The Pandora Report 9.6.13

by Siddha Hover, posted in News, Pandora Report

Highlights: The Syrian BW “threat”, MERS vaccine, Nipah, biological weapons in the Philippines, and al Shabaab contributing to polio. Happy Friday!

On Not Falling Prey to Syrian Biological Weapons Alarmism

There have been a lot of articles (starting with the WaPo, and snowballing to the Telegraph, VoR, etc) discussing the “emerging threat” of Syrian biological weapons. Before the rumors grow and plant seeds, we strongly recommend you take a moment to check out Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormely’s excellent rebuttal. Here’s an excerpt from her piece:

“A September 5 Washington Post article raises concern that Syria might resort to biological weapons in retaliation for a Western military strike. The article states that intelligence reports indicate that Syria engaged in bioweapons development in the 1970s and 80s and since then has maintained a “dormant capability,” which some experts interviewed by the Post believe can easily be reactivated to produce biological weapons. it is important to inject a little bit of reality in regard to the question of whether or not Syria might be able to successfully reactivate a “dormant program” and effectively develop and use biological weapons.”

Read the full post here.

MERS Vaccine Passes First Test

The confirmation of another two cases of the Middle Eastern Respiratory Virus in the last week, bringing the global total to 110 cases and 52 fatalities, has the scientific community scrambling to develop a viable vaccine. Now researchers at Loyola Marymount University, working in conjunction with the Erasmus lab in Rotterdam (the same lab who refused to play nice in sharing the MERS genome), have developed a candidate vaccine which can be used in case of a pandemic. However, while the candidate has passed the first pre-clinical trials, if proven efficacious in humans  it would still be at least a year before the vaccine would be ready for production.

Medical Xpress – “The starting point for the new vaccine was a related virus known as Modified Vaccinia virus Ankara (MVA). MVA is an attenuated strain of the virus that causes smallpox, and has been used for more than 30 years for the manufacture of smallpox vaccine. Indeed, MVA is at the heart of a worldwide effort to design and generate vaccines not only against viral pathogens but also against cancers. In this context, MVA serves as the carrier for specific antigens that elicit the production of protective antibodies in the immunized host. MERS-CoV is known to bind to human cells via its so-called spike (S) protein, which is exposed on the surface of its membrane envelope. Sutter and his team therefore used molecular biological methods to introduce the gene for the MERS S protein into the MVA genome.”

Bats spreading deadly virus, Stanford scientist warns

If there’s one thing we’ve learned here at GMU Biodefense, it’s stay good and far away from bats. Whether it’s rabies or MERS, the creatures of the night are bastions for all sorts of nasty diseases.  Now it looks like Pteropus bats in Bangladesh are in the “villain of the week” spotlight. A researcher at Stanford University is voicing concerns over the bats, which range across South East Asia, spreading the deadly virus Nipah.

Stanford News – “Among Nipah’s worrisome traits: Many strains are capable of limited person-to-person transmission, and it is a ribonucleic acid (RNA) virus, which has the highest known rate of mutation among biological agents. If a more efficient human-adapted strain developed, it could spread rapidly in highly populous South Asia before spilling into other regions. The global community must do a better job of estimating and managing the risk, Luby said. That will require stepped-up study of how the virus is transmitted, closer observation of infected people and consideration of vaccinations for at-risk communities.”

Military claims NPA has ‘biological weapons’; Reds laugh off claim

Moving away from the existence, or lack thereof, of Syrian BW, a rebel leader in the Philippines has been accused by the government of using biological weapons. According the Filipino government,  the device in question tested positive for both Enterobacter cloacae and Streptococcus agalacteiae. The government claims the rebels smeared the unexploded landmines with feces. The rebels deny the claims outright. We’ll leave it there.

Inquirer Mindanao – “The military insisted Thursday that the New People’s Army now uses ‘biological weapons’ to further its goal of toppling the government. In a press statement, the Eastern Mindanao Command based here said laboratory examination of unexploded land mines seized from NPA camps in Southern Mindanao showed the presence of ‘deadly toxin’ and bacteria ‘not usually found in steel rebars and nails used as shrapnel.’ The NPA unit operating in the region laughed off this claim, calling it ‘malicious and wildly concocted military propaganda.'”

Somalia: Polio Widespread in Regions Under Al-Shabaab Control

Polio eradication is a bit of a soapbox around here, maybe because as a planet we’ve been so close for so long and because it’s often security issues which hamper efforts. For those of you who have managed to miss our various rants, all but three states – Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – have eradicated the virus. Somalia, despite its numerous failings, worked extremely hard to become polio-free in 2007. The news that the terrorist organization al-Shabaab, which controls large swathes of Southern Somalia, is refusing to allow supplies into territory it controls, while also telling local populations that the vaccine causes AIDS and sterility, is infuriating.

All Africa – “Al-Shabaab’s refusal to allow the supply of the polio vaccine in areas under its control is causing panic among residents at a time when aid workers are struggling to contain an outbreak of the crippling virus.’The polio outbreak plaguing Somalia has spread despite significant efforts to curb the disease,’ the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said in a statement August 15th, adding that insecurity is hampering efforts to contain the virus. Six years after Somalia was declared free of the virus, at least 105 cases have been confirmed in the country, the ‘worst outbreak in the world in a non-endemic country’, according to OCHA.

(image: Hakan Dahlstrom/Flickr)

On Not Falling Prey to Biological Weapons Alarmism in Syria

by Siddha Hover, posted in News, Research Notes

by Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley

A September 5 Washington Post article raises concern that Syria might resort to biological weapons in retaliation for a Western military strike. The article states that intelligence reports indicate that Syria engaged in bioweapons development in the 1970s and 80s and since then has maintained a “dormant capability,” which some experts interviewed by the Post believe can easily be reactivated to produce biological weapons. it is important to inject a little bit of reality in regard to the question of whether or not  Syria might be able to successfully reactivate a “dormant program” and effectively develop and use biological weapons.

First, we need to define more clearly what capabilities are actually available to Syria. If a “dormant capability” means that Syria has maintained from its 1980s program only a handful of research activities, the country will face tremendous difficulties in launching a crash program capable of producing the quantities of agent required for use as a weapon. If we assume — and this is entirely speculation — that Syria already has stocks of pathogens, its first task will be to produce a sufficient amount of liquid agent for weaponization. Scaling-up, however, has been a stiff challenge for both past terrorist and state bioweapons programs. The passage from a laboratory sample to larger quantities of bioagent is not a straightforward linear process. Because microorganisms are sensitive to their environmental and processing conditions, scaling-up has to be incremental, and each stage requires a revision of the production parameters. For example, when the Soviets launched the large-scale production of their anthrax weapon at the Stepnogorsk production plant in Kazakhstan, their scientists could not maintain the lethal qualities of the agent throughout the production process. They were therefore compelled to review and test each parameter of the production protocol at each stage of the scale-up, a process that lasted about two years. Scale-up also exposes the agent to contamination, which further delays production, as was the case in both the U.S and Soviet programs.  Current biodefense and pharmaceutical companies also routinely face such contamination and scale-up challenges.

Second, it is important to determine what type of expertise is currently available to Syria. If Syria maintained minimal research activities over the past 20 years, it is likely that they will face a shortage of expertise at key points of a weapons development. This includes process development, pilot-scale production, large-scale production, testing, dissemination, and weaponization. For example, the Iraqi program had very few experts with knowledge directly applicable to the agents they selected for use as a weapon. They also had only one fermentation expert, and before his involvement in the program, the fermenters purchased for the program remained in their crates for lack of personnel with knowledge on how to use them. The Iraqis also did not have weaponization experts within the bioweapons program. Weaponization work was conducted by individuals involved in the chemical weapons program, and consisted of adapting existing chemical bombs and warheads for bioweapon use. This resulted in very inefficient weapons, designed to disseminate the agent upon impact, which would have destroyed most of the bioagent. It is worth reiterating also that the Iraqis were only able to produce liquid agents, even though they had access to drying equipment. If active bioweapons programs faced such challenges, one can only imagine what problems a “dormant program” might face.

Were the Syrians able to shepherd enough expertise from the civilian sector, it is not clear whether their skills could be directly relevant to support bioweapons work.  The Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo had among its members individuals with scientific education, but their lack of practical experience in bioweapons development imposed a steep learning curve, which after six years of effort and about $10 million dollars of investment, resulted in failures at every step of a bioweapon’s development.  The Iraqi program faced similar issues: most of its scientists had no prior bioweapons expertise and required several years of learning and exploratory work before they could start making some headway.

Access to expertise is not the only challenge facing Syria. Making sure that the teams of scientists, technicians, and engineers work together, coordinate their efforts, and work towards the same goal is as, if not more, important. The lack of coordination and cooperation was a major source of delay and failure in the Soviet program, which was arguably the most successful of all state programs. Yet, if creating the conditions required for such cooperation is difficult under normal conditions, it is even more complicated under the stress of maintaining covertness in times of war, particularly under an authoritarian regime.

In sum, it is important to avoid falling prey to alarmist claims similar to those that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The threat of Syrian bioweapons use merits a careful and systematic analysis of the capabilities currently available to Syria and a more nuanced and holistic  appreciation of the challenges they might face.

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Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University and is primarily affiliated the GMU Biodefense graduate program. Professor Ben Ouagrham-Gormley has conducted research and written on such topics as biological weapons proliferation, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) trafficking in states of the former Soviet Union, biosecurity and bioterrorism, export controls, transfer mechanisms of WMD expertise, defense industry conversion, and redirection of WMD experts. She has received several grants from the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy, as well as from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Carnegie Corporation of New York to conduct research on WMD proliferation and contribute to remediation programs such as the DOD-funded Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

(image: CIAT International/Flickr)

What virologists’ dreams are made of: A total viral catalog

by Siddha Hover, posted in News

Believe it or not, we have a tremendous deal to learn about viruses. A lot of huge, fundamental questions about viruses remain unanswered –  are they alive or dead? Where did they originate? How many are there? This last question is in some ways the most feasible to answer, and scientists have begun to do so by examining Indian Flying Fox bats. In a new study, scientists at Columbia university took over a thousand samples from the bat species and scoured them for viruses. They turned up 55 viruses, of which a staggering 50 were hitherto undiscovered. Ten of them are in the same family as Nipah. The scientists now hope to take the viruses found from the Indian Flying Foxes and begin a catalog of viruses which infect the remaining 5,484 known species of mammals. Such a resource, while expensive to produce, would be a huge aid in preparing us for future zoonotic outbreaks.

New York Times – “We might be able to take away this element of surprise if we had a catalog of all the viruses lurking in mammals. As soon as a mysterious epidemic broke out, scientists could turn to the catalog to figure out where the virus came from, potentially gaining some crucial clues to the virus’s biology. But few scientists have ventured to build such a catalog, perhaps because there seemed to be such a vast number of viruses to contend with.’No one’s really been addressing this question, even though it seems like such a fundamental one,’ said Simon J. Anthony, an associate research scientist at Columbia University and a researcher at EcoHealth Alliance, a New York-based scientific research organization.”

Read the full article here.

(image: Fritz Geller-Grimm)

Slide Show: What does a chemical weapon look like?

by Siddha Hover, posted in Images

Image of the Week: What does a chemical weapon look like? While we can’t show you the chemical weapons of Syria (we suggest youtube for that), we can show you images the CIA collected whilst doing analysis of the former Iraqi program. The images below focus on the weapons themselves, and are pulled almost exclusively from various CIA intelligence reports.

This slideshow requires JavaScript.

(header image: CIA)

Koblentz on Syria

by Siddha Hover, posted in Media Notes, News

Dr. Gregory Koblentz, GMU Biodefense Deputy Director and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at CFR,  has made a slew of media appearances recently discussing all aspects of the developments in Syria, including interview with Al Jazeera, two with CTV, and SunTV. His interview last Satruday with CCTV America on the options available to UN inspectors in the embattled state is particularly incisive – watch it below.

 

 

Using AI to Predict a Pandemic

by Siddha Hover, posted in News

Researchers are using “machine learning”, a process by which computers use compiled data to develop algorithms, to try and determine distinctive characteristics of viruses with pandemic potential, like H7N9. It’s hoped that being able to identify these properties will help alert virologists when new strains emerge containing them. Machine learning enables researchers to cross-reference tremendous amounts of data – “hundreds of thousands of flu strains” – to look for similar markers of pathogenicity.

Wired – “‘It’s changing the field radically,’ said Nir Ben-Tal, a computational biologist at Tel Aviv University in Israel. Researchers are also using these approaches to investigate a broad range of viral mysteries, including what makes some viruses more harmful than others and the factors that influence a virus’s ability to trigger an immune response. The latter could ultimately aid the development of flu vaccines. A study published in July analyzed differences in the human immune system’s response to flu, identifying for the first time genetic variants that seem to influence an individual’s ability to fight off H1N1. Machine learning techniques might even accelerate future efforts to identify the animal source of mystery viruses.”

Read more here.

(image: Axs Deny/Flickr)

The Pandora Report 8.30.13

by Siddha Hover, posted in Pandora Report

Highlights include MERS case updates, dengue raging through Central America, Syria’s CW (obviously), eastern equine encephalitis, and the cetacean morbillivirus. Happy Friday, and a very happy Labor Day Weekend to everyone! Stay away from the dolphins!

WHO: MERS global case count 108, 50 deaths 

MERS continues to spread throughout Saudi Arabia, with an additional four cases confirmed today. The total global case count is now 108, with a fatality rate of just below 50%. Two of Saudi Arabia’s four most recent cases involved immunocompromised patients, while the other two are children aged 16 and seven respectively. Interestingly, both children are currently asymptomatic, despite testing positive for the virus. The World Health Organization (WHO) has not recommended travel restrictions to Saudi Arabia, promoting instead strong surveillance and testing measures.

World Health Organization – “Globally, from September 2012 to date, WHO has been informed of a total of 108 laboratory-confirmed cases of infection with MERS-CoV, including 50 deaths.Based on the current situation and available information, WHO encourages all Member States to continue their surveillance for severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) and to carefully review any unusual patterns. Health care providers are advised to maintain vigilance. Recent travellers returning from the Middle East who develop SARI should be tested for MERS-CoV as advised in the current surveillance recommendations”.

Dengue fever epidemic sparks public health emergency in Central America

Central America is currently experiencing a serious Dengue outbreak, with over 120,000 cases in three states across the region. If not effectively contained, a number of external factors will likely result in the outbreak “exploding”. The rainy season in the area is set to last another three months, with high heat resulting in ideal breeding grounds for dengue’s mosquito vector. Containment of the outbreak in Honduras particularly has proven challenging, prompting the state to turn to the Red Cross for help. The 2010 outbreak of dengue in the area lead to 1.6 million cases, of which 49,000 were severe. Dengue eradication efforts are hampered by its infection through four, distinct serotypes, no one of which offers cross-protection against the other three.

The Guardian – “The poor suburbs of Central American capitals are the main targets for campaigns to raise public awareness. Poor housing, the lack of a mains water supply and the accumulation of household waste make such neighbourhoods an ideal breeding ground for mosquitoes. The authorities have dispatched paramedics, police and the military to remote villages in order to stamp out the epidemic in the areas most at risk. Latin America is particularly exposed to dengue epidemics, which recur on a three- to five-year cycle. In 2010 the fever caused 132 deaths. ‘Aedes aegypti was eradicated in the subcontinent in the mid-20th century, but with increasing global trade it returned in the 1970s, from Asia,’ says Philippe Brémond, an epidemiologist at France’s Institute of Research for Development (IRD).”

Syria’s Red Line

We know everyone’s talking about chemical weapons in Syria (ourselves included), and with President Obama now apparently set on unilateral (ugh) military action in the area, we wager everyone will continue to talk about Syria for a good while longer. We’re including Jeanne Guillemin’s review article because it’s a thorough overview of the storied history and political maneuverings of chemical weapons use. Read it and be an expert.

The Boston Review – “When the present crisis in Syria is resolved, as inevitably it will be, the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] must be made universal. It almost is: 188 states adhere to it; 7 are holdouts (Israel, Syria, Egypt, Myanmar, Angola, North Korea, and South Sudan). Syria must allow its chemical weapons to be identified, contained, and destroyed. It should have been done years ago. Israel and Egypt must also be persuaded to join the treaty and comply with it, before more chaos erupts. ‘Almost universal’ is simply not good enough.”

Eastern equine encephalitis threat level raised to ‘high’ in four communities

Ongoing detection of eastern equine encephalitis (EEE) in four communities in Massachusetts has prompted local health authorities to raise threat levels to “high”, encouraging residents to avoid outdoor evening activities until the end of the mosquito season. Although most cases of EEE are aysmptomatic, in severe cases the virus can cause permanent brain damage and death. We can’t remember if we already posted this, but here is an excellent Nature article explaining why it would actually be totally fine if we exterminated all mosquitoes.

Boston – “The EEE threat is high in Easton, Raynham, Taunton, and West Bridgewater. Residents in high-risk areas are urged to avoid evening outdoor events for the remainder of the mosquito season, said the statement from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health…There has been one human case of EEE this year, in a Norfolk County woman in her 80s, who died earlier this month. There were seven cases of EEE in 2012, including three deaths.Symptoms of EEE show up about 3 to 10 days after a person is bit by an infected mosquito and they include high fever, a stiff neck, headache, and lack of energy.”

Because People Will Ask: Measles-like virus may be cause of dolphin deaths on U.S. coast

Included so you can assure concerned friends and families that the virus, which is killing bottlenose dolphins up and down the East Coast, cannot be transmitted to humans. Since July, 333 dolphins – 10 times the normal number for the same period – have died from cetacean morbillivirus, a measles-like virus which is thought to cause immunosuppression.  Virginia’s beaches have seen the highest number of strandings, at 174 n the last couple months. While the virus cannot be transmitted to humans, beach goers are advised not to approach any stranded dolphins, as they may carry other bacterial or fungal infections.

National Geographic – “‘Along the Atlantic seaboard, this [outbreak] is extraordinary,’ Rowles said. The last morbillivirus outbreak in the region occurred from June 1987 to May 1988, and resulted in the deaths of at least 900 bottlenose dolphins. Officials are unsure of how long the current outbreak will last. ‘Typically, outbreaks will last as long as there are susceptible animals,’ Rowles said. But if it plays out like the 1987-1988 outbreak, ‘we’re looking at mortality being higher and morbillivirus traveling southwards and continuing until May 2014,’ she added. Right now, experts think this current outbreak is probably due to a dip in herd immunity.”

(image credit: Jeff Kraus/Flickr)

In-Depth: The Syrian “Red Line” and the Importance of Multilateral Action

by Siddha Hover, posted in News, Policy Review

The Chemical Weapons Red Line: a tedious response to the Syrian crisis and how international treaties should guide multilateral reaction

By Chris Brown, PhD Candidate

Inspectors from the United Nations (UN) are expected to report their findings on Saturday about whether chemical weapons (CW) were used in rocket attacks in Syria last week. Depending on the degradation rate and other properties of a chemical agent, if any, used in the attack, the UN investigation may also reveal what kind of weapon(s) was deployed. Sarin and VX nerve agents top the list of likely possibilities given the types of symptoms and number of casualties reported after the attacks. But determining if and which chemical agent(s) was used in Syria is only the beginning of what should be a far more complex investigation before any international action occurs. It is crucial to determine who used the agent, against whom, and what international legal obligations the user was bound by at the time of use. Only then can the international community establish a clear basis for action in Syria.

Popular opinion at present holds that Syrian President Bashar al-Asaad’s forces likely deployed CW against rebel groups and civilians. Despite the fact that the regime risks loss of power by inviting international intervention as a result of CW use, and that CW use would signal waning confidence in its forces’ ability to maintain control through conventional tactics; international opposition to the al-Asaad government, led largely by the U.S., maintains that the ruling government is to blame. “There is also very little doubt, and should be no doubt for anyone who approaches this logically, that the Syrian regime is responsible for the use of chemical weapons on August 21st outside of Damascus,” White House Spokesman Jay Carney said Tuesday.[1] Claims that Syrian rebel forces have the know-how and motivation to launch CW attacks lose strength given that the alleged CW-containing rockets were fired on a rebel-controlled region of Damascus, where civilians in the area sympathize with opposition forces.[2]

Given the assumption that Syrian forces used CW against rebels, the international intolerance for the use of CW on moral grounds alone seems to compel some sort of action. But there is little legal footing on which to base an intervention under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the primary international agreement aimed at preventing this kind of behavior by outlawing production, stockpiling and use of CW. Why? Syria never signed the treaty.

Other international agreements can and should be invoked in this situation, however. Despite not being a state party to the CWC, Syria has been a party to the Geneva Protocol since 1968.[3] The Geneva Protocol prohibits use of CW, but does not outlaw development and stockpiling, an omission that is commonly interpreted as prohibiting only first-use of CW in conflicts. Unless more conclusive evidence surfaces that rebel forces deployed CW against Syrian troops first, Syria is presumably in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol, breaches of which are handled through the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

However, the formal channel of redress for Geneva Protocol violations pits the U.S. against China and, perhaps more importantly, Russia, a fairly reliable backer of the al-Asaad government. Despite the fact that Russian and Chinese participation in diplomatic efforts failed to stop alleged Syrian CW use several weeks before reports of other gas attacks in the spring leaves both states less than poised to veto U.N. security council authorization of action, Russia is reportedly bolstering its naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea. At best, this is a sign of solidarity with al-Asaad and surely an indicator that Obama and U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power will have no easy time securing the security council nod for military strikes against Syria.

Though some indirect options for continuing to support rebel forces in Syria remain viable—providing them with effective medical countermeasures and protective equipment against the state forces’ CW, for instance—direct military intervention (e.g., missile strikes) may be the only effective action left in the U.S. toolbox. However, direct U.S. action stands to produce a number of negative consequences that must be considered, including provocation of Syria’s allies, including Iran; and loss of support from Russia and China against other atrocities in the ongoing Syrian conflict. Moreover, the U.S. must be able to guarantee the stability of any new Syrian government and its ability to safely and securely handle whatever CW, biological weapons (BW), or other weapons of mass destruction may be in al-Asaad’s stockpile if and when he is ousted.

With either course of action—continued indirect support or new direct intervention—it is worth considering two additional tasks: first, at the outset of any new Syrian government, implementation of the same type of coercive diplomacy that was employed in dealing with Iraq’s BW programs in the early 1990s. The terms of the ceasefire with Iraq after the first Gulf War required Iraq to ratify the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.[4] If the international community (or the U.S. alone) helps a new government ascend to power in Syria, or intervenes to defeat or subdue the al-Asaad regime, it would be wise to insist that Syria accede to the CWC. Second, Syria’s alleged acquisition or development from component chemicals of sarin gas may also warrant further investigation into the supplier of materials or foreign assistance. The CWC prohibits any export of Schedule 1 chemicals (including sarin and its methylphosphonyl difluoride precursor). A state party to the CWC guilty of helping Syria acquire or develop sarin would likely be in violation of the treaty and should face appropriate consequences.

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Chris Brown is a PhD candidate in biodefense at George Mason University. He holds a Master of Public Health in biostatistics and epidemiology from the University of Nebraska Medical Center, and received his undergraduate degree in biology with a minor in Spanish from the University of Louisville. Contact him at cbrown12@gmu.edu or on Twitter @ckbrow07.

[1] Jay Carney, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney,” August 27, 2013, accessed August 28, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/27/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-8272013/.

[2] Eyder Peralta, “Is It Possible the Syrian Rebels (Not Assad) Used Chemical Weapons?,” National Public Radio, August 27, 2013, accessed August 28, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/08/27/216172145/is-it-possible-the-syrian-rebels-not-assad-used-chemical-weapons.

[3] “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” June 17, 1925, accessed May 1, 2013, http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=921B4414B13E58B8C12563CD002D693B/.

[4] “NTI Country Profiles, Iraq, Overview,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 2011, accessed May 1, 2013, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iraq/.

(image courtesy of Syria Freedom House/Flickr)

Slideshow: The Chemical Weapons of Syria

by Siddha Hover, posted in Media Notes

In the face of what seems to be recent chemical weapons use by the Assad regime on the Syrian rebels, and potential US military action as a result, now is a good time to gain a basic understanding of the key chemical weapons in play. Charles Blair, writing in his capacity as a columnist with the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, has a new multimedia piece out in which he succinctly describes the history and effects of six of the most common chemical weapons agents used today.

View the full slideshow here.

(image courtesy of R. Sameer/Flickr)

Image of the Week

by Siddha Hover, posted in Images

This week’s image depicts the vacuole of a Vero cell, within which Coxiella burnetii, the bacteria which causes Q fever, is growing. Infection with just one of those green bacterium can cause Q fever in humans, an often asymptomatic disease which can occasionally result in respiratory symptoms, enlarged liver and spleen, and rarely, death. Q fever is found throughout the world, and is transmitted to humans primarily through interaction with contaminated livestock.

c.burnetti niaid(Image via NIAID/Flickr, click for larger image)