Airborne Bird Flu Transmission: Balancing Scientific Recourse and National Security

By Chris Healey

Articles recently published in the scientific journal Cell mark the end of a long battle for one researcher in his endeavor to publish research that raises security concerns.

Ron Fouchier, a virologist with Erasmus University Medical Center in the Netherlands, published an article in Cell explaining how H5N1, the causative agent of bird flu, can be genetically modified for airborne transmission between mammals. Dr. Fouchier says his research can help prevent bird flu pandemics. However, others in the scientific community believe Dr. Fouchier will cause what he seeks to prevent.

David Relman, a researcher at Stanford University, says Dr. Fouchier is essentially giving would-be terrorists instructions on how create a deadly contagion.


The controversy began in December 2011 when the  National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a federal advisory committee composed of twenty-five members who provide expertise in areas such as molecular biology and infectious diseases, advised all scientific journals to refrain from publishing Dr. Fouchier’s H5N1 airborne transmission research.

In February of 2012, the World Health Organization released its own evaluation of the research. The WHO stated Dr. Fochier’s work had scientific value and should be shared in its entirety. Shortly after the WHO’s report, the NSABB reevaluated the research findings. In March 2012, it retracted its recommendation to refrain from publishing. The complete study, along with all its findings, was finally published in Cell on April 10, 2014.

By its nature, science is a cumulative process. Communication among professionals is essential to promote progress and mutual understanding. Experts agree scientific advancement progresses best when least inhibited by authority. Government intervention generally pushes great minds away from heavily-scrutinized areas into those less regulated.

However, national security remains a priority and precedent exists for controlling scientific literature. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was passed to control and restrict nuclear weapons research conducted in the United States during WWII. No similar legislation exists to prevent communication of biological findings. However, the government can take steps to restrict research with dual use findings.

Government information classification, colloquially known as identifying information as top secret, secret, or confidential, is useful for keeping government-owned information away from the public. However, research the government had no part in creating, either through federal funding or conducted by government employees cannot be given a sensitivity label.

A common practice in government funding of scientific research is the requirement of funding to be contingent upon acceptance of sensitive but unclassified contract provisions. Those provisions allow the government to have authority on whether research findings can be published.

Dr. Fouchier’s research was precarious because it was conducted in a foreign university but supported by U.S federal funds. Outside the United States, the federal government has less control over research conducted under its auspices. It is unclear if Dr. Fouchier’s research was subject to a sensitive but unclassified contract provision.

With the power of the purse, the federal government can influence research and publication decisions through threat of funding withdrawal. While federal money funds much scientific research, simply pulling funding is not a fool-proof censorship method. Private benefactors can step in for lack of government support. The government can wield no financial influence on those sources receiving no government funding, including research funded by foreign governments.

Outside of financial influence, the government can best stop publication of sensitive material through NSABB recommendation. The committee has many ties to scholarly publications and is generally well respected. Initial recommendations not to publish Dr. Fouchier’s research were very influential; it was not published until well after committee approval.

There is no straight-forward answer to questions concerning science and security dissidence. Benefits of sharing scientific research must be weighed with harm that could arise from that research.

 

Image Credit: James Jin/Flickr

Microbes: The 21st Century Astronauts

By Alena M. James

The Third Commercial Resupply (CRS-3) mission was scheduled for launch on Monday, April 14, 2014. Taking off from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, the CRS-3 mission was to head to the International Space Station (ISS) at 4:58pm. However due to a helium leak on the launch vehicle, the launch has been postponed for Friday, April 18 at 3:25 p.m.

If the repairs are made by Friday, the space pioneering company, Space X will be given the opportunity to test its Falcon 9 rocket and its unmanned Dragon cargo capsule in transporting materials and supplies to the ISS.  The Falcon 9 rocket is not the only equipment requiring repairs. A critical computer onboard the ISS also failed to activate last Friday.  Although NASA confirms that the ISS Crew was not any danger with the broken computer, a spacewalk to repair the system has been scheduled for April 22, 2014.

The mission cancelled on Monday will transport materials astronauts can use to repair the computer system, as well as 5,000 pounds of additional supplies. Among these supplies are materials used by astronauts to execute more than 150 scientific investigations. Such investigations include laser optics tests to explore information exchange from space to Earth and National Institutes of Health funded immune system research projects.

Also onboard the unmanned mission will be more than 48 different types of bacterial strands sponsored by Project MERCCURI, which stands for Microbial Ecology Research Combining Citizen and University Researchers on the International Space Station.  Under the project, microbial samples were collected from stadiums, monuments, museums, retired space crafts, and other public sources throughout the United States. The purpose of sending the different types of microbes into space is to determine how the bacteria will grow in the absence of gravity.  In addition to determining the effects of the absence of gravity on microbial growth, Astronauts on board the ISS will collect their own bacterial samples residing on fomites board the station. This study will help to establish the microbial flora of the ISS by identifying the different types of bacteria present.

The study of microbes at zero gravity conditions is nothing new. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has conducted previous studies primarily investigating the virulent nature of pathogenic organisms in space. A study carried out in 2006 revealed Salmonellato express a higher degree of virulence when grown in a zero gravity environment.  According to the study 167 genes and 73 proteins were found to have been altered in structure—the likely cause for the higher degree of virulency. Salmonella strains grown in space were brought back to Earth and their effects tested on mice. The studies showed that mice from the experimental groups were subject to illness at a faster rate than the control groups.  NASA has also completed studies evaluating the effects of antigravity conditions on the human immune system. Their investigations show that the absence of gravity has an adverse effect on the human body and weakens the immune system. In essence, pathogens become stronger in the absence of gravity; while the human immune system becomes weaker. This finding may have grave implications for individuals hoping to travel to space or to be a part of the MarsOne human settlement scheduled for 2024.

Contrary to NASA’s pathogenicity studies, Project MERCCURI’s research focuses on non-pathogenic bacteria and examination of their microbial growth properties. Findings of the study are likely to provide greater insight into the ubiquitous nature of bacteria and make actors in space exploration more cognizant about the bacterial environment around them.

If repairs to the Falcon 9 rocket are successful and the launch continues as planned for Friday, the Dragon space craft is expected to dock at the station for four weeks. After four weeks it will return to Earth bringing with it supplies and experiments performed on the ISS.

 

MERCCURI is a project made possible by the collaborative efforts of microBEnet/UC Davis with the Science Cheerleaders, Space Florida, NanoracksJPL-NASA, and SciStarter.com.

Let’s talk about it…

By Jomana Musmar
Ms. Musmar is a PhD student in the Biodefense program at George Mason.

In a letter published on January 23, 2013, in Nature and Science, forty scientists announced an end to the self-imposed moratorium on research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza transmission. The moratorium was first triggered by the controversial publication of two H5N1 experiments in 2011.  In their letter, the scientists provide two major conclusions: that the aims of the moratorium have been reached, and that the benefits of conducting research on H5N1 outweigh the risks. They emphasize that scientists have a public health responsibility to conduct life-saving research, and that they are fully aware of the high risks involved in its potential misuse.  They also highlight that the moratorium helped foster robust global dialogue on the benefits and existing efforts to secure this research, in addition to the formal review of international policies.

Two such policies have been recently released by the US government (both available at http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Pages/default.aspx). The first is a White House proposed policy-update aimed at maximizing the benefits of life sciences research. The other is a US Department of Health and Human Services draft framework guiding funding decisions for conducting H5N1 research. The first of seven criteria in the draft framework to determine funding is that “the virus anticipated to be generated could be produced through a natural evolutionary process.”  This criterion echoes the final key point in the scientist’s letter in support of their conclusion–that the risks of an emerging H5N1 capable of mammalian transmission already exist in nature.

Although some may argue that the year-long moratorium has impeded the advancement of science and research related to influenza, I believe it has provided several benefits: (1) An opportunity for scientists to publicly voice their opinions and debate the topic on a global scale; (2) a chance for decision-makers to renew efforts at globally standardizing frameworks and guidelines related to research that present international security concerns; and (3) an increase in awareness on the public health benefits and security concerns of research in the life sciences.

In conclusion, the debate on the risks versus the benefits of controversial life science research is necessary to ensure that all stakeholders are participating in open dialogue, and that the frameworks drafted to help guide this sort of research are nimble enough to keep up with the pace of scientific advancements.

Norwegian Students Drinking E.Coli for Us All

Yes, E.coli, as in the frequent bathroom visit kind.

“20 year old medical student participates in an extraordinary research project at Haukeland University Hospital, where healthy students voluntarily get infected with E. coli bacteria. Then students’ stool samples are evaluated for developing a vaccine against the disease. Talking to TV2, project researcher Halvor Sommerfelt says that many children in developing countries still die from diarrheal disease, approximately 1.5 to 2 million children annually. This project aims to help developing a vaccine against one of the main causes of diarrhea among children in developing countries.”

“So far, 24 volunteers participated in the project, which is a collaboration between several countries, including the U.S. and Norway.”

More here.