Tag: bioterrorism

Pandora Report 10.27.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

TGIF and Pandora Report day! Buckle up because we’ve got an abundance of biodefense news that covers GHSA, chemical weapons, synbio, and more.

 Global Health Security – WHO & PATH Reports and GHSA Ministerial Meeting
As the Global Health Security Agenda Ministerial meeting in Kampala, Uganda takes place this week, several reports were released highlighting the deficiencies in global biosecurity and biosafety efforts, as well as the importance of investing in global health security. Fortunately, on the eve of the GHSA Kampala summit, the Trump administration endorsed the future of the GHSA. Don’t forget to stay tuned to our weekly reports as two GMU Biodefense graduate students are participating (as recipients of the George Mason Global Health Security Ambassador Fellowship) in the Ministerial meeting alongside NextGen GHSA and they’ll be reporting on their experiences in the coming weeks. The first report this week is from NTI, which called on countries to improve biosecurity after WHO demonstrated that there are substantial biosecurity/biosafety gaps worldwide. NTI analyzed 39 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) peer reviews and mapped the related biosecurity and biosafety related scores. Here are their findings: “74% of the assessed countries demonstrated limited or no capacity for a whole-of-government national biosafety and biosecurity system. 64% of the assessed countries demonstrated limited or no capacity for biosafety and biosecurity training and practices. 41% of the assessed countries demonstrated limited or no capacity for linking their public health and security authorities during a suspected or confirmed biological event.” The map they’ve created is also a great visualization for how truly weak biosecurity and biosafety efforts are on a global scale. NTI also used this information to track commitments and biosecurity assistance and partners. The next report comes from PATH, which just released their work: Healthier World, Safer America: A US government Roadmap for International Action to Prevent the Next Pandemic The latest PATH analysis focuses on global health security and global efforts to respond to threats. “This paper aims to examine the benefits of investments in pandemic preparedness, as well as recommends the US Administration and Congress come together behind a comprehensive US strategy, robust investments, and continued vigilance both at home and abroad. The recommendations focus on global leadership, a US plan for international action, and research and development; underpinned by the risks of unsustainable funding, with special focus given to the Ebola supplemental funding sunset set to occur in FY2019.”

Reauthorizing & Improving The Department of Homeland Security
Don’t miss the recent National Interest series by GMU Biodefense PhD alum Daniel Gerstein  on the DHS reauthorization bill. This three-part series starts with a focus on why it’s time to improve the Department of Homeland Security. Gerstein notes that “reauthorization of the Department of Homeland Security is vital to clarifying responsibilities and setting expectations for the continued evolution of the department.” The second part in the series highlights methods for fixing the fractured department. “The question is not whether reauthorization of DHS is necessary. It  most definitely is. However, we should also ask whether the bill goes far enough and what other issues should a comprehensive DHS bill encompass? This second commentary considers whether the DHS structure with  relatively weak central authorities should be reevaluated. Interestingly, each successive secretary has sought to consolidate power and authorities at the department level. Is it time to legislate this outcome? ” Lastly, Gerstein addresses why updating the DHS Acquisition System matters. “This third commentary considers how to better align the department’s requirements, research, development and acquisition processes. Currently, the processes are not synchronized and should be harmonized to better align these critical departmental systems.”

Global Health Security Forum 2017 
Don’t miss out on this November 7th event hosted by the Center for Strategic & International Studies. The all-day event will be held at the CSIS headquarters and will even include an entire session on “Hurtling Toward a Genomic 9/11”! Don’t miss out on the “CSIS’s annual flagship conference on the top challenges facing U.S. and global security. This year’s Forum will focus on national security priorities ten months into the Trump Administration and one year prior to U.S. midterm elections.”

 The Collision Of Civil War And Threat Of Global Pandemics
Infectious disease outbreaks can be challenging for even the most stable country and those experiencing civil war are even more impacted by such biological events. Currently, there are 30 civil wars going on around the world – between cholera in Yemen, polio in Syria, and yellow fever in the DRC, countries that have experienced civil war also tend to experience infectious disease outbreaks. “The Daedalus issue, “Civil War & Global Disorder: Threats and Opportunity,” explores the factors and influences of contemporary civil wars. The 12 essays look at the connection of intrastate strife and transnational terrorism, the limited ambitions of intervening powers, and the many direct and indirect consequences associated with weak states and civil wars. Barry and Wise believe there is significant technical capacity to ensure that local infectious outbreaks are not transformed into global pandemics. But those outbreaks require some level of organized and effective governance—and political will. Prevention, detection, and response are the keys to controlling the risk of a pandemic. Yet it’s almost impossible for these to coincide in areas of conflict.” Civil war impacts not only communication, but access to health resources and can challenge early detection and response of outbreaks. Moreover, the traditional hotspots for emerging infectious diseases (tropical and subtropical areas where spillover is likely) are also areas continually “plagued by civil conflict and political instability.”

Chemical Weapons and Syria
On Tuesday, Russia vetoed a vote at the United Nations Security Council that would “renew a mandate to continue an investigation into who was responsible for the use of chemical weapons during Syria’s civil war.” The Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) was initially set up in 2015 to help identify those responsible for chemical attacks and is currently reviewing the April nerve agent attack in Khan Sheikhoun. “But Russia could not get enough support and instead used its veto to block adoption. Russia, along with the UK, China, France and the US, have veto powers at the Security Council. It is the ninth time Russia has blocked action against its ally Syria, something rights group Amnesty called ‘a green light for war crimes’.” The United States has already released a statement through the State Department – “We are disappointed, we are very disappointed that Russia put what it considered to be political considerations over the Syrian people who were so brutally murdered,”.

The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly of Pandemic Prediction, Preparation, and Medical Countermeasure Communication 
Pandemic preparedness often feels like a teetering game of picking your poison. Will we see an avian influenza like H7N9 or will it be a novel disease? The CDC “evaluates every potentially dangerous strain, and gives them two scores out of 10—one reflecting how likely they are to trigger a pandemic, and another that measures how bad that pandemic would be. At the top of the list, with scores of 6.5 for emergence and 7.5 for impact, is H7N9.” While there isn’t strong transmission capacity between humans with the H5 and H7 viruses, the H7 strains are more worrisome in that they require fewer mutations to get to that point. Our efforts against avian influenza pandemics go beyond surveillance, and also focus on vaccine responses. “In the meantime, vaccines are being developed to match the viruses seen in the fifth and current epidemic. Other control measures have waxed and waned. When the first of the epidemics struck, Chinese health ministries closed markets and slaughtered birds. But as Helen Branswell reports in STAT, some of those containment efforts became more lax in 2015 and 2016.” Preparedness and response exercises can also gives great insight into problems that may arise when dealing with a pandemic. A recent pandemic simulation was held during the World Bank’s annual meeting in Washington D.C., in which participants addressed everything from hospital closures to mass quarantine. “For the World Bank simulation, organizers looked at the impact on travel and tourism of an outbreak of a mysterious respiratory virus in a hypothetical country. Discussions during the 90-minute session were off the record. But in interviews after the event, organizers said the step-by-step scenario made the theoretical possibility seem very real for participants. In particular, it drove home the need for speedy, accurate information-sharing and strong coordination within and across governments and institutions.” These kinds of exercises are crucial to not only address gaps, but bring together a variety of people that will be critical to pandemic response and recovery. The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security also just released their self-guided exercise scenario that focuses on communication dilemmas that occur during development of medical countermeasures. The exercise is aimed at public health communicator and risk communications researchers, and revolves around a novel coronavirus outbreak in 2025. “Over a 3-year period, the virus spreads to every US state and more than 40 countries, where case fatality rates vary depending on the capabilities of local health systems. In the United States, an existing drug is repurposed to treat SPARS symptoms while federal regulators work with a pharmaceutical company to fast-track the production of a SPARS vaccine. The response differs in other nations. What follows is a nationwide vaccination effort and lingering strains on the US healthcare sector from a steady stream of patients seeking treatment for serious post-SPARS complications.”

Security Implications of Genome Editing – Meeting of Experts in Hanover
Earlier this month, a meeting of scientists and experts on policy and security gathered to discuss the potential implications of genome editing technologies like CRISPR. GMU Biodefense professor Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley attended, noting that “Over 100 CRISPR scientists form all over the world (China, India, U.S., Europe, Africa), and policy and security experts gathered in Hannover, Germany,  to discuss the security implication of the new gene-editing technique CRISPR.The group reviewed various threat scenarios and discussed potential policy responses. The meeting was particularly successful as both the scientists and security experts engaged in a productive dialogue about the importance of ensuring security without hampering the use of this new technology to promote progress in medicine and agriculture among other things.” The conference focused on establishing proactive international dialogue about genome editing and incorporating experts that range from ethics and philosophy to economics and political science. “Many workshop participants emphasised that it is vital to support and sustain a culture of responsibility and integrity in research and innovation and to engage with stakeholders. Moreover, researchers and policy makers must commit to continuing an open and inclusive dialogue that builds trust. As with other new and emerging technologies, a lack of communication about any uncertainties may undermine public confidence in science. Scientists and security experts should listen to concerns or fears regarding the misuse of genome editing, and provide their expertise on what is and is not likely.”

Synthesizing Biological Threats—A Small Leap From Horsepox to Smallpox
GMU biodefense PhD student Saskia Popescu discussed dual-use research concerns with GMU professor and graduate program director Dr. Gregory Koblentz and how these relate to healthcare and infectious disease professionals. Drawing on the recent horsepox synthesis, Dr. Koblentz emphasized how this opens Pandora’s box even wider for potential smallpox synthesis and misuse of synbio. Popescu highlighted these concerns and how important it is for healthcare workers to be aware of such events and vulnerabilities. “From the healthcare perspective, it may not seem like something we should worry about, but the direction of gene editing and dual-use research of concern is something that is intrinsically linked to public health. Nefarious outcomes of such experiments, regardless of the origin or intent, will inevitably make their way into an emergency department, urgent care, or worse, the community. Although we may not be seeing the implications today, as medical providers and healthcare workers, we must keep our ears to the ground, listening for these biotech advancements, and then thinking through what they mean for us tomorrow.”

Step Away From The Backyard Poultry
Do you keep poultry in your backyard? If so, you may want to rethink it as the number of Salmonella infections related to contact with backyard poultry has quadrupled since 2015. “This year, nearly every state has been pecked by outbreak strains; only Alaska and Delaware can crow about dodging them. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has confirmed 1,120 cases. Nearly 250 of those involved hospitalization, and one person died.But that is likely just scratching the surface of the real numbers, according to CDC veterinarian Megin Nichols. ‘For one Salmonella case we know of in an outbreak, there are up to 30 others that we don’t know about,’ she told the AP.” The issue is that chickens and other fowl can carry organisms without having symptoms and shed them in their feces. While some hatcheries will test prior to selling their birds, it’s important that owners be aware of the risks for such infections.

The Schar School of Policy & Government Presents: Strategic Trade and International Security: Policy and Practice
This Brown Bag Seminar Presentation by Dr. Andrea Viski is the place to be on Thursday, November 2nd, from noon to 1:30pm. “Dr. Andrea Viski is the founder and director of the Strategic Trade Research Institute, an independent organization dedicated to providing authoritative research on issues at the nexus of global security and economic trade. She is also the editor-in-chief of the Strategic Trade Review, a peer reviewed journal dedicated to sanctions, export controls, and compliance. She previously worked for Project Alpha at King’s College London and for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). She has published numerous articles and book chapters in the areas of strategic trade controls, nuclear non-proliferation, and international law. Dr. Viski received her Ph.D. from the European University Institute, her M.A from Georgetown University’s Institute for Law, Science and Global Security, and her B.A in International Politics from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.” The seminar will be at Founders Hall 602, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Uganda’s Marburg Outbreak – Uganda has just confirmed the death of a 50-year-old woman as a result of the hemorrhagic fever, Marburg. “The victim, a 50-year old woman, died on October 11 at a hospital in eastern Uganda after “she presented with signs and symptoms suggestive of viral hemorrhagic fevers”, the minister said. The woman had nursed her 42-year old brother who died on September 25 with similar signs and symptoms and also participated in cultural preparation of the body for burial, she added.”
  • Big Chicken – Are you reading the latest book by Mary McKenna on antibiotic misuse in the poultry industry? “In Big Chicken, McKenna lays out in extensive detail the unintended consequences that resulted from experiments performed at Lederle Laboratories in December 1948 when scientist Thomas Jukes began adding trace amounts of the antibiotic aureomycin (later to be known as chlortetracycline) to chicken feed. The discovery that the drug could quickly fuel growth in chicks raised in confinement revolutionized the poultry industry, turning chicken into America’s favorite protein.”

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 10.20.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Happy Friday and welcome to our weekly rundown of all things health security!

Smallpox Could Again Be A Serious Threat
GMU Biodefense professor, graduate program director, and all around health security grand master, Dr. Gregory Koblentz, is working to make sure we’re not ignoring the threat of smallpox due to synthetic biology. The problem isn’t just within the amazing capabilities of synbio, but its dual-use nature, meaning that it has the potential to be misused by nefarious actors. This concern has become even greater with the horsepox recreated by Canadian researchers who demonstrated not only capability, but also the low cost of such work. It’s not a far jump from horsepox to smallpox, especially when we have mail-order DNA fragments available at prices that continue to lower. Koblentz notes just how much of a disaster a re-emergence of smallpox would be on a global level, especially since it’s highly contagious and routine immunization has long been gone. “If resurrecting horsepox virus provides a roadmap to synthesizing smallpox virus, then why would anyone try to synthesize it? Because there are potentially legitimate uses for. Tonix claims that the horsepox virus is a good candidate for developing a new, safer smallpox vaccine. Unfortunately, the current legal and technical safeguards against the synthesis of smallpox virus are weak and fragmented. There is no clear international legal or regulatory framework to prevent the synthesis of smallpox virus. The WHO has a policy banning the synthesis of the smallpox and regulating who can produce and possess large fragments of smallpox DNA, but it hasn’t been widely adopted by states. Furthermore, there is no mechanism—at either the national or international level—for detecting or punishing violations of this policy.” Aside from some substantial gaps in regulations, there are some voluntary industry screening processes however, these are pretty limited and tend to be minimal at best. Koblentz points out that there is still time to get ahead of the pox in this case – specifically by rallying international organizations, national governments, the DNA synthesis industry, and the synbio community. Check out his recommendations and comments in the article here!

Global Health Security Supplement – CDC’s EID Journal
Don’t miss out on this ahead-of-print alert for the December edition of the CDC’s Emerging Infectious Disease journal. Volume 23 will include a section on global health security, with articles on the contributions made by the CDC and other partners, establishment of the CDC Global Rapid Response Team, and Joint External Evaluations. There’s also a great commentary by Dr. Michael T. Osterholm on the unfinished journey of global health security. “All countries need to have the laboratory, trained workforce, surveillance, and emergency operations capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to disease threats. Only when these accomplishments are realized can we truly be on the road to global health security for infectious diseases. Until then, the goal of global health security remains an unfinished journey.”

GMU Biodefense PhD Info Session – October 26th!
Don’t miss your last chance to catch our biodefense PhD info session before applications are due! On Thursday, October 26th at 7pm at our Fairfax campus, we’ll be hosting this session where you can meet with professors, current students, and find out how much fun getting a PhD can be. Where else can you study everything from synbio to Ebola and even how to stop biological threats? GMU Schar School’s Biodefense program is just the place for all things health security.

The Worrying State of Epidemic Preparedness & Global Spread of Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses: Predicting Pandemics
University of London professor Sanjeev Krishna studies neglected infectious diseases and like so many, wasn’t surprised at the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak. He notes that globally, we could’ve been better prepared to handle the outbreak and that vaccine development, among other things, is critical. “At the start of this year an organisation was launched to lead the way, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). Its mission is to bring politicians, academics, drug firms and philanthropists together to help prepare for the next epidemic. It was launched at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, and is backed with $620m (£466m) from the governments of Norway, Germany, Japan, Canada, Belgium and Australia and the world’s two largest health charities the Wellcome Trust and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. It is working to establish the lab and distribution infrastructure and access to funds needed to rapidly develop vaccines in a crisis.” CEPI Chief Executive Richard Hatchett has continually emphasized the importance of recognizing warning signs and investing in prevention efforts. Hatchett points out that the biggest lesson from Ebola, like so many outbreaks, is that we simply can’t be complacent about diseases with epidemic potential. Vaccine development can take a while and is costly (some say it’s about $1 billion per vaccine) and it’s taken groups like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Wellcome Trust to really support some of these efforts when government investments have been lacking. These gaps in preparedness and funding are worrisome in the event of a pandemic flu. “Sir John Bell, scientist at Oxford University and author of the UK’s life sciences industrial strategy, agrees on the threat posed by flu, noting that the last flu pandemic in 1918 killed 50m to 100m people, around 3-5pc of the world’s population at the time. ‘The experience of the epidemic in 1919 should give ample cause for concern about the impact of such an event globally,’ he says.” The truth is that we’re still working to prepare and respond to these biological events, but the real question is – will we learn from our mistakes? You can also read Dr. Alaa Murabit’s comments on the challenges of securitizing health and how this UN High-Level Commissioner is tackling global health issues. “Epidemics usually occur when health systems are unprepared.” These words ring especially true this week, during International Infection Prevention week (read below). Hemorrhagic viruses and hantavirus have shown an uncanny ability for epidemic expansion, whether it be through people or rodents across significant geographical areas. “The ultimate goal is to develop a resilient global health infrastructure. Besides acquiring treatments, vaccines, and other preventive medicine, bio-surveillance is critical to preventing disease emergence and to counteracting its spread. So far, only the western hemisphere has a large and established monitoring system; however, diseases continue to emerge sporadically, in particular in Southeast Asia and South America, illuminating the imperfections of our surveillance. Epidemics destabilize fragile governments, ravage the most vulnerable populations, and threaten the global community.” The truth is that we so frequently follow the pattern of poorly prepared health systems responding to epidemics and governments re-alligning preparedness efforts only after the event. The current world is in a state of flux to fix these health issues despite constant external stressors like conflict, growing populations, migration, climate change. Despite these challenges, it is vital we strengthen our health systems to more effectively and efficiently identify biological threats, prevent them, and respond to them.

Measuring Radiation Doses in Mass-Casualty Emergencies                 We’re getting a double-dose of GMU biodefense in this fascinating article on radiation measurement. GMU biodefense professor and graduate program director Dr. Gregory Koblentz and doctoral candidate Mary Sproull (who is also a radiation guru at the Radiation Oncology Branch of the National Cancer Institute at the National Institutes of Health) are teaming up to address diagnostic challenges and technologies in the event of a nuclear attack. This article is especially relevant with tensions rising between the United States and North Korea in the wake of nuclear tests. In the event of something this horrific, one of the challenges is to appropriately and accurately diagnosis and treat radiation-related injuries. “Fortunately, new types of diagnostics to address this critical need are being developed in the field of radiation biodosimetry. Radiation biodosimetry is the estimation, through observation of biological variables, of received dose from previous radiation exposure; the new diagnostics use changes in various biological markers to estimate the severity of radiation doses.” Koblentz and Sproull highlight several gaps within U.S. preparedness related to biodosimetry, especially in terms of surge capacity and how such diagnostic capabilities may be challenged in a large-scale event. They also point to research into new assays, like those using newly identified radiation biomarkers. Lastly, Koblentz and Sproull focus on recommendations to better integrate biodosimetry, whether it be integrating medical management of radiation injuries into healthcare provider education or equipping federal response teams with deployable point-of-care biodosimetry diagnostic capability.

Meeting of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense – National Biodefense Strategy: Implementation and Implications
Don’t miss this event at the Hudson Institute on Thursday, November 2nd from 10:30am to 2pm. “This meeting of the Study Panel will address implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy and its implications for the Office of Management and Budget, congressional authorization and appropriation, leadership, coordination, collaboration, and innovation. Thought leaders will draw upon current and previous experiences with implementing national strategies and high-level policy directives. These speakers will also share their thoughts on: (1) the biological threat, the priority they place on biodefense, and efforts to address their concerns; (2) what the Administration should consider as it goes about populating the Implementation Plan for the National Biodefense Strategy; and (3) how Congress should use the Strategy and its Implementation Plan to inform its biodefense oversight and legislative activities.” Make sure to RSVP here by October 30th if you’re attending in person – the event will also be webcast.

Doreen and Jim McElvany Nonproliferation Challenge
Don’t miss out on this wonderful opportunity through the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) to encourage innovative thinking and help address nonproliferation. “The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and its journal, the Nonproliferation Review, aim to spur new thinking about nonproliferation and disarmament.To advance this goal, the Doreen and Jim McElvany Nonproliferation Challenge will recognize the most outstanding new ideas and policy proposals published in Volume 25 (2018) of the Nonproliferation Review. The Challenge will award a grand prize of $5,000, a $3,000 runner’s-up prize, and a $1,000 honorable mention prize.”

The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts               The Islamic State has grown increasingly comfortable with using chemical weapons and Columb Strack is taking us through the evolution of their practices. While their use of chemical weapons seems to have been abandoned since the loss of Mosul in June 2017, intelligence sources have suggested that a new chemical weapons cell has been established within the Euphrates River Valley. “The Islamic State’s use of chemical agents in Iraq and Syria is characterized by three phases. During the initial phase, which encompasses the first year of the caliphate’s existence (between June 2014 and June 2015), chemical attacks drew on tried and tested techniques, adapted to include widely available industrial chemicals—mainly chlorine and phosphine—from stockpiles captured as part of the group’s territorial expansion. These attacks were carried out using crude delivery mechanisms, in most cases adding canisters of chemicals to roadside or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The second phase, from July 2015 to January 2017, represents the enhanced capability the group had achieved by combining the production of sulfur mustard agent with the means to deliver it using projectiles, such as mortar bombs and improvised rockets. During this period, chemical attacks were carried out simultaneously across the caliphate, from Syria’s Aleppo province in the west to Iraq’s Kirkuk province in the east, indicating the existence of multiple operational units with the required expertise. Attacks peaked in April 2016, with eight separate recorded chemical attacks in one month. The third phase began with the last recorded chemical attack in Syria on January 8, 2017, and ended with the Islamic State’s apparent abandonment of its CW production following the loss of Mosul in July 2017.” Strack traces the history of intent and methodology development from two decades of experimentation by other militant groups. Strack also discusses experiments and sources for the weapons, including the seizure of military sites where chemical weapons could have been stored. Lastly, he discusses the slow degradation of capability that occurred following airstrikes against facilities and individuals, but that ultimately, the Islamic State has “the capability not only to transfer the know-how to produce toxic chemicals via secure online communications to operatives already living in target countries, but also to ship materials, including explosives, undetected.”

Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense- Animal Agriculture Vulnerabilities
Diseases that impact animals and have the potential to cross over to humans, let alone impact the agriculture industry, can be devastating. The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense has just released their report evaluating the threats to animal agriculture and how this can not only impact human health, but also the U.S. economy. “In December 2014, a highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza entered the United States via migrating wild birds. The ensuing outbreak resulted in the largest animal health disaster ever experienced by the United States. Federal and state governments spent $879 million on outbreak response. The outbreak impacted 21 states, lasted until the middle of 2015, and led to the depopulation of more than 50 million birds on 232 farms. Subsequent trade bans impacted as many as 233,770 farms. The total cost to the U.S. economy was estimated at $3.3 billion. In 2015, the agriculture, food, and related industries contributed $992 billion (5.5%) to U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), making it one of the largest sectors of the U.S. economy. Given its critical importance to food safety and availability in the United States and around the world, protecting this sector is a matter of national security.” The report covers the threat to food and agriculture, zoonoses, how federal response is organized, collaborative efforts like biosurveillance, and the innovative work within next-generation medical countermeasures.

Why You Should Be Celebrating International Infection Prevention Week                                                                                                                                         Are you celebrating infection control this week? GMU Biodefense PhD student Saskia Popescu is pointing out how vast the role of infection prevention is across healthcare and why we should all be celebrating it. “October 15-21, 2017 marks International Infection Prevention Week and while this may seem like a week where we rally around hand hygiene, it’s much bigger than that. Infection prevention goes beyond the nuances of hand hygiene and expands to almost every corner of medical care and healthcare. Whether it be a dental clinic, operating room, or even an outpatient treatment center, infection prevention plays a vital role in keeping patients and healthcare workers safe. Not convinced? On any given day, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that roughly 25 people in the United States will acquire a healthcare-associated infection (HAI). In a given year, it’s estimated that 722,000 HAIs occur, of which 25,000 of those patients die due to the infection. Realistically, it’s believed that the annual number of HAIs within the United States is closer to 2 million, which is astounding.”

Monkeypox in Nigeria
Nigeria is currently experiencing an outbreak of monkeypox after confirming three cases. “Since Sep 22, there have been 60 reports of suspected monkeypox cases from across Nigeria. The laboratory analysis showed that 12 suspected cases from the Bayelsa state were not positive for monkeypox. The NCDC said that all patients with suspected and confirmed monkeypox are currently receiving supportive medical care and improving. The NCDC offered no further details on the confirmed cases, besides noting that they were from Bayelsa state. The agency said the likely source of infection is through primary zoonotic transmission, and cautioned Nigerians to avoid contact with squirrels, rats, and any animals that appear sick.” Samples are currently being analyzed at the WHO regional office in Dakar, Senegal.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Did Disease Impact the Fall of Rome?– We know that disease can have devastating consequences on societies and even ancient Rome experienced several outbreaks of smallpox and plague, but just how impacting were these biological events? “Rome was far from the only advanced society shaken to its core by the explosive force of infectious diseases. The medieval Black Death sent some leading-edge polities (like the communities of Italy) backward, while opening the space for the ascent of others, such as England. The lethal role of pathogen exchange in the European conquest of the New World is relatively famous, if still imperfectly understood.”
  • Supportive Care Recommendations for Ebola Patients– Treatment for patients afflicted with Ebola can be tricky and there’s often little time to get the right mixture. “The study, by a team of international experts, was published yesterday in The Lancet. The authors write that at the beginning of the outbreak in 2013, case-fatality rates were 70%, but that number was lowered significantly (to 40%) as supportive care practices improved over the course of the outbreak. Using Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) methodology, the authors present evidence-based recommendations for patient care during the next Ebola outbreak. Oral hydration and intravenous hydration had the strongest recommendation. When administered properly, the measure carries no risk of transmission to healthcare workers, the experts say. and making sure patients, especially the very young, are adequately hydrated is a necessary supportive measure.”

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 10.13.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

What could be spookier than a Friday, 13th, in October? Actually, a few things – antimicrobial resistance, biological weapons, plague in Madagascar…..

The Trump Administration’s Misaligned Approach to National Biodefense
This recent publication from Reid Kirby is casting light upon the calamitous state of current and future U.S. biodefense efforts. Kirby points to several factors that will ultimately impact the new administration’s ability to create a new national biodefense strategy – the dysfunction rampant throughout the White House, the anti-science culture that continues to bubble up, a general inability to appoint fill key positions in a timely manner, and the disparage between the Trump administration’s ability to strategize and execute effective actions. “Again, how is the Trump administration doing so far in national biodefense? To answer this question, it is helpful to think in terms of ways, means, and ends – where the “ends” amount to security itself, the “ways” are formation of strategy, and the “means” are execution of strategy. What is concerning about the Trump administration is that the ways and means through which it pursues biodefense policy are fundamentally mismatched with the execution of meaningful biodefense ends.” Kirby highlights these failures through several examples, like the administration’s continued disrespect for science, whether it be climate change or nuclear energy. The administration’s resistance against government-sponsored research (and science in general), is in direct opposition to what a new biodefense strategy will need. “The Trump administration’s worldview, and its inability to distinguish between defense and security, may well be incompatible with a biodefense strategy. Biodefense is a scientific and technological endeavor.” Kirby states that “the administration has expressed a desire to formulate a comprehensive biodefense strategy, but the ways and means it is marshalling are not in alignment with achieving that goal. The future of US biodefense is at significant risk.

North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program – The Known and Unknown
The Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center has just released a new report on North Korea’s biological weapons program. There’s been significant attention recently on their nuclear program however, there is still speculation regarding the real capacity for a biological weapons program. Bioweapon programs are always challenging to determine from the outside – so much of the equipment has dual-use capacity that makes external monitoring inaccurate at best. The new report utilizes publicly available information and interviews with experts to investigate the knowns and unknowns of North Korea’s BW program. Researchers “examine where policy on North Korea’s BW stands. We focus our analysis on the policies of South Korea and the United States, rather than at an international level, as North Korea has had limited participation in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).” The report also provides recommendations on how to improve assessment and surveillance efforts, not to mention current policies regarding North Korea’s BW program. Within this report, you’ll also find sections regarding means of delivery, strategic and tactical usage, gaps in current policies, how to improve nonproliferation policy, etc.

GMU Biodefense MS Open House – October 19th
Next week, GMU’s Schar School will be hosting a Masters Open house for prospective students, which means you get another chance to learn about our engaging and exciting Biodefense MS programs! You’ll be able to speak to faculty, learn about admissions, and how you can study biodefense on campus or remotely, at 6:30pm on Thursday, October 19th at our Arlington campus.

Biodefense: Federal Efforts to Develop Biological Threat Awareness
The most recent report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is drawing attention to biothreat awareness and how key agencies, like the DHS, DoD, USDA, HHS, and EPA, work to develop such awareness, regardless of the origin of the threat. The report highlighted three categories of efforts – intelligence gathering, scientific research, and analysis activities. “Federal agencies with key roles in biodefense share biological threat information through many different mechanisms designed to facilitate collaboration among government partners, including working groups and interagency agreements. For example, agency officials reported using collaborative mechanisms to coordinate activities and avoid duplication and overlap. However, as GAO and others have noted, opportunities exist to better leverage shared resources and inform budgetary tradeoffs. Recent legislation requires key biodefense agencies to create a national biodefense strategy that has the potential to help address these issues, by, among other things, supporting shared threat awareness. Until the strategy is developed, the extent to which it will meet this need is unknown.” Due to the variety of sources that biological threats can originate from, this report was established to review how federal agencies not only develop, but also share threat information and how this impacts future biodefense efforts. GAO utilized policies, directives, and strategies that were all related to biodefense to appropriately assess processes and the main agencies that would have critical roles within biodefense efforts.

NASA Backs Research on Evolution of Viruses in Extreme Environments Understanding how viruses adapt and infect hosts is a critical component to predicting movement and hopefully, prevention. NASA has recently funded Portland State biologist Ken Stedman to study viral evolution and how hybrid viruses work. “The study stems from a bizarre virus Stedman discovered in a hot spring at Lassen Volcanic National Park five years ago. The virus’s genetic code is derived from both DNA and its evolutionary predecessor, RNA. The vast majority of life on Earth switched its genetic code from RNA to DNA about four billion years ago, so the fact that this virus has both is highly unusual, according to Stedman.” The NASA grant will allow Stedman and his research team to study hybrid viruses, who they infect, and how they were able to adapt to such extreme environments.

Pandora Report Twitter
Feeling like you need a little extra biodefense information and humor in your life outside of our weekly reports? Check out our Twitter account (@PandoraReport) for a pretty constant stream of not only informative headlines, but also a taste of the hysterical biodefense community. The hidden world of biosecurity/biodefense twitter nerdom is pretty outstanding and probably the best thing on twitter (well, we may be a bit biased, but find out for yourself!).

Seychelles Identifies A Case of Plague
As Madagascar is struggling against a severe outbreak of plague, a nearby chain of islands, Seychelles, has just identified its first imported case. Seychelles is currently working to prophylactically treat fifteen people who were in close contact with the 34-year-old man who fell ill after returning from Madagascar. This is the first case that has spread beyond Madagascar, so officials are working diligently to avoid secondary cases. The WHO is currently sending 1.2 million antibiotics to Madagascar to fight the plague outbreak that is rapidly spreading, especially since many of the cases are pneumonic. Currently, there have been 50 deaths and 500 cases in Madagascar since the outbreak began in August.

Backing the Global Health Security Agenda
After months of speculation and concern regarding the Trump administration’s support for the future of the GHSA, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson brought forth a wave of relief. In a recent keynote speech, Tillerson “voiced support for US collaboration on global infectious disease issues, including ongoing efforts to battle threats such as HIV and malaria. He also signaled US support for extending to 2024 the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), a partnership of 50 nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations geared toward building countries’ capacity to prevent and respond to infectious disease threats.” While discussing the importance of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), he also highlighted that HIV/AIDS is not the only biological threat that needs addressing, commenting that the GHSA was a useful framework. Tillerson noted that “While we’ve made tremendous progress since GHSA was launched in 2014, considerable work remains. That is why the United States advocates extending the Global Health Security Agenda until the year 2024. the United States commitment to working in multi-sectoral partnerships to counter infectious diseases through the Global Health Security Agenda will remain constant,”.

Strategies Against Antimicrobial Resistance
We’ve been waging war on antimicrobial resistance (AMR) for decades now, but the truth is that future strategies may require thinking outside the box. Here are some of the potential avenues for helping to stop the global burden of microbial resistance – utilizing the human micro biome to help develop new antimicrobials and deploying tiny semiconductors – “A minuscule amount of drug with some light can treat some of the worst superbug infections we tested in clinical strains acquired from a Colorado hospital,” Nagpal says. “Of course, more work and extensive studies in preclinical and clinical trials need to be done before we can administer these quantum dots to patients. However, this initial study shows a lot of promising features.” Efforts also includes infection killing polymers, changing the culture of research to move away from siloing and towards efforts across multiple channels, making existing antibiotics stronger, etc. In fact, if you want to see how AMR spreads around the world, check out this graphic from Pew Charitable Trusts.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Puerto Rico’s Post-Hurricane Infectious Disease Woes – Following the destruction of Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico is now working against the clock of infectious diseases. “Four deaths in Hurricane Maria’s aftermath are being investigated as possible cases of a disease spread by animals’ urine, Puerto Rico’s governor said Wednesday amid concerns about islanders’ exposure to contaminated water. A total of 10 people have come down with suspected cases of leptospirosis, Gov. Ricardo Rossello said at a news conference.”
  • The Interesting Case of the World’s First Vaccine– a recent report on a 115-year-old smallpox vaccine vile is shedding light onto the ingredients of this revolutionary medical countermeasure. “With the evolution of science and the advanced tools now used to conduct it, it has become clear that vaccinia — the virus used in modern smallpox vaccines — is neither cowpox nor horsepox. Whether it is a virus that formerly infected some species of animals — rodents, maybe — or is something that evolved in laboratories through the deliberate mingling of pox viruses isn’t clear.”

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 10.6.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Welcome to your favorite weekly dose of biodefense news!

George Mason University Global Health Security Ambassador Fellowship
We’re excited to announce the selection of two GMU Biodefense students, Anthony Falzarano and Stephen Taylor, as recipients of the George Mason Global Health Security Ambassador Fellowship. As GMU Global Health Security Ambassadors, they will be attending the 4th Annual GHSA Ministerial Meeting in Kampala, Uganda as part of the Next Generation Global Health Security Network delegation. The Next Generation Network engages and facilitates contributions by emerging scholars, scientists, and professionals from government and non-governmental institutions to the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) and other global health security projects. The NextGen Network is led by Jamechia Hoyle, who is not only an infectious disease guru, but also an adjunct professor at GMU, teaching Global Health Security Policy. The GHSA meeting, which will take place from October 25-27, is the world’s premier meeting on global health security and will be attended by senior representatives of the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Finance, and Security from more than 50 GHSA member states as well as implementing partners from civil society and the private sector. The theme of this year’s meeting is Health Security for All: Engaging Communities, Non-Government Actors, and the Private Sector.                                                                                                                                                       Thanks to the generous support of the Schar School, our Biodefense graduate students will be able to provide you with detailed accounts of the meeting from the front row. Following the GHSA meeting, we will be publishing their experiences and thoughts on the summit, so you’ll want to stay tuned. Anthony is a microbiologist and environmental engineer, who focuses his research on antimicrobial resistance, food and agriculture microbiology, and microbial enhanced oil recovery. Anthony also worked with Ohio State University’s Medical Center to study biofilms as a public health burden. Stephen is a biologist and Peace Corp-alum where he served in Mozambique  teaching biology, information technology, and English. Since 2015, he has worked for the U.S. Department of Agriculture at the Animal Parasitic Diseases Laboratory in Beltsville, Maryland.

Blue Ribbon Study Panel: U.S. Not Prepared to Identify Perpetrators of Biological Crimes, Terrorism, Proliferation, and Warfare
The Blue Ribbon Study Panel just released information on their recent special meeting, Biological Attribution: Challenges and Solutions, which sought to better understand the ability of the U.S. government to accurately identify pathogens and their sources, “attribute the use of biological weapons with scientific and other forms of evidence; and explore the processes used for investigative, legal, policy, and political decisions involving biological attribution.” “Effective prosecution depends on the ability to quickly and accurately attribute crimes to their perpetrators,” said Ken Wainstein, meeting chair, and former Homeland Security Advisor and United States Attorney. “In the aftermath of a biological attack, we need to find out who did it, how they did it, what disease agent they used, and where they obtained it. The biological threat is real and growing, and the Nation needs this attribution capability now.” Adds former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, whose office received some of the anthrax letters in 2001, “We face some major challenges in microbial forensics and biological attribution, but we can overcome many of them. We need to do what we can to eliminate them now, before we find ourselves under attack again. We can’t afford to have another investigation drag on for years.” The Panel also addressed the impact of the President’s FY2018 budget request on biodefense efforts and how it could eliminate critical health security functions.

Fostering an International Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Responsible Conduct in the Life Sciences
GMU biodefense MS alum Kathleen Danskin and PhD student Elise Rowe are tackling the importance of biosecurity, biosafety, and responsible conduct in life sciences. Citing the lack of an internationally agreed upon definition and approach to disseminating lessons, they highlight “how these concepts are covered by relevant international treaties, international organizations, and professional organizations. While there are some efforts under way, opportunities exist to evaluate and strengthen the culture of biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible conduct in the life sciences in order to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, and diversion of biological agents, related materials, technology, or equipment, and the unintentional or intentional exposure to (or release of) biological agents.” Responding to this gap, Danskin and Rowe propose three changes: partnership between international regimes, organizations, and professional organizations to share and enhance best efforts, use of the nuclear safety and security culture as a model for creating organizational culture within life sciences, and that the international community should amplify efforts to recognize “champions of change” at the state level. “Challenges remain on how best to address the issue of operationalizing the concept of a culture of biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible conduct in order to address goals such as: (1) reducing the occurrence of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs), incidents, and near misses, (2) ensuring that biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible conduct receive adequate attention, (3) ensuring that organizational members share the same beliefs and attitudes about risks, LAIs, and near misses, (4) increasing commitments to biosafety and biosecurity, and (5) assessing the breadth and strength of a biosafety and biosecurity program.”

Reasonable Doubts: Foreseeing Failures in WMD Security
GMU biodefense MS alum Greg Mercer is evaluating the historical failures in WMD security and what we can take away from such terrifying events. Pulling on examples from the live anthrax spores being mailed due to poor DoD lab practices to antinuclear protesters managing to get into the Oak Ridge nuclear facility, Mercer addresses serious system failures and a “culture of complacency”. Unfortunately, since the creation of nuclear weapons, there has been a colorful history of accidents and close calls. Mercer cites such examples to point out that while not spectacularly dramatic (I’m thinking of something like the film, The Rock), they nonetheless highlight significant vulnerabilities. “As a class, these organizational problems are not unique to the management of WMD. Insights into their nature, and into the sorts of practices that could help to anticipate and remedy them, may also be found further afield. Especially within the broader study of national security, a new literature has begun to emerge proposing either a new framing of the issues, or identifying tools and ideas that might be employed to guard against recurring ‘complacency’.” Mercer points to analyses, like those from Janne E. Nola, which suggest grass-roots changes that aim at fixing things at the organization level. What is to be done though? Some suggest the use of red teaming, while others point to forecasting and prediction, as a means to identifying risks and vulnerabilities. “History shows that warning signs are often ignored until disaster strikes, and that disaster is the engine of change. In the United States, the public demands change. If better institutional checks are to be placed on American nuclear and biological security, it will take a public outcry like the one that follows a disaster. The public will have to demand that the country’s nuclear- and biological-defense enterprises stop stepping out to the brink, and instead avert the disasters foreshadowed by the many uncomfortable compromises and accidents we have seen.”

Madagascar Battles Plague
The death toll has risen to twenty as government officials are banning public gatherings in the country’s capital. While plague is endemic to the country and causes roughly 400 cases a year, this spike in cases and the swift spread is concerning the WHO after already 114 cases have been reported since August. “More than half of recorded cases – 73 out of 133 – are pneumonic plague, the most virulent form, which is passed through person-to-person transmission. If it is not treated, pneumonic plague can be fatal within 24 hours. The epidemic also involves bubonic plague, which is spread by rats and kills about 50% of people it infects.” The WHO has released $300,000 in emergency funds and is asking for $1.5 to support outbreak response as the disease has quickly spread to several cities and outbreak season (September-April) is just beginning. You can read the latest WHO report on the outbreak here.

HBO VICE’s Contagion Episode
Check out the latest VICE episode regarding two interesting topics – Russian hacking and contagions. “The outbreak of an infectious disease sparks worldwide panic nearly every year. And as humans cluster themselves in denser cities and encroach closer to the wildlife harboring disease, the chances of a devastating global pandemic only intensifies. But scientists are finding that diligent surveillance of these threats could help keep the next nightmare disease at bay. VICE founder Suroosh Alvi went to Uganda to see how vulnerable humans are to a new pandemic and the options there are for staving it off.”

Bavarian Nordic Wins Up-to-$539M BARDA Contract for Smallpox Vaccine BARDA has contracted with Bavarian Nordic to ensure the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile has smallpox vaccine in the form of freeze-drived Imvamune. “The contract consists of an initial $100 million base award toward manufacturing and storage of Imvamune vaccine bulk—the third bulk contract inked between the company and BARDA. The two earlier bulk contracts total a combined $233 million. In addition, the contract includes two initial options: Up to $299 million toward the filling and freeze-drying of Imvamune produced under the three bulk awards and up to $140 million toward clinical development, regulatory commitments, and portions of the establishment and validation of fill/finish activities.” This new contract will cover roughly 13 million doses at $48 per dose.

The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU                                                                                                                                             James Revill addresses growing concern over the potential for non-state groups to utilize chemical or biological terrorism within the European Union. Pulling on historical events involving CBW use by non-state actors, he addresses the current and future risks. “To achieve this, the article analyses six interlinked clusters of factors that can be seen as important in assessing the risk of whether or not to adopt such weapons. These are: the perceived relative advantage of CBW and their utilities; the complexity of such weapons; their ideological compatibility; the role of organisational structures; the visibility and ‘fashionability’ of such weapons; and the wider environmental context.” Overall, Revill finds that while there is potential for sophisticated CBWs to do great harm, they are unlikely, and the use of a “scruffy low-level chemical weapon” is much more realistic.

ABSA International 60th Annual Biological Safety Conference
October is national Biosafety Month, so don’t miss out on this conference held by the Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity on October 13-18th in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The conference will include special meetings like public health interest groups, next generation/new biosafety professionals shared interest group meetings, and great networking opportunities for biosafety and biosecurity professionals!

How the 1918 Flu Pandemic Revolutionized Public Health
As the centennial of the 1918/1919 pandemic approaches, it encourages us to really look at what has changed and what we’ve learned from such a global catastrophe. Public health itself has evolved – no longer restricted by the antiquated policies that were marked with eugenics and social stigma. At the time, influenza was not a reportable disease either, which meant that public health surveillance was shotty at best and quarantine efforts were usually too little, too late. “The lesson that health authorities took away from the catastrophe was that it was no longer reasonable to blame an individual for catching an infectious disease, nor to treat him or her in isolation. The 1920s saw many governments embracing the concept of socialized medicine—healthcare for all, delivered free at the point of delivery.” Now, disease surveillance and epidemiology are a cornerstone of public health, not to mention the development of the WHO in 1946. The 1918 flu pandemic forced us to change our approach to public health, but also taught a vital lesson – infectious disease was a global problem and not isolated to a single country, region, or group of people.

Biosafety Governance
The Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) just released their report on ensuring institutional compliance with biosafety, biocontainment, and laboratory biosecurity regulations and guidelines. FESAP recommendations are crucial, as they are supposed to be followed within research facilities that perform work with human, plant, and/or animal infectious agents and toxins. “The United States has a comprehensive biosafety, biocontainment, and biosecurity oversight system designed to protect laboratory workers, public health, agriculture, the environment, and national security. Biosafety and biocontainment oversight rests on a foundation of federal regulations, guidelines, and policies and is provided at multiple levels. Oversight of day to day research activities is largely a responsibility of the institutions and the investigators conducting the research with direct biosafety oversight being implemented at the local level.” In efforts to ensure compliance and build a culture of responsibility, FESAP has released guidance that aims to ensure biosafety, biosecurity, and biocontainment, while encouraging research. Some of the regulations and guidelines include: “conduct regular assessments of committees, offices, and departments with responsibilities for biosafety and biosecurity oversight to assess their function and strengthen their performance when necessary” and “promote transparency regarding institutional biosafety and biosecurity oversight.” The report also includes federal regulations and guidelines regarding research conduct, environmental regulations, dual-use research of concern oversight at the institutional level, etc.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • BioShield Adds Ebola Vaccine To SNS & BARDA Industry Day – Project Bioshield, responsible for acquiring MCM against CBRN agents, is now adding two Ebola treatments and two vaccines to the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The new additions include “a single-dose vaccine licensed by Merck, a prime-boost vaccine regimen from Johnson & Johnson, and monoclonal antibody treatments from Mapp Biopharmaceutical and Regeneron Pharmaceuticals.” If you’re looking to get more information on MCM, you can also attend the 2017 BARDA Industry Day on November 7-8, at the Ronal Reagan Building. Presented by ASPR (Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response), the conference will give individuals the opportunity to learn about the past, present, and future of BARDA, MCM development opportunities, experiences partnering with BARDA, and more. Robert Kadlec, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, will be the keynote speaker for the event.
  • Bioweapons and Virtual Terrorism – Considering the threat of biological weapons and virtual terrorism? It was recently estimated that the cost of a bioweapon is 0.05% the cost of a convention weapon that would produce the same casualties per square kilometer. What are your thoughts on the author’s notion that biological weapons are “comparatively easy, using common technology available for the production of some antibiotics, vaccines, foods, and beverages, and delivery systems such as spray devices from an airplane, boat, or car are commonly available”?
  • History and Future of the Global HIV/AIDS Response: A Conversation with Dr. Michael Merson and Dr. Stephen Inrig– The Center for Strategic and International studies will be hosting this event on Monday, October 16th from 10-11:30am. Drs. Merson and Inrig will discuss the origins and evolution of the global HIV/AIDS response, as well as critical current and future issues affecting the fight against the disease worldwide, which were recently highlighted in papers issued by the CSIS HIV Working Group.  “This ambitious book provides a comprehensive history of the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Programme on AIDS (GPA), using it as a unique lens to trace the global response to the AIDS pandemic. The authors describe how WHO came initially to assume leadership of the global response, relate the strategies and approaches WHO employed over the years, and expound on the factors that led to the Programme’s demise and subsequent formation of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). The authors examine the global impact of this momentous transition, portray the current status of the global response to AIDS, and explore the precarious situation that WHO finds itself in today as a lead United Nations agency in global health. The global response – the strategies adopted, the roads taken and not taken, and the lessons learned – can provide helpful guidance to the global health community as it continues tackling the AIDS pandemic and confronts future global pandemics.” The event will be webcast live from the event page. Please register by clicking the “Register” button above and contact Sara Allinder, sallinder@csis.org, with questions.
  • MoBE 2017 Symposium to highlight research on the Microbiology of the Built Environment – October 10-12th, in Washington, D.C.  The event will highlight recent research on the Microbiome of the Built Environment and explore ways to bridge the gaps between research and applications. More specifically, The MoBE 2017 Symposium will bring together leading researchers and stakeholders to discuss MoBE findings pertinent to human health, safe drinking water, healthy built environments and urban design. Ed Yong of The Atlantic, Susan Lynch of the University of California at San Francisco and Marc Edwards of Virginia Tech will provide keynote addresses.

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 9.29.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

 Homeland Security Struggles to Fund ChemBio Defense & The Invisible Threat Looming budget cuts within DHS are doing little to qualm concern that state and local infrastructure is simply unprepared to handle a biological or chemical attack. “In terms of bsecurity, ‘we are much better prepared than we were’ post-9/11, said Tom Inglesby, director of the Center for Health Security at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland. ‘But we are not where we need to be, and the progress is, in some cases, somewhat fragile’.” Internationally, the use of chemical weapons in Syria and growing tensions with North Korea are continual reminders that preparedness is vital. “The department’s science and technology directorate took a 28 percent budget cut when the omnibus bill for fiscal year 2017 was signed in May, and the chemical biological defense division is ‘taking a cut much more significant than that’ in fiscal year 2018, said John Fischer, division director. The directorate in May released a budget overview for congressional justification, which stated over $58 million would be put toward chemical, biological and explosive defense research and development for 2017, assuming a continuing resolution would remain in effect for the rest of the fiscal year. Less than $53 million was requested for 2018, according to the document. DHS did not respond to requests for an interview.” 2018 will be a year of harsh budget reductions for biosurveillance and chemical detection programs, as border security will be headlining in terms of priority. The surge of biodefense funding that was seen post-Amerithrax has certainly waned, but there is also concern for complacency and a tendency to go from fire to fire instead of working to establish robust and effective prevention and response mechanisms. Overall, this fiscal tightening will surely have an impact on prevention, identification, and response strategies for biological and chemical threats, leaving many people holding their breath that the blowback won’t be severe.

 Now more than ever, it is important we change the narrative of lackluster efforts to defend against biological threats. Budgetary slashing, lowering of barriers, and an era of increasing globalization and rapid international travel – these are all the things that should remind us that biological threats are not a figment of science fiction. “What was unthinkable back in the day is now quite common and easy,” Inglesby said. “Genetic engineering is now possible with kits from boxes at younger and younger ages with less and less training.” The dual-use nature of biological research not only has the capacity to lower the barriers to bioweapon development, but can also muddy the waters when determining if research is  offensive or defense. “That’s not the only challenge facing those sounding the alarm about biothreats. Government scientists worry that there aren’t enough biologists working on this problem. “We have relatively few biologists working in national security,” Matheny told FP. “This is one area where we’re just starting to catch up to the fact.” While the future of NBACC is still not set, such uncertainty has rippling effects when it comes to staffing. While we consider biological threats a multi-faceted enemy – natural, intentional, or accidental, it is now biodefense efforts that are facing attacks at multiple fronts. The recent de novo synthesis of smallpox has brought many of these concerns to fruition. Whether it be through the advancement of life sciences that poses dual-use risk, severe budgetary cuts, or a shifting focus onto border walls, we cannot afford to allow this threat to be invisible much longer.

 GMU Schar School MS Open House – October 19th
Have you ever wanted to study what you love to further your career? GMU’s MS in Biodefense is just that chance and we’ve got an open house coming up so you can get all the information on it. On Thursday, October 19th at 6:30pm at our Arlington campus, we’ll be hosting an information session about our in-person and online biodefense MS program. From anthrax to Zika, GMU is the place for all things biodefense!

Navigating Our Way Out of the Jungle: Modernizing Meat Inspection
It’s been over 111 years since the famous Meat Inspection Act of 1906 and we’re still struggling to keep food safety efforts at a pace that can beat risks from farm to table. “What triggered such a shift after decades of poor industry practice? The year prior, in 1905, a book by Upton Sinclair was published in a series, which would then be published in entirety in early 1906. The Jungle brought forth the unsavory and grotesque underbelly of the American meat system. Although this may not have been the focus of his book, readers took away from it that their trusted source for meat was corrupt and lacked safety mechanisms. Within the year, the Federal Meat Inspection Act was established.” Pew Charitable Trusts is working to help evaluate and strengthen the meat and poultry industry and to help reduce the impact that contamination has within the U.S. population (2 million are sickened annually due to contamination). “A June 2017 report from Pew and Cargill, an American privately held global corporation based in Minnetonka, Minnesota, highlighted some of these concerns and established an open dialogue to develop recommendations. They addressed the need to establish a risk-based oversight system, which would incorporate data from across the food-safety system. The guidance also included better risk communication, a modernized approach to slaughter inspection that would include current technology and pathogen-specific appropriate levels of protection, among other components.” Food safety and security is truly the soft underbelly of American and it’s vital that we modernize such efforts.

BBC Pandemic
If you’re one of our readers in the UK, make sure to take advantage of this new outbreak tool through the BBC. The BBC Pandemic app can be downloaded onto your phone and may just help us understand how future outbreaks spread. “Through the app, BBC Pandemic will be conducting two experiments: the National Outbreak, which is open to anyone in the UK from 27th September 2017; and the Haslemere Outbreak, a closed local study that is only open to people in the town of Haslemere, Surrey, and runs for 72 hours starting on Thursday 19th October 2017. In the National Outbreak, the app will track your approximate movement at regular intervals over a 24 hour period. (Don’t worry, it won’t know exactly where, or who you are.) It will also ask some questions about your journeys and the people you spent time with during those 24 hours. All data collected will be grouped to ensure your anonymity, and a research team from the University of Cambridge and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine will use it to predict how a flu pandemic might spread across the country – and determine what can be done to stop it.” If you’re still not sold on it, here’s another reason why apps like this can truly help future pandemic response – data modeling. Despite our best efforts, epidemiological models are only as good as the data we have available. Simulation efforts help response efforts coordinate resources and plan accordingly however, if our modeling isn’t a decent representation of the population due to limited data, it won’t be that effective. Getting information from a broad range of people helps strengthen such efforts.

Recommendations for Incentivizing the Development of Therapeutics, Diagnostics, and Vaccines to Combat Antibiotic-Resistance 
The Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria (PACCARB) has been working since 2015 to curb the threat of resistant germs. The group has found that current economic efforts are insufficient and through three working groups on incentives (for vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics), they have released a new report. Identifying 46 critical issues that are preventing the development of new/improved products and providing 64 recommendations to address them, this new report is a robust 42 pages worth the read. For example, regarding human health and incentives for vaccine use, the group found that “federal and nonfederal stakeholders lack a common understanding about the current and potential economic value and societal impact of vaccines that can reduce AMR.” Their recommendation for this issue: “Analyses on the cost and societal impacts associated with new vaccine development and administration in the AMR arena developed via a multi-agency process that involves at least CDC, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the Treasury Department, in partnership with industry and public health stakeholders.” Within each section, you can find issues and recommendations categorized by economic, R&D, regulatory, and behavioral. The United Nations Foundation and the Wellcome Trust has also released a new report regarding the global efforts that have been sustained to fight AMR. “The report, published a year to the day that the United Nations (UN) General Assembly agreed to address the root causes of AMR and take action to tackle the problem, shows that many nations are following up on their pledge to encourage more responsible use of antimicrobials in human medicine and agriculture. Out of 151 countries recently surveyed, 85% say they are developing or have developed national action plans on AMR and 52% have a fully developed plan that addresses the One Health spectrum of human, animal, and environmental sectors.”

 Chemical & Biological Attacks: Underground Transport Restoration Project
After four years, this DHS-sponsored project is finally wrapping up their work studying the methods for chem-bio agent dispersion in subways. “Sandia National Laboratories’ engineer Bob Knowlton has worked on this challenge for a dozen years. His team has developed scientific sampling methods to determine the extent and nature of the contamination. Sampling also is essential to confirm the decontamination was effective and the site is safe to re-enter. Sandia researchers and their collaborators at other national laboratories and local, state and federal agencies have looked at everything from how to clean subway stations and grimy tunnels to where a surrogate for anthrax would go when released inside the New York City subway system and the best way to decontaminate a subway car.” Check out their findings on this project and from the 2016 large-scale testing they did in a mock subway system.

Little Island of Horrors – Vozrozhdeniya 
During height of the Soviet offensive bioweapons program, an ideal island, like Vozrozhdeniya, was the perfect place to test cutting-edge biological weapons. Present day, the island is a sad reminder of one of the largest state-sponsored bioweapons programs. “The island’s secrets have endured, partly because it isn’t the kind of place where you can just turn up. Since Vozrozhdeniya was abandoned in the 1990s, there have only been a handful of expeditions. Nick Middleton, a journalist and geographer from Oxford University, filmed a documentary there back in 2005. ‘I was aware of what went on, so we got hold of a guy who used to work for the British military and he came to give the crew a briefing about the sorts of things we might find,’ he says. ‘He scared the pants off me, to be honest’. Aerial photographs taken by the CIA in 1962 revealed that while other islands had piers and fish-packing huts, this one had a rifle range, barracks and parade ground. But that wasn’t even the half of it. There were also research buildings, animal pens and an open-air testing site. The island had been turned into a military base of the most dangerous kind: it was a bioweapons testing facility.” An isolated secret, this island was the testing ground for some of the worst pathogens. It was also chosen as a holding place for “the largest anthrax stockpile in human history” and while the cache’s location was never disclosed, the pits were visible from space, which meant that the U.S. pledge $6 million towards a clean-up project. Sadly, this isn’t a resolution as the open-air testing done on the island has surely left residual microbial burden, not to mention the burial pits of infected animals. Make sure to read about Dave Butler’s journey to this island and how even now, it still instills fear.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • China to Open BSL-4– The first certified BSL-4 lab in China will be opening this year. The research institute, located in Wuhan, represents a partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Wuhan government. “The lab is part of a 10-year-plan by the Ministry of Science and Technology that proposes to build five to seven BSL-4 laboratories by 2025 as well as one BSL-3 lab in every province. It was built with technology and equipment imported from France, and some of its future research staff have visited France for BSL-4 training. Although construction was finished in 2015, the lab has since undergone multiple assessments, Yuan Zhiming, director of the Wuhan branch of CAS, told the Science and Technology Daily. ‘The lab will become a public platform for Chinese scientists to conduct research into dangerous viruses,’ Yuan said.”
  • Signature Science-led Team awarded $2.9M contract to develop advanced genomic computational technologies in support of IARPA’s Functional Genomic and Computational Assessment of Threats Program – “The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) awarded Signature Science, LLC a $2.9M contract for the development of new computational tools to screen DNA sequences to detect biological threats that may manifest from synthetic microbial manipulation. The challenge is to overcome the speed and precision limitations of contemporary synthetic DNA screening practices to rapidly detect and isolate a prospective threat within a segment of DNA. The research team will re-tool bio-threat detection methods, and focus detection efforts on functional genetic elements to increase analytic speed and precision, thereby dramatically improving predictive capacity to isolate the toxic gene that constitutes the threat.”
  • Medieval Plague Gives Insight Into Human Pollution History – “A recent study indicates that much less lead occurs naturally in the air than we thought—in fact, there should be almost none. Scientists measured lead trapped in an ice core from the Swiss-Italian Alps. They found that lead levels dropped dramatically only once in the past 2,000 years, during a time that coincided with the Black Death pandemic. This means that in Europe, lead levels in the air have been elevated for thousands of years. Most people think about air pollution as a problem that began with the Industrial Revolution, but we’ve been spoiling the quality of our air for a very long time. It has harmed our health throughout history, from Medieval Europe to the Roman Empire to Ancient Egypt and Peru, and continues to do so today.”

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 9.8.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Happy Friday and welcome to your weekly source for all things biodefense. Got plague? Good news – if you have some live chickens hanging around, you can try this medieval treatment.

Defense Against Biological Attacks
Biological threats come in all shapes and sizes – whether it’s an outbreak of Ebola, a biological weapon, a laboratory mishap, or even the potential for biosafety breaches following  a hurricane. Preparedness and response efforts need to be just as diverse. As Texas begins the process of rebuilding and the threat of nuclear weapons has been fresh in everyone’s mind, it is crucial we don’t forget about the importance of health security. Disease knows no borders and it’s easy to diminish the threat of it however, Laura Holgate and Elizabeth Cameron are drawing attention to the need for President Trump to prevent the next biological attack before it happens. “As Congress and the Trump administration mull a new biodefense strategy, we urge them to use this time — the time in between biological crises — to get ahead of the curve before the next major biological event inevitably comes our way.” They point to several different strategies that should to be followed – watch out for emerging threats in unstable regions, fund and renew the Global Health Security Agenda, replenish the budget to maintain global biosecurity, keep laboratory assets for attributing biological attacks, and use biosurveillance to stop outbreaks before they start. We need to take the National Bioforensics Analysis Center off the chopping block, stop slashing the biosecurity budget as programs like the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program are vital, and truly, the GHSA renewal is a no-brainer. These efforts not only defend against current threats, but work to address the next generation of bioweapons and biothreats.  Holgate and Cameron note that “We know that biological threats must remain at the top of the national security agenda, and leaders must recognize that stopping outbreaks at the source requires strong global and domestic capacity to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to naturally occurring outbreaks and biological attacks”

Health Security – Call for Papers
The Health Security journal is currently looking for papers on communication and health security: improving public health communication in response to large-scale health threats. Manuscript deadlines are October 20, 2017. “Effective communication is an essential tool in establishing an appropriate response to any large-scale health threat or disaster, such as a newly emerging infectious disease, terrorism, environmental catastrophe, or accident. Yet, public health communication is occurring in an increasingly complex world with competing messages, new platforms, and limited trust.A special feature in Health Security will be devoted to analysis of the current communication environment and efforts to effectively communicate during outbreaks of infectious diseases and other health threats. The journal seeks papers that address the wide range of policy, practice, and research issues relevant to communication in large-scale health events.” Topics might include exploration of the communication environment during recent infectious disease events or public health disasters, investigation of the role of social media and other emerging or recently emerging communication platforms, etc. Submission information can be found here.

GMU Biodefense MS – Open House on September 14th
Don’t miss out on the Master’s Open House next week for the GMU Biodefense MS program!  From 6:30-8:30pm next Thursday, September 14th, at the GMU Arlington campus, you can speak to faculty, learn about admissions, and why biodefense students have a blast while getting their graduate degrees. This is a great chance to learn about the MS program (for both online or in-person) and chat with faculty about the exciting classes and activities GMU biodefense students get to enjoy.

The Biological Weapons Convention At A Crossroad
As Robert Frost once said, “Two roads diverged in a wood, and I- I took the one less traveled by, and that has made all the difference.” Which direction will the BWC take? Bonnie Jenkins investigates the uncertain future of the BWC, its current challenges, which direction it might take, and the direction it should take. Despite its relevance and capacity to endure decades of challenges, the latest RevCon was considered a monumental disappointment and left many in a state of disagreement. “Some of the major issues that were discussed at previous meetings—but at this point have no platform for discussion at the BWC—include advances in science and technology, disease outbreak preparedness and response, and national BWC implementation. Previously-held mid-year experts’ meetings have also been dropped, so there is now no chance for the exchanges with experts from relevant international organizations, including input from the World Health Organization that has been so useful in the past. These are all steps backward.” Despite a lack of Meeting of States Parties in August, there is hope that the December meeting with work towards developing an inter-sessional work program. On top of these barriers, the BWC has funding challenges, which severely impacts the Implementation Support Unit (ISU). Against these odds, the BWC ISU continues to promote universal membership and treaty implementation. Global initiatives are also beneficial to promotion of health security and prevention of biological weapons. “When global initiatives interconnect like this, it reinforces all of the initiatives. The Global Health Security Agenda, for instance, brings over 55 countries together to strengthen countries’ capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats, whether natural, deliberate, or accidental.” These efforts seek to strengthen the BWC through global health security, but there is still work to be done. Jenkins suggests three tasks are crucial to maintain BWC relevancy and sustainability: “1) Sufficient and sustained funding by states parties, to include payments now in arrears; 2) Strong leadership and a successful December MSP that reaffirms the importance of the treaty to the international community and that also develops an inter-sessional work program; and 3) A vision for developing the role of the BWC as part of a larger interconnected global security architecture.”

Using Ebola Data to Fight Future Outbreaks
Learning from past outbreaks to avoid future failures is always a tough aspect of public health however, a new strategy is using data to help stop the next outbreak of Ebola. Researchers have developed a new platform to help organize and share Ebola data that was previously scattered and unable to be utilized. This was a significant issue on the ground during the 2014/2015 outbreak, which makes this project all the more important. “The information system is coordinated by the Infectious Diseases Data Observatory (IDDO), an international research network based at the University of Oxford, UK, and is expected to launch by the end of the year. At a meeting to discuss Ebola on 7–9 September in Conakry, Guinea, the team heading the platform will seek input from West African scientists, health officials and advocacy groups.” One of the most vital components to the system is the emphasis of partnership and involvement of African collaborators. Not only will this focus encourage the use of historical data, but will also allow utilization during future outbreaks. Control of the data has also been a challenging hurdle to overcome, as there are many cooks in the kitchen. “Amuasi says that he would have liked the database to be hosted and curated in Africa, rather than in Oxford, because training and paying African researchers to manage the platform would teach them how to use the information and improve their ability to respond to future outbreaks in the region. But he adds that this seems unlikely, because it would raise the cost of the project, and the infrastructure already exists at Oxford. Merson says that a copy of the database will be maintained in West Africa, although its exact location has yet to be determined. She adds that an African committee may be in charge of deciding who gets access to the data. And she says that fellowships are likely to be made available for West African students who want to work on the database.”

The Global Health Security Agenda: Public & Private Partnerships
The Global Health Security Agenda Consortium and EcoHealth Alliance will be hosting this meeting on Thursday, September 14th at 12pm. Held at the ONE UN New York Hotel in NYC, you can catch this event with speakers like Dr. Beth Cameron from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Admiral Tim Ziemer from the US National Security Council. Make sure to RSVP here.

Launch of International Health Regulations Costing Tool
Georgetown University Center for Global Health Science & Security is launching their new open-access IHR costing tool. “In 2016, the World Health Organization adopted the Joint External Evaluation tool (JEE) to measure country-specific progress in developing the capacities needed to prevent, detect, and respond to public health threats, as mandated under the 2007 International Health Regulations (IHR). However, national governments and development partners have struggled to accurately define the costs of strengthening and maintaining critical health security systems that often depend on multi-sectoral coordination. This poses a serious dilemma for global health security and presents a compelling opportunity to improve the drafting and implementation of practical health security policies.” A joint effort with Talus Analytics, this new tool was developed to help estimate the cost to build capacity under the IHR. You can access the tool here (you may want to use Google Chrome).

IDSA Slams Budget Cuts to AMR
Biodefense budgets aren’t the only ones to be taking a beating… The president’s FY2018 budget released in May would cut the CDC’s Antibiotic Resistance Solutions Initiate (ARSI) by 14%, as well as 23% from the NIH and NIAID, which funds research on AMR. Leaders from Infectious Disease Society of America (IDSA) are rallying to oppose such efforts. “In a letter published yesterday in Annals of Internal Medicine, IDSA treasurer Helen Boucher, MD, past president Barbara Murray, MD, and current president William Powderly, MD, argue that the budget cuts for public health and research proposed by the Trump administration will not only diminish the nation’s surveillance capacity and its efforts to reduce infections and promote appropriate antibiotic use, but also undercut US leadership in global efforts to tackle the AMR threat, which is responsible for more than 700,000 deaths each year globally.” The letter emphasizes that such cut would severely impact AMR efforts, which is highly worrisome and dangerous given the severity of the global AMR threat. You can read the letter here.

An Integrated Approach to Forensic Investigation of Threat Agents
In the wake of a chemical or biological event, threat analysis is a high-stakes operation that has little room for error. Determining the substance, origin, and components all make for a stressful situation that requires effective analytical methods. “Traditional analytical methods are good at confirming the presence or absence of a particular agent or substance. If a sample is believed to contain Bacillus anthracis, standard biological analysis will quickly determine whether or not this is the case. But it will not provide insight into its virulence, origin or how it might have been manipulated. And if the sample turns out to be something other than B. anthracis, it will not tell you what it actually is. An integrated approach to CB forensics provides investigators with richer information. Integrated forensics combines advanced forensic science technologies to provide more comprehensive and timely technical intelligence.” Some of these strategies include advanced genomic analysis like massively parallel sequencing and advanced chemical analysis like gas chromatography and high resolution mass spectrometry. Currently, the extraction methods for biological analysis can render the sample unusable for chemical analysis, which make analysis problematic. A new strategy from Battelle is looking to combat these discrepancies, which involves a new process to “systematically triage samples and integrate biological and chemical forensics, as well as developing and testing new technologies to help investigators more quickly identify and characterize biological agents, including new, emerging and synthetic agents, to glean more forensic information from the samples.”

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Zika Vaccine Efforts Slow– Sanofi recently announced they are halting work on a candidate Zika vaccine. The vaccine was a joint effort with Walter Reed Army Institute of Research however, budgetary cuts and federal efforts to scale back put the project in jeopardy. “In its Sep 1 statement, Sanofi said BARDA informed the company on Aug 17 that the agency reassessed its Zika-related projects and have decided to focus on a more limited set of goals and deliverable, and that BARDA has decided to “de-scope” its contract with Sanofi for the manufacture and clinical development of an inactivated Zika vaccine. BARDA said it would limit its funding to a case definition and surveillance study, as well as any activities needed to pause work on the vaccine until an epidemic re-emerges. As a result, Sanofi said it doesn’t intend to continue developing or seek a license from WRAIR for the Zika vaccine candidate.”
  • Australia Battles Influenza – As Australia experiences a particularly harsh flu season, many are wondering what this will mean for Europe and North America.”In general, we get in our season what the Southern Hemisphere got in the season immediately preceding us,” Fauci said. An “intelligent guess,” therefore, is that the north will probably have a bad flu season. “With influenza, it is never 100%,” he said. “So when you talk about influenza, almost nothing is absolutely precision,” Fauci said. “In general, one can say we usually see here what they see there in their season.” Schaffner agrees: “There’s not a one-to-one correlation.” Still, hearing about Australia’s high number of flu cases, he said, “I started to tighten my belt.”

Pandora Report 9.1.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Craving some satyrical genome editing? Check out the Onion’s pros and cons list on this biotechnology.

The De Novo Synthesis of Horsepox Virus: Implications for Biosecurity and Recommendations for Preventing the Reemergence of Smallpox 

The recent de novo synthesis of horsepox by Canadian researchers has raised concern and spurred serious conversations about the future of orthopoxviruses, like smallpox, and the dual-use research that could bring them back. GMU biodefense associate professor and graduate program director Dr. Gregory Koblentz evaluates this horsepox experiment and what it means for biosecurity and efforts to prevent the reemergence of smallpox. Koblentz notes that this experiment represents a significant crossroads within the field of biosecurity and that the techniques for synthesis of such viruses are increasingly reducing barriers to potential misuse. Unleashing smallpox back into the world would be a global disaster as most of the world is no longer immune. Koblentz points out that “The threat of smallpox has been held at bay for the past 40 years by 2 conditions: the extreme difficulty of acquiring the virus and the availability of effective medical countermeasures. Synthetic biology is on the brink of erasing both of these formidable barriers to the reemergence of smallpox as a global health threat.” He highlights the limited and rather lackluster legal and technical safeguards against smallpox synthesis and that the increasing normalization and globalization of it will likely create a boom of researchers performing such experiments. Think of the gold rush, but rather the orthopoxvirus syntehesis rush. As orthopoxviruses, are being used to develop new vaccines and oncolytic medical treatments, its popularity and wider range of applications carries with it inherent risks that should be considered. “The combination of rising demand and increasing supply could lead to the global diffusion of the capability and expertise to create orthopoxviruses de novo as well as modify these synthetic viruses. With this diffusion will come an increased risk that scientists, acting on their own volition or on behalf of a terrorist group, might misuse their know-how to create variola virus, or that governments could use civilian biomedical research with synthetic orthopoxviruses as a cover for offensive applications. The release of the smallpox virus— whether due to a biosafety failure, a breach in biosecurity, or an act of biological warfare—would be a global health disaster.” Koblentz draws attention to the challenges that the normalization and globalization of orthopoxvirus synthesis poses to national and international systems working to ensure life sciences research is safely conducted. He points out that there is no clear international legal framework to prevent the synthesis of the variola virus, few comphresensive legal safeguards, and that the private DNA industry (the main supplier of large synthetic DNA fragments) has inconsistent regulatory interventions. With these concerns, Koblentz suggests several recommendations to prevent the return of smallpox, ranging from the WHO’s World Health Assembly (WHA) passing a resolution to enshrine the WHO’s Advisory Committee on Variola Research (ACVVR) recommendations on the handling and synthesis of variola virus DNA into international law, to efforts within the DNA synthesis industry to declare a temporary moratorium on the synthesis of orthopoxvirus DNA fragments until effective WHO oversight can be established. Overall, Koblentz points to the importance of this experiment in terms of how such work is performed and the lack of informed debate surrounding the dual-use nature prior to the start of research. He emphasizes  “the risks posed by the routine and widespread synthesis of orthopoxviruses that could lead to the creation of a widely distributed network of laboratories and scientists capable of producing infectious variola virus from synthetic DNA.”

GMU Biodefense Master’s Open House – September 14th
We’re two weeks away from the first Master’s Open House and you won’t want to miss the chance to learn about GMU’s biodefense MS program. From 6:30-8:30pm on Thursday, September 14th, at the GMU Arlington campus, you can speak to faculty, learn about admissions, and why biodefense students have a blast while getting their graduate degrees. From Anthrax to Zika, we’ve got the place for all things biodefense.

Stanford’s New Biosecurity Initiative  

Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) just announced their new biosecurity initiative, the Stanford Biosecurity Initiative, which will be led by David Relman and Megan Palmer. “Relman said the biosecurity initiative will seek to advance the beneficial applications of the life sciences while reducing the risks of misuse by promoting research, education and policy outreach in biological security. His CISAC leadership gives him the know-how to lead such a wide-ranging effort across diverse disciplines and communities,”. Palmer is a senior research scholar at Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and leads research on risk governance in emerging technology development and is an all around biotechnology guru. The biosecurity initiative also includes key Stanford partnerships and expertise within the fields of life sciences, engineering, law, and policy. Palmer noted that, “Stanford has an opportunity and imperative to advance security strategies for biological science and technology in a global age. Our faculty bring together expertise in areas including technology, policy, and ethics, and are deeply engaged in shaping future of biotechnology policy and practices.” We look forward to seeing the amazing work this new initiative will accomplish!                                                                                         

NAS Symposium on Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) for the Next Ten Years and Beyond
Don’t miss out on this September 18-19 event at the Keck Center. “In 2009 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction concluded that expanding and updating U.S. Government Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs in both form and function would enhance U.S. national security and global stability. The NAS Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) is convening a symposium to examine how CTR has evolved since that time and to consider new approaches for CTR programs and related WMD elimination efforts to increase their ability to enhance U.S. security. Speakers will include Amb. Laura Holgate, former U.S. Representative to the Vienna Office of the UN and IAEA, Amb. Ronald Lehman, Counselor to the Director of LLNL, William Tobey, former Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at NNSA, Andrew Weber, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, and other key thinkers and practitioners from CTR programs as well as experts from outside of CTR implementing agencies who have experience addressing complex international security problems. The symposium is sponsored by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) in the Naval Postgraduate School and will be open to the public. A ‘meeting in brief’ document will be issued by NAS after the symposium.”

International Biosecurity Fellows Reflect on SB7.0
The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security recently partnered with Stanford’s Drew Endy to bring 32 emerging biosecurity leaders together for a fellowship program to attend the 7th International Meeting on Synthetic Biology (SB7.0) in Singapore. “In addition to attending the conference, fellows had the opportunity to engage with practicing experts and to discuss—with peers and senior scientists and government officials—biosecurity as it relates to synthetic biology. The fellows represented 19 countries on 6 continents and professions in the public and private sectors, the nonprofit space, and academia. The fellowship program was sponsored by the Open Philanthropy Project, hosted by Endy, and coordinated by the Center, BioBricks Foundation, and SynBioBeta. Center staffers Crystal Watson, DrPH, MPH, senior associate, and Matt Watson, senior analyst, organized the fellowship discussions and events and joined the fellows in Singapore for the 4-day experience. Gigi Kwik Gronvall, PhD, a senior associate at the Center and author of Synthetic Biology: Safety, Security, and Promise, spoke at SB7.0 and helped lead the fellowship’s panel discussions along with Watson and Watson.” Don’t miss out on GMU Biodefense PhD student Yong-Bee Lim’s reflection on page 39. Lim comments on the unique insight that comes from researchers with a non-technical background who still focus on the biosecurity, biosafety, and governance of emerging biotechnologies. “However, the enthusiasm of the technical conference attendees and fellows that I met about the advancements in synthetic biology was infectious. Whether Christina Smolke was talking about leveraging yeast to produce opioids to address medical access inequities, Kate Adamala was discussing synthetic cells as an alternative for research purposes, or Dorothee Krafft explained how her lab was seeking to synthesize a simple cell with alternate building blocks, their passion for their work came through. This allowed me the rare opportunity to enjoy the possibilities of these new avenues of innovation.” Don’t miss out on his tales of confiscated beef jerky and how there’s often a disparage between the science and security communities.

Building Airborne Isolation Units During Emergent Times  & Why the CDC Quarantined Potentially Defective Equipment
GMU biodefense PhD student Saskia Popescu is taking a deep-dive into faulty PPE and hospital preparedness efforts that might just save us during an airborne outbreak. Popescu first looks at the recent CDC actions to pull defective PPE from the SNS. “The special focused on personal protective equipment (PPE) that was being stockpiled by the CDC for use against future outbreaks or public health emergencies, such as treating an influx of Ebola patients during an outbreak. The 60 Minutes investigative team filed a Freedom of Information Act request to obtain documents regarding MicroCool gowns that are part of the US Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The filing of the Freedom of Information Act request is especially prudent as a group of hospitals were recently awarded $454 million in damages from PPE manufacturers Kimberly-Clark and Halyard Health (formerly a division of Kimberly-Clark) after a jury found they were liable for fraud and defects within the MicroCool gowns.” While these gowns were advertised as meeting standards for the highest level of impermeability, their efficacy is clearly in question. Many are concerned about the existing stockpiles hospitals have been holding onto since the Ebola outbreak in 2014 and if such PPE is still effective. Popescu also takes a look into a recent study that evaluated the potential for hospitals to readily and cheaply convert entire wings into negative-pressure, airborne isolation units. Such a measure would be necessary if there was an influx of infectious patients with SARS, MERS, or another disease that requires airborne isolation, as most hospitals have limited amounts of negative-pressure rooms. “Following their analysis, the team found that they were able to maintain negative pressure that was actually higher than the CDC recommendations for airborne isolation and there was no pressure reversal during the entering and exiting of the ward by medical staff. They did find that ‘pressures within the ward changed, with some rooms becoming neutrally or slightly positively pressured’, which means that healthcare staff would need to wear proper personal protective equipment (PPE) at all times in the unit and not just while in the patient rooms.” While this isn’t a permanent response measure, it does show proof of concept that would allow safer hospitalization for infectious patients during an airborne outbreak.

Stem Cells, Smallpox Vaccines, and FDA Crackdowns 
Earlier this week, the FDA announced it was taking action to shut down clinics that were advertising and performing unproven stem cell therapies. Clinics in California and Florida have received warning letters and the StemImmune Inc, clinic in San Diego, CA, received a visit from U.S. Marshals, who seized five vials of smallpox vaccine. “The FDA says it learned that StemImmune was using the vaccines as well as stem cells from body fat to create an unapproved stem cell therapy. On its website, StemImmune says ‘The patient’s own (autologous, adult) stem cells, armed with potent anti-cancer payloads, function like a ‘Trojan Horse,’ homing to tumors and cancer cells, undetected by the immune system’.” These clinics have been using stem cell treatments for patients suffering from Parkinson’s, ALS, COPD, heart disease, and pulmonary fibrosis. “Action by the FDA on clinics promoting unproven stem cell therapies is ‘a long time coming,’ says Sean Morrison, former president of the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) and d irector of the Children’s Research Institute at UT Southwestern.”

Hurricane Harvey – Harbinger of Infectious Disease?
As hospitals are forced to evacuate patients and medical centers become overwhelmed, the George R. Brown Convention Center has become the city’s largest emergency shelter. It’s always challenging though, meeting the medical demands of so many people in an emergent environment. As providers work to meet basic medical needs there is another concern that bubbles up with an influx of people into a small environment…disease. Floodwater injuries are of course a concern, but we also worry about infectious diseases associated with overrun sewage systems, lack of potable water and safe food, and the existence of mega-shelters that are ripe for transmission of respiratory and diarrheal illness. That’s not even considering the potential for nasty resistant infections like MRSA, VRE, etc. Did I mention mosquitoes? “Based on experience following Hurricane Katrina, there will be several competing effects on the population of mosquitoes and the prevalence of arboviruses, such as Zika, dengue and West Nile, that they transmit. Mosquitoes need stagnant water to lay eggs. Winds and floods will wash away containers that would have been breeding pools, said Hayden, who studies weather and vector-borne disease. In the immediate future, both Hayden and Hotez anticipate that local mosquito populations will decline. But once the floodwaters recede, mosquitoes will recover. In 2006, a year after Katrina, Tulane University public-health experts reported that cases of West Nile infection increased more than twofold in communities that had been in that hurricane’s path. The study authors suggested that increased exposure was the culprit. Fleeing partially submerged buildings, people spent days outside waiting for rescue.” Sadly, it will take years to recover and rebuilding Houston after Harvey, and there are lessons we can apply from not only Harvey, but also Hurricane Sandy, towards future preparedness and response efforts. Matt Watson and Eric Toner from the Center for Health Security are drawing attention to the need for Congress to start gearing up for the health impacts following Harvey.  “Stepping back from the operational response, it’s important to recognize that Congress has a vital role to play in both preparing for and enabling recovery following large scale disasters. On the recovery front, it will be important for lawmakers to pass an emergency appropriation that provides emergency funding. It is critical that Congress reverse that trend and continue to support annual appropriations for hospital and public health preparedness so that the nation is able to respond to increasingly frequent natural disasters and other large-scale emergencies.”

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Distinguishing Virulent from Harmless Bacteria to Improve Biosurveillance- “Researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory are working to eliminate false positives in detection of Francisella bacteria, a few species of which include highly virulent human and animal pathogens. The effort contributes to more efficient and effective biological surveillance, such as that conducted by the US Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense, which provides early warning of infectious disease outbreaks, hazardous environmental exposures, or possible bioterrorist attacks by spotting trends of public health importance.”
  • Deadly Strain of Klebsiella pneumoniae Found In China– Chinese researchers are reporting a highly virulent, resistant, and deadly strain of the bacteria in five patients at a hospital in Hangzhou, China. “All five patients—who were admitted to the ICU between late February and April of 2016—had undergone surgery for multiple trauma followed by ventilation and subsequently developed carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae infections and severe pneumonia that responded poorly to all available antibiotics. All five patients died of severe lung infection, multi-organ failure, or septic shock.”

 

Pandora Report 8.25.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Happy Friday and welcome to your weekly dose of all things biodefense. Have you ever wanted to take a tour of Dugway Proving Ground? Here’s your chance at a virtual tour through some amazing photography.

GMU Biodefense Graduate Programs & Information Sessions
Classes are just starting up and if you’ve ever wanted to take classes on synthetic biology and biosecurity, global health security policy, nonproliferation and arms control, biosurveillance, or emerging infectious diseases, we’ve got just the program for you! GMU offers both Masters and PhD programs in biodefense and has several informational sessions coming soon. Our program provides the perfect intersection of policy and science with courses taught by a range experts. If your time is limited or distance is a problem, we also offer an online MS program, which means you can study biodefense from anywhere!

Revisiting NIH Biosafety Guidelines
It’s been forty years since NIH established the Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules to assess the risks of genome editing. Now more than ever, with the speed of biotech development, it is relevant to take a moment and look back at the significance of such guidelines. “Responsibilities include setting up Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) to assess risks and potential hazards through standards for containment and laboratory practices. Noncompliance on any project, whatever the funding source, can result in loss of all such NIH funding. In his address to the workshop.” Since its inception, there have been several advances in the field, like DIY gene editing and CRISPR, which may require changes to the existing guidelines. “And conventional risk management practices that focus on listed pathogens may underestimate risks of new, unlisted organisms. The informality of voluntary guidelines has enabled prompt responses by funders and researchers to emerging evidence on benefits and risks of technologies. But what has worked with those receiving NIH funding with IBCs may not work with the wider range of actors who now have access to these technologies.” How can the NIH meet these challenges with a forty-year-old set of rules? A few things might help it maintain relevancy- participation in international forums, facilitating researchers/publishers/insurers to set common benchmarks on researcher conduct, engage more with institutional biosafety officials, and working to ensure there are more IBCs. Overall, there is a need to modernize the guidelines to better meet and serve the expanding plain of the life sciences.

Revisiting Compliance in the Biological Weapons Convention                                                                       Have you noticed a trend this week? Revisiting is the name of the game and that’s just what the latest occasional paper from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey is doing. The latest RevCon was a dud and the future of the BWC and its relevance is being tested. James Revill is looking at compliance and an incremental approach within the BWC. Revill notes that “compliance with the BWC is more than a simple binary choice to sign a commitment not to develop or produce biological weapons. It requires the adherence to all the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties in signing and ratifying the convention. In the BWC context, this is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding certain obligations, changes in science and security, and the limited resource capacity of some states to fulfill their obligations. Under such circumstances, without episodically revisiting compliance, there remains the risk that BWC will become ever more fragmented, outmoded and poorly implemented.” He emphasizes that despite many pushing for multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocols, this is an unlikely outcome. An incremental approach to revisiting compliance, Revill suggests, could incorporate several activities – review relevant science and technology, enhance the collection and analysis of compliance indicators, develop the consultative mechanism, building the provision of assistance in the event of a violation of the BWC, explore voluntary visits, enhance the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism, and remedy the institutional deficient. Overall, he points to the wavering nature of norms against bioweapons and that “without revisiting compliance and tending the convention, there is a risk that the regime will be left to fester and fragment, in time potentially diminishing the norms against biological weapons.”

Meeting on the Attribution of Biological Crime, Terrorism, and Warfare
The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense will be hosting this October 3rd meeting in Washington D.C. “Effective prosecution and decisions regarding U.S. response depend on accurate attribution of biological attacks. Despite ongoing biological crimes and suspected development of biological weapons for the purpose of attacking the Nation, the United States has yet to establish this capability fully. The Study Panel will host a special focus meeting entitled Biological Attribution: Challenges and Solutions. This meeting of the Study Panel, chaired by former Homeland Security Advisor Ken Wainstein and former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, will provide federal government, industry, and academic representatives with the opportunity to discuss their perspectives, experiences, challenges, and recommended solutions with regard to biological attribution.” Stay tuned for more details!

SynBio Salmagundi: Proposed Framework for Identifying Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology – Report, SB7.0 & Options for Synthetic DNA Screening 
It’s a good day to get your synbio nerdom on with this potpourri of news! If you missed the webinar on Tuesday, you can now access the latest NAS interim report regarding the biodefense implications of synthetic biology. “Synthetic biology and related biotechnologies hold great promise for addressing challenges in human health, agriculture, and other realms. At the same time, synthetic biology raises concerns about possible malicious uses that might threaten human health or national security. This interim report is the first phase of a study by the National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine to assess potential vulnerabilities. The report proposes a strategic framework that can be used to identify and prioritize potential areas of concern.” Within the report you can find definitions and study scope regarding synthetic biology in the context of biodefense, factors to assess capability for malicious use, technologies and applications to assess, and framework approach (parameters to consider, use and limitations, etc.). Check out this latest article regarding the screening processes of for synthetic DNA ordering. Sure, there are current screening processes (providers affiliated with the International Gene Synthesis Consortium voluntarily screen double-stranded DNA synthesis orders over 200bp to check for regulated pathogens and additional customer screening), but truly, the processes isn’t that easy…or cheap. Researchers, like Gigi Kwik Gronvall, pointed out actions that could help “preserve the effectiveness of DNA order screening as a security tool and develop additional mechanisms to increase the safety and security of DNA synthesis technologies.” Highlighting the DHHS screening guidance as quickly becoming obsolete, they emphasized options like including direct financial support to companies for screening, especially as we look to the future costs and responsibilities of the U.S. government. “The screening of dsDNA orders is not a panacea for biosecurity concerns: it is possible for nefarious actors to work around the screening. However, we believe that screening dsDNA orders still raises barriers to the development of biological weapons and may offer some protection against biosafety concerns.” The future of synthetic DNA ordering will surely be debated as experiments, like the recent horsepox reconstitution, bring to light new gaps. One such focus onto the realm of biosecurity and synthetic biology comes from Dr. Eric van der Helm, who participated at the latest SB7.0 synthetic biology conference. Van der Helm attended as part of the SB7.0 biosecurity fellowship and has highlighted some of the biorisks we worry about. He also points to the latest horsepox experiment which brought about so much attention to the biosecurity implications of reconstituting an extinct virus. “Synthetic biology has only been recently recognized as a mature subject in the context of biological risk assessment — and the core focus has been infectious diseases. The main idea, to build resilience and a readiness to respond, was reiterated by several speakers at the SB7.0 conference.  In the case of biosecurity, we’re already dependent on biology [with respect to food, health etc.] but we still have an opportunity to develop biosecurity strategies before synthetic biology is ubiquitous.  There is still an opportunity to act now and put norms and practices in place because the community is still relatively small.” Van der Helm emphasizes the need to have these conversations regarding biosecurity measures and synbio, like those at SB7.0, more frequently and openly.

North Korea’s Bioweapon Program: What do we actually know?
If you haven’t gotten enough on discussions regarding North Korea’s bioweapons program, check out GMU biodefense professor Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley‘s latest interview in which she discusses what we know and what we might be missing. What a perfect way to enjoy the morning commute or a lunch break!

Post-Ebola Recovery – An Upside to an Epidemic
A recent mudslide in Sierra Leone is revealing a positive outcome from the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak – sustained disaster response. Shortly after the mudslide, emergency response crews were already working alongside volunteers to help rescue victims. Sidi Tunis chatted with Buzzfeed, noting that “During Ebola we had a lot of community engagement, so they knew how to be first responders. They knew how to do search and rescues, they knew how to convey corpses safely to the morgue.” Many of the young men digging through rubble were already experienced, having helped with Ebola burial teams and the ambulance system was better equipped and supported as a result of the outbreak. “There was a lesson learnt from Ebola that instead of creating parallel system of NGOs, let’s take leadership from the start,” she said. “So this time it’s been led by the government from the onset, and having them take that ownership is more of a sustainable system.” “Still, NGOs playing a critical role are in a better position than they might typically have been. Three days after the mudslide, unclaimed bodies piling up in Freetown’s main mortuary posed another health risk. There were so many that they began to decompose in the tropical heat, prompting the government to order mass burials over the following two days. Workers from UNICEF were among those who helped scrub out the morgue during a massive clean-up operation that followed. ‘That needed a lot of infection prevention equipment – gloves, boots, aprons,’ James said. ‘UNICEF had emergency stock ready to go from Ebola’.”

Meeting of the Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria
Don’t miss out on this September 13th and 14th meeting in which the “Advisory Council will provide advice, information, and recommendations to the Secretary regarding programs and policies intended to preserve the effectiveness of antibiotics by optimizing their use; advance research to develop improved methods for combating antibiotic resistance and conducting antibiotic stewardship; strengthen surveillance of antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections; prevent the transmission of antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections; advance the development of rapid point-of-care and agricultural diagnostics; further research Start Printed Page 38913on new treatments for bacterial infections; develop alternatives to antibiotics for agricultural purposes; maximize the dissemination of up-to-date information on the appropriate and proper use of antibiotics to the general public and human and animal healthcare providers; and improve international coordination of efforts to combat antibiotic resistance.” The meeting will be held at the DHHS Hubert Humphrey Building or you can attend online here.

Pandemic Readiness (Hint: We’re Not There Yet)
Despite funding for the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) and an increase in funding to the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program (PHEP), many are pointing out that these programs are chronically underfunded to begin with. “This House bill also does little to create a realistic public health emergency response fund, a standing pot of money to meet the immediate needs of a public health crisis. We saw how long it took to get emergency funds to respond to Zika, Ebola and Hurricane Sandy, with each event taking longer and longer to help these communities respond to devastating disasters.” You can also check out this latest meeting with Judy Woodruff and Liberian-born Dr. Raj Panjabi at Spotlight Health. Dr. Panjabi discusses the seriousness of infectious disease threats and the challenges of pandemic prevention.

Forecasting Outbreaks One Image at a Time
Tracking infectious diseases is a tough job and requires a lot of boots on the ground (shout out to gumshoe epidemiologists who go door to door doing contact tracing). Researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory have been using computer modeling for a while to track disease movement, but a new partnership with Descartes Labs, is bringing high-resolution satellite imagery into the arsenal. “By mapping where high-moisture areas intersect with those social media signals and clinical surveillance data, we can help identify areas at risk for disease emergence and subsequently predict its potential path. Descartes Labs collects data daily from public and commercial imagery providers, aggregating the images into a single database. Our team at Los Alamos will use the Descartes Labs Platform to correlate satellite imagery with multiyear clinical surveillance data from approximately 5,500 Brazilian municipalities for mosquito-borne diseases such as dengue, chikungunya, and Zika in order to better understand how they spread.” This new imagery will allow Los Alamos Lab researchers to focus on specific neighborhoods and other small geographical areas. By using retrospective analysis via historical data, they’ll make sure the mathematical models are accurate and ensure that future models are truly capable of prediction.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Munich Re Signs Strategic Agreement With Metabiota to Enhance Insurability Against Epidemic Losses – The risk analytics firm Metabiota has announced a strategic agreement with Munich Re, one of the world’s leading reinsurers, to better establish insurability “by protecting companies and local economies from the financial loss related to epidemics. This really is the next frontier for the insurance industry – given the high risk of infectious disease outbreaks, it is imperative that we find new ways to manage and finance these risks for our customers.” Metabiota’s newest platform is a modeling method for estimating epidemic preparedness and risk, as well as the cost and severity of outbreaks by using historical data and disease scenarios and analytics.
  • Ebola Survivors Plagued With Long-term Disabilities – Imagine becoming infected with one of the most deadly viruses on the planet. Now, imagine by some stroke of luck and medical marvel, you’re able to survive. After the long, miserable road that is Ebola infection, survivors have been finding themselves with chronic conditions and high rates of disabilities. A new study found that Ebola survivors have seven times the disability rate compared to their close contacts. “In the first study, researchers followed 27 Ebola survivors in Sierra Leone for 1 year after diagnosis and found they were seven times more likely than their close contacts to report a disability. Almost 80% of the survivors (77.8%) reported a disability 1 year post-infection, compared with 11.1% of their close contacts. Disabilities included major limitations in vision, mobility, and cognition. ‘This study has demonstrated that a year following acute disease, survivors of the recent EVD outbreak have higher odds of persisting disability in mobility, vision, and cognition,’ the authors concluded. ‘Mental health issues such as anxiety and depression persist in EVD survivors and must not be neglected’.”
  • Minnesota Measles Woes & Anti-vaxxers– The benefits of vaccines have been under fire from anti-vaccine activists, despite the overwhelming good they’ve done for the world. While Minnesota continues to battle their worst outbreak of measles in decades, the antivaxxers are becoming energized in their efforts. “In Facebook group discussions, local activists have asked about holding ‘measles parties’ to expose unvaccinated children to others infected with the virus so they can contract the disease and acquire immunity.” The initial cases of this outbreak were in the Somali American community, which are believed to be the result of anti-vaccine activists speaking to community members and instilling fears and concerns. “Despite the anti-vaccine drumbeat, Minnesota’s Somali American community has begun to push back, according to some health-care providers. As part of an unprecedented collaboration clinicians and public health officials launched this summer, ­Somali American imams are urging families to protect their children by getting the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine.”

Pandora Report 8.18.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

ECDC Tool for Prioritizing Biothreats
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control has released their tool for the prioritization of infectious disease threats. “This qualitative tool, implemented as an Excel workbook, is based on multi-criteria decision analysis. It ranks infectious disease threats in a transparent, comparable and methodologically reproducible manner. The tool enables the relative ranking of different infectious disease threats. It is intended as a supplement to other methods that also support decision-making in preparedness planning.” Part of the tool involves a scoring of diseases, in which it suggests that a multidisciplinary expert group works to establish reliable information and adequate scoring. The ECDC tool also includes a handbook and manual for users to get the most out of it.

 Long Ignored: The Use of CBW Against Insurgents
GMU Biodefense PhD alum Glenn Cross investigates the use of chemical and biological weapons in counterinsurgency campagins like that of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Syria. Cross notes that history has shown the efficacy of CBW against ill-equipped and often poorly trained insurgents. He points to the debate regarding application of use – some say that these weapons are used when conventional forces are ineffective and often a last resort, while others note that the lack of an international and effective response have given insurgents incentive. “The conclusion from these examples is that regimes in extremis — when the battle is for their very survival — seem to have little compunction about resorting to chemical and biological weapons use. The much-heralded international norms and conventions prohibiting and condemning chemical and biological development and use go out the window when a regime’s survival is at stake. The examples of Rhodesia and Syria show that the international community must be united and demonstrate the requisite political will to enforce norms if the use of chemical and biological weapons is to be prevented.” Cross highlights two case studies, Rhodesia and Syria, pointing to the use of biological weapons by Rhodesian forces as being the only example of a nation using bioweapons since the end of WWII. While the regime was aware of treaty obligations, it had no bearing on their decision to use such weapons. So what are effective constrains on the use of CBW? The case studies reveal that regimes care little about their efficacy, international norms, or international agreements, but it is really deterrence that likely prevents the use of such weapons. The credible threat of military action is the strongest deterrent and realistically, until international norms include uniform enforcement amongst nations, they won’t be as effective. “As we’ve seen in Syria, such consensus is elusive, and the international community has failed to act. As a consequence, the world faces a sad, but inevitable conclusion. The Syrian regime is unlikely to ever face justice for its use of chemical weapons.”

A View from the CT Foxhole: Edward You, FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Biological Countermeasures Unit
As if we need any more reasons to think Edward You is a biosecurity action hero! The Combating Terrorism Center recently sat down with Supervisory Special Agent in the FBI’s WMD Directorate, Biological Countermeasures Unit, and discussed not only his role within the FBI but also their work and coordination with partners. You notes that his “primary mission is to support outreach and engagement, but probably most importantly it is to backstop the WMD Coordinators who are positioned in the field. They have to cover the whole broad range of modalities—chem, bio, nuke, explosives. They do the initial engagements, the partnerships, the initial response, but they can always call back to headquarters where we leverage all of our expertise as subject matter experts. We can bring in the laboratory division; we can bring in Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), if necessary, the Department of Homeland Security to support them when they run into an incident out in the field.” He emphasizes the importance of the relationship the FBI has with the private sector, not only in terms of shared interests, but also communicating security problems to help get more buy-in and coordination. When asked about the DIY biohacker, You notes that “We look at these community labs as a big positive force in the economy and engines of innovation. That has helped us overcome the natural tendency for such outfits to be a little bit anti-establishment. By engaging with them, we’re helping them to raise their level of awareness that they could potentially be targeted by malicious actors seeking to subvert their work, steal their technology, or recruit insiders on their staff. By helping them establish a form of ‘neighborhood watch,’ they will be best positioned to identify and report on instances of suspicious activity both internal and external to their community. Who better to identify threats than the community members themselves?” While the partnerships with DIY labs haven’t garnered any leads to potential threats, they help the FBI understand the direction biotech is heading, which allows them to flag areas of concern faster than if they used a top-down approach. You also addresses the 2016 Europol warning of potential ISIS experimentation with bioweapons, commenting that “With ISIS, al-Qa`ida, or any other threat actor for that matter, we are faced with two significant challenges. The first is ideology. What happens if that lone individual that becomes persuaded by their ideology happens to be a microbiologist or a biochemist? The counter WMD mission has always proceeded by identifying the actors expressing the intent to acquire, develop, or use WMDs (e.g., counterproliferation efforts). And historically, significant effort and investments have been made to counter the biological weapon threat ranging from state/non-state actors to individual level biological crimes (e.g., attempted ricin poisonings). But this introduces the second challenge. Unlike the chemical and radiological/nuclear realms where materials of concern are highly regulated and the expertise is almost arcane, biology could be classified as dual use or multi-use. The strength of the field is based on the fact that it is inherently open in nature (e.g., peer-reviewed scientific journals), which has led to significant advances in areas such as healthcare.” Lastly, You points to what he considers the greatest biosecurity threat facing the U.S. – the concerns of non-state actors, but also the role of data in terms of gene editing and other biotech, noting that “we may have have been short-sighted. Most of our legal frameworks have been focused on privacy and not on security.” “Because there’s a lack of understanding about where bio is going, we’re in danger of falling behind, and my biggest concern is that for lack of our foresight and being strategic in this space, I think China is going to become a potential biological superpower.” Did I mention that Edward You is frequently a speaker at our summer workshops?

North Korea’s Chemical Arsenal Complicates U.S. Options 
As concerns over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program grows, the threat of chemical weapons has seemingly been downplayed. Tackling nuclear threats through preemptive strikes could push North Korea to utilize their chemical weapons program and sizable stockpile, which is considered to be one of the largest. “Experts are also disturbed by Kim Jong-un’s brazen public assassination of his half-brother using the nerve agent VX, saying it demonstrates the regime’s willingness to use deadly toxins. ‘I think if people paid more attention to the chemical side, they’d be less inclined to talk about preemption and going first against North Korea,’ said Greg Koblentz, a researcher of weapons of mass destruction at George Mason University.” In the event that chemical weapons are deployed, the South Korean capitol of Seoul would surely take a hit, which is home to 25 million people. While details of North Korea’s biological weapons program have given little insight into what is actually going on, there is considerably more knowledge regarding their chemical weapons initiatives. “The exact composition and size of North Korea’s chemical arsenal is unclear, but it’s believed to include everything from antiquated chlorine gas all the way up to sarin, VX, and other highly lethal nerve agents. These weapons are distributed at facilities across the country, often tucked away in underground bunkers or other sites unknown to U.S. and allied intelligence. The weapons are also deployed along the armistice line, which sits just 35 miles north of Seoul.” While there are limits to their chemical weapons capabilities, they surely provide little comfort to South Korean citizens and those living in Seoul.

 Chatting With the WHO
New WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus spoke with Foreign Affairs’ regarding his plans for the future of the WHO and efforts to combat global disease. Tedros notes that epidemics or pandemics keep him up at night, especially something like the 1918 pandemic and the “serious gaps we have”. He comments that “I think the world should unite and focus on strong health systems to prepare the whole world to prevent epidemics—or if there is an outbreak, to manage it quickly—because viruses don’t respect borders, and they don’t need visas.” In regards to irrational beliefs as a public health threat, Tedros highlights the role of governments (and the WHO in supporting them) to communicate with communities and use media as a tool for teaching. Tedros discussed the WHO’s response to Ebola and when asked about hesitancy governments may experience regarding raising the alarm for an outbreak, he noted that “it’s not an issue between the WHO and the member state in question; it’s about the overall implementation of the International Health Regulations [the rules that govern how states respond to outbreaks]. That involves not only the country in question but other countries, as well. For instance, a country may fear the impact on the economy if it reports a certain disease. And if the other countries, instead of banning travel or other measures, could be supportive and implement the IHR, then the country could be encouraged to report immediately.”

Book Review – Barriers to Bioweapons
As the summer winds down, you may find yourself needing a new book to delve into. GMU biodefense professor Sonia Ben Ougrham-Gormley‘s book, Barriers to Bioweapons, is a great addition to any lover of health security and the realities of biological experiments. This latest book review gives a witty and entertaining overview of her work, noting that “Barriers to Bioweapons argues that actually, we’re not all living on borrowed time – that there are real organizational and expertise challenges to successfully creating bioweapons. She then discusses specific historical programs, and their implications for biosecurity in the future.”

Pandemic Preparedness & A Global Catastrophic Biological Risk By Any Other Name Would Smell As Sweet

GMU biodefense PhD student Saskia Popescu tackles the importance of pandemic preparedness and the latest publication from the Center for Health Security regarding global catastrophic biological risks. “We may think written plans and the occasional table-top exercise are making us more prepared to handle a pandemic, but true preparation goes far beyond that. The ability to prevent, detect, respond, and control outbreaks is a hefty investment that countries are still struggling to make, and as a new report recently revealed, a paltry amount of countries may be ready for a pandemic.” She highlights the latest World Bank report that only six countries have truly taken efforts to evaluate their readiness to handle a pandemic. Like many things, the devil is in the details, and often that is as simple as a real name for a problem. A recent publication from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security sought to fix this by establishing a working definition for global catastrophic biological risks (GCBR). “What makes this definition unique, aside from it being the first working definition for GCBRs, is that it highlights several components, such as sustained catastrophic damage, and instead of highlighting a specific number of deaths, it looks to a range of negative outcomes, such as infertility. The challenging task of defining such a globally feared, but poorly understood risk was daunting; however, the Center for Health Security has provided us with a working tool that can now be applied to policy, and future preparedness and response efforts.”

H5 Hits the Philippines and Plague in Arizona
The Philippines is reporting its first highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza outbreak. Hitting a commercial poultry farm in Luzon, the outbreak began in July and killed 36,485 of the 190,000 birds. “A report today in the Manila Times, based on a media briefing with Emmanuel Pinol, the country’s agriculture secretary, said the outbreak was confirmed in the city of San Luis and that six poultry farms were affected. Most of the poultry deaths were in layer chickens. Pinol told reporters that the outbreak may have begun as early as April when deaths were reported in quail housed above ducks. He said ducks are the likely source of the outbreak, since they had contact with migratory birds. The Manila Times report said the outbreak site is 37 miles north of Manila and is close to swamps that are stopovers for migratory birds from the Asian mainland.” Public health officials in Arizona have announced that fleas in two counties have tested positive for plague (Yersinia pestis). While plague is endemic in the southwest, public health officials still work to ensure residents are aware that there is an increased risk. Officials are warning residents to be mindful of the potential for exposure via pets. “Fleas can bite rabbits, prairie dogs and other rodents — and anything that may eat them — and transfer the disease to pets, who in turn can infect humans. Cats who get plague transmit it through their cough. Dogs typically carry the fleas on their fur. Health officials cautioned county residents and visitors to keep their pets leashed and to avoid touching dead animals. Evidence of a large die-off could indicate plague is present, they say.”

Strategies for Identifying and Addressing Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology
Don’t miss out on these events by the National Academies Committee on Strategies for Identifying and Addressing Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology:

  • August 21 – the committee’s interim report and proposed framework will be released at 11am EDT here
  • August 22 – a public release webinar and report briefing will be held from 11am-12pm EDT. Committee Chair Michael Imperiale and committee members Patrick Boyle and Andrew Ellington will be reviewing the interim report and the proposed framework. This webinar is free to attend and open to the public, but you must register to attend. You can register at the following link:  https://nasevents.webex.com/nasevents/onstage/g.php?MTID=e39277a767b1f0190db4f7ee491c01271  You will be able to submit questions and comments during this webinar through a text-based feature but will not be able to speak directly with the presenters.
  • August 23-24: The meeting will be held at the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s Keck Center at 500 5th Street NW, Washington, DC Room 208. You must register to attend the meeting in person; the Keck Center is a secure building and we will need to have your name on the guard’s list to enter the building. You can register by emailing synbiodefense@nas.edu. If you would like to attend via teleconference, you can access the conference by dialing the following: to listen, please dial 1-(866) 668-0721 and use conference code 380 454 1676.

The committee is also soliciting feedback from the public on the interim report and the associated framework. You can submit questions or comments through September 5, 2017 at the following link:  http://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/3758337/A-Proposed-Framework-For-Identifying-Potential-Biodefense-Vulnerabilities-Posed-By-Synthetic-Biology  Due to the anticipated volume of questions, the committee may not explicitly address every comment received but all comments will be considered and reviewed. PLEASE NOTE: if you submit a question, your question and any associated identifying information you provide will be added to the study’s public access file as per the National Academies’ requirements to comply with FACA.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Uganda Ebola-like Illness Demystified- Public health officials in Uganda are sighing with relief as results from the Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI) have reported the death of a 20-year-old woman in Luweero was due to carbon monoxide poisoning and not the suspected Ebola virus. “There are currently 3 female cases admitted at Bishop Asili hospital, Luweero. However, results from UVRI indicate that all cases were negative for Ebola, Marburg, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, Rift Valley fever, and Sosuga viruses. ‘The ministry of health team is working closely with the District Health Team to monitor, review, and manage these cases as well as orienting health workers on management and referral protocols of suspected cases,’ reads the statement.”

Pandora Report 8.11.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Norovirus may be plaguing athletes in London for the World Championships, but we’re making sure to deliver the latest biodefense news to you (germ free)! Check out these WHO courses for managing public health emergencies.

CDC Invests $200 Million For Infectious Disease Preparedness
Last week the CDC announced that it awarded more than $200 million to help prevent, detect, respond to, and control biothreats posed by emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. The funds will go through the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity for Infectious Diseases (ELC) cooperative agreement and reach all fifty state health departments and several local health agencies in large metropolitan areas. The CDC announcement noted that the “CDC and states work together to improve local surveillance, laboratory diagnostic capabilities, and outbreak response. The CDC has awarded more than $200 million through the Epidemiology and ELC cooperative agreement to help states, cities, counties, and territories prevent, detect, respond to, and control the growing threats posed by emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. State programs are the foundation of the U.S. public health system and are integral to the nation’s efforts to combat infectious disease threats. CDC and states work together to improve local surveillance, laboratory diagnostic capabilities, and outbreak response.” This also includes $77 million to help state health departments combat antibiotic resistance in their areas. The 2017 funding enhances current Antibiotic Resistance Laboratory Network (AR Lab Network) activities by increasing testing nationwide for Candida fungal threats, strengthening national TB surveillance and infrastructure, and enhancing detection of drug-resistant gonorrhea. This surge of funds, mixed with a new strategy that combines market entry rewards with population-based payments from insurers, could help bring us ahead in the battle against the resistant bug. “The proposal, dubbed the Priority Antimicrobial Value and Entry (PAVE) award, would use limited public funds to cover the majority of revenue for the first 1 to 2 years a new antibiotic is on the market, but that revenue would be phased out over 5 years and replaced by revenue from population-based contracts with health insurers. The purpose of the PAVE award, the authors said in their recent Journal of the American Medical Association paper, is to guarantee a return-on-investment for antibiotic developers by ‘de-linking’ the revenue of new antibiotics from the volume used and to promote stewardship of those drugs, so that thy remain effective and available.”

A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to 21st Century
Don’t miss out on the latest bioweapon gem from W. Seth Carus – a history on biological warfare! “It covers what we know about the practice of BW and briefly describes the programs that developed BW weapons based on the best available research. To the extent possible, it primarily draws on the work of historians who used primary sources, relying where possible on studies specifically focused on BW. By broadening our knowledge of BW, such studies have enabled us to write about the topic with more accuracy and detail than could have been done even a few years ago.” Carus breaks BW history into three sections – prehistory to 1900, 1900-1945, and then 1945-modern day. He focuses on the agents covered by the BWC and looks at the history of state-sponsored programs, the role of scientific advances in understanding microorganisms, use of BW in warfare, and more.

What It Means To Militarize Biotechnology
Biotechnology is a fickle beast and a frequently debated topic. While many focus on the security implications of gene-editing and other biotechnologies in the hands of nefarious actors, there has been an increasing militarization of the field. Military research and investment in biotechnology can be a bag of mixed outcomes and there has been little discussion regarding the growing military interest in it. “One such issue is the risk that military investment in biotechnology will adversely affect research priorities. Another is the possibility that military investment into defensive or public health projects by one state might be misinterpreted by other states as having offensive potential. In the same vein, the scarcity of publicly available information about military research into biotechnology might fuel public distrust of valuable and well-intended work. It is clear, for example, that research into preventing, identifying, and treating infectious diseases by various militaries around the world will continue to provide broader spin-off benefits—but publics in some states might be unsure why military rather than public health institutions lead such work.” Progress in fields like synthetic biology has brought forth almost a renaissance of research and also engagement in security discussions. Brett Edwards highlights the role of the Amerithrax attacks in bringing biology into the forefront of American terrorism worries. He notes that the synbio community has been heavily engaged in the debate of misuse and its implications for innovation and regulation. Working in the synbio field inherently carries with it a forced sensitization to these issues. Edwards emphasizes that the future should include international dialogue with researchers regarding biotechnology militarization. “This sort of dialogue might allow shared principles regarding state investment in biotechnology to be identified and articulated—principles that would both guide research priorities and establish hard limits about what is permissible. Such discussions could draw upon relevant principles in international human rights, humanitarian, and arms control law—including, but not limited to, treaties specifically dealing with biological, chemical, and environmental warfare.”

Air Travel or Bug Travel?
We’ve all been on that flight with one (or more) people who are visibly and audibly ill…and there’s nothing like that ominous feeling of “I’m definitely getting sick after this flight.” A new study investigated disease transmission on airplanes and found that things like plane size and boarding method can have some pretty profound implications for disease transmission. Sure, jamming ourselves into a metal box where it’s cold and we’re in close quarters should already be a redflag for disease transmission, but there are many more variables that impact airborne disease spread. Researchers started first with how Ebola might be transmitted on a plane. “Unfortunately for current fliers, the commonly used three-section boarding technique, where passengers board by first class, middle zone and back section, is actually the worst strategy for reducing the number of infected. The reason this works so poorly is that it forces passengers to stand together in the aisle while they all wait to get to their seats, which means more time for a tightly packed group to be exposed to the contagious passenger”. They found that changing the boarding method to a two-section, random method is much more protective. Also, the speed at which we all race off the airplane once we’re landed appears to have little impact. “For plane size, you might think the bigger the plane, the smaller your odds, right? Not quite. In fact, the study found that planes with less than 150 seats are better at reducing new infections; there are fewer susceptible people present overall, fewer people within a given person’s contact radius and less time spent moving through the plane to reach assigned seats. ‘Using smaller airplanes during an outbreak, instead of completely banning flights to a specific destination, can drastically reduce the probability of introduction of infection,’ Mubayi said.” The investigative team found that if airlines stuck to their existing boarding strategies during an ebola outbreak, there would be a 67% chance of infection rates reaching 20 air-travel-related cases per month. Regardless of plane size, if airlines modified their boarding strategies, the change for infection drops to 40%. Such work gives us great insight into strategies to help slow the rate of transmission during outbreaks through the powerful vector that is international air travel.

Computer Security and DNA Sequencing
A recent article on the implications of DNA sequencing and big data highlights investigations into the “robustness of such tools if (or when) adversarial attacks manifest”. Researchers noted that DNA synthesis can provide attackers with arbitrary remote code execution and highlight the need to look at the feasibility of such attacks. Performing their own attacks on a modified down-stream sequencing utility, they found data leakage and used such lessons to evaluate security hygiene of the more common DNA processing programs. Such work is especially prudent given that biohackers recently encoded malware in a DNA strand. University of Washington researchers revealed at the USENIX Security conference this week that it’s actually possible to encode malware into DNA strands, “so that when a gene sequencer analyzes it the resulting data becomes a program that corrupts gene-sequencing software and takes control of the underlying computer. While that attack is far from practical for any real spy or criminal, it’s one the researchers argue could become more likely over time, as DNA sequencing becomes more commonplace, powerful, and performed by third-party services on sensitive computer systems.” The researchers are calling it the “the first ‘DNA-based exploit of a computer system‘.” This new finding sounds like something out of a science fiction film, but points to the unexpected threats within DNA sequencing and data processing. Thankfully, the process was pretty unreliable and the researchers had to take some significant shortcuts, which means attacks like this may be not be in the immediate future. Nonetheless, it brings forth the need to consider the security implications of information stored within DNA.

Next Generation Global Health Security Network & the Nuclear Threat Initiative Webinar 
Don’t miss out on this webinar today, at 2pm EST regarding the Next Generation for Biosecurity in GHSA Competition! This webinar will provide an overview of eligibility and submission requirements for the NTI-sponsored biosecurity competition to develop regional and global partnerships among next generation professionals. Participants will also have an opportunity ask questions about the competition. Click here to add the event to your calendar.

Bio-Labs of the Future – The Promises & Perils of the Fourth Industrial Revolution
The Wilson Center’s Science and Technology Innovation Program takes a deep-dive into the bio-labs of the future . The rise of the biotech revolution and advances in gene-editing DNA synthesis, AI, etc. are all helping laboratories grow in connectivity and intelligence. “While this may be a boon for the development of novel vaccines and therapeutics by parties that have traditionally not had access to the necessary tools, it also opens the risk of nefarious use to engineer or edit biological agents or toxins. While there have been attempts at governance to limit the avenues by which a bad actor may gain access to the pathogens or tools to create biological weapons, the ever-increasing pace of innovation has left gaps that may be exploited.” Many are calling this time a Fourth Industrial Revolution, and with technologies like portable genomics sequencers, there is a need to examine the vulnerabilities, which includes things like growing accessibility. The Wilson Center paper highlights the need to evaluate threat, potential for exploitation of gaps, and provides policy recommendations.

Combating Biological Terrorism Roundtable Discussion
Don’t miss out on this event put on by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies on Thursday, August 24th, noon-2pm at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (901 N Stuart Street, Suit 200, Arlington, VA 22203). Roundtable speakers include Professors Rita Colwell, S. Gerald Sandler, Rashid Chotani, and Normal Kahn. “Biological security concerns are a permanent fixture of history, ranging from Mother Nature’s infectious diseases to man-made threats. Recent epidemics, such as Ebola and Zika, and the potential dangers of biological terrorism urgently need to be addressed through international partnerships to reduce the gravest health risks at home and abroad. Experts with governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental experience will provide an assessment of future challenges and offer recommendations for an international comprehensive biosecurity strategies.” RSVP is required (please email icts@potomacinstitute.org).

The Future of the GHSA Matters for US Clinicians
GMU Biodefense PhD student Saskia Popescu discusses the importance of the GHSA and why it should matter to U.S. clinicians. “Fundamentally, the GHSA is a crucial component to ensuring a solid and reliable global foundation exists for responding to, detecting, and preventing public health crises. Whether you are a physician in an urgent care, a nurse in a major hospital, a public health epidemiologist, or working in national policy, the importance of the GHSA and its work is apparent and a future without it will only serve to weaken US and global health security.”

CBRN Insurance Approaches
GMU biodefense MS alum Zamawang F Almemar is looking at a new actuarial approach to a CBRN insurance policy. A WMD attack against a major city would have devastating consequences but countries often struggle with the realities of costly prevention efforts. It’s important to truly analyze the threats of national security and develop countermeasure infrastructure accordingly. Drawing parallels to homeowners insurance, “investing national resources to prevent and recover from the effects of a nuclear attack is an appropriate choice for national policymakers, but what level of protection is warranted to guard against non-state actor developed and employed chemical or biological weapons, or against a radioactive attack.” The authors looked to factors that may help determine how much should be spent on WMD “insurance” and a method for evaluation. While calculating some factors, like societal fears, are challenging, there are things to consider, like economic cost of property cost damage and recovery costs, economic and societal costs of injuries, deaths, disruption, and changes to society, etc. “Factors affecting the cost of implementing a protection action include the difficulty of taking the action, the equipment needed, and the extent of the measure being taken”. Regarding policy recommendations, the authors focus on the imminent threat from terrorist organisations, noting that “it is now of utmost importance for the new administration to prioritize cWMD efforts within the national defense strategy and to ensure there is a balance in appropriations investing in these cWMD efforts.”

A Shadow Network of Science Experts
At first glance, this sounds like an elusive club of James Bond-esque scientists. In reality, the truth gives a startling look into the White House. In effort to combat several science gaps within the new administration, there are reports that an unofficial network of Obama loyalists is working to continue the Obama science agenda. “Participants have provided counsel to Democratic lawmakers and their staffs on Capitol Hill, and they have held group-wide strategy sessions much in the same fashion as they did when they worked out of a fourth-floor wing in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House.” “In interviews, members of the new Obama group — which numbers in the dozens — said they have remained more engaged than they expected to before Trump’s victory in November. Beyond fielding policy questions from congressional offices, they have consulted with scientific societies, and advised organizers of the March for Science, among other activists — a few have even made those organizations their new professional homes. They have also assisted in analyzing the impact of White House budget proposals — which have outlined deep cuts to federal research agencies — and the impact of policies including Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate accords.”

Using Vaccines to Fight Antimicrobial Resistance
While we’re working to find new antimicrobials, reducing antibiotic use, and stopping the spread of AMR, there may be another strategy – vaccines. Many are pointing to the prevention of disease via vaccines as a means of countering infections in the first place, which are frequently misdiagnosed and treated with unnecessary antibiotics. Consider pneumococcal conjugate or influenza vaccines. “A study published in the Lancet led by Ramanan Laxminarayan of the Center for Disease Dynamics, Economics, and Policy found that if every child under 5 years old in the 75 countries studied received pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, the resulting reduction of pneumonia would avert 11.4 million days of antibiotic use each year.” Vaccines can be an effective tool in reducing illness and these infections often lead to not only the missuse of antibiotics, but also hospitalizations that often result in exposure to resistant organisms. We know the benefits of vaccines against specific viral infections however, perhaps it’s time we start adding them to the arsenal against antibiotic resistance? Overcoming AMR will not be a result of a singular effort, but rather a mosaic of combined practices and changes as diverse as the reasons resistance occurred in the first place.

A Silent Anthrax Outbreak Within The Chimpanzee Population
Researchers in the Tai forest within the Ivory Coast are working to find out why chimpanzees are dying from anthrax. The anthrax strain, a new form of Bacillus cereus, known as Bcbva, has been responsible for 38% of local wildlife deaths in the forest. Anthrax in the rainforest environment is unique and this outbreak is challenging the ways we traditionally think about such infections. “In the savannah, anthrax almost always infects hoofed grazing mammals, which ingest soil laced with bacterial spores. Although it can spill over into humans, until 2001, there was no record of it afflicting wild primates. Now, we know that the Taï strain hits chimpanzees, as well as other unusual hosts like mongooses and porcupines. It even affects monkeys that spend all their time in the treetops, far away from contaminated soil. ‘We don’t know how they get infected,’ says researcher Fabian Leendertz. ‘How do the spores make it up in the trees?’” Fortunately, Bcbva isn’t active in other parts of Africa. Chimpanzees, like many great apes in this region are already fighting off disease like Ebola, so this new surge of an unsual disease is worrying researchers.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Hot Topics In Biodefense –  What would you consider the hottest topics? GMU’s Biodefense program has students just as diverse as the topics we face in global health security, which makes the classroom discussions pretty fantastic. One of our PhD students recently sat down and wrote about the biggest issues we face in biodefense and why this field is so crucial – check it out here.
  • Graphic Design – A New Public Health Tool?– A new exhibit at London’s Welcome Collection is drawing attention to the role of graphic design during outbreaks and epidemics. The designs range from ambulances, hospital interiors, posters, cigarette packaging, and street art. “Rebecca Wright, who has co-organised the show with graphic designer Lucienne Roberts, says that exhibits in a section about contagion are especially dramatic. An Italian ‘plague notice’ from 1681 ‘uses bold typography to give authority in time of panic,’ she says, adding that it is a beautiful object. Graphic design responding to the early spread of HIV/Aids is included, such the historic and controversial, ‘Don’t Die of Ignorance’ campaign launched by the British government in 1986. ‘It was the first time every household in the UK received a health leaflet, Wright says.”
  • China & the U.S. Battle for Biotech – Check out this latest article on FBI Supervisory Special Agent, biosecurity guru, and GMU summer workshop instructor, Ed You on the U.S.-China dispute over genetic data and its implications for biotechnology. FYI – You’ll need access to the Financial Times.