Pandora Report 4.19.2024

This week’s edition of the Pandora Report covers GMU’s opening of the Mason Autonomy and Robotics Center, the United States’ latest Global Health Security Strategy, WHO’s new definitions for airborne pathogens, and more. New publications, upcoming events, and job openings are also included.

GMU College of Engineering and Computing Opens Mason Autonomy and Robotics Center

George Mason University’s College of Engineering and Computing formally opened the Mason Autonomy and Robotics Center (MARC) this week at an event on the University’s campus in Fairfax, VA. In his remarks at the event, Dean Ken Ball told the crowd “MARC is the focal point for our research in autonomy, robotics, and AI. Mason truly is a pace-setter in these areas.”

Both Ball and University President Gregory Washington noted that in addition to being a leader in AI, the university is focusing on responsible AI, with a graduate certificate in that field launching in fall 2024.

Learn more about MARC and GMU’s focus on responsible AI and other technologies here.

White House Releases Latest Global Health Security Strategy

This week, the Biden administration launched the new U.S. Global Health Security Strategy (GHSS), which broadly calls for a whole-of-government, science-based approach to strengthening global health security. In a statement, the White House said “Building on progress achieved since 2019 and incorporating lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Global Health Security Strategy lays out a path to deliver on the goals in the 2022 National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan and the bipartisan Global Health Security and International Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response Act of 2022, which was enacted as part of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. ­It places county-driven action, equity, and inclusion at its core to ensure the world is better prepared to prevent and respond to health emergencies, including pandemics. The Strategy also envisions using United States leadership to drive global action toward shared goals, including stronger investment and commitment by other countries.”

The GHSS sets three main goals to guide the country’s global health security agenda:

  1. “Strengthen global health security capacities through bilateral partnerships”
  2. “Catalyze political commitment, financing, and leadership to achieve health security,” and
  3. “Increase linkages between health security and complementary programs to maximize impact”

Read the summary of these goals and the overall strategy here.

WHO Updates Terminology for Pathogens That Transmit Through the Air

The WHO announced changes to how it defines airborne transmission and other related terms this week. In a statement, the Organization said “Following consultation with public health agencies and experts, the World Health Organization (WHO) publishes a global technical consultation report introducing updated terminology for pathogens that transmit through the air. The pathogens covered include those that cause respiratory infections, e.g. COVID-19, influenza, measles, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and tuberculosis, among others.”

“The publication, entitled “Global technical consultation report on proposed terminology for pathogens that transmit through the air”, is the result of an extensive, multi-year, collaborative effort and reflects shared agreement on terminology between WHO, experts and four major public health agencies: Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention; Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; and United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. This agreement underlines the collective commitment of public health agencies to move forward together on this matter.”

This document, among other things, explains that the term “through the air” may be used in reference to infectious diseases “where the main type of transmission involves the pathogen travelling through the air or being suspended in the air, in line with other terms such as “waterborne” diseases, which are understood across disciplines and by the public.”

As Reuters explains, “Agencies have historically required high levels of proof before calling diseases airborne, which required very stringent containment measures; the new definition says the risk of exposure and severity of disease should also be considered. Past disagreements also centred around whether infectious particles were “droplets” or “aerosols” based on size, which the new definition moves away from.”

NIH Revises Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules

The NIH recently published revisions to NIH Guidelines to outline biosafety practices for research involving gene drive modified organisms (GDMOs) in contained research settings. The revisions include:

  • “Specifying the minimum containment requirement for research involving GDMOs;
  • Articulating considerations for risk assessment and additional responsibilities for Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) and Biosafety Officers”.

The revised version is now available here.

“Opinion: The Next Pandemic Threat Demands Action Now”

Jaime M. Yassif recently published this piece with CNN, writing in her introduction “The headlines are concerning: “Highly pathogenic avian influenza found in Texas, Kansas dairy cattle.” “Bird flu detected in dairy worker.” “First human case of avian flu in Texas raises alarm.” Could this be how the next pandemic begins? Well, so far US officials are saying they believe there is minimal risk to the public from the latest iteration of bird flu.”

“But with growing evidence of potential mammal-to-mammal spread just weeks after the new bird flu was detected in cows, many of us in the biosecurity and pandemic preparedness community believe that leaders in capitals around the globe should be working to get ahead of this new public health threat in case the H5N1 flu virus gains the ability to spread among humans.”

“H5N1 Bird Flu in U.S. Cattle: A Wake-Up Call to Action”

Luciana Borio and Phil Krause recently published this opinion piece with STAT News, in which they explain “Comparisons to seasonal flu management underestimate the unique challenges posed by H5N1. Unlike its seasonal counterparts, vaccines produced and stockpiled to tackle bird flu were not designed to match this particular strain and are available in such limited quantities that they could not make a dent in averting or mitigating a pandemic, even if deployed in the early stages to dairy workers. The FDA-approved H5N1 vaccines — licensed in 2013, 2017, and 2020 — do not elicit a protective immune response after just one dose. Even after two doses, it is unknown whether the elicited immune response is sufficient to protect against infection or severe disease, as these vaccines were licensed based on their ability to generate an immune response thought to be helpful in preventing the flu.”

The Outbreak Atlas

Rebecca Katz and Mackenzie S. Moore recently published this book: “Designed for the general public, this book provides an overview of outbreak activities alongside more than 100 engaging case studies and visuals to guide readers through the complexity involved in outbreak preparedness, response, and recovery and the many fields involved.”

“Outbreak Atlas lifts the curtain on the rationale and interconnectedness of outbreak responses across different fields and at various levels, presenting accessible information that ensures a shared understanding of the essential activities to control an outbreak.”

Learn more and purchase here.

“WHO Technical Advisory Group on the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences and Dual-Use Research (‎TAG-RULS DUR)‎:  Report of the Inaugural Meeting, 24 January 2024”

From WHO: “The Technical Advisory Group on the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences and Dual-Use Research (TAG-RULS DUR) was established in November 2023 to provide independent advice to WHO including on technical and strategic advice relevant to the monitoring and mitigation of biorisks, advances in the life sciences and related technologies, the governance of dual-use research and the responsible use of the life sciences.”

“On 24 January 2024, eighteen members of the TAG-RULS DUR virtually met to introduce TAG-RULS DUR members; to discuss current and future activities related to the responsible use of the life sciences and dual-use research; and to share the members’ perspectives and visions on the work ahead.”

Read the report here.

“Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Newsletter Issue No. 15, April 2024”

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction’s latest newsletter has several items of interest, including discussion of the recent creation of the Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative and the new home of the Global Partnership 1540 Assistance Support Initiative Database. Give the newsletter a read and subscribe here.

“The State of Compliance with Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Treaties”

Shannon Green and Christine Parthemore recently authored this piece for the Council on Strategic Risks, explaining in their introduction “Every year, the US Department of State is mandated to provide an update to Congress on compliance with core treaties that focus on addressing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) risks: the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and a host of agreements pertaining to nuclear weapons, including the New START Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and nuclear testing moratoria. This post highlights a few key updates from these compliance reports, and examples of the many things the US government is pursuing to address these threats, with the greatest emphasis on the treaties banning chemical and biological weapons. On the whole, the reports show that most nations abide by these treaties, though the nations certified in non-compliance and those for which there is insufficient information to make a compliance determination, demonstrate increasingly troublesome developments such as the pursuit of dual-use programs.”

“NATO Releases First International Strategy on Biotechnology and Human Enhancement Technologies”

“NATO Allies broke new ground by adopting the first international strategy to govern the responsible development and use of biotechnologies and human enhancement technologies at a meeting of Allied Defence Ministers in February. On Friday (12 April 2024), NATO released a public version of the strategy.”

Read more here.

“Technological Risks Are Not the End of the World”

Jack Stilgoe, a sociologist, recently published this piece in Science discussing the risk AI and other technologies pose to humanity, writing in part “Sociologists have found that, when it comes to science and innovation, distance normally lends enchantment. Those on the fringes of innovation may see technology as magical, but the people who see it up close understand the messy reality. With AI, even the people nearest the technology seem in thrall to it. Hinton explained to me his surprise at the giant leaps made by the large language models that his research has helped enable: “it’s very exciting. It’s very nice to see all this work coming to fruition. But it’s also scary.” He, like other AI researchers, cannot fully explain how the machines do what they do and is troubled by the implications. Last year, Hinton stepped down from his role at Google and chose to speak out about what he saw as the existential dangers of AI.”

‘Astrobiodefense:’ Thinktank Calls for Defending Earth From Space Bugs”

In this piece for Space Insider, Leonard David discusses recent work done by members of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense focused on potential biodefense threats posed by space exploration. He writes in part “While many debate the possibility of advanced, intelligent life elsewhere, few consider the probability of non-intelligent alien microorganisms. These life forms could exist on other planets or moons, hitchhike on spacecraft, or move through the universe in the asteroids they inhabit.”

“They [there] could also be Earth microbes that mutate or evolve in response to the stress of spaceflight, becoming more virulent, resistant, or invasive. Either would seriously threaten the public health, safety, and security of humans, animals, and plants operating in space or living on Earth,” they noted.”

NEW-BWC: Scientific and Technological Advisory Mechanism

From UNIDIR: “The Friends of the Chair, together with UNIDIR and UNODA, are organizing an informal webinar on a BWC scientific and technological advisory mechanism. This webinar is intended to support ongoing activities of the BWC Working Group and stimulating thinking and discussion around a mechanism during the intersessional period. The event will consist of an expert panel followed by a moderated question-and-answer session with the audience.”

This online event will take place on April 25, 13:15-14:45 CEST. Learn more and RSVP here.

ICYMI: Capitol Hill Steering Committee on Pandemic Preparedness and Health Security, Preventing and Preparing for the Next Pandemic: A Focus on Funding Priorities

From the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security: “The panel discussion, moderated by Anita Cicero, discussed highlights from the finalized FY 2024 funding bills and looked ahead to appropriations for FY 2025 and beyond. It considered the priorities laid out in the recently released President’s Budget Request and discussed how sustainable investments in preparedness can lead to tangible improvements in our nation’s health security.”

Watch here.

Industry Summit 2024: Partners for a Resilient Future

From ASPR’s Office of Industrial Base Management and Supply Chain (IBMSC): “Join industry and government partners in exploring federal opportunities for industry engagement aligned with ASPR’s strategic vision and organizational priorities for industrial base management and the public health and health care supply chain.”

This in-person event will take place on April 22, in Washington, DC. Learn more and register here.

3rd International Biosecurity Virtual Symposium

From ABSA: “The Symposium will bring together biosecurity professionals from a wide range of disciplines with varying expertise to share their experiences and knowledge on diverse biosecurity topics. The Symposium will offer attendees an opportunity to learn the latest in biosecurity and have thought-provoking conversations about real-world biosecurity issues, concerns, and scenarios.”

This symposium will take place May 7-8. Learn more and register here.

Addressing the Challenges Posed by Chemical and Biological Weapons: Intensive Online Introductory Course for Students of Technical Disciplines

“SIPRI and the European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium (EUNPDC) invite graduate and postgraduate students of the technical or natural science disciplines to apply for an intensive online introductory course on chemical and biological weapons—their proliferation, the efforts to eliminate them, the various mechanisms used to control their spread—and endeavours underway to reduce the risk of chemical or biological agents in terrorist attacks. The course will take place online, during four half-days on 2831 May 2024, 14:00 to 18:00 Central European Summer Time (CEST).”

“The course will cover the fundamentals of chemical and biological weapons as well as of missiles and other means of delivery; the history of chemical and biological warfare; the evolution of international norms against these weapons; the threats associated with potential terrorist uses of chemical and biological material; bioweapons and other related scientific advances; the current challenges posed by chemical weapons; arms control treaties; and mechanisms to curb the spread of dangerous substances, including export controls.”

“The course will also discuss the role of the EU institutions and industry to address the challenges mentioned above. The course will be instructed by renowned experts on non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament, export controls, verification and related subjects from SIPRI, other European research centres, think tanks and international organizations.”

Learn more and apply here.

Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open

Registration is now open for the Global Health Security 2024 conference in Sydney, Australia. This iteration will take place 18-21 June, 2024. The call for abstracts is also still open. “The mission of the Global Health Security conference is to provide a forum where leaders, researchers, policy-makers, and representatives from government, international organisations, civil society, and private industry from around the world can engage with each other, review the latest research and policy innovations, and agree solutions for making the world safer and healthier. To that end, our mission is to help foster a genuinely multidisciplinary community of practice that is committed to working collaboratively to enhance global health security and eliminate disease, irrespective of its origin or source.”

SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology, and Biosecurity Conference in Africa

“Join us for the SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Conference in Africa, a groundbreaking event that brings together experts, researchers, and enthusiasts in the field of synthetic biology. This in-person conference will take place at the Laico Regency Hotel from Wed, Jul 17, 2024 to Friday, Jul 19, 2024.”

“Get ready to dive into the exciting world of synthetic biology and explore its potential applications in Africa. From cutting-edge research to innovative solutions, this conference offers a unique opportunity to learn, network, and collaborate with like-minded individuals.”

“Discover the latest advancements, trends, and challenges in synthetic biology through engaging keynote speeches, interactive workshops, and thought-provoking panel discussions. Immerse yourself in a vibrant atmosphere where ideas flow freely and new connections are made.”

“Whether you’re a seasoned professional or just starting your journey in synthetic biology, this conference provides a platform to expand your knowledge, exchange ideas, and contribute to the growth of the field in Africa.”

“Don’t miss out on this extraordinary event that promises to shape the future of synthetic biology and biosecurity in Africa. Mark your calendars and join us at the SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Conference in Africa!”

Learn more and register here.

Job Openings at the Institute for Progress

Senior Biotechnology Fellow

“Our biotechnology portfolio explores how we can advance policies that improve U.S. state capacity to accelerate and shape promising innovations in biotechnology and biotechnology governance. Innovations in biology may finally deliver cures to HIVmalariainfluenza, and some cancers. New AI models are unfolding the secrets of the molecular world before our eyes. Spurred by the urgency of the pandemic, we are now closer than ever before to developing technologies to prevent future such outbreaks.”

“Biotechnology fellows are expected to have a keen interest in these issues. Under the guidance of the IFP team, they will explore and become experts in specific biotechnology topics, both from a technology and policy perspective. Fellows will interact with policymakers, write articles and white-papers, and more. We encourage fellows to pursue creative routes that they think might have significant counterfactual policy impact.”

Biotechnology Fellow

“Biotechnology fellows are expected to have a keen interest in these issues and the ways the U.S. government supports and oversees them. Under the guidance of the IFP team, they will explore and become experts in specific biotechnology topics, both from a technical and policy perspective. Fellows will interact with policymakers, write articles and white papers, and more – we encourage fellows to pursue creative routes that they think might have significant counterfactual policy impact.”

Learn more and apply to these positions here.

Job Opening at Blueprint Biosecurity

“Blueprint Biosecurity is seeking a full-time Program Director to build and lead our portfolio of work on personal protective equipment (PPE). We are seeking a proactive leader who thrives in a dynamic and evolving environment. You will have a high degree of autonomy to design and steer a pioneering program that aims to advance the state of PPE for pandemic prevention. This effort will build on the roadmap for Pandemic Proof PPE, developing goals and objectives to translate our ambitious vision into tangible outcomes. A successful candidate will be excited about building an effort from the ground up and willing to pivot and iterate to find ways to succeed.”

“In this role, you will be working collaboratively with other teams within and external to Blueprint Biosecurity. The ideal candidate will have excellent interpersonal abilities and strong skills in project management, strategic prioritization, research, and analysis.”

Learn more and apply here.

Job Openings at NTI

(NTI | bio), Focus: Biosecurity Dialogue

“NTI is seeking a Senior Program Officer or Director (title to be determined based on candidate experience) to join the Global Biological Policy and Programs team. The selected candidate will help lead NTI | bio efforts to bolster biosecurity in countries around the world, among other areas of focus. This position reports to the NTI Vice President for Global Biological Policy and Programs. This is a full-time hybrid position, working a minimum of three days a week in our Washington, DC office.”

Senior Program Officer/Director, Global Biological Policy and Programs (NTI | bio), Focus: Biotech Governance

“NTI is seeking a Senior Program Officer or Director (title to be determined based on candidate experience) to join the Global Biological Policy and Programs team. This position reports to the NTI Vice President for Global Biological Policy and Programs. The selected candidate will help lead NTI | bio efforts to strengthen biotechnology governance. This is a full-time hybrid position, working a minimum of three days a week in our Washington, DC office.”

Learn more and apply to these positions here.

Event Summary: Building Capacities for Addressing Future Biological Threats

Defining Convergence

By Geoffrey Mattoon, Biodefense MS Student

On Tuesday, 20 September, the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) hosted the “Building Capacities for Addressing Future Biological Threats” webinar, which included keynote speaker Dr. David Christian (Chris) Hassell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at ASPR, speakers Dr. Pardis Sabeti, Professor at the Center for Systems Biology at Harvard University, and Dr. Akhila Kosaraju, CEO and President of Phare Bio, and was moderated by Dr. Yong-Bee Lim, Deputy Director of the Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons and George Mason Biodefense Program alumni. Together they discussed the evolving biological threats landscape and the means that exist to improve preparedness and response. This event follows the previous webinar “The American Pandemic Preparedness Plan: One Year of Progress & The Path Forward,” also hosted by CSR on 8 September, and focused heavily on the need for greater cooperation, collaboration, and innovation to prepare for the next pandemic.

             Dr. Hassell began the event by highlighting the misconceptions associated with the terms “convergence” and “bioconvergence” within the field. His concern was that these terms have become buzzwords within biodefense and their use implies that the different fields and disciplines necessary for biodefense are converging or cooperating organically. Such a misconception leads those within and outside of the field to assume that unity of effort is common and effortless, which is not the case. Barriers to convergence are prevalent and numerous, both in government and private sectors. Dr. Hassell provided an example from his previous experience in the Department of Defense developing chemical detectors, comparing a lack of higher-level convergence to the lack of standardized interfaces on different detectors preventing operators from gaining competency on all systems after mastering any single system. Such stove-piping of systems and efforts prevents convergence and is common across biodefense. The solution is a greater degree of crosstalk between disciplines working towards a unified solution or goal. Providing another example of this failure of convergence, Dr. Hassell highlighted the recent Pentagon appropriations for biodefense failing to account for the need for cyber funding to be successful against future threats as that discipline becomes more critical.

            Dr. Hassell also indicated that biological threats, in addition to the biodefense, are converging. As biotechnology and other life sciences continue to advance, the line between chemical and biological threats blurs. Previous research has demonstrated this growing convergence, from opioid-producing yeast conducted by Galanie et al. published in Nature to chemical synthesis of toxins conducted by Matinkhoo et al. in the Journal of the American Chemical Society. He urges a greater convergence of chemical and biodefense disciplines to effectively overcome these threats in the future. Such efforts would come at a substantial cost and require the reorganization of numerous government agencies, but it may be necessary to respond to the evolving threat landscape and enable more efficient use of future funding to unify efforts.

            Dr. Hassell then commented on the need for greater inclusion of data sciences, data technologies, and nanotechnologies in future biodefense efforts. The necessity of greater convergence between chemical and biodefense and the inclusion of these disciplines is a key requirement identified in Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, a report prepared by the National Academies for the Department of Defense in 2018. The addition of these technology-based disciplines is indicative of a greater requirement for technology convergence in chemical and biodefense efforts to combat the rising technology integration in the threat landscape. Modern biotechnology has created significant risk of dual use to create ever greater biological threats. Dr. Hassell pointed to the recent “Dual Use of Artificial-Intelligence-Powered Drug Discovery,” published by Urbina et al. in Nature Machine Learning, that indicated how easy it may be for a machine learning system designed with the best of intentions to identify new therapeutic disease inhibitors to be reprogrammed to instead identify novel toxin molecules. In that report, the MegaSyn system was able to generate 40,000 novel VX molecules in less than 6 hours. Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Associate Professor at George Mason University and author of Barriers to Bioweapons, indicated such results do not directly equate to actionable threats on the Radiolab episode 40,000 Recipes for Murder that covered this journal article, but they still are indicative of the evolving chemical and biological threat landscape. Dr. Hassell also indicated the convergence of other disciplines critical to future biological threats, including climate change, which is enabling greater zoonotic spillover events, generating new and often novel biological threats.

            Dr. Pardis Sabeti underscored deadly infectious diseases as an existential threat to humanity during her remarks. She agreed with Dr. Hassell’s call for greater convergence and stated we must aspire to use technology to outpace the evolution of diseases so that we can be more anticipatory and less reactionary in the face of future outbreaks. She emphasized that COVID-19, though a recent a traumatic pandemic, is not the biggest threat we have faced or could face in the future. She argued we are on the precipice of cataclysm if we do not relentlessly pursue these efforts of convergence to enhance biodefense. Infectious disease is an existential threat that we can address because the tools necessary for biodefense are not bespoke or esoteric. Effective current and future biodefense tools, she argued, must be broad spectrum, offer daily value, contain transferrable benefits and knowledge, and be embraced at a cultural level to be effective. In line with the previous CSR webinar on COVID-19, Dr. Sabeti called for a greater commitment to community engagement as a key effort to combat future biological threats.

            Dr. Akhila Kosaraju then emphasized the need to take novel technologies required for biodefense out of the lab and into the field. She also supported the need for greater convergence, stating such efforts must be intentional to be successful. Her company, Phare Bio, exemplifies such efforts, employing AI and deep learning to enable rapid antibiotic discovery to overcome rising drug resistances. This approach provides Phare Bio a strategy to overcome the drug development “valley of death” where most current pharmaceutical development fails and presents an opportunity for other organizations like it across biodefense.  Modern biodefense efforts must emphasize biotechnology, relying on computational biologists, bioengineers, and other technical experts to maximize advances in the field.  She also indicated a need for organizations like The Audacious Project, a backer of Phare Bio, to effectively unify disciplines to solve intractable problems like drug resistance. The Audacious Project is a “collaborative funding initiative catalyzing social impact on a grand scale” across a broad range of disciplines that seeks to de-risk and encourage innovation. Injection of philanthropic, grant, or even government funding sources to adequately de-risk the “valley of death” and other obstacles is essential to future preventative and treatment therapeutics. Additionally, biodefense must strive to recognize small players in the field that often offer bespoke technologies and solutions that can accelerate efforts beyond that of the usual bigger players, as demonstrated throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Efforts like Operation Warp Speed serve as foundational examples to the benefits such efforts can provide to the future of biodefense.  

Finding Its Niche in Biodefense: Bioprinting

By Alena M. James

Three-Dimensional printing has become a major controversial topic in the new age technology sector for the past few years now. Earlier this month, Yoshitomo Imura was arrested in Kawaski, Japan after using his 3-D printer to build five guns; two of which held the capability to fire bullets. This is an example of the potential dangers of 3-D printing. In April, a private company working in Shanghai used 3-D printers to print 10 full-sized houses in approximately 24 hours. This demonstrates the technology’s potential utility in building development. The benefits and risks of 3-D printing continue to be illustrated via innovators, but there has not yet been a clear consensus on the accepted utility of this advancing technology.

However, on the medical front these machines have proved incredibly advantageous. 3-D printers have advanced the medical field by allowing the creation of artificial limbs for patients, skin grafs for burn victims, and even noses for patients requiring facial reconstruction.  Despite the ambiguity of whether or not 3-D printing induces more harm than good or more good than harm for society, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has found a significant utility for this rising technology in the biodefense world.

Last week, DTRA announced the new role for 3-D printers in biodefense research. According to DTRA, using 3-D printers in countermeasures research against chemical and biological weapons would allow for scientists to rapidly produce human tissue on which treatments against chemical and biological agents can be tested.

The technique is known as bioprinting—the use of 3-D printers to develop human tissues and organs.  In bioprinting, a specialized 3-D printer is designed to disseminate viable cells that can strategically lay the framework to biofabricate organoids—smaller version of organs. Ears and skin have been the two most common organs that have been developed via this technology.

Studies at Harvard University have helped to pique DTRA’s interest in bioprinting. So far, the Harvard Scientists have successfully developed 3-D organoids that can survive for at least eight days. The length of viability is significant, because it allows more time for testing to be performed on sensitive organisms like bacteria.

If DTRA scientists can test the effectiveness of treatments against biological or chemical weapons on bioprinted human tissue, they maintain the capacity to evaluate these treatments in more accurate human models without harming actual patients. Using biofrabricated systems will also enable DTRA scientists to determine the best countermeasures against these types of weapons without solely relying on animal modeling systems. These types of studies are traditionally condemned due to ethical concerns for the animals and are limited in producing side effects that are associated within the human model.  By using human tissue fabricated from 3-D printers, scientists reduce animal testing trials and gain a more accurate understanding of the effectiveness of the treatments being investigated. The fabrication of organoids may also allow drug testing to occur at a faster pace saving time and money in the research field.

One of the leading companies of this technology is Organovo. The company focuses on developing structurally and functionally accurate human tissue models used in medical research. The process of bioprinting requires several steps to produce the intended tissue or organ type. First, a design of the target tissue must be created. Second, the key architectural and compositional elements of the tissue must be identified. Third, the software must be used to develop a printing protocol.  Fourth, a bioprocess is required to develop the bio-ink for the project. Bio-ink comes from cells involved in the development of the tissue copy. Fifth, the ink gets dispensed from the bioprinter layer-by-layer building the tissue in 3-D.

Although the process outlined above appears simple, bioprinting still requires more investigative studies to truly evaluate its advantages and disadvantages.  However, it is quite exciting to know that the technique is finding a significant role in to the Biodefense realm.

 

(Image Credit. Image Caption: The scaffolding for two replacement ears printed is shown above. Prior to bioprinting replacement ears were developed from rib cartilage.)