Tag: 21st Century Terrorism

Pandora Report 3.9.2018

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Nerve agent attacks, horsepox synthesis, and funding global health security, oh my! On top of all the biodefense news we’ve got in store for you this week, we’re also thoroughly excited to announce the 2018 summer workshop on pandemics, bioterrorism, and global health security.

Summer Workshop on Pandemics, Bioterrorism, and Global Health Security – From Anthrax to Zika
We’re delighted to release the dates for the summer workshop on all things global health security. The recent publication of the horsepox synthesis study, uncertain future of U.S. investment in global health security, and a severe flu season, are just a handful of the topics we’ll be addressing in this three-day workshop from July 18-20, 2018. Did I mention that it’s also the centennial of the 1918/1919 pandemic? We face unprecedented microbial challenges in this modern age – whether it be the risk of nefarious actors misusing genome editing, antimicrobial resistance, or the speed at which a disease can circumvent the globe. Our workshop is the perfect place to learn from experts in the field and meet with a diverse group of fellow biodefense gurus. If you register before May 1st or are a returning member or GMU alum, you can even get a discount! From anthrax to Zika, our July workshop is the place to be for all things health security.

 The Herculean Challenge of Assessing the De Novo Synthesis of Horsepox 
Nine-headed Hydra or cleaning out the Augean stables? None of these tasks were particularly easy, and neither is truly assessing the risks and benefits of the recent horsepox synthesis. Two of the latest articles analyzing the implications of this research have been released this week in mSphere.  In the editorial, Michael J. Imperiale points to the increased attention on DURC and the debate surrounding the benefits of a new vaccine versus the potential for a nefarious actor to misuse the process. “The two articles posted today come from Gregory Koblentz at George Mason University, who argues that this work was poorly justified on two fronts, scientifically and commercially, and from Diane DiEuliis and Gigi Gronvall from National Defense University and the Center for Health Security at Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, respectively, who discuss this study in the larger context of how the risks and benefits of dual use research are assessed and managed. (mSphere asked the leadership of Tonix to submit a manuscript, but we received no response.)” Koblentz first underlines the weak scientific foundation for the claim that the horespox synthesis aids in the development of a new smallpox MCM. He states that the “combination of questionable benefits and known risks of this dual use research raises serious questions about the wisdom of undertaking research that could be used to recreate variola virus.” Within his commentary, Koblentz addresses the scientific and commercial rationale for synthesizing the virus as well as the weak scientific basis for its use as a safer alternative for human vaccine use and the lack of demand for a new smallpox vaccine. “At the heart of the dual use research dilemma is the need to assess and balance the benefits and risks presented by an experiment or line of research. This is a difficult task given the largely theoretical risks posed by unknown adversaries in the future and the enticing yet uncertain benefits that the research may eventually yield. Indeed, measuring risks and benefits and weighing them can be a wicked problem that defies simple or straightforward conclusions. The difficulty of the task, however, does not excuse researchers, funders, or journal editors from trying to do so. While the benefits of biotechnology and life sciences research are beyond question, we should not take for granted the benefits of specific experiments or avenues of dual use research.” In their counterpoint article, Diane DiEuliis and Gigi Kwik Gronvall emphasize that the horsepox researchers went through due biosecurity diligence at their research institution, the importance of utilizing an analytical framework for assessing the risks and benefits of DURC, and discuss “relevant components of biosecurity policy and the biodefense enterprise (including the acquisition of medical countermeasures) in the United States.” DiEuliis and Kwik Gronvall point to the horespox synthesis (and the controversy) as an opportunity to evaluate how dual-use risks should be handled, the complicated approach to stockpiling MCM, and “the challenges of forecasting risks and benefits from a particular scientific discovery or technology”. They highlight the National Academies Imperiale report framework for evaluating the capacity for technology to be misused, which includes factors like weighing the use of the technology itself against consequence management, etc. They also note three issues that have been raised by the horespox paper that require additional consideration – “The decision of what to do with a technology or research area that is dual use cannot be black or white, MCMs cannot be a check-the-box procedure for the USG, The synthesis of and booting up of a pathogen should serve as strategic warning that current biosecurity controls and preparedness are insufficient.” DiEuliis and Kwik Gronvall note that “Now that the work has been published, the authors examined the research according to the Imperiale report framework, which aims to provide a systematic way to evaluate biosecurity risks. We again found that while dual use information would benefit highly experienced actors who are intent on misuse, the recreation of smallpox virus may require additional research and development steps than have been described in this publication: smallpox virus is less similar to horsepox virus than horsepox virus is to vaccinia virus, the tools to recreate horsepox virus were originally developed for vaccinia virus, and they might require additional troubleshooting for re-creation of smallpox virus.”

NTI Launches GHS Video: Act Now to Protect U.S. Investment in Global Health Security
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has launched a new video urging Congress to act now and ensure funding for global health security. Dr. Elizabeth Cameron, NTI VP, global biological policy and programs, is spear-heading the endeavor to turn the tides and ensure sustained funding for global biodefense. “Without sufficient funding of $208 million a year for the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and $172 million a year at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), we weaken the global network of protection, increase risk to American lives, and threaten investments from other governments and the private sector. Urge Congress to act now to provide sustained funding for global biodefense.” Cameron notes that “in response to the devastating Ebola crisis of 2014, the United States Congress authorized over $900 million in supplemental funding to support the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) for five years to help countries prepare for and address biological threats. This critical funding runs out at the end of fiscal year 2019, placing up to 80% of our global health security efforts abroad – offices, personnel, and programs – at risk. Also at risk?  U.S. health security and extended biodefenses. Without sufficient funding of $208.2 million a year for the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and $172.5 million a year at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), we weaken the global network of protection, increase risk to American lives, and threaten investments from other governments and the private sector.”

Ominous Biosecurity Trends Under Putin
If you ever needed a reminder of the importance of investing in global health security, this just might provide that cold dose of reality. The latest book from Raymond Zilinskas and Philippe Mauger, Biosecurity in Putin’s Russia, assesses Russia’s actions regarding DURC and biosecurity measures. “They investigate — solely through open sources — the current Russian position. They especially dig into issues such as ‘genetic weapons’ (bioweapons aimed at damaging DNA, potentially of specific individuals or groups) and biodefence research. Their underlying intention throughout seems to be to examine the likelihood that the Russian government is itself willing to engage in banned activities related to biowarfare agents. The book thus becomes a technical-scientific detective story.” This is an in-depth analysis by two top biological weapons specialists – definitely worth the read!

A Nerve Agent, An Ex-Russian Spy, And A Bench in the U.K. 
Speaking of Russia…..a former Russian spy was recently found alongside his daughter in critical condition on a bench in Salisbury. The former spy, Sergi Skripal, and his daughter, Yulia, were found slumped over on Sunday and in desperate need of medical attention. It is now being reported that they were poisoned by a nerve agent, which has raised the suspicion that this was an assassination attempt. “The development forces the British government to confront the possibility that once again, an attack on British soil was carried out by the government of President Vladimir V. Putin, which Western intelligence officials say has, with alarming frequency, ordered the killing of people who have crossed it. Prime Minister Theresa May and her cabinet ministers held a meeting on Wednesday of the government’s emergency security committee to discuss the matter. ‘This is being treated as a major incident involving attempted murder by administration of a nerve agent,’ said Mark Rowley, Britain’s chief police official for counterterrorism and international security.” Twenty-one people are also being treated for exposure to the nerve agent in connection to the attack.

Netflix Documentary – Rajneesh Salad Bar Bioterrorism
Get ready for some Netflix and nerdom on March 16th as the documentary on the largest bioterrorist attack in the United States is released. “In 1984, more than 700 people in The Dalles, OR, contracted Salmonella infections after followers of Rajneesh sprinkled the pathogen on salad bar ingredients in 10 local restaurants. The action was an effort to swing the results of an election.” Don’t miss out on the biosecurity twitter activity during a virtual viewing party – @pandorareport!

#NoImpunity: Will The Newest International Effort to Stop Chemical Attacks in Syria Succeed?
How can we stop the use of chemical weapons if there is no authority on attribution? GMU professor Gregory Koblentz is delving into the latest strategy to hold the Assad regime accountable for their continued use of chemical weapons. Between Russian vetoes that halt OPCW efforts and the death of the Joint Investigation Mechanism, many worry that the lack of punishment will encourage further CW use by the Assad regime. “To fill this gap in the global anti-chemical weapon architecture, France launched an international initiative in January to pressure the Assad regime to halt its use of chemical weapons. The Partnership Against Impunity, which uses the hashtag #NoImpunity on Twitter, is a group of 25 countries motivated by the twin goals of deterring future chemical attacks and bringing to justice the perpetrators of past attacks.” Sure, the sanctions by some of these countries are ultimately more symbolic than behavior-changing, but they are now infusing a dose of public shaming into the mix. “First, by curating a public database that lists all of the front companies and procurement agents used by the SSRC, the Partnership Against Impunity makes it easier for other countries and companies around the world to avoid doing business with Syria’s chemical weapons program. While sanctioning these shadowy companies and middlemen is like playing ‘whack-a-mole,’ it is an essential element of preventing Syria from rebuilding the capabilities that the OPCW destroyed after Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention.” The Partnership Against Impunity is also laying “the groundwork for future prosecutions of military officers and government officials who engaged in war crimes” and establishing a “concrete manifestation of the noble goal enshrined in the preamble of the Chemical Weapons Convention ‘to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons’.”

 Assessing CRISPR – The Dread And the Awe
Genome editing is a hot topic – both in terms of future possibilities, but also potential peril. GMU biodefense professor Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and doctoral student Saskia Popescu are teaming up to review two new books on this gene editing technology. First, A Crack in Creation by Jennifer Doudna, one of CRISPR’s creators, who discusses the revolutionary marvel with a mixture of hope and dread. “Doudna became aware of this paradox soon after publishing the seminal 2012 article that announced her discovery. She was surprised and delighted by the technology’s rapid spread and its use in a variety of fields, yet some applications—such as the use of Crispr to edit human embryos, as performed for the first time by Chinese scientists in 2015—made her uneasy about the future of the technology. Unscrupulous individuals’ interest in using Crispr for pure profit made her uneasy as well.” Next, Modern Prometheus by computational biologist and freelance writer, Jim Kozubek. “He ponders the power of genetic manipulation as a gateway to the dehumanization of medicine and the objectification of human beings. Kozubek draws comparisons with ‘Jurassic Park’ and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein to pose larger questions about genetic engineering—and also to point out that, though people are fascinated with technological advances, they often neglect to consider technologies’ implications, notably on people themselves.”

The U.S. and Global Health Security At A Time of Transition
The Kaiser Family Foundation will be hosting this free event on Monday, March 12th from 2-3:30pm EDT at the Kaiser Family Foundation Barbara Jordan Conference Center in Washington, D.C. This event will seek to explore the future of U.S. global health security efforts, what role the U.S. will play in the future of the GHSA, and more through a panel of experts. “Jen Kates, Vice President and Director of Global Health and HIV Policy, will provide opening remarks, and Anne Schuchat, Acting Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), will give a keynote address on U.S. global health security efforts. Josh Michaud, Associate Director of Global Health Policy at the Kaiser Family Foundation, will moderate a follow up discussion with Beth Cameron, Vice President for Global Biological Policy and Programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI); Rebecca Katz, Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Center for Global Health Science and Security at Georgetown University; Nancy Knight,Director of the Division of Global Health Protection at CDC; and J. Stephen Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director of the CSIS Global Health Policy Center.”

New Paradigms for Global Health: Building Capacity through Science and Technology Partnerships
The American Association for the Advancement of Science and Hitachi Ltd. will be hosting this event on March 21st from 11:30am-12:30pm at the AAS headquarters in New York City. “Why are science and technology partnerships — and science diplomacy — more critical to global health than ever before? Jimmy Kolker, former U.S. ambassador to Uganda and to Burkina Faso and the Obama Administration’s chief HHS health diplomat, offers a practitioner’s perspective on new ways of integrating and advancing global health science, security, and assistance. Public-private and technical partnerships can enable the best experts to build sustainable capacity in low- and middle-income countries, strengthening global health science, policy, systems, and delivery.”

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • The Troubling Truth About Medicine’s Supply Chain –  Maryn McKenna (author of Big Chicken and all around global health guru) is lifting back the curtain on the painful reality that is America’s hospital supply chains. While not something the public generally considers, it’s something we need to start fixing. “Missing IV bags and missing pharmaceuticals seem like unrelated problems, a temporary disruption layered on top of a longstanding problem. But in fact, they are unavailable for the same reason. The United States has allowed the manufacturing of most of its drugs and medical devices to drift offshore, at the end of long, thin supply chains.”

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 2.16.2018

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

 

 White House Budget Hits Public Health
The White House has released their new plan, “Efficient, Effective, Accountable: An American Budget”, which sees an increase in military spending, funds for a U.S.-Mexico border wall, and a 10%  increase in spending from 2017. “The plan also calls for major cuts to Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps and other social programs — reductions that conservatives have long sought. But even with these reductions, which add up to more than $3 trillion in cuts over 10 years, the proposal would not bring the budget into balance because of the lost tax revenue and higher spending on other programs.” The 2019 budget proposal also includes $9.2 billion added after Congress lifted mandatory spending caps. “But the 2019 budget might not be as steady as it seems, because the White House is calling for the creation of three new institutes within the NIH. They include a National Institute for Research on Safety and Quality, which would replace the $324-million Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Trump plan would also transfer the National Institute of Disability, Independent Living, and Rehabilitation Research from the HHS’s Administration for Community Living, and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to the NIH from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).” The plan also includes a cap for how much salary a scientist can draw from an NIH grant (90%), gives NIH an additional $750 million for research towards the opioid crisis ($400 million of which must “be spent on public-private partnerships to develop new treatments”). Unfortunately, this proposed budget significantly weakens public health preparedness and response plans with a 43% reduction in the CDC’s Public Health Preparedness and Response Program. Furthermore, it includes hitting the CDC hard with a 12% reduction and plans to move the strategic national stockpile (SNS) to ASPR. Such plans severely impact global health security as funding for the GHSA is expected to drop. You can read a further overview on the health security outlook by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security here. There has also been increasing concern regarding the lack of a nominee for the head of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, especially since the de facto advisor is a 31-year-old political science major from Princeton. 

GMU Schar School MS Open House
Don’t miss out on our information session next week. This is a great chance to chat with faculty about the GMU Biodefense MS program (both online and in person). “The session will provide an overview of our master’s degree programs, an introduction to our world-class faculty and research, and highlights of the many ways we position our students for success in the classroom and beyond. Our admissions and student services staff will be on hand to answer your questions.” FYI – GMU biodefense students are making headlines for their dedication and passion for health security, come join the nerdom!

Next Generation Global Health Security Mentorship Program
Interested in becoming a mentor  or protege in health security? The NextGen Global Health Security Mentorship Program is a great way to build partnerships and collaborations for those passionate about health security. “The NextGen Global Health Security (NGGHS) Mentorship Program is an annual program aimed at connecting early to mid-career professional and students interested in global health security with experts in the field to enhance professional development. Mentors and Protégés are free to establish a program that suits them best. Meetings can be based on current events, suggested topics and/or other common areas of interest. The pair will maintain correspondence either in person, over the phone or by email, as often as they have decided feasible.” If you’re a GMU biodefense alum, also make sure to update your information in Stay Connected so you’ll get the latest in biodefense program news and opportunities!

The Anniversary of Kim Jong Nam’s VX Assassination
February 13th marked the one-year anniversary of the assassination of Kim Jong Un’s half brother at the Kuala Lumpur airport. Kim Jong Nam was attacked by two women who smeared VX nerve agent on his face. “The women claim they were tricked into believing they were part of a reality show, but the U.S. and South Korea say the murder was orchestrated by Pyongyang. The brazen killing came as North Korea was starting to accelerate its missile tests and countries around the world came under mounting pressure to enforce ever-tightening U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang.” In the wake of the attack, Malaysia is working to distance itself from its previously close relationship with Pyongyang. The murder trial, which started in October of 2017, is set to end in March of this year, with the two women maintaining their innocence. 

Biosafety Failures in UK Lab
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) released findings from their investigations into more than 40 “mishaps” at specialist labs from 2015-2017. The labs were run by hospitals, private companies, and Public Health England (PHE), which reveals an unfortunate trend across many sectors. “One scientist at a PHE laboratory became sick after contracting Shigella, a highly contagious bacterial infection that causes most cases of dysentery in Britain. The incident led the HSE to send the agency an enforcement letter to improve its health and safety practices.” Incidents range from failure to communicate safety requirements for mailing samples to airflow failures and lab workers acquiring illnesses from lab safety mishaps.

Antimicrobial Resistance: Forging A New Strategy Against An Old Threat
GMU Biodefense students love all things health security and that includes antimicrobial resistance. PhD student Saskia Popescu is tackling the woefully insufficient response we’ve had over the years to this growing threat. Pointing to current challenges, initiatives, and research strategies, Popescu discusses current trends and hopeful plans to combat AMR. “What is to be done? There are several initiatives, like the Combating Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (CARB-X), that seek to infuse life into the research and development of new drugs. There is also a push on health care providers and agriculture to reduce the use of antimicrobials. But these are all long-term solutions that may take years or decades to implement. Although long-term plans are critical, if you were hospitalized today with a highly resistant infection, what would be the short-term plan of action your heath care providers would take?”

ABSA Risk Group Database App
Check out the latest Risk Group Database resource (and app!) from the Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity (ABSA) International. “In many countries, including the United States, infectious agents are categorized in risk groups based on their relative risk. Depending on the country and/or organization, this classification system might take the following factors into consideration: pathogenicity of the organism, mode of transmission and host range, availability of effective preventive measures (e.g., vaccines), availability of effective treatment (e.g., antibiotics), and other factors.”

Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense Receives Grant to Advance Leadership and Reduce Catastrophic Risk
“The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense announced today a $2.5 million grant from the Open Philanthropy Project. The grant allows the Panel to continue its leadership role in assessing our nation’s biodefense, issuing recommendations and advocating for their implementation, and identifying viable avenues for needed change to policy. The grant comes amidst heightened global tensions as North Korea and other regimes seek to develop biological weapons. It also arrives on the 100th anniversary of a catastrophic influenza pandemic that took the lives of millions around the world, a stark reminder of the dangers of biological events.”

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • DHS Announces Finalists in $300k Biothreat Prize Competition –  “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), in collaboration with the Office of Health Affairs National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), today announced five finalists for Stage 1 of the Hidden Signals Challenge. The challenge calls for the design of an early warning system that uses existing data to uncover emerging biothreats. The announcement was made at the American Society for Microbiology’s 2018 ASM Biothreats meeting.”
  • Seoul Virus Transmission – Have a pet rat at home? Make sure to practice safe rodent handling and hand hygiene as physicians are seeing cases of rodent-to-human transmission of Seoul virus. “After confirming Seoul virus infection in the Wisconsin patients, the CDC and the Wisconsin Department of Health Services investigated the source of the disease. ‘The outbreak spread from sales or trade of infected pet rats between people’s homes or between ratteries’ – places where rats are bred – ‘in 11 states,’ said Kerins, who coauthored the report.”

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 12.15.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Welcome back to your weekly dose of all things biodefense! We’ve got a packed newsletter for you, so buckle up. Curious about CRISPR and how it works? Check out the best and worst analogies here.

Read Out On The GHSA Ministerial Meeting in Kampala
If you missed our Read-Out on the GHSA meeting in Kampala, we’ve got a great overview with attachments. The NextGen Global Health Security Network Reflections can be found here and Coordinator Jamechia Hoyle was kind enough to provide her powerpoint from the Read-Out, which you can access here. The Read-Out involved presentations and discussions from not only NextGen GHSA Coordinator Hoyle, but also Jennifer Nuzzo from the Center from Health Security, and two GMU Biodefense MS students – Anthony Falzarano and Stephen Taylor. In fact, Anthony and Stephen provided several great photos from the Kampala summit, which you can see here. “While they discussed that the dialogue was driven by high level members of government. The overall consensus was the need to bring in non-governmental and academic voices. The panel members emphasized this by showcasing the work with Next Generation Global Health Security Leaders and the continued efforts to bring young professionals and students into these working groups. From the discussion, it is evident that GHSA’s efforts are being felt in many nations. The Response Center in Uganda, while small, had the hallmarks of the CDC and other organizational support.” Dr. Nuzzo brought her talk to a close with a poignant quote from the summit – “it is much cheaper to spend on preparedness than it is to spend on response.” Attendee and biodefense MS student Janet Marroquin noted that “the containment of the Marburg virus in Uganda during the conference perfectly illustrated the benefits of improved health security measures, but it is easy to overlook this success when good health is expected as a guarantee. In addition to bringing attention to current deficiencies in global health security, the GHSA is needed to look to the future and anticipate and prevent roadblocks in implementation.”

Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties – Recap
Last week, GMU biodefense PhD student Saskia Popescu attended the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties (MSP) with the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security ELBI program. This MSP started on somewhat of a bated breath as last year’s Review Conference was, as described by many, an epic failure. Having endorsed the Joint NGO Statement, Popescu noted that “the role of the NGOs felt even more important in such a disjointed climate where the future of the BWC was in many ways, up in the air. The importance of support and pushing for future cohesion regarding not only the intersessional process (ISP), but also S&T developments, was a significant point within the NGO statement.” As you can find in many of the live-tweeting that was occurring (#MSP2017), the MSP started off with a bang as Iran noted that they were not convinced further ISP work would be productive and if the BWC isn’t legally binding, it can’t truly be universal. Chairman Gill started the MSP with a quote from Rumi and worked tirelessly to maintain focus and forward momentum. Thankfully, despite several days of closed-door discussion, consensus was reached and the ISP was established to include 4 days of meetings of the MSP and 5 meetings of experts, which would focus on cooperation and assistance, development S&T, strengthening national implementation, assistance for preparedness and response, and the institutional strength of the BWC.  You can also find detailed overviews of each day here. A few of Popescu’s favorite moments from attending: “Sweden’s inclusion of antimicrobial resistance in their opening statement, Australia’s comments on the need for a more diverse attendance in the future and the growing presence of women within the BWC. It was also surprising how shockingly low the states costs for BWC inclusion are…and how some are delinquent by a few hundred dollars. Lastly and perhaps the most important part of the trip was getting to attend a pivotal event in biodefense history with such an amazing group of people who were all as excited and enthusiastic as I was. As we took a break to visit the WHO and peered upon the famous smallpox statue, I think it all hit us how vital this work is on a global level.”

Jurassic Ticks?
Paleontologists have recently announced the finding of a 99-million-year-old tick that not only was holding on for dear life within the feathers of a dinosaur, but provides evidence that these blood-suckers fed on dinosaurs. While this tick came from the Cretaceous period, it feels eerily similar to how Jurassic Park began. “This study provides the most compelling evidence to date for ticks feeding on feathered animals in the Cretaceous,” said Ryan C. McKellar, a paleontologist at the Royal Saskatchewan Museum in Canada who was not involved in the study. “It demonstrates just how much detail can be obtained from a few pieces of amber in the hands of the right researchers.” Imagine the kind of dino-arboviruses we might come across with this finding! It’s hard not to chuckle at the timing of the announcement since the latest Jurassic World movie trailer was released just last week.

Podcast “Syria(s) Problem: Chemical Weapons & International Norms from Power Problems“
Don’t miss this episode of the bi-weekly podcast Power Problems from the Cato Institute hosted by Emma Ashford and GMU biodefense professor Trevor Thrall. In this episode on the use of chemical weapons in Syria, GMU biodefense professor and graduate program director Gregory Koblentz discusses how the use of such weapons calls into question the utility of international norms. Some of the show notes also include the discussion of taboos against chemical weapons, and antibiotic resistance as a biological threat.

Is North Korea’s Bioweapons Threat Growing With Increasing Biotech Expertise?
Are the technical hurdles to biological weapons eroding in North Korea? Advances in the life sciences have brought forth a wealth of new capabilities, like manipulating DNA, but are we also lowering the bar for bioweapons development? There’s been increasing talk regarding the potential for North Korea to develop and deploy biological weapons. While there certainly has been a lowering of technical hurdles in some aspects of bioweapons development, has North Korea truly developed a functioning program? “The gains have alarmed U.S. analysts, who say North Korea — which has doggedly pursued weapons of mass destruction of every other variety — could quickly surge into industrial-scale production of biological pathogens if it chooses to do so. Such a move could give the regime yet another fearsome weapon with which to threaten neighbors or U.S. troops in a future conflict, officials and analysts say. Current and former U.S. officials with access to classified files say they have seen no hard evidence so far that Kim has ordered production of actual weapons, beyond samples and prototypes. And they can only speculate about the reasons.” Many note that their possession of biological agents is known but that the unknown is just how far along a bioweapons program might be. The development of a high-functioning and successful bioweapons program requires significant funding, human resources, and tacit knowledge. Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley recently broke down just how realistic these concerns are (hint: she’s a GMU biodefense professor and guru on tacit knowledge). In response to this week’s increased attention on a potential program in North Korea, Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley was also interviewed regarding the cost of a biological weapons program and just how much it would take to truly develop and maintain one. “The cost of maintaining an active biological weapons program is high, according to Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, associate professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. She said the Soviet Union spent ‘several billion dollars’ on its program, while terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo spent about $10 million, though the latter ‘failed at every step.’ The United States spent about $700 million on its program, which was active over the course of roughly 27 years. ‘The challenge is in acquiring the expertise to handle and manipulate living organisms that are fragile and unpredictable: that requires time and a work organization that ensure continuity and stability of work,’ Ben Ouagrham-Gormley said. ‘These are conditions that are difficult to maintain in a covert program. That’s why most covert bioweapons programs have failed thus far’.”

Global Health Security and the US Export Economy
It’s easy for many to think that outbreaks only impacts public health, but the truth is that the effects of health security threats are felt across many sectors and industries. The export economy is not immune to disruption should there be a public health emergency. A recent study reviewed economic vulnerability to the US export economy that would be impacted by disruptions in 49 countries. These 49 countries are currently being targeted by the CDC and partners to improve capabilities to prevent/respond to public health infectious disease threats throughout laboratories, workforce, surveillance, and response systems. Enhancing global health security by strengthening the country capacity is the goal for these 49 countries. “US exports to the 49 countries exceeded $308 billion and supported more than 1.6 million jobs across all US states in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, oil and gas, services, and other sectors. These exports represented 13.7% of all US export revenue worldwide and 14.3% of all US jobs supported by all US exports. The economic linkages between the United States and these global health security priority countries illustrate the importance of ensuring that countries have the public health capacities needed to control outbreaks at their source before they become pandemics.” The numbers are startling, especially if you consider that the 2002-2003 SARS epidemic was estimated to have a global economic impact of almost $40 billion USD. The total value of US material goods/services exported to all countries was estimated to be $2.3 trillion in 2015. The findings of this study point to the significant economic disruption that would occur if a health security event occurred in one of these 49 countries. Global health security is truly an investment that provides a return, as we know that an outbreak anywhere is an outbreak everywhere.

Cyberbiosecurity: DNA Has Gone Digital – What Could Possibly Go Wrong?
As biotechnology and biology go full-steam ahead, there is increasing use of technology and informatics databases to support such innovation. Where does that leave us in terms of cybersecurity? Coined as “cyberbiosecurity”, many in the field, like Colorado State University’s Jean Peccoud, are drawing attention to the risk this new frontier has for researchers, industry, and the government. Peccoud and his colleagues point to the potential for accidental or intentional breaches, noting that “In the past, most biosecurity and biosafety policies were based on sample containment,” Peccoud says. “Now, it’s so easy to read DNA sequences, for example, or to make DNA molecules out of sequences publicly available from bioinformatics databases. Most projects have a cyber dimension, and that introduces a new category of risk.” Traditional biosecurity efforts focus on containment of the organism from accidental or nefarious use, but that doesn’t really focus on the computational aspect of new biotech, like synthetic biology. “The authors recommend employee training, systematic analyses to examine potential exposure to cyberbiosecurity risks, and the development of new policies for preventing and detecting security incidents. ‘Once individuals in a community are aware of cyberbiosecurity risks, they can begin to implement safeguards within their own work environments, and work with regulators to develop policies to prevent cyberbiosecurity breaches,’ they write.” Peccoud also pointed to the potential for computer viruses to impact the physical world. Citing the 2010 computer virus that caused equipment failure at an Iranian nuclear plant, such malware could result in biological outcomes that could be dangerous. It doesn’t take much of a venture down the rabbit hole to think about the automated processes that are used in laboratories, especially high-containment labs, and how they could be damaging if commandeered for nefarious purposes. So what can be done? The first step is truly recognizing the threat – “The threats are bidirectional. And not all cyberbiosecurity threats are premeditated or criminal. Unintentional errors that occur while translating between a physical DNA molecule and its digital reference are common. These errors might not compromise national security, but they could cause costly delays or product recalls.” Synthetic biology and biotech have taken us to places we would’ve never dreamed of, but it’s critical that the ability to manipulate DNA be protected through proper measures and we protect the digital components as well. The growing attention to cyberbiosecurity also comes at a time when the FDA has issued a warning on DIY gene therapy, noting that “the sale of these products is against the law. FDA is concnered about the safety risks involved.” “Last month, Josiah Zayner, CEO of The Odin, which sells DIY biology kits and supplies through its website, posted a video in which he injected himself with the gene-editing tool CRISPR during a biohacker conference in California. That video has been viewed more than 58,000 times on YouTube. In its statement, which FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb tweeted on November 21, the same day it was posted to the agency’s website, the regulator took aim directly at companies selling CRISPR supplies intended for self-administration.”

Biodosimetry: A Future Tool for Medical Management of Radiological Emergencies                                                                                                                          How can we better manage patients in radiological emergencies? GMU biodefense PhD student Mary Sproull and professor/graduate program director Gregory Koblentz are looking at biodosimetry as a medical management tool for this very predicament. “The field of radiation biodosimetry has advanced far beyond its original objectives to identify new methodologies to quantitate unknown levels of radiation exposure that may be applied in a mass screening setting. New research in the areas of genomics, proteomics, metabolomics, transcriptomics, and electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) applications have identified novel biological indicators of radiation injury from a diverse array of biological sample materials, and studies continue to develop more advanced models of radiation exposure and injury. In this article, we identify the urgent need for new biodosimetry assessment technologies, describe how biodosimetry diagnostics work in the context of a broad range of radiation exposure types and scenarios, review the current state of the science, and assess how well integrated biodosimetry resources are in the national radiological emergency response framework.”

Fellowship in Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft
The International Security Program of Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies in the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences are launching a collaborative program to mentor the next generation of foreign policy scholars. The Project on Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft is made possible with support from the Charles Koch Foundation: a $1,846,200 grant to MIT and one for $1,853,900 to Harvard Kennedy School (HKS). Those interested in this fellowship should apply to the International Security Program Fellowship when the Belfer Center’s online application system becomes available on December 15, 2017.  Those desiring to apply before then may apply through MIT’s application system. For more information, click here.

National Academies Publication – Combating Antibiotic Resistance
The National Academies has released their latest report on a one health approach to the global threat that is antimicrobial resistance. “As of 2017, the emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance continues unabated around the world, leaving devastating health and economic outcomes in its wake. Those consequences will multiply if collaborative global action is not taken to address the spread of resistance. Major drivers of antimicrobial resistance in humans have been accelerated by inappropriate antimicrobial prescribing in health care practices; the inappropriate use of antimicrobials in livestock; and the promulgation of antibiotic resistance genes in the environment.” The report focuses on the global momentum to counter AMR, microbial movements across the one health domain, utilization of social and behavioral sciences to combat AMR, R&D, and strengthening partnerships and international cooperation. AMR is a multi-sectoral, international problem that requires a One Health approach to combat it – reports like these are a critical step towards combatting AMR

Boston University’s Needle Gets the Greenlight
After years of controversy and $200 million in federal funds spent on a BSL 4 high-containment lab, the Boston University Lab “The Needle” is finally opening. Located in the heart of the city, local citizens raised substantial opposition over biosafety concerns for the neighboring areas. It’s taken nearly a decade to get to this point, but the Boston Public Health Commission gave the official greenlight for the lab to open. “The commission’s OK was the final step allowing the study of Biosafety Level 4 pathogens — those that have no treatment or vaccine, such as Ebola. Level 4 research could begin in a month or two at the facility, called the National Emerging Infectious Disease Laboratories. Facing fierce opposition from neighbors and others concerned that dangerous germs would escape, the biolab underwent more than a dozen years of risk assessments, public hearings, and failed lawsuits. It received more than 50 permits and approvals from federal, state, and city agencies, most recently passing muster a year ago with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.”

Doreen and Jim McElvany Nonproliferation Challenge
To advance this goal, the Doreen and Jim McElvany Nonproliferation Challenge will recognize the most outstanding new ideas and policy proposals published in Volume 25 (2018) of the Nonproliferation Review. The Challenge will award a grand prize of $5,000, a $3,000 runner’s-up prize, and a $1,000 honorable mention prize. The deadline to submit is 11:59 pm/EST, July 6, 2018. However, due to the limited number of pages that we can publish in a single volume, eligible articles will be accepted for publication on a rolling basis. We therefore encourage interested authors to submit early. Decisions on the winners of the scholarly award will be announced in early 2019

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Most Americans Think A Zombie Pandemic Is Likely – We recently stumbled across this survey and were surprised to find that while a surprisingly high number of Americans think a zombie plague is going to happen, few are prepared for it. “Only 9% of respondents considered it likely that undead zombies might ever walk the earth. Nearly three times that many respondents (28%) consider it likely that a worldwide epidemic of a neurological disease that makes people more aggressive and likely to lose control of their thoughts and motor functions.”

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 10.6.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Welcome to your favorite weekly dose of biodefense news!

George Mason University Global Health Security Ambassador Fellowship
We’re excited to announce the selection of two GMU Biodefense students, Anthony Falzarano and Stephen Taylor, as recipients of the George Mason Global Health Security Ambassador Fellowship. As GMU Global Health Security Ambassadors, they will be attending the 4th Annual GHSA Ministerial Meeting in Kampala, Uganda as part of the Next Generation Global Health Security Network delegation. The Next Generation Network engages and facilitates contributions by emerging scholars, scientists, and professionals from government and non-governmental institutions to the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) and other global health security projects. The NextGen Network is led by Jamechia Hoyle, who is not only an infectious disease guru, but also an adjunct professor at GMU, teaching Global Health Security Policy. The GHSA meeting, which will take place from October 25-27, is the world’s premier meeting on global health security and will be attended by senior representatives of the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Finance, and Security from more than 50 GHSA member states as well as implementing partners from civil society and the private sector. The theme of this year’s meeting is Health Security for All: Engaging Communities, Non-Government Actors, and the Private Sector.                                                                                                                                                       Thanks to the generous support of the Schar School, our Biodefense graduate students will be able to provide you with detailed accounts of the meeting from the front row. Following the GHSA meeting, we will be publishing their experiences and thoughts on the summit, so you’ll want to stay tuned. Anthony is a microbiologist and environmental engineer, who focuses his research on antimicrobial resistance, food and agriculture microbiology, and microbial enhanced oil recovery. Anthony also worked with Ohio State University’s Medical Center to study biofilms as a public health burden. Stephen is a biologist and Peace Corp-alum where he served in Mozambique  teaching biology, information technology, and English. Since 2015, he has worked for the U.S. Department of Agriculture at the Animal Parasitic Diseases Laboratory in Beltsville, Maryland.

Blue Ribbon Study Panel: U.S. Not Prepared to Identify Perpetrators of Biological Crimes, Terrorism, Proliferation, and Warfare
The Blue Ribbon Study Panel just released information on their recent special meeting, Biological Attribution: Challenges and Solutions, which sought to better understand the ability of the U.S. government to accurately identify pathogens and their sources, “attribute the use of biological weapons with scientific and other forms of evidence; and explore the processes used for investigative, legal, policy, and political decisions involving biological attribution.” “Effective prosecution depends on the ability to quickly and accurately attribute crimes to their perpetrators,” said Ken Wainstein, meeting chair, and former Homeland Security Advisor and United States Attorney. “In the aftermath of a biological attack, we need to find out who did it, how they did it, what disease agent they used, and where they obtained it. The biological threat is real and growing, and the Nation needs this attribution capability now.” Adds former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, whose office received some of the anthrax letters in 2001, “We face some major challenges in microbial forensics and biological attribution, but we can overcome many of them. We need to do what we can to eliminate them now, before we find ourselves under attack again. We can’t afford to have another investigation drag on for years.” The Panel also addressed the impact of the President’s FY2018 budget request on biodefense efforts and how it could eliminate critical health security functions.

Fostering an International Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Responsible Conduct in the Life Sciences
GMU biodefense MS alum Kathleen Danskin and PhD student Elise Rowe are tackling the importance of biosecurity, biosafety, and responsible conduct in life sciences. Citing the lack of an internationally agreed upon definition and approach to disseminating lessons, they highlight “how these concepts are covered by relevant international treaties, international organizations, and professional organizations. While there are some efforts under way, opportunities exist to evaluate and strengthen the culture of biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible conduct in the life sciences in order to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, and diversion of biological agents, related materials, technology, or equipment, and the unintentional or intentional exposure to (or release of) biological agents.” Responding to this gap, Danskin and Rowe propose three changes: partnership between international regimes, organizations, and professional organizations to share and enhance best efforts, use of the nuclear safety and security culture as a model for creating organizational culture within life sciences, and that the international community should amplify efforts to recognize “champions of change” at the state level. “Challenges remain on how best to address the issue of operationalizing the concept of a culture of biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible conduct in order to address goals such as: (1) reducing the occurrence of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs), incidents, and near misses, (2) ensuring that biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible conduct receive adequate attention, (3) ensuring that organizational members share the same beliefs and attitudes about risks, LAIs, and near misses, (4) increasing commitments to biosafety and biosecurity, and (5) assessing the breadth and strength of a biosafety and biosecurity program.”

Reasonable Doubts: Foreseeing Failures in WMD Security
GMU biodefense MS alum Greg Mercer is evaluating the historical failures in WMD security and what we can take away from such terrifying events. Pulling on examples from the live anthrax spores being mailed due to poor DoD lab practices to antinuclear protesters managing to get into the Oak Ridge nuclear facility, Mercer addresses serious system failures and a “culture of complacency”. Unfortunately, since the creation of nuclear weapons, there has been a colorful history of accidents and close calls. Mercer cites such examples to point out that while not spectacularly dramatic (I’m thinking of something like the film, The Rock), they nonetheless highlight significant vulnerabilities. “As a class, these organizational problems are not unique to the management of WMD. Insights into their nature, and into the sorts of practices that could help to anticipate and remedy them, may also be found further afield. Especially within the broader study of national security, a new literature has begun to emerge proposing either a new framing of the issues, or identifying tools and ideas that might be employed to guard against recurring ‘complacency’.” Mercer points to analyses, like those from Janne E. Nola, which suggest grass-roots changes that aim at fixing things at the organization level. What is to be done though? Some suggest the use of red teaming, while others point to forecasting and prediction, as a means to identifying risks and vulnerabilities. “History shows that warning signs are often ignored until disaster strikes, and that disaster is the engine of change. In the United States, the public demands change. If better institutional checks are to be placed on American nuclear and biological security, it will take a public outcry like the one that follows a disaster. The public will have to demand that the country’s nuclear- and biological-defense enterprises stop stepping out to the brink, and instead avert the disasters foreshadowed by the many uncomfortable compromises and accidents we have seen.”

Madagascar Battles Plague
The death toll has risen to twenty as government officials are banning public gatherings in the country’s capital. While plague is endemic to the country and causes roughly 400 cases a year, this spike in cases and the swift spread is concerning the WHO after already 114 cases have been reported since August. “More than half of recorded cases – 73 out of 133 – are pneumonic plague, the most virulent form, which is passed through person-to-person transmission. If it is not treated, pneumonic plague can be fatal within 24 hours. The epidemic also involves bubonic plague, which is spread by rats and kills about 50% of people it infects.” The WHO has released $300,000 in emergency funds and is asking for $1.5 to support outbreak response as the disease has quickly spread to several cities and outbreak season (September-April) is just beginning. You can read the latest WHO report on the outbreak here.

HBO VICE’s Contagion Episode
Check out the latest VICE episode regarding two interesting topics – Russian hacking and contagions. “The outbreak of an infectious disease sparks worldwide panic nearly every year. And as humans cluster themselves in denser cities and encroach closer to the wildlife harboring disease, the chances of a devastating global pandemic only intensifies. But scientists are finding that diligent surveillance of these threats could help keep the next nightmare disease at bay. VICE founder Suroosh Alvi went to Uganda to see how vulnerable humans are to a new pandemic and the options there are for staving it off.”

Bavarian Nordic Wins Up-to-$539M BARDA Contract for Smallpox Vaccine BARDA has contracted with Bavarian Nordic to ensure the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile has smallpox vaccine in the form of freeze-drived Imvamune. “The contract consists of an initial $100 million base award toward manufacturing and storage of Imvamune vaccine bulk—the third bulk contract inked between the company and BARDA. The two earlier bulk contracts total a combined $233 million. In addition, the contract includes two initial options: Up to $299 million toward the filling and freeze-drying of Imvamune produced under the three bulk awards and up to $140 million toward clinical development, regulatory commitments, and portions of the establishment and validation of fill/finish activities.” This new contract will cover roughly 13 million doses at $48 per dose.

The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU                                                                                                                                             James Revill addresses growing concern over the potential for non-state groups to utilize chemical or biological terrorism within the European Union. Pulling on historical events involving CBW use by non-state actors, he addresses the current and future risks. “To achieve this, the article analyses six interlinked clusters of factors that can be seen as important in assessing the risk of whether or not to adopt such weapons. These are: the perceived relative advantage of CBW and their utilities; the complexity of such weapons; their ideological compatibility; the role of organisational structures; the visibility and ‘fashionability’ of such weapons; and the wider environmental context.” Overall, Revill finds that while there is potential for sophisticated CBWs to do great harm, they are unlikely, and the use of a “scruffy low-level chemical weapon” is much more realistic.

ABSA International 60th Annual Biological Safety Conference
October is national Biosafety Month, so don’t miss out on this conference held by the Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity on October 13-18th in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The conference will include special meetings like public health interest groups, next generation/new biosafety professionals shared interest group meetings, and great networking opportunities for biosafety and biosecurity professionals!

How the 1918 Flu Pandemic Revolutionized Public Health
As the centennial of the 1918/1919 pandemic approaches, it encourages us to really look at what has changed and what we’ve learned from such a global catastrophe. Public health itself has evolved – no longer restricted by the antiquated policies that were marked with eugenics and social stigma. At the time, influenza was not a reportable disease either, which meant that public health surveillance was shotty at best and quarantine efforts were usually too little, too late. “The lesson that health authorities took away from the catastrophe was that it was no longer reasonable to blame an individual for catching an infectious disease, nor to treat him or her in isolation. The 1920s saw many governments embracing the concept of socialized medicine—healthcare for all, delivered free at the point of delivery.” Now, disease surveillance and epidemiology are a cornerstone of public health, not to mention the development of the WHO in 1946. The 1918 flu pandemic forced us to change our approach to public health, but also taught a vital lesson – infectious disease was a global problem and not isolated to a single country, region, or group of people.

Biosafety Governance
The Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) just released their report on ensuring institutional compliance with biosafety, biocontainment, and laboratory biosecurity regulations and guidelines. FESAP recommendations are crucial, as they are supposed to be followed within research facilities that perform work with human, plant, and/or animal infectious agents and toxins. “The United States has a comprehensive biosafety, biocontainment, and biosecurity oversight system designed to protect laboratory workers, public health, agriculture, the environment, and national security. Biosafety and biocontainment oversight rests on a foundation of federal regulations, guidelines, and policies and is provided at multiple levels. Oversight of day to day research activities is largely a responsibility of the institutions and the investigators conducting the research with direct biosafety oversight being implemented at the local level.” In efforts to ensure compliance and build a culture of responsibility, FESAP has released guidance that aims to ensure biosafety, biosecurity, and biocontainment, while encouraging research. Some of the regulations and guidelines include: “conduct regular assessments of committees, offices, and departments with responsibilities for biosafety and biosecurity oversight to assess their function and strengthen their performance when necessary” and “promote transparency regarding institutional biosafety and biosecurity oversight.” The report also includes federal regulations and guidelines regarding research conduct, environmental regulations, dual-use research of concern oversight at the institutional level, etc.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • BioShield Adds Ebola Vaccine To SNS & BARDA Industry Day – Project Bioshield, responsible for acquiring MCM against CBRN agents, is now adding two Ebola treatments and two vaccines to the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The new additions include “a single-dose vaccine licensed by Merck, a prime-boost vaccine regimen from Johnson & Johnson, and monoclonal antibody treatments from Mapp Biopharmaceutical and Regeneron Pharmaceuticals.” If you’re looking to get more information on MCM, you can also attend the 2017 BARDA Industry Day on November 7-8, at the Ronal Reagan Building. Presented by ASPR (Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response), the conference will give individuals the opportunity to learn about the past, present, and future of BARDA, MCM development opportunities, experiences partnering with BARDA, and more. Robert Kadlec, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, will be the keynote speaker for the event.
  • Bioweapons and Virtual Terrorism – Considering the threat of biological weapons and virtual terrorism? It was recently estimated that the cost of a bioweapon is 0.05% the cost of a convention weapon that would produce the same casualties per square kilometer. What are your thoughts on the author’s notion that biological weapons are “comparatively easy, using common technology available for the production of some antibiotics, vaccines, foods, and beverages, and delivery systems such as spray devices from an airplane, boat, or car are commonly available”?
  • History and Future of the Global HIV/AIDS Response: A Conversation with Dr. Michael Merson and Dr. Stephen Inrig– The Center for Strategic and International studies will be hosting this event on Monday, October 16th from 10-11:30am. Drs. Merson and Inrig will discuss the origins and evolution of the global HIV/AIDS response, as well as critical current and future issues affecting the fight against the disease worldwide, which were recently highlighted in papers issued by the CSIS HIV Working Group.  “This ambitious book provides a comprehensive history of the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Programme on AIDS (GPA), using it as a unique lens to trace the global response to the AIDS pandemic. The authors describe how WHO came initially to assume leadership of the global response, relate the strategies and approaches WHO employed over the years, and expound on the factors that led to the Programme’s demise and subsequent formation of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). The authors examine the global impact of this momentous transition, portray the current status of the global response to AIDS, and explore the precarious situation that WHO finds itself in today as a lead United Nations agency in global health. The global response – the strategies adopted, the roads taken and not taken, and the lessons learned – can provide helpful guidance to the global health community as it continues tackling the AIDS pandemic and confronts future global pandemics.” The event will be webcast live from the event page. Please register by clicking the “Register” button above and contact Sara Allinder, sallinder@csis.org, with questions.
  • MoBE 2017 Symposium to highlight research on the Microbiology of the Built Environment – October 10-12th, in Washington, D.C.  The event will highlight recent research on the Microbiome of the Built Environment and explore ways to bridge the gaps between research and applications. More specifically, The MoBE 2017 Symposium will bring together leading researchers and stakeholders to discuss MoBE findings pertinent to human health, safe drinking water, healthy built environments and urban design. Ed Yong of The Atlantic, Susan Lynch of the University of California at San Francisco and Marc Edwards of Virginia Tech will provide keynote addresses.

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 9.29.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

 Homeland Security Struggles to Fund ChemBio Defense & The Invisible Threat Looming budget cuts within DHS are doing little to qualm concern that state and local infrastructure is simply unprepared to handle a biological or chemical attack. “In terms of bsecurity, ‘we are much better prepared than we were’ post-9/11, said Tom Inglesby, director of the Center for Health Security at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland. ‘But we are not where we need to be, and the progress is, in some cases, somewhat fragile’.” Internationally, the use of chemical weapons in Syria and growing tensions with North Korea are continual reminders that preparedness is vital. “The department’s science and technology directorate took a 28 percent budget cut when the omnibus bill for fiscal year 2017 was signed in May, and the chemical biological defense division is ‘taking a cut much more significant than that’ in fiscal year 2018, said John Fischer, division director. The directorate in May released a budget overview for congressional justification, which stated over $58 million would be put toward chemical, biological and explosive defense research and development for 2017, assuming a continuing resolution would remain in effect for the rest of the fiscal year. Less than $53 million was requested for 2018, according to the document. DHS did not respond to requests for an interview.” 2018 will be a year of harsh budget reductions for biosurveillance and chemical detection programs, as border security will be headlining in terms of priority. The surge of biodefense funding that was seen post-Amerithrax has certainly waned, but there is also concern for complacency and a tendency to go from fire to fire instead of working to establish robust and effective prevention and response mechanisms. Overall, this fiscal tightening will surely have an impact on prevention, identification, and response strategies for biological and chemical threats, leaving many people holding their breath that the blowback won’t be severe.

 Now more than ever, it is important we change the narrative of lackluster efforts to defend against biological threats. Budgetary slashing, lowering of barriers, and an era of increasing globalization and rapid international travel – these are all the things that should remind us that biological threats are not a figment of science fiction. “What was unthinkable back in the day is now quite common and easy,” Inglesby said. “Genetic engineering is now possible with kits from boxes at younger and younger ages with less and less training.” The dual-use nature of biological research not only has the capacity to lower the barriers to bioweapon development, but can also muddy the waters when determining if research is  offensive or defense. “That’s not the only challenge facing those sounding the alarm about biothreats. Government scientists worry that there aren’t enough biologists working on this problem. “We have relatively few biologists working in national security,” Matheny told FP. “This is one area where we’re just starting to catch up to the fact.” While the future of NBACC is still not set, such uncertainty has rippling effects when it comes to staffing. While we consider biological threats a multi-faceted enemy – natural, intentional, or accidental, it is now biodefense efforts that are facing attacks at multiple fronts. The recent de novo synthesis of smallpox has brought many of these concerns to fruition. Whether it be through the advancement of life sciences that poses dual-use risk, severe budgetary cuts, or a shifting focus onto border walls, we cannot afford to allow this threat to be invisible much longer.

 GMU Schar School MS Open House – October 19th
Have you ever wanted to study what you love to further your career? GMU’s MS in Biodefense is just that chance and we’ve got an open house coming up so you can get all the information on it. On Thursday, October 19th at 6:30pm at our Arlington campus, we’ll be hosting an information session about our in-person and online biodefense MS program. From anthrax to Zika, GMU is the place for all things biodefense!

Navigating Our Way Out of the Jungle: Modernizing Meat Inspection
It’s been over 111 years since the famous Meat Inspection Act of 1906 and we’re still struggling to keep food safety efforts at a pace that can beat risks from farm to table. “What triggered such a shift after decades of poor industry practice? The year prior, in 1905, a book by Upton Sinclair was published in a series, which would then be published in entirety in early 1906. The Jungle brought forth the unsavory and grotesque underbelly of the American meat system. Although this may not have been the focus of his book, readers took away from it that their trusted source for meat was corrupt and lacked safety mechanisms. Within the year, the Federal Meat Inspection Act was established.” Pew Charitable Trusts is working to help evaluate and strengthen the meat and poultry industry and to help reduce the impact that contamination has within the U.S. population (2 million are sickened annually due to contamination). “A June 2017 report from Pew and Cargill, an American privately held global corporation based in Minnetonka, Minnesota, highlighted some of these concerns and established an open dialogue to develop recommendations. They addressed the need to establish a risk-based oversight system, which would incorporate data from across the food-safety system. The guidance also included better risk communication, a modernized approach to slaughter inspection that would include current technology and pathogen-specific appropriate levels of protection, among other components.” Food safety and security is truly the soft underbelly of American and it’s vital that we modernize such efforts.

BBC Pandemic
If you’re one of our readers in the UK, make sure to take advantage of this new outbreak tool through the BBC. The BBC Pandemic app can be downloaded onto your phone and may just help us understand how future outbreaks spread. “Through the app, BBC Pandemic will be conducting two experiments: the National Outbreak, which is open to anyone in the UK from 27th September 2017; and the Haslemere Outbreak, a closed local study that is only open to people in the town of Haslemere, Surrey, and runs for 72 hours starting on Thursday 19th October 2017. In the National Outbreak, the app will track your approximate movement at regular intervals over a 24 hour period. (Don’t worry, it won’t know exactly where, or who you are.) It will also ask some questions about your journeys and the people you spent time with during those 24 hours. All data collected will be grouped to ensure your anonymity, and a research team from the University of Cambridge and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine will use it to predict how a flu pandemic might spread across the country – and determine what can be done to stop it.” If you’re still not sold on it, here’s another reason why apps like this can truly help future pandemic response – data modeling. Despite our best efforts, epidemiological models are only as good as the data we have available. Simulation efforts help response efforts coordinate resources and plan accordingly however, if our modeling isn’t a decent representation of the population due to limited data, it won’t be that effective. Getting information from a broad range of people helps strengthen such efforts.

Recommendations for Incentivizing the Development of Therapeutics, Diagnostics, and Vaccines to Combat Antibiotic-Resistance 
The Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria (PACCARB) has been working since 2015 to curb the threat of resistant germs. The group has found that current economic efforts are insufficient and through three working groups on incentives (for vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics), they have released a new report. Identifying 46 critical issues that are preventing the development of new/improved products and providing 64 recommendations to address them, this new report is a robust 42 pages worth the read. For example, regarding human health and incentives for vaccine use, the group found that “federal and nonfederal stakeholders lack a common understanding about the current and potential economic value and societal impact of vaccines that can reduce AMR.” Their recommendation for this issue: “Analyses on the cost and societal impacts associated with new vaccine development and administration in the AMR arena developed via a multi-agency process that involves at least CDC, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the Treasury Department, in partnership with industry and public health stakeholders.” Within each section, you can find issues and recommendations categorized by economic, R&D, regulatory, and behavioral. The United Nations Foundation and the Wellcome Trust has also released a new report regarding the global efforts that have been sustained to fight AMR. “The report, published a year to the day that the United Nations (UN) General Assembly agreed to address the root causes of AMR and take action to tackle the problem, shows that many nations are following up on their pledge to encourage more responsible use of antimicrobials in human medicine and agriculture. Out of 151 countries recently surveyed, 85% say they are developing or have developed national action plans on AMR and 52% have a fully developed plan that addresses the One Health spectrum of human, animal, and environmental sectors.”

 Chemical & Biological Attacks: Underground Transport Restoration Project
After four years, this DHS-sponsored project is finally wrapping up their work studying the methods for chem-bio agent dispersion in subways. “Sandia National Laboratories’ engineer Bob Knowlton has worked on this challenge for a dozen years. His team has developed scientific sampling methods to determine the extent and nature of the contamination. Sampling also is essential to confirm the decontamination was effective and the site is safe to re-enter. Sandia researchers and their collaborators at other national laboratories and local, state and federal agencies have looked at everything from how to clean subway stations and grimy tunnels to where a surrogate for anthrax would go when released inside the New York City subway system and the best way to decontaminate a subway car.” Check out their findings on this project and from the 2016 large-scale testing they did in a mock subway system.

Little Island of Horrors – Vozrozhdeniya 
During height of the Soviet offensive bioweapons program, an ideal island, like Vozrozhdeniya, was the perfect place to test cutting-edge biological weapons. Present day, the island is a sad reminder of one of the largest state-sponsored bioweapons programs. “The island’s secrets have endured, partly because it isn’t the kind of place where you can just turn up. Since Vozrozhdeniya was abandoned in the 1990s, there have only been a handful of expeditions. Nick Middleton, a journalist and geographer from Oxford University, filmed a documentary there back in 2005. ‘I was aware of what went on, so we got hold of a guy who used to work for the British military and he came to give the crew a briefing about the sorts of things we might find,’ he says. ‘He scared the pants off me, to be honest’. Aerial photographs taken by the CIA in 1962 revealed that while other islands had piers and fish-packing huts, this one had a rifle range, barracks and parade ground. But that wasn’t even the half of it. There were also research buildings, animal pens and an open-air testing site. The island had been turned into a military base of the most dangerous kind: it was a bioweapons testing facility.” An isolated secret, this island was the testing ground for some of the worst pathogens. It was also chosen as a holding place for “the largest anthrax stockpile in human history” and while the cache’s location was never disclosed, the pits were visible from space, which meant that the U.S. pledge $6 million towards a clean-up project. Sadly, this isn’t a resolution as the open-air testing done on the island has surely left residual microbial burden, not to mention the burial pits of infected animals. Make sure to read about Dave Butler’s journey to this island and how even now, it still instills fear.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • China to Open BSL-4– The first certified BSL-4 lab in China will be opening this year. The research institute, located in Wuhan, represents a partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Wuhan government. “The lab is part of a 10-year-plan by the Ministry of Science and Technology that proposes to build five to seven BSL-4 laboratories by 2025 as well as one BSL-3 lab in every province. It was built with technology and equipment imported from France, and some of its future research staff have visited France for BSL-4 training. Although construction was finished in 2015, the lab has since undergone multiple assessments, Yuan Zhiming, director of the Wuhan branch of CAS, told the Science and Technology Daily. ‘The lab will become a public platform for Chinese scientists to conduct research into dangerous viruses,’ Yuan said.”
  • Signature Science-led Team awarded $2.9M contract to develop advanced genomic computational technologies in support of IARPA’s Functional Genomic and Computational Assessment of Threats Program – “The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) awarded Signature Science, LLC a $2.9M contract for the development of new computational tools to screen DNA sequences to detect biological threats that may manifest from synthetic microbial manipulation. The challenge is to overcome the speed and precision limitations of contemporary synthetic DNA screening practices to rapidly detect and isolate a prospective threat within a segment of DNA. The research team will re-tool bio-threat detection methods, and focus detection efforts on functional genetic elements to increase analytic speed and precision, thereby dramatically improving predictive capacity to isolate the toxic gene that constitutes the threat.”
  • Medieval Plague Gives Insight Into Human Pollution History – “A recent study indicates that much less lead occurs naturally in the air than we thought—in fact, there should be almost none. Scientists measured lead trapped in an ice core from the Swiss-Italian Alps. They found that lead levels dropped dramatically only once in the past 2,000 years, during a time that coincided with the Black Death pandemic. This means that in Europe, lead levels in the air have been elevated for thousands of years. Most people think about air pollution as a problem that began with the Industrial Revolution, but we’ve been spoiling the quality of our air for a very long time. It has harmed our health throughout history, from Medieval Europe to the Roman Empire to Ancient Egypt and Peru, and continues to do so today.”

Thank you for reading the Pandora Report. If you would like to share any biodefense news, events, or stories, please contact our Editor Saskia Popescu (biodefense@gmu.edu) or via Twitter: @PandoraReport

Pandora Report 8.25.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Happy Friday and welcome to your weekly dose of all things biodefense. Have you ever wanted to take a tour of Dugway Proving Ground? Here’s your chance at a virtual tour through some amazing photography.

GMU Biodefense Graduate Programs & Information Sessions
Classes are just starting up and if you’ve ever wanted to take classes on synthetic biology and biosecurity, global health security policy, nonproliferation and arms control, biosurveillance, or emerging infectious diseases, we’ve got just the program for you! GMU offers both Masters and PhD programs in biodefense and has several informational sessions coming soon. Our program provides the perfect intersection of policy and science with courses taught by a range experts. If your time is limited or distance is a problem, we also offer an online MS program, which means you can study biodefense from anywhere!

Revisiting NIH Biosafety Guidelines
It’s been forty years since NIH established the Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules to assess the risks of genome editing. Now more than ever, with the speed of biotech development, it is relevant to take a moment and look back at the significance of such guidelines. “Responsibilities include setting up Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) to assess risks and potential hazards through standards for containment and laboratory practices. Noncompliance on any project, whatever the funding source, can result in loss of all such NIH funding. In his address to the workshop.” Since its inception, there have been several advances in the field, like DIY gene editing and CRISPR, which may require changes to the existing guidelines. “And conventional risk management practices that focus on listed pathogens may underestimate risks of new, unlisted organisms. The informality of voluntary guidelines has enabled prompt responses by funders and researchers to emerging evidence on benefits and risks of technologies. But what has worked with those receiving NIH funding with IBCs may not work with the wider range of actors who now have access to these technologies.” How can the NIH meet these challenges with a forty-year-old set of rules? A few things might help it maintain relevancy- participation in international forums, facilitating researchers/publishers/insurers to set common benchmarks on researcher conduct, engage more with institutional biosafety officials, and working to ensure there are more IBCs. Overall, there is a need to modernize the guidelines to better meet and serve the expanding plain of the life sciences.

Revisiting Compliance in the Biological Weapons Convention                                                                       Have you noticed a trend this week? Revisiting is the name of the game and that’s just what the latest occasional paper from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey is doing. The latest RevCon was a dud and the future of the BWC and its relevance is being tested. James Revill is looking at compliance and an incremental approach within the BWC. Revill notes that “compliance with the BWC is more than a simple binary choice to sign a commitment not to develop or produce biological weapons. It requires the adherence to all the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties in signing and ratifying the convention. In the BWC context, this is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding certain obligations, changes in science and security, and the limited resource capacity of some states to fulfill their obligations. Under such circumstances, without episodically revisiting compliance, there remains the risk that BWC will become ever more fragmented, outmoded and poorly implemented.” He emphasizes that despite many pushing for multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocols, this is an unlikely outcome. An incremental approach to revisiting compliance, Revill suggests, could incorporate several activities – review relevant science and technology, enhance the collection and analysis of compliance indicators, develop the consultative mechanism, building the provision of assistance in the event of a violation of the BWC, explore voluntary visits, enhance the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism, and remedy the institutional deficient. Overall, he points to the wavering nature of norms against bioweapons and that “without revisiting compliance and tending the convention, there is a risk that the regime will be left to fester and fragment, in time potentially diminishing the norms against biological weapons.”

Meeting on the Attribution of Biological Crime, Terrorism, and Warfare
The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense will be hosting this October 3rd meeting in Washington D.C. “Effective prosecution and decisions regarding U.S. response depend on accurate attribution of biological attacks. Despite ongoing biological crimes and suspected development of biological weapons for the purpose of attacking the Nation, the United States has yet to establish this capability fully. The Study Panel will host a special focus meeting entitled Biological Attribution: Challenges and Solutions. This meeting of the Study Panel, chaired by former Homeland Security Advisor Ken Wainstein and former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, will provide federal government, industry, and academic representatives with the opportunity to discuss their perspectives, experiences, challenges, and recommended solutions with regard to biological attribution.” Stay tuned for more details!

SynBio Salmagundi: Proposed Framework for Identifying Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology – Report, SB7.0 & Options for Synthetic DNA Screening 
It’s a good day to get your synbio nerdom on with this potpourri of news! If you missed the webinar on Tuesday, you can now access the latest NAS interim report regarding the biodefense implications of synthetic biology. “Synthetic biology and related biotechnologies hold great promise for addressing challenges in human health, agriculture, and other realms. At the same time, synthetic biology raises concerns about possible malicious uses that might threaten human health or national security. This interim report is the first phase of a study by the National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine to assess potential vulnerabilities. The report proposes a strategic framework that can be used to identify and prioritize potential areas of concern.” Within the report you can find definitions and study scope regarding synthetic biology in the context of biodefense, factors to assess capability for malicious use, technologies and applications to assess, and framework approach (parameters to consider, use and limitations, etc.). Check out this latest article regarding the screening processes of for synthetic DNA ordering. Sure, there are current screening processes (providers affiliated with the International Gene Synthesis Consortium voluntarily screen double-stranded DNA synthesis orders over 200bp to check for regulated pathogens and additional customer screening), but truly, the processes isn’t that easy…or cheap. Researchers, like Gigi Kwik Gronvall, pointed out actions that could help “preserve the effectiveness of DNA order screening as a security tool and develop additional mechanisms to increase the safety and security of DNA synthesis technologies.” Highlighting the DHHS screening guidance as quickly becoming obsolete, they emphasized options like including direct financial support to companies for screening, especially as we look to the future costs and responsibilities of the U.S. government. “The screening of dsDNA orders is not a panacea for biosecurity concerns: it is possible for nefarious actors to work around the screening. However, we believe that screening dsDNA orders still raises barriers to the development of biological weapons and may offer some protection against biosafety concerns.” The future of synthetic DNA ordering will surely be debated as experiments, like the recent horsepox reconstitution, bring to light new gaps. One such focus onto the realm of biosecurity and synthetic biology comes from Dr. Eric van der Helm, who participated at the latest SB7.0 synthetic biology conference. Van der Helm attended as part of the SB7.0 biosecurity fellowship and has highlighted some of the biorisks we worry about. He also points to the latest horsepox experiment which brought about so much attention to the biosecurity implications of reconstituting an extinct virus. “Synthetic biology has only been recently recognized as a mature subject in the context of biological risk assessment — and the core focus has been infectious diseases. The main idea, to build resilience and a readiness to respond, was reiterated by several speakers at the SB7.0 conference.  In the case of biosecurity, we’re already dependent on biology [with respect to food, health etc.] but we still have an opportunity to develop biosecurity strategies before synthetic biology is ubiquitous.  There is still an opportunity to act now and put norms and practices in place because the community is still relatively small.” Van der Helm emphasizes the need to have these conversations regarding biosecurity measures and synbio, like those at SB7.0, more frequently and openly.

North Korea’s Bioweapon Program: What do we actually know?
If you haven’t gotten enough on discussions regarding North Korea’s bioweapons program, check out GMU biodefense professor Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley‘s latest interview in which she discusses what we know and what we might be missing. What a perfect way to enjoy the morning commute or a lunch break!

Post-Ebola Recovery – An Upside to an Epidemic
A recent mudslide in Sierra Leone is revealing a positive outcome from the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak – sustained disaster response. Shortly after the mudslide, emergency response crews were already working alongside volunteers to help rescue victims. Sidi Tunis chatted with Buzzfeed, noting that “During Ebola we had a lot of community engagement, so they knew how to be first responders. They knew how to do search and rescues, they knew how to convey corpses safely to the morgue.” Many of the young men digging through rubble were already experienced, having helped with Ebola burial teams and the ambulance system was better equipped and supported as a result of the outbreak. “There was a lesson learnt from Ebola that instead of creating parallel system of NGOs, let’s take leadership from the start,” she said. “So this time it’s been led by the government from the onset, and having them take that ownership is more of a sustainable system.” “Still, NGOs playing a critical role are in a better position than they might typically have been. Three days after the mudslide, unclaimed bodies piling up in Freetown’s main mortuary posed another health risk. There were so many that they began to decompose in the tropical heat, prompting the government to order mass burials over the following two days. Workers from UNICEF were among those who helped scrub out the morgue during a massive clean-up operation that followed. ‘That needed a lot of infection prevention equipment – gloves, boots, aprons,’ James said. ‘UNICEF had emergency stock ready to go from Ebola’.”

Meeting of the Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria
Don’t miss out on this September 13th and 14th meeting in which the “Advisory Council will provide advice, information, and recommendations to the Secretary regarding programs and policies intended to preserve the effectiveness of antibiotics by optimizing their use; advance research to develop improved methods for combating antibiotic resistance and conducting antibiotic stewardship; strengthen surveillance of antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections; prevent the transmission of antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections; advance the development of rapid point-of-care and agricultural diagnostics; further research Start Printed Page 38913on new treatments for bacterial infections; develop alternatives to antibiotics for agricultural purposes; maximize the dissemination of up-to-date information on the appropriate and proper use of antibiotics to the general public and human and animal healthcare providers; and improve international coordination of efforts to combat antibiotic resistance.” The meeting will be held at the DHHS Hubert Humphrey Building or you can attend online here.

Pandemic Readiness (Hint: We’re Not There Yet)
Despite funding for the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) and an increase in funding to the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program (PHEP), many are pointing out that these programs are chronically underfunded to begin with. “This House bill also does little to create a realistic public health emergency response fund, a standing pot of money to meet the immediate needs of a public health crisis. We saw how long it took to get emergency funds to respond to Zika, Ebola and Hurricane Sandy, with each event taking longer and longer to help these communities respond to devastating disasters.” You can also check out this latest meeting with Judy Woodruff and Liberian-born Dr. Raj Panjabi at Spotlight Health. Dr. Panjabi discusses the seriousness of infectious disease threats and the challenges of pandemic prevention.

Forecasting Outbreaks One Image at a Time
Tracking infectious diseases is a tough job and requires a lot of boots on the ground (shout out to gumshoe epidemiologists who go door to door doing contact tracing). Researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory have been using computer modeling for a while to track disease movement, but a new partnership with Descartes Labs, is bringing high-resolution satellite imagery into the arsenal. “By mapping where high-moisture areas intersect with those social media signals and clinical surveillance data, we can help identify areas at risk for disease emergence and subsequently predict its potential path. Descartes Labs collects data daily from public and commercial imagery providers, aggregating the images into a single database. Our team at Los Alamos will use the Descartes Labs Platform to correlate satellite imagery with multiyear clinical surveillance data from approximately 5,500 Brazilian municipalities for mosquito-borne diseases such as dengue, chikungunya, and Zika in order to better understand how they spread.” This new imagery will allow Los Alamos Lab researchers to focus on specific neighborhoods and other small geographical areas. By using retrospective analysis via historical data, they’ll make sure the mathematical models are accurate and ensure that future models are truly capable of prediction.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Munich Re Signs Strategic Agreement With Metabiota to Enhance Insurability Against Epidemic Losses – The risk analytics firm Metabiota has announced a strategic agreement with Munich Re, one of the world’s leading reinsurers, to better establish insurability “by protecting companies and local economies from the financial loss related to epidemics. This really is the next frontier for the insurance industry – given the high risk of infectious disease outbreaks, it is imperative that we find new ways to manage and finance these risks for our customers.” Metabiota’s newest platform is a modeling method for estimating epidemic preparedness and risk, as well as the cost and severity of outbreaks by using historical data and disease scenarios and analytics.
  • Ebola Survivors Plagued With Long-term Disabilities – Imagine becoming infected with one of the most deadly viruses on the planet. Now, imagine by some stroke of luck and medical marvel, you’re able to survive. After the long, miserable road that is Ebola infection, survivors have been finding themselves with chronic conditions and high rates of disabilities. A new study found that Ebola survivors have seven times the disability rate compared to their close contacts. “In the first study, researchers followed 27 Ebola survivors in Sierra Leone for 1 year after diagnosis and found they were seven times more likely than their close contacts to report a disability. Almost 80% of the survivors (77.8%) reported a disability 1 year post-infection, compared with 11.1% of their close contacts. Disabilities included major limitations in vision, mobility, and cognition. ‘This study has demonstrated that a year following acute disease, survivors of the recent EVD outbreak have higher odds of persisting disability in mobility, vision, and cognition,’ the authors concluded. ‘Mental health issues such as anxiety and depression persist in EVD survivors and must not be neglected’.”
  • Minnesota Measles Woes & Anti-vaxxers– The benefits of vaccines have been under fire from anti-vaccine activists, despite the overwhelming good they’ve done for the world. While Minnesota continues to battle their worst outbreak of measles in decades, the antivaxxers are becoming energized in their efforts. “In Facebook group discussions, local activists have asked about holding ‘measles parties’ to expose unvaccinated children to others infected with the virus so they can contract the disease and acquire immunity.” The initial cases of this outbreak were in the Somali American community, which are believed to be the result of anti-vaccine activists speaking to community members and instilling fears and concerns. “Despite the anti-vaccine drumbeat, Minnesota’s Somali American community has begun to push back, according to some health-care providers. As part of an unprecedented collaboration clinicians and public health officials launched this summer, ­Somali American imams are urging families to protect their children by getting the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine.”

Pandora Report 8.18.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

ECDC Tool for Prioritizing Biothreats
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control has released their tool for the prioritization of infectious disease threats. “This qualitative tool, implemented as an Excel workbook, is based on multi-criteria decision analysis. It ranks infectious disease threats in a transparent, comparable and methodologically reproducible manner. The tool enables the relative ranking of different infectious disease threats. It is intended as a supplement to other methods that also support decision-making in preparedness planning.” Part of the tool involves a scoring of diseases, in which it suggests that a multidisciplinary expert group works to establish reliable information and adequate scoring. The ECDC tool also includes a handbook and manual for users to get the most out of it.

 Long Ignored: The Use of CBW Against Insurgents
GMU Biodefense PhD alum Glenn Cross investigates the use of chemical and biological weapons in counterinsurgency campagins like that of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Syria. Cross notes that history has shown the efficacy of CBW against ill-equipped and often poorly trained insurgents. He points to the debate regarding application of use – some say that these weapons are used when conventional forces are ineffective and often a last resort, while others note that the lack of an international and effective response have given insurgents incentive. “The conclusion from these examples is that regimes in extremis — when the battle is for their very survival — seem to have little compunction about resorting to chemical and biological weapons use. The much-heralded international norms and conventions prohibiting and condemning chemical and biological development and use go out the window when a regime’s survival is at stake. The examples of Rhodesia and Syria show that the international community must be united and demonstrate the requisite political will to enforce norms if the use of chemical and biological weapons is to be prevented.” Cross highlights two case studies, Rhodesia and Syria, pointing to the use of biological weapons by Rhodesian forces as being the only example of a nation using bioweapons since the end of WWII. While the regime was aware of treaty obligations, it had no bearing on their decision to use such weapons. So what are effective constrains on the use of CBW? The case studies reveal that regimes care little about their efficacy, international norms, or international agreements, but it is really deterrence that likely prevents the use of such weapons. The credible threat of military action is the strongest deterrent and realistically, until international norms include uniform enforcement amongst nations, they won’t be as effective. “As we’ve seen in Syria, such consensus is elusive, and the international community has failed to act. As a consequence, the world faces a sad, but inevitable conclusion. The Syrian regime is unlikely to ever face justice for its use of chemical weapons.”

A View from the CT Foxhole: Edward You, FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Biological Countermeasures Unit
As if we need any more reasons to think Edward You is a biosecurity action hero! The Combating Terrorism Center recently sat down with Supervisory Special Agent in the FBI’s WMD Directorate, Biological Countermeasures Unit, and discussed not only his role within the FBI but also their work and coordination with partners. You notes that his “primary mission is to support outreach and engagement, but probably most importantly it is to backstop the WMD Coordinators who are positioned in the field. They have to cover the whole broad range of modalities—chem, bio, nuke, explosives. They do the initial engagements, the partnerships, the initial response, but they can always call back to headquarters where we leverage all of our expertise as subject matter experts. We can bring in the laboratory division; we can bring in Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), if necessary, the Department of Homeland Security to support them when they run into an incident out in the field.” He emphasizes the importance of the relationship the FBI has with the private sector, not only in terms of shared interests, but also communicating security problems to help get more buy-in and coordination. When asked about the DIY biohacker, You notes that “We look at these community labs as a big positive force in the economy and engines of innovation. That has helped us overcome the natural tendency for such outfits to be a little bit anti-establishment. By engaging with them, we’re helping them to raise their level of awareness that they could potentially be targeted by malicious actors seeking to subvert their work, steal their technology, or recruit insiders on their staff. By helping them establish a form of ‘neighborhood watch,’ they will be best positioned to identify and report on instances of suspicious activity both internal and external to their community. Who better to identify threats than the community members themselves?” While the partnerships with DIY labs haven’t garnered any leads to potential threats, they help the FBI understand the direction biotech is heading, which allows them to flag areas of concern faster than if they used a top-down approach. You also addresses the 2016 Europol warning of potential ISIS experimentation with bioweapons, commenting that “With ISIS, al-Qa`ida, or any other threat actor for that matter, we are faced with two significant challenges. The first is ideology. What happens if that lone individual that becomes persuaded by their ideology happens to be a microbiologist or a biochemist? The counter WMD mission has always proceeded by identifying the actors expressing the intent to acquire, develop, or use WMDs (e.g., counterproliferation efforts). And historically, significant effort and investments have been made to counter the biological weapon threat ranging from state/non-state actors to individual level biological crimes (e.g., attempted ricin poisonings). But this introduces the second challenge. Unlike the chemical and radiological/nuclear realms where materials of concern are highly regulated and the expertise is almost arcane, biology could be classified as dual use or multi-use. The strength of the field is based on the fact that it is inherently open in nature (e.g., peer-reviewed scientific journals), which has led to significant advances in areas such as healthcare.” Lastly, You points to what he considers the greatest biosecurity threat facing the U.S. – the concerns of non-state actors, but also the role of data in terms of gene editing and other biotech, noting that “we may have have been short-sighted. Most of our legal frameworks have been focused on privacy and not on security.” “Because there’s a lack of understanding about where bio is going, we’re in danger of falling behind, and my biggest concern is that for lack of our foresight and being strategic in this space, I think China is going to become a potential biological superpower.” Did I mention that Edward You is frequently a speaker at our summer workshops?

North Korea’s Chemical Arsenal Complicates U.S. Options 
As concerns over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program grows, the threat of chemical weapons has seemingly been downplayed. Tackling nuclear threats through preemptive strikes could push North Korea to utilize their chemical weapons program and sizable stockpile, which is considered to be one of the largest. “Experts are also disturbed by Kim Jong-un’s brazen public assassination of his half-brother using the nerve agent VX, saying it demonstrates the regime’s willingness to use deadly toxins. ‘I think if people paid more attention to the chemical side, they’d be less inclined to talk about preemption and going first against North Korea,’ said Greg Koblentz, a researcher of weapons of mass destruction at George Mason University.” In the event that chemical weapons are deployed, the South Korean capitol of Seoul would surely take a hit, which is home to 25 million people. While details of North Korea’s biological weapons program have given little insight into what is actually going on, there is considerably more knowledge regarding their chemical weapons initiatives. “The exact composition and size of North Korea’s chemical arsenal is unclear, but it’s believed to include everything from antiquated chlorine gas all the way up to sarin, VX, and other highly lethal nerve agents. These weapons are distributed at facilities across the country, often tucked away in underground bunkers or other sites unknown to U.S. and allied intelligence. The weapons are also deployed along the armistice line, which sits just 35 miles north of Seoul.” While there are limits to their chemical weapons capabilities, they surely provide little comfort to South Korean citizens and those living in Seoul.

 Chatting With the WHO
New WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus spoke with Foreign Affairs’ regarding his plans for the future of the WHO and efforts to combat global disease. Tedros notes that epidemics or pandemics keep him up at night, especially something like the 1918 pandemic and the “serious gaps we have”. He comments that “I think the world should unite and focus on strong health systems to prepare the whole world to prevent epidemics—or if there is an outbreak, to manage it quickly—because viruses don’t respect borders, and they don’t need visas.” In regards to irrational beliefs as a public health threat, Tedros highlights the role of governments (and the WHO in supporting them) to communicate with communities and use media as a tool for teaching. Tedros discussed the WHO’s response to Ebola and when asked about hesitancy governments may experience regarding raising the alarm for an outbreak, he noted that “it’s not an issue between the WHO and the member state in question; it’s about the overall implementation of the International Health Regulations [the rules that govern how states respond to outbreaks]. That involves not only the country in question but other countries, as well. For instance, a country may fear the impact on the economy if it reports a certain disease. And if the other countries, instead of banning travel or other measures, could be supportive and implement the IHR, then the country could be encouraged to report immediately.”

Book Review – Barriers to Bioweapons
As the summer winds down, you may find yourself needing a new book to delve into. GMU biodefense professor Sonia Ben Ougrham-Gormley‘s book, Barriers to Bioweapons, is a great addition to any lover of health security and the realities of biological experiments. This latest book review gives a witty and entertaining overview of her work, noting that “Barriers to Bioweapons argues that actually, we’re not all living on borrowed time – that there are real organizational and expertise challenges to successfully creating bioweapons. She then discusses specific historical programs, and their implications for biosecurity in the future.”

Pandemic Preparedness & A Global Catastrophic Biological Risk By Any Other Name Would Smell As Sweet

GMU biodefense PhD student Saskia Popescu tackles the importance of pandemic preparedness and the latest publication from the Center for Health Security regarding global catastrophic biological risks. “We may think written plans and the occasional table-top exercise are making us more prepared to handle a pandemic, but true preparation goes far beyond that. The ability to prevent, detect, respond, and control outbreaks is a hefty investment that countries are still struggling to make, and as a new report recently revealed, a paltry amount of countries may be ready for a pandemic.” She highlights the latest World Bank report that only six countries have truly taken efforts to evaluate their readiness to handle a pandemic. Like many things, the devil is in the details, and often that is as simple as a real name for a problem. A recent publication from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security sought to fix this by establishing a working definition for global catastrophic biological risks (GCBR). “What makes this definition unique, aside from it being the first working definition for GCBRs, is that it highlights several components, such as sustained catastrophic damage, and instead of highlighting a specific number of deaths, it looks to a range of negative outcomes, such as infertility. The challenging task of defining such a globally feared, but poorly understood risk was daunting; however, the Center for Health Security has provided us with a working tool that can now be applied to policy, and future preparedness and response efforts.”

H5 Hits the Philippines and Plague in Arizona
The Philippines is reporting its first highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza outbreak. Hitting a commercial poultry farm in Luzon, the outbreak began in July and killed 36,485 of the 190,000 birds. “A report today in the Manila Times, based on a media briefing with Emmanuel Pinol, the country’s agriculture secretary, said the outbreak was confirmed in the city of San Luis and that six poultry farms were affected. Most of the poultry deaths were in layer chickens. Pinol told reporters that the outbreak may have begun as early as April when deaths were reported in quail housed above ducks. He said ducks are the likely source of the outbreak, since they had contact with migratory birds. The Manila Times report said the outbreak site is 37 miles north of Manila and is close to swamps that are stopovers for migratory birds from the Asian mainland.” Public health officials in Arizona have announced that fleas in two counties have tested positive for plague (Yersinia pestis). While plague is endemic in the southwest, public health officials still work to ensure residents are aware that there is an increased risk. Officials are warning residents to be mindful of the potential for exposure via pets. “Fleas can bite rabbits, prairie dogs and other rodents — and anything that may eat them — and transfer the disease to pets, who in turn can infect humans. Cats who get plague transmit it through their cough. Dogs typically carry the fleas on their fur. Health officials cautioned county residents and visitors to keep their pets leashed and to avoid touching dead animals. Evidence of a large die-off could indicate plague is present, they say.”

Strategies for Identifying and Addressing Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology
Don’t miss out on these events by the National Academies Committee on Strategies for Identifying and Addressing Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology:

  • August 21 – the committee’s interim report and proposed framework will be released at 11am EDT here
  • August 22 – a public release webinar and report briefing will be held from 11am-12pm EDT. Committee Chair Michael Imperiale and committee members Patrick Boyle and Andrew Ellington will be reviewing the interim report and the proposed framework. This webinar is free to attend and open to the public, but you must register to attend. You can register at the following link:  https://nasevents.webex.com/nasevents/onstage/g.php?MTID=e39277a767b1f0190db4f7ee491c01271  You will be able to submit questions and comments during this webinar through a text-based feature but will not be able to speak directly with the presenters.
  • August 23-24: The meeting will be held at the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s Keck Center at 500 5th Street NW, Washington, DC Room 208. You must register to attend the meeting in person; the Keck Center is a secure building and we will need to have your name on the guard’s list to enter the building. You can register by emailing synbiodefense@nas.edu. If you would like to attend via teleconference, you can access the conference by dialing the following: to listen, please dial 1-(866) 668-0721 and use conference code 380 454 1676.

The committee is also soliciting feedback from the public on the interim report and the associated framework. You can submit questions or comments through September 5, 2017 at the following link:  http://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/3758337/A-Proposed-Framework-For-Identifying-Potential-Biodefense-Vulnerabilities-Posed-By-Synthetic-Biology  Due to the anticipated volume of questions, the committee may not explicitly address every comment received but all comments will be considered and reviewed. PLEASE NOTE: if you submit a question, your question and any associated identifying information you provide will be added to the study’s public access file as per the National Academies’ requirements to comply with FACA.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Uganda Ebola-like Illness Demystified- Public health officials in Uganda are sighing with relief as results from the Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI) have reported the death of a 20-year-old woman in Luweero was due to carbon monoxide poisoning and not the suspected Ebola virus. “There are currently 3 female cases admitted at Bishop Asili hospital, Luweero. However, results from UVRI indicate that all cases were negative for Ebola, Marburg, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, Rift Valley fever, and Sosuga viruses. ‘The ministry of health team is working closely with the District Health Team to monitor, review, and manage these cases as well as orienting health workers on management and referral protocols of suspected cases,’ reads the statement.”

Pandora Report 8.11.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

Norovirus may be plaguing athletes in London for the World Championships, but we’re making sure to deliver the latest biodefense news to you (germ free)! Check out these WHO courses for managing public health emergencies.

CDC Invests $200 Million For Infectious Disease Preparedness
Last week the CDC announced that it awarded more than $200 million to help prevent, detect, respond to, and control biothreats posed by emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. The funds will go through the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity for Infectious Diseases (ELC) cooperative agreement and reach all fifty state health departments and several local health agencies in large metropolitan areas. The CDC announcement noted that the “CDC and states work together to improve local surveillance, laboratory diagnostic capabilities, and outbreak response. The CDC has awarded more than $200 million through the Epidemiology and ELC cooperative agreement to help states, cities, counties, and territories prevent, detect, respond to, and control the growing threats posed by emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. State programs are the foundation of the U.S. public health system and are integral to the nation’s efforts to combat infectious disease threats. CDC and states work together to improve local surveillance, laboratory diagnostic capabilities, and outbreak response.” This also includes $77 million to help state health departments combat antibiotic resistance in their areas. The 2017 funding enhances current Antibiotic Resistance Laboratory Network (AR Lab Network) activities by increasing testing nationwide for Candida fungal threats, strengthening national TB surveillance and infrastructure, and enhancing detection of drug-resistant gonorrhea. This surge of funds, mixed with a new strategy that combines market entry rewards with population-based payments from insurers, could help bring us ahead in the battle against the resistant bug. “The proposal, dubbed the Priority Antimicrobial Value and Entry (PAVE) award, would use limited public funds to cover the majority of revenue for the first 1 to 2 years a new antibiotic is on the market, but that revenue would be phased out over 5 years and replaced by revenue from population-based contracts with health insurers. The purpose of the PAVE award, the authors said in their recent Journal of the American Medical Association paper, is to guarantee a return-on-investment for antibiotic developers by ‘de-linking’ the revenue of new antibiotics from the volume used and to promote stewardship of those drugs, so that thy remain effective and available.”

A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to 21st Century
Don’t miss out on the latest bioweapon gem from W. Seth Carus – a history on biological warfare! “It covers what we know about the practice of BW and briefly describes the programs that developed BW weapons based on the best available research. To the extent possible, it primarily draws on the work of historians who used primary sources, relying where possible on studies specifically focused on BW. By broadening our knowledge of BW, such studies have enabled us to write about the topic with more accuracy and detail than could have been done even a few years ago.” Carus breaks BW history into three sections – prehistory to 1900, 1900-1945, and then 1945-modern day. He focuses on the agents covered by the BWC and looks at the history of state-sponsored programs, the role of scientific advances in understanding microorganisms, use of BW in warfare, and more.

What It Means To Militarize Biotechnology
Biotechnology is a fickle beast and a frequently debated topic. While many focus on the security implications of gene-editing and other biotechnologies in the hands of nefarious actors, there has been an increasing militarization of the field. Military research and investment in biotechnology can be a bag of mixed outcomes and there has been little discussion regarding the growing military interest in it. “One such issue is the risk that military investment in biotechnology will adversely affect research priorities. Another is the possibility that military investment into defensive or public health projects by one state might be misinterpreted by other states as having offensive potential. In the same vein, the scarcity of publicly available information about military research into biotechnology might fuel public distrust of valuable and well-intended work. It is clear, for example, that research into preventing, identifying, and treating infectious diseases by various militaries around the world will continue to provide broader spin-off benefits—but publics in some states might be unsure why military rather than public health institutions lead such work.” Progress in fields like synthetic biology has brought forth almost a renaissance of research and also engagement in security discussions. Brett Edwards highlights the role of the Amerithrax attacks in bringing biology into the forefront of American terrorism worries. He notes that the synbio community has been heavily engaged in the debate of misuse and its implications for innovation and regulation. Working in the synbio field inherently carries with it a forced sensitization to these issues. Edwards emphasizes that the future should include international dialogue with researchers regarding biotechnology militarization. “This sort of dialogue might allow shared principles regarding state investment in biotechnology to be identified and articulated—principles that would both guide research priorities and establish hard limits about what is permissible. Such discussions could draw upon relevant principles in international human rights, humanitarian, and arms control law—including, but not limited to, treaties specifically dealing with biological, chemical, and environmental warfare.”

Air Travel or Bug Travel?
We’ve all been on that flight with one (or more) people who are visibly and audibly ill…and there’s nothing like that ominous feeling of “I’m definitely getting sick after this flight.” A new study investigated disease transmission on airplanes and found that things like plane size and boarding method can have some pretty profound implications for disease transmission. Sure, jamming ourselves into a metal box where it’s cold and we’re in close quarters should already be a redflag for disease transmission, but there are many more variables that impact airborne disease spread. Researchers started first with how Ebola might be transmitted on a plane. “Unfortunately for current fliers, the commonly used three-section boarding technique, where passengers board by first class, middle zone and back section, is actually the worst strategy for reducing the number of infected. The reason this works so poorly is that it forces passengers to stand together in the aisle while they all wait to get to their seats, which means more time for a tightly packed group to be exposed to the contagious passenger”. They found that changing the boarding method to a two-section, random method is much more protective. Also, the speed at which we all race off the airplane once we’re landed appears to have little impact. “For plane size, you might think the bigger the plane, the smaller your odds, right? Not quite. In fact, the study found that planes with less than 150 seats are better at reducing new infections; there are fewer susceptible people present overall, fewer people within a given person’s contact radius and less time spent moving through the plane to reach assigned seats. ‘Using smaller airplanes during an outbreak, instead of completely banning flights to a specific destination, can drastically reduce the probability of introduction of infection,’ Mubayi said.” The investigative team found that if airlines stuck to their existing boarding strategies during an ebola outbreak, there would be a 67% chance of infection rates reaching 20 air-travel-related cases per month. Regardless of plane size, if airlines modified their boarding strategies, the change for infection drops to 40%. Such work gives us great insight into strategies to help slow the rate of transmission during outbreaks through the powerful vector that is international air travel.

Computer Security and DNA Sequencing
A recent article on the implications of DNA sequencing and big data highlights investigations into the “robustness of such tools if (or when) adversarial attacks manifest”. Researchers noted that DNA synthesis can provide attackers with arbitrary remote code execution and highlight the need to look at the feasibility of such attacks. Performing their own attacks on a modified down-stream sequencing utility, they found data leakage and used such lessons to evaluate security hygiene of the more common DNA processing programs. Such work is especially prudent given that biohackers recently encoded malware in a DNA strand. University of Washington researchers revealed at the USENIX Security conference this week that it’s actually possible to encode malware into DNA strands, “so that when a gene sequencer analyzes it the resulting data becomes a program that corrupts gene-sequencing software and takes control of the underlying computer. While that attack is far from practical for any real spy or criminal, it’s one the researchers argue could become more likely over time, as DNA sequencing becomes more commonplace, powerful, and performed by third-party services on sensitive computer systems.” The researchers are calling it the “the first ‘DNA-based exploit of a computer system‘.” This new finding sounds like something out of a science fiction film, but points to the unexpected threats within DNA sequencing and data processing. Thankfully, the process was pretty unreliable and the researchers had to take some significant shortcuts, which means attacks like this may be not be in the immediate future. Nonetheless, it brings forth the need to consider the security implications of information stored within DNA.

Next Generation Global Health Security Network & the Nuclear Threat Initiative Webinar 
Don’t miss out on this webinar today, at 2pm EST regarding the Next Generation for Biosecurity in GHSA Competition! This webinar will provide an overview of eligibility and submission requirements for the NTI-sponsored biosecurity competition to develop regional and global partnerships among next generation professionals. Participants will also have an opportunity ask questions about the competition. Click here to add the event to your calendar.

Bio-Labs of the Future – The Promises & Perils of the Fourth Industrial Revolution
The Wilson Center’s Science and Technology Innovation Program takes a deep-dive into the bio-labs of the future . The rise of the biotech revolution and advances in gene-editing DNA synthesis, AI, etc. are all helping laboratories grow in connectivity and intelligence. “While this may be a boon for the development of novel vaccines and therapeutics by parties that have traditionally not had access to the necessary tools, it also opens the risk of nefarious use to engineer or edit biological agents or toxins. While there have been attempts at governance to limit the avenues by which a bad actor may gain access to the pathogens or tools to create biological weapons, the ever-increasing pace of innovation has left gaps that may be exploited.” Many are calling this time a Fourth Industrial Revolution, and with technologies like portable genomics sequencers, there is a need to examine the vulnerabilities, which includes things like growing accessibility. The Wilson Center paper highlights the need to evaluate threat, potential for exploitation of gaps, and provides policy recommendations.

Combating Biological Terrorism Roundtable Discussion
Don’t miss out on this event put on by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies on Thursday, August 24th, noon-2pm at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (901 N Stuart Street, Suit 200, Arlington, VA 22203). Roundtable speakers include Professors Rita Colwell, S. Gerald Sandler, Rashid Chotani, and Normal Kahn. “Biological security concerns are a permanent fixture of history, ranging from Mother Nature’s infectious diseases to man-made threats. Recent epidemics, such as Ebola and Zika, and the potential dangers of biological terrorism urgently need to be addressed through international partnerships to reduce the gravest health risks at home and abroad. Experts with governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental experience will provide an assessment of future challenges and offer recommendations for an international comprehensive biosecurity strategies.” RSVP is required (please email icts@potomacinstitute.org).

The Future of the GHSA Matters for US Clinicians
GMU Biodefense PhD student Saskia Popescu discusses the importance of the GHSA and why it should matter to U.S. clinicians. “Fundamentally, the GHSA is a crucial component to ensuring a solid and reliable global foundation exists for responding to, detecting, and preventing public health crises. Whether you are a physician in an urgent care, a nurse in a major hospital, a public health epidemiologist, or working in national policy, the importance of the GHSA and its work is apparent and a future without it will only serve to weaken US and global health security.”

CBRN Insurance Approaches
GMU biodefense MS alum Zamawang F Almemar is looking at a new actuarial approach to a CBRN insurance policy. A WMD attack against a major city would have devastating consequences but countries often struggle with the realities of costly prevention efforts. It’s important to truly analyze the threats of national security and develop countermeasure infrastructure accordingly. Drawing parallels to homeowners insurance, “investing national resources to prevent and recover from the effects of a nuclear attack is an appropriate choice for national policymakers, but what level of protection is warranted to guard against non-state actor developed and employed chemical or biological weapons, or against a radioactive attack.” The authors looked to factors that may help determine how much should be spent on WMD “insurance” and a method for evaluation. While calculating some factors, like societal fears, are challenging, there are things to consider, like economic cost of property cost damage and recovery costs, economic and societal costs of injuries, deaths, disruption, and changes to society, etc. “Factors affecting the cost of implementing a protection action include the difficulty of taking the action, the equipment needed, and the extent of the measure being taken”. Regarding policy recommendations, the authors focus on the imminent threat from terrorist organisations, noting that “it is now of utmost importance for the new administration to prioritize cWMD efforts within the national defense strategy and to ensure there is a balance in appropriations investing in these cWMD efforts.”

A Shadow Network of Science Experts
At first glance, this sounds like an elusive club of James Bond-esque scientists. In reality, the truth gives a startling look into the White House. In effort to combat several science gaps within the new administration, there are reports that an unofficial network of Obama loyalists is working to continue the Obama science agenda. “Participants have provided counsel to Democratic lawmakers and their staffs on Capitol Hill, and they have held group-wide strategy sessions much in the same fashion as they did when they worked out of a fourth-floor wing in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House.” “In interviews, members of the new Obama group — which numbers in the dozens — said they have remained more engaged than they expected to before Trump’s victory in November. Beyond fielding policy questions from congressional offices, they have consulted with scientific societies, and advised organizers of the March for Science, among other activists — a few have even made those organizations their new professional homes. They have also assisted in analyzing the impact of White House budget proposals — which have outlined deep cuts to federal research agencies — and the impact of policies including Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate accords.”

Using Vaccines to Fight Antimicrobial Resistance
While we’re working to find new antimicrobials, reducing antibiotic use, and stopping the spread of AMR, there may be another strategy – vaccines. Many are pointing to the prevention of disease via vaccines as a means of countering infections in the first place, which are frequently misdiagnosed and treated with unnecessary antibiotics. Consider pneumococcal conjugate or influenza vaccines. “A study published in the Lancet led by Ramanan Laxminarayan of the Center for Disease Dynamics, Economics, and Policy found that if every child under 5 years old in the 75 countries studied received pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, the resulting reduction of pneumonia would avert 11.4 million days of antibiotic use each year.” Vaccines can be an effective tool in reducing illness and these infections often lead to not only the missuse of antibiotics, but also hospitalizations that often result in exposure to resistant organisms. We know the benefits of vaccines against specific viral infections however, perhaps it’s time we start adding them to the arsenal against antibiotic resistance? Overcoming AMR will not be a result of a singular effort, but rather a mosaic of combined practices and changes as diverse as the reasons resistance occurred in the first place.

A Silent Anthrax Outbreak Within The Chimpanzee Population
Researchers in the Tai forest within the Ivory Coast are working to find out why chimpanzees are dying from anthrax. The anthrax strain, a new form of Bacillus cereus, known as Bcbva, has been responsible for 38% of local wildlife deaths in the forest. Anthrax in the rainforest environment is unique and this outbreak is challenging the ways we traditionally think about such infections. “In the savannah, anthrax almost always infects hoofed grazing mammals, which ingest soil laced with bacterial spores. Although it can spill over into humans, until 2001, there was no record of it afflicting wild primates. Now, we know that the Taï strain hits chimpanzees, as well as other unusual hosts like mongooses and porcupines. It even affects monkeys that spend all their time in the treetops, far away from contaminated soil. ‘We don’t know how they get infected,’ says researcher Fabian Leendertz. ‘How do the spores make it up in the trees?’” Fortunately, Bcbva isn’t active in other parts of Africa. Chimpanzees, like many great apes in this region are already fighting off disease like Ebola, so this new surge of an unsual disease is worrying researchers.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Hot Topics In Biodefense –  What would you consider the hottest topics? GMU’s Biodefense program has students just as diverse as the topics we face in global health security, which makes the classroom discussions pretty fantastic. One of our PhD students recently sat down and wrote about the biggest issues we face in biodefense and why this field is so crucial – check it out here.
  • Graphic Design – A New Public Health Tool?– A new exhibit at London’s Welcome Collection is drawing attention to the role of graphic design during outbreaks and epidemics. The designs range from ambulances, hospital interiors, posters, cigarette packaging, and street art. “Rebecca Wright, who has co-organised the show with graphic designer Lucienne Roberts, says that exhibits in a section about contagion are especially dramatic. An Italian ‘plague notice’ from 1681 ‘uses bold typography to give authority in time of panic,’ she says, adding that it is a beautiful object. Graphic design responding to the early spread of HIV/Aids is included, such the historic and controversial, ‘Don’t Die of Ignorance’ campaign launched by the British government in 1986. ‘It was the first time every household in the UK received a health leaflet, Wright says.”
  • China & the U.S. Battle for Biotech – Check out this latest article on FBI Supervisory Special Agent, biosecurity guru, and GMU summer workshop instructor, Ed You on the U.S.-China dispute over genetic data and its implications for biotechnology. FYI – You’ll need access to the Financial Times.

Pandora Report 7.7.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

WHO Leadership Prioritization
There are six key positions the new WHO director general should prioritize, according to Mukesh Kapila of The Atlantic. The newly elected, first ever African director general has a lot on his plate and his future efforts will surely be evaluated against the mistakes and successes of his predecessors. Dr. Tedros comes into the position with somewhat of a dark cloud following him – during the election an advisor to his opponent made public comments accusing  Tedros of intentionally covering up outbreaks within his home country of Ethiopia. Kapila’s proposed to-do list for Tedros includes six main components. Firstly, promote home-grown national solutions, which focuses on sustainability and developing models that fit them and not a standardized solution for all countries. Secondly, remember that the WHO does not have a monopoly on health wisdom. “Delivering change will require a revisioning of WHO’s long-presumed position as the centre of the global health ecosystem. Today we have many well-resourced international bodies and national institutions with highly-qualified experts. Thus, WHO does not have a monopoly on health wisdom and its norm-setting and convening authority is questioned. It’s high time that the humbleness that has endeared Tedros to many people rubs off on the organisation.” Third, hire diverse talent that helps restore trust throughout member states instead of pulling from just a select few. Fourth, don’t get bogged down in international reform. “Tedros can’t afford to waste his five-year tenure on simply rearranging institutional furniture. All his recent predecessors as director general have huffed and puffed but ultimately failed to reform WHO. An effective and efficient organisation is just a means towards an end. So, Tedros only has to do enough to make WHO fit for the purpose of delivering his vision.” Fifth, look beyond traditional thought leaders – tackle the exhaustive list of issues by thinking outside the box and approach such challenges with a different vantage point. Lastly, accept that the WHO has to live within its means. “WHO is broke with budget gaps in priority areas and excessive reliance on ad hoc voluntary funding. But he should resist setting out with a begging bowl and instead reform the budgetary architecture and agree a new compact for consistent and predictable funding.” WHO headquarters alone are in an expensive location, but overall Tedros must work to truly budget accordingly while re-establishing the WHO as a leader in global health with a reputation that encourages participation and support.

Public Transit Emergency Preparedness Against Ebola and Other Diseases
Globalization and innovative developments in transit allows us to travel around the world within hours rather than days or months. Unfortunately, we’re not the only ones that travel with such new capabilities. Outbreaks like SARS, MERS, and even Ebola have all bubbled outside of their origins thanks to the ability of global travel. What can be done though? “The Transportation Research Board’s Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Legal Research Digest 50: Public Transit Emergency Preparedness Against Ebola and Other Infectious Diseases considers federal and state laws and available court decisions affecting transit agencies’ responses to infectious disease outbreaks, including potential cohesiveness among transit agencies’ procedures and federal and state guidance”. This finding highlights major topic areas like closures of major traffic generators, quarantine and isolation, employee protocols, etc. Overall, the TCRP digest investigates the legal basis for closures or emergency regulations on transit agencies as a response mechanism to pandemics or outbreaks. One particularly interesting component to the report is section VIII, which discusses infection control and disinfection measures related to transit.

Summer Workshop – Don’t Miss Out!
With just over a week before our Summer Workshop on Pandemics, Bioterrorism, and Global Health Security begins, don’t miss out on the last remaining spots! We’ll have instructors from all over the realm of biodefense discussing a range of topics as diverse as the threats themselves. Biotechnology and medical countermeasures? We’ve got it! Dual-use research and biosecurity? Got it. Don’t worry – we’ve got all the topics covered. You won’t want to miss this three-day workshop filled with wonderful topics and some of the top names in the biodefense field.

How Bill Gates Got Bioweapons Wrong
Following Bill Gates’s comments on bioterrorism, Filippa Lentzos points out that while his intentions were good, his comments about a terrorist wiping out 30 million people with a weaponized disease are wrong, especially as they draw such attention to amateurs as terrorists. Lentzos specifically highlights the tacit knowledge that would be needed for such an act and that frankly, it’s a stretch for terrorists to take advantage of biotech advances. “Available evidence shows that few terrorists have ever even contemplated using biological agents, and the extremely small number of bioterrorism incidents in the historical record shows that biological agents are difficult to use as weapons. The skills required to undertake even the most basic of bioterrorism attacks are more demanding than often assumed. These technical barriers are likely to persist in the near- and medium-term future.” Moreover, Lentzos points out that by making such comments, Gates distracts from those who are more concerning in terms of bioweapons – state-sponsored groups and national militaries. It’s within these groups that the capacity to develop and deploy weapons lies, not within the small DIY garage bioterrorist. “Another factor significantly limiting the use of biological weapons is their lack of perceived military utility. In the near-to-medium term, however, advances in science and technology may enable the development of more capable and more accessible biological weapons. These weapons might allow attacks to be targeted more precisely. Attribution would become more difficult. These technical developments—paired with changes in the social context around biological weapons—may lower barriers to the development and use of biological weapons.” To defend against these degrading barriers, Lentzos urges several things – modernizing the Biological Weapons Convention, use of a collective and convincing response for any breaches in norms against bioweapons or actual use of one, and development of national biodefense capacities. Lentzos leaves the reader with a final plea – within these biodefense programs, ensure biosafety and biosecurity, implement the BWC, declare the program to ensure confidence-building measures are submitted, and regularly review your program to ensure compliance with the BWC. In the end, it’s the state-sponsored or military bioattacks we should worry about rather than drawing attention to the potential for bioterrorists.

Bio: Separating Fact From Fiction
GMU biodefense PhD alum Daniel M. Gerstein evaluates the good, bad, and ugly of DIY biotechnology. Drawing on a range of events and even films, Gerstein first describes what exactly DIY biotechnology is as there is frequently confusion. He highlights the freedom that DIY biologists have in terms of their projects, especially since they aren’t driven by grants or deadlines that companies or universities place on such projects. The promises and perils of DIY bio has been met with an array of critics and supporters – some say that this freedom is how scientific discovery occurs, while others point to the lack of oversight and that people without fundamental understanding of scientific ethics may abuse such technology. “The DIY spirit is embedded in humankind’s quest for discovery and knowledge. As DIY bio continues to evolve, two ‘courses of action’ are available. The first would be to place harsh limitations on such activity, but that would ultimately be counterproductive and likely fail. The second would be to embrace DIY, understand its risks and limitations and work collaboratively with the community to shape activities to ensure the safety of those conducting the experiments and the general population. If and when boundaries are breached, swift and appropriate actions must be taken to remediate the actions and even discipline the offenders. Finally, important outreach will be important to ensure law enforcement and society at large understands DIY bio. The image of DIY bio in the movie Quarantined must be replaced with a more nuanced understanding of the benefits and risks of the use of biotechnology.”

Scientists Utilize Old School Approach Against Resistant Bacteria
In the fight against resistant bacteria, an old strategy may be worth a try – bacteriophages. Using viruses to kill bacteria is an old strategy but it may be effective for our new problem – resistance. While the strategy was first discovered in the early 20th century, isolating and truly utilizing bacteriophages was challenging. Fortunately, now we have technology and advances in medicine on our side. “As a result, scientists are taking a fresh look at what is called phage therapy. ‘They are starting to dust off their old laboratory notes and re-explore the use of bacteriophages as a ‘new’ way to treat serious, life-threatening infections,’ says William Schaffner, medical director of the National Foundation for Infectious Diseases. Increasingly, specialists in infectious diseases believe phage therapy holds promise against bacterial diseases, especially in cases where antibiotics have failed. In 2016, the approach saved a San Diego man who otherwise would have died. Several similar successes have been reported since then.” While phage therapy isn’t yet FDA-licensed for humans, it can be used in life-threatening situations (like the San Diego case), but researchers are working to combat the challenges with getting it approved. Despite its use in other countries as a means of treatment, there is limited phage data within the U.S. There’s a long road ahead for harnessing the power of phage therapy, but it just may be one of the greatest tools in the fight against the resistant germ.

Stories You May have Missed:

  • How the DRC Beat Ebola in 42 Days – After the destruction that the virus left in its wake in 2014/2015, the news that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had a case, triggered PTSD for many. With the news of their initial case in May, public health response teams were dispatched and within 42 days, the outbreak was over. So how did the DRC manage such a feat? “This swift resolution was partly a matter of luck. The virus hit the remote and sparsely populated Likati region, which is 1,300 kilometers away from the capital city of Kinshasa, and nestled deep in equatorial rainforest. ‘People weren’t moving around in the way they were during the West African outbreak,’ says Anne Rimoin from the University of California Los Angeles, who has worked in the DRC for 15 years. ‘So it was a very small outbreak in and of itself’.”
  • The Trouble With Ticks– traditionally, we’ve seen ticks as a source for Lyme disease and not much else. Unfortunately, this isn’t the case as a bad tick season is afoot. “Experts say the Northern United States may be in for a bad tick season this summer, raising concerns about Lyme and other scary tick-borne diseases, including the Powassan virus, which causes encephalitis and can leave people with permanent neurological damage. ‘This spring definitely seems worse than others I remember,’ said Dr. Catherine Wiley, chief of general pediatrics at Connecticut Children’s Medical Center. ‘People are coming in from the yard with numerous ticks on them’.”
  • Ebola Exhibit – While we all remember the fear and frustration surrounding the most devastating outbreak of Ebola, a new exhibit is taking viewers through a visual journey of the epidemic. “A new and poignant special exhibit at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in the agency’s David J. Sencer CDC Museum. Sencer, who died in 2011, happens to have been the CDC’s director in 1976, when the first known outbreak of Ebola occurred in Yambuku, Zaire — now the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

Pandora Report 6.23.2017

by spopescu, posted in Pandora Report

TGIF! Before we begin our weekly dose of all things biodefense, have you ever wondered the traits that predict animal or host spillover?

What Does A Post-Polio World Look Like?
Decades of battling diseases in eradication efforts has been a struggle throughout public health history, but what happens when you finally reach the finish line? Donors around the world have worked to eliminate polio and in the final stretch and last ditch efforts, many are asking what will happen when polio is eradicated and the donors are gone? The truth is that many polio eradication programs (which include vaccination and surveillance campaigns) actually form the foundation of public health for many countries and rural areas. These programs have been the backbone of establishing some semblance of public health for areas that many not receive it otherwise. “If and when polio is gone, however, much of the transition may fall to national governments. International funding stands to shrink dramatically. About 27 percent of WHO’s $587 million in spending in 2016 went to polio eradication efforts. The African region would also be particularly hard hit. Forty-four percent of WHO spending there went to polio efforts, and about 90 percent of all immunization staff and infrastructure on the continent are funded through the WHO’s Global Polio Eradication Initiative.” We haven’t really considered what it means to eradicate a disease like polio and how the withdrawing of funds and personnel might impact countries. Moreover, many of the polio eradication programs are closely tied to other vaccination programs (measles, tetanus, pertussis, etc.) and if funds are lost because polio is eradicated, these other vaccination programs could take a hit. Aside from vaccination initiatives, if stable public health programs are not established prior to eradicating polio, there is also a risk for loss of disease surveillance. Current polio eradication programs highlight the role of surveillance, which is also used to facilitate laboratory development, all of which could impact pandemic preparedness and global health security. It is vital that efforts to eradicate polio are also met with work from political leadership to ensure a transition occurs that maintains public health efforts. “The transition as polio is eradicated will be complex, and needs to be carefully managed, country specific and country led. Polio surveillance systems can provide an important foundation, and are tremendous assets to health care systems, said Irene Koek, the deputy assistant administrator of global health at the United States Agency for International Development. Civil society organizations will have a role to play in advocating to keep local governments and ministries on target, said John Lange, the United Nations Foundation‘s senior fellow for global health diplomacy.”

Instructor Spotlight – Summer Workshop on Pandemics, Bioterrorism, and Global Health Security
We’re getting closer to the July 17th start date for our workshop (and the July 1st early registration discount expiration!) and this week we’re excited to show off one of our very own GMU Biodefense professors, Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley. An economics and defense expert, biodefense guru, and world traveler, Dr. Ouagrham-Gormley is the kind of professor whose class you spend the entire time on the edge of your seat. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, PhD, is an Associate Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. She holds affiliations with GMU’s Biodefense Program, Center for Global Studies, and the Department of History and Art History’s Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies (MAIS) program. Prior to joining the faculty at George Mason in 2008, Professor Ben Ouagrham-Gormley was a Senior Research Associate with the Monterey Institute of International Studies’ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). While at CNS, she spent two years at the CNS Almaty office in Kazakhstan, where she served as Director of Research. She also was the founding Editor-in-Chief of the International Export Control Observer, a monthly publication focusing on proliferation developments and export controls around the globe. From 2004 to 2008, she was an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. She is the author of Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development (Cornell University Press, 2014). She received her PhD in Development Economics from the Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris; a graduate degree in Strategy and Defense Policy from the Ecoles des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Paris; a master’s degree in Applied Foreign Languages (triple major in economics, law, and foreign languages —Russian, and English) from the University of Paris X-Nanterre, and a dual undergraduate degree in Applied Foreign Languages and English Literature from the University of Paris X-Nanterre. She is fluent in French, English, Russian, and spoken Arabic, and possesses beginner competence in Kazakh. For more information, visit https://schar.gmu.edu/about/faculty-directory/sonia-ben-ouagrham-gormley

President’s Budget Would Leave U.S. Vulnerable to Global Health Security Threats and Why We Need An Emergency Fund For Future Outbreaks
Cuts to public health, health research, and international aid have some pretty far-reaching implications and faculty from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security are pointing to the inherent vulnerability that would come from Trump’s proposed budget. Health security incorporates several programs and the reality is that an epidemic anywhere means an epidemic everywhere – simply put, the outbreaks that could pose a threat to the U.S. commonly begin abroad. “The proposed budget would cut $76 million from CDC’s Global Health programs, including cuts to Global Disease Detection and other programs that train and prepare countries to diagnose and respond to emerging diseases, and to the Global Immunization Program. It would reduce by $65 million CDC’s Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases programs, which aim to prevent and control outbreaks of diseases such as Zika. It cuts by $136 million the CDC Preparedness and Response Capability budget, which includes the funding for CDC’s Emergency Operations Center and the deployment of its people abroad to emergencies such as the Ebola epidemic in West Africa.” The CDC, among other agencies with biodefense positions, has a significant volume of vacancies that haven’t been filled.  More over, the authors point to the gap within the president’s budget regarding the future work of the GHSA, which is a vital multi-lateral effort to strengthen global health security. The budget has many worried because together, these cuts paint a bleak future for health security efforts – impacting surveillance, preparedness, and response efforts across the board. Global health security is simply not an investment we can afford to ignore. Did I mention that co-author Jennifer Nuzzo is also an adjunct professor at GMU’s biodefense program? Even if you’re not worried about the impact of the budget on health security, Ebola and Zika revealed just how necessary an emergency fund for outbreaks really is. “Creating a similar ‘rainy day’ fund—and providing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention with permission to use it in advance—could save lives and money, both at home and overseas. The idea behind an emergency fund is not to displace efforts to combat infectious disease but to ramp them up to meet a crushing temporary need. During an outbreak the CDC can call on many doctors and nurses to work without pay, but the costs of transportation, medical supplies and protective equipment still have to be covered.” While the president’s 2018 budget includes such a fund, it fails to give a specific dollar figure and is already cutting into public health funding, which may be counterintuitive. “Lawmakers need to follow through by approving one or both of the proposed measures for the president to sign to ensure that the money will be there when the next public health emergency strikes.”

North Korea & A Sea of Sarin
The threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from North Korea is a growing concern and while many focus on their nuclear and ballistic missile ambition, Reid Kirby is examining North Korean chemical weapons. Looking at the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system and South Korean capital of Seoul, which houses more than 10 million people, many worry about North Korea’s ongoing vague threats. “Proponents of preemptive military action against North Korea’s nuclear program, along the lines of Israel’s 1981 Operation Opera against Iraq’s nuclear program, typically ignore North Korea’s history of asymmetrical responses. But North Korea’s capacity to inflict mass chemical casualties on the Seoul area in a ‘sea of sarin’ attack rivals its capacity for nuclear destruction.” In 2010, it was estimated that North Korea possessed 2,500-5,000 tons of chemical weapons (mostly sarin and VX) and maintains roughly eight manufacturing facilities, which could ramp up production to 12,000 tons. Kirby addresses estimates of rounds per minute and calculations of how much sarin Seoul might receive in such an attack, noting that “a heuristic approach to estimating the total quantity of sarin required to inflict 25 percent casualties on a city such as Seoul under the specified conditions simplifies the problem into a box model of 600 square kilometers, with casualty rates integrated by area to find the necessary quantity. Using this approach, a ‘sea of sarin’ attack on Seoul would require about 400 kilograms of sarin per square kilometer”. He highlights the consequences of a 240-ton sarin attack on Seoul, noting that it would kill around 6.5% (higher lethal dosage) or potentially 25% of the population (if lower lethal dosage assumed). “If publicly stated intelligence estimates are to be believed, North Korea’s chemical arsenal represents a credible and present threat. How North Korea could apply this threat as a deterrent is speculative. But the destructive potential of the threat should give reasonable cause to hesitate regarding preemptive military options against North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions.”

Pandemic Flu Plan – A New Approach
The US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) just released their updates to pandemic flu plans. “The original plan was geared toward a more severe scenario and set a goal of delivering pandemic vaccine within 6 months of a pandemic declaration. The new document incorporates lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, which resulted in a less severe event. It also spells out the goal of having the first vaccine doses ready within 3 months of pandemic strain emergence, along with approved broad-spectrum antivirals.” Within the plan there are now seven domains of focus, which include objectives, goals, and key steps. The domains are: surveillance, epidemiology, and lab activities, community mitigation measures, medical countermeasures, healthcare system preparedness and response, communications and public outreach, scientific infrastructure and preparedness, domestic and international response policy, incident response, and global partnerships. You can read the plan here, in which HHS notes that they are exploring several innovative approaches to pandemic flu preparedness like re-conceptualizing respiratory protection, accelerating vaccine and antiviral development, building on emerging technologies for innovative diagnostic and diagnostic testing, etc. “Taken together, the updated domains reflect an end-to-end systems approach to improving the way preparedness and response are integrated across sectors and disciplines, while remaining flexible for the conditions surrounding a specific pandemic. This more-nuanced and contemporary approach recognizes the interdependence of domain areas, which should lead to a better understanding of how the system functions as a whole.” The updated HHS pandemic plan emphasizes that while the nature of influenza and pandemics may change, the importance of planning and strengthening critical infrastructure will always be necessary.

DoD Tick-Borne Disease Research Program
There’s been increasing attention to the threat of tick-borne diseases and the DoD is ramping up research efforts. Their Tick-Borne Disease Research Program (TBDRP) looks to help increase not only treatment efforts, but also diagnostic capacity. Created in 2016, the TBDRP works to fill the gaps within tick-borne disease research through programs like the Idea Award which encourages and supports investigators in the early stages of their career. The New Investigator aspect of this award aims at those postdoctoral fellows working to develop independent research and in the early stages of faculty appointments. “There are currently at least 16 known tick-borne illnesses, with emerging diseases being discovered all the time. In the United States, the yearly cases of Lyme disease and other tick-borne diseases, including spotted fever rickettsiosis, anaplasmosis, and ehrlichiosis, have been increasing steadily for years, currently totaling tens of thousands of people diagnosed annually, with more likely undiagnosed. Globally, the US Military prioritizes tick-borne Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever as an operational threat abroad. The FY17 TBDRP intends to support conceptually innovative, high-risk/potentially high-reward research in the early stages of development that could lead to critical discoveries or major advancements that will accelerate progress in improving outcomes for individuals affected by Lyme disease and/or other tick-borne illnesses.”

Health Sector Resilience Checklist for High- Consequence Infectious Diseases
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and the CDC jointed together to take the lessons learned from Ebola and build a checklist to strengthen the U.S. in the event of such high-consequence outbreaks. This checklist focused on high-consequence infectious diseases (HCIDs), which are novel, moderate to highly contagious, moderate to highly lethal, not easily controllable by MCM or non-pharmaceutical intervention, and cause exception public concern (think Ebola, MERS, H5N1, etc.). “The principal aim of this project was to develop evidence-based recommendations to enable communities to build health sector resilience to events involving HCIDs based on the domestic response to confirmed cases of EVD in the United States.” Aside from the checklist, their findings highlight issues with governance and coordination, communication, public health issues, health-care specific issues, EMS, and laboratories.  The general checklist itself includes sections on preparedness, leadership, creative flexibility, command structure, public trust, managing uncertainty, and crisis and emergency risk communication. There are also checklists for public health, healthcare, EMS, and elected officials, which includes things like a collaborative relationship with partners at other healthcare facilities and awareness of resources related to public health law expertise.

Stories You May Have Missed:

  • Anthrax: DoD Develops Biological Select Agents & Toxins Surrogate Solution – “The Defense Biological Product Assurance Office (DBPAO), a component of the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, has announced the development of a Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) surrogate solution that will mitigate the risks associated with shipment and use of Bacillus anthracis. In addition to risk mitigation for Department of Defense (DoD) stakeholders and the community at large, this product demonstrates DBPAO’s commitment to providing quality reagents to the DoD and to the biodefense community. To accomplish this task, the DBPAO developed a Bacillus anthracis surrogate strain named Recombinant Bacillus anthracis with Assay Targets (rBaSwAT) using a recombinant DNA approach to create a BSL-2-level genetically modified organism that will allow continuation of operations with reduced risk. The strain is built in a novel, non-virulent Bacillus anthracis background and carries a comprehensive complement of anthrax specific molecular and immunological markers.”
  • Bioviolence- Matt Watson from Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, is taking us through the history of bioviolence aka using infectious diseases for violent purposes. While not everyone truly sees the immediate threat of biological agents, Watson highlights the newer threats like synbio and biotechnologis that have growing potential for misuse. He also takes care to highlight the history of bioweapons to truly show the range of their application. “Of all the scourges of mankind, plagues and warfare are almost certainly the most dreaded and dangerous. Several times throughout history—and more frequently than most people are aware of—there have been attempts by individuals, organizations, and nation-states to harness the former in service of the latter.” If you want a brief overview of historical biological weapons and to truly understand the future of biothreats, don’t miss out on this great op-ed.
  • New York City Legionnares’ Cluster – Health officials are scrambling to investigate the source of a NYC Legionnaires’ cluster in Manhattan. “In a Jun 16 statement, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) said seven illnesses have been confirmed over the past 11 days. Four people are recovering in the hospital, two have been discharged, and one person in his or her 90s with underlying health conditions has died. Authorities are sampling and testing all cooling tower systems within a half-kilometer radius of the affected area of Lennox Hill. The health department is urging New Yorkers who have respiratory symptoms such as fever, cough, and chills to promptly seek medical care. In a typical year, about 200 to 400 Legionnaires’ cases are reported in New York City.” Legionnaires’ can be deadly for immunocompromised patients and is often a result of water treatment issues or poor disinfecting processes with spas, hot tubs, humidifiers, condensers, etc.