and that another drugmaker would soon begin to produce the vaccine.”

“A Multinational Delphi Consensus to End the COVID-19 Public Health Threat”

Lazarus et al.’s new Nature article discusses findings of a Delphi study focused on the COVID-19 pandemic response: “Despite notable scientific and medical advances, broader political, socioeconomic and behavioural factors continue to undercut the response to the COVID-19 pandemic^1,2. Here we convened, as part of this Delphi study, a diverse, multidisciplinary panel of 386 academic, health, non-governmental organization, government and other experts in COVID-19 response from 112 countries and territories to recommend specific actions to end this persistent global threat to public health. The panel developed a set of 41 consensus statements and 57 recommendations to governments, health systems, industry and other key stakeholders across six domains: communication; health systems; vaccination; prevention; treatment and care; and inequities. In the wake of nearly three years of fragmented global and national responses, it is instructive to note that three of the highest-ranked recommendations call for the adoption of whole-of-society and whole-of-government approaches¹, while maintaining proven prevention measures using a vaccines-plus approach² that employs a range of public health and financial support measures to complement vaccination. Other recommendations with at least 99% combined agreement advise governments and other stakeholders to improve communication, rebuild public trust and engage communities³ in the management of pandemic responses. The findings of the study, which have been further endorsed by 184 organizations globally, include points of unanimous agreement, as well as six recommendations with >5% disagreement, that provide health and social policy actions to address inadequacies in the pandemic response and help to bring this public health threat to an end.”

“Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Outbreak”

New from the RAND Corporation, a volume on COVID-19 that includes chapters on the need to prioritize biosafety and biosecurity, and GOF research: “The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic that began in late 2019 and continues as of the writing of this Perspective in summer 2022 has been the cause of both tremendous tragedy—in lives lost and economic hardship—and great triumph in the rapid development of effective vaccines. Many nations around the world have scrambled to respond to a once-in-a-century event that has exposed many weaknesses in response planning and capabilities, including those of the United States. Even as the pandemic continues, it is not too early to reflect on the missteps that have been made and lessons that can be learned so that the United States and nations worldwide can be better prepared for the future.”

“This volume contains a collection of essays that explores topics of critical importance toward that aim and identifies actions that can be taken to not only improve pandemic preparedness but also help prevent the occurrence of future pandemics. The essays center on U.S. challenges and experiences, but the solutions, in many cases, require collaborative efforts that reach across national boundaries.”

“The Global Inequality in COVID-19 Vaccination Coverage Among Health and Care Workers”

Nabaggala et al. discuss COVID-19 vaccinations in HCWs in their new article in the International Journal for Equity in Health. Using WHO data, they found that “Despite being considered a priority group, more than a third of countries did not achieve 70% vaccination coverage of their HCWs at the end of 2021. Large inequities were observed with low income countries lagging behind. Additional efforts should be dedicated to ensure full protection of HCWs through vaccination.”

“Bolstering Arms Control in a Contested Geopolitical Environment”

Michael Moodie and Jerry Zhang’s recent issue brief published by the Stimson Center: “For decades, arms control has constituted one of the cornerstone frameworks for global governance and served as a critical tool for bolstering international security and stability. The global arms control regime is now under unprecedented pressure, due to heightened competition between major powers, rapidly deteriorating security environment, and emerging technologies. Nevertheless, cooperation on arms control is important in today’s contested geopolitical environment as it can encourage responsible competition broadly between great powers, avoid the proliferation of advanced weaponry, and reduce the risk of unintended military escalation. This paper recommends three measures to reinvigorate arms control: sustaining long-term engagement between major powers; adopting a multi-stakeholder approach by including smaller states and non-government entities in the process; and reconceptualizing the fundamentals of arms control.”

“Addressing the Global Shortage of Biosafety and Biosecurity Professionals through Education”

The International Federation of Biosafety Associations recently published this white paper discussing their efforts to build undergraduate degree programs designed to create competent biosafety professionals. They write: “Biosafety and biosecurity professionals provide an essential role in safeguarding infectious disease agents in clinical and research laboratories and other settings where biological materials are handled. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought into focus the significant demand on the profession and many countries face an overall shortage of these specialized individuals. Given that biosafety and biosecurity professionals work in laboratories behind the scenes of the frontline response, the profession remains largely unknown to students interested in pursuing a career in the sciences. As such, students tend to be steered towards more visible education paths in the biological and health sciences.”

“To address this gap, the IFBA is leading a multisectoral effort towards a future sustainable workforce by formalizing a biosafety & biosecurity career path within the higher education system. Now is the right time since the recent lived COVID-19 experiences of youth have motivated them to become involved. Over the past 6 months, and with funding support from Global Affairs Canada, the IFBA has been collaborating with Kenya’s Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST) to develop and pilot a new undergraduate BSc degree program specifically in Biosafety and Biosecurity. This new BSc program leverages MMUST’s existing programs in the Department of Medical Laboratory Sciences. All students undertake related core courses in microbiology and related disciplines in the first two years followed by specialized biosafety & biosecurity courses, practical laboratory and field experience and a capstone project in their later academic years.”

“The lessons learned from this pilot program will be used for future program roll out to additional universities across Africa and globally. This project presents a recommended solution towards a sustainable future global workforce of biosafety and biosecurity professionals. Supporting this approach are multisectoral partnerships committed to biosafety and biosecurity education and our common vision of more graduates and young scientists entering the profession.”

“A Plea for Making Virus Research Safer”

Dr. Jesse Bloom’s guest essay in the New York Times offers an overview of notable pathogen research, efforts over the years to make it more secure, and current concerns. In it she writes “The French statesman Georges Clemenceau said, “War is too important to be left to the generals.” When it comes to regulating high-risk research on potential pandemic viruses, we similarly need a transparent and independent approach that involves virologists and the broader public that both funds and is affected by their work.”

“How to Detect a Man-Made Biothreat”

This Wired piece discusses US government funding to develop test that would detect engineered pathogens: “To guard against these potential threats, the US government is funding the development of tests to detect dangerous bioengineered organisms before they have a chance to cause significant harm. The effort was announced in 2017 by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, or Iarpa, within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In a livestreamed update in October, Iarpa program manager David Markowitz announced that two platforms developed under the program were both 70 percent accurate at identifying the presence of bioengineering. “We simply never know what sample is going to come through the door in a government lab, and we need to be prepared for anything,” Markowitz said during the news briefing.”

“Why Climate Change Matters for Pandemic Preparedness”

Check out this Nature Outlook piece with computational ecologist Xavier Rodó on climate change’s role in pandemic planning: “Numerous studies over more than two decades have demonstrated a robust relationship between climate and the dynamics of human diseases, such as cholera, malaria and dengue. Changes in climate, including both long-term warming trends and short-term climate variability, might affect patterns of disease. Xavier Rodó, a computational ecologist and climate dynamics specialist at the Barcelona Institute for Global Health and the Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies in Spain, spoke to Nature about how climate modelling could be used to help prepare for future disease outbreaks — and the obstacles he has faced in implementing such systems.”

“Chemical Security Experts Call for Multisector Cooperation Against Terrorism”

From INTERPOL: “The devastating impact of chemical weapons and explosives used in acts of terrorism continues to affect civilian populations and is well known for its destructive and long-term harm.”

“Last year over 1,000 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks were conducted by non-state actors, injuring over 7,150 people in more than 40 countries. Many attacks come from chemicals that criminals acquired through weak points in the supply chain – from manufacturing to storage and retail– and made into weapons.”

“To counter this threat, some 220 chemical security practitioners from more than 70 countries met at INTERPOL’s 3rd Global Congress on Chemical Security and Emerging Threats (25-27 October) to find ways of reducing vulnerabilities by enhancing multisector cooperation and collaboration.” Read more here.

What We’re Listening To 🎧

THE RETORT: EPISODE 4 Gain of Function Experiments

The latest episode of Dr. Brett Edwards’ podcast, The Retort, offers “A straightforward introduction to the past decade of discussion of international oversight of gain of function pandemic research,” with Dr. Nariyoshi Shinomiya of Japan’s National Defense Medical College. This episode and previous ones are available on Dr. Edwards’ YouTube channel. His other podcast project, Poisons and Pestilence, also recently reached 7,000 listens. In celebration, he is hosting a t-shirt give away, so be sure to check that out here.

Conversations Before Midnight

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is hosting its Bulletin Annual Gathering on November 9, 2022, at 5 pm CDT virtually. This is the Bulletin’s “signature event” and it aims to allow guests to engage in high-level conversations with influential voices tracking man-made threats. At the event, “Each virtual table has an expert, established and up-and-coming specialists in the fields of nuclear risk, climate change, disruptive technologies, and biosecurity. These discussion leaders include members of the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, Board of Sponsors, and invited experts from around the world. Below are a few samples for this year’s gathering.”‘ Table experts include our own Dr. Greg Koblentz, so be sure to check out this event’s info page here.

Briefings in Preparation for the Ninth BWC Review Conference

From UNIDR: “The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a cornerstone in the regime to prevent the hostile use of biology. The Ninth BWC Review Conference will take place in late November 2022 and presents an important opportunity to take stock of the past and chart a course for the future of this increasingly important agreement. In support of preparations for the Ninth BWC Review Conference and beyond, UNIDIR has recently published several reports intended to stimulate thinking on substantive issues related to the BWC.”

“This virtual event will bring together the authors of the latest UNIDIR publications on BWC topics to provide short outlines of the key insights and ideas in their respective reports for State Parties to consider ahead of the Review Conference. These include verification, advances in science and technology, international cooperation, and potential outcomes of the Review Conference. The presentations will be followed by a moderated interactive discussion with the participants.” This event will take place on November 7 at 2 pm CET, online. Learn more and register here.

Infection Prevention and Control: Incorporating Lessons Learned in Managing Special Pathogens

“After nearly three years responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, hospitals and other healthcare facilities have learned many lessons about the management of special pathogens and essential infection prevention and control practices. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response’s Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange (ASPR TRACIE) and the National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center (NETEC) invite you to learn more about some of those lessons. Speakers will share their perspectives on how our approach to outbreaks has changed since the pandemic began. They will address issues such as infection prevention for healthcare workers and patients and mitigating disease spread. Speakers will also highlight newly developed tools and resources. This webinar will take place November 7 at 2:00 pm ET. Register today!”

WHO/AFRO Fellowship Programme on Public Health Emergencies in Africa

“The World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa (WHO AFRO) invites interested and eligible candidates to submit applications for a fellowship programme on improving the management of public health emergencies in Africa under the COVID-19 Incident Management Support Team (IMST).” Learn more and apply here.

Happy Halloween! This week we haves lots of scares for you, including even more misuse of international organizations to further disinformation narratives! This week, we focus on Russia’s request for a UNSC investigation of its bogus BW claims and complaint lodged in accordance with Article VI of the BWC, the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions minority report on SARS-CoV-2 origins, and ongoing debates about the SARS-CoV-2 experiments conducted at Boston University. We also cover new publications, upcoming events, and new announcements ahead of One Health Day.

Russia Criticized Heavily After Calling for UNSC Resolution on “Secret Biolabs in Ukraine”

In yet another massive waste of everyone’s time, Russia has continued to press its false claims that the US runs “secret military biological programs” in Ukraine with the UN Security Council, this time drafting a resolution that would establish a commission (comprised of all 15 UNSC members) to investigate the claims. This comes amid a new wave of “transparently false allegations” on the part of Moscow, most recently regarding alleged Ukrainian plans to use a dirty bomb in its own territory. In response to this latest effort at the Security Council, the UK’s Ambassador to the UN, Dame Barbara Woodward, asked the question on everyone’s mind-“How much more of this nonsense do we have to endure?”

This newest attempt includes an official complaint to the UNSC, filed in accordance with article VI of the BWC, in addition to the request for the formation of a formal commission to investigate the October 24 complaint. The complaints continue to center on efforts between the US and Ukraine, largely under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, to support public health research and diagnostic facilities, though Russia insists these facilities are not for peaceful purposes.

In a Thursday briefing before the Security Council, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) reiterated again that it is not aware of any biological weapons programs in Ukraine, echoing its previous statements on the matter made in March and May. In response, Russia’s Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia said, “Do you really think that we’re that naïve?…Do you really think that we think that the Pentagon is going to inform the high representative of the Office of Disarmament Affairs within the UN about their secret biological programs in Ukraine?”

US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, summarized the absurdity of Russia’s claims, explaining “We hear Russia raise alarms that biological weapons will be delivered by birds and bats and now even mosquitoes. Birds and bats. Russia knows public health laboratories routinely study migratory animal species to assess and counter animal-borne pathogens. Bear in mind, much like Russia, birds and bats don’t tend to observe or respect sovereign borders. Russia’s assertions are absurd for many reasons, including because such species, even if they could be weaponized, would pose as much a threat to the European continent and to Ukraine itself as they would to any other country.”

Thomas-Greenfield also described the meeting as a “…colossal waste of time… an attempt to distract from the atrocities Russian forces are carrying out in Ukraine and a desperate tactic to justify an unjustifiable war.” She later added, “It doesn’t matter how many meetings Russia tries to call on this subject. And it doesn’t matter how hard it ratchets up its propaganda machine. We must not divert UN resources toward a baseless investigation. And we must not allow Russia’s tactics to distract us from its brutal war of aggression.”

Senate HELP Committee Minority Interim Report Released on SARS-CoV-2 Origins

This week, the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee Minority oversight staff released their interim report-“An Analysis of the Origins of the COVID-19 Pandemic”. The report makes a number of claims, including “While it remains possible that SARS-CoV-2 emerged as a result of a natural zoonotic spillover, facts and evidence found in previous documented zoonotic spillover events have not, to date, been identified in relation to this pandemic,” “Substantial evidence suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic was the result of a research-related incident associated with a laboratory in Wuhan, China,” and “This investigation’s interim report concludes that SARS-CoV-2 and the resulting COVID-19 global pandemic was, more likely than not, the result of a research-related incident associated with coronavirus research in Wuhan, China.”

The 35-page report does not completely rule out a market origin and, importantly, it does not claim that SARS-CoV-2 was engineered as a bioweapon-a popular conspiracy theory. One interesting element it does focus on is that Chinese scientists began testing their COVID-19 vaccines in humans about a month before the United States did. The report implies this means the Chinese had some sort of advanced (pre-January 11, 2020) access to genomic sequencing, though it does still ask “What additional steps, processes, or novel techniques did AMMS [PLA Academy of Military Medical Sciences] researchers take that advanced the development of their vaccine faster than the Operation Warp Speed timeline?” The report states, “While mRNA vaccine candidates were able to design their vaccine construct in two days, because mRNA vaccines only need the coronavirus’ genetic sequence to make a vaccine and no virus has to be cultivated in labs, traditional vaccine platforms take longer.” It continues, highlighting that the first Operation Warp Speed (OWS) vaccine candidates to enter human clinical trials were non-mRNA vaccines-AstraZeneca-Oxford’s offering and Johnson & Johnson’s, both viral vector vaccines.

It then contrasts the 8 months it took for OWS viral vector candidates to human clinical trials with the 67 days it took one AMMS team to do the same, writing “Given Operation Warp Speed’s success, it is unusual that the two AMMS COVID-19 vaccine development teams were able to reach early milestones in vaccine development even more quickly. The Chen AMMS team beat AstraZeneca-Oxford to phase I clinical trials by 38 days. The Zhou AMMS team built and validated the effectiveness of its COVID-19 candidate vaccine 44 days after the sequence of SARS-CoV-2 was released. The extremely accelerated vaccines development timelines achieved by the AMMS teams pose the following two outstanding questions:”

• “What additional steps, processes, or novel techniques did AMMS researchers take that advanced the development of their vaccine faster than the Operation Warp Speed timeline?”
• “If no additional steps were taken to speed up the development timeline, when did researchers in China have access to the genomic sequence? Was it before January 11, 2020? If so, how far in advance of January 11, 2020?”

This argument does not address differences in the regulatory environments of the US and PRC. Rather, it seems to imply that this is evidence the Chinese had advance knowledge of this outbreak with no discussion of drug and therapeutic approval reforms in recent years that aim to improve the country’s ability to compete in pharmaceutical manufacturing globally and incentivizes development of vaccines and drugs for rare diseases. The CCP has identified competition in global biopharmaceutical manufacturing as a top priority, so the implication that the faster timeline to clinical trials supports the lab leak theory is unsatisfactory as presented.

It also does not appear to have even won over prominent supporters of the lab leak theory, including Dr. Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University. The New York Times explains, “Dr. Ebright, who was interviewed by the report’s authors, said he supported the argument that evidence pointed to a laboratory origin. But the only new element, he said, appeared to be questions raised about how China could have developed a vaccine so quickly, which he did not find persuasive. Otherwise, he said, “there was no information in the report that has not been publicly presented in the media and discussed in the media previously.”

Naturally, this interim report has been heavily criticized. The conclusion reached in this report obviously differs from the two peer-reviewed Science articles published earlier this year that found 1) the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market was the epicenter of the initial outbreak and 2) that there were at least two distinct spillovers from animals sold at the market. Scientists supporting the market origin still have not identified which animals were infected or where they came from, as no animals were tested before the market was shut down early in 2020. Of this, the report states “Critical corroborating evidence of a natural zoonotic spillover is missing. While the absence of evidence is not itself evidence, the lack of corroborating evidence of a zoonotic spillover or spillovers, three years into the pandemic, is highly problematic.”

Dr. Michael Worobey, Department Head of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology at the University of Arizona and a co-author of both the Science articles, addressed the report with Science news, with the news team writing “Michael Worobey, an evolutionary biologist at the University of Arizona who has co-authored scientific reports examining data from the early days of the pandemic that provide some of the strongest support for a jump from animals to humans, speculates that the timing of the report’s release could be “a cynical effort to try to win Republican votes” in the upcoming midterm congressional and state elections.  Or, Worobey says, “it could just be a bunch of staffers with no ability to understand the science who stumbled across a bunch of misinformation and disinformation-filled tweets.” (“Senator Burr felt enough compelling, open-source information had been gathered during staff’s comprehensive review of the facts that an interim report was appropriate,” a senior aide to the minority staff told Science.)”

After the minority interim report was released, Senator Patty Murray, Chair of the Senate HELP Committee, issued a statement on “continuing bipartisan oversight efforts into the origins of the virus that causes COVID-19” that did not address the minority report. Sen. Murray stated “COVID-19 has caused so much pain, hardship, and loss for people in Washington state, across our country, and all across the globe. As I’ve said time and again, it is absolutely critical we learn the lessons from this pandemic so that we never find ourselves in a similar situation again—and that, of course, includes undertaking a full examination of how COVID-19 first emerged.”

“That’s why I made it a top priority as Chair to craft bipartisan legislation to strengthen our public health and pandemic preparedness systems with the PREVENT Pandemics Act—which, among so many other vital steps, would establish an independent task force to conduct a comprehensive review of COVID’s origins and the federal response to the pandemic. And it’s why, in 2021, I announced a bipartisan oversight effort with Senator Burr into the origins of this virus. The HELP Committee is continuing bipartisan work on this oversight report, and I remain committed to passing the PREVENT Pandemics Act, which advanced out of Committee with overwhelming bipartisan support.”

More on the Boston University Controversy

While the controversy surrounding experiments conducted on SARS-CoV-2 at Boston University has subsided some, attention has shifted to how such research is regulated. The New York Times explains the concerns, writing “But the uproar highlighted shortcomings in how the U.S. government regulates research on pathogens that pose a risk, however small, of setting off a pandemic. It revealed loopholes that allow experiments to go unnoticed, a lack of transparency about how the risk of experiments is judged and a seemingly haphazard pattern in the federal government’s oversight policy, known as the P3CO framework.” It also notes “Even as the government publicly reprimanded Boston University, it raised no red flags publicly about several other experiments it funded in which researchers manipulated coronaviruses in similar ways. One of them was carried out by the government’s own scientists.”

Nature explains the issue further, writing “At issue is whether — and when — researchers modifying SARS-CoV-2 or other deadly pathogens need to keep regulators and funding agencies such as the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) informed about their work, even if the agencies didn’t fund the experiments in question. Studies that make pathogens more transmissible or virulent are sometimes called ‘gain of function’ research.”

The issue now being discussed is if federal guidance is too vague in explaining what disclosures are required after a proposal is approved and research is progressing. Dr. Greg Koblentz told The New York Times “The government should be providing the guidance to help people figure this out,” and explained to Grid that “Pandemic prevention and lab safety rules “only move in fits and starts,” said biodefense professor Gregory Koblentz of George Mason University, pointing to the long list of past controversies. “And we only make progress where there is some crisis, or perceived crisis, that grabs people’s attention.”

Koblentz also commented on the confusion surrounding “gain of function”, telling Grid “‘Gain of function’ — we should retire that term, it really doesn’t help us in that debate,” said Koblentz. “It has become shorthand for a class of research that people are worried about because of the risks it poses, but it is a term that really has outlived its usefulness.” The term garnered attention during a number of political debates, including back-and-forths between Senator Rand Paul and Dr. Anthony Fauci.

Grid also noted that, though many experts disagree on the utility of the term “gain of function, “There’s one point all of the experts who spoke to Grid agreed on — the Boston University chimera experiments do point to a need for stronger federal government oversight of potentially dangerous bugs. The fact that we are still debating whether to review genetically altering known pandemic pathogens, not even potential ones, said Koblentz, “is an indictment of both the self-governance model that the virology community largely supports and the current policy.”

NCT Magazine

In this issue focused on 4th generation chemical weapons, several experts offer their perspective on existing and emerging issues. Drs. Stefano Costanzi and Gregory Koblentz authored a piece for this issue, “Controlling Novichok Nerve Agents After the Skripal and Navalny Incidents”. They cover the history of this family of nerve agents and international disarmament and nonproliferation attempts before discussing the Skripal and Navalny incidents as evidence that both the Chemical Weapons Convention and Australia Group Chemical Weapons Precursors list need to be revised to better address Novichok agents. They conclude “The ability of the CWC and AG to adapt to the new challenge posed by these fourth-generation nerve agents demonstrates the resilience of the chemical weapon nonproliferation regime. However, further measures need to be implemented to reduce the opportunities for proliferators to develop and use Novichok nerve agents. Embracing a family-based approach to listing chemicals of proliferation concern would strengthen the nonproliferation regime and the adoption of technologies such as cheminformatics can facilitate the transition to this new approach to containing the threat posed by chemical weapons.”

“Designation of Three Syrian Military Officials Due to Involvement in Gross Violations of Human Rights”

On the topic of chemical weapons, the US State Department recently designated multiple military officials from the Syrian regime, it declared in a press release this week. The statement reads in part, “Of the atrocities committed by the Assad regime, some of which rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity, few are as inhumane and abhorrent as the repeated use of chemical weapons against civilians.  In August 2013, the Syrian Artillery and Missile Directorate of the Syrian Armed Forces launched rockets carrying the nerve agent sarin, a deadly chemical, on Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus, killing at least 1,400 people, many of them children.  Today, we are taking additional action to promote accountability.”

“The Department of State is designating three Syrian regime military officials involved in these airstrikes, pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022.  Brigadier General Adnan Aboud Hilweh, Major General Ghassan Ahmed Ghannam, and Major General Jawdat Saleebi Mawas were involved in gross violations of human rights, namely the flagrant denial of the right to life of at least 1,400 people in Ghouta. As a result of today’s action, Hilweh, Ghannam, and Mawas as well as their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.”

“To Fix American’s Biodefense Strategy, Think Smaller”

From Breaking Defense: “It’s a natural reflex for the US government to try to develop strategies to deal with issues as broadly as possible, to handle a wide array of contingencies. But in the op-ed below, Al Mauroni of Air University’s Center for Strategic Deterrent Studies argues that the Biden administration’s biodefense strategy, expanding on past strategies, has grown too cumbersome and is in need of a cure of its own.”

ASPR TRACIE on Major Radiological or Nuclear Incidents

ASPR’s Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Information Gateway (TRACIE) recently released this updated document providing an “overview of health and medical response and recovery needs following a radiological or nuclear incident…” It also outlines resources for planners. Other relevant resources can also be found on the TRACIE CBRN page.

“Preventing and Preparing for Pandemics with Zoonotic Origins”

This piece from the Council on Foreign Relations discusses how factors that drive pathogen emergence and spread should influence decisions on investments in pandemic preparedness and response. It discusses priority pathogens, primary pandemic prevention, and secondary pandemic prevention and pandemic preparedness, concluding that “There is unprecedented support at the highest levels of government to enhance global pandemic prevention and preparedness. The recent decision to create a new fund for pandemics out of the World Bank and the ongoing negotiation for a pandemic agreement within the World Health Organization are potentially transformational. It is critical that comprehensive action be taken quickly through these efforts before the world’s collective attention moves on to the next crisis. Failure to do so means future generations will live less healthy and productive lives than we have today.”

“COVID-19 Genomic UK (COG-UK) Consortium: Final Report”

In this article from RAND Health Quarterly, Marjanovic et al. write in their abstract “The ability to sequence and understand different variants of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and their impact is crucial to inform policy and public health decisions. Soon after the UK went into its first lockdown in March 2020, the CCOVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) Consortium was launched. COG-UK is a collaboration of experts in pathogen genomics including academic institutions, public health agencies, the Wellcome Sanger Institute, NHS Trusts and Lighthouse Labs. RAND Europe evaluated how COG-UK delivered against its objectives, for example how it contributed to advancing scientific knowledge about SARS-CoV-2, informing public health decisions, and providing information that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of vaccines and treatments. The evaluation also examined the diverse factors that influenced COG-UK progress and impact, including enablers and challenges, and considered implications for the future.”

Coronavirus Vaccines R&D Roadmap

From CIDRAP: “CIDRAP, with support from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and The Rockefeller Foundation, has led an international collaborative effort to develop a coronavirus vaccines research and development (R&D) roadmap (CVR). The CVR aims to serve a strategic planning tool to facilitate R&D, coordinate funding, and promote stakeholder engagement aimed at generating broadly protective coronavirus vaccines.”

“A key component of roadmap development is gathering feedback via a public comment period. The draft CVR is now available for a 4-week public comment period from October 24 – November 18, 2022. Feedback gathered during the public comment period will be used to refine the roadmap, resulting in a final roadmap made available in early 2023.”

“The draft CVR may be downloaded in PDF format. Comments should be submitted via this survey, which will be available through November 18, 2022. The survey offers the opportunity to share general and specific comments on the roadmap; the team welcomes as little or much feedback as you would like to provide.”

“The Future of Infodemic Surveillance as Public Health Surveillance”

In this recent piece from a supplement issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases, Chiou et al. write “Public health systems need to be able to detect and respond to infodemics (outbreaks of misinformation, disinformation, information overload, or information voids). Drawing from our experience at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the COVID-19 State of Vaccine Confidence Insight Reporting System has been created as one of the first public health infodemic surveillance systems. Key functions of infodemic surveillance systems include monitoring the information environment by person, place, and time; identifying infodemic events with digital analytics; conducting offline community-based assessments; and generating timely routine reports. Although specific considerations of several system attributes of infodemic surveillance system must be considered, infodemic surveillance systems share several similarities with traditional public health surveillance systems. Because both information and pathogens are spread more readily in an increasingly hyperconnected world, sustainable and routine systems must be created to ensure that timely interventions can be deployed for both epidemic and infodemic response.”

COVID Taking the Fun Out of Fungi?

The WHO recently released its first fungal priority pathogens list (FPPL)- “the first global effort to systematically prioritize fungal pathogens, considering their unmet research and development (R&D) needs and perceived public health importance.” The WHO explains that “The WHO FPPL aims to focus and drive further research and policy interventions to strengthen the global response to fungal infections and antifungal resistance. The WHO FPPL list is divided into three categories: critical, high and medium priority. The report presents these categories and proposes actions and strategies for policymakers, public health professionals and other stakeholders; targeted at improving the overall response to these priority fungal pathogens including preventing the development of antimicrobial resistance. Three primary areas for action are proposed, focusing on: (1) strengthening laboratory capacity and surveillance; (2) sustainable investments in research, development, and innovation; and (3) public health interventions.”

This comes amid a spike in certain fungal diseases during the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the report found that “Currently, fungal infections receive less than 1.5% of all infectious disease research funding,” and that “most treatment guidelines are informed by limited evidence and expert opinion.”

Opinion: “To Fight Misinformation, We Need to Teach That Science Is Dynamic”

In this piece for Scientific American, Dr. Carl Bergstrom, Daniel Pimentel, and Dr. Jonathan Osborne discuss public ignorance of the scientific community, identifying ways this can be rectified. They write, “It’s easy to see why so many of us struggle to distinguish trustworthy science from what is flawed, speculative or fundamentally wrong. When we don’t learn the nature of consensus, how science tends to be self-correcting and how community as well as individual incentives bring to light discrepancies in theory and data, we are vulnerable to false beliefs and antiscience propaganda. Indeed, misinformation is now a pervasive threat to national and international security and well-being.”

They discuss the need to develop a population of competent outsiders, explaining “Giving people more facts is insufficient. Instead, we need a populace that can tell which sources of information are likely to be reliable, even if the science itself is beyond what they learned in school, so that they can identify when they need scientific information to make decisions in their own lives. Just as critically, people must understand enough about how science attempts to minimize error. In other words, every member of our society needs to be what science education researcher Noah Feinstein calls a “competent outsider.”

What We’re Listening To 🎧

This Week in Virology 948: Breathless with David Quammen

“David Quammen returns to TWiV to discuss how he wrote his new book ‘Breathless’, a story about the science and the scientists behind the race to understand the pandemic coronavirus SARS-CoV-2.” Listen here.

Conversations Before Midnight

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is hosting its Bulletin Annual Gathering on November 9, 2022, at 5 pm CDT virtually. This is the Bulletin’s “signature event” and it aims to allow guests to engage in high-level conversations with influential voices tracking man-made threats. At the event, “Each virtual table has an expert, established and up-and-coming specialists in the fields of nuclear risk, climate change, disruptive technologies, and biosecurity. These discussion leaders include members of the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, Board of Sponsors, and invited experts from around the world. Below are a few samples for this year’s gathering.”‘ Table experts include our own Dr. Greg Koblentz, so be sure to check out this event’s info page here.

Briefings in Preparation for the Ninth BWC Review Conference

From UNIDR: “The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a cornerstone in the regime to prevent the hostile use of biology. The Ninth BWC Review Conference will take place in late November 2022 and presents an important opportunity to take stock of the past and chart a course for the future of this increasingly important agreement. In support of preparations for the Ninth BWC Review Conference and beyond, UNIDIR has recently published several reports intended to stimulate thinking on substantive issues related to the BWC.”

“This virtual event will bring together the authors of the latest UNIDIR publications on BWC topics to provide short outlines of the key insights and ideas in their respective reports for State Parties to consider ahead of the Review Conference. These include verification, advances in science and technology, international cooperation, and potential outcomes of the Review Conference. The presentations will be followed by a moderated interactive discussion with the participants.” This event will take place on November 7 at 2 pm CET, online. Learn more and register here.

Infection Prevention and Control: Incorporating Lessons Learned in Managing Special Pathogens

“After nearly three years responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, hospitals and other healthcare facilities have learned many lessons about the management of special pathogens and essential infection prevention and control practices. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response’s Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange (ASPR TRACIE) and the National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center (NETEC) invite you to learn more about some of those lessons. Speakers will share their perspectives on how our approach to outbreaks has changed since the pandemic began. They will address issues such as infection prevention for healthcare workers and patients and mitigating disease spread. Speakers will also highlight newly developed tools and resources. This webinar will take place November 7 at 2:00 pm ET. Register today!”

From One Health Commission-World Bank Open Call

“Open Call for Experts to serve on the Technical Advisory Panel to the Governing Board of the Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response Financial Intermediary Fund (“PPR FIF”)”- November 3 Deadline

“World Bank has posted a call for experts to serve on the Technical Advisory Panel (TAP) to the Governing Board of the Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response Financial Intermediary Fund (“PPR FIF”).”

“The TAP will comprise a multidisciplinary pool of up to 20 experts, bringing a diverse range of independent technical and financial expertise relevant to PPR FIF-supported projects and activities. To register your interest in being considered for the PPR FIF TAP, please submit documents to ppr_fif_secretariat@worldbank.org using the subject line “Expression of interest for the PPR FIF TAP”

Speaking of One Health…November 3 is One Health Day

Mark your calendars for this year’s One Health Day on November 3. One Health Day is an international campaign that was launched in 2016. The One Health Commission explains that “The goal of One Health Day is to bring attention around the world to the need for One Health interactions and for the world to ‘see them in action’. The One Health Day campaign is designed to engage as many individuals as possible from as many arenas as possible in One Health education and awareness events, and to generate an inspiring array of projects worldwide.” If you are hosting an event on this day, you can register your event here with the Commission. A list of registered One Health Day events for 2022 is also available here.

It’s Friday again and this time we are kicking it off with some great news from our program. We then discuss the Biden administration’s new National Biodefense Strategy and the Boston University preprint controversy. As always, we finish the week out with new publications and upcoming events, including an entire issue supplement of Clinical Infectious Diseases dedicated to anthrax. Finally, mark your calendars, because November 3 is One Health Day (more on that in the announcements section).

First, Some Good News from the Biodefense Program!

Biodefense Faculty Member Joins Council on Strategic Risks and Wins Schar School of Policy and Government Distinguished Alumni Award…All in One Week!

This week, Dr. Saskia Popescu, an epidemiologist, prominent infection prevention consultant, an assistant professor at the Schar School, and more (No, seriously, she does all that AND more.) was named a Senior Fellow at the Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons at the Council on Strategic Risks. In case that somehow was not enough for one week, she is also being honored today as this year’s Schar School of Policy and Government Distinguished Alumni Award winner. Read all about Dr. Popescu’s hero origin story here on the Schar School site.

Biodefense PhD Student Named Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Editorial Fellow

Kimberly Ma, a first year Biodefense PhD student and senior analyst with the Preparedness division at the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, was recently named an Editorial Fellow at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Over the next year, she will author a number of pieces on biosecurity for the Bulletin, so keep an eye out for her upcoming work!

The Biden Administration Releases New National Biodefense Strategy

This week, the White House announced the release of the new National Biodefense Strategy and President Biden’s intent to sign National Security Memorandum 15-“Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security”. The strategy takes a comprehensive approach, aiming to make improvements in these areas-“detect pandemic and other biological threats, “prevent outbreaks from becoming epidemics and prevent biological incidents before they can happen,” “prepare for pandemics and other biological incidents,” “rapidly respond to outbreaks when they occur,” and “recover from a pandemic or biological incident.”

Among other points about the strategy, the Nuclear Threat Initiative explains that “The new strategy’s requirement that the National Security Council and the Office of Science and Technology Policy conduct an interagency policy review regarding biosafety and biosecurity norms and oversight for life sciences research also is valuable. As the largest funder of bioscience and biotechnology research and development in the world, the U.S. Government has a responsibility to put guardrails in place to prevent laboratory accidents or deliberate misuse of the tools of modern bioscience and biotechnology. Doing so can have a profound direct impact in reducing global biological risks and serve as a valuable example for other funders around the world.”

National Security Memorandum 15, “National Security Memorandum on Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security,” directs the heads of agencies addressed to:

1. “implement the Biodefense Strategy, as well as related strategies such as the U.S. Global Health Security Strategy, and include biodefense-related activities, including resourcing and achieving the goals of the Biodefense Strategy and the priorities, targets, and actions of its Implementation Plan, within their strategic planning and budgetary processes;
2. in the event of the determination of a nationally or internationally significant biological incident, implement Federal response efforts in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 of February 28, 2003 (Management of Domestic Incidents), Presidential Policy Directive 8 of March 30, 2011 (National Preparedness), Presidential Policy Directive 44 of November 7, 2016 (Enhancing Domestic Incident Response), and Federal Government response and recovery frameworks and operational plans;
3. coordinate their biodefense policies with other agencies that have responsibilities or capabilities pertaining to biodefense, as well as with appropriate non-Federal entities;
4. share information and coordinate decision-making related to the biodefense enterprise; and
5. monitor, evaluate, and hold their respective agencies accountable for the implementation of section 3(a) of this memorandum.”

The memorandum also states that “To facilitate effective implementation of the Biodefense Strategy, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum and at least quarterly thereafter, the NSC staff Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense shall convene lead agencies identified in the Biodefense Strategy’s Implementation Plan at the Assistant Secretary level.  These agencies shall brief the NSC staff on progress towards key milestones and timelines, as well as on critical gaps and barriers to progress.  The NSC staff Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense shall provide updates quarterly to the APNSA based off of these briefs, summarizing progress towards the implementation of the Biodefense Strategy by highlighting the extent to which the goals and objectives are being met, outlining major gaps and impediments to timely and effective implementation, and presenting options for overcoming these gaps.  The APNSA shall provide to the President, on an annual basis, a memorandum summarizing these updates.”

Transcripts of the background call on this new strategy are available here, and check out the Council on Strategic Risks discussion of the strategy here.

Boston University Controversy

Last week, researchers from Boston University’s (BU) National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) posted results from their controversial work on BA.1 variant spike proteins in preprint. As Science explains, “They took the gene for Omicron’s surface protein, or spike protein, which SARS-CoV-2 uses to enter cells and added it to the genome of a “backbone” virus—a variant of SARS-CoV-2 from Washington state that was identified soon after the pandemic first emerged in Wuhan, China, in early 2020. The objective was to tease apart whether Omicron’s spike protein explains why it is less pathogenic (meaning it causes less severe disease). The answer could lead to improved COVID-19 diagnostic tests and better ways to manage the disease, the preprint authors say.”

By Monday, a UK tabloid, Daily Mail, ran with the story, indicating in their headline that the lab had created a strain of SARS-CoV-2 with an “80 percent kill rate,” and had created a much more dangerous strain of the virus. While the Daily Mail piece is very clearly from a tabloid, this did spark debate online, as this preprint describes what some argue is gain of function research. This work was not approved by the National Institutes of Health, though it was approved by the institutional biosafety committee at NEIDL. Critics argue that this study lacks scientific value and that its potential risks were not properly reviewed before it was conducted. Some, including Francois Balloux, a virologist at University College London, expressed concern over the study’s relevance to human health, noting that findings in mice frequently do not carry over to humans. Others, however, are far less alarmed, generally arguing that the hybrid virus is far less lethal than the original, pointing to the extreme sensitivity of the mice used in the study, and highlighting that similar SARS-CoV-2 variants have already emerged before later fading away.

The university responded to accusations made in the Daily Mail, stating “We want to address the false and inaccurate reporting about Boston University COVID-19 research, which appeared today in the Daily Mail,” said the BU statement. “First, this research is not gain-of-function research, meaning it did not amplify the Washington state SARS-CoV-2 virus strain or make it more dangerous. In fact, this research made the virus replicate less dangerous.” BU also explained that “The animal model that was used was a particular type of mouse that is highly susceptible, and 80 to 100 percent of the infected mice succumb to disease from the original strain, the so-called Washington strain,” says Corley. “Whereas Omicron causes a very mild disease in these animals.” On the topic of funding, BU said the lab “…did not amplify the [backbone] SARS-CoV-2 virus strain or make it more dangerous. In fact, this research made the virus replicate less dangerous,” as reason for not reporting the study to NIH. They also stated this work did not need to be cleared by NIH as it was not directly funded by the agency as the lab used NIAID grants only to pay for tools and platforms.

Science reports that “Emily Erbelding, director of the NIAID division that helped fund the work, said the hybrid virus experiments weren’t described in BU’s grant proposal or progress reports. But she said if BU had informed NIAID about its plans, the institute probably would have evaluated it to determine whether it qualified for review by a special Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) committee.”

NIH also released a statement this week: “The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), part of the National Institutes of Health, did not review nor issue awards for experiments described in a pre-print article on SARS-CoV-2 research at Boston University’s National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL). NIH is examining the matter to determine whether the research conducted was subject to the NIH Grants Policy Statement or met the criteria for review under the HHS Framework for Guiding Funding Decisions about Proposed Research Involving Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens (HHS P3CO framework)…”

While the debate is sure to keep raging, it is also likely to add fuel to the ongoing review of federal oversight policies for GoF research led by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). According to Science, “In September, an NSABB task force issued a draft report that recommended the review policy be expanded to sweep in some kinds of research, and some pathogens, that are now exempt. And experts on all sides of the GOF debate have said the criteria for review need to be clearer. The government is expected to release new rules as early as next year. (For more, see this week’s feature in Science.)”

However, as Science has also previously written, “A U.S. clampdown will have no sway over privately funded GOF research or what happens in other countries, which typically lack policies like the P3CO framework. In Japan and most of Europe, for example, oversight is limited to rules on biosafety and, sometimes, biosecurity along with voluntary self-regulation, say biosecurity experts Gregory Koblentz of George Mason University and Filippa Lentzos of King’s College London. It’s too soon to say how a 2020 Chinese biosafety law will affect PPP research, they say.”

“National Security Snapshot: Department of Defense and Intelligence Community Preparedness for Biological Threats”

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently released this National Security Snapshot co-authored by Dr. Brian Mazanec, an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD program. This snapshot discusses core issues like biopreparedness and the PRC’s intent to exploit US genetic data. The authors write, “We made several key recommendations to improve how DOD and the Intelligence Community prepare for and respond to biological threats. DOD is taking a number of positive steps, such as coordinating with partners to research and develop vaccines. But, DOD doesn’t have a comprehensive strategy that, for example, shows where biodefense resources are needed.”

“Public Health Preparedness: HHS Should Address Strategic National Stockpile Requirements and Inventory Risks”

GAO also recently released this report discussing the Department of Health and Human Services’ inventory planning reports and their failure to “meet most legal requirements enacted in 2019 or communicate risks associated with not meeting recommended inventory levels. This is partly because HHS hasn’t updated its processes for completing the reports and a key advisory body was inactive.” This report makes a number of recommendations while also noting that HHS’s leadership and coordination of public health emergencies is on the office’s high risk list.

“COVID-19: A Warning – Addressing Environmental Threats and the Risk of Future Pandemics in Asia and the Pacific”

From the UN Environment Programme: “This scientific review begins with the history of humans and zoonoses and provides clarity on the issues of zoonoses and emerging infectious diseases. It then presents the seven anthropogenic drivers of zoonotic disease emergence as well as the concept of viral mixing. After providing rich context, this review continues to outline solutions that address the intricate link between nature and human health and strategies to prevent future zoonotic outbreaks.”

“”It was Compromised”: The Trump Administration’s Unprecedented Campaign to Control CDC and Politicize Public Health During the Coronavirus Crisis”

The House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis recently released its third installment of staff reports detailing the Trump administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the report, the committee explains its findings from its investigation into the Trump administration’s “rampant political interference with the federal public health response to the coronavirus pandemic.” Chairman Clyburn released this statement about the report: “The Select Subcommittee’s investigation has shown that the previous administration engaged in an unprecedented campaign of political interference in the federal government’s pandemic response, which undermined public health to benefit the former president’s political goals. As today’s report shows, President Trump and his top aides repeatedly attacked CDC scientists, compromised the agency’s public health guidance, and suppressed scientific reports in an effort to downplay the seriousness of the coronavirus. This prioritization of politics, contempt for science, and refusal to follow the advice of public health experts harmed the nation’s ability to respond effectively to the coronavirus crisis and put Americans at risk. As we continue to recover from the coronavirus crisis, we must also continue to work to safeguard scientific integrity and restore the American people’s trust in our public health institutions.”

Clinical Infectious Diseases “Issue Supplement 3, Anthrax Preparedness”

This issue supplement of Clinical Infectious Diseases is all about anthrax, including articles ranging from “Responding to the Threat Posed by Anthrax: Updated Evidence to Improve Preparedness” to “Risk Factors for Severe Cutaneous Anthrax in a Retrospective Case Series and Use of a Clinical Algorithm to Identify Likely Meningitis and Evaluate Treatment Outcomes, Kyrgyz Republic, 2005-2012”. So, if it has been a while since you were deeply concerned about anthrax, this issue is for you!

“How SARS-CoV-2 Battles Our Immune System”

If you like medical illustrations and interactive timelines, this one is for you. This new story available from Science walks readers visually through SARS-CoV-2’s interaction with the human immune system, offering detailed yet easily understood, general explanations along the way. Readers can even learn about the virus’s different proteins and their specific effects on the immune system.

What We’re Listening To 🎧

This Podcast Will Kill You: Episode 107: Sepsis: It’s a Mess

“Over the years of the podcast, we have often struggled with questions of why: why pathogens act the way they do, why certain people get sick while others don’t, or why we know little about some diseases. This episode is no exception – sepsis certainly inspires many “whys”. But for perhaps the first time on the pod, we find ourselves grappling not only with “why?” but also with “what?”. What, indeed, is sepsis? Ask a dozen doctors and you may get a dozen different answers. Our first goal for this episode is to sift through the various definitions of sepsis and what we know about its pathology to get a firm handle on this deadly consequence of infection. We then turn our sights to a thrilling period of sepsis history – Joseph Lister and his carbolic acid spray – before attempting to address the status of sepsis around the world today. By the end of the episode, your picture of sepsis may not be crystal clear, but hopefully the edges are a little less blurry.” Listen here on Spotify or wherever you listen to podcasts!

Project Responder 6: Evolving Response Environment Webinar

From DHS: “You’re invited to join the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) for a briefing on the Project Responder 6 report, designed to document emergency response capability needs across significant changes in the operating environment. The innovative approach this data collection effort—now in its sixth generation—takes is to bring together S&T’s First Responder Resource Group (FRRG), which includes responders from traditional (fire service, law enforcement, emergency medical services, emergency management) and non-traditional (public health, public works, medical examiner/coroner, search and rescue) response agencies, to focus on identifying and validating needs across disciplines.” Learn more and register here. Download the report here. This event will take place on October 24, at 11 am ET.

Addressing Health Inequities by Strengthening Antibiotic Stewardship

From NCEZID: “Please join The National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Disease (NCEZID) on Tuesday, October 25, 2022, at 10 a.m. EDT for the next AMR Exchange webinar on addressing health inequities by strengthening antibiotic stewardship entitled Addressing health inequities by strengthening antibiotic stewardship. The discussion will feature experts from CDC, The Pew Charitable Trusts, the Federal Office of Rural Health Policy, and Emory University School of Medicine who work to strengthen antibiotic use and prescribing and improve the quality of health care across the United States. Please register here.”

South Korea as a Global Vaccine Hub

The Korea Economic Institute of America is hosting this event October 27, at 3 pm EST virtually: “Early in the pandemic, South Korea drew widespread praise for the speed and efficiency of its response to slowing the spread of the virus and saving lives. However, despite this initial success, South Korea faced vaccine nationalism and other access challenges in its effort to secure Covid-19 vaccines. Spurred by these challenges, South Korea established a national strategic policy to become a global vaccine hub, not only to meet the current and future public health needs of its own population but also to assist low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) facing even starker obstacles in accessing safe and effective vaccines.”

“Please join KEI for a discussion with the Thomas Byrne, Claire Callahan, Irene Kyoung, and Salomé Da Silva Duarte Lepez about how global vaccine access and equity was hindered by the shortcomings of national and bilateral vaccine diplomacy and multilateral mechanisms during the Covid-19 pandemic, and how South Korea’s demonstrated capabilities to rise as global vaccine development, manufacturing and training hub will help bolster global public health capacities in the future.” Register here.

The Case for the Use of “Red Lines” in the Governance of Life Sciences Research with David Relman

From CISAC: “The nature of evolving risks in life sciences research, a brief history of risk governance, and the case for the use of so-called “red lines” in the governance of life sciences research will be presented. The goals of this presentation are to elicit discussion about the benefits and pitfalls of red lines, or guardrails, in general, including a historical perspective, and options for public policy recommendations to address concerns about the present and future risks arising from life sciences research.” This event will take place on October 27, at 3:30 pm PT. Register here.

Infection Prevention and Control: Incorporating Lessons Learned in Managing Special Pathogens

“After nearly three years responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, hospitals and other healthcare facilities have learned many lessons about the management of special pathogens and essential infection prevention and control practices. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response’s Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange (ASPR TRACIE) and the National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center (NETEC) invite you to learn more about some of those lessons. Speakers will share their perspectives on how our approach to outbreaks has changed since the pandemic began. They will address issues such as infection prevention for healthcare workers and patients and mitigating disease spread. Speakers will also highlight newly developed tools and resources. This webinar will take place November 7 at 2:00 pm ET. Register today!”

ICYMI: IARPA, Gingko Bioworks and Draper Announce New Technologies to Detect Engineered DNA

This week, Gingko Bioworks, Draper, and IARPA held an event to announce the completion of IARPA’s Finding Engineering-Linked Indicators (FELIX), a program aimed at improving existing biodetection and surveillance capabilities. “The event featured a panel with Catherine Marsh, IARPA Director; David A. Markowitz, IARPA Program Manager; Joshua Dunn, Head of Design, Ginkgo Bioworks; Laura Seaman, Principal Scientist and Machine Intelligence Group Leader, at Draper; and Erin Rosenberger, Senior Member of Technical Staff, Biological Microsystems Group, at Draper. During the panel, the panelists discussed the program findings and also featured a demo of the research results.” A recording of the livestream is available here.

November 3 is One Health Day

Mark your calendars for this year’s One Health Day on November 3. One Health Day is an international campaign that was launched in 2016. The One Health Commission explains that “The goal of One Health Day is to bring attention around the world to the need for One Health interactions and for the world to ‘see them in action’. The One Health Day campaign is designed to engage as many individuals as possible from as many arenas as possible in One Health education and awareness events, and to generate an inspiring array of projects worldwide.” If you are hosting an event on this day, you can register your event here with the Commission. A list of registered One Health Day events for 2022 is also available here.