Welcome to this week’s Pandora Report! This issue examines GMU’s new graduate course on AI and Biosecurity with Dr. Sarah Carter, a critical analysis of OPCW funding shortfalls and global chemical security, and the latest news in global health security.
Wishing all our readers a safe and happy Halloween weekend! 🎃
📣 Interested in Graduate Study in Public Policy, Biodefense, or International Security?
The Schar School of Policy and Government is hosting a series of upcoming virtual information sessions for prospective master’s and PhD students. These interactive sessions offer a direct opportunity to learn about curriculum structure, career pathways in biodefense and policy, and the student experience at George Mason University.
Chemical Security Is National Security
In this Lawfare article, Dr. Gregory Koblentz warns that a severe financial crisis at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) – primarily caused by the United States withholding its $17 million annual dues – endangers vital global nonproliferation operations. Although the U.S. State Department officially prioritizes the OPCW as critical to national security, the agency faces a massive budget shortfall that has already led to hiring freezes, depleted reserves, and potential cutbacks in core missions. This funding strain directly threatens the OPCW’s high-stakes efforts to locate and destroy leftover chemical arsenals in post-Assad Syria, investigate Russia’s ongoing use of riot control agents in Ukraine, and address emerging threats in Sudan and Iran. Koblentz argues that fully and promptly paying U.S. contributions is essential to maintain international chemical security and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Further Reading:
GMU Biodefense Program Welcomes Dr. Sarah R. Carter to Teach Nation’s First AI and Biosecurity Course
This spring, GMU’s Schar School of Policy and Government welcomes Dr. Sarah R. Carter as an adjunct professor leading BIOD 610: AI and Biosecurity—the country’s first graduate-level course dedicated to this emerging field. Dr. Carter, Principal of Science Policy Consulting LLC and a former White House OSTP policy analyst, brings extensive expertise from her work with the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and CEPI on evaluating biological AI design tools and governance. The course will equip students to navigate dual-use technological risks, AI governance, and the evolving policy frameworks shaping modern biodefense. Current students can enroll via PatriotWeb. Read the full profile on The Pandora Report here.
AI and Bioweapons: Separating Hype from Reality
By Shreya Rajkumar, MS Biodefense Student, GMU
On Thursday, October 22nd, Issues in Science and Technology’s editors held an Open Editorial Meeting on the topic of “Making Sense of Biosecurity in the Age of AI”. Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Associate Professor and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, and Mr. Edward H. You, Founder of EHY Consulting LLC. and former FBI Special Agent, were featured experts. Members of the biosecurity field tuned in from all over the world, including Jamaica, Pakistan, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom. The event was moderated by Issues’ Editor-In-Chief, Lisa Margonelli, and included multiple thought-provoking questions from the audience.
The event opened with the question of reviewing the biosecurity landscape post-9/11 and the influence of AI. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley addressed misunderstandings about bioweapons and fears about AI’s role in facilitating and de-skilling the bioweapon development process. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley cited historical programs, stating that many traditional barriers to bioweapons such as multidisciplinary team-building and tacit knowledge cannot be overcome with AI. It is important to determine which stage of weapons development AI is most impactful in, and then create policy to disrupt that stage. Mr. You agreed with Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and highlighted the lack of understanding around both AI learning and systems biology. These gaps open the door to unforeseen consequences of adopting AI models and prompting them. Mr. You also encouraged a more positive mentality of platforming examples of responsible AI usage and looking for ways to use AI to create solutions to biosecurity problems.
The conversation then shifted to detecting signals and biosecurity risks with a question from Issues’ Senior Editor Megan Nicholson. Mr. You identified the logistical component of bioweapon development as a source of potential leads for law enforcement. Mr. You also suggested that AI could be a beneficial tool, studying what normal e-commerce looks like and flagging concerning interactions and transactions. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley agreed that AI could be a useful tool for processing and detecting signals but also clarified that procurement does not equal capability. Having the tools and skilled individuals is not a guarantee of success for a bioweapons program. Tying into a question from the audience, Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley illustrated the need for tacit knowledge and experience using the example of the Iraqi bioweapons program. The Iraqi program had state resources to bring together educated virologists. However, the agent they wanted to use was bacterial, so the scientists had to spend several years studying bacteriology. AI could have been helpful in the process, but the output of the system would only be as useful as the user’s ability to vet the AI’s answers and troubleshoot issues. Mr. You agreed, saying the AI advantage would be limited. Mr. You also brought attention to the potential effects of AI on crime. Just as the internet changed the landscape of gambling, Mr. You suggested that AI and biological design tools could have a large impact on developing narcotics and other drugs.
During questions from the audience, concerns were raised about AI companies recording lab workers to unlock tacit knowledge. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Mr. You were not convinced that the recordings would be successful. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley added that biology is a hands-on discipline requiring hands-on practice and Mr. You clarified that recordings primarily capture mechanistic knowledge rather than tacit knowledge. Mr. You also addressed the need for diverse perspectives (i.e. biosafety, commerce, and logistics professionals) to be present when tackling biosecurity issues and spoke to the lack of a robust reporting mechanism for biosecurity threats following the dissolution of the WMD directorate at the FBI and loss of capabilities at ODNI and DHS.
Other audience concerns included the fear that AI might supercharge biology, pointing to the example of AI solving difficult mathematical formulas, and questions about regulating open-source models, which were used to develop novel phage viruses. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley spoke to the uniqueness of biology, which, unlike mathematical formulas, is influenced by multiple variables that cannot all be controlled. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley also pointed out that for biology, AI solutions must produce a direct application, not just theoretical concepts. Mr. You pushed the need for more education and training in biosecurity, including a shout-out to GMU’s Biodefense program. Mr. You also mentioned introducing bioethics concepts like the BWC in high school biology classes, increasing funding for basic research in biology, and training assessors to do proper risk assessments. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley added that IRB reviewers should also be educated before approving research that combines AI with biology.
The final question of the afternoon asked about AI and biosecurity on the international scale. Dr. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley spoke about Russia and China’s regulations over the exchange of biodata and who has sovereignty over it. Mr. You also spoke about China, sharing that while their overall investments in biotechnology are high, they lacked investment in risk assessment. Mr. You criticized the lack of a US biotechnology strategy, sharing concerns about data privacy and falling behind in the bioeconomy.
US Avian Influenza Cases Rise
By Margeaux Malone, Pandora Report Associate Editor
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) bird flu cases are climbing nationwide. USDA reported 29 confirmations in the past 30 days in 11 commercial and 18 backyard flocks, affecting about 1.32 million birds. Turkey farms in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and North Dakota were impacted, and an Illinois egg farm lost nearly 934,600 hens, the month’s largest outbreak. On the West Coast, backyard flocks in California and Washington have tested positive, and wild Canada geese and white pelican infections have been detected, consistent with fall migration.
In Washington, routine surveillance identified H5N1 in a Benton County dairy herd, which has been placed under quarantine. Bird flu has spread rapidly through the state’s dairy industry, with case numbers jumping from nine to 27 in the last week, only three weeks after the state’s very first confirmed cattle infection on a Yakima County farm. State Veterinarian Amber Itle said, “Seeing the virus move to another county is disappointing,” but credited farmers’ biosecurity efforts, noting the virus was caught before cows became sick.
Screwworm Spreads as Border Reopenings Continue
Like bird flu, New World screwworm cases are also on the rise as the outbreak spreads to a third US state. USDA has confirmed 71 cases, 18 of them currently active, up from just two active cases a month ago. Recent detections include the first case in US wildlife, an elk harvested on a Texas game ranch, and a beef cow in New Mexico. On Wednesday, a maggot-infested dog was confirmed in Cochise County, Arizona, the state’s first detection.
The elk case raises the stakes since wildlife “don’t stop at fences or checkpoints,” as one industry report put it. The discovery raises questions and concerns about how far the flesh-eating parasite may have spread and complicates ongoing eradication efforts. Texas is redrawing its infested zone, and USDA and Texas Parks and Wildlife are expanding surveillance in response.
Even so, USDA is pressing ahead with reopening the border to Mexican cattle. The import halt tightened US cattle supplies and pushed beef prices to record highs, adding pressure to resume trade. Under a phased plan that began in Arizona in August, trade has restarted at three ports of entry in Arizona and New Mexico. Columbus, New Mexico, is scheduled to reopen to cattle next, followed by Nogales, Arizona at the end of November if conditions remain favorable. It’s unclear whether these new detections in Arizona and New Mexico may impact this timeline.
Further Reading:
- “An mRNA–lipid nanoparticle vaccine against H5N1 influenza virus protects lactating dairy cows from infection,” Jefferson J. S. Santos, et al. Nature Biotechnology
- “Dutch government orders nationwide poultry lockdown amid bird flu outbreaks,” Charlotte Van Campenhout, The Independent
- “Screwworm case confirmed at New Mexico State University,” Algernon D’Ammassa, Albuquerque Journal
IN OTHER NEWS
AI, Biosecurity, and Biotechnology
- “UK to invest £100m in ‘world first’ AI Biosecurity Lab,” Liv McMahon, BBC
- “Japan to draft DNA synthesis rules to prevent bioterror misuse amid AI worries,” The Mainichi
- “Managing Biological Risks from General-Purpose AI Models under the EU AI Act,” Bhuvana Sudarshan, Zaheed Kara, Matthew van der Merwe, John Halstead, Scott Allen, Hannes Bastians, Coleman Breen, Michael Mahar, Carl Mayers, Tegan McCaslin, Cassidy Nelson, GovAI
- “AI biosecurity must include agriculture,” Jonathan Feldman, Tal Feldman, and Pardis C. Sabeti, Science
- “Claude helped plan risky bird flu research. What did the AI add?” Sascha Brodsky, Science News
Global Health Outbreaks and Infectious Disease
- “Ebola scientists to probe Nigeria case origin, Africa CDC says,” Jennifer Rigby, Reuters
- “Kenya reports second death from Ebola,” Reuters
- “Devex CheckUp: Who’s who in Trump’s America First Global Health Strategy,” Jenny Lei Ravelo, Devex
- “Antimicrobial Resistance Threats Report,” CDC
- “Russian plague lab death: 3 lessons from the history of lab accidents,” Alison Young, Health Beat
- “Lab Safety to Bio-Responsibility | Bio-Responsibility Policy Lecture,” Bio-Responsibility Initiative
BWC, Policy and Health Preparedness
- “Behavioural Arms Control and the BWC Working Group: A New Framework for Assessing Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, 2023–2026,” Alexander Kelle and Malcolm R. Dando, CBWNet
- “HHS Seeks Experts to Help Strengthen the Nation’s Health Preparedness,” ASPR
- “The Instigator,” Jeffrey Mervis, Science
- “The FDA rarely inspects much of the produce Americans eat,” Caitlin Gilbert and Rachel Roubein, WP
- “CDC’s deputy director to leave Trump administration after brief stint,” Dan Diamond and Lena H. Sun, WP
🎙️ What We’re Listening To:
- “Biosecurity in the AI Era,” Steph Guerra, RAND
- “45 Bonus Episode: The bark that didn’t dog. Irkutsk Panel Special,” Poisons and Pestilence
NEW: Gordon Research Seminar (GRS) on Chemical and Biological Defense
Saturday, February 27 – Sunday, February, 2027 | Ventura, CA
Held directly before the main Gordon Research Conference (see below), this two-day seminar, “Integrated Response Strategies for Complex Threats in Chemical and Biological Defense,” provides a unique forum for early-career researchers, doctoral students, and postdocs to present original work, discuss emerging threats, and build professional networks. Key topics include threat detection, characterization, and convergent approaches spanning in silico, in vitro, and in vivo models. The program features oral presentations, poster sessions, and a mentorship panel on “Career Pathways and Perspectives in Chemical and Biological Defense.” Abstract submission deadline for talk consideration is November 22, 2026; general applications close January 30, 2027.
NEW: Gordon Research Conference (GRC) on Chemical and Biological Defense
Sunday, February 28 – Friday, March 5, 2027 | Ventura, CA
Join international researchers, policy leaders, and scientists for a Gordon Research Conference, “The Convergence of In Silico, In Vitro, and In Vivo Models to Address the Divergent and Intersecting Profiles of Chemical and Biological Threats.” This five-day premier conference focuses on cutting-edge research in chemical and biological defense. Session topics include AI-accelerated science, agent-agnostic threat detection, attribution of CBRN events, medical countermeasure design, and biosecurity policy governance. Applications are due by January 31, 2027.
Hiding in Plain Sight: Mpox and the Cost of Neglecting Known Threats
Friday, October 30 | 9:00 – 10:15 am ET
From the Independent Panel: “For decades, mpox caused sporadic outbreaks in parts of West and Central Africa, but the disease was largely neglected by the international community. That neglect later produced not one, but two international emergencies. Today the virus has spread worldwide, with multiple variants now established in the human population. Through research and conversations with those working on mpox, the report seeks to answer how this happened and, more importantly, what it will take to prevent the same failures in future.”
Understanding Zoonotic Disease Risk in Violent and Conflict-Affected Places: Where Do We Go from Here? – A Talk
Friday, October 30 | 11:00 am – 12:00 pm ET
From Johns Hopkins: “The next pandemic will likely be caused by a zoonotic pathogen and will likely emerge in a place affected by conflict and violence. As such, disease spillover and spread will likely be affected by informal and extralegal economies, population displacement, distrust between people and governmental authorities, and failing health and disease surveillance systems. This talk will discuss findings and lessons learned from collaborative, interdisciplinary research on zoonotic disease risk among pastoralists in eastern Ethiopia and gather feedback on remaining questions and potential next steps.”
AI, Biosecurity, and Pandemic Preparedness in the Global South
Monday, November 2, from 8:00-9:30 AM ET
Medical Events Global is hosting a free 90-minute virtual workshop examining how artificial intelligence and emerging technologies are reshaping biological risk and what preparedness requires in the Global South. The panel will explore where biological risks are concentrated, the capabilities of AI-enabled biological design, operational preparedness, and approaches to governance. Confirmed speakers include Alex Kyabarongo, BIOD MS student at George Mason University, along with Rahul Nagvekar of Stanford University’s Department of Genetics and Adam Abdullahi of the Institute of Human Virology Nigeria and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.
After NSCEB: What Comes Next for U.S. Biotech Policy
Tuesday, November 17 | 2:00 – 6:00 pm ET
From the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB): “The Commission’s authority ends December 31. What it built is the beginning. Carrying it forward takes Congress, industry and capital. In April 2025, the Commission called for $15 billion over five years to secure American leadership in biotechnology. Join Commission leadership, members of Congress, founders and investors for an afternoon on who carries that work into 2027.”
Strengthening Biosafety and Biosecurity in Farm and Livestock Settings: A One Health Approach to Influenza Preparedness – Call for Experts
Sunday, November 8 | 11:59 PM ET
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) are seeking nominations for a 10–12-member volunteer expert committee to evaluate biosafety and biosecurity across commercial and informal livestock systems (poultry, swine, cattle). The study will focus on mitigating influenza spillover risks, identifying implementation challenges, and developing near-term (2–5 years) and long-term One Health recommendations for federal/state agencies and producers. Targeted expertise includes influenza research, pandemic preparedness, veterinary epidemiology, farm biosecurity, agricultural economics, behavioral science, and agricultural occupational health.
