Pandora Report: 5.6.2022

Happy National Nurses Day to all our readers in the US and a big thank you to the countless nurses working hard always, but especially during this pandemic! Our main focus this week is on the continued spread of H5N1 influenza in the United States and current challenges and evolving knowledge of the COVID-19 pandemic as BA.2.12.1 accounts for more and more cases. We have also included several new publications, a couple of great new podcast episodes, and announcements, including the launch of CBWNet. Finally, in case you missed it, check out our May 4 special feature on bioweapons in Star Wars on our site.

The Birds, 2022 Edition

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) continues to spread in the United States with 32 states reporting at least one confirmed infected flock as of May 5, 2022. Iowa has the most infected birds currently, with USDA reporting a total of 13,373,901 infections in that state. Minnesota has the most infected flocks currently at 69. 34 states have also reported positive samples in wild bird populations across the country. This has prompted massive poultry culling across the US in an attempt to control outbreaks in commercial and backyard flocks. For example, Rembrandt Enterprises, a large egg producer in Iowa owned by the same person as the Minnesota Timberwolves, has culled 5.3 million hens so far using what some describe as inhumane methods, prompting multiple public protests at Timberwolves games (Rembrandt also laid off most of its staff in the process as well, contributing to the backlash). HPAI spreads rapidly through bird populations and is a particularly painful disease for the birds to suffer through. Many of the H5 and H7 subtype viruses cause severe, systemic disease with near 100% mortality, prompting the culls. Amid skyrocketing grocery prices, eggs and poultry are especially more costly these days, with nearly 9% of all US hens having been culled recently. This is particularly challenging as the world, including the US, has steadily increased its egg consumption over the last decade, with many turning to chicken eggs as a cheaper source of protein compared to meat.

US states with detection of HPAI in wild birds as of May 5, 2022. Source: USDA APHIS

While large commercial flocks are easy targets for rapid infection, illegal cockfighting rings are also pressing dangers. Cockfighting is illegal in all US states and it is penalized as a felony in 42 of them, though enforcement and punishment vary. Oklahoma, a state with at least 20 documented major cockfighting traffickers, is especially at risk as it is a prime location for inter-state shipment of fighting birds who have higher chances of coming into contact with commercial birds along the way. Of the Oklahoma rings, Wayne Pacelle (President of Animal Wellness Action and the Center for a Human Economy) said, ““Cockfighting has unique potential to make the avian influenza outbreak even more deadly and far-reaching. Cockfighters are orchestrating illegal fights in state that cluster people and their animals from multiple states, creating perfect conditions for birds to contract the disease and then to spread it back home when the derbies are done.”

This comes as some in the Oklahoma legislature seek to lessen punishments for cockfighting. State Rep. Justin Humphrey’s measure would also “redefine the definition of “cockfighting.” Only when the birds are fitted with artificial spurs, knives or gaffs would it be considered a cockfight. Language would be removed from the law that currently includes “any training fight in which birds are intended or encouraged to attack or fight with one another” under the definition of “cockfight.” This bill, HB 3283, passed out of committee with a 5-0 vote before failing to be voted on before the legislative deadline, though Humphrey later amended a similar Senate bill that subsequently also passed the House committee. Oklahoma City’s Journal Record wrote, “Tropical conditions overseas, where there is a demand for cockfighting birds, makes it difficult to raise healthy birds in those climates – that’s why they buy quality birds from Oklahoma, Humphrey said. Purchasers might buy several males aged 10 months, raise them to two years and then choose best to use for breeding the next generation.”

Colorado reported a case of H5 influenza in a person who had direct exposure to poultry while culling animals with presumptive H5N1 bird flu late last month. CDC has confirmed the case and insists that the public health risk of H5N1 remains low as this person had direct exposure to infected animals. The patient experienced several days of fatigue (their only symptom) and has since recovered following isolation and treatment with oseltamivir (Tamiflu). CDC has been monitoring exposed humans for symptoms since the outbreaks were first detected in bird populations in late 2021, finding just one case so far in the 2,500 people tracked. The UK notified the WHO of a confirmed human H5 case in South West England in January of this year, bringing the human case total to two so far this round. Over 880 human infections with previous H5N1 viruses have been reported since 2003, though the predominant H5N1 viruses circulating currently in birds globally are different from previous viruses, according to CDC. 10 people who came into contact with the Colorado case or were also exposed at work are under close observation.

“Transmission electron microscopic image of two Influenza A (H5N1) virions, a type of bird flu virus Note the glycoprotein spikes along the surface of the virion and as a stippled appearance of the viral envelope encasing each virion.” Source: CDC/ Cynthia Goldsmith; Jackie Katz

Avian influenza (AI) cases have been documented in commercial flocks since at least the 1800s. However, AI became a much more troubling threat at the end of the 20th century when an H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong resulted in 18 infections and six deaths in the human population and the culling of over 1 million chickens. Outbreaks of H5N1 naturally occur every few years, with the last one in the US occurring in 2014 and 2015. While bird flu viruses typically do not infect humans (and generally only infect those with close contact with infected animals), there is concern that these viruses might mutate and become better able to spread in human populations, potentially causing wide spread disease. There is no indication this has happened yet, but it is important to limit the opportunity for this to happen by containing the outbreak. Read more on precautions, including those for bird feeders, from the Raptor Center at the University of Minnesota.

Our Evolving Understanding of COVID-19 and Its Impacts

27 months into the pandemic, the United States reached 1 million COVID-19 deaths to on Wednesday. While not as high as they once were, the US is averaging about 600 deaths per day in its current 7-day average. Cases are continuing to climb as well across the country, with the BA.2.12.1 subvariant now accounting for 29% of new infections. The WHO also confirmed this week that the world saw 14.9 million excess deaths associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, a grim reminder of how severe this has been.

This comes as the FDA announced this week that it is limiting the EUA on the Johnson & Johnson/Janssen COVID-19 vaccine “to individuals 18 years of age and older for whom other authorized or approved COVID-19 vaccines are not accessible or clinically appropriate, and to individuals 18 years of age and older who elect to receive the Janssen COVID-19 Vaccine because they would otherwise not receive a COVID-19 vaccine.” The FDA stated this is because of the risk of developing thrombosis with thrombocytopenia syndrome associated with the J&J vaccine. Unlike the mRNA offerings from Pfizer and Moderna, the J&J vaccine uses more traditional viral vector technology, using a disabled adenovirus to deliver COVID-19’s DNA to cells, instructing them to produce the spike proteins. This prompts the body to mount an immune response by creating antigens. While the J&J vaccine was initially thought to be a game changer in terms of its potential to increase patient compliance versus that of the two dose vaccines, it only proved to be 66.3% effective in preventing lab-confirmed COVID-19 infection, despite being highly efficacious in preventing hospitalization and death in those who did fall ill. It also was later found to be less effective against the Delta and Omicron variants that emerged in late 2021. This EUA limitation comes alongside pandemic response challenges. With the prospect of more COVID-19 funding for the administration held up in Congress, it’s unclear if the Biden administration could even afford a broader push for second boosters the FDA has hinted at recently.

The recent Omicron subvariants have, in some ways, fundamentally changed how many think of the pandemic. With the federal mask mandate struck down, many, including Delta Airlines, have celebrated the “return to normal” and COVID-19’s transition “to an ordinary seasonal virus.” Megan Molteni with STAT News notes that COVID-19 has yet to find a seasonal cadence and COVID-19 is still more than capable of causing mass death and disability, as recently witnessed in Hong Kong. Omicron has brought a number of changes still, such as drastic differences in how the virus spreads among people. Whereas up to 80% of infections with the original version were caused by about 10 to 20% of those infected, Omicron is spreading much more in places like households, meaning superspreader events might be less important as key drivers of outbreaks. Given the drastic differences in variants, some scientists think it is worth turning to prior variants that never took off as much as ones like Delta and Omicron to better understand what future variants might bring, according to this new article in the New York Times.

Of course, the costs of this pandemic have not been limited to lives alone. A recent article in Nature examines the long-term health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on healthcare workers (HCWs). The results are not all that surprising–more front-line HCWs now show signs of PTSD than they did before the pandemic. In the article, Ouyang et al. seek to “investigate the development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in HCWs in a longitudinal manner.” They also aim to further explore how risk perception impacts the evolution of PTSD over a longer period of time using a one-year follow-up study. Their study used HCWs in Guangdong, China (a coastal city bordering Macau and Hong Kong) and concludes, “Our data provide a snapshot of the worsening of HCWs’ PTSD along with the repeated pandemic outbreaks and highlight the important role of risk perception in the development of PTSD symptoms in HCWs over time.”

“Risky ‘Gain-of-Function’ Studies Need Stricter Guidance, Say US Researchers”

This new news piece from Nature details experts’ calls for the US government to improve its guidance on experiments that might make pathogens more deadly or transmissible. It covers the April 27 listening session offered by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), to which Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz provided a statement. The Nature article explains that, “Many at the listening session pushed for stricter oversight of risky-pathogen research, however. Some suggested that the HHS advisory-panel approach be extended to other US entities. Gregory Koblentz, a biosecurity-policy specialist at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia, pointed out that pharmaceutical firms, philanthropic institutions and federal agencies, including the Department of Energy, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Defense, also conduct research on potentially risky pathogens. They should adhere to the same guidelines, he said.”

While the debate about gain-of-function (GoF) testing has been strong over the last decade, it has gained renewed attention amid the COVID-19 pandemic and debates about the origin of SARS-CoV-2. In 2014, the US government announced a funding moratorium on GoF experiments that was lifted in 2017 after HHS implemented an extra review layer for such experiments. While most virologists think SARS-CoV-2 spilled-over to humans directly from animals, this has remained a political debate in the US centering on the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Regardless of COVID-19’s origin, concerns over these kinds of experiments and challenges in biosecurity standards should still be reviewed and addressed now before it is too late. Watch the NSABB listening session recording here and read the Under the NIH Poliscope blog post about it here.

“Building a Sustainable Biopreparedness Industrial Base”

The MITRE Corporation recently released this report discussing the state of the American biopharma industry and what objectives the US government should pursue within it. MITRE identifies several shortfalls across USG capabilities, the mRNA industry, and the mRNA supply chain and ecosystem. The report argues that “To counter strategic competition in this industry, the United States needs a focused approach to drive action and accountability on sustaining needed capacity and capabilities. However, a history of inconsistent priorities and funding constitutes a significant barrier to creating a strong partnership between government and industry in this sector.” The report outlines a number of courses of action the US government can take to help improve this capacity and help protect the US population from future biological threats.

“Strengthening Biological Security After COVID-19: Using Cartoons for Engaging Life Science Stakeholders with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention”

Novossiolova et al.’s new article in the Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity reports on the development of an awareness-raising resource which uses the cartoon format to facilitate consideration of biological and chemical security issues. This resource takes the form of a cartoon series comprising five two-page thematic cartoons. The cartoon series was published by the London Metropolitan University, UK and is freely available online in 13 languages. Indicative facilitation notes aim to support the use of the cartoon series for outreach and training.

Critical Federal Capabilities Needed to Evaluate Real-World Safety, Effectiveness, and Equitable Distribution and Use of Medical Countermeasures During a Public Health Emergency

From the National Academies:

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of having access to real-world data and evidence to monitor and assess medical countermeasure (MCM) use and performance so policy makers can make more effective and rapid public health decisions, protect population health, and save lives. During public health emergencies, the use of MCMs, such as therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostics, can be made available to the public under a range of regulatory access mechanisms.

This Rapid Expert Consultation was produced by individual members of the Standing Committee for CDC Center for Preparedness and Response. Its aim is to review and propose modifications to an initial draft list of critical federal capabilities presented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration that are needed to evaluate real-world safety, effectiveness, equitable distribution, access, and use of MCMs during a public health emergency. This effort draws from expert input, published literature, and lessons learned from previous public health emergencies, as well as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

“Summit on Strengthening the Nation’s Early Warning System for Health Threats: A Meeting Summary”

The White House released this meeting summary covering its April 19 Summit supporting the launch of the CDC’s Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics (CFA). The summit included panels on Next-Generation Public Health Data and Analytics, Enabling Local Governments, Strengthening the System for Patients, and closing remarks from Dr. Sandi Ford, Special Assistant to the President for Public Health & Science, Domestic Policy Council.

The Role of Public Health Emergency Management in Biodefense: A COVID-19 Case Study”

Incoming Biodefense PhD Student Ryan Houser recently published a new article in Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness. Houser uses the COVID-19 pandemic to “explore the biodefense and public health preparedness landscape for tends in federal support and capacity building.” He identifies a number of consistent failures and concludes that, “To counter the increasing biothreats, the United States must invest in revamping the biodefense infrastructure to mimic and support public health emergency preparedness initiatives which will increase our resilience to various biothreats.”

Student Features

Biodefense MS Student Theresa Hoang‘s research paper, “­­The Hidden Pandemic: COVID-19’s Impact on Antimicrobial Resistance”, was recently posted on the Pandora Report. Hoang uses a number of case studies to discuss how AMR has grown as a threat over the course of the pandemic and what might be done to help combat this mounting public health crisis, including improvements in antibiotic stewardship programs.

Biodefense PhD Student Danyale C. Kellogg recently discussed the threat Chinese failed outbreak responses pose to global health security on the Schar School’s Center for Security Policy Studies (CSPS) website. Kellogg, a current CSPS Fellow, covers prior failures of the Chinese Communist Party in the COVID-19 outbreak response in addition to its efforts to cover up the spread of HIV/AIDS in Henan Province in the 1990s and SARS in the early 2000s. She discusses the challenges of preparing for future pandemics in light of a rising China that is more interested in usurping the international order than promoting global health security.

This Podcast Will Kill You Episode 95, Tetanus: An Inhumane Calamity!

The Erins go beyond the risks of rusty nails and Tdap booster requirements to discuss the biology, clinical presentation, and historical and modern challenges posed by this disease. They provide an especially interesting discussion of how neonatal tetanus in the American South impacted the field of epidemiology on top of all the other great content packed into this episode.

Franklin Institute’s So Curious! Podcast: What is Biohacking? From Bodybuilding to Bacterial Shoes

Episode 9 of So Curious! continues this season’s theme of Human 2.0 by discussing innovations in hacking the human body. Covering everything from cyborgs and laws and ethics, this episode features Ricky Solorzano (CEO of Allevi) and Scott Shunk (a physique athlete who provides an interesting perspective on this topic). Give it a listen!

The 2021 Global Health Security Index: A Tool for Decision-Makers in Latin America

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Initiative for Global Security (IGS) are offering this Zoom event on May 11 at 3:30 pm EST. The GHS Index is a comprehensive assessment and benchmarking of health security and related capabilities across 195 countries. Since the launch of the first edition of the GHS Index in October 2019, much has changed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The second edition of the GHS Index considers lessons learned from this experience and expands upon the measures of national level health security. National leaders across the globe bear a collective responsibility for developing and maintaining robust global capability to counter infectious disease threats. Political will is needed to protect people from the consequences of epidemics, to take action to save lives, and to build a safer and more secure world. Register here.

The Danger of Disinformation: Understanding Russia’s Propaganda Campaign Against Ukrainian Biological Facilities

Join NTI for a conversation with Dr. Gregory Koblentz, one of the world’s foremost biodefense scholars working at the nexus of health, science, and security, to discuss the ongoing Russian disinformation campaign against biological research facilities in Ukraine.

As part of an effort to justify its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has sought to sow doubt and confusion around the purpose of public health and research labs in the country, spreading disinformation that these facilities are conducting covert, offensive bioweapon development operations. This tactic is a longstanding favorite of the Russian government, going back decades. Koblentz will explore the true aims of Russia’s disinformation campaign in Ukraine and what the international community should do to counter it. This seminar will be held on May 17 at 11 am EST. Register here.

Lessons from COVID-19 for the Public Health Emergency Enterprise: What Happened to the Plans? – A Workshop

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies is hosting a workshop exploring the nation’s Public Health Emergency (PHE) preparedness enterprise, through the lens of COVID-19 in the US. The workshop will be hosted on May 17 and 18, and will explore key components, success stories, and failure points throughout the entire PHE preparedness and response enterprise. Participants will also identify opportunities for more effective catastrophic disaster, pandemic, and other large scale PHEs planning at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. Speakers include Dr. Deborah Birx (former Coronavirus Response Coordinator at the Office of the Vice President) and Dr. Gigi Gronvall (Senior Scholar at Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security). Register here.

Chemical and Biological Weapons Net Launched

The CBWNet research project received funding from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, lasting April 2022 through March 2026. The project will be carried out by the Berlin office of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), the Chair for Public Law and International Law at the University of Gießen, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and the Carl Friedrich Weizsäcker-Centre for Science and Peace Research (ZNF) at the University of Hamburg. The joint project aims to “identify options to comprehensively strengthen the norms against chemical and biological weapons (CBW).” The project includes an analysis of the normative order of these regimes and investigation of the potential consequences of certain technological developments in light of changing security dynamics. The project’s site explains, “Wherever research results point to challenges for or a weakening of CBW norms, the project partners will develop options and proposals to uphold or strengthen these norms and to enhance their resilience.”

Russian WMD Disinformation Resources

The mountain of debunkings and academic commentary on the Russian disinformation campaign targeting DTRA’s Biological Threat Reduction Program-supported labs in Ukraine continues to grow. While a more comprehensive list and tool on the Pandora Report’s website is currently under construction, here are a couple of recent works on the matter:

“People’s Republic of China Efforts to Amplify the Kremlin’s Voice on Ukraine”

The US State Department released this Disarming Disinformation piece outlining how China and its state outlets seek to influence public opinion on Russia’s war in Ukraine. It discusses the PRC’s toolbox of methods to do this and offers a detailed timeline of these attempts along with more sources on the subject.

“Ukraine’s Battlefield Is Haunted by Putin’s Chemical Weapons Legacy”

William J. Broad’s new piece in the New York Times begins with the 2017 televised destruction of what President Vladimir Putin claimed was the last of Russia’s CW stockpile before diving into current concerns about his potential to use these weapons in Ukraine. Broad discusses differences between how the Kremlin treats nuclear and conventional war versus chemical war as well as past Russian uses of CW, including during the hostage crisis in a Moscow theater in 2002.

“Are Russia’s Claims of Ukrainian Biological Weapons a Propaganda Ploy?

Deutsche Welle released this English language backgrounder on Russian disinformation focusing on BW. It includes a portion about accusations targeting modern Germany specifically, including the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology’s collaboration with Kharkiv’s Institute of Experimental and Clinical Veterinary Medicine.

EUvsDisinfo Now Available in Mandarin Chinese

The European External Action Service’s EUvsDisinfo is now offering articles published in Chinese to target Chinese-speaking audience with factual information about the war in Ukraine. This is in response to previous alignment of pro-Kremlin and Chinese state outlets using disinformation tactics on subjects like biological weapons and the origins of COVID-19. One report released in March (““生物武器被全面禁止,但是进行生物研究并不违法””/””Bioweapons Are Totally Banned, But It’s Not Illegal to Conduct Biological Research””) discusses the mission of the Nunn Lugar Program and the legal, important public health work it conducts in host countries.

MAY THE FOURTH BE WITH YOU

First, a little Biodefense Graduate Program-Star Wars parody to kick off the festivities.

Happy Star Wars Day! A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away…there were also biological weapons, believe it or not. While certainly not an elegant weapon for a more civilized age, these bioweapons (BW) varied in sophistication and caused their victims much suffering. They were a threat in most major conflicts throughout the history of the galaxy and were a research priority of the Galactic Empire. Fortunately, the Alliance to Restore the Republic prioritized destroying Imperial BW facilities throughout the Galactic Civil War and beyond. Join us for a recap on uses of BW throughout Star Wars Canon and Legends and don’t forget to re-watch your favorite Star Wars movie or show (and by that we mean Episode V) today and see if you can spot some of these examples. This is the way.

Refresher: Canon vs Legends

Since the premier of Episode IV: A New Hope in 1977, the epic space-opera franchise we all know and love has grown massively. Today this includes the nine films of the Skywalker Saga, the two anthology films (Rogue One and Solo), a whole array of TV shows from Droids and Ewoks in the 1980s to The Mandalorian and The Book of Boba Fett today, and countless books, games, and comics. It is a lot to keep up with. Originally, everything outside of the films and certain other productions (like The Clone Wars TV show) was considered the Expanded Universe (EU). The EU covered events from more than 36,000 years before the events of Episode I: The Phantom Menace in the Dawn of the Jedi comics to over 100 years after Episode VI: Return of the Jedi in the Legacy comics. Interestingly, the EU is also technically older than the films themselves. This is because the novel adaptation of Episode IV was released six months before the film in 1977.

Anyway, in 2014, in preparation for the sequel trilogy, Lucasfilm (acquired by Disney in 2012) announced that everything previously considered EU was going to be re-branded as Legends and would no longer be adhered to. This meant that there was now new continuity consisting of the original six films, Star Wars: The Clone Wars, and any future material- this became the official canon. In January 2021, Lucasfilm announced six new eras dividing all of the canonical content to help organize the expanding franchise: The High Republic, The Fall of the Jedi, The Reign of the Empire, The Age of Rebellion, The New Republic, and The Rise of the First Order. Right now, the canon consists of 12 movies (the nine films of the Skywalker Saga, the two anthology films, and the 2008 animated film, The Clone Wars), several television shows (The Clone Wars, Rebels, The Mandalorian and The Book of Boba Fett), EA’s video games (Battlefront, Battlefront II, Jedi: Fallen Order, and Squadrons), and a ton of books. Everything published or produced after 2014 is canon; everything else is considered Legends. There are at least 381 novels under the franchise, including famous series like Timothy Zahn’s Thrawn Trilogy and his follow-up Thrawn Duology. There are also well over 100 comic series between those published by Marvel and Dark Horse Comics. So, as you can imagine, there have been plenty of opportunities over the years for bioweapons to make an appearance or two in this franchise, some of which we’ll cover today.

Biological and Toxin Weapons in Star Wars Canon

Do you recall any examples of BW use in Star Wars over the years? There is a great chance you don’t. Fortunately, some of us had a lot of free time before graduate school and, as a result, are all too aware of these instances. While we don’t know a ton about BW use in the early history of the canon, we do know that the Empire was very interested in these weapons (particularly neurotoxins and defoliants) throughout its rule. The Separatists during the days of the Galactic Republic were also interested in biological and toxin weapons, most notably Blue Shadow Virus.

Fall of the Jedi- Blue Shadow Virus

This virus makes appearances in both Canon and Legends stories, but in the canon, it is said to have spread across the galaxy like a plague many years before the Clone Wars. Blue Shadow Virus is a waterborne virus that the majority of carbon-based lifeforms were susceptible to. It is said that patients infected with this virus had only 48 hours before the resulting disease would prove fatal, with 96% of carbon-based life-forms succumbing to the virus. Patients generally experienced coughing and fatigue in addition to developing visible blue veins over their bodies. Originally infamous for being incurable, it was discovered that a cure (described in the franchise as an antidote) could be derived from the reeska root, a rare plant originating only on the planet Iego in the Outer Rim Territories.

Because of its wide spread thousands of years before the Clone Wars, efforts were successfully made to eradicate it. However, Dr. Nuvo Vindi (pictured in the Tweet below), working under the Confederacy of Independent Systems, created and weaponized an airborne version of the virus during the Clone Wars. He planned to use bombs to spread the weapon across the galaxy, working on his plot in a Separatist laboratory hidden in the swamps of Naboo. Eventually, the Royal Naboo Security Forces intercepted a tactical droid returning to the lab, prompting Senator Padmé Amidala and Representative Jar Jar Binks to return to their home planet to investigate. They were captured by Vindi’s battle droids, though they were later rescued by Jedi Generals Obi-Wan Kenobi and Anakin Skywalker and Anakin’s Padawan, Ahsoka Tano. They thwarted Vindi’s plot but, as the facility was being decontaminated, a service droid stole a sample of the virus and detonated one of the remaining devices, trapping Amidala, Tano, Binks, and Captain Rex and his squad in the lab with a few remaining battle droids. As the clock ticks, Kenobi and Skywalker travel to Iego to collect the reeska root, eventually returning to Naboo with the cure just in the nick of time.

The Reign of the Empire and Beyond

In Aftermath: Life Debt, Imperial Navy Vice Admiral Perwin Gedde oversaw one of the Empire’s largest, most brutal BW programs. Under his direction, “ancient diseases” were tested on annexed planets’ civilians. After the Empire was defeated on Endor, he escaped and hid out on Vorlag with Slussen Canker, a slaver and crime lord. Gedde was wanted by the New Republic for his war crimes and was eventually tracked down by a team of Imperial hunters led by Norra Wexley following a galaxy-wide manhunt. While Gedde temporarily subdued his hunters with the assistance of Jas Emari, she later betrayed him, leading to Gedde being imprisoned on the Halo as the team returned to Chandrila. Under the orders of Imperial Navy Admiral Rae Sloane, he was poisoned with a mycotoxin by the bounty hunter Mercurial Swift so that he could not provide information about his BW work to the New Republic.

In Star Wars: Commander (a mobile strategy game), it is revealed that the Imperial Military Department of Advanced Weapons Research organized a program called Project Blackwing on Dandoran. The project was tasked with discovering how to create immortality, principally by using Sith alchemy to create a virus that could reanimate the dead. However, this did not go according to plan as there was the accidental creation and release of the Blackwing virus, AKA “the Sickness”, sometime between the Battles of Yavin and Hoth. The virus killed its hosts and turned them into cannibal zombies. While the zombies did move slower than their living hosts had previously, they had much more stamina and strength than before. Worse yet, the virus allowed the zombies to act as one and to learn from others, allowing them to use weapons and pilot starships. The outbreak spread across the secret installation, earning the new Undead Troopers the collective name “Army of the Dead” as they eventually came to be supplemented by Heavy and Scout Undead Troopers. Both the Empire and the Rebel Alliance worked to contain this threat, eventually succeeding, though the rebels did have to contain a second outbreak later on. This virus also appears in Legends work.

Finally, Battlefront: Twilight Company reveals that during the Galactic Civil War, the Empire hosted a BW research facility on Coyerti. The Distillery was the main hub of the BW operation on the planet, making it an important strategic target during the Coyerti campaign. Though there are not many specifics, it is known that the Distillery created, tested, and exported toxin (and even some chemical) weapons. During the Coyerti campaign, the Alliance’s 61st Mobile Infantry (AKA Twilight Company) successfully destroyed the Distillery. However, weapons from the Distillery stockpiled on Nakadia were later used on Twilight Company, claiming many rebel soldiers, including Maediyu after her internal organs liquified.

“These aren’t pesticides. They’ve got military-grade bioweapons, be careful.”

Hazram Namir, Battlefront: Twilight Company

That wraps up examples in the canon. Check out Star Wars: The Clone Wars S1:E17 and 18 (“Blue Shadow Virus” and “Mystery of a Thousand Moons”) to see Blue Shadow Virus in action. And before you say, “But what about the Kamino saberdart?” Well…more on that at the end.

Biological and Toxin Weapons in Star Wars Legends

As you might have guessed, BW is much more prevalent throughout the much larger Legends side of the franchise. While we can’t possibly cover it all in this post, we will hit some of the highlights. Much like in the canon, it is known that bioweapons have been used across time and space in the galaxy. Ship, the sentient spacecraft who existed in the intergalactic void, recalled the use of the Plague bomb during a war in a distant galaxy. Ship reveals in “Star Wars 38: Riders in the Void” that the bomb destroyed the home world of Ship’s pilot, with the pilot being the only known member of the species to survive the outbreak. The Charon are also known to have used BW frequently.

More recently, the Old Republic era saw the use of many bioweapons, such as Trihexalon in the Star War: Jedi Starfighter game. Trihexalon, AKA hex or dragon’s breath, was a weapon created by the Trade Federation using ore from Mount Merakan. It was said to cause “complete biomass conversion” in targets and it could be either tailored to target a specific individual or used against an entire planet. Once refined, hex was a dust that was inert and stable at very low temperatures. This was kept in vials that allowed the agent to be released when ready, causing a massive energy burst. A palm-sized sample was enough to kill as many as 300 Wookies, though this depended on the blast size generated by the special vial.

Later on, the Empire developed nano-destroyers, engineered viruses designed to destroy a victim’s body a single cell at a time. These were first introduced in Champions of the Force and have since been briefly mentioned in The New Rebellion and The New Jedi Order: Agents of Chaos I: Hero’s Trial. The destroyers were said to bind to the victims’ cells, causing them to have powers such as increased strength and speed or rapid healing. However, they also caused the victims to mutate and turn into mindless beings who fed on others. Though there is mention of a cure developed on Carida, little other information is provided about it.

A Sith scientists named Vul Isen developed a weapon using “viral spores” during the Second Imperial Civil War for use as a force multiplier against rebelling planets. Essentially, these weapons killed every living creature in a target planet’s oceans within a matter of days, rendering the oceans totally uninhabitable and eventually killing off the entire population of the planet. He developed several versions of this weapon before finally creating one potent enough so that one vial had the destructive capacity to end life on an entire planet. He intended this final strain to be used on Utapau, where remnants of the Galactic Alliance maintained a base. Later, Isen was ordered by Darth Wyyrlok to release the spores on Dac to punish the Mon Calamari for aiding the Alliance. Within a few days of doing so, millions of Dac’s inhabitants died, floating on the water’s surface and prompting Rogue Squadron to incorrectly conclude that a new landmass had formed on the planet because of the size of the collection of corpses. Galactic Alliance Admiral Gar Stazi became aware of the plot and successfully organized a massive evacuation of Dac, allowing 20% of the planet’s inhabitants to escape before the rest succumbed to the spores. This attack outraged many across the galaxy and set Jedi Cade Skywalker on a warpath for Isen, whom he called the “Butcher of Dac”.

“Poisons? Toxins? Destroy them from space with bombs!”

“As I have explained before, Darth Azard, we’re not here to make the inhabitants really, really sick. We’re to make certain they all die.”

Vul Isen to Darth Azard in Legacy 49: Extremes, Part 2 (2006)

The last one we’ll touch on today is Vira606, a virus engineered by the Imperial Security Bureau that appeared in the Stars Wars: The Roleplaying Game campaign book, The Far Orbit Project. Basically, the ISB created this virus to be 100% fatal, though it was not contagious. There was, however, a very specific series of serum injections that could keep it at bay for a time, preventing death until another series was needed. The ISB used this to maintain control over enemies and agents, ensuring their loyalty and forcing them to do tasks in order to get a ration of the injections in time.

Final Thoughts and Further Reading/Nerding

In case it isn’t clear, some times the Star Wars universe confuses BW and CW and sometimes the causative agents and mechanisms of these weapons just do not add up. While it is likely that societies in a galaxy where inter-planetary travel and jumps through hyperspace are common have more advanced bioweapons than those in real life, their designs are not always clear to us here in this galaxy. However, it is still interesting to see how these kinds of weapons are represented in popular culture, especially since BW doesn’t quite have a key, iconic representation in film a la Dr. Strangelove.

BW’s presence in pop culture did grow during the Cold War, though it has appeared in written and film media for much longer (check out Albert Robida’s La Guerre au vingtième siècle/The War in the Twentieth Century for a 19th century take on weaponized disease, for example). Some of this mid-20th century fascination seems to have influenced parts of Star Wars’ take on BW as well. For example, Dr. Nuvo Vindi speaks with a distinctly German accent. He also weaponizes a previously eradicated pathogen, paralleling the real-life threat of smallpox weapons following the disease’s eradication and the end of civilian vaccination campaigns. Of course, in recent years, zombie films have been huge in the United States, though the South Koreans definitely do zombie movies best. Iconic outbreak films like Outbreak, Contagion, and I Am Legend also naturally experienced renewed popularity in 2020. Whatever the era or genre, it seems we just can’t get enough of the psychological terror the idea of an infectious disease killing everyone off brings- even in the classic space opera in a galaxy far, far away.

For more BW+space opera fun, this Wookiepedia page offers a great jumping point to learn more about all the uses of BW in Legends materials. This one offers examples of BW use appearing in canon work. If you’re more interested in CW, check out this Wookiepedia listing for weapons that use different chemicals (including lots of assassination weapons). Make sure to check out this post on the Star Wars official site called the Phlegmpire Strikes Back, which discusses other bioweapons and naturally-occurring illnesses in the galaxy. Finally, if you want a video on the Imperial BW Program, check out EckhartsLadder’s video on the program here on YouTube. Now, about that saberdart…

The canon isn’t always clear on if the Kamino saberdart uses a toxin or a poison to kill, but it is more clear in Legends work that these darts can use either type of weapon. Love or hate the Dex’s Diner scene in Episode II, this weapon helped drive the plot along while establishing that CBW are also used for assassinations in this galaxy. Now if only we knew more about disinfo campaigns in the galaxy…

That wraps up this special feature. May the fourth be with you all, Pandora Report readers. We’ll see you on Friday for the weekly newsletter!

­­The Hidden Pandemic: COVID-19’s Impact on Antimicrobial Resistance

By Theresa Hoang, Biodefense MS Student

Introduction

The COVID-19 global pandemic has threatened public health security by adversely altering the health of patients and overwhelming hospital systems throughout the world. Not only is COVID-19 a global health threat, but antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a public health crisis too. AMR happens when microbes become resistant to antimicrobials that are designed to kill them.[1] AMR contributes to healthcare-associated infections (HAI)­ in patients, which spreads within healthcare facilities and throughout the community and environment.[2] The CDC reports that “each year in the U.S., at least 2.8 million people are infected with antibiotic-resistant bacteria or fungi, and more than 35,000 people die as a result.”1 AMR is a serious public health concern, especially during the pandemic, because experts have noted that COVID-19 may have reversed the progress on reducing AMR by creating a “perfect storm” for antibiotic-resistant infections in healthcare settings.[3] How has the COVID-19 pandemic impacted AMR in clinical patients, and why is it important? This issue is important because it affects patients, who are undergoing antibiotic treatments, and healthcare systems that are trying to prevent the spread of AMR. The current literature has discussed extensively the direct and indirect effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on AMR. A group of authors focuses on the increase of secondary drug-resistant infections and how they are affecting COVID-19 patients. Another group discusses the deterioration of healthcare systems allowing AMR transmission to escalate. Other authors analyze the disruption of antibiotic stewardship and its adverse effects during the pandemic. To fight against this growing pandemic, patients should work together with their healthcare providers to learn about the troubling effects of AMR and how to prevent it from spreading by practicing enhanced antimicrobial stewardship.

Secondary Drug-Resistant Infections from AMR

The surge in AMR during the pandemic has resulted in a rise of secondary drug-resistant infections. The three drug-resistant microorganisms that will be discussed are methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales (CREs), and Candida auris.

Scanning Electron Micrograph of MRSA (from CDC)

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus

MRSA is commonly spread in healthcare facilities and communities, and it can cause staphylococcus infections that are usually difficult to treat because of its resistance to some antibiotics.[4] Segala et. al explain that, during the pandemic, MRSA co-infections have increased significantly in COVID-19 patients who were admitted to intensive care units (ICUs).[5] “Up to 86.4% of all COVID-19 patients admitted to the ICU received a wide spectrum antibiotic therapy,” which helps treat against a vast majority of co-infections, including MRSA.5 However, exposing patients to these unnecessary antibiotics in a combination therapy can induce AMR. In another case study completed in Italy on mechanically ventilated patients, researchers compared the proportion of ventilator associated pneumonia (VAP) due to MRSA, between COVID-19 patients and non-COVID-19 patients.5 They found VAP rates were significantly higher in COVID-19 patients due to receiving a broad spectrum antibiotic therapy. Their findings also suggest there is higher rate of MRSA colonization and environmental contamination in COVID-19 ICUs.5 MRSA has not only evolved to become more resistant to antibiotics, but it continues to spread and colonize in healthcare facilities and other communities, in addition to infecting COVID-19 patients at increasing rates.

Infographic of the Risk of CRE Infections (from CDC)

Carbapenem-Resistant Enterobacterales (CREs)

Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales (CREs), formerly known as CR Enterobacteriaceae and nicknamed “Nightmare bacteria,” are a large group of different types of Gram-negative bacteria, such as Escherichia coli (E. coli) and Klebsiella pneumoniae, that commonly causes multiple infections in humans and in healthcare settings. CREs also develop resistance to a group of antibiotics called carbapenems.[6] CRE infections are spread from person-to-person by infecting or colonizing people (without causing infections or symptoms), specifically contact with wounds or stool, and through medical devices that have not been properly cleaned.[7]

CREs are a threat to public health because they are difficult to treat and are resistant to almost all available antibiotics.6 Their resistance comes from producing carbapenemases, which are enzymes that spread to other germs and cause resistance in carbapenems, rendering them ineffective.4 The CDC states that high levels of antibiotic resistance in CREs necessitate more toxic and less effective treatments, harming patient outcomes.7

Studies have shown that CRE infections are increasing among COVID-19 patients. According to a recent review on CRE infections during the pandemic, “secondary infections caused by CR-Klebsiella pneumoniae (Cr-Kp) show high prevalence of co-infection in COVID-19 patients.”5 Researchers have noticed that CR-Kp colonization and infections were associated with a high mortality rate in COVID-19 patients and increased use of antimicrobial agents.5 This represents a significant challenge for both infection control and clinical practice because as new antibiotics continue to be overused, CRE infections continue to rise and manifest in healthcare facilities and throughout communities.

Candida auris on CHROMagar Candida after Salt Sab Dulcitol Broth enrichment (from CDC)

Candida auris

Candida auris is an emerging multidrug-resistant (MDR) yeast that brings severe infections and spreads easily between hospitalized patients and nursing home residents through skin-to-skin contact.4 It can also cause invasive infections by entering the bloodstream, and even cause wound and ear infections.[8] Moreover, C. auris can trigger outbreaks in healthcare settings by contaminating hospital surfaces and medical equipment, especially if they are used for COVID-19 critical care. This indicates that patients are at high risk of C. auris colonization and infections.[9]

C. auris is an extreme public health threat to communities, and it has become a more serious concern during the pandemic. Since some patients with severe COVID-19 have required intubation and other invasive devices, they are put at a higher risk of C. auris infections; the pandemic may have contributed to an increase in these cases.[10] In another report from the CDC, 39 cases of C. auris have appeared in Florida during the pandemic that were attributed to “unconventional personal protective equipment (PPE) practices and environmental contamination.”[11] Risk factors like these have caused critically ill COVID-19 patients with C. auris infections to stay longer at ICUs and require antifungal drugs for long periods of time.5 This proves that improper and extended use of PPE has played a role in self-contamination and transmission of C. auris among COVID-19 patients.5 To prevent C. auris from spreading, especially among COVID patients, it must be detected immediately and IPC practices must be implemented.

Overall, the three different pathogens share a common goal, which is to induce AMR and increase secondary infections among patients. These drug-resistant microorganisms are a few out of the many other agents that have impacted patients during the COVID-19 pandemic.

AMR Implications for Healthcare Systems

Additionally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the exacerbation of healthcare systems has increased transmission of AMR. Studies have shown that the rise of AMR in healthcare facilities was caused by a variety of factors, such as prolonged stays in the ICU,[12] overcrowding,[13] “contaminated PPE, increased workload among hospital staff, and prolonged glove usage.”[14] Furthermore, “shortages of PPE, staff shortages, fatigue, and deployment of inexperienced staff members with only basic training” are other factors that may contribute to the increased risk of AMR.[15] These determinants not only led to a surge in AMR, but also increases in morbidity, mortality, and healthcare costs for patients.14

To reduce AMR from escalating any further, Rawson et. al propose that social distancing, increased hand hygiene practice, and pre-emptive discharge of patients and cancellation of routine procedures are potential interventions that healthcare systems can implement during the pandemic.13 In addition, Knight et. al mention “enhanced infection prevention and PPE usage and control measures, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, will help prevent infections and limit the spread of AMR.”15 Therefore, better health infrastructure and enhanced IPC measures set in place mean minimization of AMR amongst patients.

Disruption of Antimicrobial Stewardship

Disruption of antibiotic stewardship is another problem that needs to be addressed with the rise of AMR driven by COVID-19. Antimicrobial stewardship (AMS) is “promoting the appropriate use of antimicrobials, improving patient outcomes, reducing AMR, and decreasing spread of infections caused by multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs).”[16] However, AMS has not been emphasized enough during the pandemic. For instance, researchers are concerned that increased antibiotic use during the pandemic could enhance the long-term threat of AMR.[17] Popescu states that “misuse and overprescribing of antibiotics, poor stewardship, and generalized lack of surveillance,” are some reasons why AMR continues to be a public health problem.[18]

Moreover, misinformation on antibiotic use (whether it is low public awareness or increased consumption of them) is another factor that may enhance the rise and spread of AMR.[19] For example, Arshad et. al explain that 44% of respondents to a population survey in Australia assumed that antibiotics could treat or prevent COVID-19, and university students in Jordan who believed in conspiracy theories around COVID-19 also thought antibiotics can cure it.[20] Additionally, clinical uncertainty about the disease process and pathology of an infection can increase antibiotic use. “When clinicians do not have all the necessary information to truly understand what is happening to the patient, they tend to prescribe more antibiotics.”17 Altogether, these factors can increase the spread of AMR and disrupt AMS.

In contrast, Toro-Alzate et. al argue that “telemedicine consultations could be useful to educate patients on improving antibiotic use.”19 But at the same time, they mention how telemedicine can also increase over-prescription of antibiotics due to physicians’ decision making.19 Because they are not with patients in-person, healthcare providers tend to misdiagnose more often and not order as much lab tests with these remote services.

#BeAntibioticsAware: Do I really need antibiotics? (from CDC)

Another AMS strategy is using social media to manage online media campaigns that combat misinformation of antibiotic use. Some organizations, such as WHO and Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, correct antimicrobial misinformation and discuss ineffectiveness of antibiotics as a treatment for COVID-19 by using their digital platforms.20 Taking everything into consideration and how the pandemic impacted the public health community, AMS must be further improved and emphasized among patients and healthcare providers to reduce AMR.

Are Hospital Stays of COVID-19 Patients (with AMR) Longer than Those of Non-COVID Patients?

The literature does not yet analyze the question of whether the length of hospital stays for COVID-19 patients with AMR are longer compared to hospital stays of non-COVID-19 patients. One study has claimed that AMR has led to adverse consequences for patients, including “more prolonged hospital admissions.”[21] Srinivasan mentions and compares the patient discharge data and AMR rates between patients with influenza-like illness and COVID-19.11 Yet, the data between patients with flu and COVID-19 were collected at different time frames.

Source: CAPT Arjun Srinivasan, MD, USPHS (CDC PowerPoint)

In the current literature, there is no evidence and comparison recorded between hospital stays of COVID-19 and non-COVID patients during the pandemic, over the same time period. Considering that the surge in AMR has been driven by the pandemic, and that it has caused ill patients to stay at hospitals based on their conditions, it is hypothesized that COVID-19 patients with AMR have stayed at the hospitals much longer than non-COVID patients during the pandemic. To examine this gap, further research needs to be conducted by attempting to gather data through a survey and compare hospital stay rates between COVID-19 and non-COVID patients from different hospitals in the Northern Virginia area. This would also explore the critical steps needed to treat patients with AMR and to mitigate its transmission before discharging patients.

Conclusion

Antibiotics save lives but any time antibiotics are used, they can induce side effects and lead to AMR.4 Along with the rise in AMR, COVID-19 has compounded this issue, creating more challenges for patients and hospital systems to overcome. The surge of secondary infections among patients, the exacerbation of hospital infrastructures, and the disruption of antimicrobial stewardship are the results of COVID-19’s impact on AMR.

Bibliography

Arshad, Mehreen, Syed Faisal Mahmood, Mishal Khan, and Rumina Hasan. 2020. “COVID-19, Misinformation, and Antimicrobial Resistance.” BMJ371 (November): m4501. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m4501.

CDC. 2021. “Candida auris.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. July 19, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/fungal/candida-auris/index.html.

CDC. 2021. “CRE: Healthcare-Associated Infections (HAI).” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. April 7, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/cre/index.html.

​​CDC. 2021. “Patients | CRE | HAI”. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. February 18, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/cre/cre-patients.html.

CDC. 2020. “What Exactly Is Antibiotic Resistance?” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. March 13, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/about.html.

CDC. 2020. “Where Antibiotic Resistance Spreads.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. March 10, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/about/where-resistance-spreads.html.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.). 2019. “Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United States, 2019.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.). https://doi.org/10.15620/cdc:82532.

Jul 27, Chris Dall | News Reporter | CIDRAP News | and 2021. n.d. “CDC Reports Two Outbreaks of Pan-Resistant Candida Auris.” CIDRAP. Accessed October 6, 2021. https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2021/07/cdc-reports-two-outbreaks-pan-resistant-candida-auris.

Chowdhary, Anuradha, and Amit Sharma. 2020. “The Lurking Scourge of Multidrug Resistant Candida Auris in Times of COVID-19 Pandemic.” Journal of Global Antimicrobial Resistance 22 (September): 175–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jgar.2020.06.003.

“COVID-19 & Antibiotic Resistance | CDC.” 2021. June 8, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/covid19.html.

Hsu, Jeremy. “How Covid-19 is Accelerating the Threat of Antimicrobial Resistance.” BMJ: British Medical Journal (Online) 369, (May 18, 2020). http://dx.doi.org.mutex.gmu.edu/10.1136/bmj.m1983.

Knight, Gwenan M., Rebecca E. Glover, McQuaid C. Finn, Ioana D. Olaru, Gallandat Karin, Quentin J. Leclerc, Naomi M. Fuller, et al. 2021. “Antimicrobial Resistance and COVID-19: Intersections and Implications.” ELife 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.64139.

Majumder, Md Anwarul Azim, Sayeeda Rahman, Damian Cohall, Ambadasu Bharatha, Keerti Singh, Mainul Haque, and Marquita Gittens-St Hilaire. 2020. “Antimicrobial Stewardship: Fighting Antimicrobial Resistance and Protecting Global Public Health.” Infection and Drug Resistance 13: 4713–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.2147/IDR.S290835.

Manning, Mary Lou, Edward J. Septimus, Elizabeth S. Dodds Ashley, Sara E. Cosgrove, Mohamad G. Fakih, Steve J. Schweon, Frank E. Myers, and Julia A. Moody. 2018. “Antimicrobial Stewardship and Infection Prevention—Leveraging the Synergy: A Position Paper Update.” American Journal of Infection Control 46 (4): 364–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajic.2018.01.001.

Popescu, Saskia. 2019. “The Existential Threat of Antimicrobial Resistance.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75 (6): 286–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1680053.

Rawson, Timothy M, Luke S P Moore, Enrique Castro-Sanchez, Esmita Charani, Frances Davies, Giovanni Satta, Matthew J Ellington, and Alison H Holmes. 2020. “COVID-19 and the Potential Long-Term Impact on Antimicrobial Resistance.” Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 75 (7): 1681–84. https://doi.org/10.1093/jac/dkaa194.

Segala, Francesco Vladimiro, Davide Fiore Bavaro, Francesco Di Gennaro, Federica Salvati, Claudia Marotta, Annalisa Saracino, Rita Murri, and Massimo Fantoni. 2021. “Impact of SARS-CoV-2 Epidemic on Antimicrobial Resistance: A Literature Review.” Viruses 13 (11): 2110. https://doi.org/10.3390/v13112110.

​​Srinivasan, Arjun. “The Intersection of Antibiotic Resistance (AR), Antibiotic Use (AU), and COVID-19.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. February 10, 2021. https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/antibiotic-resistance-antibiotic-use-covid-19-paccarb.pdf.

Sun Jin, Louisa and Fisher, Dale. 2021. “MDRO Transmission in Acute Hospitals during the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. (34) 4: 365–371.

Toro-Alzate, Luisa, Karlijn Hofstraat, and Daniel H de Vries. 2021. “The Pandemic beyond the Pandemic: A Scoping Review on the Social Relationships between COVID-19 and Antimicrobial Resistance.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18 (16): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18168766.        

Vidyarthi, Ashima Jain, Arghya Das, and Rama Chaudhry. 2021. “Antimicrobial Resistance and COVID-19 Syndemic: Impact on Public Health.” Drug Discoveries & Therapeutics 15 (3): 124–29. https://doi.org/10.5582/ddt.2021.01052.


[1] CDC. 2020. “What Exactly Is Antibiotic Resistance?” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. March 13, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/about.html.

[2] CDC. 2020. “Where Antibiotic Resistance Spreads.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. March 10, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/about/where-resistance-spreads.html.

[3] “COVID-19 & Antibiotic Resistance | CDC.” 2021. June 8, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/covid19.html.

[4] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.). 2019. “Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United States, 2019.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.). https://doi.org/10.15620/cdc:82532.

[5] Segala, Francesco Vladimiro, Davide Fiore Bavaro, Francesco Di Gennaro, Federica Salvati, Claudia Marotta, Annalisa Saracino, Rita Murri, and Massimo Fantoni. 2021. “Impact of SARS-CoV-2 Epidemic on Antimicrobial Resistance: A Literature Review.” Viruses 13 (11): 2110. https://doi.org/10.3390/v13112110.

[6] CDC. 2021. “CRE: Healthcare-Associated Infections (HAI).” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. April 7, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/cre/index.html.

[7] CDC. 2021. “Patients | CRE | HAI”. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. February 18, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/cre/cre-patients.html

[8] CDC. 2021. “Candida auris.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. July 19, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/fungal/candida-auris/index.html.

[9] Chowdhary, Anuradha, and Amit Sharma. 2020. “The Lurking Scourge of Multidrug Resistant Candida Auris in Times of COVID-19 Pandemic.” Journal of Global Antimicrobial Resistance 22 (September): 175–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jgar.2020.06.003.

[10] Jul 27, Chris Dall | News Reporter | CIDRAP News | and 2021. n.d. “CDC Reports Two Outbreaks of Pan-Resistant Candida Auris.” CIDRAP. Accessed October 6, 2021. https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2021/07/cdc-reports-two-outbreaks-pan-resistant-candida-auris.

[11] Srinivasan, Arjun. “The Intersection of Antibiotic Resistance (AR), Antibiotic Use (AU), and COVID-19.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. February 10, 2021. https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/antibiotic-resistance-antibiotic-use-covid-19-paccarb.pdf.

[12] Vidyarthi, Ashima Jain, Arghya Das, and Rama Chaudhry. 2021. “Antimicrobial Resistance and COVID-19 Syndemic: Impact on Public Health.” Drug Discoveries & Therapeutics 15 (3): 124–29. https://doi.org/10.5582/ddt.2021.01052.

[13] Rawson, Timothy M, Luke S P Moore, Enrique Castro-Sanchez, Esmita Charani, Frances Davies, Giovanni Satta, Matthew J Ellington, and Alison H Holmes. 2020. “COVID-19 and the Potential Long-Term Impact on Antimicrobial Resistance.” Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 75 (7): 1681–84. https://doi.org/10.1093/jac/dkaa194.

[14] Sun Jin, Louisa and Fisher, Dale. 2021. “MDRO Transmission in Acute Hospitals during the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. (34) 4: 365–371.

[15] Knight, Gwenan M., Rebecca E. Glover, McQuaid C. Finn, Ioana D. Olaru, Gallandat Karin, Quentin J. Leclerc, Naomi M. Fuller, et al. 2021. “Antimicrobial Resistance and COVID-19: Intersections and Implications.” ELife 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.64139.

[16] Manning, Mary Lou, Edward J. Septimus, Elizabeth S. Dodds Ashley, Sara E. Cosgrove, Mohamad G. Fakih, Steve J. Schweon, Frank E. Myers, and Julia A. Moody. 2018. “Antimicrobial Stewardship and Infection Prevention—Leveraging the Synergy: A Position Paper Update.” American Journal of Infection Control 46 (4): 364–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajic.2018.01.001.

[17] Hsu, Jeremy. “How Covid-19 is Accelerating the Threat of Antimicrobial Resistance.” BMJ: British Medical Journal (Online) 369, (May 18, 2020). http://dx.doi.org.mutex.gmu.edu/10.1136/bmj.m1983.

[18] Popescu, Saskia. 2019. “The Existential Threat of Antimicrobial Resistance.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75 (6): 286–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1680053.

[19] Toro-Alzate, Luisa, Karlijn Hofstraat, and Daniel H de Vries. 2021. “The Pandemic beyond the Pandemic: A Scoping Review on the Social Relationships between COVID-19 and Antimicrobial Resistance.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18 (16): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18168766.          

[20] Arshad, Mehreen, Syed Faisal Mahmood, Mishal Khan, and Rumina Hasan. 2020. “COVID-19, Misinformation, and Antimicrobial Resistance.” BMJ 371 (November): m4501. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m4501.

[21] Majumder, Md Anwarul Azim, Sayeeda Rahman, Damian Cohall, Ambadasu Bharatha, Keerti Singh, Mainul Haque, and Marquita Gittens-St Hilaire. 2020. “Antimicrobial Stewardship: Fighting Antimicrobial Resistance and Protecting Global Public Health.” Infection and Drug Resistance 13: 4713–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.2147/IDR.S290835.

Pandora Report: 4.29.2022

Happy National Arbor Day to all our readers in the United States! To kick off this day highlighting the importance of protecting our environment and trees, we discuss how man-made climate change is increasing the spread of infectious diseases. We also cover COVID-19 as a future endemic disease, discussion of modern WMD threats, and a long list of fantastic new publications, including some by our own faculty members and students as well as friends of the Pandora Report.

Climate Change and Infectious Disease Risks- Is This the Pandemicene?

Newly published research in Nature this week reaffirms that climate change does indeed increase the risk of infectious diseases spreading. The new article by Carson et al. discusses how climate change specifically increases the chances of cross-species viral transmission. The authors explain that “At least 10,000 virus species have the capacity to infect humans, but at present, the vast majority are circulating silently in wild mammals. However, climate and land use change will produce novel opportunities for viral sharing among previously geographically-isolated species of wildlife. In some cases, this will facilitate zoonotic spillover…” Their work uses a phylogeographic model of the mammal-virus network to simulate potential hotspots of future viral sharing while also projecting geographic range shifts for over 3,100 mammal species using climate change and land use scenarios for the year 2070.

Ed Yong recently discussed this in the Atlantic, highlighting how the coming decades are estimated to see about 300,000 first encounters between species that typically do not interact. Though this number comes from some of the most optimistic climate outlooks, he explains, this would still allow for approximately 15,000 spillovers. He notes that Southeast Asia will likely be especially prone to spillovers because of a number of factors, include the wide range of bats living in the region. Africa too will likely encounter several problems, he explains, writing “In Africa, bats are probably the natural reservoirs for Ebola. Thirteen species could potentially carry the virus, and as global warming forces them to disperse, they’ll encounter almost 3,700 new mammal species, leading to almost 100 spillovers.”

Milder winters, less days with frost, increased precipitation, and hotter summers all mean it is easier for infectious diseases to spread globally and infect more people. As the world continues to fail to implement policies to reduce factors contributing to climate change, vectors will continue to spread and human populations will increasingly interact with wildlife populations. As such, it is important to invest in disease surveillance and public health infrastructure globally to meet these threats wherever they crop up. Yong summarizes this need nicely, writing “But pandemics are inherently unpredictable, and no amount of prevention will fully negate their risk. The world must be ready to meet the viruses that slip through the net. That means fortifying public health and health-care systems, strengthening social safety nets, and addressing all the weaknesses of the pre-COVID normal that made the world so vulnerable to the current pandemic and will leave it susceptible to the next. The world, in its desire to move past COVID, is already forgetting the lessons of the recent past, and perhaps assuming that a generation-defining crisis will occur only once a generation.”

COVID-19 Probably Is Not Going Anywhere

Dr. Anthony Fauci stated in an interview this week that the US is “out of the pandemic phase” in its battle with COVID-19, explaining that the virus still poses a threat but that, “We’re really in a transitional phase, from a deceleration of the numbers into hopefully a more controlled phase and endemicity.” After all, the Biden administration has made Paxlovid more accessible, second boosters are authorized for older and immunocompromised people, and, according to the CDC, three out of every four children have likely been infected with COVID-19. However, Becker’s writes, “Nationwide, COVID-19 cases increased 59 percent over the past 14 days, according to HHS data collected by The New York Times. Cases of COVID-19 have increased in the last 14 days in 47 states.” Furthermore, as more Americans gain access to at-home rapid antigen tests, it is likely that a large number of people in the US are positive but do not report the test results, especially if they experience mild or no symptoms. While cases are climbing right now, the US is averaging a little over 55,000 new cases per day for the last week, a sharp difference from the over 802,000 per day average experienced in January this year. So, if more people are experiencing milder infections, the people who are going to get vaccinated have done so, and antivirals are more readily available, when will this thing go away?

Well, it probably will not go away completely. Early in the pandemic, optimistic discussion of the possibility of eradicating COVID-19 abounded. However, as time has dragged on, that possibility dwindled. Only one human disease has been eradicated- smallpox. Smallpox was one of history’s most formidable killers, but there was not an animal reservoir for it, so it only infected humans. While this fact did not make eradication easy, it made it possible to use ring vaccination campaigns to eventually suffocate the virus as there was no risk it was lurking in the wild. Dr. Fauci discussed earlier this year how COVID-19 will likely become endemic once a less severe variant becomes established and helps COVID-19 become more like all of the other infectious diseases we routinely deal with, stating “But hopefully it will be at such a low level that it doesn’t disrupt our normal social, economic and other interactions.” The possibility of new, deadlier variants emerging remains important to consider while access to vaccines and therapeutics remains inequitable globally, with the developing world still largely lacking consistent access to these resources.

This discussion also has some increasingly considering whether or not the Russian flu of the 19th century was actually a coronavirus pandemic too. The “Russian flu” was originally thought to have lasted from 1889 to 1890, killing an estimated 1 million globally and coming at a time when modern germ theory was challenging miasma theory. A recent Fortune article discusses how this was the first well-documented pandemic and how it potentially stuck around after its pandemic phase ended, likely lasting anywhere from 1894 to 1900. Interestingly, long-term complications were also experienced with the Russian flu, similar to what is observed with long COVID. The article explains some of the symptoms observed with this supposed flu: “…Brüssow refers to a 344-page doctors’ report from 1891 London, which describes Russian flu patients as suffering from a “hard, dry cough,” fevers of 100 to 105 degrees, “frontal headache of special severity,” “pains in the eyeballs,” “general feeling of misery and weakness, and great depression of spirits,” and “weeping, nervous restlessness, inability to sleep, and occasional delirium.”” It also explains how children were relatively spared from it and how nearly 10% of cases had long-term symptoms, further leading to speculation this was a coronavirus pandemic. Some hypothesize this “flu” lives on today as OC43, a human coronavirus that generally causes mild upper respiratory illness, which would again point to a coronavirus pandemic that became much more mild and endemic. However, OC43 does occasionally bring increased mortality rates, with a 2021 study finding a 9.1% mortality rate in 77 patients at a Korean hospital between 2012 and 2017.

All this to say…COVID-19 probably is not going anywhere, though it might be less disruptive now. It is still important to take precautions and not fall into a sense of apathy, however, especially as factors like man made climate change mean most of us will likely experience an extreme pandemic in our lifetimes. If this all has you down, check out PBS Eons’ video about the pandemic that lasted 15 million years when ERV-Fc kept jumping around during the Oligocene and early Miocene epochs.

Is This the Cold War 2.0? Assessing Modern WMD Threats

Amid the surge in discussion and concern about potential use of WMD amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, DOD’s counter-WMD leaders warned the House Armed Services Committee earlier this month that this is a potential “wake-up call” for the US. A new piece in Air Force Magazine discusses this, quoting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, John Plumb, stating “I think the crisis in Ukraine and the blatant threats, really, by Russia of the potential use of chemical and biological weapons is opening everyone’s eyes to how much of a problem this is.” The piece further explains how the US has focused in the last decades on concerns that non-state actors like ISIS and al-Qaeda or “rogue states” like North Korea or Iran would use these weapons. However, this has been challenged by use of CW in Syria and in assassination attempts against Navalny and the Skripals. It continues with, “In order to be prepared should deterrence fail, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III has directed that DOD integrate counter-WMD operations into “planning, resourcing, modernizing, and then more importantly, training and exercising, holistically,” said Vice Adm. Collin Patrick Green, deputy commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.” The reality is that, in addition to concerns about other WMD categories, advances in modern science and the current security environment are making the BW threat evolve, so this discussion is critical.

However, recognizing a threat is one thing. Adapting policies to combat it is an entire other beast. Enter Al Mauroni’s recent publication, “On Biological War” (move over Clausewitz?). Mauroni, Director of the US Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies at Air University, discusses the modern BW threat in the era of renewed great power competition, warning of the dangers of shifting to a “threat-agnostic” approach to DOD’s Chemical-Biological Defense Program. He argues that, “Prior to attempting the implementation of yet another strategy to counter biological threats, the Army needs to establish the context of how adversaries would deliberately use biological threats against U.S. national security interests.” He also stresses that such a strategy, once the threat is properly appreciated, has to be adequately resourced and implemented to address deliberate biological releases while “understanding that natural infectious diseases pose a competing priority.”

He continues by arguing that COVID-19 actually does not tell us much about how prepared the US is for a BW attack as SARS-CoV-2 has not behaved like a biological weapon. This is contrary to much of what has been argued over the course of the pandemic, offering a fresh perspective on this issue. He also discusses different approaches to developing this preparedness, focusing on one option where chemical and biological defense are a combined operational concept and another where the medical community is responsible for responding to both BW attacks and naturally occurring outbreaks. He also covers the challenges of a centralized biodefense enterprise before strongly cautioning against trying to make the Army focus on both man-made and naturally occurring outbreaks, writing “The only way to succeed in moving forward in a future biological defense posture is not, then, to dilute the Army’s efforts by trying to manage the development of defensive capabilities for all natural disease outbreaks and deliberate biological attacks under a single general construct.”

Student Feature: Emily Johnson, Biodefense MS Student, Attends ABSA Conference

Emily Johnson, a student in the Biodefense Graduate Program, attended the American Biological Safety Association’s 64th Annual Biosafety and Biosecurity Conference in October 2021. Her write up of the event is now available on the Pandora Report. She covers a number of sessions from the conference, including “Virology in the Time of a Pandemic”, “The COVID Pandemic: The Evolving Reality”, “Gene Therapy”, and “Professional Development: Identifying and Overseeing Potential DURC: A practical Guide for the Biosafety Professional”.

Combating Terrorism Center: Biological Threat Special Issue-Part One

West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center’s new issue of CTC Sentinel is packed full of work covering everything from potential bioterror exploitation of tunable viral agents to a piece on global biorisk management authored by Dr. Filippa Lentzos of King’s College London, Biodefense Graduate Program Director, Dr. Gregory Koblentz, and Biodefense PhD Student and CSIS Research Associate, Joseph Rodgers. Lentzos et al. discuss the need not only to address contemporary risks while creating an international biorisk framework, but to also develop “an authoritative international institution with a mandate to systematically register and track maximum containment facilities and to oversee extremely high-risk research.”

“Closing the Gap: Establishing a New UN Mechanism for Discerning the Source of Pandemics of Unknown Origins”

A team of Nuclear Threat Initiative researchers, including Former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane and Dr. Jaime Yassif, recently published this commentary piece with the European Leadership Network. In it they discuss the disruptions to regional and global security caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the growing concerns about use of unconventional weapons. They write, “Not least of these concerns is the dangerous disinformation campaign by Russia alleging bioweapons development in Ukraine, which has led to concerns that Russia may itself use chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine as part of a false flag operation. These allegations have highlighted the salience and importance of efforts to guard against biological risks, and they have drawn attention to gaps in the global biosecurity and pandemic preparedness architecture.” They offer the idea of a Joint Assessment Mechanism that would make use of things like bioinformatics, data science, and AI to be the “eyes of the international community” in monitoring these threats.

“Biosecurity in an Age of Open Science”

Smith and Sandbrink’s new article in PLOS Biology discusses the risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research and its increasing risk amid modern biotechnological advancements. They write:

The risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research is increasing as biotechnology advances. As open science becomes widespread, we must consider its impact on those risks and develop solutions that ensure security while facilitating scientific progress. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. Increasing the availability of computational tools, datasets, and protocols could increase risks from research with misuse potential. For instance, in the context of viral engineering, open code, data, and materials may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. While preprints accelerate dissemination of findings, their increased use could challenge strategies for risk mitigation at the publication stage. This highlights the importance of oversight earlier in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.

“Meeting the Challenges of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Strengthening the Chemical and Biological Disarmament and Non-proliferation Regimes”

In this new report in Frontiers in Political Science, Edwards et al. offer an overview of current technical and political challenges in the CBW regime ahead of the upcoming Review Conferences for the Biological Weapons Convention (2022) and Chemical Weapons Convention (expected in 2023). They seek to provide, “…an introduction to this issue area for the general reader before surveying key issues and developing a series of practical policy suggestions for further consideration.” In doing so, they cover everything from the basics of CBW to the impacts of modern scientific advancement on proliferations of the weapons and the way different types of conflict have shaped these weapons. This very thorough report is an excellent backgrounder for anyone looking to get up to speed ahead of RevCon later this year! The report is also a key output of their ongoing project, “Informing Policymakers of the Progress in Strengthening the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime”.

“China’s Biomedical Data Hacking Threat: Applying Big Data Isn’t as Easy as It Seems”

Drs. Kathleen M. Vogel and Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley recently published this piece in the Texas National Security Review. In it they explain that, “Concerns have developed in recent years about the acquisition of U.S. biomedical information by Chinese individuals and the Chinese government and how this creates security and economic threats to the United States. And yet, China’s illicit acquisition of data is only one aspect of what is required to produce an enhanced science and technology capability that would pose a security threat.” They discuss how current assessments fail to “account for the heterogeneity of big data and the challenges that any actor (state or nonstate) faces in making sense of this data and using it.” They seek to provide new socio-technical frameworks that can help better understand Chinese threats involving biomedical big data to help improve things like law enforcement and policies focusing on Chinese acquisition of this data.

“China Focuses on Ethics to Deter Another ‘CRISPRbabies’ Scandal”

Nature News Senior Reporter Smriti Mallapaty recently published this piece discussing the PRC State Council’s recent statement calling on research institutions in China to expand and improve ethics training. This directive and several others are designed to address gaps exposed by He Jiankui’s research that created the first babies with edited genomes in 2018. She writes, “The document places primary responsibility for ethics governance on institutions, but also calls for the establishment of a science and technology ethics association, which could have a role. “This is really refreshing,” says Joy Zhang, a sociologist at the University of Kent in Canterbury, UK. Academic associations in China have conventionally played a limited role in regulatory discussions, but they could help enforce ethical norms, she says.” However, she later explains that “…some researchers worry that the statement might deter those wanting to engage in scientifically valuable research topics that can be responsibly conducted but that could raise ethical questions, says Nie. “They will say ‘I will not bother because I do not want to get in trouble’.” This complicated topic and its potential security challenges were highlighted by Biodefense Graduate Program faculty member Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley in her award winning paper, “From CRISPR Babies to Super Soldiers: Challenges and Security Threats Posed by CRISPR”.

“Evidence-Based Laboratory Biorisk Management Science and Technology Roadmap”

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy’s (OSTP) recently released this roadmap from the National Science and Technology Council’s Health Security Threats Subcommittee on Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity. It discusses the current challenges in this area before offering recommendations, including the need for government-wide coordination, biorisk management data-sharing, and a globally distributed research agenda. It also identifies applied biorisk research priorities, including sociology of laboratory biorisk management and evaluation of risk assessment and management methods.

“Countering the Future Chemical Weapons Threat”

Dr. Tuan Nguyen of Lawrence Livermore National Lab recently published this policy forum piece in Science discussing challenges facing the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in today’s security environment. The OPCW was created as the implementing body for the CWC, which is set for review next year. The CWC is the first multilateral disarmament treaty that provides universal standards for the elimination of an entire WMD category. To date, the OPCW has conducted over 4,200 industry inspections and overseen the destruction of 71,614 metric tons of the world’s declared CW stockpiles. He discusses how the OPCW will eventually need to shift more towards focusing on nonproliferation than disarmament, writing “As the next CWC review conference approaches in 2023, a next-generation OPCW 2.0 can be effective and credible only if it reinforces international norms against CW, anticipates future challenges posed by advancements in science and technology (S&T), incorporates more qualitative elements into the verification and compliance system, and keeps pace with technological change.”

“War Amid a Pandemic: The Public Health Consequences of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”

The Global Health Policy Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently published this piece addressing a number of questions about how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has impacted healthcare and public health in the war-torn country. It covers everything from low vaccination rates to the health security challenge of the influx of Ukrainian refugees into Europe, concluding “As the course of the war and true costs of reconstruction become clearer, there must be a dose of caution: after two years of intensive global spending on the Covid-19 response, public health and foreign assistance budgets are strained, if not exhausted. Even with more creative sources of funds and the extraordinary response to the Ukrainian cause to date, spending fatigue will be a looming concern, particularly as the cost of reconstruction efforts is expected to number in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Concerted effort will be required to sustain global solidarity and meet the ambition required for durable public health recovery in Ukraine.”

“The Perils of Machine Learning in Designing New Chemicals and Materials”

Shankar and Zare recently published this correspondence piece in Nature Machine Intelligence. In it they discuss how machine learning will revolutionize practice in chemistry and materials science. They write, “Already, machine learning is being used to find new pharmaceutical compounds, including in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. This holds great promise for the future, but also great peril. Right now, too little attention is being paid to the downside, as pointed out in a recent Comment by Urbina et al.” They explain how less than 1% of the chemicals registered for commercial use in the US have undergone toxicity characterization and how material and chemical use increased to 60 billion tons annually over the last century. They conclude that, “There is an intrinsic conflict between making work public, to encourage adoption and improvement of new codes and databases, and protecting it from abuse and misuse,” ultimately calling for a conference of experts to create a plan to balance safe deployment and wide utility of these capabilities. Scientific American also recently published a piece featuring Drs. Filippa Lentzos of King’s College London and Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley of George Mason University’s Biodefense Graduate Program discussing the risk of AI drug discovery systems being repurposed to make chemical weapons.

Biological Risks and Hazards In the World Today With Special Focus On Russia and Ukraine

Columbia University’s Institute for Social and Economic Research Policy is offering this event featuring Dr. Gregory Koblentz. The event will take place on May 4, 2022, from 12:00-1:30pm ET. This will be held as a Zoom webinar, and is open to the public. Information and registration for the event can be found here: tinyurl.com/iserpbiorisks .

Biological and Chemical Weapons Security and the War in Ukraine

On May 5 at 4 pm CT, join experts Asha George and Robert Pope in conversation with Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists editor Matt Field to discuss security risks in Ukraine. The discussion will cover the role of US-supported biological labs in Ukraine, what Russia’s alleged use of poisons and chemical weapons in the past says about its intentions for use in the future, and how disinformation about the use of biological weapons in Ukraine weakens global security. Speakers include Dr. Asha George (Executive Director of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense) and Dr. Robert Pope (Director of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency). Register here.

Russian WMD Disinformation Resources

The mountain of debunkings and academic commentary on the Russian disinformation campaign targeting DTRA’s Biological Threat Reduction Program-supported labs in Ukraine continues to grow. While a more comprehensive list and tool on the Pandora Report’s website is currently under construction, here are a couple of recent works on the matter:

“Biological Weapons Are Banned: Biological Research Is Not”

EUvsDisinfo released this interview with Dr. Jean-Pascal Zanders, founder of The Trench, this week discussing some of the basics of history and international law surrounding biological weapons and the implications of Russia’s claims.

Programme Biologique Militaire en Ukraine, Histoire d’Une Désinformation Russe/ Military Biological Program in Ukraine, History of Russian Disinformation

This French language resource from the Fondation Pour la Recherche Stratégique (Foundation for Strategic Research) discusses Russia’s historical CBW disinformation efforts and offers updates and analysis of recent developments, including Russia’s statements at the UN Security Council last month.

Pandora Report: 4.22.2022

This week we discuss the CDC’s new pandemic “weather service”, the growing impacts of Shanghai’s ongoing lockdown, and the spread of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in the US and around the world. We also cover a couple of great new publications and have listed several upcoming events, including a new episode of CSIS’s Coronavirus Crisis Update podcast featuring Dr. Beth Cameron.

The CDC’s New Pandemic “Weather Service”

The CDC announced this week the formation of the Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics, comprised of about 100 scientists who will analyze technical data and communicate their findings to decision makers and the public regarding risk and changes in how COVID-19 is behaving. Caitlin Rivers, an epidemiologist and associate director for science at the CDC initiative, was quoted in the Washington Post stating, “We think of ourselves like the National Weather Service, but for infectious diseases.” She further explained the goals of the center, saying “We would love to be able for people to look to us to say, ‘I’m about to commute on the Red Line. … Should I bring a mask based on what’s happening with respiratory disease in my community? Should I have my birthday party outside or inside?’ Those kinds of decisions, I think, are where we would like to move toward.”

The center’s creation was a feature of the Biden administration’s first national security memorandum, dated January 21, 2021, though the center officially launched last Thursday at a summit on strengthening US early warning systems for health threats hosted by the Office on Science and Technology Policy. CDC Director Dr. Rochelle Walensky’s efforts to attract outside experts to this team are seen by some as acknowledgment on her part of the criticism that her agency has failed systemically to make effective use of surveillance, data collection, and risk communication throughout the pandemic. Health IT Analytics quoted Walensky announcing the center’s launch, writing ““I am excited we have launched CDC’s Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics,” said CDC Director Rochelle P. Walensky, MD, in the press release. “This new center is an example of how we are modernizing the ways we prepare for and respond to public health threats. I am proud of the work that has come out of this group thus far and eager to see continued innovation in the use of data, modeling, and analytics to improve outbreak responses.””

China’s “Zero-Covid” Toll Grows

Shanghai’s lockdown woes continue, with residents still struggling to gain adequate access to food and other basic supplies amid a lockdown said to be even worse than Wuhan’s in 2020. Authorities have even take to taping residents’ doors shut so they can tell if they left their homes without permission and the necessary escort. Simultaneously, whole neighborhoods have been relocated to quarantine facilities over 100 miles away in an effort to keep negative individuals away, though it remains unclear why the authorities have chosen to move negative people away instead of those who are positive. The BBC explained that many in the small town of Beicai were forced to leave randomly, writing “An official notice issued to residents told them to pack their belongings and leave their wardrobe doors open. They were also told to leave open the front door of their home. Images on social media of people queuing with packed suitcases at night-time showed the scale of the operation.” Worse yet, footage emerged this week of a community worker brutally beating a pet corgi to death with a shovel in Pudong after its owner tested positive for COVID-19 and was moved to quarantine.

Shanghai has reported just 17 deaths during this entire ordeal, again sparking many questions about the legitimacy of the country’s numbers, though it seems China defines COVID-19 deaths more narrowly, opting to label chronically ill patients who die while sick with COVID-19 as having died of their chronic condition. Furthermore, the New York Times writes, “It may never become clear how many similar stories there are. China does not release information on excess deaths, defined as the number of deaths — from Covid as well as other causes — exceeding the expected total in a given period. Public health scholars say that figure more accurately captures losses during the pandemic, as countries define Covid-related deaths differently.” On a related note, India continues to hold up the WHO’s efforts to publish their calculations indicating 15 million people have died from COVID-19 globally, a number completely dwarfing the current estimate of about 6.2 million.

The lockdowns are also causing major disruptions in the Yangtze River Delta region, which includes Shanghai and the provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu, that together represent about a fifth of the PRC’s national GDP. While some areas and factories have had their lockdowns eased, it has not been enough to stop the negative impacts on the global economy. Daily truck volumes moving through Shanghai were down 70% this week compared to just prior to when the lockdown began. The EU Chamber of Commerce also estimates that the availability of trucks in the city has shrunk by 40%, mirroring the lack of community and delivery workers currently facing the city amid rising tensions. The Wall Street Journal explained this week, “The logistics snarls in and around Shanghai further add pressure to an already battered global supply chain and to rising prices of goods in the U.S. They also complicate the Chinese government’s efforts to reopen factories shuttered due to lockdowns. Logistics managers expect weeks to months before some international shipments return to normal.” However, as the world continues to grapple with constant supply chain issues, it is becoming evident this might just be normal now.

It’s Time For Your Bird Feeders to Fly the Nest (For Now)

The United States is currently experiencing an “unprecedented outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in our wild birds,” according to the Raptor Center at the University of Minnesota’s College of Veterinary Medicine. The strain being transmitted right now is a highly pathogenic form of H5N1, prompting culling across the country as the virus is detected in commercial flocks. The US recorded the euthanization of over 22 million commercial chickens and turkeys between the start of February and the start of April this year in response to the spread of the virus, following similar outbreaks in Europe earlier this year. The virus is shed in feces and respiratory droplets from infected birds, and it is known for being quite tough, able to survive for weeks in some environments. According to the New York Times, “The H5N1 strain of the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, which is widespread in Europe, was first reported in North America in the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador in December 2021. By mid-January, the virus had infected an American wigeon and blue-winged teal in South Carolina, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.”

Avian Influenza (AI) is typically found in migratory waterfowl like swans, geese, and ducks, who can carry these viruses without getting sick. As they migrate, they can spread the disease within their own groups as well as into other bird species. This is a problem when it infects birds like chickens or raptors, who become severely ill and die quickly. This year has seen AI have an unusually significant impact on birds of prey, however, with over three dozen bald eagles recorded dying from the disease heading into their spring nesting season, prompting further concern. The current outbreak is unique because of the very high levels of transmission of H5N1 in wildlife right now, says the Raptor Center. They also explain that more is known about how the virus impacts waterfowl, shorebirds, seabirds, and, to a lesser extend, birds like raptors. They note there is a significant knowledge gap in how songbirds are affected by HPAI outbreaks.

Dr. Victoria Hall at the University of Minnesota explained concerns about bird feeders during this time, writing:

“During these unprecedented times, we recommend doing anything that we can to try and help our wild bird populations. Because the science is unclear on the role of songbirds in this current H5N1 outbreak, one consideration is to not encourage birds to gather together at places such as bird feeders or bird baths. These are places where things like viruses could easily be exchanged between individuals.

In areas with HPAI transmission in any avian species, consider pausing the use of bird feeders and baths for the next couple of months until the rate of virus transmission in wild birds dramatically decreases. Not only will this action help to protect those beautiful feathered creatures that visit your yard, but will also help all wild bird species that are already having it  hard this spring because of HPAI. We have it in our power to take a short term action so we are not accidentally assisting in the virus’ spread.  This outbreak won’t last forever and I, for one, am greatly looking forward to when I can safely hang my bird feeders back up!”

The United States Geological Survey is updating their maps showing areas of the US where cases have been reported, which can further help in determining whether it is time to take some extra precautions like taking down the bird baths and feeders for now. Fortunately, hummingbird feeders are considered to be at the lowest risk since fewer types of birds visit them. Experts advise to consider pausing use of these feeders or, if their use is continued, clean them on a daily basis for now to help reduce risk.

Because this is the Pandora Report and not your neighborhood bird watching newsletter, here is where we scare you just a bit more: HPAI, particularly strains like H5N1, are of concern in global health security because, though they tend to only infect birds, the potential consequences if they were able to infect humans could be devastating. Specifically, the concern is that influenza A viruses that are circulating in poultry populations could recombine with human influenza A viruses, allowing them to become more transmissible in human populations. This could cause massive rates of infections and deaths globally. Right now, HPAI Asian H5N1 is epizootic in poultry populations in many countries, and that is not expected to change in the near future, so there will be some sporadic human infections in those who closely interact with these bird populations. Avian Influenza viruses like H5N1 are on the USDA’s portion of the Select Agents and Toxins List and they have been prominent features in discourse about dual use research of concern and gain of function studies on certain potential pandemic pathogens. Though HPAI H5N1 has more opportunities to infect people right now by virtue of more humans being exposed to infected animals amid the outbreaks, there is no indication that it has become better suited to infect and spread between people through genetic reassortment with human influenza A viruses. This is, however, a good reminder that human interactions with animal populations are not without risk, especially as human populations continue to encroach upon and damage wildlife habitats globally.

CSIS Coronavirus Crisis Update Ft. Dr. Beth Cameron

Dr. Beth Cameron, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor for Global Health Security and Biodefense at the White House, joins CSIS for Episode #132 of this podcast. “The Biden administration is making progress on the Global Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness Fund, envisioned as a Financial Intermediary Fund at the World Bank. The fund will invest in a globally linked bio-surveillance and early warning system, aid to the most vulnerable countries to build their health security, and rapid research and development in regulatory systems to create, rapidly scale, and distribute medical countermeasures.” They discuss the need to “finish the job” and get out of this phase of the pandemic and the need for truly global surveillance systems and stronger information sharing to prevent the next biological threat. The second COVID-19 Summit has been announced for May 12, with the dual goals of ending the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic and strengthening preparedness for variants and future pandemic threats.

The Athena Agenda: Advancing the Apollo Program for Biodefense

The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense recently released its newest report, the Athena Agenda, building on its January 2021 report, The Apollo Program for Biodefense: Winning the Race Against Biological Threats. This new report highlights the devastation brought in the year since the earlier report was published, arguing that COVID-19, despite these horrors, is not a once-in-a-century pandemic and that another major biological event will likely occur before the century’s end. The authors focus on reductions of biodiversity, exploitation of wildlife, animal-human interactions, advances in gene-editing and synthetic biology, and more in explaining the myriad of risks facing the world today. They write, “The Athena Agenda: Advancing The Apollo Program for Biodefense contains additional recommendations to execute The Apollo Program, building on the Commission’s previous work and taking into consideration the efforts of current and former Administrations and Congresses. This report provides the following specific governance and technology recommendations to implement The Apollo Program for Biodefense and identifies the US government organizations responsible for leadership and accountability, though certain actions may require or benefit from public-private partnerships.” Biodefense Graduate Program Director Dr. Gregory Koblentz provided advice to the authors of this report.

The Bubble Benefits From Some GMU Biodefense Program Knowledge

Netflix’s new comedy film, The Bubble, premiered early this month featuring the likes of Karen Gillan and David Duchovny in its all-star cast. The film follows the plight of a film cast trying to make a movie during the COVID-19 pandemic, following them through their two week quarantine and an influenza outbreak on set that will not stop the studio from making them film (In other, real life news, 20% of workplace COVID-19 outbreaks in LA County are in the entertainment industry, but the show must go on!). While the film has not been too popular with critics, the writers did make an effort to get their commentary on pandemic life right, turning to GMU Biodefense PhD Program turned professor, Dr. Saskia Popescu, for guidance.

Biological Risks and Hazards In the World Today With Special Focus On Russia and Ukraine

Columbia University’s Institute for Social and Economic Research Policy is offering this event featuring Dr. Gregory Koblentz. The event will take place on May 4, 2022, from 12:00-1:30pm ET. This will be held as a Zoom webinar, and is open to the public. Information and registration for the event can be found here: tinyurl.com/iserpbiorisks .

Biological and Chemical Weapons Security and the War in Ukraine

On May 5 at 4 pm CT, join experts Asha George and Robert Pope in conversation with Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists editor Matt Field to discuss security risks in Ukraine. The discussion will cover the role of US-supported biological labs in Ukraine, what Russia’s alleged use of poisons and chemical weapons in the past says about its intentions for use in the future, and how disinformation about the use of biological weapons in Ukraine weakens global security. Speakers include Dr. Asha George (Executive Director of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense) and Dr. Robert Pope (Director of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency). Register here.

Lessons from COVID-19 for the Public Health Emergency Enterprise: What Happened to the Plans? – A Workshop

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies is hosting a workshop exploring the nation’s Public Health Emergency (PHE) preparedness enterprise, through the lens of COVID-19 in the US. The workshop will be hosted on May 17 and 18, and will explore key components, success stories, and failure points throughout the entire PHE preparedness and response enterprise. Participants will also identify opportunities for more effective catastrophic disaster, pandemic, and other large scale PHEs planning at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. Speakers include Dr. Deborah Birx (former Coronavirus Response Coordinator at the Office of the Vice President) and Dr. Gigi Gronvall (Senior Scholar at Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security). Register here.

Women in STEM with Syra Madad and Linda Mobula

The Harvard Belfer Center’s Women in STEM series developed and moderated by Dr. Syra Madad highlights women leaders in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics). The aim of the series is to recognize the various accomplishments and contributions by women in STEM fields while educating and empowering young women, providing valuable advice and sharing pearls of wisdom. Join Belfer Fellow Dr. Syra Madad in conversation with Dr. Linda Mobula (Senior Health Specialist at World Bank) on Wednesday April 27 at 1 pm ETVisit the event website for more information and to register.

Russian WMD Disinformation Resources

The mountain of debunkings and academic commentary on the Russian disinformation campaign targeting DTRA’s Biological Threat Reduction Program-supported labs in Ukraine continues to grow. While a more comprehensive list and tool on the Pandora Report’s website is currently under construction, here are a couple of recent works on the matter:

“Biological Weapons Are Banned: Biological Research Is Not”

EUvsDisinfo released this interview with Dr. Jean-Pascal Zanders, founder of The Trench, this week discussing some of the basics of history and international law surrounding biological weapons and the implications of Russia’s claims.

Programme Biologique Militaire en Ukraine, Histoire d’Une Désinformation Russe/ Military Biological Program in Ukraine, History of Russian Disinformation

This French language resource from the Fondation Pour la Recherche Stratégique (Foundation for Strategic Research) discusses Russia’s historical CBW disinformation efforts and offers updates and analysis of recent developments, including Russia’s statements at the UN Security Council last month.

ABSA 2021 Conference- Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Filling the Toolbox: Staying Vigilant and Preparing for the Next Public Health Event

By Emily Johnson, Biodefense MS Student

Introduction

The United States is experiencing a decline in COVID-19 cases, but SARS-CoV-2 is still a prominent topic here and internationally. The American Biological Safety Association’s (ABSA) 64th Annual Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity Conference took place October 25-27, 2021, bringing together a global community to discuss these topics while aiming to provide solutions to tackle the most challenging issues, present fascinating case studies, and showcase the latest developments in biosafety and biosecurity. The conference was presented virtually, offering a platform similar to a live conference including a lobby, exhibit hall, poster hall, networking lounge, and live presentations.

Overview of ABSA Virtual Conference Report

I attended this virtual conference along with my GMU Biodefense Program colleague, Mr. Konnor Heyde. To provide our readership with a comprehensive report on the ABSA conference, we self-assigned the sessions we would write about. This report provides an overview, details, and comments on the following sessions:

  1. Session I: Virology in the Time of a Pandemic
  2. Session III: The COVID Pandemic: The Evolving Reality
  3. Session XII: Gene Therapy
  4. Professional Development: Identifying and Overseeing Potential DURC: A practical Guide for the Biosafety Professional

Session I: Virology in the Time of a Pandemic

When a novel virus emerges in a population there is no substitute for preparedness in improving the effectiveness and timeliness of the response. The conference commenced with Dr. Dirk P. Dittmer from the University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill discussing the causative agent of COVID-19, testing, and disease outlook.

He began by utilizing a case study format, presenting an “old” pandemic: HIV. The progression of the pandemic was separated into three phases and compared to the current pandemic. It began with a phase he designated as “pre” which, for HIV, was before publication of the July 1981 MMWR report recognizing abnormal presentation of pneumonia in both San Francisco and New York. The rate of occurrence increased exponentially creating a bell curve which was the pandemic phase. The curve dropped precipitously, though never returning to zero even after effective treatment using antiretrovirals was approved. This was the transition to the “post” phase. For the COVID-19 pandemic, Dr. Dittmer defined the “pre” phase as the period leading up to the release of the article in the New England Journal of Medicine on A Novel Coronavirus from Patients with Pneumonia in China, 2019. Dr. Dittmer considers the pandemic phase as ending with the FDA approval of a vaccine in August of this year in addition to an EUA for other treatments.

The Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (more commonly known by its acronym- GISAID) is a worldwide repository of genomic sequences historically used to catalog international influenza variants. It played a critical role in the identification and tracking of emerging strains of SARS-CoV-2 variants. By March of 2020, the G614 variant was present in the US, exhibiting lower CT values (referring to the PCR cycle threshold where a florescent signal is first detectable) suggesting a higher viral load and therefore an increase in transmissibility over the wild type. This does not necessarily indicate more severe disease. In May 2021, the delta variant arrived in the US and, as of September, was indicated in over 90% of cases.

Dr. Dittmer referred to the pre-pandemic period as a time of blissful ignorance and squandered opportunities. He identified one failure as the self-imposed bottleneck by the single PCR test manufactured in a single place that slowed testing in the US. Another example of this is the underfunding of proposed basic science research on viruses related to HIV or SARS-CoV-2 prior to their respective outbreaks. Limited funding resulted in few experts on coronaviruses. The lesson to be learned is that while research will escalate during a pandemic, basic science research should be supported between public health emergencies.

Constant preparedness is crucial. Previous work on techniques to increase accuracy in virus detection resulted in a broad knowledge base from which researchers could build when faced with the testing demands of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaque assays measure infectious virus, but they are time consuming. QPCR overestimates viral load because it includes viral segments. This means the CDC assay is more sensitive because it measures full genome as well as segments while the WHO assay only reports full genome.

Dr. Dittmer’s lab is using Rapid NextGen Sequencing methods. There is a linear relationship between viral load and number of reads, therefore it can also be used as a viral load assay, albeit an expensive one. It takes about 100,000 reads to determine a whole genome. The results suggest that most genomic material sequenced was whole genome, therefore eliminating the advantage of the CDC assay over the WHO assay.

NextGen sequencing can be used in fragment detection, even with a low number of reads. If the segments are dispersed throughout the target genome it is likely the fragmented virus was present in the sample. Although further testing is needed, he proposes a relationship between sequence coverage and infectivity. The higher the number of reads, the more likely the sample contained infectious virus. The remaining barrier is cost.

The next pandemic cannot be predicted. There is no magic bullet. The best way to prepare is to be ready for the unpredictable. This, Dr. Dittmer, says is the value of basic science.

Session III: The COVID Pandemic: The Evolving Reality

In 2005, Dr. Michael T. Osterholm published an article in the New England Journal of Medicine outlining the inevitability of an imminent pandemic and a strategy to prepare. These warnings went mostly unheeded. In this fireside chat, he discussed the state of the COVID-19 pandemic, posed questions to be investigated, and measures that should be taken to prepare not only for the next inevitable pandemic, but for the impending surges of COVID-19 the US is likely to continue to experience. He is a leading epidemiologist, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, professor at the University of Minnesota, and in November of 2020 was appointed to President-elect Joe Biden’s Transition COVID-19 Advisory Board.

Dr. Osterholm began by discussing the mystery of the four- to six-week surges in geographical hot spots of COVID-19 cases during which he draws parallels between this phenomenon and the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. At the beginning of that pandemic, there was a surge in cases during the March/April timeframe followed by a significant drop with no mitigation factors in place. This repeated in the late Fall. That winter, the cases of H1N1 were sparce, but more interestingly, there was an international phenomenon of a drop in seasonal flu cases. Similarly in 2020, all respiratory diseases appeared to decrease in prevalence. He observes that this is not the result of human action as it was equally demonstrated in countries with and without mitigations.

The Dawn of the Age of the Variants

In November 2020, the SARS-CoV2 alpha variant was detected in the UK. It was this point where he said his analogy changed from which inning of the COVID-19 pandemic baseball game we were in to how many minutes of the game had passed. Variants can be associated with changes in transmissibility, severity, or the ability to evade natural defenses and vaccine immunity. There is potential for emergence of novel variants as the pathogen continues to spread. With 65 million eligible Americans still unvaccinated and Russia experiencing an uptick in cases due to similar hesitancy among the Russian population to accept the Sputnik vaccine, we have a population ripe for the spread of this virus for months or years to come. However, Dr. Osterholm believes that COVID-19 is likely to present seasonally in the future.

Another point where SARS-CoV-2 is not analogous to seasonal influenza is that when a pandemic influenza becomes a seasonal virus, it attenuates into a seasonal pattern and genetic changes are unlikely to result in it becoming more challenging. Conversely, we do not know what severity or transmissibility modifications future SARS-CoV-2 variants will exhibit.

Vaccines: Study, Learn, Implement, Repeat

When mRNA data was originally released, it showed high rates of safety and over 90% protection from severe illness, hospitalization, and death. The Johnson & Johnson adenovirus-based vaccines showed lower initial immune response, only reaching about 74%.  

The mRNA vaccines exhibit waning immunity over time. It is still unclear what this will mean over the long term, but he predicts break through cases will continue to increase in number and in younger populations as they received their initial vaccine later than the older population and are now reaching a valley of immunity.

Dr. Osterholm believes the adenovirus-based vaccines will be the game changers with COVID-19. Although the mRNA vaccines initially reached a higher rate of protection, it dropped over time while the Johnson & Johnson vaccine improved over time, reaching the low 80% range by six months post-immunization. A second dose increases numbers into the 90% range, and this may be more enduring. We must learn how to best use these vaccines concerning mixing, dosing, and timing. There may be multi-strain vaccines in the future, but improvements seen in second or third generation COVID vaccines will likely be developments related to temperature tolerance and, possibly, coverage for variants.

Laboratory Safety

During his tenure on the Natural Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, he was very critical of the research on mammalian transmission of H5N1, citing his respect for the importance of laboratory and biologic safety issues. He views the origins of SARS-CoV-2 in a similar light and is concerned with lab safety. However, he believes that while it is possible the virus originated in a lab, it is likely the result of a spillover event like SARS or MERS. He went on to point out that Wuhan is a transportation hub in China with millions of travelers traversing the city daily. In addition, there is a thousand-mile reach for food, particularly live animals, coming to the markets of Wuhan. This evidence supports a spillover scenario. He dismissed the cleavage site evidence of a human-manipulated genome citing similar genetics in coronaviruses found in caves in Laos.

To demonstrate his point, he proposes the hypothetical situation of a novel virus emerging in the Caribbean. One of the initial regions the virus would be clinically detected is Atlanta, Georgia due to it being a transportation hub between North America and the Caribbean. Would the international population assume the virus escaped from a CDC lab?

Question & Answer Session

When asked why there were more cases in the US than China where it originated, Dr. Osterholm was quick to point out that those two elements are not related. China imposed draconian quarantine measures and rampant testing while the US has not. There are many factors contributing to the respective countries’ reported number of cases.

Another attendee asked why immunity from infection was not equal to that of the vaccine. Dr. Osterholm explained that we do not fully understand what immunity to COVID-19 is yet. In the first weeks after mRNA vaccination, study participants showed high levels of protection from disease, but almost undetectable antibody levels. Cellular immunity was playing some role in that protection that is not yet fully understood. There is conflicting data on what immunity is offered by natural infection. While it does afford some protection, how good it is and how long it lasts are still unknown. There is strong evidence that those who receive a vaccine after natural infection are at a lower risk, similar to the natural infection acting like a first dose.

A question asked by many since the pandemic began is, “What could have been done differently in the beginning?” He replied that not much can be done once a respiratory virus establishes itself in a population. There is no magical solution. The US could have improved in preparations for a major health event. A better prepared healthcare system will be integral in successful navigation of future pandemics. He also cited improving communication with the public.

Lastly, he believes there is a zero chance of eradication. It is more likely that with long-term vaccination, COVID-19 will eventually present in a seasonal manner like influenza.

Session XII: Gene Therapy Research Boom and Future Challenges

Dr. Daniel Eisenman of Advarra shared an overview of the progression of gene therapy research and the changes relevant to an institutional biosafety committee.

To review the process of regulatory oversight of gene therapy research, it begins with preclinical research and development involving only animal models. When potential has been shown, an application for an Investigational New Drug (IND) is submitted to the FDA. Phase two is the first clinical phase involving humans. It usually involves 20 to 100 subjects, although Dr. Eisenman pointed out that the trial for a COVID-19 vaccine had around 30,000. The focus of phase two is to prove safety. In phase three, the focus shifts to showing efficacy, it involves more participants, and it has determined optimal dosing. After successfully completing phase three, FDA approval is requested. Phase four includes post approval research.

Immediately preceding the pandemic, Dr. Eisenman published an article in Applied Biosafety which demonstrated the dramatic, explosive growth in the number of gene therapy IND applications per year. By 2020, that number had flatlined. Why? As a result of COVID-19, many clinical trials were suspended.

Prior to COVID-19, most gene therapy submissions were for oncological application. Now, among the most recent approvals, there were eight for oncology, but six for infectious diseases (two of which were COVID-19 vaccines) and two for rare diseases. These successes pave the way for future therapies.

Two gene therapy success stories were presented. The first was treatment for retinitis pigmentosa, a disease characterized by night blindness at a young age that progresses to total blindness. The therapy reversed vision loss demonstrated by the speed with which they were able to navigate a dimly lit maze. The other example of a successful application was treatment of spinal muscular atrophy type 1. SMA1 usually results in death during toddlerhood due to the inability to control muscles involved in breathing. Children who have undergone treatment are living into childhood and are even able to walk and run on their own.

There are currently over 350 gene therapies in phase three trials. In a recent statement on advancingthe  development of safe and effective cell and gene therapies, the FDA suggested that gene therapy may be at a turning point similar to that of monoclonal antibodies in the late 1990s. The technology has the potential to become a backbone of modern treatment regimens.

Dr. Eisenman then went on to discuss some changes in Institutional Review Board (IRB) involvement in multi-site studies. Traditionally an IRB review is done at each institution where the clinical trial is being carried out. This can be inefficient. As of 2018, all NIH funded multi-site studies are required to utilize a single IRB. Other federally funded studies made the change in 2020.

NExTRAC is the Novel and Exceptional Technology and Research Advisory Committee. It no longer oversees individual clinical trials but instead relies on prompts which would direct public deliberation on certain research. This is one result of the burden of oversight shifting from NIH to the FDA.

One recommendation Dr. Eisenman hasd is for the public to request more formal FDA requirements for shedding data during clinical trials. Currently it is risk based and more of a recommendation as FDA exemptions are regularly requested and granted. He suggested it should be included for all vector-based studies and replication-competent microbes, including vaccines.

Conclusion

The presentations shared at the conference were very informative, thought provoking, and had a general feeling of collegiality from living the pandemic and experiencing similar struggles. One of the presentations exhibiting ingenuity resulting from COVID-19 was given by Benjamin Fontas. He discussed the development of Short Term Use Biocontainment Bubbles at Yale (STUBB-Y) where researchers drew on their expertise to provide professionals working in high risk occupations at Yale temporary protection from aerosols at the beginning of the pandemic. This was just one example of the innovative applications of biosafety experience that presenters contributed to their institutions to mitigate safety concerns during the pandemic.

COVID-19 vaccines were also discussed by multiple speakers, specifically regarding the need to look at them as one of the tools in our toolbox, not a final solution. A recurrent theme was the importance of communication with the public to ensure their trust in science and scientific representatives. From misinformation about mitigations to questions about the ability of novel pathogens to escape a lab, it is more important now than ever that the public is communicated with in a way that encourages trust and understanding.

Professional Development Course on Dual Use Research of Concern

Professional development courses were offered in conjunction with the ABSA 2021 conference. I attended Identifying and Overseeing DURC: A practical Guide for the Biosafety Professional presented by Rebecca Moritz, Biosafety Director at Colorado State University.

Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) is defined by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as “life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.” It is interesting to note there is a difference between dual use research and dual use research of concern. They both refer to research that could be used for both beneficial and malevolent purposes. However, DURC directly references a significant threat with broad consequences.

Historically relevant cases of DURC include the mousepox experiment by Jackson et. al in 2001 and the 1918 influenza research by Tumpey in 2005. In 2004, the National Academies of Sciences released Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, better known as the Fink Report. The goal was to better educate the scientific community on how their research could have unintended consequences.

To better guide those defining what should be considered concerning research, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity released the Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information. The guiding principles focused around oversight that would maintain public trust by demonstrating that the scientific community recognizes potential security threats and is acting responsibly to protect the public safety and security. However, it cautions that there must be a balance that allows for both oversight and research advancement.

Similarly, research on potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs) is necessary to protect global health and security. The Department of Health and Human Services released the Framework for Guiding Funding Decisions about Proposed Research Involving Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens (P3CO) in 2017. This framework guides department-level pre-funding review on research that may create, transfer, or use enhanced PPP.

The most recent DURC policy went into effect in 2015. The framework should be applied in cases that involves one of the 15 agents listed in the policy or if it has the potential to result in one of the seven experimental effects listed. This includes enhancements in consequences, resistance, or transmissibility, disrupting immunity, altering the natural host range, or reconstituting an extinct agent. Interestingly, the reference to a “novel pathogen” was dropped between the 2012 and the 2014 versions, but it is still a topic to be taken into consideration. In fact, it is possible for research outside the scope articulated in the policy to still be DURC and require review.

The Institutional Review Entity (IRE) board performs a risk assessment on any research or work done at the institution that is subject to DURC evaluation. The members should have sufficient expertise to assess dual use of a range of scenarios but may also contact consultants as needed. These plans, including mitigations, should be reviewed annually.

There are many points to consider when reviewing the whole lifespan of proposed research for DURC. They can be summarized by looking at how the work will be performed and results communicated, the scope of consequences with countermeasures taken into consideration, the potential timeframe for misuse, and the skill, knowledge, or technology needed to use the product for nefarious purposes. Potential benefits are also an essential aspect of the review. DURC should not be only associated with the unscrupulous application of science. The goal is knowledge or methods that will benefit humanity. If there are risks, it is important to consider if they target a specific population.

Recognizing a risk is present is not necessarily reason to deny the research from proceeding. Risk mitigation can reduce the risk to a level that is acceptable when compared to the potential benefits. These plans may include biosafety, biosecurity, personal protective equipment, standard operating procedures, occupational health plan like vaccines, training, and countermeasures. Institutions may apply varying mitigations as appropriate for each individual situation.

If existing measures are not adequate to mitigate conceivable risk, creating a mitigation plan may be the means to receive funding from a government source. Subsequently ensuring compliance with the plan is essential. One way to encourage this is by the IRE maintaining a positive relationship with the primary investigator and requesting that they report any changes that may alter the evaluation. Another source that may assist in identifying DURC is the institutions’ grant administrators. These mitigation plans may be subject to Freedom of Information Act requests and therefore should not disclose institutional proprietary or security information.

To close the session, dual use case studies were presented and evaluated. This was a learning opportunity to practice what had been taught, but also to experience how subjective interpretations can be. Those same case studies were used to develop risk mitigation plans that would alleviate the most pressing risks while still allowing the research to take place and be submitted for publishing, possibly with some changes.

Pandora Report: 4.15.2022

This week we tackle online claims that Russia used CW in Mariupol, continued attacks on Ukrainian healthcare infrastructure and personnel, Shanghai’s continued lockdown and COVID-19’s spread to other Chinese cities, and the trillions climate change will likely cost US taxpayers annually in the not-so-distant future. We have listed a number of new publications, including one Biodefense PhD student’s new article covering the military history of sulfur mustard and new work on hurdles to establishing international biosecurity rules.

Managing Editor’s Note: Last week, some readers encountered issues with how the font for the weekly report displayed in their browsers and email. This looks to have been a technical issue as the font size of the Pandora Report was not actually made smaller on our site or editing platforms. Thank you so much to those who took the time to write and bring this to our attention- it is much appreciated! The weekly issue from April 8 is available here on our site for anyone who had the viewing issue last week and would like to see it on the website.

Did Russia Use Chemical Weapons in Ukraine? Vague Reports of Drones and Poisonous Substances Does Not a CW Attack Make

Following social media reports on Monday that Russia used “a poisonous substance of unknown origin” in Mariupol near the Azovstal iron and steel works, the internet has been full of debate about whether or not this was a chemical weapons attack. The widely circulating post claims that victims suffered “respiratory failure”, “vestibulo-atactic syndrome” (which many have noted is an oddly specific term to include with such little evidence), inner ear issues causing dizziness, and vomiting, eye twitching, and loss of coordination. BBC reports that, “One injured man described a “sweet-tasting” white smoke covering an area of the plant after an explosion. Another said he felt immediately unable to breathe and had collapsed with “cotton legs”.” The reports indicated that three people were ill as a result, though severe illness and injuries were not reported. While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, and Pentagon Spokesman John Kirby all expressed that the claims are being taken seriously and investigated, experts have cast significant doubt on these claims’ legitimacy. This also comes amid continued concerns about use of white phosphorus bombs, which are not considered incendiary or chemical weapons under Protocol III and the CWC respectively, in civilian areas of Mariupol.

The key problems with these CW claims are that there is a lack of solid reporting, it is difficult (if not impossible) to make confident assessments about an event like this remotely and over social media, and the reports spark more questions than they answer, including: Why is the reported illness being attributed to chemicals specifically? What kind of drone was used? Are there videos or photos of it? What height was the drone at when the agent was delivered? How is it known that it was there to deliver an agent and not for another purpose? How much and what kinds of agent could that drone deliver? What were the weather and environment like at the time? What industrial chemicals are at the plant where this occurred? What was happening at the time of the attack? Was there active combat occurring where fires and explosions are expected? Was the agent persistent? Can environmental and biomedical samples be taken? What would such a small-scale CW attack provide the Russians right now? This is not to accuse anyone of lying, to say this did not happen, or to pretend the threat of CW use in this war is not real (though it is generally considered low), but these are questions that need to be answered to substantiate these reports. Claims that a state used CW are very serious and should not be made or spread haphazardly. It is also incredibly important to recognize that different agents behave in very different ways, so it may be impossible to ever verify that this happened, especially as heavy fighting continues.

Dan Kaszeta, author of numerous works on chemical weapons and a current fellow at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute, was quick to outline a number of the facts about what we do (and don’t) know about this incident and the dangers of trying to define this event via social media. Among these problems is that the reported symptoms are not agent-specific and do not point specifically to chemical agents as their cause. There have been vague descriptions of the chemical used in the supposed attack and, even with some claims indicating it was colorless and odorless, this is still going to be an issue without environmental samples. Important to note too is that this occurred in an industrial area several weeks into a war; a number of industrial materials could have caused this, particularly amid fires and explosions caused by combat near the plant. Kaszeta also pointed out how varied CW agents are, so any chance of finding evidence of an attack will depend on a myriad of factors like how persistent the supposed agent is. He also explained that it is dangerous to jump to conclusions on matters such as these, so it is important to wait for more definite information to come out, particularly as many of the initial reports were authored by Azov, a Ukrainian nationalist group associated with the far right and neo-Nazism.

Dr. Jean-Pascal Zanders contextualized these concerns and reports in The Trench, explaining that sensationalizing this reported event based on limited, “extremely sketchy” information is dangerous. He also explained in this piece when industrial chemicals and their precursors are considered chemical weapons which, again, is important to consider given the setting in Mariupol. He also notes some of the eerie similarities to previous events in Syria, including Russia’s ultimatum to Mariupol’s defenders, demanding that they surrender the city. He writes, “In and of itself, the incident is unrelated to possible CW use. However, it carries echoes of military operations in Syria where defenders of encircled cities or positions were offered the option to withdraw or face serious consequences. The insurgent groups and civilians who decided to retreat could leave the area; those who continued resisting faced chlorine attacks until they too abandoned their positions. The chemical attacks caused, relative to conventional operations, few casualties but with time psychological pressure increased. Once confronted with the demand to withdraw, the consequences of refusal became increasingly obvious.”

What is not in question is that the West is publicly decrying any threat or actual use of chemical weapons in the conflict. The CWC Coalition released a statement decrying this threat, highlighting Russia’s use of Novichoks in assassination attempts in recent years and its close allying with the Syrian Arab Republic, which has used CW throughout its civil war. The CWC Coalition also called out unsubstantiated claims about CW use, writing “We call upon Russia, in the strongest possible terms, to respect its solemn obligations under the Geneva Protocol and the CWC not to contemplate, let alone use or threaten to use, these globally banned weapons of mass terror. We also call on all parties to refrain from making unsubstantiated CW allegations for political advantage.”

On a related note, the European Commission announced recently that the EU has developed strategic reserves for chemical, biological, and radio-nuclear emergencies under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. This measure includes a €540.5 million rescEU strategic stockpile, established in close collaboration with the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA). According to the Commission, this stockpile will consist of equipment and medicines, vaccines and other therapeutics to treat patients exposed to CBRN emergencies agents, as well as of rescEU decontamination reserve to provide decontamination equipment and expert response teams. The Commission explains that, “Extreme weather conditions and emerging threats, such as the coronavirus, but also CBRN incidents may overwhelm the ability of EU Member States to help each other, especially when several European countries face the same type of disaster simultaneously,” and that “People may be exposed to CBRN agents as a result of unintentional disasters (eg. a chemical plant leak, nuclear power plant incidents, the spread of an infectious disease) or intentional incidents (eg. a terrorist attack). Being prepared to address the risks of such threats is a key part of the EU CBRN stockpiling strategy.” The rescEU medical reserve has been mobilized to procure potassium iodine tablets (which can be used to help protect against the effects of radiation by saturating the thyroid, helping stop it from absorbing radioactive iodine if taken at the right time), 3 million of which have already been delivered to Ukraine through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

Another Grim Milestone: WHO Records 100th Attack on Healthcare in Ukraine

The WHO announced on April 7 that, since Russia started the war in Ukraine on February 24, over 100 attacks on healthcare facilities and personnel were recorded in the country. The release reads, ““We are outraged that attacks on health care are continuing. It took just 42 days to reach this grim milestone, the announcement noted. Attacks on health care are a violation of international humanitarian law, said Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General, at a press conference. “Peace is the only way forward. I again call on the Russian Federation to stop the war.”” As of today, since the start of this year, the WHO’s Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care has tracked 125 attacks on healthcare in Ukraine, resulting in at least 73 deaths and 51 injuries. These primarily consist of violence with heavy weapons, obstruction to healthcare delivery, and militarization of healthcare assets. Furthermore, 111 of these attacks have impacted facilities, 14 impacted medical transports, and 24 impacted supplies.

The WHO announcement continues with, “Across Ukraine, 1000 health facilities are in proximity to conflict areas or in changed areas of control,” explained Dr Jarno Habicht, WHO Representative in Ukraine. “Health workers throughout the country are risking their lives to serve those in need of medical services, and they, and their patients, must never be targeted. Further, when people are prevented from seeking and accessing health care, either because the facilities have been destroyed or out of fear that they may become a target, they lose hope. The mental health toll wreaked by the war cannot be underestimated, affecting civilians and the health workforce alike.”

It is important to note that Ukraine was working to improve its healthcare system but had a number of challenges when it was attacked by Russia, suffering from a polio outbreak, low COVID-19 vaccination rates, and other issues when the war started. Ukraine has been making efforts to institute healthcare reforms and achieve universal healthcare coverage, having finally secured parliamentary support for the latter in recent years after 25 years of efforts to do so. Reforms included a financing mechanism under which money follows the patient, so the specific needs of a patient are funded rather than facilities and providers. The state also introduced full-coverage for primary, palliative, and emergency care as well as reimbursement for medication for cardiovascular diseases, asthma, a type 2 diabetes with online prescription filling systems in development. These were significant steps and it is important to remember that healthcare is not a resource that just immediately replenishes itself. It takes time, funding, and serious effort to build a resilient, robust healthcare system and it takes time to develop competent, experienced healthcare professionals. Debilitating a country’s healthcare and public health infrastructure also severely harms their preparedness for CBW attacks and other similar emergencies so, if Russia does in fact decide to use these kinds of weapons in Ukraine, civilian casualties will likely be higher because of this damage to healthcare in the country.

The WHO’s report concludes with another grim reminder: “Attacks on health are unfortunately seen amid conflicts globally. Since 1 January 2022 [as of April 7], WHO has verified 160 attacks on health care in 11 countries and territories resulting in 97 deaths and 74 injuries. Outside of Ukraine at this time, Sudan is also witnessing a recent increase in attacks on health care.”

“Zero-COVID” Fails to Contain Shanghai Surge Amid Record Cases and Lockdown Challenges

According to the Wall Street Journal, 45 cities accounting for 40% of the PRC’s economic output had implemented full or partial lockdowns as of Monday evening. As Shanghai enters its third week of strict lockdowns, videos have emerged of citizens and the police clashing amid growing frustrations as many households run dangerously low on supplies. As grocery deliveries and other services in the city continued to struggle to adapt and more areas of the city were turned into quarantine centers, Shanghai reported a record 27,000 cases on Thursday alone. 25,146 of these were asymptomatic, according to NBC. Despite this and partial easing of restrictions in some areas, President Xi has indicated the city must continue with its strict “dynamic Covid clearance” policy and pandemic control measures. A piece published in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post read, “And yet, the anxieties have been fuelled by images of pandemic prevention workers killing dogs, hungry residents looting grocery stores and drones flying over skyscrapers telling residents to “control your soul’s desire for freedom”.”

The fact that other cities are turning to lockdowns now too has many concerned China could soon face a much more serious, widespread fight with the disease even as the Party continues to stick to its Zero-COVID policies. Guangzhou, a major industrial center located near Hong Kong with 19 million people in it, recently shut itself off as other cities follow suit and close schools and factories. There are also concerns that spring planting for China’s farmers, who feed over 1.4 billion people, could be disrupted as a result. The need for these measures and the fact they are spreading and getting so much attention is also likely a major embarrassment to the Party, which has worked hard to portray an image of having the disease under control from the start of the pandemic.

Having witnessed the recent struggle with COVID-19 in Hong Kong, the PRC is pushing vaccines for the elderly (17% of whom were not vaccinated in late March) in the mainland in an attempt to control the spread amid concerns Omicron and its subvariants may overwhelm the system that, ostensibly, has held strong for so long. It is important to consider too that China’s COVID-19 vaccines are not mRNA vaccines (despite the initial claims that the country was ready to roll out two such vaccines), but rather they are inactivated vaccines that are not as effective as the mRNA ones available in dozens of other countries. While China’s ARCoV/ Walvax vaccine, an mRNA COVID-19 vaccine candidate, is approved for Phase III clinical trials in China, Mexico, Indonesia, and Nepal, this does not offer much help or hope in the current situation. Low efficacy vaccines combined with much more draconian containment measures mean the country is lagging in both natural and vaccine-induced immunity, making the next several weeks critical for the PRC’s COVID-19 response and, potentially, the global economy.

The Cost of Doing Nothing: The US Could Face $2 Trillion in Revenue Loss if Climate Change Isn’t Addressed

The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released the first accounting of what unchecked climate change could spell for the federal budget and the economy overall. This is accompanied by two new assessments- the Federal Budget Exposure to Climate Risks and the Long-Term Budget Outlook focused on climate change. Written by Candace Vahlsing, Associate Director for Climate, Energy, Environment, and Science at OMB, and Danny Yagan, Chief Economist at OMB, the analysis highlights a few keypoints: 1) the economy might shrink a lot (up to a 10% reduction of GDP by the end of the century), 2) the cost of programs for various disaster responses will substantially increase, and 3) there will be consequences for things like business and public health that cannot be adequately understood or addressed by the OMB fiscal balance sheet.

Some of the shocking estimates, and what they will cost the US taxpayer, include: “Increased hurricane frequency could drive up spending on coastal disaster response between $22 billion and $94 billion annually by the end of the century,” “Over 12,195 individual Federal buildings and structures could be inundated under ten feet of sea level rise, with total combined replacement cost of over $43.7 billion,” “Rising wildland fire activity could increase Federal wildland fire suppression expenditures by between $1.55 billion and $9.60 billion annually, the equivalent of an increase between 78 percent and 480 percent, by the end of the century,” and “Federal expenditures on crop insurance premium subsidies are projected to increase 3.5 to 22 percent each year due to climate change-induced crop losses by the late-century, the equivalent of between $330 million and $2.1 billion annually.”

Climate change has attracted growing attention as a national security threat in the last decade as rising temperatures, increased severe weather, and reduced access to critical resources will likely increase geopolitical tensions and social instability globally. This was outlined in-depth in a National Intelligence Estimate from the National Intelligence Council last year, titled “Climate Change and International Responses Increasing Challenges to US National Security Through 2040”. The physical effects of climate change are judged to likely exacerbate cross-border geopolitical flashpoints, most acutely impact the developing world, and worsen tensions on the global stage as states argue over who is most responsible and should pay for how much to meet goals like those in the Paris Agreement.

These reports and analysis from OMB help further explain the threat the US faces and the far-reaching consequences of failing to address this threat. President Biden’s budget request for FY 2023 asks for $44.9 billion to help tackle climate change, an increase of almost 60% over FY 2021, after failing to pass similar funding legislation under the Build Back Better framework. The Biden administration is asking for $15 billion for clean energy investment and infrastructure and $18 billion for climate resilience. However, this is just a request that Congress has to approve, so it remains in question if it will be fulfilled. Importantly, according to the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, it will be cheaper to reach the goal of keeping warming within 2°C than it will be to suffer the consequences of failing to do so.

“King of the War Gases: Examining the Military History of Mustard Gas”

Biodefense PhD student Chris Quillen recently published a new article titled “King of the War Gases: Examining the Military History of Mustard Gas” in the spring 2022 issue of the Georgetown Security Studies Review.  Chris’s article examines the role of sulfur mustard, commonly referred to as mustard gas, in an effort to determine why it is has become the most widely used chemical weapon in history.  Understanding why particular weapons were employed is essential to deciphering their importance and dissuading their future use. 

This study explores sulfur mustard use in a variety of conflicts over the last century.  The historical record begins with mustard’s introduction on the Western Front in World War I by the Germans followed by the retaliation in kind by the French, British, and Americans.  Between the world wars, mustard was widely used in the colonial battles in Africa by the Spanish in Morocco and the Italians in both Libya and Ethiopia.  Japan also employed mustard against the Chinese in the lead up to the Second World War.  In the 1960s Egypt utilized mustard during its intervention in the civil war in Yemen.  Iraq under Saddam Hussein repeatedly attacked both the Iranians and their own citizens with mustard during the 1980s.  Finally, the Islamic State became the first non-state actor to use mustard gas in Iraq and Syria. 

By analyzing this historical record, the impact of sulfur mustard in warfare is revealed as an effective, but not decisive, weapon of war.  While not a war-winning weapon, mustard gas is nevertheless viewed as a valuable weapon of terror for those willing to violate the taboo against the use of chemical weapons.  The lack of international reaction to the breaking of this taboo has only facilitated mustard’s continuing use.  The article concludes by determining the most effective method to limit sulfur mustard use in the future is increased willingness by the international community to enforce the taboo against chemical weapons use.

“Why the World Has No Universal Biosafety Standards”

Andrew Silver’s new article in the British Medical Journal covers pushes for the creation of international biosafety standards. To do this, he first discusses laboratory exposures to pathogens in recent years, including the case of the Academia Sinica lab worker who contracted COVID-19 while working with infected animals in late 2021, and others globally, including 56 unintended pathogen exposures in the UK between January 2020 and December 2021. The pandemic, he explains, has brought renewed interests in biosafety concerns, with China having passed a comprehensive biosecurity law in 2020 that entered into effect a year ago, and the UK announcing a call for evidence in February this year to help inform updates to its biological security strategy. The US has also recently launched reviews of its national biosecurity policy frameworks for pathogens with pandemic potential. However, there are not real international standards for this and key challenges to creating these include trying to align diverse national systems to fit a new international standard. He consulted with King’s College London’s Dr. Filippa Lentzos too, writing

In 2005, the World Health Assembly adopted the International Health Regulations, a legal instrument covering measures for preventing the spread of infectious disease transnationally. Currently, the regulations don’t have a mandate on biosafety or compliance, and Filippa Lentzos, a social scientist at King’s College London who studies biosecurity, says it’s “not realistic to get one agreed.” Instead she suggests that the International Organisation for Standardisation’s 2019 biorisk management standard for laboratories (ISO35001) could be adopted internationally with a third party responsible for certification and validation.

“BWC Assurance: Increasing Certainty in BWC Compliance”

Shearer et al. have released their article on Preprints discussing their efforts over the course of a year to interview 16 states parties’ delegations to the BWC and 20 subject matter experts to gauge their views on verification, compliance, and related concepts. They note that these views varied widely among interviewees which is not necessarily shocking as they write, “Following the 2001 end to negotiations on a legally binding protocol, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) states parties (SPs) developed entrenched positions about the necessity of a verification regime, hindering progress on treaty aims.” Their study is aimed at improving dialogue on verification issues outside the context of these issues, with the authors using the word “assurance” to “represent the degree of certainty that SPs are meeting their treaty obligations.” They found that there was general support for implementing assurance mechanisms, even without a comprehensive and legally binding protocol or verification regime, even among states parties who hold that as their primary goal. This is a useful study to build further discussions upon in the run-up to the 9th BWC RevCon later this year.

“Operationalising BTWC Article VII – A Task For the Forthcoming Review Conference”

Dr. Jean-Pascal Zanders authored this discussion piece asking questions about issue-oriented approaches to Article VII of the BWC and highlighting the complicated relationship between BW and naturally-occurring outbreaks. The Implementation Support Unit of the Biological Weapons Convention (part of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs) released a report, “Operationalising Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention”, this week to delegates participating in PrepCom in Geneva ahead of the BWC RevCon later this year. Article VII of the BWC reads simply, “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.” Dr. Zanders writes of Article VII in the The Trench,

Its clauses do not fit well together. The reference to the UN Security Council (UNSC) has its roots in the original draft Convention proposed by the United Kingdom in 1969 that outlined specific responsibilities and obligations for the body. Today, it makes little sense to wait for a decision in New York to authorise emergency assistance. Fortunately, States Parties have already clarified that ‘assistance’ as meant in the article is not military, but humanitarian. They have also agreed that humanitarian assistance may be provided before any such UNSC decision. Article VII also circumscribes the context for an assistance request, namely exposure to a danger that is the consequence of a breach of the Convention.

He also points out that much of what would fall under Article VII overlaps with global health as it pertains to naturally occurring outbreaks. Outbreaks are rarely intentionally caused by man, and there are potential dangers in not being clear about this overlap as it pertains to these international security measures. The BWC is a disarmament treaty and, as Zanders explains, states will likely invoke COVID-19 in their statements at RevCon this year, so this difference must be kept in mind. While much of the responses triggered by BW attacks would be the same as those triggered by natural outbreaks, understanding and delineating how the emergency response will differ once it is determined that the outbreak is deliberate is important and should be thought of during the upcoming review.

Systematizing the One Health Approach in Preparedness and Response Efforts for Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Proceedings of a Workshop

From the National Academies Press: A planning committee convened by the Forum on Microbial Threats of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine held a virtual workshop on February 23-25, 2021, titled Systematizing the One Health Approach in Preparedness and Response Efforts for Infectious Disease Outbreaks. The workshop gave particular consideration to research opportunities, multisectoral collaboration mechanisms, community-engagement strategies, educational opportunities, and policies that speakers have found effective in implementing the core capacities and interventions of One Health principles to strengthen national health systems and enhance global health security. This Proceedings of a Workshop summarizes the presentations and discussions of the workshop.

Malaria in Africa: Translating Science Into Practice

John’s Hopkins is offering this online symposium for World Malaria Day on April 25. This year’s World Malaria Day symposium, “Malaria in Africa: Translating Science into Practice”, will feature presentations by the five NIH International Centers of Excellence for Malaria Research (ICEMRs) that are actively working in Africa (Mali, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, and Zambia). Confirmed speakers include Dr. Matshidiso Rebecca Moeti (WHO Regional Director for Africa), Dr. Rick Steketee (Deputy US Global Malaria Coordinator), and Professor Sheila Tlou (African Leaders Malaria Alliance Ambassador). Learn more about the symposium and register here.

Russian WMD Disinformation Resources

The mountain of debunkings and academic commentary on the Russian disinformation campaign targeting DTRA’s Biological Threat Reduction Program-supported labs in Ukraine continues to grow. While a more comprehensive list and tool on the Pandora Report’s website is currently under construction, here are a couple of recent works on the matter:

“Biological Weapons Are Banned: Biological Research Is Not”

EUvsDisinfo released this interview with Dr. Jean-Pascal Zanders, founder of The Trench, this week discussing some of the basics of history and international law surrounding biological weapons and the implications of Russia’s claims.

Programme Biologique Militaire en Ukraine, Histoire d’Une Désinformation Russe/ Military Biological Program in Ukraine, History of Russian Disinformation

This French language resource from the Fondation Pour la Recherche Stratégique (Foundation for Strategic Research) discusses Russia’s historical CBW disinformation efforts and offers updates and analysis of recent developments, including Russia’s statements at the UN Security Council last month.

Pandora Report: 4.8.2022

This week we discuss the BWC at 50, the CDC’s upcoming review, the Metaverse’s continued failure to flag Russian propaganda and conspiracy theories, and Shanghai in lockdown. We also cover a number of great new publications and exciting upcoming events. Finally, we want to congratulate Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley for recently winning the Runner-Up McElvany Award from the James Martin Center and the Nonproliferation Review!

Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley Wins Runner-Up McElvany Award from James Martin Center and Nonproliferation Review

Biodefense faculty member, Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, was recently selected as the Runner-up Prize winner for the Doreen and Jim McElvany Award from the Middlebury Institute’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Nonproliferation Review. Her paper, “From CRISPR Babies to Super Soldiers: Challenges and Security Threats Posed by CRISPR” reviews Dr. He Jiankui’s experiments and evaluates the risks of such uses of CRISPR for malevolent purposes. She focuses on the technical obstacles to this kind of abuse, offering fresh perspectives on this security challenge. Her work was praised by the judges for “…its thoroughness and for the sophistication of her analysis of the sociotechnical factors that made Dr. He’s experiments unsuccessful, building on prior research on synthetic biology and biological-weapons proliferation. One called it “an antidote” to worst-case thinking about the risks of misuse that the CRISPR gene-editing tool may pose.” A big congratulations to Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and the other winners!

The Biological Weapons Convention Turns 50

The Preparatory Committee’s (PrepCom) second session for the BWC’s upcoming Ninth Review Conference is currently ongoing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. This is in preparation for the Review Convention (RevCon) set to take place in August of this year. Much of the commentary surrounding PrepCom has focused on the critical need to improve the BWC and enforcement of it, particularly in light of the ongoing devastation caused by the pandemic and the nonproliferation and biosecurity threats posed by advancements in the biological sciences.

US Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, released a statement discussing the BWC’s history, its clear importance, and the need to strengthen it today. Among other things, his statement highlighted that “The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the devastating impact that disease can have on the world. We must recognize that other biological risks are growing and take action to address them. We face not only an increased threat of naturally occurring diseases, but also the potential for laboratory accidents and the intentional misuse of life sciences and biotechnology. The weaponization of biological agents and toxins violates the BTWC and is unacceptable, and the use of biological weapons – in the words of the Convention – “would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” He called on this year’s RevCon to take “near-term, concrete action to strengthen the Convention and benefit States Parties in such areas as increasing resource for international assistance and cooperation and establishing a mechanism to review advances in science and technology.”

You can find the reports from this PrepCom here. A recording of UNIDIR’s event, Lessons Learned for the biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference, is also available here.

Facebook Fails to Appropriately Label 80% of Bioweapon Conspiracy Articles On Its Platform

It’s no secret that Facebook remains a fertile land for conspiracy theorists and fringe groups, despite the launch of platforms like Parler and Truth Social. In recent years, Facebook and other platforms have begun labeling misleading and false posts with warnings, with varying levels of success. For example, during the early 2021 US Senate election in Georgia (a state where the 2020 presidential election was decided by just 12,000 votes), Facebook failed to apply fact check labels to 60% of top-performing posts using false election information. This has been a recurring theme regarding health information throughout the pandemic as well. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no different either. According to a study released by the Center for Countering Digital Hate Similarly, Facebook failed to label 80% of articles on its service that promote conspiracy theories about US labs in Ukraine and Ukraine’s supposed intent to use CBW against Russia. The Center also found Facebook fails to label 91% of posts containing Russian propaganda about Ukraine posted between February 24 and March 14 this year. The Center is renewing its calls for Meta to better enforce its use of “false information”, “partly false information”, and “missing context” labels in light of its findings.

Shanghai in Lockdown

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to cling to its “zero-COVID” strategy, this time shutting down the entire city of Shanghai amid the city’s worst COVID-19 outbreak since the pandemic began. Shanghai, a major global trade and finance hub, is home to 25 million people, making it the most populated city proper in the world and the only city in East Asia with a GDP higher than that of its country’s capital. The city officially recorded over 130,000 cases since March 1 as of yesterday, April 7, according to CNN. While lockdowns (along with censorship and lies) have been key features of the CCP’s COVID-19 response, Shanghai has seen the breakdown of food delivery services, which have proven essential for those stuck in lock down cities. Meituan, one such delivery service, sent nearly 1,000 extra workers to Shanghai to help with this issue this week amid rising complaints of hunger and lack of access to other necessities. Other measures include implementation of next-day group deliveries, community bulk buying, and use of autonomous delivery vehicles to help alleviate some of the problems.

Furthermore, there is concern about an “immunity gap” in the PRC, meaning the population has little to no protection gained through infection and very low protection acquired from Chinese vaccines due to their poor quality. China, like many countries, also still struggles with providing antivirals to people who do contract the disease, further complicating the matter. All of this has led some to question whether this will seriously damage the CCP moving forward, particularly as frustrations in Shanghai rise, with more citizens becoming increasingly vocal about their concerns. This all comes, too, after many a debate about whether or not the authoritarian government system in the PRC would prove “better” at pandemic management, further demonstrating the complications of understanding the relationship between governance and outbreak management.

CDC to Undergo Month-Long Evaluation Following Relentless Criticism

CDC Director, Dr. Rochelle Walensky, announced this week that her agency will undergo a month-log, sweeping review in response to the near constant criticism it has received in the last couple of years. According to CNN Health, “Starting April 11, Jim Macrae, an administrator with the US Department of Health and Human Services, will join the CDC for a month-long listening tour and assessment. Walensky said he will provide her with insight on how the delivery of the agency’s science and programs can be further strengthened as it transitions more of its Covid-19 response activities to its various centers, institutes and offices. Walensky also asked three senior leaders to gather feedback on the agency, including its current structure and suggestions for change.” CDC says it has worked over the last year to develop systems to speed up data reporting and scientific processes during pandemic response, though it says it now needs to institutionalize and formalize these approaches.

Walensky also said in her statement, “Never in its 75 years history has CDC had to make decisions so quickly, based on often limited, real-time, and evolving science. The COVID-19 pandemic has presented opportunities across HHS to review current organizational structures, systems, and processes, and CDC is working to strategically position and modernize the agency to facilitate and support the future of public health. As we’ve challenged our state and local partners, we know that now is the time for CDC to integrate the lessons learned into a strategy for the future.” The CDC has been criticized for being slow to recommend universal masking early in the pandemic, as well as its subsequent rapid changes on masking and booster policies, in addition to its recent halving of the isolation time for infected people.

Health Security Intelligence- An Operations Perspective

A new article was recently published in Intelligence and National Security focusing on the bridge between health security warning intelligence and hospital preparedness and response, titled “Health Security Warning Intelligence During First Contact With COVID: An Operations Perspective”. In it, Wilson et al. use Nevada’s experience with COVID-19 as a case study to show that “access to health security warning intelligence enabled avoidance of overwhelming patient demand and compromise of emergency response.”

New Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Report

A new IPCC report released this week, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change, offers a more optimistic perspective on the potential to seriously limit global warming to 1.5°C, citing factors like the “sustained decreases of up to 85% in the costs of solar and wind energy, and batteries” in the last decade. “We are at a crossroads. The decisions we make now can secure a liveable future. We have the tools and know-how required to limit warming,” said IPCC Chair Hoesung Lee.  “I am encouraged by climate action being taken in many countries. There are policies, regulations and market instruments that are proving effective.  If these are scaled up and applied more widely and equitably, they can support deep emissions reductions and stimulate innovation.”

New AMR Strategic Plan from WHO and Others

The WHO, UN Environment Programme, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, and World Organisation for Animal Health recently released their new strategic plan for combatting AMR, “Together for One Health: Strategic Framework for Collaboration on Antimicrobial Resistance”. Among other things, the framework discusses the benefits of this specific collaboration and identified key goals and implementation strategies, including building countries’ capacities to ensure policy coherence across sectors.

IMF’s Global Strategy for Long-Term COVID-19 Risks

The International Monetary Fund recently released its latest strategy for COVID-19, “A Global Strategy to Manage the Long-Term Risks of COVID-19”, which assesses outcomes for scenarios ranging from a mild endemic disease to future dangerous variants emerging. Its strategy implications focus on broad healthcare equity, disease surveillance and monitoring, transition from an acute response to a sustainable, long-term one, and a unified risk-mitigation approach to future disease threats.

Biological and Chemical Warfare in Ancient Myth and History

Dr. Adrienne Mayor is delivering Loyola University Chicago’s Callahan Lecture this discussing her work, including her book, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs: Unconventional Warfare in the Ancient World. The lecture will be available on Zoom on April 11, 2022 at 5 pm CST. Register here.

ASPR TRACIE Climate Change Resilience and Healthcare System Considerations

Join presenters from the federal and private sectors as they discuss ASPR TRACIE’s newly released Climate Change Resilience and Healthcare System Considerations document and accompanying Topic Collection; current and future HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health (OASH) and Office of Climate Change and Health Equity (OCCHE) efforts and priorities as they pertain to climate change; and the critical role of health systems in advancing environmental stewardship to achieve health equity. The webinar will take place from 2:30-3:30 PM (ET) on Monday, April 18, 2022Register today.

Russian WMD Disinformation Resources

The mountain of debunkings and academic commentary on the Russian disinformation campaign targeting DTRA’s Biological Threat Reduction Program-supported labs in Ukraine continues to grow. While a more comprehensive list and tool on the Pandora Report’s website is currently under construction, here are a couple of recent works on the matter:

Lessons From the First Time Russia Accused the United States of Biowarfare

Dr. Conrad Crane of the US Army War College authored this piece in War on the Rocks discussing the Soviet Union’s false claims that the US used BW against North Korea and China during the Korean War.

Will Russia Use Chemical Weapons in Ukraine? Researchers Evaluate the Risks

Davide Castelvecchi reports in this Nature News Explainer, discussing Western government’s worries about Russian CW, probable Russian thinking on the use of CW in the conflict, and prevention and detection measures.

Unmasking “Clandestine,” the Figure Behind the Viral “Ukrainian Biolab” Conspiracy Theory

The Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism recently released this article discussing the identity and background of “Clandestine”, a Virginia man and ARNG veteran who helped spur the biolab conspiracy theory in the US.

Pandora Report: 4.1.2022

This week we discuss ongoing Russian attacks on Ukrainian healthcare facilities and global response to the threat of WMD use in Ukraine. We also cover the Biden administration’s budget requests for science in the coming fiscal year, the WHO’s new strategy for genomic surveillance, and the United States’ new special representative to the BWC. We round out with a myriad of new publications, including one on hypoallergenic CRISPR kitties, and updates to our collection of resources on Russian WMD disinformation.

Sign of the Times? Gruinard Island Is On Fire

Continuing with this decade’s general trend, an uninhabited Scottish island once used for germ warfare experiments in the early half of the 20th century caught fire this week. The island, 1 km off the mainland’s shore at its closest point, has long since been uninhabited. However, rumors of its secrets spread to the mainland over the decades as sheep, cows, and horses mysteriously died following anthrax tests on livestock during WWII, as revealed by a declassified film from the British Ministry of Defence. It even took the Ministry 24 years after the tests to mention the anthrax risk on the island’s warning signs, according to the BBC. The Ministry finally declared the island anthrax-free in 1990, further indicating these is little risk in this situation, but the internet was quick to point out how characteristic of the 2020s headlines about the “Anthrax Island” catching fire are. Check out the BBC’s documentary on the Dark Harvest Commando’s trip to the island in 1981 here.

Russia Continues Attacks On Ukrainian Healthcare Facilities

According to the World Health Organization, there have been more than 70 attacks targeting hospitals, ambulances, and providers in Ukraine. That number, the organization states, continues to increase on a daily basis. As of this morning, the Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care put this number at 82 since the start of February, with most of the recent attacks being classified as either violence with heavy weapons or removal of healthcare assets. A number of videos of attacks on Ukrainian facilities continue to circulate online, including footage corroborated by the BBC and other outlets of the shelling of the newly refurbished hospital in Izyum on March 8. At the time, the hospital was treating “children, pregnant women and three newborn babies as well as soldiers and civilians injured in fierce fighting in the region, according to the Ukrainian authorities.” While many of these attacks have focused on damaging hospitals, transports, and supplies, the WHO has recorded the “”probable” abduction or detention of healthcare staff and patients.” Civilian hospitals are protected under Article 18 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Exceptions to this come only under circumstances such as when civilian healthcare facilities are being used to shield healthy combatants or if they are placed near legitimate military targets. Violations of this rule can be investigated by the International Criminal Court, allowing individual perpetrators to be prosecuted and punished if found guilty of war crimes.

WMD and CBRN Concerns in the War Persist

Science also reported this week that, although the power was restored on 14 March to the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, according to Anatolii Nosovskyi (Director of the Institute for Safety Problems of Nuclear Power Plants (ISPNPP) in Kyiv), looters made off radioactive isotopes used to calibrate instruments and pieces of radioactive waste. Concerns over these stem from the fact these materials could be used to help create a dirty bomb when mixed with conventional explosives. Chornobyl is not the only nuclear facility at risk, as facilities like Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology have also been attacked, in what Nosovskyi describes as “state-sponsored nuclear terrorism.” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi called the Zaporizhzhya shelling a “close call” as the projectiles, thankfully, missed the facility’s reactor halls. The Science article explains the unique concerns about Chornobyl, writing, “But Chornobyl has a unique set of radioactive hazards. On 11 March, wildfires ignited in the nearby radioactive forests, which harbor radioisotopes that were disgorged in the accident and taken up by plants and fungi. Russian military activities have prevented firefighters from entering the exclusion zone, Nosovskyi says.” This comes amid continued international concerns the Russians could use weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine.

This prompted the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to release a statement this week decrying Russia’s invasion and ongoing war in Ukraine and the subsequent concerns of WMD use, writing “We are outraged that the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction has been evoked in the course of this conflict and that military action is creating serious CBRN risks for the population and the environment, with the potential for catastrophic results.” The statement continues, “Ukraine is a long-standing, constructive and committed member of the Global Partnership with an exemplary non-proliferation record, as demonstrated by its renouncing of nuclear weapons inherited from the former Soviet Union in 1994. For more than two decades, Global Partnership members have worked together with Ukraine to increase the safety and security of facilities dealing with sensitive nuclear, biological or chemical materials for exclusively peaceful purposes and to support and enhance protective capabilities against the abuse of such materials.” This has also prompted renewed discussion of nuclear responsibility, including this piece by Ariel Levite (former Principal Deputy Director General for Policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission) and Toby Dalton from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace discussing the risks of a nuclear power accident and Russian use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Biden White House Aims High in Science Budget Requests (Again)

President Biden submitted to Congress a 2023 budget request that calls for a 9.5% increase in domestic discretionary spending. Science reports “Biden is asking for a 19% increase at the National Science Foundation (NSF), a 9.6% boost for the National Institutes of Health (NIH), 4.5% more for the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Office of Science, and a 5% hike for NASA’s science missions. Once again, fighting climate change and boosting sustainable energy technologies also rank high among Biden’s research priorities.” However, last year, even with the Democrats in control, Biden’s first budget requests for science funding were seriously downsized in Congress’s final 2022 spending bill. Science explains, “For example, legislators shrank Biden’s proposed budget for a new Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H) from $6.5 billion to $1 billion, instead giving NIH’s existing institutes a boost of 5%. But ARPA-H remains a presidential favorite, with Biden requesting a total of $5 billion for it in 2023.” In an effort to garner bipartisan support, Biden requested to increase defense spending by 4% this year and has focused this request on addressing the federal deficit by reducing overall spending (though he still proposed to raise taxes on the super wealthy). The US budget deficit hit a record $1.7 trillion in the first half of the fiscal year, amid huge spending for pandemic relief including the $1.9 trillion economic rescue package passed last March. The budget request does push for increased funding for agencies like HHS and local public health funding, but some, including Secretary of HHS Xavier Becerra, seem worried this will not be enough to “finish the job” on COVID-19.

Kenneth D. Ward Named US Special Representative to the Biological Weapons Convention

The US Department of State and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie D. Jenkins announced this week that Kenneth Ward is the Biden administration’s new pick to represent the US at the BWC. Ward boasts a 30-year career in arms control and nonproliferation with the US Department of State and the former US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, having previously served as the US Ambassador to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague, Netherlands, with previous assignments as the Director of the Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs in State’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, and the Deputy Negotiator during the 2004-2007 WMD elimination effort in Libya. This is a critical time for the BWC, especially with its ninth review conference set to be held later this year, so strong US representation is a must.

WHO- One in Three Countries Do Not Have Genomic Surveillance Capacity

The WHO released its new 10-year strategy to improve genomic surveillance of pathogens globally. While few countries historically have been able to do genomic surveillance routinely in-country (largely because of how complicated and expensive the process is), COVID-19 has helped change this. WHO explains “Data collected by WHO show that in March 2021, 54% of countries had this capacity. By January 2022, thanks to the major investments made during the COVID-19 pandemic, the number had increased to 68%. Even greater gains were made in the public sharing of sequence data: in January 2022, 43% more countries published their sequence data compared to a year before.” Importantly, the new “Global Genomic Surveillance Strategy for Pathogens with Pandemic and Epidemic Potential 2022-2032″ is not pathogen- or disease threat-specific. Rather, it aims to provide a high-level framework to “…leverage existing capacities, address barriers and strengthen the use of genomic surveillance worldwide.” It tries specifically to address the potential for the gaps and increased inequity the greater use of this technology might lead to as well, particularly in assessing workforce training and needs. Genomic surveillance proved critical in this pandemic in identifying the novel coronavirus and creating diagnostic tests and vaccines for it, so it is critical to continue investing in this technology and global capacity.

Is It Time For a National Biorisk Management Agency?

A new article in Health Security by Ritterson et al. discusses the merits of creating a new, centralized federal entity that would act as mission control for biorisk oversight in the United States. They explain the current patchwork system of biorisk management in the US federal government that is highly dependent on the pathogens researchers are using, where their funding comes from, and the location of the lab in question. As an example of this, they point to the fact that the CDC and USDA are able to regulate labs that possess agents on the select agent lists, but they have very little control over labs that are researching other transmissible agents. While they applaud the Biden administration for recognizing these risks, they write that the current plan of action doesn’t address major gaps, writing “Currently, the US government does not know the location of laboratories working with pathogens, what pathogens are being studied within these laboratories, or the conditions under which these laboratories are operating—something the US Government Accountability Office itself has repeatedly recognized as a serious issue.” Furthermore, they explain the challenges of oversight in privately funded institutions, who can technically do research on pathogens like H2N2 influenza, including trying to make it more transmissible, with no federal, state, or local entity having much power to do anything about it. While there is robust debate on the merits of such research, the authors of this piece conclude that a new federal entity with better oversight and enforcement mechanisms is needed to help address the conflicts of interest situations like this can create, as well as broader biorisk management issues in the US.

Addressing Inaccurate Information on Biological Threats Through Scientific Collaboration

The National Academies Press has released this new report, Addressing Inaccurate and Misleading Information About Biological Threats Through Scientific Collaboration and Communication in Southeast Asia, which discusses how scientists can work collaboratively across scientific disciplines and sectors to identify and address inaccuracies that could fuel mis- and disinformation. The authors explain that, “Some false claims may be addressed through sound scientific analysis, suggesting that scientists can help counter misinformation by providing evidence-based, scientifically defensible information that may discredit or refute these claims,” and continue by writing, ” Although the study focused on a scientific network primarily in Southeast Asia, it is relevant to scientists in other parts of the world.” Biodefense faculty member Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley contributed to this report.

The Devil Never Sleeps: Learning to Live in an Age of Disasters

Juliette Kayyem, former Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Intergovernmental Affairs, recently released this book discussing the realities of living in a time “…of constant, consistent catastrophe, where things more often go wrong than they go right.” In The Devil Never Sleeps, Juliette Kayyem lays the groundwork for a new approach to dealing with disasters. Presenting the basic themes of crisis management, Kayyem amends the principles we rely on far too easily. Instead, she offers us a new framework to anticipate the “devil’s” inevitable return, highlighting the leadership deficiencies we need to overcome and the forward thinking we need to harness. It’s no longer about preventing a disaster from occurring, but learning how to use the tools at our disposal to minimize the consequences when it does. Kayyem also recently discussed disaster management with Jen Patja Howell on the Lawfare Podcast.

“Here CRISPR Kitty?”

In great news for all of us who just can’t seem to help petting cats even though we know we will suffer shortly afterward- Researchers at InBio, formerly known as Indoor Biotechnologies, reported in a new article published in The CRISPR Journal that they have made progress in treating people with cat allergies, though there is still the goal of creating a hypoallergenic cat. The journal explains, “About 15 percent of the population suffer allergies to domestic cats, which researchers have previously shown is largely attributable to what the Atlantic called “a pernicious little protein” — an allergen called Fel d 1 that is shed by all cats. In the new study, Nicole Brackett and colleagues at InBio performed a bioinformatics analysis of the Fel d 1 gene from 50 domestic cats to pinpoint conserved coding regions suitable for CRISPR editing. Further comparisons to genes in eight exotic felid species revealed a high degree of variation, suggesting that Fel d 1 is nonessential for cats. The researchers used CRISPR-Cas9 to disrupt Fel d 1 with high efficiency.” The authors claim Fel d 1, based on their data, is a viable candidate for gene deletion to help cat allergy sufferers by removing the relevant major allergen at the source. The journal also writes, “The study paves the way for further experiments exploring the use of CRISPR as a potential genetic therapy to muzzle the release of cat allergens.”

Categorizing Sequences of Concern by Function To Better Assess Mechanisms of Microbial Pathogenesis

Godbold et al.’s new minireview in Infection and Immunity tackles the question of how best to regularize descriptions of microbial pathogenesis. In other words, how should we describe what makes “bag bugs” bad? This review assesses adequacy of annotations of sequences with a role in microbial pathogenesis using existing controlled vocabularies and sequence databases. According to the article, “We relate the categorization of more than 2,750 sequences of pathogenic microbes through a controlled vocabulary called Functions of Sequences of Concern (FunSoCs). These allow for an ease of description by both humans and machines. We provide a subset of 220 fully annotated sequences in the supplemental material as examples. The use of this compact (∼30 terms), controlled vocabulary has potential benefits for research in microbial genomics, public health, biosecurity, biosurveillance, and the characterization of new and emerging pathogens.”

Fifth Annual Global Health 50/50 Report Released

Global Health 50/50 has just released their fifth annual report, “Boards for all?”, which presents the organization’s first-ever analysis of the gender and geography of who governs public health. According to Global Health 50/50, the field of global health is not living up to its name. The organization writes, “The report further presents its annual review of the equality- and gender-related policies and practices of 200 global organisations. Building on five years of evidence, it finds signs of rapid progress in building more equitable and gender-responsive global health organisations, while also revealing stagnating progress among a large subset of global health organisations. For the first time, the Index categorises all organisations by performance and presents dedicated pages for each organisation to explore and compare findings.” The report calls for global representation and equitable global health governance.

National Advisory Committee on Individuals with Disabilities and Disasters Meeting

The next public meeting of the National Advisory Committee on Individuals with Disabilities and Disasters (NACIDD) will take place on Friday, April 1 from 11:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. ET. Registration for this event is required and can be accessed along with additional meeting information through the online event page. Join federal leaders, NACIDD members, distinguished guests, and other experts as we discuss topics on the challenges, opportunities, and priorities related to addressing the needs of people with disabilities.  Hear from Amy Nicholas, Senior Attorney Advisor, for the National Council on Disability, sharing “Lessons Learned on the Efficacy of Federal Programs and Policies for People with Disabilities Before, During, and After Disasters”.  The meeting will also be joined by Sachin Dev Pavithran, Ph.D., Executive Director, with the US Access Board, discussing, “Providing Temporary Aide and Accessible, Transportable Housing During Disaster Events”.

Russian WMD Disinformation Resources

The mountain of debunkings and academic commentary on the Russian disinformation campaign targeting DTRA’s Biological Threat Reduction Program-supported labs in Ukraine continues to grow. Below are some highlights from the last couple of weeks, with the updates since last week in red:

Russia’s Lies About Bioweapons in Ukraine Make the World Less Safe

Wired released this article late this week discussing the importance of Ukraine’s labs to global public health and how Russian lies about them risk public health in Ukraine, in the region, and around the world.

Ukraine: Is a Chemical or Biological Attack Likely?

Chatham House released this explainer this week discussing the historical context of Russian CBW and disinformation as well as assessing the likelihood of such attacks in the current conflict, which the authors determine are unlikely but still concerning.

Have You Been Lied to About Ukrainian Biolabs? 

Drs. Filippa Lentzos and Gregory Koblentz recently hosed this even on Twitter Space discussing the ongoing bioweapon claims targeting labs in Ukraine. A recording of the event is available here and the transcript can be found here.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DTRA has released this fact sheet discussing its support for Ukrainian labs and other key facts, including details of Russia’s illegal and dangerous takeover of multiple Ukrainian-owned labs. They have also released a YouTube video discussing the program and the beneficial work it has done and continues to do in disarmament and public health.

Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

The PRIF Blog published this piece explaining and refuting Russia’s BW claims while also addressing concerns that these claims could be used as a pretext for a chemical weapons attack against Ukraine. Read more here.

Council on Strategic Risks

Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell at CSR authored a piece, “The Deeply Dangerous Spread of Russian Disinformation on Biological Weapons,” discussing the implications of Russia’s debunked claims. Of the idea that Russia might use WMDs in this war, they quote Andrew Weber, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, writing “If Russia does commit such atrocities, “There would be a very strong and united international response to any use of chemical or biological weapons, both of which are banned by the chemical and biological weapons conventions,” Andy Weber emphasized.”

Nuclear Threat Initiative

Hayley Severance and Jacob H. Heckles with NTI’s Global Biological Policy and Programs team explained some of the dangers of this Russian propaganda, focusing on the division and confusion it sows and the potential for this to later allow Russia to be viewed as justified in their invasion and war against Ukraine. Check out the piece, “Russian Propaganda Established a Dangerous, Permissive Environment,” here.

Congressional Research Service

CRS, the public policy research institute of the United States Congress, released a CRS Insight addressing members’ of Congress questions and concerns regarding these laboratories. It discusses the dangers combat operations pose to these facilities and potential courses of action Congress might consider taking as a result of these issues.

CBW Events Ukraine FAQ Page

CBW Events has created a one-stop-shop for all your questions on this issue here. CBW Events is “a project to create a record of events to enable and encourage understanding of how policies on the issues relating to chemical and biological warfare and its prevention are developed.”

Dr. Gregory Koblentz Was Recently Quoted in Numerous Outlets Discussing These Claims

Dr. Koblentz has been working overtime taking interviews to help combat this disinformation. Below are some of the quotes he provided within the last couple of weeks across various news outlets and debunking sites.

Deutschlandfunk– “Hält sich Russland an die Biowaffenkonvention?” (German: “Does Russia Comply With the Biological Weapons Convention?”)

  • Audio recording features segments of an interview with Dr. Koblentz discussing Russia’s past with WMD claims and its interaction with the BWC

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists– “Amid False Russian Allegation of US “Biolabs” in Ukraine, It’s Worth Asking: What Is a Bioweapon?”

  • This article features Dr. Koblentz extensively, discussing in-depth factors like what characteristics would make for the ideal bioweapon, including considerations for blowback and potentially starting another pandemic

El Periodico– “El Ruido Sables Nucleares De Putin” (Spanish: “Putin’s Nuclear Saber Rattling”)

Daily Mail– “The 46 US Labs in Ukraine and the $200 Pentagon Program That Sparked a Propaganda War: How Ex-Soviet Facilities Adopted by America That House Pathogens Prompted Kremlin Bioweapons Claims in Putin’s Back Yard”

  • “‘These are all public health and veterinary labs,’ said Gregory Koblentz, director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, according to Poynter. ‘None of them have been involved in biological warfare’.” 

The Washington Post– “A Legacy of ‘Secrecy and Deception’: Why Russia Clings to an Outlawed Chemical Arsenal”

  • “Novichok’s distinctive chemical formula differed from that of other known nerve agents, and because of this, Novichok was initially omitted from the Chemical Weapons Convention’s list of banned substances. Russia could thus continue to tinker with the new weapon without technically violating their treaty obligations, said Gregory Koblentz, a biological and chemical weapons expert and director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government.”
  • ““Russia didn’t just inherit the Soviet chemical weapons arsenal; they also inherited the secrecy and deception that surrounded the program,” Koblentz said.”

Axios Science “Why Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use Are Hard to Investigate”

“What to watch: Gregory Koblentz, director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, says that, rather than use a chemical or biological weapon for an attack in Ukraine, there is a risk “Russia will invent or stage an event, claim it as an atrocity and use it domestically for escalating their commitment to the conflict.”

  • “Even if the U.S. and Ukrainians could expose this was staged or a hoax, on some level, the disinformation would be out there, and some would throw up their hands and say they don’t know and are going to sit it out,” he says.
  • Another concern for Koblentz is that unsubstantiated claims that bioweapons are being developed in Ukrainian labs that study and surveil pathogens like Crimean hemorrhagic fever could damage international cooperation on biosecurity and pathogen surveillance among labs around the world.

What’s next: The BCW is scheduled to meet in August to discuss how its mechanisms for resolving concerns about biological weapons compliance could be strengthened.

  • There had been signs over the past few years that parties may be willing to agree to measures that would facilitate verifying whether parties are complying. But “now there is no way it will be a constructive diplomatic event,” Koblentz says. “It’s been sacrificed for geopolitics.””

Bloomberg Quicktake– “Ukraine: Is Russia Planning to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction?”

iNews– “How Russia’s Fake Claims About Ukraine Bioweapons Spread From Telegram Anti-Vaxxers to Fox News”

  • ““It goes back to the 1980s, when the KGB started a rumour that the United States occurred the HIV virus,” said Dr Greg Koblentz, Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University.”

CNN What Matters– “Russia and Chemical Weapons: What You Need to Know”

  • Dr. Koblentz featured heavily in this article through a long interview discussing many facets of Russian CBW, including the difference between BW and CW, Russia’s obligations under international law, the potential for Russia to use such weapons against Ukraine, and more

Open– “No! Quelli in Ucraina Non Sono Laboratori Militari Per La Guerra Biologica” (Italian: “No! The Labs in Ukraine Are Not Biowarfare Labs”)

  • “Associate professor and director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government , Gregory Koblentz, explains to Open why the Russian narrative of biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine could be the first phase of a maneuver aimed at attributing to the A completely invented biological threat was born.”
  • “These laboratories are used to diagnose and conduct research on endemic diseases in Ukraine – explains Koblentz -, they are not designed or intended for use to conduct research on biological weapons. The concern is not whether Russia will take them over and use them to develop biological weapons. Moscow already has three large military microbiology facilities which it uses to conduct research and development on biological weapons. Instead, the concern is that Russia is leaking “evidence” fabricated in those labs and claiming to have uncovered a secret US-Ukraine program to develop biological weapons. Of course, such a statement would be nonsense.”
  • “The only way these laboratories could pose a danger would be if they were bombed, looted or occupied and unsuspecting individuals accidentally became infected with a leftover pathogen sample – continues the expert -, which was on site but no longer properly stored. . The WHO has told Ukraine to destroy the samples of high-risk pathogens in their laboratories for this reason ”.
  • “The United States and Ukraine have been transparent about the type of public health research conducted in these laboratories – concludes Koblentz -, as you can see on the US embassy website . The Defense Department has just released a new fact sheet explaining its assistance to Ukraine in this area. The BTRP strengthens biological health and safety in laboratories around the world and develops the capacity of these laboratories to diagnose and study diseases that pose a threat to public health in those countries. Since the onset of COVID-19, the program has also helped these countries respond to the pandemic by providing diagnostic kits, etc. “

EFE Verifica– “Nada Prueba Que Haya Laboratorios de Armas Biológicas en Ucrania, Como Afirma Rusia” (Spanish: “Nothing Prove That There Are Biological Weapons Laboratories in Ukraine, As Russia Claims”)

  • “For his part, Gregory Koblentz, director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Politics and Government, recalls that in 1980 the Soviets spread the rumor that the US had “invented” the HIV virus and was being “used” as a biological weapon.”
  • “Since then, this type of disinformation campaign has been “quite aggressive” and has targeted not only the US, but also Georgia and Ukraine, stresses Koblentz, for whom these accusations are part “of a pattern” in propaganda Russian.”

Pandora Report: 3.25.2022

We’re back! We kick off this issue with a very special update from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists before getting into the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense’s recent meeting discussing the future of biodefense and biosecurity, more updates, and a number of great new publications and events to attend. We also included a brief update on why we were away last week, featuring plenty of photos of animals to brighten everyone’s day. A list of resources, updates, and faculty media features regarding Russia’s WMD disinformation is also at the end of this issue following our normal announcement section.

Has the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Gone Rogue?

According to the Onion, America’s Finest News Source, our friends at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists are demanding a whopping $10 trillion in unmarked bills, otherwise they will set their Doomsday Clock to midnight, destroying the Earth. Dr. Rachel Bronson, President and CEO of the Bulletin, was definitely quoted saying, “Citizens of Earth, we have long served as stewards of your puny globe, safeguarding it from destruction with our Doomsday Clock, and today we demand you recognize our sacrifice with a simple monetary donation—say, $10 trillion?” in a message to all UN member states. She continued with, “Since time immemorial, we overseers at the Bulletin have been responsible for averting countless catastrophes with this all-powerful timekeeping instrument, and now we ask: Will you be the generation that allows humanity to be extinguished for a measly few trillion dollars? You have heard our demands. My finger is already on the minute hand. Now what shall you do?” The Onion also reported in 2016 that the Bulletin moved the clock to 60 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been to global catastrophe, following Arby’s threats to create a three-cheese jalapeno beef’n bacon melt. The clock currently sits at 100 seconds to midnight because of factors like “negative trends in nuclear and biological weapons, climate change, and a variety of disruptive technologies—all exacerbated by a corrupted information ecosphere that undermines rational decision making,” so they really took the beef’n bacon melt to heart.

North Korea Conducts First ICBM Test Since 2017

Japan’s Defense Ministry announced yesterday that a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. North Korea has not conducted such a test since 2017, during the “fire and fury” days of the Trump administration. Japanese State Minister of Defense Makoto Oniki told the press the missile likely was in the air for approximately 71 minutes before landing about 150 km west of the Oshima Peninsula off Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost major island. The missile was later confirmed to be a Hwasong-17, which is thought to be 82 feet long and is estimated to be the largest road-mobile ballistic missile system in the world. North Korea revealed the Hwasong-17 at a military parade in October 2020, with this week’s test launch from an airport near Pyongyang being its first full-range test, according to ABC News. Kyodo News cited an unnamed source in the Japanese government who claimed this might be the closest a DPRK missile has ever come to the Japanese mainland. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, currently attending a meeting with G7 leaders in Brussels, strongly condemned the launch and stated he would seek to work with G7 members in formulating a response to the test that violates UN Security Council resolutions. While Kim Jong Un declared a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and ICBMs in 2018, he appeared to rescind it last January in instructing officials to “rapidly examine the issue on resuming” such testing, according to NK News. A likely new ICBM base was discovered earlier this year in Hwapyong-gun, just 25 km from the Chinese border in the north of the country, further indicating the moratorium was likely terminated. DPRK state media released propaganda videos dramatizing the massive missile’s launch, one of which quickly drew attention online for its over-the-top style (at 1:08 in the linked video). Korean Central News Agency (the state agency of the DPRK) announced this test was guided by Kim Jong Un in pursuit of a “powerful tool for nuclear attack” aimed to “contain” the United States.

Biodefense Students Conduct Vector Surveillance in Kenya for Spring Break

Biodefense Program students Michelle Grundahl (MS Student) and Danyale C. Kellogg (PhD Student and Managing Editor of the Pandora Report) recently returned from a trip to the Mpala Research Centre outside of Nanyuki, Kenya. On this trip, they assisted researchers working on grants under the Department of Defense’s Congressionally Directed Medical Research Program (CDMRP) and the Remote Emerging Disease Intelligence Network (REDI-NET). Grundahl explained some details of the trip, saying “Our focus was to support Mason professor, Dr. Von Fricken. His work in Kenya involves surveillance of vector-borne diseases using a One Health approach. Starting on day one, we had the opportunity to collect water and soil samples, leeches, and ticks…The 10 students on this trip were intensely involved in setting up laboratory equipment and working through protocols to support the REDI-NET surveillance program.” The pair were joined by a number of Kenyan scientists who are also involved with the project through the Smithsonian’s Global Health Program. Grundahl and Kellogg previously attended the Medical Management of Chemical and Biological Casualties course, offered by USAMRIID and USAMRICD, together in the fall of 2021.

Meeting of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense- The Biological Threat Expanse: Current and Future Challenges to National Biodefense

The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense met on Tuesday to discuss the expanding landscape of current and future biological threats, the roles and responsibilities of the federal government in assessing and preparing for various biological threats, and biological weapons, bioterrorism, and biological arms races with the public. The Commission explains, “In its 2015 bipartisan report, A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts, the Commission described biological threats to the Nation and made 33 recommendations to optimize U.S. efforts to prevent, deter, prepare for, detect, respond to, attribute, recover from, and mitigate intentionally introduced, accidentally released, and naturally occurring biological events. Seven years later, the U.S. experience with COVID-19 continues to validate our original findings and the need for an Apollo Program for Biodefense as biological threats to the Nation continue to expand and increase.”

Biodefense Program Director, Dr. Gregory Koblentz, also testified during this event, providing insight on the future of biodefense (time stamp- 3:47:22). On the risks posed by dual use research of concern and effective biosafety and biosecurity risk management, Koblentz concluded: “Whether or not the current pandemic was caused by a laboratory accident, it does not mean the next pandemic won’t be. Indeed, efforts to prevent and prepare for the next pandemic, ironically, include a range of activities that serve to increase the risk posed by an accident. Given that existing national and international systems to ensure that such research is conducted safely, securely, and responsibly are already inadequate, we need a new global architecture for biorisk management that can address the growing challenges we face in this domain.” The event recording is available here.

Omicron Subvariant BA.2 Updates

The BA.2 subvariant, AKA “stealth Omicron,” of COVID-19, which spreads up to 80% faster than the original Omicron variant, was found to have doubled in the US over the last two weeks, making it the dominant subvariant in the country right now, according the CNBC. Dr. Anthony Fauci told ABC News this week that BA.2, which was already dominant in some European countries, is 50% to 60% more transmissible than Omicron. The University of Minnesota’s CIDRAP noted that, “Currently BA.2 makes up roughly one third of COVID-19 cases in the United States but will likely overtake Omicron this spring,” in an article from March 21. “When you look at the cases, they do not appear to be any more severe and they do not appear to evade immune responses either from vaccines or prior infection,” Fauci said. The WHO announced too that BA.2 has taken over as the dominant strain circulating globally. The Food and Drug Administration also announced on March 21 that the Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee will meet on April 6 to discuss boosters in light of Pfizer and Moderna’s submissions for EUAs for fourth doses of their COVID-19 vaccines.

Armed Services Committees’ Leadership Announces Selections for National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology

The leadership of the of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees announced their appointments to the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, which was established by Sec. 1091 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY22). The National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology will conduct a thorough review of how advances in emerging biotechnology and related technologies will shape current and future activities of the Department of Defense, provide an interim report to the President of the United States and the Armed Services Committees within one year, and submit a final unclassified report within two years to the President and the committees, including recommendations for action by Congress and the federal government. Twelve appointed members will make up the Commission.

The leaders of the Armed Services Committees named the following appointees: Senator Alex Padilla, the Honorable Dov S. Zakheim (Senior Advisor at CSIS and former Undersecretary of Defense), Congressman Ro Khanna, Paul Arcangeli (current Staff Director of the House Armed Services Committee, set to retire on April 1), Senator Todd Young, Dr. Alexander Titus (former  Assistant Director for Biotechnology within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering), Congresswoman Stephanie Bice, and Dr. Jason Kelly (co-founder and CEO of Gingko Bioworks).

SARS-CoV-2: International Investigation Under the WHO or BWC

Drs. Mirko Himmel and Stefan Frey recently published their policy brief article in Frontiers in Public Health discussing current debates about the origin of SARS-CoV-2 and the complexities of the political and biological elements of this debate. They offer recommendations for potential courses of action under the World Health Organization’s umbrella and in respect to the Biological Weapons Convention. They provide insight to how a number of complex issues might be resolved, particularly as China continues to delay the investigation into the start of the COVID-19 pandemic by withholding evidence.

UNIDIR- Potential Outcomes of the Ninth BWC Review Conference

The UN Institute for Disarmament Research’s recently released this report authored by Dr. Jez Littlewood. It aims to provide “a forthright assessment of the risks, benefits, and financial implications of four different potential Review Conference outcomes,” including very limited, status quo, forward-looking, and negotiation outcomes. It was released in preparation for the Ninth Biological Weapons Review Conference, currently scheduled for August of this year, where States parties will have the opportunity to advance biological disarmament and determine the future course of this treaty. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs recently released this primer on the BWC too, covering the history of negotiations of the treaty, its current state, and the importance of this treaty in the modern world.

“Insidious Insights: Implications of Viral Vector Engineering for Pathogen Enhancement”

Biodefense Graduate Program Director, Dr. Gregory Koblentz, and co-authors recently published this article in Gene Therapy. In it they discuss the dangers of optimizing viral vectors and their properties, despite the benefits this would provide to clinical gene therapy. They write, “High potential for misuse is associated with (1) the development of universal genetic elements for immune modulation, (2) specific insights on capsid engineering for antibody evasion applicable to viruses with pandemic potential, and (3) the development of computational methods to inform capsid engineering.” They ultimately recommend that “…computational vector engineering and the publication of associated code and data be limited to AAV [(adeno-associated viruses)] until a technical solution for preventing malicious access to viral engineering tools has been established.”

CSIS Global Health Policy Center Coronavirus Crisis Update

The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Global Health Policy Center recently released a new episode of its podcast, Live From Munich: Dr. Richard Hatchett “Pandemic Preparedness Needs to Be Viewed as a Security Challenge”. Dr. Hatchett reminds listeners that having just had a pandemic does not prevent outbreak of another, and that pandemic preparedness needs to be “viewed as a security challenge, not as a health challenge, not as a development challenge”. He points to lessons in vaccine manufacturing and financing arrangements that incentivize disease surveillance that can better prepare us for the next pandemic. “Many of the high-income countries see the value from a geopolitical and security perspective in making these investments. The challenge for the long term, obviously, will be whether these facilities can be successful, sustainable, and be sustained.”

WHO- “Emerging Trends and Technologies: A Horizon Scan for Global Public Health”

The World Health Organization released this report earlier this month identifying 15 new and emerging technologies and scientific advances that could have major impacts on global health in the coming decades. To do so, it “presents the findings of a global horizon scan, conducted by a group of international experts, on emerging technologies and trends relevant to global public health conducted in 2020 and 2021.” Identified issues include vaccine distribution, apps for disease screening, addressing dis- and misinformation, and machine learning for antibiotic discovery. Dr. Filippa Lentzos of King’s College London recently co-authored an article addressing issues similar to the latter in Nature Machine Learning discussing the dangers of using AI in drug development.

Curious Coincidence: A Journey To the Origins of COVID-19

MIT Technology Review released a new episode of their podcast discussing challenges in determining the origins of the pandemic, this time focusing on what is known about the disease’s emergence in Wuhan in late 2019. Hosted by investigative reporter Antonio Regalado, Curious Coincidence dives into the mysterious origins of COVID-19 by examining China’s trade in wild animals, the labs doing sensitive research on dangerous pathogens, and questions of whether a lab accident may have touched off a global pandemic. Dr. Laura H. Kahn also recently discussed these issues in her piece in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Building Public Trust in Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response (PHEPR) Science: A Workshop

From the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic to wildfires and floods, public health emergencies are becoming increasingly common and complex. Public trust in public health emergency preparedness and response (PHEPR) science is key to a quick and effective response. Join the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for a two-day public workshop on March 29th and 30th to examine issues of building public knowledge of and trust in PHEPR science enterprise–the institutions, the research process, and the researchers and practitioners. Learn more and register here.

Inaugural Public Meeting of the National Advisory Committee on Seniors and Disasters and National Advisory Committee on Individuals with Disabilities and Disasters

Join Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Dawn O’Connell along with Assistant Secretary for Aging and Acting Administrator for Community Living Alison Barkoff, Wednesday, March 30 from 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. ET for the inaugural meeting of the National Advisory Committee on Seniors and Disasters (NACSD) and National Advisory Committee on Individuals with Disabilities and Disasters (NACIDD). Advanced registration for this meeting is required and can be accessed, along with additional meeting information, through the online event page. During this joint meeting, committee members will be sworn into service and begin a national discussion with federal subject matter experts on the challenges, opportunities, and priorities in meeting the unique health needs of older adult populations and people with disabilities during and after disasters and public health emergencies.

WHO Outreach and Engagement Consultant Job Opening Announcement

The purpose of this consultancy is to provide technical  input related to the projects of the emerging technologies, research prioritization and support (EPS) unit on dual-use research of concern as part of the “Reducing Biological Proliferation Risks Posed by Dual Use Research of Concern – (DURC)” and end to end research process optimization as part of the project “Strengthening WHO processes to accelerate timelines linking R&D with access”. The work will advance the implementation of the corresponding work plans of the two projects. Due to the COVID restrictions, the consultant will perform the work remotely from his/her home location. The consultant will need to be available during Geneva office hours (9h00-18h00 CET). Learn more and apply here.

Russian WMD Disinformation Resources

The mountain of debunkings and academic commentary on the Russian disinformation campaign targeting DTRA’s Biological Threat Reduction Program-supported labs in Ukraine continues to grow. Below are some highlights from the last couple of weeks:

Have You Been Lied to About Ukrainian Biolabs? 

Drs. Filippa Lentzos and Gregory Koblentz recently hosed this even on Twitter Space discussing the ongoing bioweapon claims targeting labs in Ukraine. A recording of the event is available here and the transcript can be found here.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DTRA has released this fact sheet discussing its support for Ukrainian labs and other key facts, including details of Russia’s illegal and dangerous takeover of multiple Ukrainian-owned labs. They have also released a YouTube video discussing the program and the beneficial work it has done and continues to do in disarmament and public health.

Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

The PRIF Blog published this piece explaining and refuting Russia’s BW claims while also addressing concerns that these claims could be used as a pretext for a chemical weapons attack against Ukraine. Read more here.

Council on Strategic Risks

Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell at CSR authored a piece, “The Deeply Dangerous Spread of Russian Disinformation on Biological Weapons,” discussing the implications of Russia’s debunked claims. Of the idea that Russia might use WMDs in this war, they quote Andrew Weber, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, writing “If Russia does commit such atrocities, “There would be a very strong and united international response to any use of chemical or biological weapons, both of which are banned by the chemical and biological weapons conventions,” Andy Weber emphasized.”

Nuclear Threat Initiative

Hayley Severance and Jacob H. Heckles with NTI’s Global Biological Policy and Programs team explained some of the dangers of this Russian propaganda, focusing on the division and confusion it sows and the potential for this to later allow Russia to be viewed as justified in their invasion and war against Ukraine. Check out the piece, “Russian Propaganda Established a Dangerous, Permissive Environment,” here.

Congressional Research Service

CRS, the public policy research institute of the United States Congress, released a CRS Insight addressing members’ of Congress questions and concerns regarding these laboratories. It discusses the dangers combat operations pose to these facilities and potential courses of action Congress might consider taking as a result of these issues.

CBW Events Ukraine FAQ Page

CBW Events has created a one-stop-shop for all your questions on this issue here. CBW Events is “a project to create a record of events to enable and encourage understanding of how policies on the issues relating to chemical and biological warfare and its prevention are developed.”

Dr. Gregory Koblentz Was Recently Quoted in Numerous Outlets Discussing These Claims

Dr. Koblentz has been working overtime taking interviews to help combat this disinformation. Below are some of the quotes he provided within the last couple of weeks across various news outlets and debunking sites.

Daily Mail– “The 46 US Labs in Ukraine and the $200 Pentagon Program That Sparked a Propaganda War: How Ex-Soviet Facilities Adopted by America That House Pathogens Prompted Kremlin Bioweapons Claims in Putin’s Back Yard”

  • “‘These are all public health and veterinary labs,’ said Gregory Koblentz, director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, according to Poynter. ‘None of them have been involved in biological warfare’.” 

The Washington Post– “A Legacy of ‘Secrecy and Deception’: Why Russia Clings to an Outlawed Chemical Arsenal”

  • “Novichok’s distinctive chemical formula differed from that of other known nerve agents, and because of this, Novichok was initially omitted from the Chemical Weapons Convention’s list of banned substances. Russia could thus continue to tinker with the new weapon without technically violating their treaty obligations, said Gregory Koblentz, a biological and chemical weapons expert and director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government.”
  • ““Russia didn’t just inherit the Soviet chemical weapons arsenal; they also inherited the secrecy and deception that surrounded the program,” Koblentz said.”

Axios Science “Why Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use Are Hard to Investigate”

“What to watch: Gregory Koblentz, director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, says that, rather than use a chemical or biological weapon for an attack in Ukraine, there is a risk “Russia will invent or stage an event, claim it as an atrocity and use it domestically for escalating their commitment to the conflict.”

  • “Even if the U.S. and Ukrainians could expose this was staged or a hoax, on some level, the disinformation would be out there, and some would throw up their hands and say they don’t know and are going to sit it out,” he says.
  • Another concern for Koblentz is that unsubstantiated claims that bioweapons are being developed in Ukrainian labs that study and surveil pathogens like Crimean hemorrhagic fever could damage international cooperation on biosecurity and pathogen surveillance among labs around the world.

What’s next: The BCW is scheduled to meet in August to discuss how its mechanisms for resolving concerns about biological weapons compliance could be strengthened.

  • There had been signs over the past few years that parties may be willing to agree to measures that would facilitate verifying whether parties are complying. But “now there is no way it will be a constructive diplomatic event,” Koblentz says. “It’s been sacrificed for geopolitics.””

Bloomberg Quicktake– “Ukraine: Is Russia Planning to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction?”

iNews– “How Russia’s Fake Claims About Ukraine Bioweapons Spread From Telegram Anti-Vaxxers to Fox News”

  • ““It goes back to the 1980s, when the KGB started a rumour that the United States occurred the HIV virus,” said Dr Greg Koblentz, Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University.”

CNN What Matters– “Russia and Chemical Weapons: What You Need to Know”

  • Dr. Koblentz featured heavily in this article through a long interview discussing many facets of Russian CBW, including the difference between BW and CW, Russia’s obligations under international law, the potential for Russia to use such weapons against Ukraine, and more

Open– “No! Quelli in Ucraina Non Sono Laboratori Militari Per La Guerra Biologica” (Italian: “No! The Labs in Ukraine Are Not Biowarfare Labs”)

  • “Associate professor and director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government , Gregory Koblentz, explains to Open why the Russian narrative of biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine could be the first phase of a maneuver aimed at attributing to the A completely invented biological threat was born.”
  • “These laboratories are used to diagnose and conduct research on endemic diseases in Ukraine – explains Koblentz -, they are not designed or intended for use to conduct research on biological weapons. The concern is not whether Russia will take them over and use them to develop biological weapons. Moscow already has three large military microbiology facilities which it uses to conduct research and development on biological weapons. Instead, the concern is that Russia is leaking “evidence” fabricated in those labs and claiming to have uncovered a secret US-Ukraine program to develop biological weapons. Of course, such a statement would be nonsense.”
  • “The only way these laboratories could pose a danger would be if they were bombed, looted or occupied and unsuspecting individuals accidentally became infected with a leftover pathogen sample – continues the expert -, which was on site but no longer properly stored. . The WHO has told Ukraine to destroy the samples of high-risk pathogens in their laboratories for this reason ”.
  • “The United States and Ukraine have been transparent about the type of public health research conducted in these laboratories – concludes Koblentz -, as you can see on the US embassy website . The Defense Department has just released a new fact sheet explaining its assistance to Ukraine in this area. The BTRP strengthens biological health and safety in laboratories around the world and develops the capacity of these laboratories to diagnose and study diseases that pose a threat to public health in those countries. Since the onset of COVID-19, the program has also helped these countries respond to the pandemic by providing diagnostic kits, etc. “

EFE Verifica– “Nada Prueba Que Haya Laboratorios de Armas Biológicas en Ucrania, Como Afirma Rusia” (Spanish: “Nothing Prove That There Are Biological Weapons Laboratories in Ukraine, As Russia Claims”)

  • “For his part, Gregory Koblentz, director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Politics and Government, recalls that in 1980 the Soviets spread the rumor that the US had “invented” the HIV virus and was being “used” as a biological weapon.”
  • “Since then, this type of disinformation campaign has been “quite aggressive” and has targeted not only the US, but also Georgia and Ukraine, stresses Koblentz, for whom these accusations are part “of a pattern” in propaganda Russian.”