Pandora Report 3.15.2024

Happy Friday! This week’s edition of the Pandora Report covers HHS’ launch of a probe into the cyber attack on Change Healthcare, the IC’s annual threat assessment, new publications and professional opportunities, and more.

Biodefense PhD Student Lands Fellowship With National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology

“Aishwarya Sriraman, Biodefense PhD student, is starting a fellowship with the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, a legislative branch advisory entity charged with conducting a review of how emerging biotechnologies will shape current and future activities of the Department of Defense. The fellowship will provide an exciting opportunity to gain firsthand policy and research experience working at the intersection of national security and emerging biotechnology. She will specifically be working with the Policy and Research team focused on partnerships and bioliteracy.”

HHS Opens Probe Into UnitedHealth Cyber Attack

The US Department of Health and Human Services announced Wednesday that it has opened an investigation into the February 21 cyber attack targeting a subsidiary of United Health-Change Healthcare. The aim of the investigation is to determine if there was any breach of protected health data and to see if UnitedHealth Group abided by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. ‘”Given the unprecedented magnitude of this cyberattack and in the best interest of patients and health care providers” the HHS Office for Civil Rights is initiating an investigation into the incident, the health department said.”

Secretary of HHS Xavier Becerra and Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor Julie A. Su said in a letter regarding the issue “In a situation such as this, the government and private sector must work together to help providers make payroll and deliver timely care to the American people. The Biden-Harris Administration has taken action by removing challenges for health care providers and addressing this cyberattack head on. Now, we are asking private sector leaders across the health care industry – especially other payers – to meet the moment.”

“The Biden-Harris Administration remains committed to ensuring that all Americans can access needed care in spite of this cyberattack. We urge the private sector to quickly identify and carry out solutions. Specifically, we call on UHG, other insurance companies, clearinghouses, and health care entities to take additional actions to mitigate the harms this attack places on patients and providers, particularly our safety net providers.”

Reuters explained in its reporting that Change Healthcare “processes about 50% of medical claims in the U.S. for around 900,000 physicians, 33,000 pharmacies, 5,500 hospitals and 600 laboratories.”

UnitedHealth has indicated it will cooperate with the investigation. It has yet to comment on what patient data may have been exposed by the attack.

Annual IC Threat Assessment Includes Warnings About Biotechnology, CBW

The Intelligence Community’s recently-released annual threat assessment included several sections dedicated to threats and challenges posed by advancing biotechnology and WMD proliferation. On biological weapons, the assessment explains “Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea probably maintain the capability to produce and use pathogens and toxins, and China and Russia have proven adept at manipulating the information space to reduce trust and confidence in countermeasures and U.S. biotechnology and research.”

It also outlines the potential for CW use to grow, explaining “The use of chemical weapons, particularly in situations other than state-on-state military operations, could increase in the near future. During the past decade, state and non-state actors have used chemical warfare agents in a range of scenarios, including the Syrian military’s use of chlorine and sarin against opposition groups and civilians, and North Korea’s and Russia’s use of chemical agents in targeted killings. More state actors could use chemicals in operations against dissidents, defectors, and other perceived enemies of the state; protestors under the guise of quelling domestic unrest; or against their own civilian or refugee populations.”

Finally, it identifies biotechnology and related biosecurity issues as key challenges (alongside AI) requiring cooperative global solutions. However, it notes such cooperation is harmed by authoritarian governments like those in China and Russia: “This competition also exploits technological advancements— such as AI, biotechnologies and related biosecurity, the development and production of microelectronics, and potential quantum developments—to gain stronger sway over worldwide narratives affecting the global geopolitical balance, including influence within it. The fields of AI and biotechnology, in particular, are rapidly advancing, and convergences among various fields of science and technology probably will result in further significant breakthroughs. The accelerating effects of climate change are placing more of the world’s population, particularly in low- and middleincome countries, at greater risk from extreme weather, food and water insecurity, and humanitarian disasters, fueling migration flows and increasing the risks of future pandemics as pathogens exploit the changing environment.”

More Than 90 Prominent Biologists, Other Scientists Sign Agreement Aiming to Mitigate AI Bioweapon Risk

The New York Times recently reported that “…over 90 biologists and other scientists who specialize in A.I. technologies used to design new proteins — the microscopic mechanisms that drive all creations in biology — have signed an agreement that seeks to ensure that their A.I.-aided research will move forward without exposing the world to serious harm.”

In their agreement, they explain “Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are creating unprecedented opportunities for life science research, including by enabling the design of functional biological molecules, especially proteins. This application of AI for protein design holds immense potential to enhance our understanding of the world and help address some of humanity’s most pressing challenges by enabling rapid responses to infectious disease outbreaks, curing numerous diseases, unlocking sustainable sources of energy, helping to mitigate climate change, and more.”

“As scientists engaged in this work, we believe the benefits of current AI technologies for protein design far outweigh the potential for harm and we would like to ensure our research remains beneficial for all going forward. Given anticipated advances in this field, a new proactive risk management approach may be required to mitigate the potential of developing AI technologies that could be misused, intentionally or otherwise, to cause harm. We are therefore motivated as a community to articulate a set of values and principles to guide the responsible development of AI technologies in the field of protein design. These values include safety, security, equity, international collaboration, openness, responsibility, and pursuing research for the benefit of society. Furthermore, we as signatories voluntarily agree to a set of specific, actionable commitments informed by these values and principles and outlined here. We will work together with global stakeholders across academia, governments, civil society, and the private sector to ensure that this technology develops in a responsible and trustworthy manner and that it is safe, secure, and beneficial for all.”‘

Read more here.

“Hidden in Plain Sight: the Next Biosecurity Threat”

This commentary piece was co-authored by Biodefense PhD Program alumnus Daniel M Gerstein. In it, Gerstein and his co-authors tackle key challenges in enforcing the International Health Regulations, comparing global responses to China’s delayed notification of the emergence of COVID-19 to the WHO with South Africa’s prompt notification of the emergence of the Omicron variant. They write in part, “The message is now clear: Keep quiet as long as possible to keep your hotels and beaches full, trade going and air travel open. There will be no penalty if you delay reporting. There will be no penalty if you refuse or delay access to the WHO or other specialists….In Geneva, Switzerland, negotiations on a global pandemic preparedness treaty stalled where they were predicted to stall: who gives what to whom and for how much?”

“If an international agreement does progress, to be effective it must “have teeth, but they rarely do,” commented the executive director of the American Public Health Association. If Geneva produced any agreement, the United States could be a party only with Senate ratification. The likelihood of that level of bipartisan cooperation is (charitably) remote.”‘

“Learnings from COVID-19 for Future Respiratory Pathogen Pandemic Preparedness: A Summary of the Literature”

From WHO: “A scoping literature review of learnings from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic was commissioned by WHO to inform operational priorities for future respiratory pathogen pandemic preparedness. The learnings are grouped according to WHO’s subsystems for health emergency preparedness, response and resilience. Key takeaway messages include: 1) Preparedness works; 2) Health is everyone’s business; 3) No one is safe until everyone is safe; and 4) Response must be agile and adaptive. The review will support pandemic planners at all levels to develop and update preparedness and response plans.

“The COVID-19 Pandemic at Year Four: The Imperative for Global Health Solidarity”

Syra Madad recently authored this blog post for the New York Academy of Sciences, writing in part “This month marks a solemn milestone: the four-year anniversary of the COVID-19 pandemic declaration by the World Health Organization. During this period, the virus has caused the deaths of over seven million individuals globally—a figure that is vastly undercounted, with actual losses likely two to three times higher. This number also includes over one million COVID-19 deaths in the United States alone. A recent analysis of excess mortality in the U.S., which provides an estimation of deaths that likely would not have occurred under normal, non-pandemic conditions, has found that in the first two years of the pandemic many of the excess deaths that were attributed to natural causes were actually uncounted COVID-19 deaths. This points to a significant underestimation of the pandemic’s true death toll, let alone the impact on livelihoods and disability caused by this virus.”

“Mixed Thoughts on Chances of a New Pandemic”

Statista’s Anna Fleck recently authored this piece rocused on public perceptions of the chances of a new pandemic emerging. It covers the results of a survey, with the results displayed in this chart:

“Banning Gain-of-Function Research Would Do Far More Harm Than Good”

Judy Minkoff tackles the debate over a recently-passed House bill that aims to halt federal funding for all research involving gain of function work in this piece for MedPage Today. She writes in her introduction “The Republican-controlled House of Representatives recently approved an amendmentopens in a new tab or window to the 2024 House spending billopens in a new tab or window that prohibits federal funding for all gain-of-function (GoF) research — that which endows a pathogen with a new or enhanced property. Many scientists are hopeful that the bill will fail in the Democratic-controlled Senate, but if this vaguely-worded provision becomes law, it could halt research pertaining to a wide variety of public concerns, including gene therapy, cancer treatment, and pandemic preparedness.”

“Congressional attacks on science extend beyond this amendment. House Republicans, holding a majority in the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemicopens in a new tab or window, have skewed the narrative on COVID-19 toward an unsupported link with GoF research, citing communications between government officials and the authors of a controversial scientific publicationopens in a new tab or window as proof of a conspiracyopens in a new tab or window to suppress the lab origin theory. Rather than leveraging their authority to foster balanced discussion among experts in an effort to learn from the pandemic, the subcommittee has engaged in months of hearings on this single topic.”

“The Joint Assessment Mechanism: Discerning the Source of High-Consequence Biological Events of Unknown Origin”

A new white paper from NTI: “The white paper, which reflects several rounds of consultations with an international group of technical and policy experts, diplomats, and other key stakeholders in the field of pandemic preparedness, provides an in-depth argument for establishing the JAM to fill the critical gap among existing UN mechanisms and entities. The paper suggests that the JAM should be based within the Office of the UN Secretary General—serving as an interface between the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism, and other key stakeholders—where it can provide an ongoing baseline assessment of current biological risks.”

“Bioliteracy for the Age of Biology”

From the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology: ‘“Bioliteracy” is the concept of imbuing people, personnel, or teams with an understanding of — and ability to engage with — biology and biotechnology. The Commission believes that all Americans—including policymakers in the U.S. Government, students at all levels of education, current and future biotechnology workers, and the broader public—should one day be as comfortable using and engaging with biotechnology in the same way that they do with computers and software in their daily lives and within society.”

“Increased bioliteracy across all segments of the population will help Americans realize the potential of a robust U.S. biotechnology ecosystem that maximizes the promises of biotechnology for the benefit of all citizens.”

Read more here.

“The Viral Most Wanted-The Filoviruses”

CEPI’s latest installment of the Viral Most Wanted tackles the filoviruses. Its exciting introduction explains: “Dr Jean-Jacques Muyembe was a newly-qualified microbiologist working as a field epidemiologist when he got a call in 1976 to help investigate an outbreak. A pernicious disease had taken hold in the village of Yambuku in central Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. People were dying in large numbers of the infection – one that appeared at first to be like malaria or typhoid or yellow fever, but was clearly something even worse.”

“Muyembe knew that some of the Belgian nuns working in the village had been vaccinated against yellow fever and typhoid, yet this infection was easily flooring those defences. It was a swift and gruesome new killer.”

“Reflecting on his experience with these first few patients, Muyembe said the most striking thing was when he drew blood from them. Removing the syringe and needle, he found that the tiny puncture hole would continue to gush blood. It was the first time he’d seen such a thing, he recalled, and he knew it was an ominous sign.” 

“After asking one of the infected nuns to fly back with him to Kinshasa, Muyembe took blood samples from her and sent them to Belgium for testing. The analysis that followed produced a shocking result. The blood of the nun, who by now had been killed by the disease, was infected with a virus that caused an acute haemorrhagic fever – one that scientists now describe as “one of the most lethal infections you can think of”.”  

“The pathogen swiftly became known as Ebolavirus after the river that runs near Yambuku where it infected the villagers and the nuns. It was also swiftly recognised as a member of the Filovirus family – one of The Viral Most Wanted.

“Response is Failure in the Primary Mission of Preventing CBW”

JP Zanders recently published this piece on The Trench: “The Global Partnership against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction has now been around for over two decades. In the wake of the terrorist attacks against the US in September 2001, it started out as an effort to mobilise the resources of the G8 members to prevent terrorist acquisition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and related materials. The weapons, technologies and skills available from the former Soviet Union presented a significant proliferation risk, which the US was already addressing through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme.”

“Now comprising 31 members, the Global Partnership (GP) played a key role in assisting Russia with the destruction of its chemical weapons (CW) and dismantling the biological weapons (BW) infrastructure in other former Soviet states. Since then, it has expanded its mission of preventing the re-emergence of BW and CW to different parts of the world and tackles multiple types of proliferation threats. Among the latest is Russia’s massive disinformation campaign against the collective threat reduction activities in former Soviet republics to justify the invasion of Ukraine and interference in other countries.”

“To discuss the GP’s past and present work and the response to the latest challenges, I interviewed Trevor Smith, Senior Program Manager of the Biological and Chemical Security Weapons Threat Reduction Program run by Global Affairs Canada. The interview took place on 31 January 2024.”

“Flashback: When Nerve Gas Testing Killed 7,000 Sheep Near Dugway in Utah”

This Axios SLC Old News piece discusses the deaths of more than 7,000 sheep thirty miles away from the US Army’s Dugway Proving Grounds in 1968. “The Army confirmed in a 1978 report — which wasn’t publicly released until the Salt Lake Tribune obtained it 20 years later — that “incontrovertible” evidence showed VX was to blame.”

In 2018, Al Mauroni published this article with the Modern War Institute discussing this incident and its implications, writing in part “Politics and perception had essentially overwhelmed science and reason. This probably wasn’t the first time that this had happened, nor would it be the last. The point of this narrative, other than as a historical observation, is to reflect on what this has done to the preparedness of US military forces today. Yes, the United States no longer has a chemical weapons program. Yes, there is a Chemical Weapons Convention that nearly all nations of the world have signed, effectively eliminating chemical weapons as a future tool of warfare—we hope. North Korea is a particular exception to that treaty, and most assumptions are that, if North Korea goes to war against South Korea, it will use thousands of tons of chemical warfare agents against US forces. Are we confident that our forces have the necessary gear to protect themselves and sustain combat operations in such an environment? And do we have plans for how US military bases and ports will recover after being attacked with chemical weapons?”

“COLUMN: Which Terrorist Organization Suffers More Casualties in Its Attacks? Al Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, or Iran-backed Militia Groups?”

Schar School associate professor Mahmut Cengiz recently published this commentary piece with Homeland Security Today, explaining in his introduction “Despite being a top priority on government agendas for the past few decades, it appears that no counterterrorism policies have been successful in combatting terrorist groups. Thousands of terrorist attacks and fatalities are still being recorded each year by terrorism databases. For instance, in 2023, the Global Terrorism and Trends Analysis Center (GTTAC) Records of Incidents Database (GRID) documented 7,480 terrorist attacks that led to the death of 23,119 individuals.”

What We’re Listening To 🎧

Poisons and Pestilence, 24 Movie Special: Outbreak and Contagion with Saskia Popescu

“In our first ever movie review special, Dr Saskia Popescu reviews the classics Contagion (2011) and Outbreak (1995)…”

NEW: Addressing the Challenges Posed by Chemical and Biological Weapons: Intensive Online Introductory Course for Students of Technical Disciplines

“SIPRI and the European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium (EUNPDC) invite graduate and postgraduate students of the technical or natural science disciplines to apply for an intensive online introductory course on chemical and biological weapons—their proliferation, the efforts to eliminate them, the various mechanisms used to control their spread—and endeavours underway to reduce the risk of chemical or biological agents in terrorist attacks. The course will take place online, during four half-days on 2831 May 2024, 14:00 to 18:00 Central European Summer Time (CEST).”

“The course will cover the fundamentals of chemical and biological weapons as well as of missiles and other means of delivery; the history of chemical and biological warfare; the evolution of international norms against these weapons; the threats associated with potential terrorist uses of chemical and biological material; bioweapons and other related scientific advances; the current challenges posed by chemical weapons; arms control treaties; and mechanisms to curb the spread of dangerous substances, including export controls.”

“The course will also discuss the role of the EU institutions and industry to address the challenges mentioned above. The course will be instructed by renowned experts on non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament, export controls, verification and related subjects from SIPRI, other European research centres, think tanks and international organizations.”

Learn more and apply here.

Artificial Intelligence and Automated Laboratories for Biotechnology: Leveraging Opportunities and Mitigating Risks

From the National Academies’ Board on Life Sciences: “Please join us April 3-4, 2024 for a hybrid workshop on the opportunities and mitigation of risks of the use of artificial intelligence and automated laboratories (i.e., self-driving labs) for biotechnology.”

“The workshop will consider opportunities to leverage AI and laboratory automation capabilities for discovery and development, explore methods and approaches to identify, track, and forecast the domestic and international development of such technologies, and convene experts across sectors to highlight recent advances and explore implications for the development and use of these technologies.”

Learn more and register here.

Launch of the 2024 National Blueprint on Biodefense

From the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense: “On the 10th anniversary of its inception, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense will release its 2024 National Blueprint on Biodefense: Immediate Action Needed to Defend Against Biological Threats.”

“Please join us for this momentous event at the Congressional Auditorium, Capitol Visitor Center, on April 17th at 4:30pm.”

“The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense (formerly the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense) was established in 2014 to provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of United States biodefense efforts and to issue recommendations that foster change.  Subsequently, the Commission has briefed White House Administrations (including then Vice President Biden); testified before Congress; convened numerous meetings with experts; released 12 reports; produced the graphic novel Germ Warfare; and mobilized biodefense conversations and actions in the private and public sectors.”

Learn more and register here.

Registration for GHS 2024 Now Open

Registration is now open for the Global Health Security 2024 conference in Sydney, Australia. This iteration will take place 18-21 June, 2024. The call for abstracts is also still open. “The mission of the Global Health Security conference is to provide a forum where leaders, researchers, policy-makers, and representatives from government, international organisations, civil society, and private industry from around the world can engage with each other, review the latest research and policy innovations, and agree solutions for making the world safer and healthier. To that end, our mission is to help foster a genuinely multidisciplinary community of practice that is committed to working collaboratively to enhance global health security and eliminate disease, irrespective of its origin or source.”

SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology, and Biosecurity Conference in Africa

“Join us for the SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Conference in Africa, a groundbreaking event that brings together experts, researchers, and enthusiasts in the field of synthetic biology. This in-person conference will take place at the Laico Regency Hotel from Wed, Jul 17, 2024 to Friday, Jul 19, 2024.”

“Get ready to dive into the exciting world of synthetic biology and explore its potential applications in Africa. From cutting-edge research to innovative solutions, this conference offers a unique opportunity to learn, network, and collaborate with like-minded individuals.”

“Discover the latest advancements, trends, and challenges in synthetic biology through engaging keynote speeches, interactive workshops, and thought-provoking panel discussions. Immerse yourself in a vibrant atmosphere where ideas flow freely and new connections are made.”

“Whether you’re a seasoned professional or just starting your journey in synthetic biology, this conference provides a platform to expand your knowledge, exchange ideas, and contribute to the growth of the field in Africa.”

“Don’t miss out on this extraordinary event that promises to shape the future of synthetic biology and biosecurity in Africa. Mark your calendars and join us at the SBA.3 International Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Conference in Africa!”

Learn more and register here.

Eighth Annual Next Generation for Biosecurity Competition Open for Applications

“The Eighth Annual Next Generation for Biosecurity Competition is now open. NTI | bio hosts this competition to provide a platform for the next generation of global leaders in biosecurity to develop original concepts and share them with the wider biosecurity community. This year’s co-sponsors include 80,000 Hoursthe Global Health Security Networkthe iGEM Foundation, the International Federation of Biosafety Associations, the Next Generation Global Health Security NetworkPandemic Action NetworkSynBio Africa, and Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and Conflict Transformation.

This year, the competition invites innovative and creative papers focused on how investments in biosecurity can both contribute to a more equitable society and reduce biological risks. The full prompt is provided below.”

“Winners of the Biosecurity Competition will be awarded the following:

  • Online publication of their paper on the NTI website
  • The opportunity to attend a high-profile international biosecurity event, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, and present their paper at a prestigious side event.”

Learn more here.

Apply for the 2024 Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship

“The global norm against biological weapons cannot be maintained without youth voices  being  included  in the multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Youth perspectives are key to create innovative solutions and generate long-term engagement. There are particular benefits to including the perspectives of young people from developing countries, where most of the world’s youth is concentrated.”

“Organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva in partnership with key international actors empowering youth in science diplomacy and global biosecurity, the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship provides a unique learning and networking experience into multilateral discussions taking place in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva.”

“Launched in 2019 as a Biosecurity Diplomacy Workshop, the Youth for Biosecurity Initiative organized its first fellowship in 2023. For the second edition, the fellowship will provide the opportunity for 20 young scientists from the Global South to join an online interactive training programme prior to a field visit during the meeting of the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention in Geneva.”

Learn more here.

WHO Launches a Mobile App for Biosafety Risk Assessment

“WHO has launched the Risk Assessment Tool (RAST) for Biosafety and Laboratory Biosecurity, developed to help with laboratory risk assessment. Laboratory workers are reported to be up to 1000 times more vulnerable to infections compared to the general population.”

“RAST is designed to complement the WHO Laboratory biosafety manual’s (LBM4) risk- and evidence-based approach. It reflects the first two steps of the risk assessment framework outlined in the LBM4: gather information and evaluate the risks. The app aims to increase understanding of hazards and risks, and to promote thorough assessment and adherence to biological safety practices for laboratory staff.”

Learn more here.

Pandora Report 3.3.2023

Happy end to yet another very eventful week! Today we are covering the Department of Energy’s updated assessment on the start of the pandemic, the subsequent discourse, the IC’s assessment on Havana syndrome, the newly-signed NSM 19, and Iran’s investigation into alleged poisonings of schoolgirls.

Spy Agencies Gone Wild RE: COVID-19 Origins? Not Quite…

This week, the Department of Energy (DOE) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provided assessments and statements indicating that they believe the initial spread of SARS-CoV-2 was the result of a lab leak in Wuhan. The initial firestorm was kicked off by a Wall Street Journal article with a less-than-helpful headline regarding DOE’s delivery of an assessment to the White House. In the following days, the FBI director provided statements indicating his agencies reached the same conclusion. Subsequent discussion has been rife with poor understandings of the Intelligence Community (IC) and intelligence itself, in addition to flawed claims about what these assessments actually mean. This section aims to break down what all has happened in this area this week and highlight the intrinsically interdisciplinary nature of intelligence and national security more broadly.

What Actually Happened This Week

As previously mentioned, the Wall Street Journal published an article on Sunday entitled “Lab Leak Most Likely Origin of COVID-19 Pandemic, Energy Department Now Says” to much uproar from all matter of folks. The assessment referenced by the article stemmed from analysis conducted by Z-Division at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which led DOE to conclude “as part of a new government-wide intelligence assessment that a lab accident was most likely the triggering event for the world’s worst pandemic in a century.”

As the Washington Post explains, “…other intelligence agencies involved in the classified update — completed in the past few weeks and kept under wraps — were divided on the question of covid-19’s origins, with most still maintaining that a natural, evolutionary “spillover” from animals was the most likely explanation. Even the Energy Department’s analysis was carefully hedged, as the officials expressed only “low confidence” in their conclusion, according to U.S. officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe a classified report.”

“U.S. officials confirmed that an updated assessment of covid-19’s origins was completed this year, and said the document was based on fresh data as well as new analysis by experts from eight intelligence agencies and the National Intelligence Council.” Furthermore, the IC remains firm in its view that SARS-CoV-2 was absolutely not developed as a biological weapon.

Of course, this news sparked a lot of conversation from lab leak and natural origin proponents alike. As NPR notes:

…at the end of the day, the origin of the pandemic is also a scientific question. Virologists who study pandemic origins are much less divided than the U.S. intelligence community. They say there is “very convincing” data and “overwhelming evidence” pointing to an animal origin.

In particular, scientists published two extensive, peer-reviewed papers in Science in July 2022, offering the strongest evidence to date that the COVID-19 pandemic originated in animals at a market in Wuhan, China. Specifically, they conclude that the coronavirus most likely jumped from a caged wild animal into people at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, where a huge COVID-19 outbreak began in December 2019.

Virologist Angela Rasmussen, who contributed to one of the Science papers, says the DOE’s “low confident” conclusion doesn’t “negate the affirmative evidence for zoonotic [or animal] origin nor do they add any new information in support of lab origin.”

“Many other [news] outlets are presenting this as new conclusive proof that the lab origin hypothesis is equally as plausible as the zoonotic origin hypothesis,” Rasmussen wrote in an email to NPR, “and that is a misrepresentation of the evidence for either.”

The FBI also re-iterated its moderate confidence assessment that the virus originated in a lab, with FBI Director Christopher Wray highlighting this in an interview with Fox News. To summarize, the FBI maintained its moderate confidence assessment that the COVID-19 pandemic began with a lab accident, DOE changed its view to that above, and the CIA and another agency remain undecided as they did in the 2021 unclassified assessment. The others continue to favor a natural origin. So where does that leave us?

The Breakdown

As this discussion has been fraught with confusion about the IC, we will cover some brief basics about the IC’s structure and work. First, the IC is broad and diverse. It is composed of 18 organizations, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the 17 constituent organizations that report to ODNI. ODNI and the Central Intelligence Agency are independent organizations. Nine others are Department of Defense elements (including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National-Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the DoD service intelligence elements). Seven other organizations are elements of other departments and agencies. These include the “Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and US Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis.”

Naturally, each of these agencies has its strong suits and purposes, though there is intentional overlap. The intelligence failures in the lead up to the events of September 11, 2001, significantly changed the IC, bringing the abolition of the Director of Central Intelligence, the establishment of ODNI and the Director of National Intelligence position, creation of new agencies and restructurings of existing ones, and an overall effort to improve coordination, collaboration, and communication in the community. The main failure in the case of 9/11 was in not “connecting the dots”, so there have been strong efforts to make agencies share information in a timely, useful manner. Of course, this has not made the IC immune to failures, but it has been a positive step in improving coordination and creating appropriate overlap that can help provide more comprehensive intelligence to decision makers.

Furthermore, far from simply being “spy stuff”, intelligence draws on broad expertise and knowledge sources in a cycle of evaluation and feedback. In fact, it is estimated that about 80% of intelligence relies on open information, including news and academic sources. Information gaps and limitations may require further collection, but the bulk of information is often times openly available. Furthermore, the community is simply not full of a bunch of spies. For example, in 2003, it was estimated that just 10% of the CIA’s workforce were clandestine officers-the ones that recruit sources and go on covert missions like you might see in the movies. The rest are all kinds of analysts, mission management and admin folks, and even all kinds of scientists, physicians, public health experts, and so on. Agencies oftentimes have entire directorates dedicated to S&T work, and there are entire sub-organizations dedicated to specific S&T-related topics, including the National Center for Medical Intelligence.

There is also confusion about how analysts conduct their work. The 2011 IC Consumers Guide referenced by many news outlets and scholars discussing these assessments and their confidence levels explains how analysts conduct their work. It reads in part “Intelligence analysts are generally assigned to a particular geographic or functional specialty area. Analysts obtain information from all sources pertinent to their area of responsibility through information collection, processing, and forwarding systems. Analysts may tap into these systems to obtain answers to specific questions or to generate information they may need.”

“Analysts receive incoming information, evaluate it, test it against other information and against their personal knowledge and expertise, produce an assessment of the current status of a particular area under analysis, and then forecast future trends or outcomes. The analyst also develops requirements for the collection of new information…Analysts rarely work alone; they operate within a system that includes peer review and oversight by more senior analysts.

With this information in mind, it is clear that statements that paint the IC as a hive mind that produces assessments on political whims without oversight, methodologies, or internal review processes are unhelpful and untrue. Though it is not publicly known who specifically wrote these assessments, it is reasonable to believe they were made in good faith and in accordance with the above information. In addition to personal knowledge and expertise, importantly, IC analysts do have access to classified information-a fact seemingly overlooked by many in the last week.

One of the main points of confusion in public discussion of this has centered on why the Department of Energy is making an assessment on the origins of a virus. It is true that the Department of Energy, as the name implies, oversees national energy policy and manages nuclear power and weapons, but that is not its only tasking. In fact, the idea that eventually led to the Human Genome Project was conceived in the Department’s Office of Science. DOE has an intelligence element (as referenced above) and also oversees the National Laboratories, a broad system that aims to address critical scientific challenges “from combating climate change to discovering the origins of our universe”. Three of these laboratories (Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia) are National Nuclear Security Administration labs, meaning they do work related to nuclear weapons in addition to other kinds of research-including global security research. The labs do work in conjunction with other organizations and, in some cases, support the IC. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, for example, has its Laboratory Intelligence Program, which has been at the heart of this frenzy and provides “critical science and technology support to the intelligence community’s foundational intelligence missions in strategic intelligence and anticipatory intelligence, as well as mission objectives in counterproliferation, cyber intelligence and counterterrorism.” The point is-DOE is not just a bunch of physicists working on the nuclear weapons stockpile. The Department is as large and diverse as its taskings, including those requiring expertise in the life and social sciences.

Much attention has also been paid to the confidence levels of the assessments. WSJ noted later in its piece that the assessment was made with low confidence, a term used by analysts when “…information used in the analysis is scant, questionable, fragmented, or that solid analytical conclusions cannot be inferred from the information, or that the IC has significant concerns or problems with the information sources.” Unfortunately, this information is not particularly helpful for the general public as the assessment itself is classified, so it is not known what information led to the assessment and why specifically it was rated low confidence. Analytical confidence can be influenced by several factors, including analyst expertise (which is likely limited given the nature of this specific assessment), time constraints, source reliability and corroboration, and more.

As ODNI identified in its unclassified October 2021 Intelligence Community Assessment on COVID-19 Origins, at the time, four elements and the National Intelligence Council also assessed with low confidence that initial SARS-CoV-2 infection was likely caused by natural exposure to an infected animal. One agency (the FBI) was noted to assess that the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most likely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident. This assessment was made with moderate confidence, which “…generally indicates that the information being used in the analysis may be interpreted in various ways, or that the IC has alternative viewpoints on the significance or meaning of the information, or that the information is credible and plausible but it is not sufficiently corroborated to warrant a higher level of confidence.” At that time, three other IC elements remained unable to coalesce around either explanation. Again, however, these assessments are classified, so there is no way of knowing why they were judged this way in the open source.

Others have taken aim at a low confidence assessment finding a lab origin “very likely”, arguing that these terms are mutually exclusive. Analytic confidence is separate from the estimative language employed by the IC. Estimative language (“very likely”, “almost certainly”, “unlikely”, etc.) expresses an assessment or judgement. Assessments are oftentimes based on incomplete information, which is why analysts use estimative language to express the likelihood or probability of something given what information is available. Because information gaps are inherent to this work, these products include declarations of underlying assumptions and judgements analysts made in their processes. Confidence levels “reflect the scope and quality of the information supporting its judgements.” In fact, to avoid confusion, the ODNI indicates that a confidence level and degree of likelihood should not be included in the same sentence. Again, as these assessments are classified, we do not know what assumptions were made nor what sources were used. However, it is possible and okay to judge that something is very likely with low confidence, particularly when dealing with something as complex as the origin of this virus.

The Bottom Line

Flashy news headlines aside, what have we really learned from these reports? Well…not much. It was well-established in late 2021 that the IC is unclear on the origins of SARS-CoV-2, and the events of this week have not settled that debate. As the NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications, John Kirby, told the press this week, “There is not a consensus right now in the U.S. government about exactly how covid started…That work is still ongoing, but the president believes it’s really important that we continue that work and that we find out as best we can how it started so that we can better prevent a future pandemic.”

Furthermore, it is important to address the question of to what extent we can know this and what it would change at this point. China is clearly not going to cooperate on any kind of investigation into COVID-19’s origin. That has been clear since the early days of the pandemic and is part of a pattern of behavior on the part of the CCP. Irrespective of where this virus actually came from, it is clear that China did cover up its initial spread in the population, censoring netizens and healthcare professionals until it was impossible to conceal further. While an in-depth investigation into the start of this pandemic has always been needed, hyper focusing on this runs the risk of diverting attention from other critical issues we have much more information readily available on. China did cover up the initial spread of this virus and has been disingenuous in its reporting and handling of it ever since. The United States failed to adequately respond to this pandemic for a variety of reasons, a fact that does not depend on how the virus initially spread. It is vital to balance desires to find the truth of COVID-19’s origins, something that is indisputably important, with using the information that is available and can reasonably be acquired to address these problems before the next pandemic. This information could inform debates on laboratory safety and oversight, though, as Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz demonstrated in his interview with the New York Times this week, there is a wealth of information available already driving these discussions.

Finally, this all demonstrates the intrinsically inter/multidisciplinary and cross-sectoral nature of these problems. False dichotomies pitting national defense against public health, particularly in terms of funding, are not helpful, particularly as it is increasingly clear that public health threats are critical national security threats. As the IC learned in the early years of this century, siloing information is incredibly dangerous-a lesson we cannot afford to have to re-learn at the intersection of public health and national security. While respect for expertise and experience is an absolute necessity, understanding the need to collaborate, work across lanes, and recognize what unique capabilities others can offer is equally vital. These threats are not going anywhere, so learning to understand how different disciplines approach these problems and how best to work together is of the utmost importance.

New ICA-Havana Syndrome Very Likely Not Caused by Foreign Adversary

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines released a statement this week regarding the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the mysterious “Havana syndrome”, indicating the IC finds it very unlikely a foreign adversary is responsible for the phenomenon. The Washington Post writes “The new intelligence assessment caps a years-long effort by the CIA and several other U.S. intelligence agencies to explain why career diplomats, intelligence officers and others serving in U.S. missions around the world experienced what they described as strange and painful acoustic sensations. The effects of this mysterious trauma shortened careers, racked up large medical bills and in some cases caused severe physical and emotional suffering.”

The DNI Statement reads in part “Today we are sharing key judgments and investigative efforts from our Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Anomalous Health Incidents (AHIs). This assessment builds on the Intelligence Community’s (IC) interim findings released last year, which described the IC’s judgment that U.S. adversaries, including Russia, were not engaged in a global campaign resulting in AHIs, but indicated that we continued to investigate whether a foreign actor was involved in a subset of cases. Since then, we continue to surge resources and expertise across the government to explore all possible explanations.”

“Based on the latest IC-wide effort, which has resulted in an ICA that will be issued today, I can share with you that most IC agencies have now concluded that it is “very unlikely” a foreign adversary is responsible for the reported AHIs. IC agencies have varying confidence levels because we still have gaps given the challenges collecting on foreign adversaries — as we do on many issues involving them.”

President Biden Signs National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security

This week, President Biden signed National Security Memorandum (NSM) 19 to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security. According to the White House, “This comprehensive new strategy advances several of President Biden’s most enduring national security priorities: protecting our nation and the international community from the existential threats posed by WMD terrorism and preventing non-state actors from using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.”

Among its central aims is that of keeping radioactive materials used in industry out of terrorists’ hands, notes the New York Times. The same article explains that “Details of the new memorandum are classified. Previous versions of the policy focused on securing fissile material commonly used in nuclear weapons such as the ones the United States used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The effort focuses on specific radioisotopes that terrorists could potentially use in so-called dirty bombs — improvised weapons that use explosives to blast radiological materials into the surrounding area, potentially sickening or killing people and causing environmental harm.”

President Biden’s Homeland Security Advisor, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, explained the impact of NSM 19 on the medical field at an event at the Nuclear Threat Initiative: “In her remarks, the homeland security adviser said that medical devices for treating blood with X-rays — a process that makes transfusions safer — have traditionally used cesium-137 as the radioactive source to produce those rays, but that alternatives that use less dangerous materials now exist…The Department of Veterans Affairs, which manages the largest public health care network in the country, recently removed all cesium-based blood irradiators from its hospitals, she said, and transitioned in October to machines that produce X-rays though different processes.”

This comes just over a month after a small quantity of cesium-137 went missing in Western Australia, prompting a large search for the tiny cylinder that lasted six days.

Iran Investigating Reports of Schoolgirl Poisonings

Iran announced this week it is investigating reports that several schoolgirls were poisoned as revenge for the role of young women in recent protests in the country. The Guardian explains “Iran’s deputy education minister, Younes Panahi, told reporters yesterday: “After the poisoning of several students in [the city of] Qom … it was found that some people wanted all schools, especially girls’ schools, to be closed.” He added: “It has been revealed that the chemical compounds used to poison students are not war chemicals … the poisoned students do not need aggressive treatment and a large percentage of the chemical agents used are treatable.”

Dan Kaszeta, author of multiple well-known works on chemical weapons, discussing Iran’s investigation

“Report: A Summary on Ending Biological Threats-Event Summary”

From the Council on Strategic Risks: “This report summarizes discussions held during a workshop hosted by the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) on September 26, 2022, focused on ending extreme risks from biological threats. For several years, CSR has convened diverse experts who agree that it is more feasible than ever to halt the spread of infectious disease threats from all sources before they cause significant damage. After several years of virtual discussions during the heights of the COVID-19 pandemic, this in-person, invitation-only event brought together experts from government, academia, industry, and non-profit organizations to discuss how to use technological advances, policy, and other tools to gauge progress, identify open questions and ongoing challenges, and think strategically about what steps must be done next.”

“Conversations and panels held during “The Summit on Ending Biological Threats” were held under the Chatham House Rule. This report does not represent consensus among participants, nor does it assign specific perspectives to any individual participant. Though many topics were covered throughout the Summit, conversation centered around a few core subject areas: pathogen early warning, public-private collaboration, interagency efforts and collaboration, and strategic communications. This summary report will discuss these central topics and provide a general overview of discussions.”

“A Bipartisan Approach to Pandemic Security? It’s Within Reach”

Beth Cameron, Gary Edson, and J. Stephen Morrison recently published this opinion piece with STAT News in which they discuss the findings of the “Democracy and Pandemic Security” roundtable convened by their respective organizations. They write in part “Covid-19 laid bare persistent inequities across America. Polarization, a comorbidity that made the pandemic worse, continues to impede a unified and effective response to public health threats, and not just those caused by viruses. When the next threat emerges — and it will — it is uncertain if most Americans will adhere to public health measures.”

“That is why our organizations — the Brown University School of Public Health Pandemic Center, the Covid Collaborative, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies Global Health Policy Center — recently convened a diverse group of leaders to discuss how to better protect Americans from pandemic threats while at the same time reinforcing American values of freedom and democracy. The group included former governors and mayors; officials from red, blue, and purple states and from the Biden, Trump, Obama, and Bush administrations; as well as experts in incident management and pandemic inequity.”

“Prevention of Zoonotic Spillover”

From the WHO: “The devastating impact of COVID-19 on human health globally has prompted extensive discussions on how to better prepare for and safeguard against the next pandemic. Zoonotic spillover of pathogens from animals to humans is recognized as the predominant cause of emerging infectious diseases and as the primary cause of recent pandemics.”

“This spillover risk is increased by a range of factors (called drivers) that impact the nature, frequency and intensity of contact between humans and wild animals. Many of these drivers are related to human impact, for instance, deforestation and changes in land use and agricultural practices. While it is clear that the triad of prevention-preparedness-response (P-P-R) is highly relevant, there is much discussion on which of these three strategic activities in the field of emerging infectious disease should be prioritized and how to optimally target resources. For this, it is important to understand the scope of the respective activity and the consequences of prioritization. “

Read this position paper here.

“WHO Warns of Worsening Health Situation in Ukraine”

This Devex Inside Development piece discusses the WHO’s data on health care in Ukraine since Russia invaded the country last year. It reads in part “About 44% of people in liberated areas are seeking health care for chronic conditions, such as kidney and heart disease. One in 3 people can no longer afford to buy medicines. An estimated 10 million people may have a mental health condition. All this is happening against a backdrop of continued attacks on health care in the country. Since the war started, WHO has recorded more than 800 attacks on health care, a huge majority of which damaged or destroyed facilities, including hospitals and pharmacies.”

Third International Summit on Human Genome Editing

The Royal Society will host this hybrid summit March 6-8, 8:30- 6 pm GMT. “Building on previous events held in Washington, DC (2015) and Hong Kong (2018), the London meeting will continue the global dialogue on somatic and germline human genome editing. Major themes for discussion include developments in clinical trials and genome editing tools such as CRISPR/Cas9, as well as social, ethical and accessibility considerations these scientific developments entail.”

“The three-day Summit is being organised by the Royal Society, the UK Academy of Medical Sciences, the US National Academies of Sciences and Medicine and The World Academy of Sciences. Find out more about the Summit’s Organising Committee, chaired by Professor Robin Lovell-Badge FMedSci FRS.”

Register here.

Report LaunchPreparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the CWC: A Guide to the Issues

“The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is pleased to invite you to the in-person launch of a new report on Preparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Issues. This is the first in a series of events the Institute is hosting in preparation for the Fifth CWC Review Conference, which is scheduled to take place from 15 to 19 May 2023.” One version will be hosted in The Hague on Monday, March 6 from 12:30-14:30 CET and another in Brussels on Tuesday, March 7 from 12:30-14:30 CET. Both will also be broadcast via Zoom.

Penetrate, Exploit, Disrupt, Destroy – with Dr. Craig J. Wiener

From the Alperovitch Institute: “Join us on Wednesday, March 15th at 5pm at the SAIS Hopkins Kenney Auditorium. Dr. Craig J. Wiener is recognized as an expert in major foreign adversary espionage, sabotage and strategic capabilities that pose threats to the U.S. Government (USG) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dr. Wiener’s previous position was as the Senior Technical Analyst for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence where he fulfilled a role as DOE’s lead all source cyber threat analyst, the Department’s representative to the National Security Council for Cyber Operations, a key member of National Intelligence Council Special Analytic Groups, and a government briefer and/or advisor for Defense Science Board studies on Cyber as a Strategic Capability, Homeland Defense, Strategic Surprise and the future of US Military Superiority among other topics. Additionally, Dr. Wiener initiated and led studies for special nuclear weapons related threat and vulnerability analyses and advanced technical security threats to USG equities by foreign adversaries and engaged in the development, planning and operationalization of counter-adversary strategies across multiple domains of operations. Dr. Wiener joined the MITRE Corporation as a Technical Fellow in early-2020, where he supports key U.S. Government (USG) national security initiatives. He was recently appointed by the Secretary of Energy to the Electricity Advisory Committee to advise DOE on current and future electric grid reliability, resilience, security, sector interdependence, and policy issues.”

Dr. Wiener is an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD Program! Learn more and register for this event here.

Intelligence Studies Consortium

“On March 24, 2023, the Intelligence Studies Consortium is convening its third symposium, entitled New Perspectives in Intelligence Studies. This year, George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting. The symposium will be from 8 AM to 4 PM in Rooms 125-126 Van Metre Hall, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA. The closest Metro is Virginia Square/GMU on the Orange and Silver lines.

The symposium will feature student presentations in four panels:

  • Russia and China
  • Violent Non-State Actors
  • Emerging Technologies
  • Transnational Challenges

There will be an 8:30 AM keynote address from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Shannon Corless, and a lunchtime conversation with General Michael V. Hayden.

We encourage students to attend in person. We have also provided a livestream option for those not in the Washington DC area.”

Learn more and register here.

Charity Entrepreneurship 2023 Charity Ideas

Charity Entrepreneurship currently has a call open to support the launch of a nonprofit in Biosecurity and Large-Scale Global Health. Possible organizations includes: “An organization that addresses antimicrobial resistance by advocating for better (pull) funding mechanisms to drive the development and responsible use of new antimicrobials,” and “An advocacy organization that promotes academic guidelines to restrict potentially harmful “dual-use” research.” Learn more and apply for these grants here.

Sustainable Diagnostic Containment Laboratories – Request for Expressions of Interest

“This Expression of Interest (RFEI) is seeking bold ideas that will reinvent the diagnostic laboratory, making it fit-for-purpose in resource-limited contexts globally. These innovative solutions are expected to reimagine the physical laboratory in order to reduce ongoing operational and maintenance costs and allow sustainable presence of safe and secure handling of high-consequence pathogenic materials, whilst maintaining and/or optimizing core functions of a diagnostic laboratory in low- and middle- income countries.”

“This RFEI represents Phase I of a dual-phase approach to development of a Grand Challenge for Sustainable Diagnostic Laboratories. The pool of Expressions of Interest received will be used to inform the scope of a full Grand Challenge program in Phase II, under which Grand Challenges Canada will award funding. Submission of an Expression of Interest does not constitute an application for funding; however, Expressions of Interest will receive feedback from an external review process designed to improve the quality of full proposals submitted for an open call for funding applications in Phase II. Most promising Expressions of Interest may also be shortlisted for direct invitations to submit full proposals for funding in Phase II.”

Learn more and register here.

Weekly Trivia Question

You read the Pandora Report every week and now it’s time for you to show off what you know! The first person to send the correct answer to biodefense@gmu.edu will get a shout out in the following issue (first name last initial). This week, we are throwing it back to middle school English class: This chemical agent features in Roald Dahl’s famous short story, The Landlady, in which the main character is given a tea that tastes of bitter almonds. What is the name of this agent?

The correct answer to last week’s question, “What is the first multilateral disarmament treaty that banned an entire category of WMD?” is the Biological Weapons Convention.