Author: Siddha Hover

Fall 2013 Biodefense Policy Seminar Line Up

by Siddha Hover, posted in Biodefense Policy Seminar, Events

The Biodefense Policy Seminars are monthly talks focused on biodefense and biosecurity broadly conceived. Free and open to the public, they feature leading figures within the academic, security, industry, and policy fields. Launched in the Spring of this year, the Seminars have been a tremendous success. Our Fall lineup features leaders from across the government and academic sectors, including Dr. Daniel Dogden at ASPR, Dr. Paul Walker of Green Cross, and Dr. Kathleen Vogel.

Fall 2013 Biodefense Policy Seminars

September Seminar: “The ABCs of Including Special Populations in Biodefense and Public Health Preparedness”
Speaker: Dr. Daniel Dodgen
Date: Tuesday, September 17th, 2013 at 7:20 PM
Where: Meese Conference Room, Mason Hall, GMU Fairfax Campus

daniel_dodgenJoin us as Dr. Daniel Dodgen discusses the importance of including special populations in Biodefense & Public Health planning. Dr. Dodgen is the Director for At-Risk Individuals, Behavioral Health, and Community Resilience in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). His office is tasked with ensuring that HHS is developing policies and capabilities for emergency planning, response, and recovery activities that integrate at-risk individuals (including children), behavioral health, and community resilience. Dr. Dodgen also served as the Executive Director of the White House directed national advisory group on disaster mental health, and played a coordinating role in the federal response to Hurricanes Sandy, Gustav, Ike, and Dean; the H1N1 epidemic, the BP oil spill, the Sandy Hook school shooting, and other natural and manmade disasters.

October Seminar Title: “Syria and Chemical Weapons: Building a World Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction”
Speaker: Dr. Paul Walker
Date: October 16, 2013 at 7:20PM
Location: Meese Conference Room, Mason Hall, GMU Fairfax Campus

Paul-Walker_imagePaul Walker will join us to discuss Syrian proliferation concerns. Dr. Walker is the International Director of the Environmental Security and Sustainability (ESS) Program for Green Cross International (GCI) and manages the Washington DC office for GCI and its US national affiliate, Global Green USA. The ESS Program is an international effort to facilitate and advocate the safe and environmentally sound demilitarization, nonproliferation, and remediation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons stockpiles.  Walker has worked, spoken, and published widely in the related areas of international security, threat reduction, non-proliferation, weapons demilitarization, and environmental security for over three decades and took part in the first on-site inspection by US officials of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile at Shchuch’ye in the Kurgan Oblast in 1994. Since that time he has worked closely with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), US and Russian officials, the US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, the G-8 Global Partnership, and other multilateral regimes to help foster cooperative, timely, and safe elimination of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and related systems. He has helped to permanently eliminate over 50,000 tons of chemical weapons and millions of munitions in six countries to date. Dr. Walker was also recently awarded the 2013 Right Livelihood Award, widely known as the alternate Nobel Peace Prize. To read more about the award and Dr. Walker’s work, visit their website here.

November Seminar Title: Project BACHUS: Forecasting Bioweapons Threats with Experiment and Demonstration
Speaker: Kathleen Vogel
Date: November 21, 2013, 7:20PM
Location: Meese Conference Room, Mason Hall,  GMU Fairfax Campus

20110912_Fall Scholars 2011Dr. Vogel will describe a 1990s bioweapons threat assessment that involved setting up a mock bioweapons production facility as an “experiment”. The talk will discuss the difference between a scientific experiment and scientific demonstration and why it is important to interrogate what things are labeled as “experiments” and the implications that has for bioweapons assessments. Kathleen Vogel is an associate professor at Cornell, with a joint appointment in the Department of Science and Technology Studies and the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. Vogel holds a Ph.D. in biological chemistry from Princeton University. Prior to joining the Cornell faculty, Vogel was appointed as a William C. Foster Fellow in the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction in the Bureau of Nonproliferation. Vogel has also spent time as a visiting scholar at the Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories and the Center for Nonprolif­eration Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Her research focuses on studying the social and technical dimensions of bioweapons threats and the production of knowledge in intelligence assessments on WMD issues.

Koblentz on NPR discussing Syria

by Siddha Hover, posted in Media Notes

Dr. Koblentz was featured in two radio interviews last Friday. The first interview, “Why Do Chemical Weapons Evoke Such A Strong Reaction?” appeared as a part of NPR’s All Things Considered.  In the interview, Dr. Koblentz discusses the implications of chemical weapons as “dreaded risks”. Listen to the timely piece here. The second piece, “Syria’s Chemical Arsenal” was featured during the Background Briefing with Ian Masters, and is available here.

This Week in DC: Events

by Siddha Hover, posted in Events, Week In DC

Welcome back everyone! With Congress in session again, DC is alive and humming once more. As always, the week’s most interesting (and free) events in national security, foreign policy, and where possible, science.

Monday, September 9th, 2013

An Evening with Former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff
Elliot School
7:00PM – 8:00PM

The George Washington University International Affairs Society will be hosting the Honorable Michael Chertoff, Former Secretary of Homeland Security (2005-2009), for a discussion on homeland security challenges and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s role in shaping domestic security policy. Secretary Chertoff will also reflect on his tenure at the Department and the challenges that it faces ahead.

Tuesday, September 10th, 2013

Beyond Benghazi: Libya’s Transition and the Future of US-Libyan Relations
Freedom House
12:00 – 2:00PM

September 11, 2013 will mark the one-year anniversary of the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi and the tragic loss of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans. Since then, a deteriorating security situation and growing political chaos signal a country plunging into a deeper state of crisis. Yet Libya’s transition remains critical to the security and political development of the region. What are the main challenges confronting Libya’s transition? Who are the key players in the political realm, and what are the key political dynamics? What are the prospects for the National Dialogue? What role can the United States play to positively influence Libya’s transition? Please join us for a discussion of these and other questions appraising developments in Libya since the tragic events in Benghazi and the crucial steps the US can take to help Libya establish itself as a stable, secure democracy.

Prospects for a Diplomatic Solution with Iran
American Security Project
12:30 – 2:00PM

Tensions with Iran have brought negotiations on nuclear issues to a standstill. Could the election of President Rouhani provide an opening to more productive negotiations? Join us for a conversation on the current state and future prospects for diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear program with Joel Rubin, Policy Director for the Ploughshares Fund; Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Council for Foreign Relations; and Greg Thielmann, Senior Fellow at the Arms Control Association.

Al Qaeda Today
American Enterprise Institute
1:00 – 3:00 PM

Al Qaeda continues to pose a significant threat to the US. The increasing danger has been obscured by confusion about what the current al Qaeda network actually is and how to understand its ramifications. As a result, the US has no coherent strategy for addressing this threat and is making decisions about its military forces, the capabilities of its intelligence services, and its reactions to crises in the Middle East that are profoundly endangering US national security. Understanding the enemy is imperative. Join us on September 10 as Katherine Zimmerman of AEI’s Critical Threats Project releases a groundbreaking paper describing the state of the al Qaeda network, drawing on granular analysis not only of the core al Qaeda group but also of its affiliates and associates that have taken root worldwide.

Wednesday, September 11th, 2013

Trident Alternatives: What Next for British Nuclear Forces?
Brookings
2:00PM – 3:00PM

For 20 years, the British nuclear deterrent has rested on Trident nuclear-armed missiles carried by four Royal Navy Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines, at least one of which is continuously at sea. The British government is now considering how to maintain a nuclear deterrent after the Vanguard submarines are retired. This summer, the UK concluded a study looking at a range of alternatives, including options other than Trident missiles and options that would no longer maintain a continuous at-sea deterrent presence. On September 11, the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings will host a talk by Danny Alexander, chief secretary to Her Majesty’s Treasury, on the study and how Britain should adjust its future nuclear posture to take account of new financial realities. Franklin Miller of the Scowcroft Group will offer commentary, and Brookings Visiting Fellow Ian Wallace will moderate a discussion with questions from the audience.

Pakistan’s Peace with the Taliban: Is it Possible?
Young Professionals in Foreign Policy
6:30PM – 7:00PM

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1373 authorizing the use of force in Afghanistan. The US and its allies intervened militarily and launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October of 2001. The goal of OEF was to disrupt, destroy and oust al Qaeda and their Taliban host from Afghanistan. However, after twelve years of military operations and state building the US, their allies and the Afghan government have been unable to stabilize the Afghan state and defeat the insurgency. On the other side of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Pakistan has been battling an insurgency within it’s own borders. The Pakistani Taliban, the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) and various Islamist militant groups based inside the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) seek resistance against the Pakistani state, enforcement of their interpretation of sharia law and a plan to unite against NATO-led forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan has carried out several major military operations in the region and has suffered thousands of casualties. Can Pakistan’s government even really consider talking to the Taliban? Where should the line be drawn when talking peace?

Thursday, September 12th, 2013

Twenty Years After Oslo: The Search for Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
8:15AM – 12:00PM

A panel of U.S. and regional experts assesses the legacy of the 1993 Oslo Accords and the outlook for progress toward peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

The Longevity of Human Civilization: Will We Survive Our World-Changing Technologies?
Baruch S. Blumberg NASA/Library of Congress Astrobiology Symposium
8:30AM – 4:30PM

Will human civilization on Earth be imperiled, or enhanced, by our own world-changing technologies? Will our technological abilities threaten our survival as a species, or even threaten the Earth as a whole, or will we come to live comfortably with these new powers? Baruch S. Blumberg NASA/Library of Congress Chair in Astrobiology David Grinspoon convenes scientists, humanists, journalists, and authors to explore these questions from a wide range of perspectives, and to discuss the future of human civilization in an anthropocene world.

US-Iran Reconciliation Under President Rouhani?
Atlantic Council
9:30AM

The August 4th presidential inauguration of veteran national security official Hassan Rouhani has raised expectations for progress nearly thirty-four years after the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran. Given Rouhani’s diplomatic demeanor and less confrontational rhetoric in comparison to his predecessor, many analysts see potential for de-escalating the nuclear crisis through Iranian concessions and US compromise on sanctions against Iran. Panelists will discuss the prospects for direct talks and progress in multilateral negotiations and dissect internal factors influencing the chances for reconciliation, including Rouhani’s new cabinet and the amount of leeway the new President is likely to receive from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Reset the Reset? The Future of U.S.-Russia Relations
The Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies/Elliot School
12:00 – 2:00PM

In cancelling his planned summit earlier this month with Russian President Vladimir Putin, President Obama suggested it was time to “take a pause, reassess where it is that Russia is going, what our core interests are, and calibrate the relationship.” So how might the U.S.-Russia relationship be calibrated, given core U.S. interests and Russias domestic trajectory? Kimberly Marten, Robert Orttung, and Cory Welt will lead a discussion of U.S.-Russia security relations, the nature of Russian foreign policy decision-making, and the impact of Russian domestic developments on U.S.-Russia relations.

Friday, September 13th, 2013

Technology-Strategy Seminar: NATO’s AirLand Battle Strategy and Future Extended Deterrence
CSIS
9:00 – 11:00AM

NATO’s culminating military strategy in the end-game of the Cold War was AirLand Battle. Tailored for deterrence and to win if deterrence failed, AirLand Battle was also structured to account for the political necessities of assurance and NATO cohesion. Cold War assurance and deterrence is essentially the only experience available on which to base thinking about extended deterrence in the future; although of course not all the Cold War lessons may be valid for the future. Dr. Jim Tegnelia and Dr. Rich Wagner were involved in helping to invent and implement AirLand Battle. They will discuss what it was, how it came to be, and how it worked, politically and militarily, and will speculate on lessons for the future.The seminar will be held at CSIS (1800 K St. NW) in the B1C conference room (in the basement), September 13, 9am-11am. A light breakfast will be served. This event is off-the-record.

Book Discussion: Cyber War Will Not Take Place
Wilson Center
12:00 – 1:30PM

About the Book: “Cyber war is coming,” announced a land-mark RAND report in 1993. In 2005, the U.S. Air Force boasted it would now fly, fight, and win in cyberspace, the “fifth domain” of warfare. This book takes stock, twenty years on: is cyber war really coming? Has war indeed entered the fifth domain? Author and former public policy scholar Thomas Rid discusses his new book, Cyber War Will Not Take Place. He argues that the focus on war and winning distracts from the real challenge of cyberspace: non-violent confrontation that may rival or even replace violence in surprising ways.

(image courtesy of Dell)

The Pandora Report 9.6.13

by Siddha Hover, posted in News, Pandora Report

Highlights: The Syrian BW “threat”, MERS vaccine, Nipah, biological weapons in the Philippines, and al Shabaab contributing to polio. Happy Friday!

On Not Falling Prey to Syrian Biological Weapons Alarmism

There have been a lot of articles (starting with the WaPo, and snowballing to the Telegraph, VoR, etc) discussing the “emerging threat” of Syrian biological weapons. Before the rumors grow and plant seeds, we strongly recommend you take a moment to check out Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormely’s excellent rebuttal. Here’s an excerpt from her piece:

“A September 5 Washington Post article raises concern that Syria might resort to biological weapons in retaliation for a Western military strike. The article states that intelligence reports indicate that Syria engaged in bioweapons development in the 1970s and 80s and since then has maintained a “dormant capability,” which some experts interviewed by the Post believe can easily be reactivated to produce biological weapons. it is important to inject a little bit of reality in regard to the question of whether or not Syria might be able to successfully reactivate a “dormant program” and effectively develop and use biological weapons.”

Read the full post here.

MERS Vaccine Passes First Test

The confirmation of another two cases of the Middle Eastern Respiratory Virus in the last week, bringing the global total to 110 cases and 52 fatalities, has the scientific community scrambling to develop a viable vaccine. Now researchers at Loyola Marymount University, working in conjunction with the Erasmus lab in Rotterdam (the same lab who refused to play nice in sharing the MERS genome), have developed a candidate vaccine which can be used in case of a pandemic. However, while the candidate has passed the first pre-clinical trials, if proven efficacious in humans  it would still be at least a year before the vaccine would be ready for production.

Medical Xpress – “The starting point for the new vaccine was a related virus known as Modified Vaccinia virus Ankara (MVA). MVA is an attenuated strain of the virus that causes smallpox, and has been used for more than 30 years for the manufacture of smallpox vaccine. Indeed, MVA is at the heart of a worldwide effort to design and generate vaccines not only against viral pathogens but also against cancers. In this context, MVA serves as the carrier for specific antigens that elicit the production of protective antibodies in the immunized host. MERS-CoV is known to bind to human cells via its so-called spike (S) protein, which is exposed on the surface of its membrane envelope. Sutter and his team therefore used molecular biological methods to introduce the gene for the MERS S protein into the MVA genome.”

Bats spreading deadly virus, Stanford scientist warns

If there’s one thing we’ve learned here at GMU Biodefense, it’s stay good and far away from bats. Whether it’s rabies or MERS, the creatures of the night are bastions for all sorts of nasty diseases.  Now it looks like Pteropus bats in Bangladesh are in the “villain of the week” spotlight. A researcher at Stanford University is voicing concerns over the bats, which range across South East Asia, spreading the deadly virus Nipah.

Stanford News – “Among Nipah’s worrisome traits: Many strains are capable of limited person-to-person transmission, and it is a ribonucleic acid (RNA) virus, which has the highest known rate of mutation among biological agents. If a more efficient human-adapted strain developed, it could spread rapidly in highly populous South Asia before spilling into other regions. The global community must do a better job of estimating and managing the risk, Luby said. That will require stepped-up study of how the virus is transmitted, closer observation of infected people and consideration of vaccinations for at-risk communities.”

Military claims NPA has ‘biological weapons’; Reds laugh off claim

Moving away from the existence, or lack thereof, of Syrian BW, a rebel leader in the Philippines has been accused by the government of using biological weapons. According the Filipino government,  the device in question tested positive for both Enterobacter cloacae and Streptococcus agalacteiae. The government claims the rebels smeared the unexploded landmines with feces. The rebels deny the claims outright. We’ll leave it there.

Inquirer Mindanao – “The military insisted Thursday that the New People’s Army now uses ‘biological weapons’ to further its goal of toppling the government. In a press statement, the Eastern Mindanao Command based here said laboratory examination of unexploded land mines seized from NPA camps in Southern Mindanao showed the presence of ‘deadly toxin’ and bacteria ‘not usually found in steel rebars and nails used as shrapnel.’ The NPA unit operating in the region laughed off this claim, calling it ‘malicious and wildly concocted military propaganda.'”

Somalia: Polio Widespread in Regions Under Al-Shabaab Control

Polio eradication is a bit of a soapbox around here, maybe because as a planet we’ve been so close for so long and because it’s often security issues which hamper efforts. For those of you who have managed to miss our various rants, all but three states – Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – have eradicated the virus. Somalia, despite its numerous failings, worked extremely hard to become polio-free in 2007. The news that the terrorist organization al-Shabaab, which controls large swathes of Southern Somalia, is refusing to allow supplies into territory it controls, while also telling local populations that the vaccine causes AIDS and sterility, is infuriating.

All Africa – “Al-Shabaab’s refusal to allow the supply of the polio vaccine in areas under its control is causing panic among residents at a time when aid workers are struggling to contain an outbreak of the crippling virus.’The polio outbreak plaguing Somalia has spread despite significant efforts to curb the disease,’ the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said in a statement August 15th, adding that insecurity is hampering efforts to contain the virus. Six years after Somalia was declared free of the virus, at least 105 cases have been confirmed in the country, the ‘worst outbreak in the world in a non-endemic country’, according to OCHA.

(image: Hakan Dahlstrom/Flickr)

On Not Falling Prey to Biological Weapons Alarmism in Syria

by Siddha Hover, posted in News, Research Notes

by Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley

A September 5 Washington Post article raises concern that Syria might resort to biological weapons in retaliation for a Western military strike. The article states that intelligence reports indicate that Syria engaged in bioweapons development in the 1970s and 80s and since then has maintained a “dormant capability,” which some experts interviewed by the Post believe can easily be reactivated to produce biological weapons. it is important to inject a little bit of reality in regard to the question of whether or not  Syria might be able to successfully reactivate a “dormant program” and effectively develop and use biological weapons.

First, we need to define more clearly what capabilities are actually available to Syria. If a “dormant capability” means that Syria has maintained from its 1980s program only a handful of research activities, the country will face tremendous difficulties in launching a crash program capable of producing the quantities of agent required for use as a weapon. If we assume — and this is entirely speculation — that Syria already has stocks of pathogens, its first task will be to produce a sufficient amount of liquid agent for weaponization. Scaling-up, however, has been a stiff challenge for both past terrorist and state bioweapons programs. The passage from a laboratory sample to larger quantities of bioagent is not a straightforward linear process. Because microorganisms are sensitive to their environmental and processing conditions, scaling-up has to be incremental, and each stage requires a revision of the production parameters. For example, when the Soviets launched the large-scale production of their anthrax weapon at the Stepnogorsk production plant in Kazakhstan, their scientists could not maintain the lethal qualities of the agent throughout the production process. They were therefore compelled to review and test each parameter of the production protocol at each stage of the scale-up, a process that lasted about two years. Scale-up also exposes the agent to contamination, which further delays production, as was the case in both the U.S and Soviet programs.  Current biodefense and pharmaceutical companies also routinely face such contamination and scale-up challenges.

Second, it is important to determine what type of expertise is currently available to Syria. If Syria maintained minimal research activities over the past 20 years, it is likely that they will face a shortage of expertise at key points of a weapons development. This includes process development, pilot-scale production, large-scale production, testing, dissemination, and weaponization. For example, the Iraqi program had very few experts with knowledge directly applicable to the agents they selected for use as a weapon. They also had only one fermentation expert, and before his involvement in the program, the fermenters purchased for the program remained in their crates for lack of personnel with knowledge on how to use them. The Iraqis also did not have weaponization experts within the bioweapons program. Weaponization work was conducted by individuals involved in the chemical weapons program, and consisted of adapting existing chemical bombs and warheads for bioweapon use. This resulted in very inefficient weapons, designed to disseminate the agent upon impact, which would have destroyed most of the bioagent. It is worth reiterating also that the Iraqis were only able to produce liquid agents, even though they had access to drying equipment. If active bioweapons programs faced such challenges, one can only imagine what problems a “dormant program” might face.

Were the Syrians able to shepherd enough expertise from the civilian sector, it is not clear whether their skills could be directly relevant to support bioweapons work.  The Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo had among its members individuals with scientific education, but their lack of practical experience in bioweapons development imposed a steep learning curve, which after six years of effort and about $10 million dollars of investment, resulted in failures at every step of a bioweapon’s development.  The Iraqi program faced similar issues: most of its scientists had no prior bioweapons expertise and required several years of learning and exploratory work before they could start making some headway.

Access to expertise is not the only challenge facing Syria. Making sure that the teams of scientists, technicians, and engineers work together, coordinate their efforts, and work towards the same goal is as, if not more, important. The lack of coordination and cooperation was a major source of delay and failure in the Soviet program, which was arguably the most successful of all state programs. Yet, if creating the conditions required for such cooperation is difficult under normal conditions, it is even more complicated under the stress of maintaining covertness in times of war, particularly under an authoritarian regime.

In sum, it is important to avoid falling prey to alarmist claims similar to those that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The threat of Syrian bioweapons use merits a careful and systematic analysis of the capabilities currently available to Syria and a more nuanced and holistic  appreciation of the challenges they might face.

———————————————————————————–
Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University and is primarily affiliated the GMU Biodefense graduate program. Professor Ben Ouagrham-Gormley has conducted research and written on such topics as biological weapons proliferation, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) trafficking in states of the former Soviet Union, biosecurity and bioterrorism, export controls, transfer mechanisms of WMD expertise, defense industry conversion, and redirection of WMD experts. She has received several grants from the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy, as well as from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Carnegie Corporation of New York to conduct research on WMD proliferation and contribute to remediation programs such as the DOD-funded Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

(image: CIAT International/Flickr)

What virologists’ dreams are made of: A total viral catalog

by Siddha Hover, posted in News

Believe it or not, we have a tremendous deal to learn about viruses. A lot of huge, fundamental questions about viruses remain unanswered –  are they alive or dead? Where did they originate? How many are there? This last question is in some ways the most feasible to answer, and scientists have begun to do so by examining Indian Flying Fox bats. In a new study, scientists at Columbia university took over a thousand samples from the bat species and scoured them for viruses. They turned up 55 viruses, of which a staggering 50 were hitherto undiscovered. Ten of them are in the same family as Nipah. The scientists now hope to take the viruses found from the Indian Flying Foxes and begin a catalog of viruses which infect the remaining 5,484 known species of mammals. Such a resource, while expensive to produce, would be a huge aid in preparing us for future zoonotic outbreaks.

New York Times – “We might be able to take away this element of surprise if we had a catalog of all the viruses lurking in mammals. As soon as a mysterious epidemic broke out, scientists could turn to the catalog to figure out where the virus came from, potentially gaining some crucial clues to the virus’s biology. But few scientists have ventured to build such a catalog, perhaps because there seemed to be such a vast number of viruses to contend with.’No one’s really been addressing this question, even though it seems like such a fundamental one,’ said Simon J. Anthony, an associate research scientist at Columbia University and a researcher at EcoHealth Alliance, a New York-based scientific research organization.”

Read the full article here.

(image: Fritz Geller-Grimm)

Slide Show: What does a chemical weapon look like?

by Siddha Hover, posted in Images

Image of the Week: What does a chemical weapon look like? While we can’t show you the chemical weapons of Syria (we suggest youtube for that), we can show you images the CIA collected whilst doing analysis of the former Iraqi program. The images below focus on the weapons themselves, and are pulled almost exclusively from various CIA intelligence reports.

This slideshow requires JavaScript.

(header image: CIA)

Koblentz on Syria

by Siddha Hover, posted in Media Notes, News

Dr. Gregory Koblentz, GMU Biodefense Deputy Director and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at CFR,  has made a slew of media appearances recently discussing all aspects of the developments in Syria, including interview with Al Jazeera, two with CTV, and SunTV. His interview last Satruday with CCTV America on the options available to UN inspectors in the embattled state is particularly incisive – watch it below.

 

 

Using AI to Predict a Pandemic

by Siddha Hover, posted in News

Researchers are using “machine learning”, a process by which computers use compiled data to develop algorithms, to try and determine distinctive characteristics of viruses with pandemic potential, like H7N9. It’s hoped that being able to identify these properties will help alert virologists when new strains emerge containing them. Machine learning enables researchers to cross-reference tremendous amounts of data – “hundreds of thousands of flu strains” – to look for similar markers of pathogenicity.

Wired – “‘It’s changing the field radically,’ said Nir Ben-Tal, a computational biologist at Tel Aviv University in Israel. Researchers are also using these approaches to investigate a broad range of viral mysteries, including what makes some viruses more harmful than others and the factors that influence a virus’s ability to trigger an immune response. The latter could ultimately aid the development of flu vaccines. A study published in July analyzed differences in the human immune system’s response to flu, identifying for the first time genetic variants that seem to influence an individual’s ability to fight off H1N1. Machine learning techniques might even accelerate future efforts to identify the animal source of mystery viruses.”

Read more here.

(image: Axs Deny/Flickr)

The Pandora Report 8.30.13

by Siddha Hover, posted in Pandora Report

Highlights include MERS case updates, dengue raging through Central America, Syria’s CW (obviously), eastern equine encephalitis, and the cetacean morbillivirus. Happy Friday, and a very happy Labor Day Weekend to everyone! Stay away from the dolphins!

WHO: MERS global case count 108, 50 deaths 

MERS continues to spread throughout Saudi Arabia, with an additional four cases confirmed today. The total global case count is now 108, with a fatality rate of just below 50%. Two of Saudi Arabia’s four most recent cases involved immunocompromised patients, while the other two are children aged 16 and seven respectively. Interestingly, both children are currently asymptomatic, despite testing positive for the virus. The World Health Organization (WHO) has not recommended travel restrictions to Saudi Arabia, promoting instead strong surveillance and testing measures.

World Health Organization – “Globally, from September 2012 to date, WHO has been informed of a total of 108 laboratory-confirmed cases of infection with MERS-CoV, including 50 deaths.Based on the current situation and available information, WHO encourages all Member States to continue their surveillance for severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) and to carefully review any unusual patterns. Health care providers are advised to maintain vigilance. Recent travellers returning from the Middle East who develop SARI should be tested for MERS-CoV as advised in the current surveillance recommendations”.

Dengue fever epidemic sparks public health emergency in Central America

Central America is currently experiencing a serious Dengue outbreak, with over 120,000 cases in three states across the region. If not effectively contained, a number of external factors will likely result in the outbreak “exploding”. The rainy season in the area is set to last another three months, with high heat resulting in ideal breeding grounds for dengue’s mosquito vector. Containment of the outbreak in Honduras particularly has proven challenging, prompting the state to turn to the Red Cross for help. The 2010 outbreak of dengue in the area lead to 1.6 million cases, of which 49,000 were severe. Dengue eradication efforts are hampered by its infection through four, distinct serotypes, no one of which offers cross-protection against the other three.

The Guardian – “The poor suburbs of Central American capitals are the main targets for campaigns to raise public awareness. Poor housing, the lack of a mains water supply and the accumulation of household waste make such neighbourhoods an ideal breeding ground for mosquitoes. The authorities have dispatched paramedics, police and the military to remote villages in order to stamp out the epidemic in the areas most at risk. Latin America is particularly exposed to dengue epidemics, which recur on a three- to five-year cycle. In 2010 the fever caused 132 deaths. ‘Aedes aegypti was eradicated in the subcontinent in the mid-20th century, but with increasing global trade it returned in the 1970s, from Asia,’ says Philippe Brémond, an epidemiologist at France’s Institute of Research for Development (IRD).”

Syria’s Red Line

We know everyone’s talking about chemical weapons in Syria (ourselves included), and with President Obama now apparently set on unilateral (ugh) military action in the area, we wager everyone will continue to talk about Syria for a good while longer. We’re including Jeanne Guillemin’s review article because it’s a thorough overview of the storied history and political maneuverings of chemical weapons use. Read it and be an expert.

The Boston Review – “When the present crisis in Syria is resolved, as inevitably it will be, the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] must be made universal. It almost is: 188 states adhere to it; 7 are holdouts (Israel, Syria, Egypt, Myanmar, Angola, North Korea, and South Sudan). Syria must allow its chemical weapons to be identified, contained, and destroyed. It should have been done years ago. Israel and Egypt must also be persuaded to join the treaty and comply with it, before more chaos erupts. ‘Almost universal’ is simply not good enough.”

Eastern equine encephalitis threat level raised to ‘high’ in four communities

Ongoing detection of eastern equine encephalitis (EEE) in four communities in Massachusetts has prompted local health authorities to raise threat levels to “high”, encouraging residents to avoid outdoor evening activities until the end of the mosquito season. Although most cases of EEE are aysmptomatic, in severe cases the virus can cause permanent brain damage and death. We can’t remember if we already posted this, but here is an excellent Nature article explaining why it would actually be totally fine if we exterminated all mosquitoes.

Boston – “The EEE threat is high in Easton, Raynham, Taunton, and West Bridgewater. Residents in high-risk areas are urged to avoid evening outdoor events for the remainder of the mosquito season, said the statement from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health…There has been one human case of EEE this year, in a Norfolk County woman in her 80s, who died earlier this month. There were seven cases of EEE in 2012, including three deaths.Symptoms of EEE show up about 3 to 10 days after a person is bit by an infected mosquito and they include high fever, a stiff neck, headache, and lack of energy.”

Because People Will Ask: Measles-like virus may be cause of dolphin deaths on U.S. coast

Included so you can assure concerned friends and families that the virus, which is killing bottlenose dolphins up and down the East Coast, cannot be transmitted to humans. Since July, 333 dolphins – 10 times the normal number for the same period – have died from cetacean morbillivirus, a measles-like virus which is thought to cause immunosuppression.  Virginia’s beaches have seen the highest number of strandings, at 174 n the last couple months. While the virus cannot be transmitted to humans, beach goers are advised not to approach any stranded dolphins, as they may carry other bacterial or fungal infections.

National Geographic – “‘Along the Atlantic seaboard, this [outbreak] is extraordinary,’ Rowles said. The last morbillivirus outbreak in the region occurred from June 1987 to May 1988, and resulted in the deaths of at least 900 bottlenose dolphins. Officials are unsure of how long the current outbreak will last. ‘Typically, outbreaks will last as long as there are susceptible animals,’ Rowles said. But if it plays out like the 1987-1988 outbreak, ‘we’re looking at mortality being higher and morbillivirus traveling southwards and continuing until May 2014,’ she added. Right now, experts think this current outbreak is probably due to a dip in herd immunity.”

(image credit: Jeff Kraus/Flickr)