Category: News

This week, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan shared a statement in regard to the annual report for the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). The World Health Organization (WHO) announced the 26 proposed members of the Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO). The Schar School will be hosting virtual open houses for the Master’s and Certificate Programs! These sessions will take place on 21 October and 16 November at 6:30 PM EST!

New Book – The Molecularisation of Security: Medical Countermeasures, Stockpiling and the Governance of Biological Threats

The Molecularisation of Security: Medical Countermeasures, Stockpiling and the Governance of Biological Threats by Christopher Long investigates the way that the molecular sciences are shaping contemporary security practices in relation to the governance of biological threats. In response to biological threats, such as pandemics and bioterrorism, governments around the world have developed a range of new security technologies, called medical countermeasures, to protect their populations. This book argues that the molecular sciences’ influence has been so great that security practices have been molecularised. Focusing on the actions of international organizations and governments in the past two decades, this book identifies two contrasting conceptions of the nature or inherent workings of molecular life as driving this turn. On the one hand, political notions of insecurity have been shaped by the contingent or random nature of molecular life. On the other, the identification of molecular life’s constant biological dynamics supports and makes possible the development and stockpiling of effective medical countermeasures. This study is one of the few to take seriously the conceptual implications that the detailed empirical workings of biotechnology have on security practices today. Get your copy here.

The São Paulo Declaration on Planetary Health

Humanity, and indeed all of life on Earth, is at a crossroads. Over the past several decades, the scale of human impacts on Earth’s natural systems has increased exponentially to the point where it exceeds our planet’s capacity to absorb our wastes or provide the resources we are using. The result is a vast and accelerating transformation and degradation of nature. This includes not only global climate change but also global scale pollution of air, water, and soil; degradation of our planet’s forests, rivers, coastal, and marine systems; and the sixth mass extinction of life on Earth.

The core insight of planetary health is that these disruptions and degradations of natural systems are a clear and urgent threat not only to the web of life but to humanity itself. The scale of our own environmental impacts is threatening our nutrition and mental health, increasing exposure to infectious diseases and non-communicable diseases, and driving population displacement and conflict. On our current trajectory, we can no longer safeguard human health and wellbeing.

The São Paulo Declaration on Planetary Health is a global call to action from the planetary health community charting a path forward to support a more equitable and resilient post-pandemic world. The Declaration’s cross-cutting recom­mendations were drafted during the 2021 Planetary Health Annual Meeting and Festival in São Paulo, Brazil, concluding with a global consultation of nearly 350 participants from more than 70 countries supported by the United Nations Development Programme.

Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on the Global Health Security Agenda Annual Report

This week, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan shared a statement in regard to the annual report for the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA):

“Over the past two years, the world has learned through hardship and tragedy just how dangerous and disruptive a threat to our global health security can be. More than 4.5 million people around the world have died from the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economy is still struggling to recover. That’s why the Biden-Harris Administration has put global health security back at the top of the US national security agenda—to defeat this pandemic and to invest in strengthening health systems globally so that we are better prepared to prevent, detect, and respond to the next global health threat.

Today, we are releasing the annual report, “Strengthening Health Security Across the Globe: Progress and Impact of United States Government Investments in the Global Health Security Agenda,” which details our progress and impact helping countries build health security capacity through the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) in fiscal year 2020. We are bringing a whole-of-government effort to address global health as a national security imperative, and this report describes how GHSA investments have been critical in advancing the COVID-19 response, and outlines our strategic approach for assisting countries to meet specific targets.

Initially, the GHSA was launched as a 5-year effort that began in 2014, but the success of the program and the incredible global need resulted in another 5-year plan, “GHSA 2024.” GHSA 2024 introduced the bold target of more than 100 countries completing a transparent evaluation of health security capacity, performing planning and resource mobilization to address their gaps, and implementing activities to improve their capacity. This Administration is committed to supporting and strengthening GHSA in the years ahead, and we will continue to use our partner country investments and technical expertise to help achieve the GHSA target.

Improving the capabilities of individual countries and our shared capacity to take on infectious disease threats has never been more important. The United States will continue to work expeditiously to end this pandemic, including by continuing to donate vaccine doses and drive efforts to vaccinate the world, and rally the world to build back better to prevent the next pandemic. It’s going to take ambitious actions to ensure sustained global financing and political leadership, but we can do it. We can invest in saving lives now and creating a more secure and healthy future. The GHSA is a vital part of that work.”

Read the report here.

Public Notice of Proposed New Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO) Members

The World Health Organization (WHO) announced the 26 proposed members of the Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO). The SAGO will advise WHO on technical and scientific considerations regarding the origins of emerging and re-emerging pathogens of epidemic and pandemic potential, and will be composed of a wide range of experts acting in their personal capacity. SAGO will also guide WHO on next steps for understanding the SARS-CoV-2 origins. The proposed members hail from all over the world, and have expertise in a variety of fields, including epidemiology, pathology, microbiology, virology, and genomics. The full list of proposed members can be found here.

An editorial in Science, “Preparing for Disease X,” highlights the importance of the SAGO in its mission to “advise the WHO on developing a framework to define comprehensive studies on the origins of such pathogens, including SARS-CoV-2—information that is essential for developing policies and enhancing preparedness to reduce the possibility of future zoonotic spillover events (transmission of a pathogen from animals to humans) and the chance that those events become major outbreaks.” Read the editorial here.

Biological Weapons

False Allegations of Biological-Weapons Use from Putin’s Russia

Milton Leitenberg, an expert in arms control and weapons of mass destruction, published an article, “False allegations of biological-weapons use from Putin’s Russia,” in The Nonproliferation Review this week. From 1949 until 1988, the Soviet Union conducted a nearly continuous campaign of false allegations of biological-weapon (BW) use by the United States. In 1995, senior Russian military officials revived this pattern of false allegations, which continues to the present day. Russian officials amplified the campaign after the US government funded the transformation of former Soviet BW facilities in the Commonwealth of Independent States under the Nunn–Lugar program. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in China in January 2020 prompted a very greatly expanded Russian-government BW-related disinformation effort. This paper aims to present a reasonably comprehensive account of these activities and to assess their significance. The Russian government under President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated open disdain for both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Read Leitenberg’s article here.

Remarks to United Nations First Committee

Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, gave remarks to the United Nations First Committee regarding the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC):

“The United States remains committed to leading the way on arms control and addressing complex global security challenges.  As President Biden said, we have a national security imperative and moral responsibility to manage and eventually eliminate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.  The extension of New START was the beginning of our effort to resume a leadership role on arms control and nonproliferation.  We are now entering an era of relentless diplomacy, as demonstrated by our Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia, that is focused on building a stable, predictable foundation for the future of arms control.

We must acknowledge that our current strategic environment is one of increased geopolitical tension and competition.  In that context, the United States will sponsor two resolutions this session: the Compliance with Non-Proliferation, Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments and Advancing responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security. Both address an essential element of international peace and security and their adoption would strengthen confidence in international norms.

We are also cognizant that some nations are pursuing policies to undermine the international rules-based order.  The international institutions that we have built over the past several decades are being undercut by autocratic regimes that seek to foster instability to the detriment of us all.  These regimes also pose new nuclear dangers that remind us of the importance of preventing nuclear war, avoiding nuclear arms races, and stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons.

And regrettably, the challenges we face include threats posed by other weapons of mass destruction.  We continue to witness the repeated and abhorrent use of chemical weapons in defiance of long-standing norms and international legal obligations, including the poisoning of Mr. Aleksey Navalny on Russian territory, and the Syrian Arab Republic’s use of chemical weapons.  We must steadfastly call out offenders and hold those who use chemical weapons accountable. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic underscores the need to prevent future outbreaks – whether natural, accidental, or deliberate in origin. We will therefore take action to break the two-decade deadlock over strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention.  At the upcoming Review Conference, we must bring the Convention into the 21st century.  The United States will propose that BWC States adopt and implement specific measures to strengthen the BWC in key areas and take steps to intensively explore measures to strengthen implementation and promote compliance.”

Statement on Biological Weapons UN General Assembly First Committee

Dr. Filippa Lentzos from King’s College London gave a statement on biological weapons to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee that calls for “reaffirming commitments to the BWC and the Geneva Protocol, and reporting on measures taken to implement and strengthen BWC provisions.” Given the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on health, society, and the economy, Lentzos urges the First Committee delegations to “seriously consider how to make the broader biological disarmament architecture more fit for purpose in today’s world.” A growing number of high biocontainment laboratories around the world are studying lethal viruses and preparing against unknown pathogens. According to Lentzos, “more countries are expected to build these labs in the wake of COVID-19” and “high risk and gain-of-function research with coronaviruses and other zoonotic pathogens with pandemic potential is likely to increase.” Scientific and clinical work on pathogens is critical to public health, biomedical advancements, and the prevention of disease; however, “surges in the number of labs and expansion in high-risk research carried out within them exacerbate safety and security risks.” Lentzos encourages the First Committee delegations to seriously and constructively consider the proposals already on the table for “how to evolve the biological disarmament architecture to uphold its central role in preventing the misuse of biology for hostile purposes.” Read Lentzos’ full statement here.

Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the People’s Republic of China and the Russia Federation on Strengthening the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

The Russian Federation and China issued a joint statement reaffirming “their conviction that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) is essential as a pillar of the international peace and security, and their determination to safeguard the authority and effectiveness of the Convention.” According to the statement, “the Russian Federation and China reiterate the need that the BWC should be fully complied with and further strengthened, including through its institutionalization and the adoption of a legally binding protocol to the Convention with effective verification mechanism, as well as through regular consultations and cooperation in resolving any issues related to the implementation of the Convention.” The two nations “call upon the BWC States Parties to continue joint efforts towards strengthening the Convention on a secure, legally binding basis.” Read the full joint statement here.

ALL THINGS COVID-19

The Origin of COVID-19: Evidence Piles Up, But the Jury’s Still Out

Evidence related to the origin of SARS-CoV-2 is “piling up,” but a definitive answer remains elusive. Despite investigations by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the US intelligence community, how the COVID-19 pandemic emerged is still uncertain. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists highlights how the mounting circumstantial evidence supports either the theory that the virus emerged from a natural spillover or the theory that a laboratory leak introduced the virus is dependent upon who you ask. Research is showing the spillover of animal coronaviruses may be common and viruses identified in nature have had striking similarity to SARS-CoV-2, facts that may support the natural emergence theory. But, on the flip side, supporters of the lab leak theory point a finger at a research proposal submitted to the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 2018 that would have included WIV as a “key player in that multimillion-dollar effort to study bat viruses.” Another report emphasized the “extent to which genetic engineering on bat coronavirus was being done in Wuhan.”

Addressing Biocrises After COVID-19: Is Deterrence an Option?

The COVID-19 pandemic has sparked discussion about the “potential dangers of biological weapons and biological terrorism.” Al Mauroni, the Director of the US Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies, discusses his insights on the potential for deterrence against biological threats. Michael Mazaar defines deterrence as “the practice of discouraging or restraining someone … from taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack;” the idea is to “stop or prevent an action from occurring.” According to Mauroni, the “efficacy of deterrence against biological threats depends, of course, on what the biological threat is.” The term “biological threat” is a catch-all that encompasses natural disease outbreaks, deliberate biological incidents, and accidental releases. Given that deterrence requires a “reasoning actor, …one cannot deter natural disease outbreaks or accidents at biological research laboratories as they have no human actor with malign intent to cause harm.” Deterrence against biological weapons attacks is also problematic because of “technological challenges involved with biodefense.” Deterring a terrorist from using a bioweapon is tricky, but “terrorist organizations can be deterred by threats of retaliation.” Mauroni highlights that for deterrence to be effective, “there must be communication between the defender and attacker as to expectations and consequences, and it requires the accurate perception of both to maintain stability and a balance of power.” In sum, a deterrence by denial strategy for countering biological threats will not succeed due to the “disparity between the significant number of biological warfare agents and hundreds of unprotected US cities and available defensive countermeasures.” Therefore, the US should “retain deterrence by punishment as its primary approach to discouraging deliberate biological attacks.”

How COVAX Failed on Its Promise to Vaccinate the World

The COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access – COVAX – is a global initiative working toward at equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, and it is co-led by Gavi, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and the World Health Organization (WHO). Unfortunately, COVAX has not lived up to its promise to vaccinate the world. While wealthy nations are offering boosters to their populations, “98% of people in low-income countries remain unvaccinated.” COVAX has contributed 5% of all vaccines administered globally and just announced it would not make 2021 target of 2 billion doses. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and STAT reviewed confidential internal documents and spoke with officials from more over two dozen countries. This examination found that many countries are struggling to get information from COVAX personnel and have been “left in the dark over when, if ever, deliveries would arrive.” Other concerns include late supply shipments and the sidelining of organizations that represent the needs of poorer nations. A review of COVAX highlighted the “insufficient inclusion and meaningful engagement of low- and middle-income countries, civil society organizations and community representatives.” So far, the initiative has delivered 330 million doses and now plans to distribute 1.1 billion more in the next three months.

NIH Bat Coronavirus Grant Report Was Submitted More Than Two Years Late

A progress report that covered details of US-funded research on bat coronaviruses in China was more than two years overdue.  EcoHealth Alliance is a US-based non-profit that works on research related to preventing pandemics and promoting conservation in hotspot regions across the globe. The report ultimately “described the group’s work from June 2017 to May 2018, which involved creating new viruses using different parts of existing bat coronaviruses and inserting them into humanized mice in a lab in Wuhan, China.” The very late submission of was considered highly unusually, but “neither the NIH nor the EcoHealth Alliance offered an explanation for the date of the report.” The EcoHealth Alliance and the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), longtime partners, have “come under intense scrutiny in the search for the pandemic’s origins.” Both entities are at the “center of the lab-origin hypothesis, the idea that the coronavirus could have emerged through a lab accident, the collection and storage of thousands of bat coronavirus samples, or through divisive research that makes viruses more transmissible in order to study how they evolve.”

Lessons Learned from FEMA’s Initial Response to COVID-19

During the initial months of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) COVID-19 response, the Nation faced dramatic shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare personnel as hospitals experienced an unprecedented demand for ventilators to treat patients. The objective of the audit by the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was to determine how effectively FEMA supported and coordinated Federal efforts to distribute PPE and ventilators in response to the COVID-19 outbreak.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, FEMA worked closely with the US Department of Health and Human Services and other Federal agencies to facilitate the shipment of PPE and ventilators. However, the magnitude of the global event exposed weaknesses in FEMA’s resource request system and allocation processes. Specifically, WebEOC — the system FEMA used to process resource requests including those for PPE and ventilators — contained unreliable data to inform allocation decisions and ensure requests were accurately adjudicated. This occurred because FEMA did not develop controls to validate requests and prevent incomplete, inaccurate, or duplicate data entries; nor did FEMA ensure WebEOC users received training on proper use of the system. In addition, although FEMA developed a process to allocate the limited supply of ventilators, it did not have a similarly documented process for PPE. Finally, FEMA did not have strategic guidance clearly outlining the roles and responsibilities used to lead the Federal response. FEMA’s decision to prioritize ongoing pandemic response efforts without updating its written guidance and strategic plans hindered FEMA’s coordination efforts.

To its credit, FEMA evaluated its COVID-19 response operations, identifying similar key findings and recommendations aimed at improving current and future responses, including making updates to its WebEOC system. Read the report here.

EVENTS

Schar School Open Houses

The Schar School will be hosting virtual open houses for the Master’s and Certificate Programs! These sessions will take place on 21 October and 16 November at 6:30 PM EST. This online session will provide an overview of our master’s degree programs – such as the Biodefense Program – and our Graduate Admissions team will be available to answer questions about admissions requirements, application deadlines, and materials to prepare. By working closely with faculty who draw on world-class research and practical experience, the Schar School prepares students for a high-powered career in the public, private, and non-profit sectors. Register here.

Combating Misinformation and Disinformation for COVID-19 and Future Public Health Threats

On 20 October, the Capitol Hill Steering Committee on Pandemic Preparedness and Health Security is hosting a webinar: Combating Misinformation and Disinformation for COVID-19 and Future Public Health Threats. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that accurate and timely health-related information is crucial to mounting an effective response to a public health crisis. Contradictory messaging, misinformation, and undermining of public health experts have reduced the trust in public health responders, increased belief in false medical cures, and politicized public health measures aimed at curbing transmission of the disease. As can be seen in setbacks during the COVID-19 response, health-related misinformation and disinformation can lead to more infections, deaths, disruption, and disorganization of the effort. Speakers include: Anita Cicero from Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; Imran Ahmed from Center for Countering Digital Hate; Dr. Tara Kirk Sell from Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; and Alexandra Veitch from Americas and Emerging Markets at YouTube. Register here.

Saving Sisyphus: Course Corrections for National Biodetection

In its 2015 report, A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense addressed inadequacies of BioWatch, the Department of Homeland Security environmental biodetection program. Established in 2003, the federal government intended for BioWatch to provide early warning of biological attacks on major metropolitan areas. However, after nearly two decades of operation, the system is ineffective. There is little evidence that the system effectively detects pathogens of interest, and even if it did, pathogen detection turnaround time is too slow for the government to effectively respond to any actual biological attack. If the federal government continues to spend more taxpayer money on next generation biodetection systems, a reassessment of current efforts is necessary.

Join in on 2 November at 10 AM EST for an in-person meeting of the Commission, Saving Sisyphus: Course Corrections for National Biodetection, to provide a better understanding of challenges facing federal biodetection programs, public and private advancements in environmental biodetection technology, and mission requirements for 21st Century biodetection capabilities. More details will be available here.

October marks the 20^th anniversary of the anthrax letter attacks, which killed five people and sickened 17. A new article in Nature examines the resurgence of Ebola virus in Guinea this year, suggesting a new paradigm for outbreaks. In COVID-19, the health system is seeing widespread overwork and discontent among healthcare workers, causing an acceleration in the preexisting downward trend.

20^th Anniversary of the Anthrax Attacks

This month marks the 20^th anniversary of the anthrax letter attacks, which targeted major media outlets and members of Congress. Anthrax spores were sent in letters, killing five people and sickened several more. Bacillus anthracis causes anthrax, and its spores can “remain inactive for decades until they find a favorable environment to germinate, such as blood or tissue.” Infection can occur via inhalation, ingestion, and skin contact. Anthrax can be treated by certain antibiotics; however, inhalational anthrax is usually lethal if not diagnosed and treated very early. In 2001, before the attacks, the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) was studying “how to render anthrax spores harmless through irradiation.” AFRRI’s work confirmed that electron beams and X-rays, both forms of ionizing radiation, could sanitize mail. An electron beam “passes through an electromagnetic lens, which focuses the beam on the target,” but due to limited penetration, e-beams could only be used on letters and flat envelopes. X-rays penetrate deeper, making them a better option for parcels and boxes. Since the Postal Service needed to process about 1.8 million pieces of contaminated mail, e-beam and X-ray machines needed to be scaled up. Scaling up became a logistical nightmare as the processing facility could only push through about 2,000 kilograms per hour. Though it took weeks to process all the mail items and up to a few months to get the items to their intended destination, irradiation was the key to decontaminating nearly 2 million pieces of mail after Amerithrax.

Scientific Risk Assessment of Genetic Weapons Systems

For any emerging technology, defense and homeland security analysts strive to understand (1) its dual-use potential, meaning whether the same research and technology applied for peaceful purposes may be diverted to illicit ends, for example to develop a weapon; (2) the State and sub-State actors with access to that dual-use potential, whether peacefully or illicitly directed; and (3) motivational factors and indicators of intent that might suggest these actors would divert the emerging technology to illicit ends. Precision medicine represents one such emerging technical space. Precision medicine is defined as medical care designed to optimize benefit for particular groups, especially based on genetic (or molecular) profiling. A long-speculated but incompletely understood dual-use consideration of precision medicine is the possible development of a genetic weapon system, defined as a weapon system designed to optimize effect on particular groups based on genetic profiling.

This Occasional Paper assesses the potential for precision medicine to be diverted to develop a population-specific genetic weapon system, examines relevant state capabilities and motivations to pursue such an effort, and offers policy recommendations to manage the dual-use implications of this emerging biomedical field while still preserving its potential benefit for human welfare. Read the paper here.

Identifying and Prioritizing Potential Human-Infecting Viruses from Their Genome Sequences

Determining which animal viruses may be capable of infecting humans is currently intractable at the time of their discovery, precluding prioritization of high-risk viruses for early investigation and outbreak preparedness. Given the increasing use of genomics in virus discovery and the otherwise sparse knowledge of the biology of newly discovered viruses, a team of researchers developed machine learning models that identify candidate zoonoses solely using signatures of host range encoded in viral genomes. Within a dataset of 861 viral species with known zoonotic status, their approach outperformed models based on the phylogenetic relatedness of viruses to known human-infecting viruses (area under the receiver operating characteristic curve [AUC] = 0.773), distinguishing high-risk viruses within families that contain a minority of human-infecting species and identifying putatively undetected or so far unrealized zoonoses. Analyses of the underpinnings of model predictions suggested the existence of generalizable features of viral genomes that are independent of virus taxonomic relationships and that may preadapt viruses to infect humans. Their model reduced a second set of 645 animal-associated viruses that were excluded from training to 272 high and 41 very high-risk candidate zoonoses and showed significantly elevated predicted zoonotic risk in viruses from nonhuman primates, but not other mammalian or avian host groups. A second application showed that the models could have identified Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) as a relatively high-risk coronavirus strain and that this prediction required no prior knowledge of zoonotic Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)-related coronaviruses. Genome-based zoonotic risk assessment provides a rapid, low-cost approach to enable evidence-driven virus surveillance and increases the feasibility of downstream biological and ecological characterization of viruses. Read the article here.

Resurgence of Ebola Virus in 2021 in Guinea Suggests a New Paradigm for Outbreaks

A new article in Nature examines the resurgence of Ebola virus in Guinea this year, suggesting a new paradigm for outbreaks. Seven years after the declaration of the first epidemic of Ebola virus disease in Guinea, the country faced a new outbreak—between 14 February and 19 June 2021—near the epicentre of the previous epidemic. The researchers use next-generation sequencing to generate complete or near-complete genomes of Zaire ebolavirus from samples obtained from 12 different patients. These genomes form a well-supported phylogenetic cluster with genomes from the previous outbreak, which indicates that the new outbreak was not the result of a new spillover event from an animal reservoir. The 2021 lineage shows considerably lower divergence than would be expected during sustained human-to-human transmission, which suggests a persistent infection with reduced replication or a period of latency. The resurgence of Zaire ebolavirus from humans five years after the end of the previous outbreak of Ebola virus disease reinforces the need for long-term medical and social care for patients who survive the disease, to reduce the risk of re-emergence and to prevent further stigmatization. Read the article here.

New Book – The Role of Law Enforcement in Emergency Management and Homeland Security

Keith Ludwick, Biodefense PhD alum and former FBI Special Agent, recently published a book chapter, “Terrorism Prevention: Structures and Processes,” that explains how federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies are responsible for different aspects of counterterrorism in the United States.  The book, Role of Law Enforcement in Emergency Management and Homeland Security, is edited by Mark Landhal and Tonya Thornton, formerly of the Schar School of Policy and Government. This book is part of the Community, Environment and Disaster Risk Management series, which deals with a wide range of issues relating to global environmental hazards, natural and man-made disasters, and approaches to disaster risk reduction. As people and communities are the first and the most important responders to disasters and environment-related problems, this series aims to analyze critical field-based mechanisms which link community, policy and governance systems. This book examines the role and involvement of law enforcement agencies across the spectrum of homeland security and emergency management. The chapters, developed by expert practitioners and academics in the field, focus on the mission areas of mitigation and protection, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. The introductory chapter sets the stage and the following content targets structures and activities specific to each mission area of homeland security and emergency management. Find the book here.

ALL THINGS COVID-19

Select Subcommittee to Hold Hearing on Challenges Facing Public Health Departments Amid Pandemic Response

This week. Rep. James E. Clyburn, Chairman of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, held a hybrid remote/in-person hearing examining challenges facing the nation’s state and local public health departments as they respond to the coronavirus pandemic. The hearing also addresses the dangerous politicization of public health and identify ways to rebuild and strengthen the country’s public health infrastructure.

For decades, state and local public health departments have been chronically underfunded and understaffed.  These challenges have impaired the government’s ability to improve the health of the US population and respond effectively when crises arise.  Compounding matters, throughout the coronavirus pandemic, the reckless politicization of public health has contributed to unprecedented levels of personal attacks against public health workers, high burnout rates and rapid turnover in the public health workforce, and recruitment challenges for many departments—all of which have threatened the success of the nation’s coronavirus response.

With the American Rescue Plan, Congress and the Biden Administration are making strong investments in the US public health infrastructure—but more must be done to ensure that state and local public health departments receive the funding and resources they need over the long term.  During the hearing, experts discussed potential solutions to these challenges, and ways local, state, and federal officials can work together to strengthen the public health system. Watch the hearing here.

Functioning of the International Health Regulations During the COVID-19 Pandemic

When the International Health Regulations (IHR) came into force in 2007, WHO announced that “the global community has a new legal framework to better manage its collective defenses to detect disease events and to respond to public health risks and emergencies.” The IHR aim to enable the prevention, detection, and containment of health risks and threats, the strengthening of national capacities for that purpose, and the coordination of a global alert and response system. In the prolonged and unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, some have stated that the IHR “are a conservative instrument that constrain rather than facilitate rapid action.” The Review Committee on the Functioning of the IHR (2005) during the COVID-19 Response, found instead was that much of what is in the IHR is well considered, appropriate, and meaningful in any public health emergency. However, many countries only applied the IHR in part, were not sufficiently aware of these regulations, or deliberately ignored them, and that WHO did not make full use of the powers given to it through the wording and spirit of the IHR. Thus, the IHR are not deficient, but their implementation by member states and by WHO was inadequate. Recognizing the limited mandate of the IHR Review Committee on COVID-19, which was focused solely on the IHR-related aspects of the COVID-19 response, the Review Committee proposes that there was a collective failure in three areas: compliance and empowerment; early alert, notification, and response; and financial and political commitment. Read the article here.

COVID-19 Panel of Scientists Investigating Origins of Virus Is Disbanded

Jeffrey Sachs, a professor at Columbia University, announced that he has disbanded a task force comprised of scientists that was investigating the “origins of COVID-19 in favor of wider biosafety research.” Sachs, who is the chairman of a COVID-19 commission affiliated with the Lancet, explained that he ended the task force over concerns about its links to EcoHealth Alliance. EcoHealth Alliance is a nonprofit under scrutiny from scientists, members of Congress, along with other officials for “using US funds for studies on bat coronaviruses with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)” in Wuhan, China, where the pandemic first emerged. Peter Daszak, the president of EcoHealth Alliance, led the task force, but has recused himself from that role. Dr. Sachs said, “I just didn’t want a task force that was so clearly involved with one of the main issues of this whole search for the origins, which was EcoHealth Alliance.” Sachs also said that the “Lancet COVID-19 Commission would continue studying the origins for a report to be published in mid-2022 but broaden its scope to include input from other experts on biosafety concerns including government oversight and transparency regarding risky laboratory research.”

MENTAL HEALTH OF HEALTHCARE WORKERS

Symptoms of Depression, Anxiety, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and Suicidal Ideation Among State, Tribal, Local, and Territorial Public Health Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Increases in mental health conditions have been documented among the general population and health care workers since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Public health workers might be at similar risk for negative mental health consequences because of the prolonged demand for responding to the pandemic and for implementing an unprecedented vaccination campaign. The extent of mental health conditions among public health workers during the COVID-19 pandemic, however, is uncertain. A 2014 survey estimated that there were nearly 250,000 state and local public health workers in the United States. To evaluate mental health conditions among these workers, a nonprobability–based online survey was conducted during March 29–April 16, 2021, to assess symptoms of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and suicidal ideation among public health workers in state, tribal, local, and territorial public health departments. Among 26,174 respondents, 53% reported symptoms of at least one mental health condition in the preceding 2 weeks, including depression (32.0%), anxiety (30.3%), PTSD (36.8%), or suicidal ideation (8.4%). The highest prevalence of symptoms of a mental health condition was among respondents aged ≤29 years (range = 13.6%–47.4%) and transgender or nonbinary persons (i.e., those who identified as neither male nor female) of all ages (range = 30.4%–65.5%). Public health workers who reported being unable to take time off from work were more likely to report adverse mental health symptoms. Severity of symptoms increased with increasing weekly work hours and percentage of work time dedicated to COVID-19 response activities. Implementing prevention and control practices that eliminate, reduce, and manage factors that cause or contribute to public health workers’ poor mental health might improve mental health outcomes during emergencies. Read the article here.

US Public Health Workers Leaving ‘In Droves’ Amid Pandemic Burnout

Prior to the pandemic, the public health workforce was shrinking. In COVID-19, the health system is seeing widespread overwork and discontent among healthcare workers, causing an acceleration in the preexisting downward trend. By the end of last year, more than 180 public health officials were fired or resigned from their posts in 38 states, and the current number of resignations is likely much higher. Adding insult to injury, public health departments are facing significant budget cuts and challenges to their power. There is rising fear in public health that the “toll of the pandemic poses an existential threat to their line of work.”

Building Resilience and Well-Being: Keys to Avoiding the Worst of a Looming Shortage of Healthcare Workers

Nurses and other healthcare workers are facing “unprecedented levels of work stress as the world approaches two years of this global pandemic.” This is pushing our health system toward a “potentially disastrous retention crisis among nurses that will hit hard in the next five years.” The Maslach Burnout Inventory identifies several components that influence burnout, such as emotional exhaustion and low personal accomplishment. A review assessing the risk of burnout associated with the COVID-19 pandemic found that 34% of nurses reported high emotional exhaustion and 15% reported low personal accomplishment. The high rate of burnout can “directly affect nurses’ health, increase turnover, and lead to compromises in the quality of patient care.” The Department of Health and Human Services recognizes the critical levels of burnout and just announced $103 million in grant funding for reducing burnout and promoting resilience, and $29 million of this funding will go toward hospital grants for programs that enhance evidence-informed resilience. A recent analysis by Perceptyx shows that increased workload is the leading concern for healthcare workers. Along with easing workloads, resilience needs a boost. Responses from healthcare workers highlight six recommendations to boost resilience: (1) think past today to build more optimism; (2) act on employee feedback to improve feelings of control; (3) reward accomplishments, even small ones; (4) build community; (5) create a sense of fairness; and (6) live your values, increase safety.

BIOECONOMY

National Threats to the Bio-Economy with SSA Edward You

America’s hospitals and health systems are at risks of attacks that threaten the bio-economy. How do these threats affect patients and citizens and what we can do about it to help reduce risks? FBI supervisory special agent Edward You is a former colleague of John Riggi, the senior advisor for cybersecurity and risk at the American Hospital Assocation. You is a highly accomplished 17-year veteran of the FBI and one of the nation’s leading experts on threats to the bio-economy. In a new podcast, You and Riggi discuss their work defending hospitals and health systems against high impact ransomware attacks and cyber espionage campaigns. Listen here.

Another Voice: California Biosecurity Bill Safeguards Bioeconomy and Public Health

Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and member of the Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Security of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, recently wrote an article on the California biosecurity bill. According to Koblentz, “California Gov. Gavin Newsom now has the opportunity to reduce the risk posed by synthetic smallpox — and other novel biological threats —and keep California’s bioeconomy innovative and strong.” The California Assembly recently approved the Gene Synthesis Security bill (AB 70), which would “close this vulnerability by requiring companies that produce or sell synthetic DNA in California to have screening standards that meet or exceed those used by members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC).” The Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Security urges the governor to sign this important legislation. If this bill is adopted, California would “establish the first legally binding biosecurity measure for the synthetic biology industry in the US – and in the world.” Koblentz emphasizes that “California has the potential to set a de facto national standard for biosecurity.” This bill will make Californians safer and “boost the state’s bioeconomy by creating a level playing field that enables companies to compete on the affordability and quality of their products without making trade-offs on security.”

NAVALNY

New Book – Navalny: Putin’s Nemesis, Russia’s Future?

Who is Alexei Navalny? Poisoned in August 2020 and transported to Germany for treatment, the politician returned to Russia in January 2021 in the full glare of the world media. His immediate detention at passport control set the stage for an explosive showdown with Vladimir Putin.

But Navalny means very different things to different people. To some, he is a democratic hero. To others, he is betraying the Motherland. To others still, he is a dangerous nationalist. This book explores the many dimensions of Navalny’s political life, from his pioneering anti-corruption investigations to his ideas and leadership of a political movement. It also looks at how his activities and the Kremlin’s strategies have shaped one another.

The book – Navalny: Putin’s Nemesis, Russia’s Future? – makes sense of this divisive character, revealing the contradictions of a man who is the second most important political figure in Russia—even when behind bars. In order to understand modern Russia, you need to understand Alexei Navalny. Find Navalny here.

MIT is hosting a virtual forum about the book on 7 October at Noon EST. Register here.

CNN’s Emmys for Navalny Coverage

At the 42^nd Annual News and Documentary Emmy Awards, CNN won eight Emmys honoring news programming. CNN’s recognitions include breaking news coverage, investigative reporting, and news discussion and analysis. Two of the awards were for “Outstanding Investigative Report in a Newscast” and “Outstanding Research: News,” both in regard to CNN’s work on the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

EVENTS

Webinar – Disinformation and the Evolving Threats of Chemical Weapon Proliferation

CRDF Global is offering a webinar, “Disinformation and the Evolving Threats of Chemical Weapon Proliferation,” on 4 October at 10 AM EST. As the chemical weapons threat evolves to include new types of chemicals used in new ways, one element of this proliferation challenge has more to do with technology and society than it does with chemical compounds and delivery systems. Proliferator states, Russia chief among them, have employed information operations to evade attribution and accountability for actions that violate global non-proliferation norms. While addressing proliferation challenges has traditionally been relegated to government professionals and academic experts, mitigating the proliferation risks posed by disinformation campaigns must be a whole-of-society effort.  

This panel will bring together leading experts Sarah Jacobs Gamberini from the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction and former head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons laboratory, Dr. Marc-Michael Blum, to discuss how and why Russia employs disinformation campaigns that threaten non-proliferation norms. Register here.

11^th Annual Global Summit on Regulatory Science

The 11^th Annual Global Summit on Regulatory Science will be held virtually on 4 – 6 October from 7 – 10 AM CT. The summit is organized by the National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR), a research campus of the Food and Drug Administration located in Arkansas. This year’s theme is “Regulatory Sciences for Food/Drug Safety with Real-World Data & Artificial Intelligence (AI).” Opening remarks will be made by FDA Acting Commissioner, Janet Woodcock. The two keynote speakers are Frank Yiannas, Deputy Commissioner for Food Policy and Response at FDA, and Stephen Quest, General Director at Joint Research Center of the European Commission. The summit will include platform presentations from scientists representing Brazil, Canada, the EU, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, and the US. There will be a live debate on the topic, “Is Regulatory Science Ready for AI?” Further, there will be a workshop to showcase data-science tools currently in regulatory use by FDA, European Medicines Agency (EMA), and Swissmedic. Register here.

GET Africa Global Emerging Pathogens Treatment Consortium

The 7^th African Conference on One Health and Biosecurity will take place 27 – 29 October in Lagos, Nigeria. The theme is a “Universal Approach to Addressing Biosecurity Threats: Genomic Intelligence and Vaccines.” Speakers include Sir Hilary Beckles, Vice Chancellor of the University of the West Indies; Professor akin Abayomi, Honourable Commissioner for Health of Lagos State; Professor Charles Wiysonge, Epidemiologist and Vaccinologist for the South African Cochrane Center; Dr. Valierie Oriol Matthieu, Global Medical Affairs Lead for Vaccines at Janssen Vaccines & Prevention; Dr. Sam Ujewe, Senior Research Ethics Advisor at the Canadian Institutes for Health Research; Professor Mayowa Owolabi, Dean of Faculty of Clinical Sciences at University of Ibadan; Dr. Mutiu Bamidele, Director of Lagos State Biobank; Pasquela De Blaiso, Managing Director of Integrated Systems Engineering SRL; Professor Abiodun Denloya, Professor of Applied Epidemiology at Lagos State University; Dr. Michaela Mayrhofer, Head of ELSI Services and Research; Dr. Tom Rausch, Communication Expert at Ministry of Health Luxembourg; Dr. Ayodotun Bobadoya, COO at Global Emerging Pathogens Treatment Consortium; and Professor Christian Happi, Professor of Molecular Biology and Genomics at Redeemers’ University. Register here.

2021 EPA International Decontamination Research and Development Conference

The EPA International Decontamination Research and Development Conference will be held virtually 1 – 5 November 2021. Characterization and cleanup of a site are critical challenges that the United States and EPA would face in rapidly recovering from a major chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) hazard incident. This conference is designed to facilitate presentation, discussion, and further collaboration of EPA’s Homeland Security Research Program (HSRP), which focuses on an all-hazards approach to cleaning up contaminated buildings (both interior and exterior) and infrastructure. The conference continues to focus strongly on matters involving CBR threat agents but also include “all hazards” elements.

The virtual conference speakers and group leaders will be experts in their fields from EPA and other federal agencies, state and local agencies, tribes, academia, and NGOs and associations. This year’s conference will be a mix of pre-recorded and live sessions, including oral, poster, and Technology Café presentations. Register here.

BARDA Industry Day 2021 Virtual Event

This BARDA Industry Day 2021 Virtual Event will be held 3-4 November 2021. BARDA Industry Day is our annual conference, held to increase awareness of US government medical countermeasure priorities, interact with BARDA and ASPR staff, and network with public and private sector colleagues working in the health security space.  This annual gathering of more than 1300 stakeholders from the public and private sector provides an opportunity to increase understanding of the US government medical countermeasure priorities and funding goals; interact with BARDA and ASPR staff; and showcase innovations. Innovators may apply for limited openings to present during Lightning Talks sessions. Lightning Talks are for individuals, academic institutions, pharmaceutical companies, biotech, and other industry innovators to showcase their innovative technologies. More information is available here. Registration opening soon!

One Health: Integrating Human, Animal and Environmental Health

A virtual science conference on One Health: Integrating Human, Animal and Environmental Health will be held 3 December 2021. The One Health movement, which has come to prominence in the last decade, advocates greater cross-sectoral collaboration and communication across the human-animal-environment interface. There has been a long-standing recognition that population health is intrinsically linked to both animal and environmental health, and that issues such as population growth, changes in climate and land use, and the movement of animals and people, have a huge impact on the collective health of our world today. The Conference will examine the potential societal benefits of the multifaceted One Health methodology, analyze how successful it has been to-date, determine whether One Health could be the key to future pandemic prevention, and ascertain what steps are needed to accelerate implementation. It will explore whether the interpretation of One Health has been biased towards an anthropocentric view of “health,” and it will also seek to answer the question: will something as far-reaching as the COVID-19 pandemic be the catalyst needed to finally make the aspirational goals of One Health a reality? Register here.

Schar School Open Houses

The Schar School PhD Virtual Open House will be held 6 October 2021 at 6 PM EST. This online session will provide an overview of our doctoral degree programs – such as the Biodefense Program – and our Graduate Admissions team will be available to answer questions about admissions requirements, application deadlines, and materials to prepare. By working closely with faculty who draw on world-class research and practical experience, the Schar School prepares students for a high-powered career in the public, private, and non-profit sectors. Register here.

The Schar School will also be hosting virtual open houses for the Master’s and Certificate Programs! These sessions will take place on 21 October and 16 November at 6:30 PM EST. The online session will provide an overview of our master’s degree programs and graduate certificate programs, student services, and admissions requirements. Register here.

This week we have a new student writer, Lauren Eichberger (Reynolds), a Biodefense Certificate student, shares her summary and takeaways a virtual event held by from the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO). Progress has been made over the last several days toward bringing justice to victims of the Kremlin’s campaign of assassination on British soil. A former US ambassador to the OPCW explains how the body is the “epicenter of a global chemical weapons crisis and a front line in a broader confrontation between the West and Russia.”

Commentary – Two Decades After 9/11: What We’ve Learned About Public Health Preparedness and Leadership

September 11th, 2001 is a date the United States will never forget. Following this tragedy, there were calls to improve our national security against “physical” attacks and amend preparedness plans. Now, in 2021, two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, the nation finds itself in a comparable situation with a call for greater biosecurity and health care preparedness. The Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) held a virtual event, “Two Decades After 9/11: What We’ve Learned About Public Health Preparedness and Leadership” that discussed these two calls-to-action. Lauren Eichberger (Reynolds), a Biodefense Certificate student, shares her summary and takeaways from the event. Read Lauren’s commentary here.

Worldwide Threats to the Homeland: 20 Years After 9/11

Christopher Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), made a statement before the House Homeland Security Committee about the threats facing the US. Director Wray shared that the FBI is currently investigating over 100 types of ransomware, has recently arrested over 600 gang members in a single month, and that the Bureau is opening a new China counterintelligence investigation every 12 hours. According to Wray, the greatest terrorist threats to the US are lone actors, largely because they move quickly from radicalization to action. In the wake of 9/11, 20 years ago, the FBI underwent a transformation that dramatically expanded national security operations, and changed the focus to “disrupting attacks before they occur and on working with and through our partners around the world and at every level of government here at home.” His testimony covers the violence and destruction of property at the US Capitol building on 6 January, top terrorism threats, cyber attacks, foreign malign influence, and lawful access. Read Wray’s testimony here.

New Book – Denying the Obvious: Chemical Weapons and the Information War Over Syria

Brian Whitaker, a former Middle East Editor of the Guardian newspaper, wrote a new book, Denying the Obvious: Chemical Weapons and the Information War Over Syria. In 2011 mass demonstrations broke out in Syria calling for an end to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The regime responded brutally and within months what had begun as political unrest turned into a full-scale war between government forces and a variety of armed groups. In the midst of that turmoil, the regime began using chemical weapons – banned under international law. The regime’s guilt was beyond reasonable doubt though it denied responsibility and Russia, as its chief ally, weighed in with vigorous support. So, too, did a number of small groups and individuals in the west – apparently sincere people who convinced themselves that one of the Middle East’s most oppressive regimes was the innocent victim of a plot to discredit it. Among them were an assortment of university professors, retired spies, “independent” journalists, “anti-imperialists” and more than a few habitual conspiracy theorists. They accused rebel groups of faking the chemical attacks – a claim that became the starting point for a disinformation campaign stretching far beyond Syria. This is the story of that campaign: how it originated, the ideas that drove it, and how it was choreographed with assistance from Russia. Read the new book here.

Progress Towards Accountability for Putin’s Use of Poison

On 21 September, two announcements brought justice a little bit closer to victims of the Kremlin’s campaign of assassination on British soil. The first announcement, from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), dealt with the case of Alexsandr Litvinenko, the former Russian spy, who was poisoned in London with the radioactive substance polonium-210 in 2006. The British government has accused two Russian citizens, Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitriy Kovtun, of being responsible for the poisoning. The ECHR ruled 6-1 that “there was a strong prima facie case that, in poisoning Mr. Litvinenko, Mr. Lugovoy and Mr. Kovtun had been acting as agents of the Russian State.”  Furthermore, the court noted that the Russian government had “failed to provide any other satisfactory and convincing explanation of the events or counter the findings of the UK inquiry” and that “the Russian authorities had not carried out an effective domestic investigation capable of leading to the establishment of the facts and, where appropriate, the identification and punishment of those responsible for the murder.” The court granted the plaintiff, Maria Anna Carter aka Marina Litvinenko, payment from Russia – 122,500 euros in non-pecuniary damages and costs – but rejected her claim for punitive damages. The same day, the BBC reported that the British authorities were ready to charge a third person, Denis Sergeev, in the use of Novichok nerve agent in the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, another former Russian spy, and his daughter Yulia. This botched attack led to the poisoning of two police officers and two civilians, one of whom, Dawn Sturgess, died. Sergeev had been previously identified by Bellingcat as a high-ranking GRU officer who oversaw the Skripal operation. According to the Crown Prosecution Service, there was “sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction” and that it was in the public interest to charge Sergeev even though Sergeev is in Russia and Russia refuses to extradite its citizens. Also, this week, a third man known as ‘Sergey Fedotov’ was identified and prosecutors from the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) concluded that available evidence is sufficient “to provide a realistic prospect of conviction and that it is clearly in the public interest to charge Sergey Fedotov.” Authorized charges against Fedotov include: conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; and possession and use of a chemical weapon, contrary to the Chemical Weapons Act 1996.

Syria, Russia, and the Global Chemical Weapons Crisis

Kenneth D. Ward, former US ambassador to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), explains how the OPCW is the “epicenter of a global chemical weapons crisis and a front line in a broader confrontation between the West and Russia.” Indeed, he emphasizes that the “world is now precariously perched on the knife’s edge of a new era of chemical weapons use.” In August 2013, the Syrian military launched sarin attacks against the opposition-controlled town of Ghouta, killing 1,400 people. By the end of the next month, “the international community had legally anchored the US-Russian joint framework in a decision of the OPCW Executive Council and in a UN Security Council resolution, which included measures to address any Syrian failure to comply with the resolution’s provisions or with the prohibitions of the CWC.” In 2014, Syria’s declared stocks of chemical weapons were being removed for destruction, but signs emerged that the regime would not “comply fully with its commitments under the CWC and the UN resolution.” It was around this time that the joint framework began to unravel. In the following years, attacks with chemical weapons continued, both by the Assad regime against the Syrian people and by other nations, such as Russia’s use of nerve agents in attempted assassinations. After Russia used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom, the UK initiated a special session of CWC states-parties to forge an international response, which resulted in the adoption of the decision, “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use.” This decision “dealt with Syria’s continued possession and use of chemical weapons,” “clarified the mandate of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in the context of the CWC,” and “authorized the release of OPCW information to any entities established under the auspices of the UN investigating chemical weapons use in Syria.” Ward states that the “United States must accord high priority to defending the CWC and lead an international effort to hold perpetrators accountable in all relevant forums.” He also emphasizes that “to successfully weather the assault on the convention and the norm, diplomacy must be paired with concerted international investment in the OPCW.” Read Ward’s full article here.

Terrorist Attacks Against Vaccinators: A Review

Vaccinators fulfill an important role in a nation’s public health by reducing the burden of disease on the population. Understanding patterns of attack employed against vaccinators is important to determine how to protect them. A new study conducted a search of the Global Terrorism Database for terrorist attacks against vaccinators that occurred between the years 1970 and 2018. Using the search terms “hospital,” “healthcare,” “clinic,” “doctor,” “nurses,” “vaccinators,” and “vaccinations,” 2,322 healthcare-related entries were identified. The researchers then manually searched the dataset for incidents related to attacks on vaccinators, which resulted in the identification of 133 attacks against vaccinators. The majority (128 out of 133) of attacks occurred during or after 2010. Every attack except one has occurred in the Middle East, South Asia, or sub-Saharan Africa. Pakistan has seen the most attacks against vaccinators, with 112 incidents recorded. Vaccinators continue to be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Protection of healthcare personnel during mass vaccination efforts is critical so that they can continue their life saving mission. Read the article in Health Security here.

The Future of Zoonotic Risk Prediction

In the light of the urgency raised by the COVID-19 pandemic, global investment in wildlife virology is likely to increase, and new surveillance programmes will identify hundreds of novel viruses that might someday pose a threat to humans. To support the extensive task of laboratory characterization, scientists may increasingly rely on data-driven rubrics or machine learning models that learn from known zoonoses to identify which animal pathogens could someday pose a threat to global health. A new article synthesizes the findings of an interdisciplinary workshop on zoonotic risk technologies to answer the following questions. What are the prerequisites, in terms of open data, equity and interdisciplinary collaboration, to the development and application of those tools? What effect could the technology have on global health? Who would control that technology, who would have access to it and who would benefit from it? Would it improve pandemic prevention? Could it create new challenges? Read the article here.

Here’s What We’ve Learned About COVID-19—An Update

The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)’s Master Question List (MQL) is a resource that consolidates recent and accurate COVID-19 information, and is regularly updated with the latest results and data relevant to the pandemic. The latest MQL update includes answers to some new questions covering the efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccines, the Delta variant of SARS-CoV-2, and the long-term symptoms of COVID-19 infection. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the vast majority of US COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths are occurring in unvaccinated individuals, at 95-99.9% and 94-99.8%, respectively. The Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna vaccines were found to be 88% effective overall in a study published by the US National Library of Medicine. Long-term infections persist for more than four weeks, and affects 5-10% of patients. The most common chronic symptoms include fatigue, loss of taste or smell, shortness of breath, and headache. Find the current MQL here.

Leader of WHO’s New Pandemic Hub: Improve Data Flow to Extinguish Outbreaks

Chikwe Ihekweazu, an epidemiologist and former leader of the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), talks about his exit from NCDC and shares his hopes and fears for the new Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence in Berlin. Upon his departure, the NCDC staffed about 700 people, included two emergency operation centers, and maintained surveillance teams to detect and respond to infectious disease incidents. In his new leadership role at the Hub, Ihekweazu says that he wants to “make the mechanics of reporting disease-related information easier, and also demonstrate that the World Health Organization can use that data to help countries that share it.” His main source of anxiety is that “expectations are so high that people will expect us to demonstrate results immediately — to, you know, identify a single case of a new virus anywhere in the world and stop it.” The aim of the Hub is to “offer [its] leadership, knowledge, systems for data sharing and analytics to help countries be more confident in the decisions they have to make.” Though Ihekweazu has physically left Nigeria, the country is always in his heart, and he is “always thinking about how to make Nigeria better, and how to make the continent work better.”

The Latest COVID-19 Figures

As of 23 September, worldwide, there have been 230,351,063 COVID-19 cases; 4,723,172 deaths; and 6,012,794,821 vaccine doses administered. According to STAT’s COVID-19 Tracker, COVID-19 deaths have now exceeded 675,400 in the US. To put that figure in perspective, in 1918, the Spanish flu caused a pandemic that claimed the lives of an estimated 675,000 Americans across about two years. At present, deaths in the US account for about 14% of the 4.7 million losses worldwide from the pandemic; the US population accounts for only 4.2% of the global population. In the US, 99% of new COVID-19 cases are of the Delta variant. Dr. Saskia Popescu, an assistant professor in the Biodefense Graduate Program as well as an alumna, said the fact that new cases are overwhelmingly caused by the Delta variant is “not unexpected, because it’s more transmissible, but it is also a strong reminder that we need to have continuous vigilance.” Popescu emphasizes, “don’t let your guard down,” because we still need “continuous surveillance, genomic sequencing, access to testing and public health interventions.” For everyone, this includes wearing a mask to curb transmission.

COVID-19 Cited in Significant Increase in Healthcare-Associated Infections in 2020

New data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) show that there were significant increases in healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) during 2020, the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. This surge is “quite troubling and must serve as a call to action.” Ann Marie Pettis, President of the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC), emphasizes that “as a nation we must take significant efforts to bolster our infection prevention and control programs throughout the healthcare continuum.” A new report from the CDC, COVID-19 Cited in Significant Increase in Healthcare-Associated Infections in 2020, analyzes data collected through the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN), the country’s largest healthcare-associated infection surveillance system. According to the report, “major increases were found in 2020 compared to 2019 in four serious infection types: central line-associated bloodstream infections, catheter-associated urinary tract infections, ventilator-associated events, and antibiotic resistant staph infections.” This analysis “highlights the need for healthcare facilities to strengthen their infection prevention programs and support them with adequate resources so that they can handle emerging threats to public health, while at the same time ensuring that gains made in combatting HAIs are not lost.”

Mental Health and Social Support for Healthcare and Hospital Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security recently published a new study, “Mental Health and Social Support for Healthcare and Hospital Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” that aims to identify the issues most critical to healthcare workers’ mental health, wellbeing, and motivation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Healthcare and hospital workers providing care and support to infected patients during a pandemic are at increased risk for mental distress. Factors impacting their mental health include high risk of exposure and infection, financial insecurity due to furloughs, separation from and worries about loved ones, a stressful work environment due to surge conditions with scarce supplies, traumatic experiences due to witnessing the deaths of patients and colleagues, and other acute stressors. Finding ways for institutions to support the mental wellbeing of healthcare and hospital workers in an acute pandemic-related crisis situation is of critical importance. The factors affecting mental health are deeply connected to work-related motivation and attendance. Willingness to come to work is multifactorial and is dependent upon an individual’s self-perception of risk, as well as having the skills and resources necessary to perform work tasks given the nature of the public health emergency. Social and material support for healthcare workers in a variety of high-stress and high-risk settings is important for supporting workers’ mental health and in maintaining their commitment in challenging conditions. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on healthcare workers has been profound, characterized by death, disability, and an untenable burden on mental health and well-being.

The study was conducted using a cross-sectional survey (1,189 responses) and 73 semi-structured interviews with individuals currently employed at the Johns Hopkins Health System (JHHS) and Johns Hopkins Medicine (JHM) hospitals located in Maryland and the District of Columbia. The study population included healthcare providers and direct support services staff, including workers in frontline environmental services, food services, and security. The responses from the survey and interviews revealed that the trauma of witnessing COVID-19 death was exacerbated by the general stress of working during the pandemic and that the significant mental health burden created by the pandemic/infectious disease environment itself was characterized by the ongoing uncertainty and ambiguity about the scientific understanding of the virus. Additionally, stressors negatively impacting employee mental health stemmed from the workplace, resulting in reduced trust of and increased perceptions of betrayal in the institution. Read the full study here.

In 2020, Maddie Roty, recent graduate of the Biodefense MS program, discussed the psychological effects of the pandemic on healthcare workers in her piece, “Heroes are Human Too: The Toll of COVID-19 on the Mental Health of Healthcare Workers.” Read Maddie’s article here.

Charting a Strategic Path Forward for DHS in an Evolved Threat Landscape

Dr. Daniel Gerstein, alumnus of the Biodefense PhD Program and an adjunct professor at the Schar School, discusses why the upcoming Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) strategic plan should take on new importance given the challenges the nation and DHS are facing. The QHSR is due to Congress by the end of calendar year 2021 and the Strategic Plan by February 2022. Together, they will articulate DHS’ missions and goals, the strategies to achieve each goal, and long-term performance measures to evaluate the progress. There are two possible paths for DHS with these documents. The first approach is to “dust off and update the 2014 QHSR and the DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2020-2024. The core values and guiding principles could be revalidated and minor changes made to the five operational missions and enterprise support functions.” Gerstein offers a second approach for developing the QHSR report and DHS Strategic Plan: “recognize that fundamental and profound changes have occurred in the threats and risks confronting our nation and are continuing to stretch the department in its key mission areas.” The second approach recognizes the “need for charting, or at least considering, a new operational and organizational path forward.” Gerstein argues that the latter approach is most prudent to follow given the length of time that has passed since the establishment of the Department and the changing threats and risks. Read the article here.

After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness

The COVID-19 pandemic shows how catastrophic biological incidents can cause substantial loss of life, economic damage, and require a whole-of-nation response involving multiple federal and nonfederal entities. The 2018 National Biodefense Strategy outlines specific goals and objectives to help prepare for and respond to such incidents. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to conduct monitoring and oversight of federal efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from COVID-19. GAO’s report, After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness, addresses: (1) interagency plans key federal agencies developed, and exercises they conducted, to help prepare for biological incidents; and (2) the extent to which exercises and real-world incidents revealed opportunities to better achieve National Biodefense Strategy objectives. GAO reviewed biological incident plans and after-action reports from exercises and real-world incidents from calendar years 2009 through 2019, including a non-generalizable sample of 19 reports selected based on threat scenario and other factors. GAO interviewed federal and state officials to obtain their perspectives on plans, exercises, and the COVID-19 response. GAO outlines 16 recommendations to the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture. These recommendations center largely around the secretaries working through the Biodefense Steering Committee to define the set of capabilities that each agency needs to prepare for and respond to nationally significant biological incidents, and to periodically assess and communicate exercise priorities among the capabilities they identify. Read the report here.

European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA): Getting Ready for Future Health Emergencies

On 16 September, the European Commission launched the European Health Emergency preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) to prevent, detect, and rapidly respond to health emergencies. HERA will anticipate threats and potential health crises, through intelligence gathering and building the necessary response capacities. When an emergency hits, HERA will ensure the development, production and distribution of medicines, vaccines and other medical countermeasures – such as gloves and masks – that were often lacking during the first phase of the coronavirus response. It will be fully operational early 2022. Its functioning will be reviewed and adapted on an annual basis until 2025, when a full review will be carried out. HERA is a key pillar of the European Health Union announced by President von der Leyen in her 2020 State of the Union address and will fill a gap in the EU’s health emergency response and preparedness.

Event – The US Food and Drug Administration’s Emergency Use Authorization: Lessons Learned from the Past to Guide the Future

The National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine is offering a workshop on 5-6 October that will look at the past, present, and possible future of the FDA’s Emergency Use Authorization. The workshop will examine the US Food and Drug Administration’s historic and recent use of the Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs) for diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. It will also provide an overview of the current regulatory framework for EUAs and discuss whether any possible revisions would help to ensure that EUAs are based upon the best and most reliable scientific evidence or enhance public confidence and trust in the EUA process and products.  The workshop will also examine EUAs and similar mechanisms used by other entities within the global health regulatory system, lessons that US and global regulatory and public health partners can learn from one another, and ways to enhance international cooperation between the FDA and its global partners. Register here.

Event – 2021 BSL4ZNet International Conference

The Biosafety Level 4 Zoonotic Laboratory Network (BSL4ZNet) invites you to attend the 2021 BSL4ZNet International Conference, a four-day, online event that will be held virtually on 23 and 29 September as well as 7 and 14 October. 
The conference will convene under the overarching theme of Preparing and Responding to New Post-Pandemic Challenges. The conference aims to enhance knowledge and best practices, and promote collaboration and cooperation with participants from around the world.

The 2021 BSL4ZNet International Conference will be organized into four thematic sessions focused on the post-pandemic era and driving science forward.

1. Emerging and re-emerging pathogens, on September 23, 2021
2. BSL3 and BSL4 biosafety and biosecurity: international perspectives, on September 29, 2021
3. One Health perspectives, on October 7, 2021
4. Zoonotic outbreaks and pandemics: science policy and science diplomacy perspectives, on October 14, 2021 

The diverse line-up of international keynote speakers and panelists include scientific experts and leading science professionals from government, academia, industry, and non-profit organizations, working in the areas of research, emerging and re-emerging bio-threats laboratory management, biosafety and biosecurity, science diplomacy and policy. Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program, will be speaking on the “Science policy perspectives in the future of biodefense and biosecurity” panel on 14 October. Expect to hear and engage in discussions on how to leverage the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, and other zoonotic outbreaks, through reflections and lessons learned to navigate a post-pandemic era.

Register here.

Upcoming Meeting of the National Biodefense Science Board

The National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB or the Board) is authorized under Section 319M of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act, as added by Section 402 of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 and amended by Section 404 of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act. The Board is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which sets forth standards for the formation and use of advisory committees. The NBSB provides expert advice and guidance on scientific, technical, and other matters of special interest to the Department regarding current and future chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological agents, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate.

The NBSB will meet in public (virtually) on September 28, 2021, to discuss high priority issues related to national public health emergency preparedness and response. A more detailed agenda will be available on the NBSB meeting website.

Event – Africa CDC Inaugural One Health Conference

The Africa CDC, a specialized technical agency of the African Union (AU), is working to strengthen Africa’s public health institutions to detect and respond quickly and effectively to disease threats and outbreaks on the continent. Africa CDC recognizes that a One Health approach is critical to this mission and for the accelerated implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) and to achieve the AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

Increasing globalization, urban density, ease of travel, animal movement, environmental changes and habitat overlap between humans and animals, all provide opportunities for the emergence and spread of diseases that adversely impact both human and animal health, prosperity, and food security. COVID-19 and Ebola virus disease are two recent examples of how these various factors have directly impacted Africa. To combat these current outbreaks and get ahead of the next, a One Health approach must be taken.

One Health is a collaborative, multisectoral and transdisciplinary approach used to attain optimal health outcomes for people, animals, plants, and their shared environment. Practically, One Health involves the collaboration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors as well as other relevant stakeholders, in the design and implementation of programs, policies, legislation, and research intended to achieve better health outcomes for all.

To celebrate and share the various One Health work taking place on the continent, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) is hosting a 3-day virtual One Health Conference from 1-3 November 2021. Presenters will include representatives from Africa Union Member States, RECs, Africa Union technical agencies, Africa CDC RCCs, research institutions and technical partners. Register here.

Dr. Yong-Bee Lim, Biodefense PhD ’21, was just named to the inaugural class of Editorial Fellows at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists! The COVID-19 pandemic has spurred calls to “revamp” the Biological Weapons Convention. Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program, will be speaking on the “Science policy perspectives in the future of biodefense and biosecurity” panel of the 2021 BSL4ZNet International Conference on 14 October.

Dr. Yong-Bee Lim: Inaugural Editorial Fellow at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Yong-Bee Lim, Biodefense PhD ’21, was just named to the inaugural class of Editorial Fellows at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, where he will be writing a regular column on disruptive technology. He is a fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks, focusing on biosecurity, biodefense strategy, and emerging and converging technologies. Dr. Lim is one of seven fellows who will “publish articles regularly on nuclear risk, climate change, and disruptive technologies—key areas in the Bulletin’s mission to inform the public, policymakers, and scientists about man-made threats to human existence.”

HDIAC Webinar: Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing the Risk in the Post Pandemic

The Homeland Defense and Security Information Analysis Center (HDIAC) hosted a webinar, “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing the Risk in the Post Pandemic,” earlier this week. The pandemic has posed new challenges for critical infrastructure protection (CIP), including identifying decision-makers and executing organizations’ responses to incidents. Additionally, many institutions are facing emerging threats and hazards as they return to regular operations. This session reviewed emerging and traditional risks and discuss the steps needed to safely manage the overall change in risk paradigm. Further topics include the changes in asset management, risk trends, and tools to support the new normal of CIP risk resilience. The webinar’s slides are available here, and the recording is available here.

New Book: Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology

Synthetic biology is a field of biotechnology that is rapidly growing in various applications, such as in medicine, environmental sustainability, and energy production. However, these technologies also have unforeseen risks and applications to humans and the environment. Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology is an open access book that presents discussions on risks and mitigation strategies for these technologies including biosecurity, or the potential of synthetic biology technologies and processes to be deliberately misused for nefarious purposes. The book presents strategies to prevent, mitigate, and recover from ‘dual-use concern’ biosecurity challenges that may be raised by individuals, rogue states, or non-state actors. Several key topics are explored including opportunities to develop more coherent and scalable approaches to govern biosecurity from a laboratory perspective up to the international scale and strategies to prevent potential health and environmental hazards posed by deliberate misuse of synthetic biology without stifling innovation. The book brings together the expertise of top scholars in synthetic biology and biotechnology risk assessment, management, and communication to discuss potential biosecurity governing strategies and offer perspectives for collaboration in oversight and future regulatory guidance. Download a copy here.

COVID Heats Up Debate Over Biological Weapons Convention

The COVID-19 pandemic has spurred calls to “revamp” the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Negotiations for the BWC concluded 50 years ago, but experts are currently “grappling with how to make the convention fit for the future – a need that COVID-19 has thrown into sharp relief.” There is an institutional deficit between the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), treaties both aimed at banning their respective category of weapons; however, the CWC is “much stronger.” The BWC critically lacks a “strong implementation support unit, clear investigative powers, and frequent reviews of the convention and scientific developments.” Another major issue with the BWC is the lack of transparency, evidenced by the fact that less than half of its member states submit confidence building measures. Though the BWC grants investigatory powers, the details are “blurry,” especially regarding how an investigation should be conducted. Additionally, the BWC’s review conference is held every five years, making it difficult to keep up with the pace of scientific developments. The threat of terrorism is likely growing as technology and access to it grow.

Rise of AMR During COVID-19

A physician treating hospitalized COVID-19 patients is seeing how resistant secondary infections are complicating care and the pandemic response. Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is the characteristic in which microorganisms – viruses, bacteria, and fungi – change over time and exposure in ways that that render antimicrobial medicines futile against them. Globally, about 700,000 people die from these types of infections annually. According to Dr. John B. Lynch, an infectious diseases doctor at Harborview Medical Center and professor of medicine at the University of Washington in Seattle, “the simultaneous COVID-19 and antibiotic-resistant bacteria pandemics weaken our ability to prepare for and respond to the next public health threat.” A recent study examined 148 hospitals across 17 states from March through September 2020 and found increases across several types of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). Additionally, there were 24% more cases of hospital-acquired multidrug-resistant infections than expected without SARS-CoV-2, including a 30% increase in hospital-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections. These infections are especially difficult to treat and require an “arsenal of safe and effective antibiotics.” Unfortunately, this arsenal is currently lacking. The antibiotic pipeline is waning as many large drug companies have moved away from R&D into antibiotics, which are not a good financial return on investment. The overuse and misuse of antimicrobials is contributing to growing resistance. Lynch strongly recommends that the US “prioritize its response to antibiotic resistance to ensure we are better prepared for future threats.” The bipartisan Pioneering Antibiotic Subscriptions to End Upsurging Resistance (PASTEUR) Act, Lynch asserts, is a “strong step forward.” The PASTEUR Act “would fundamentally change the way the federal government pays for the most critically needed new antibiotics — a shift from paying for volume to paying for value.”

A Strategy to Assess Spillover Risk of Bat SARS-Related Coronaviruses in Southeast Asia

Emerging diseases caused by coronaviruses of likely bat origin (e.g., SARS, MERS, SADS and COVID-19) have disrupted global health and economies for two decades. Evidence suggests that some bat SARS-related coronaviruses (SARSr-CoVs) could infect people directly, and that their spillover is more frequent than previously recognized. Each zoonotic spillover of a novel virus represents an opportunity for evolutionary adaptation and further spread; therefore, quantifying the extent of this “hidden” spillover may help target prevention programs. The authors derived biologically realistic range distributions for known bat SARSr-CoV hosts and quantify their overlap with human populations. This research then used probabilistic risk assessment and data on human-bat contact, human SARSr-CoV seroprevalence, and antibody duration to estimate that ∼400,000 people (median: ∼50,000) are infected with SARSr-CoVs annually in South and Southeast Asia. These data on the geography and scale of spillover can be used to target surveillance and prevention programs for potential future bat-CoV emergence. Read the article here.

1 in Every 500 US Residents have Died of COVID-19

As of 14 September, 663,913 people in the US have died of COVID-19. This toll equates to 1 in 500 Americans having died from the novel coronavirus. The Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine was granted approval by the Food and Drug Administration on 23 August, and two other vaccines – one from Moderna and another from Jansen – are available to the public under emergency use authorizations. Despite these shot options, little more than half of the population is fully vaccinated. Though vaccinations are the “best source of protection against the virus,” the rate of vaccination is slowing. With Pfizer approved, mandates are underway that require certain workers to get the COVID-19 shot, but many are against these measures. For example, in August, New York issued an order that required all health care workers be vaccinated against the virus by 27 September, but several Catholic and Baptist medical professionals filed a federal complaint in hopes of preventing enforcement of the mandate for religious reasons.

A Science in the Shadows

The Washington Post investigated the US support for gain-of-function experiments with potentially dangerous pathogens and the secrecy around it. Gain-of-function experiments are used to enhance certain aspects of a pathogen, often conducted using a combination of gene editing and serial passage of the pathogen between animal hosts. The controversy surrounding this realm of research stems from the concern that this work could cause a terrible outbreak. This concern has been a major topic of discussion as the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a mystery. There are suspicions that SARS-CoV-2 was an escaped virus from a high-containment laboratory in Wuhan, China. This theory has shone a light on gain-of-function research, and its risks and benefits. View the interactive here.

The Grave Risk of Lab-Created Potentially Pandemic Pathogens

In 2012, the research work of Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka “renewed the debate over whether potential pandemic virus research is too dangerous to conduct.” These researchers published “studies on making avian influenza contagious through the air among mammals.” At the time of publication, highly pathogenic avian influenza, or H5N1, was already known to transmit human-to-human, if only rarely. This debate on developing pathogenic threats for research purposes led the US government to implement a moratorium on funding gain-of-function research. Dr. Lynn Klotz, PhD, a Senior Science Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, shares his “grave concern that the probability of a pandemic caused by a lab incident or accident is much too high.” Klotz’s calculation demonstrated the “high likelihood of release into the community from at least one of the 14 facilities that now create airborne-transmissible potential pandemic viruses and made estimates of the probability that a release will seed a pandemic with potentially millions of fatalities.” These 14 facilities conduct research with avian and human pandemic influenza viruses. This calculation supports his “grave concern that the probability of a pandemic caused by a lab incident or accident is much too high.” Klotz estimates that the chance of a release from a laboratory for an estimated five years of research producing and studying mammalian airborne transmissible H5N1 avian influenza and human flu viruses is 15.8%. Human error can cause accidents that result in the release of a dangerous pathogen into the surrounding community. Given the risks, Klotz recommends a strong level of precaution, specifically a moratorium on this mammalian airborne transmissible avian influenza research.

On the China COVID Investigation, Take the Virus-Hunter Approach

The high-profile publication of the US intelligence community’s investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted how little progress has been made on that front. The report reiterated two leading theories: the virus emerged in nature or the virus escaped from a laboratory. Much of the continued uncertainty is the result of the Chinese government obscuring the events around the early days of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak and withholding important information to outside investigators. The World Health Organization (WHO) is initiating a second global investigation into the origins of COVID-19, which is to be led by more qualified investigators, but China continues to reject further inquiries. Pressure is mounting on the White House to “play hardball with China,” as in to compel cooperation via new penalties like sanctions on China’s laboratories. Dr. Michael Callahan, an infectious disease doctor, is the former biosafety physician for the US Department of State’s BioIndustry Initiative in the former Soviet Union and Bio-Engagement Program in Asia. Dr. Callahan offers a more promising method than force, one based on a “little-known 30-year US government effort to root out bioweapons in dangerous parts of the world, and to secure dangerous pathogens in foreign laboratories.” After the fall of the Soviet Union, Congress supported the idea of a “special forces” for laboratory biosecurity, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program was created. Under CTR, US biosecurity experts – infectious disease doctors, veterinarians, and microbiologists – were deployed in a “dispersed, field-based approach.” These field scientists “built partnerships in each country not just with governments, but with vaccine companies, local physicians and public health officials.” The CTR model was based on building trust through collaboration and doctor-to-doctor contacts. Callahan emphasized that “biosafety is built on collaboration, positive incentives and strong scientific and public health alliances.” Focusing on collaboration instead of “hardball tactics” could better open a line of communication with China regarding the origins of COVID-19.

Poisons & Pestilence Podcast: Shoot that Poison Arrow

A new podcast, Poisons and Pestilence, is debuting with an episode that covers the pre-history of poison arrows. Poisons and Pestilence is produced by Dr. Brett Edwards, an expert on chemical and biological weapons at the University of Bath. Listen to the podcast here.

Frontiers of Computing in Health and Society Symposium

George Mason University is organizing a two-day virtual symposium as part of the kick-off of a new thematic initiative to enhance diverse multidisciplinary research in computing, society, and healthcare, aligned with GMU’s new School of Computing. The two-day virtual “Frontiers of Computing in Health and Society” symposium will feature keynote talks, moderated panels, and lightning talk sessions organized around the broad themes of “AI, Social Justice, and Public Policy” (September 20) and “Computational Systems Biomedicine” (September 21). The conference is open to students, faculty, and the general public. The symposium will also be putting together “lightning talk” sessions on each of the two themes. Participants are encouraged to submit a short abstract on the registration page describing their research area for consideration for inclusion in one of these sessions. More information can be found here. Register here.  

Towards a Post-Pandemic World: Lessons from COVID-19 for Now and the Future

This public workshop is the second of a two-part series about what we’ve learned from a year and a half of living through a pandemic. Presentations will broadly examine responses to COVID-19 in the US and abroad and will host discussions on the long-term impacts of the pandemic on human health and society. The workshop will also examine the role of social sciences in pandemic response, including efforts to reinforce social capital through community engagement and partnerships, and the implications on improving health equity. Each session will highlight successes, missed opportunities, and emerging data in order to extract key understandings that leaders in government, public health systems, the private sector, and communities can incorporate into their ongoing pandemic responses right now – with a view towards enhancing resilience and preparedness for the future. The workshop will be held 21 – 24 September from 10:00 AM – 2:30 PM ET.

Each day of the workshop will take on a different genre of critical understandings from the pandemic to date:

• September 21 (Day 1): Anticipated Long-Term Effects of COVID-19 – Impacts on Health Equity
• September 22 (Day 2): Addressing Uncertainties during a Pandemic – Establishing Trust and Engagement, Managing Misinformation
• September 23 (Day 3): Systematizing Recovery Efforts to Mitigate the Next Pandemic
• September 24 (Day 4): Potentials for a Post-COVID World – Scenario Planning Exercise

Register here.

2021 BSL4ZNet International Conference

The Biosafety Level 4 Zoonotic Laboratory Network (BSL4ZNet) invites you to attend the 2021 BSL4ZNet International Conference, a four-day, online event that will be held virtually on 23 and 29 September as well as 7 and 14 October. The conference will convene under the overarching theme of Preparing and Responding to New Post-Pandemic Challenges. The conference aims to enhance knowledge and best practices, and promote collaboration and cooperation with participants from around the world.

The 2021 BSL4ZNet International Conference will be organized into four thematic sessions focused on the post-pandemic era and driving science forward.

1. Emerging and re-emerging pathogens, on September 23, 2021
2. BSL3 and BSL4 biosafety and biosecurity: international perspectives, on September 29, 2021
3. One Health perspectives, on October 7, 2021
4. Zoonotic outbreaks and pandemics: science policy and science diplomacy perspectives, on October 14, 2021 

The diverse line-up of international keynote speakers and panelists include scientific experts and leading science professionals from government, academia, industry, and non-profit organizations, working in the areas of research, emerging and re-emerging bio-threats laboratory management, biosafety and biosecurity, science diplomacy and policy. Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program, will be speaking on the “Science policy perspectives in the future of biodefense and biosecurity” panel on 14 October. Expect to hear and engage in discussions on how to leverage the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, and other zoonotic outbreaks, through reflections and lessons learned to navigate a post-pandemic era.

Register here.

Preparing for the Next Pandemic: A Preview of Bipartisan Congressional Action

On 22 September at 1 PM ET, join the Capitol Hill Steering Committee on Pandemic Preparedness and Health Security webinar: Preparing for the Next Pandemic: A Preview of Bipartisan Congressional Action.

Congressional leaders on the Senate HELP Committee and House Energy & Commerce Committee have long supported bipartisan legislation to improve and sustain domestic pandemic preparedness. This session will feature senior health policy staff representing Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) and Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chair and Ranking Member of the Committee, and Representatives Frank Pallone (D-NJ) and Kathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Chair and Ranking Member of the House E&C Committee.

The Health Policy Directors will discuss their plans and policy priorities for working together on bipartisan legislation to improve the nation’s public health and medical preparedness and response, by implementing lessons learned from COVID-19.

Register here.

US Chemical Weapons Stockpile Elimination: Progress Update

As part of its treaty obligations to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the United States must finish destroying all of its declared chemical weapons stockpiles by September 2023. With two years remaining before the stockpile elimination deadline, the CWC Coalition seeks to discuss what has been accomplished, what still lies ahead, and the importance of meeting the 2023 deadline. Since becoming a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the United States has worked steadily to destroy its declared chemical weapons stockpiles. As of May 2021, the United States has destroyed 96.52% of its Category 1 chemical weapons stockpile and all of its Category 2 and Category 3 chemical weapons. The United States is the last of eight declared stockpile possessor states to complete its safe and permanent demilitarization of chemical weapons. Catch up with progress updates on 23 September at 10 AM EST.  

Speakers include Dr. Brandi Vann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense; Irene Kornelly, Chair of the Colorado Citizens’ Advisory Commission; and the moderator, Paul Walker, Coordinator, CWC Coalition. Register here.

Upcoming Meeting of the National Biodefense Science Board

The National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB or the Board) is authorized under Section 319M of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act, as added by Section 402 of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 and amended by Section 404 of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act. The Board is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which sets forth standards for the formation and use of advisory committees. The NBSB provides expert advice and guidance on scientific, technical, and other matters of special interest to the Department regarding current and future chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological agents, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate.

The NBSB will meet in public (virtually) on September 28, 2021, to discuss high priority issues related to national public health emergency preparedness and response. A more detailed agenda will be available on the NBSB meeting website.

Africa CDC Inaugural One Health Conference

The Africa CDC, a specialized technical agency of the African Union (AU), is working to strengthen Africa’s public health institutions to detect and respond quickly and effectively to disease threats and outbreaks on the continent. Africa CDC recognizes that a One Health approach is critical to this mission and for the accelerated implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) and to achieve the AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

Increasing globalization, urban density, ease of travel, animal movement, environmental changes and habitat overlap between humans and animals, all provide opportunities for the emergence and spread of diseases that adversely impact both human and animal health, prosperity, and food security. COVID-19 and Ebola virus disease are two recent examples of how these various factors have directly impacted Africa. To combat these current outbreaks and get ahead of the next, a One Health approach must be taken.

One Health is a collaborative, multisectoral and transdisciplinary approach used to attain optimal health outcomes for people, animals, plants, and their shared environment. Practically, One Health involves the collaboration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors as well as other relevant stakeholders, in the design and implementation of programs, policies, legislation, and research intended to achieve better health outcomes for all.

To celebrate and share the various One Health work taking place on the continent, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) is hosting a 3-day virtual One Health Conference from 1-3 November 2021. Presenters will include representatives from Africa Union Member States, RECs, Africa Union technical agencies, Africa CDC RCCs, research institutions and technical partners.

Register here.

Tomorrow is the 20^th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The Biden administration proposed a sweeping pandemic preparedness plan. US-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation has come to an inflection point, and each state must decide whether the challenges in their bilateral relationship make it impossible to collaborate.

20^th Anniversary of 9/11 & Amerithrax

Tomorrow, 11 September 2021, marks the 20^th anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which cost the lives of nearly 3,000 people and injured 6,000 more. The following weeks in 2001 were plagued by the anthrax letter attacks that killed five people and sickened another 17.

Michael Morrell, former Acting Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and current Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government, served as President Bush’s CIA briefer during the 9/11 attacks. It was during that morning’s briefing that the attacks began, which were initially suspected as accidental due to severe weather conditions. Morrell remembers realizing that al-Qa`ida and bin Laden were behind these acts of terrorism once the second plane hit the Twin Towers. Morrell’s 9/11 story continued until the death of bin Laden under the Obama administration. Returning to the present, Morrell shared that his greatest worry remains weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which could be deployed by a nation or non-state group, such as a terrorist organization. Biological weapons are among the WMDs for which Morrell fears could wreak terrible havoc.

Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) released an analysis on the response and limitations of the public health system, Public Health Preparedness: Progress and Challenges Since September 11, 2001. A component of this report “highlights the urgent need for federal, state, and local policymakers to prioritize the nation’s health security as we work toward ending the COVID-19 pandemic and preparing for extreme weather, the health impacts of climate change, future pandemics, and other emerging threats.” The President and CEO of TFAH stated, “The 20th anniversary of September 11^th is an important milestone to mark the progress we have made in the past two decades: we have built a public health preparedness enterprise from the ground up, including a dedicated public health emergency workforce. But we must make additional and sustained investments in public health infrastructure and workforce, and we must ensure equity is at the center of preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.” TFAH recommends several policy actions, such as investment in modernizing public health data systems and equipping public health and government leaders to deliver effective public communications and counter misinformation.

Moving On & Up

Congratulations to Diandra Coleman and Minh Ly for starting new jobs in the areas of global health security and biosecurity. Diandra, a student in the Biodefense MS program, is starting a new job as a program coordinator with Health Security Partners, a nonprofit international development organization that is dedicated to building local capacity to improve health security around the world. As program coordinator, Diandra will report to the Executive Director and be responsible for supporting HSP’s education, collaboration and stewardship projects in Asia and the Middle East. Minh Ly, Biodefense MS ’21, has joined the DC office of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. CNS is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues. In his new role as a Research Associate, Minh will be focusing on the implications of advanced biotechnologies for national and international security. 

HyunJung Kim (Henry Kim), Biodefense PhD ’21, has been appointed a research fellow at the Center for Security Policy Studies Korea (CSPS-K). CSPS-K is the South Korean branch of Center for Security Policy Studies (CSPS) at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. His work at CSPS-K will focus on the use of unapproved medical countermeasures in response to public health emergencies and the history of biological warfare.

A Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy for the 21^st Century

An article co-authored by Zachary Kallenborn, a Policy Fellow at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, highlights the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to the US, and points out the limited interagency collaboration and lack of a common approach across the US government to countering the development and use of WMDs. Over time, the concept of WMDs, in general, has evolved to include not only lethal chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons (CBRNE), but also non-lethal chemical and biological weapons. Today, the debate continues regarding the inclusion of nerve agents and emerging infectious diseases. Yet, the US government has yet to develop a standardized definition of WMDs, let alone a meaning that adequately accounts for 21^st century challenges that do not fit into the traditional CBRNE model. For example, “the public health and WMD communities clash over the extent to which bioterrorism and natural pandemics should fall under the scope of WMD response.” Additionally, the norms against the use of WMDs are under threat in recent years with certain states deploying banned weapons, like Russia’s use of Novichok nerve agents in attempted assassinations. Technological leaps are changing the game, “making it easier for state and non-state actors to acquire, enhance, and use WMD.” Synthetic biology enables the development of bioweapons, drones offer a novel delivery system, and 3D printing makes components easier to manufacture. Today, the US government has three strategies to counter WMDs that do not adequately account for the dynamic threat landscape. The authors urge the US to develop a “guiding strategy to integrate activities aimed at ensuring non- and counter-proliferation of WMD across national security agencies.” This strategy should “recognize the common challenges WMD pose as a class — the need to reinforce international norms, identify and close off proliferation pathways, and punish egregious use of such weapons — but also appreciate the challenges unique to particular classes of weapons, such as the use of chemical weapons in assassination attacks.” Read the article here.

Progress on Biorisk Management in Iraq

On September 3, Mahdi Al-Jewari, senior chief biologist of the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority for Non-Proliferation (INMA), presented a working paper on Iraq’s National Biorisk Management Committee (NBMC) as part of a Meeting of Experts session on national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The working paper describes the role, objectives and structure of the NBMC, its international partnerships, achievements so far, and remaining challenges. Mr. Al-Jewari and Gregory Koblentz, director of the Biodefense Graduate Program, described the origin and evolution of biorisk management in Iraq in this 2016 article. 

Call for Emergency Action to Limit Global Temperature Increases, Restore Biodiversity, and Protect Health

The United Nations General Assembly in September 2021 will bring countries together at a critical time for marshalling collective action to tackle the global environmental crisis. They will meet again at the biodiversity summit in Kunming, China, and at the climate conference (COP26) in Glasgow, United Kingdom. Ahead of these pivotal meetings, the editors of health journals worldwide call for urgent action to keep average global temperature increases below 1.5°C, halt the destruction of nature, and protect health. Health is already being harmed by global temperature increases and the destruction of the natural world, a state of affairs health professionals have been bringing attention to for decades. The science is unequivocal: a global increase of 1.5°C above the pre-industrial average and the continued loss of biodiversity risk catastrophic harm to health that will be impossible to reverse. Despite the world’s necessary preoccupation with Covid-19, we cannot wait for the pandemic to pass to rapidly reduce emissions. Urgent, society-wide changes must be made and will lead to a fairer and healthier world. The editors of health journals call for governments and other leaders to act, marking 2021 as the year that the world finally changes course. Read the article here.

End of an Era: The United States, Russia, and Nuclear Nonproliferation

US-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation has reached an inflection point. Policy makers in both capitals must now decide whether the risks posed by the spread of nuclear weapons are great enough to merit their renewed engagement—or whether the challenges in their bilateral relationship make it impossible to collaborate in this vital sphere. The election of President Joseph R. Biden offers the potential for a more pragmatic US approach to nuclear cooperation with Russia—one aimed at reducing the mutual threats perceived by both countries. At the same time, however, both the Biden and Putin administrations will face significant domestic political opposition should they choose to revive their joint work in the nuclear sector and attempt to isolate it from other contentious issues that have plagued their relationship.

Recognizing these challenges, End of an Era: The United States, Russia, and Nuclear Nonproliferation identifies nonproliferation challenges that merit US-Russian cooperation and provides suggestions about specific measures that might usefully be pursued. These suggestions are drawn from the seven case studies, which describe instances in which the United States and Russia previously have been able to find common ground, even during periods of considerable tension in their bilateral relationship. Building upon the editors’ 2018 publication, Once and Future Partners: The United States, Russia, and Nuclear Non-proliferation, the present volume distills this history into lessons for contemporary policy makers, scholars, and students of US-Russia nuclear policy. While not a panacea, the recommendations offer practical opportunities to adopt more constructive US-Russia nuclear relations. Read End of an Era here.  

Russia’s Novel Weapons Systems: Military Innovation in the Post-Soviet Period

This article identifies the principal drivers of Russian military innovation involving five novel nuclear, conventional, or dual-capable delivery systems—Avangard, Burevestnik, Poseidon, Kinzhal, and Tsirkon—and analyzes the interplay between these drivers over the course of the innovation process. It does so by means of a structured, focused comparison of the five systems and their progression to date, distinguishing “innovation” from concepts like “invention” and “diffusion,” and defining the stages of an innovation life cycle. The article also distills prior research on Soviet weapons innovation and investigates its continued validity. The analysis finds external factors to be central in driving innovation, specifically Russian threat perceptions around (1) US missile-defense development and (2) the development of Western conventional warfighting capabilities. It also discusses the roles of a range of internal factors, including industry and high-level political support for specific systems, the availability of Soviet-legacy research and engineering initiatives, and the appeal of anticipated industrial and ancillary benefits from the development of specific systems. Cooperation between design bureaus and other industry players is also examined, as is the role of status considerations in driving innovation. Finally, the relative importance of individual factors in explaining innovation is shown to differ across the systems. The structured comparison identifies the continued validity of certain aspects of past studies on Soviet military innovation, while also bringing to light new insights about contemporary Russian weapons innovation. Read the article here.

Strengthening Global Health Security and Reforming the International Health Regulations

Since the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak emerged in late 2019, more than 623,000 people in the US and 4.4 million people worldwide are known to have died from COVID-19. The true death count is probably many times higher. More than 200 million more people around the world have been infected. The rapid spread of highly contagious variants is a grim signal that those numbers will continue to rise. Behind the daily reports are the momentous health, economic, and security challenges this crisis poses for the US and the rest of the world. The pandemic has revealed significant weaknesses in global health security. While working to end the COVID-19 pandemic as quickly as possible, leaders around the world must also marshal the resources and commitment to look beyond this pandemic and build much stronger global health security for the future. There are 4 critical components of an effective global health security system in a post-COVID world, which US government and global leaders must come together to pursue. First, global leaders must modernize essential global institutions, starting with the World Health Organization (WHO). Second, countries and institutions must strengthen international laws and norms, and agreements written at an earlier time may need to be revised. Third, the international community must mobilize sustained financing. Fourth, global leaders must strengthen global governance, with an emphasis on transparency and accountability. The authors offer several recommendations regarding amendments to the International Health Regulations (IHR), such as establishing early warning triggers for action. Read the article here.

Apollo-Style Pandemic Preparedness Plan

Last week, the Biden administration announced a new biosecurity plan that is likened to the Apollo program of the late 1960s. This $65 billion proposal would be one of the largest investments in public health in American history and would “remake the nation’s pandemic preparedness infrastructure in the wake of Covid-19.” About $12 billion would be used to develop treatments for any known virus family and $5 billion would be for developing “diagnostics that the government would aim to make available within weeks of identifying a new biosecurity threat.” Dr. Beth Cameron describes this plan as a way to ensure that the US “has the capabilities it needs to operationalize [its response] when we see the first signs of an emerging outbreak that could have epidemic or pandemic potential.” The plan focuses on overhauling pandemic preparedness in the United States in five main areas: (1) transforming medical defenses, (2) ensuring situational awareness, (3) strengthening public health systems, (4) building core capabilities, and (5) managing the mission. Dr. Yong-Bee Lim, an alumnus of the Biodefense PhD program, and Christine Parthemore assert that a “bold and innovative re-envisioning of how the United States and the global community address pandemic threats is long overdue.”

Early this year, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense released a report, The Apollo Program for Biodefense – Winning the Race Against Biological Threats, that outlines a path forward to tackle biological threats. According to the Commission, “the existential threat that the United States faces today from pandemics is one of the most pressing challenges of our time; and ending pandemics is more achievable today than landing on the moon was in 1961.” The Apollo Program for Biodefense encompasses four main goals: (1) implement the National Blueprint for Biodefense; (2) produce a National Biodefense Science and Technology Strategy; (3) produce a cross-cutting budget; and (4) appropriate multi-year funding. Interviewed experts for the Apollo Program report by the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense include Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program; Dr. Andrew Kilianski, an adjunct professor in the GMU Biodefense Graduate Program; and Dr. Saskia Popescu, an assistant professor in the Biodefense Graduate Program. Read the full report here.

Schar School Master’s and Certificate Virtual Open House

Prospective students are invited to attend a virtual open house to learn more about the Schar School of Policy and Government and our academic programs, including the Biodefense Graduate Program. The online session will provide an overview of the master’s degree programs and graduate certificate programs, student services, and admissions requirements. The open house will be on 14 September from 6:30-8 PM EDT. Register here.

Frontiers of Computing in Health and Society Symposium

George Mason University is organizing a two-day virtual symposium as part of the kick-off of a new thematic initiative to enhance diverse multidisciplinary research in computing, society, and healthcare, aligned with GMU’s new School of Computing. The two-day virtual “Frontiers of Computing in Health and Society” symposium will feature keynote talks, moderated panels, and lightning talk sessions organized around the broad themes of “AI, Social Justice, and Public Policy” (September 20) and “Computational Systems Biomedicine” (September 21). The conference is open to students, faculty, and the general public. The symposium will also be putting together “lightning talk” sessions on each of the two themes. Participants are encouraged to submit a short abstract on the registration page describing their research area for consideration for inclusion in one of these sessions. More information can be found here. Register here.  

Dual-Use Research Workshops

Identify biosecurity and biosafety risks in two real-world case studies! Many life sciences students graduate without ever learning the term “dual-use”. In this interactive workshop, led by iGEM alumni and members of the Safety and Security Committee, you will learn how to evaluate Dual Use Research of Concern and bring your biosecurity considerations to the next level.

Register here for 1 of 3 workshop sessions:

Wednesday September 15, 6:00-8:00 pm CEST

Thursday September 16, 12:00-2:00 pm CEST

Friday September 17, 7:00-9:00 am CEST

Michelle Grundahl, a Biodefense MS student, shares her take on the recent meeting of the National Biodefense Science Board. A new report highlights the compound security threats caused by the “convergence of climate change with other global risks,” such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The Pandora Report is taking a short break, but we will be back soon with news and analysis for all things biodefense!

Biodefense Board Discusses Future of US Pandemic Preparedness

On May 26, 2021, the National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB) held a (virtual) public meeting that discussed actions that the United States needs to take to be better prepared for the challenges posed by public health emergencies such as pandemics, “Disease X,” and other biological threats. NBSB is the federal committee that advises the office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) in the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). During the meeting, the NBSB presented their recommendations to ASPR from its new report on ‘filling critical gaps’ in health emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. In addition, NBSB was briefed on the CDC’s new initiative to improve its data collection and analytical capabilities to improve information sharing and situational awareness during a public health emergency. Michelle Grundahl, a student in the Biodefense MS Program, shares her insights on the event. Read Grundahl’s article here.

Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) and the Future of the Korea Bioscience Industry

HyunJung Kim, PhD candidate in the Biodefense Program, published an article – Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) and the Future of the Korea Bioscience Industry (written in Korean) – in Monthly Chosun magazine. After the presidential summit between the United States and South Korea last month, Samsung Biologics, based in Seoul, and Moderna, based in Massachusetts, concluded an agreement for Samsung Biologics to produce Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccine in Korea. While Korea has developed the second biggest biologics production capacity in the world, next to the United States, Korea lags in the development of new vaccines and therapeutics. Kim reviews the expansion of Korea’s Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) policy from in-vitro diagnostic kits to medical countermeasures. He points out that the new EUA policy contains provisions that hamper the development of Korea’s biopharma industry by encouraging the Korean government to import medicine from abroad instead of investing in innovation at home by small and medium-sized biotech companies. Read Kim’s article here.

Reading the Nuclear Tea Leaves: Policy and Posture in the Biden Administration

Joseph Rodgers, a Biodefense PhD student, and Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at CSIS, released a report regarding nuclear policy in the Biden administration. The nuclear policy community is once again in the grips of pervasive anxiety that US nuclear policy -encompassing force modernization decisions, declaratory policy, and perceptions of adversary nuclear threat and risk – is either about to dramatically change or fail to change as dramatically as it should. In a polarized community characterized by mistrust and a highly politicized discourse, it is not surprising that the public conversation is filled with competing perspectives that seek to ensure that their voices are heard before the policies are set. As such, the current discourse appears particularly noisy. The greatest controversy centers on the modernization of the nuclear force, in particular the future of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force and commitment to the full triad of nuclear delivery systems, the role and primacy of nuclear weapons in our overall deterrence declaratory policy, the relative threat posed by Russia and China as drivers of US nuclear policy, and the relevance and utility of arms control in managing and reducing these threats. Read the report here.

Iraq National Pathogens List

Iraq has published a new national pathogens list that will guide the country’s approach to biorisk management. The list of human, plant, animal and zoonotic pathogens was produced by the interagency National Biorisk Management Committee. The national pathogen list will become part of Iraq’s system for regulating the import, export, and transfer of dual-use materials. In addition, the list will be used to determine appropriate biosafety and biosecurity measures that laboratories will need to implement. The Iraq National Monitoring Authority played a key role in the development of the list. Mahdi Al Jewari, senior chief biologist at INMA, was a visiting fellow with the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University in 2015. He and Biodefense program director Dr. Gregory Koblentz described Iraq’s effort to develop a comprehensive national biorisk management system in a 2016 article.

The World Climate and Security Report 2021

The Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) released its second annual World Climate and Security Report, which highlights the compound security threats caused by the “convergence of climate change with other global risks,” such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The report shows that the growing pace and intensity of climate hazards will stress military and security services as they are deployed to climate-driven crises, while also handling direct climate threats to their own infrastructure and readiness. The authors urge security institutions around the globe to act as “leading voices urging significantly reduced greenhouse gas emissions, given recent warnings about the catastrophic security implications of climate change under plausible climate scenarios.” Key risks outlined in the report include overstretched militaries, escalating climate security risks across all regions, and insufficient climate security adaptation and resilience solutions. Key opportunities outlined in the report include embracing predictive modeling and climate risk assessment methodologies as well as updating and developing international laws and mechanisms to include environmental and climate security impacts. Read the report and summary here.

The Ruthless Hackers Behind Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals: ‘They Do Not Care’

A string of ransomware attacks on hospitals has been carried out in recent months. These attacks have forced some medical facilities to suspend surgeries and delay medical care. They are also costing hospitals millions of dollars. The Wall Street Journal tracked the major attacks conducted by a specific group, a gang of Eastern European cybercriminals known as the “Business Club” previously and Ryuk more recently, that has ties to Russian government security services. It is the “most prolific ransomware gang in the world,” responsible for one-third of the 203 million attacks in the US in 2020. It is estimated that the group accrued at least $100 million in paid ransoms last year. Bill Siegel, CEO of the ransomware recovery firm Coveware, plainly stated: “They do not care. Patient care, people dying, whatever. It doesn’t matter.” The assaults launched specifically at hospitals during the pandemic exposed concerning gaps in cybersecurity for the nation’s health systems. In this day in age, hospitals are highly dependent on computers, especially given the push to digitize patient records.

Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communique

The leaders of the G7 – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States – met in Cornwall on 11-31 June with the primary aims of beating the pandemic and building back better. The group released a communique outlining its agenda for global action. First, they will work to end the pandemic and prepare for the future by driving an intensified international effort, starting immediately, to vaccinate the world by getting as many safe vaccines to as many people as possible as fast as possible. Additionally, they will work to reinvigorate our economies by advancing recovery plans that build on the $12 trillion of support put in place during the pandemic. Efforts will be made to secure future prosperity by championing freer, fairer trade within a reformed trading system, a more resilient global economy, and a fairer global tax system that reverses the race to the bottom. Further, the group seeks to protect the planet by supporting a green revolution that creates jobs, cuts emissions, and seeks to limit the rise in global temperatures to 1.5 degrees. Finally, the members aim to strengthen partnerships with others around the world and embrace its values as an enduring foundation for success in an ever-changing world. Read the full announcement here.

Exploring Science and Technology Review Mechanisms under the Biological Weapons Convention

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) published a study that “seeks to inform discussions on establishing a dedicated and systematic S&T review process under the BWC through an examination of existing S&T review-type mechanisms employed in different regimes beyond the BWC, a survey of States Parties views on a possible review mechanism and a study of past and present discourse on this issue in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).” Study methods included assessing review-type mechanisms employed in regimes beyond the BWC; semi-structured interviews with experts; review of past BWC proposals; and a survey of the views of BWC States Parties. Though not all States Parties support the idea of a BWC science and technology review mechanism, and even those who desire such a mechanism differ in the details, two types of potential models became evident. The first is a limited-participation model that would loosely resemble mechanisms used in organizations such as the OPCW, and would draw from a group of 20–30 qualified geographically-representative technical experts nominated by States Parties. The second is an open-ended model that would allow any interested State Party to send (and fund) a maximum of one or two expert participants in the review process. Read the study here.

Event – Pandemics and Global Health Security Workshop

COVID-19 has exposed just how unprepared governments, corporations, and societies are for a global pandemic. While the SARS-CoV-2 virus is only the most recent threat to global health security, it will certainly not be the last. Threats to global health security continue to evolve due to the emergence of new infectious diseases, globalization, advances in science and technology, and the changing nature of conflict. Pandemics and Global Health Security is a three-day virtual, non-credit workshop designed to introduce participants to the challenges facing the world at the intersection of pandemic preparedness and response, public health, national security, and the life sciences. Over the course of three days, participants will discuss how the biology and epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 contributed to the emergence of that virus as a global pandemic, lessons learned from Operation Warp Speed about the development of medical countermeasures, obstacles to hospital biopreparedness, challenges to science communication during a pandemic, the bioethics of resource allocation during a public health emergency, the future of global health security, and the role of science and technology in preventing and responding to pandemics. The workshop faculty are internationally recognized experts from the government, private sector, and academia who have been extensively involved in research and policy-making on public health, biodefense, and security issues. Live, interactive sessions will include Dr. Rick Bright, The Rockefeller Foundation; Dr. Nicholas G. Evans, University of Massachusetts-Lowell; Dr. Andrew Kilianski, Department of Defense; Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, George Mason University; Dr. Jennifer Nuzzo, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; Dr. Saskia Popescu, George Mason University; Dr. Angela L. Rasmussen, Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization-International Vaccine Centre; and Jessica Malaty Rivera, COVID Tracking Project. The workshop is organized by the Biodefense Graduate Program at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and will be held virtually on July 19-21, 2021. Each day will run from 9am to 12:30pm ET. The course fee is $500. Register here.

Let Scientific Evidence Determine Origin of SARS-CoV-2, Urge Presidents of the National Academies

A statement from the Presidents of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) strongly encourages the use of scientific evidence in the investigation of the origin of SARS-CoV-2. Marcia McNutt, President of the National Academy of Sciences; John L. Anderson, President of the National Academy of Engineering; and Victor J. Dzau, President of the National Academy of Medicine write:

“The origin of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, and the circumstances of the first cases of human infection, remain unknown.  Science is our best tool to ascertain, or to understand to the extent possible, the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19, which could help prevent future pandemics.  However, misinformation, unsubstantiated claims, and personal attacks on scientists surrounding the different theories of how the virus emerged are unacceptable, and are sowing public confusion and risk undermining the public’s trust in science and scientists, including those still leading efforts to bring the pandemic under control. 

We urge that investigations into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 be guided by scientific principles, including reliance on verifiable data, reproducibility, objectivity, transparency, peer review, international collaboration, minimizing conflicts of interest, findings based on evidence, and clarity regarding uncertainties.  In the case of SARS-CoV-2, there are multiple scenarios that could, in principle, explain its origin with varying degrees of plausibility based on our current understanding.  These scenarios range from natural zoonotic spillover (when a virus spreads from non-human animals to humans) to those that are associated with laboratory work. Scientists need to be able to evaluate all of these scenarios, and all viable hypotheses, with credible data.  Data accessibility, transparency, and full cooperation from China, of course, will be essential for a proper and thorough investigation. 

Although much still needs to be done to stop the pandemic, particularly in developing nations, science has made remarkable headway, especially through the rapid development of effective vaccines. The same scientific robustness, rigor, and cooperation should be applied to examining important questions about how the pandemic began.”

We May Never Know Where the Virus Came From. But Evidence Still Suggests Nature.

Dr. Angela Rasmussen, a virologist at the Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization at the University of Saskatchewan, and Dr. Stephen Goldstein, a virologist at the University of Utah, emphasize that we may never uncover the origin of the novel coronavirus that has wreaked havoc on the world. At present, however, the evidence still suggests that SARS-CoV-2 is the product of nature. For instance, the genome sequence of the virus was analyzed by a group of prominent evolutionary virologists who assessed that it was “overwhelmingly unlikely” that there was laboratory manipulation. The worry that the virus could have come from a high-containment laboratory, specifically the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), has surged in recent weeks. The two scientists assert that the work of laboratories and institutions like WIV are critical to preparing for and responding to pandemics. Additionally, they “agree that researchers should continue to study whether the virus could have emerged from a lab, but this cannot come at the expense of the search for animal hosts that could have transmitted SARS-CoV-2 to humans.” Rasmussen is among the distinguished faculty for the upcoming Pandemics and Global Health Security Workshop hosted by the Biodefense Graduate Program.

It’s Time to Talk About Lab Safety

Dr. Filippa Lentzos, a senior lecturer in science and international security at King’s College London, and Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Director of Biodefense Graduate Program, launched GlobalBioLabs.org, an interactive web-based map of global Biosafety Level 4 facilities and biorisk management policies. Lentzos shared that the aim of the project is to “increase public knowledge about Biosafety Level 4 labs, and importantly, to strengthen national and international virus management policies.” In their research, the two scholars found that there is “significant room for improvement in the policies in place to ensure that these labs were operated safely, securely and responsibly.” Regardless of the origin of SARS-CoV-2, the risk of laboratory accidents and incidents rises as the number of laboratories in the world expands. The new map includes 59 laboratories, the majority of which are in Europe with a total of 25 labs. Only 17 of the 23 countries that house BSL-4 laboratories have national biosafety associations or are members of international partnerships. About 60% of BSL4 labs are government-run public-health institutions, leaving 20% run by universities and 20% by biodefence agencies. Only three of the 23 countries with BSL4 labs – Australia, Canada and the US – have national policies for the oversight of dual-use research. The primary concern is that an accident could trigger the next pandemic. At a national level, Koblentz and Lentzos recommend that “countries with BSL-4 labs should have whole-of-government systems that can conduct multidisciplinary risk assessments of proposed research for safety, security and dual-use activities, such as certain gain-of-function research, that have significant potential to be repurposed to cause harm.” At the international level, they recommend that “structures be put in place to systematically oversee maximum containment facilities.”

SARS-CoV-2 Variants of Interest and Concern Naming Scheme Conducive for Global Discourse

The Virus Evolution Working Group of the World Health Organization convened a group to determine a naming system that will “enable clear communication about SARS-CoV-2 variants of interest and concern.” SARS-CoV-2 is the causative agent of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), and, as with all viruses, it continuously adapts to changing environments via random genome mutations. There have been several mutations of SARS-CoV-2 since its emergence, and the naming of them has been based on three nomenclature systems, each of which has its own scientific method to classify and name lineages. This means that one variant could have multiple names. To simplify communication and information sharing, a new system was developed for the naming of Variants of Concern and Interest. The new labels use the Greek alphabet. The tables below show the new labels of Variants of Interest and Variants of Concern, respectively.

The US Has Hit 600,000 COVID Deaths, More Than Any Other Country

It has been 15 months since the first confirmed death due to SARS-CoV-2 was reported in the US, and the novel virus has now taken the lives of 600,000 people across the nation. The vaccines have slowed the trend from thousands to hundreds of deaths per day. At present, there are about 375 deaths per day on average, a major decline since January with an average of 3,000 per day. Many Americans are vaccinated or in the process of becoming so, helping to further overcome COVID-19; however, an alarming number of people are reluctant to get vaccinated.